docs(security): report security findings for the repo [PB9R0VC] - #24
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A triage document, not a change: eleven findings across the Go module, the CI workflows and the composite Action, rated by exploitability in this codebase rather than by scanner default. Each records the exact command and tool version that produced it, so a reviewer can reproduce or refute it without re-deriving the setup. Three ratings move off their scanner default, each with the reasoning stated inline: the html/template advisories and both gosec CWE-276 and CWE-22 clusters are Low here, because the vulnerable contexts do not exist in the embedded templates and no untrusted path or secret reaches the flagged writers. The scan is recorded as incomplete where it is: zizmor and shellcheck could not be installed, and no tool in this repository or in the scan environment inspects action.yml at all.
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Greptile SummaryThis PR adds a security-triage report covering the repository’s Go code, GitHub Actions, templates, generated workflows, and release pipeline.
Confidence Score: 5/5The PR appears safe to merge. No blocking failure remains. Reviews (3): Last reviewed commit: "docs(security): correct input count on S..." | Re-trigger Greptile |
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Report body listed the seven inputs interpolated into the vulnerable script step but described them as "six", contradicting the enumeration. Also clarifies that go-version (used only by the earlier setup-go step) is out of scope for this finding. Addresses greptile review on #24. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Report is on the branch as a single-file commit. Final verification:
git diff --stat main...HEADshows onlydocs/security/SECURITY-FINDINGS.md, and markdownlint reports zero errors on it.Summary
Scanned every stack present in this repository — Go module, GitHub Actions workflows, the published composite Action, the scaffold/example workflows it emits, the embedded render templates, and the GoReleaser pipeline — and wrote the results to
docs/security/SECURITY-FINDINGS.md. Eleven findings: 0 Critical, 1 High, 4 Medium, 6 Low. Nothing was fixed; the deliverable is a triage document and the report file is the only file the PR changes.The High is a template-injection sink in
action.yml:151-156, where${{ inputs.* }}is pasted into a bashrun:block — GitHub substitutes before bash parses, so the quoting there does not protect it. Because this Action runs in consumers' repositories, the exposure lands on their runners. The correct pattern is already present two steps earlier ataction.yml:66-67.Changes
docs/security/SECURITY-FINDINGS.md(new, only file changed) — summary table with per-severity counts, the stacks detected vs. scanned, tools with versions, and the date; an explicit coverage-gaps section; a table walking every manual-review class the task named with its conclusion; then one section per finding, Critical→Low, each with a stable ID,file:line, source, attacker impact, and remediation. No exploit code.Three findings sit below their scanner default, with the reasoning stated so a reviewer can argue with the argument: the five
html/templateXSS advisories (no JS, URL, or<meta content>context exists in the embedded template), and both gosec clusters (G304 paths all come from the operator's own flags; G302/G306 files are public by intent).Worth flagging for triage beyond the findings themselves: the repo's only automated security gate covers
go.moddeps and secrets only — Trivy reportedDetected config files num=0, and nothing scansaction.yml.Validation
go vet ./...— exit 0.staticcheck ./...— exit 0.actionlint -no-color -oneline— exit 0.govulncheck ./...— exit 3, six called stdlib advisories.gosec -fmt=text ./...— exit 1, nine issues. Trivy 0.72.0 filesystem scan — 0/0/0.npx markdownlint-cli2@0.18.1— zero errors on the report (the repo's own lint config).Ergates task:
06G3EKMR4ZJ9ZN8F86WPB9R0VC