Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.
Report it privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Include a description, reproduction steps, and the impact you believe it has. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few days, and credit in the fix unless you'd rather not.
The latest released 1.x line receives security fixes.
Glaux runs model-generated code, so isolation is a core feature rather than an afterthought. Findings in any of these are in scope and treated seriously:
- Sandbox escape — synthesized skills run in a WebAssembly guest with no ambient authority. Anything that lets guest code reach the host filesystem, network, or process table is a vulnerability.
- Capability bypass — the static capability check is meant to reject code that requests authority it wasn't granted.
- Workspace jail escape — the file workspace must confine reads and writes to its own directory, including via traversal, absolute paths, and symlinks.
- Ledger forgery — the hash chain and Ed25519 signatures must make undetected tampering or forged agent actions infeasible.
- Capability-token forgery — cross-agent handoff tokens must not be mintable or replayable by an unauthorised agent.
- Authentication and session handling on the HTTP API.
These are documented design decisions, not vulnerabilities:
- The workspace is opt-in and grants real file access inside its jail. Enabling it means agents can create and modify files there — that is its purpose.
- MCP servers you connect run with the authority you give them. Glaux cannot sandbox a third-party tool server.
- The semantic answer cache is opt-in and returns a prior answer for a near-identical request; it cannot account for conversation context. It is off by default for exactly this reason.
dry-runandhaltedsafety modes are cooperative controls for the swarm's own execution path, not a defence against hostile code that already escaped the sandbox.
Glaux never commits credentials. API keys live in your environment or the local
config under GLAUX_HOME (default ~/.glaux), which is git-ignored. If you find a
path where a key is logged, echoed, or written into the ledger, please report it.