OctraVPN handles real OCT stake and routes user traffic. Vulnerability reports are taken seriously and rewarded.
Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security report. Instead:
- Email
security@octra.org(ordev@octra.orgif no security alias is set up yet) with:- A description of the vulnerability.
- Steps to reproduce (proof of concept welcome).
- Affected versions and components.
- Suggested fix or mitigation if you have one.
- Optionally encrypt with our PGP key, fingerprint:
<TO BE GENERATED — see docs/release.md §5>.
The release GPG key is not yet generated. Until it is, verify releases via Sigstore Rekor entries (see
docs/release.md§6) or skip verification at your own risk. Thegpg --verifyflow documented indocs/release.md§6 is the target state, not the current state — the workflow runs green today producing unsigned artifacts. Track the rollout via the T1.x items indocs/audit/2026-05-20-reproducible-builds-audit.md§6.
You'll receive an acknowledgement within 48 hours and a triage decision within 5 business days.
In scope:
- Anything in this repository (
program/main.aml, the Rust crates, the install scripts, the deployment harness). - Released binaries (
octravpn,octravpn-node,octra). - Released container images and packages.
Out of scope:
- Bugs in the Octra chain itself (report to Octra Labs).
- Bugs in upstream dependencies (
boringtun,curve25519-dalek,tun-rs, etc.) unless we mis-use them. - Issues that require physical access to a node operator's machine.
- Denial-of-service against a single node operator's public RPC.
| Class | Examples |
|---|---|
| Critical | Fund-stealing from program escrow; signature forgery; bond bypass; permanent program corruption |
| High | Slashing avoidance; receipt unforgeability break; cross-tx replay; client/exit-node identity leak during a session |
| Medium | Sweep-bypass; metric spoofing; DoS that scales beyond one node |
| Low | Crash bugs without state corruption; information disclosure of non-sensitive data |
| Informational | Best-practice violations; documentation errors |
- T+0: Report received.
- T+5d: Triage decision communicated to reporter.
- T+30d (typical): Fix shipped in a tagged release.
- T+60d (typical, longer for critical): Coordinated public disclosure.
If a vulnerability is being actively exploited we'll disclose faster; if it requires upstream changes (e.g. in Octra's chain) the timeline extends.
There is no formal bug-bounty program at v1. Critical reports may
receive an ad-hoc bounty from the slashing treasury (see
docs/governance.md).
Reporters who consent will be listed at
https://github.com/octra-labs/octravpn/blob/main/SECURITY-HALL-OF-FAME.md.
If you discover an actively-exploitable critical vulnerability:
- Email
security@octra.orgwith[URGENT]in the subject. - Tag
@octra-labs/securityon Discord / Telegram for an out-of-band channel. - We will coordinate an emergency
set_paused(1)if necessary (seedocs/governance.md§ Emergency Response).
See docs/security.md § 1 for the full threat model. Short version:
- Dolev-Yao network attacker.
- Long-term-key compromise of validators and clients.
- Honest-majority validator set (Octra consensus assumption).
- Out of scope: side channels on operator hardware; supply-chain attacks on upstream dependencies.