docs: expand cache-header-tamper mitigations#63
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jgowdy-godaddy merged 1 commit intomainfrom Apr 17, 2026
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The previous 'future hardening: AAD' note understated how much the real risk is already neutralized by the layered checks that are in place today: - sso-jwt and awsenc both take max(header, config) for the risk level at read time, so a header edit that tries to downgrade is clamped back to the configured minimum. - Server-side expiration on the issued credential (STS, JWT exp) is authoritative regardless of what the client cache header says. - Both consumers recheck payload-embedded timestamps after decrypt. Spell these out in THREAT_MODEL.md so reviewers don't have to trace the mitigations back through consumer code. Keep the AAD binding noted as deferred — it's a trait-signature break across 4 backends and every consumer, plus an on-disk format break, for a threat that is already handled at the application layer.
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Summary
The previous "future hardening: AAD" note on cache-header tamper understated how much the real risk-level-downgrade threat is already neutralized by the layered checks in place today:
Spell these out in `THREAT_MODEL.md` so reviewers don't have to trace the mitigations back through consumer code. Keep AAD binding noted as deferred — it's a trait-signature break across all four backends (SE, CNG, keyring, software) and every consumer, plus an on-disk format break, for a threat that's already handled at the application layer.
No code change.
Test plan