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ci: verifiable releases — signed images, provenance, SBOMs, admission policy and release gates - #126
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- scripts/release/pin_audit.py fails on any `uses:` that is not a 40-hex commit SHA with a `# vX` comment, a `latest` version input, or an unpinned tool download (pip without ==, npm -g without @Version, go install @latest, /latest/ URLs, curl | sh). Workflows and composite actions are both scanned; pin-audit.yml runs it on PRs. - docs, security-scan, renovate workflows: actions resolved to commit SHAs (git ls-remote, annotated tags dereferenced); pip-audit pinned to 2.10.1. - scripts/build-images.sh: --list / --list-json expose the first-party image list (with first-party base and build tier) as the single source for the release matrix; --push of a semver tag outside GitHub Actions is refused so release tags only come from CI. :dev pushes stay allowed. Base images can be pinned by digest via BASE_IMAGE_REF; OCI version and revision labels are added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… (CE-19d) security.imageVerification.enabled (default false) renders a Kyverno ClusterPolicy with verifyImages for ghcr.io/devopssquaddev/zelkor-*: keyless attestor bound to the release workflow identity (issuer token.actions.githubusercontent.com, subject regexp on release.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z-ce), mutateDigest + verifyDigest, and an SLSA v1 provenance attestation whose workflow repository and path must match. Unsigned, re-tagged or mismatched images are rejected at admission. The issuer and identity regexp live once, as the chart defaults; the CLI and release tooling are tested against them. failureAction is a schema enum (Enforce|Audit); an empty identity fails the render. The toggle is a PICT model parameter (matrix regenerated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…release identity (CE-19d) Lists the containers (init included) of the release's pods by app.kubernetes.io/instance, resolves each Zelkor image to the digest the node pulled, and runs `cosign verify` plus `cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance1` once per digest with the fixed keyless identity (issuer token.actions.githubusercontent.com, release.yml on a vX.Y.Z-ce tag). Any failure, an unknown release, or no Zelkor image at all exits 1; a missing cosign binary is a clear error. Upstream images are listed as covered by the release attestation, not verified here. The identity constants are tested equal to the chart's security.imageVerification defaults. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… (CE-19e) scripts/release/fail_closed_matrix.py turns the S-gate pytest JUnit XML into a markdown matrix over the published categories: auth, guardrails, egress, egress via DNS, admin plane unreachable from the data plane, provider keys unreadable by tenants, component-down behaviour. Tests map to categories by S-id (from test_sNN_* names) or file stem in the checked-in fail_closed_categories.yaml; unmapped S-ids are listed. A category is FAIL on any failure or error, GAP when nothing passed (SKIP never counts as PASS), PASS otherwise. Missing evidence renders an all-GAP matrix with a banner and a workflow warning instead of being skipped. Only test names and counts are published, never failure text. DNS egress has no S-id yet and shows as GAP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…gests (CE-19a/b/c) .github/workflows/release.yml runs only on a vX.Y.Z-ce tag: - plan: check_version.py fails the run unless the tag's X.Y.Z equals every Chart.yaml version/appVersion, every first-party image tag in chart and example values, and the Zelkor FROM/ARG bases of released images; then pin audit; the image matrix comes from build-images.sh --list-json, split by build tier so derived images build FROM the signed base digest. - images-tier0..2: the release-image composite action builds and pushes each image in CI (an existing semver tag is never overwritten), signs the digest keyless, attests an SPDX SBOM (syft) and an SLSA v1 provenance naming repository, source tag, commit and workflow (cosign attest, plus GitHub attest-build-provenance pushed to the registry). Composite, not a reusable workflow, so the certificate identity stays release.yml. - chart: helm package/push both charts to oci://ghcr.io/devopssquaddev/charts, cosign sign + provenance per chart digest; upstream_digests.py resolves the upstream images the chart ships (Langfuse web/worker, datastores, init images) to digests with crane, never mirroring them; the release manifest (first-party, chart and upstream digests) is attested on the platform chart; verify_artifacts.sh round-trips every signature and attestation with the identity read from the chart defaults. - evidence + publish: fail-closed matrix from release-evidence/<tag>/s-gate.junit.xml (all-GAP when missing) and all evidence attached to the GitHub release, created as a draft if absent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
upgrade-gates.yml runs after a successful release (or on dispatch) and publishes both gate results to the release; logic is in scripts/release: - upgrade_gate.sh: install the previous vX.Y.Z-ce (ce_tags.py) with ./install.sh --profile=perimeter, upgrade to N with the same installer, then `helm rollback` to the N-1 revision, while loadgen.py drives a fixed-rate /v1 load through the gateway; any non-2xx or connection error fails the gate (max_failed_requests = 0). - retry_storm_gate.sh: 30 minutes of client retries against mock_llm.py answering 500 for every request, sampling Envoy proxy container working set from the kubelet summary API (gateway_memory.py, no metrics-server); fails over the published ceiling, on growth past max_growth_pct between the first and last window, on too few samples, or if any storm request succeeded. - gate-thresholds.json is the one published file for rates, durations, the memory ceiling and growth limit. Every kubectl/helm call goes through wrappers that name the kind context. The mock provider is CI-only and never part of the chart. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…(CE-19f) - SECURITY.md: report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, scope (first-party images, charts, CLI vs upstream images and customer code), fix targets with 72 hours for a Critical in a first-party image; contracted SLAs are not part of CE. - docs/security/cve-log.md: CVE, image, severity, disclosed, fixed version, time to fix. Seeded with CVE-2026-32871 (fastmcp in zelkor-mcp, confirmed and fixed 2026-11-16 in v2.4.6-ce, #124). - docs/security/verify-release.md: cosign verify / verify-attestation for images and charts with the release identity, the attested release manifest with upstream digests, `zelkor verify`, the opt-in Kyverno policy, and the published fail-closed matrix and gate results. - CLI docs gain `zelkor verify`; Helm values reference gains security.imageVerification; docs nav gains a Security section. - Shorter descriptions on a few pages keep llms.txt under its 2,000-token budget with the two new pages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ases) (#128) * chore(platform): release 2.5.0 (secretless HTTP APIs, verifiable releases) MINOR: new Helm contracts workspace.tools.httpApis (#125) and security.imageVerification (#126). - charts, first-party image tags, Zelkor Dockerfile bases and example charts at 2.5.0; example chart dependencies rebuilt - profiles/values-production.yaml at tag 2.5.0 with empty digests: the release workflow builds and signs the images from the tag, so digests are pinned in a follow-up PR from the signed release - test_production_overlay_uses_semver_not_dev accepts the release tag or a digest, never :dev - THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES: 2.5.0 row (no third-party pin changes) scripts/release/check_version.py v2.5.0-ce passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test,release: S-gate evidence for v2.5.0-ce; trace test uses the tenant mapping - release-evidence/v2.5.0-ce/s-gate.junit.xml: S-gate run against the release candidate (101 tests, 0 failures, 11 environment skips); re-runs and the tool-policy overlay cases merged in, file paths removed. release.yml builds the published fail-closed matrix from it (PASS 6, GAP 1: DNS egress has no S-test yet). - test_agent_trace compared the trace user with the test label; with real IdP tokens the platform tenant differs, so it now uses tenant_of(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Makes every Community Edition release verifiable: images built only in CI, signed, with provenance and SBOMs, and checkable by users.
.github/workflowsis pinned by SHA, and a newpin-auditworkflow fails on any unpinned action or tool download.scripts/build-images.shrefuses to push a semver tag outside CI and gains--list/--list-json, so CI derives the image matrix from it.release.yml, triggered by av*-cetag):oci://ghcr.io/devopssquaddev/chartsand signs them;verify_artifacts.sh.security.imageVerification.enabled(off by default) renders a KyvernoClusterPolicythat rejects unsigned or mismatchedzelkor-*images. It needs Kyverno 1.12 or later.zelkor verify <release>command checks the images running in a release against the release identity.scripts/release/fail_closed_matrix.pyturns the security-gate JUnit results into a per-release table of security checks. A category with no evidence shows as GAP, never as passed.SECURITY.md(private reporting, 72-hour target for Critical CVEs in first-party images), a public CVE log indocs/security/cve-log.md, and a guide indocs/security/verify-release.md.upgrade-gates.ymlon kind:helm rollback, with zero failed requests;gate-thresholds.json.Verification
zelkor verifywith cosign mocked, schema, config matrix, snapshots, docs).shellcheckandhelm lintare clean, and pin-audit passes on all workflows.actionlintwas not available locally; the workflows were checked by YAML parsing and structural tests only.Before the first release
id-token,packages,attestationsandcontentswrite.charts/zelkor-platformandcharts/zelkor-agent, and link them to this repo.v*-ceis recommended.release-evidence/<tag>/s-gate.junit.xmlbefore tagging; without it the matrix is all GAP.Notes
slsaprovenance1(SLSA v1); the CLI and the Kyverno policy expect the same.values.yaml,values.schema.jsonanddocs/README.md. Whichever merges second needs a small rebase and a schema regeneration.🤖 Generated with Claude Code