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Security: aniketshukla1/glaux

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.

Report it privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Include a description, reproduction steps, and the impact you believe it has. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few days, and credit in the fix unless you'd rather not.

Supported versions

The latest released 1.x line receives security fixes.

What Glaux defends

Glaux runs model-generated code, so isolation is a core feature rather than an afterthought. Findings in any of these are in scope and treated seriously:

  • Sandbox escape — synthesized skills run in a WebAssembly guest with no ambient authority. Anything that lets guest code reach the host filesystem, network, or process table is a vulnerability.
  • Capability bypass — the static capability check is meant to reject code that requests authority it wasn't granted.
  • Workspace jail escape — the file workspace must confine reads and writes to its own directory, including via traversal, absolute paths, and symlinks.
  • Ledger forgery — the hash chain and Ed25519 signatures must make undetected tampering or forged agent actions infeasible.
  • Capability-token forgery — cross-agent handoff tokens must not be mintable or replayable by an unauthorised agent.
  • Authentication and session handling on the HTTP API.

Known, deliberate trade-offs

These are documented design decisions, not vulnerabilities:

  • The workspace is opt-in and grants real file access inside its jail. Enabling it means agents can create and modify files there — that is its purpose.
  • MCP servers you connect run with the authority you give them. Glaux cannot sandbox a third-party tool server.
  • The semantic answer cache is opt-in and returns a prior answer for a near-identical request; it cannot account for conversation context. It is off by default for exactly this reason.
  • dry-run and halted safety modes are cooperative controls for the swarm's own execution path, not a defence against hostile code that already escaped the sandbox.

Handling secrets

Glaux never commits credentials. API keys live in your environment or the local config under GLAUX_HOME (default ~/.glaux), which is git-ignored. If you find a path where a key is logged, echoed, or written into the ledger, please report it.

There aren't any published security advisories