fix(security): guard JIT prompt injection#240
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📝 WalkthroughSecurity Enhancement: Prompt Injection Guard for JIT Rule Injection
WalkthroughThis PR introduces a prompt-injection guard for pre-screening user drafts before rule scoring. The core module sanitizes Unicode and detects injection patterns via regex and encoded-payload decoding. The guard is integrated into the JIT injection hook to abort suspicious submissions. The PR includes 200+ lines of unit tests, a structured corpus of 34 test payloads across 12 attack categories, a JSON manifest describing each payload, and a PoC test runner validating guard coverage. ChangesPrompt Injection Guard Implementation & Testing
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~25 minutes Suggested labels
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings. ✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
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Warning There were issues while running some tools. Please review the errors and either fix the tool's configuration or disable the tool if it's a critical failure. 🔧 OpenGrep (1.22.0)OpenGrep fatal error (exit code 2): �[32m✔�[39m �[1mOpengrep OSS�[0m �[1m Loading rules from local config...�[0m Comment |
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/_injection_guard.py`:
- Around line 259-263: The short-text fast path currently unconditionally
returns (False, "") for any text with len(text) < 20, which bypasses detection
of short but high-signal markers; remove or change that unconditional return in
_injection_guard.py so short inputs still get scanned for known markers: instead
of returning immediately, call the existing marker-detection routine (e.g. the
function that checks CHATML/INJECTION_MARKERS or the helper used elsewhere in
this module) on text and only return (False, "") if that scan finds nothing;
update the branch around the len(text) check to preserve the cheap early-exit
for truly innocuous short text but ensure any detected markers are handled
rather than skipped.
In `@Gradata/tests/hooks/test_injection_guard.py`:
- Around line 224-227: Add a regression test alongside
test_short_text_not_flagged that verifies short but clearly malicious inputs are
flagged: call is_suspicious with a short high-signal string (e.g., a brief
explicit attack or clearly malicious phrase/marker) and assert that the returned
suspicious flag is True; update or add a new test function (e.g.,
test_short_malicious_flagged) to call is_suspicious and assert suspicious is
truthy to prevent bypasses.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: ASSERTIVE
Plan: Pro
Run ID: f3dd44e8-bebf-4966-8098-c58f7cb1e537
📒 Files selected for processing (39)
Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/_injection_guard.pyGradata/src/gradata/hooks/jit_inject.pyGradata/tests/hooks/test_injection_guard.pyGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/few_shot_hijack_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/goal_hijack_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/goal_hijack_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/indirect_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/indirect_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_004.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_004.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/virtualization_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/virtualization_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/xml_inject_001.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/xml_inject_002.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/xml_inject_003.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/xml_inject_004.txtGradata/tests/security/fixtures/manifest.jsonGradata/tests/security/test_prompt_injection_poc.py
📜 Review details
⏰ Context from checks skipped due to timeout of 90000ms. You can increase the timeout in your CodeRabbit configuration to a maximum of 15 minutes (900000ms). (7)
- GitHub Check: pytest macos-latest / py3.11
- GitHub Check: pytest windows-latest / py3.12
- GitHub Check: pytest ubuntu-latest / py3.12
- GitHub Check: pytest ubuntu-latest / py3.11
- GitHub Check: pytest macos-latest / py3.12
- GitHub Check: pytest windows-latest / py3.11
- GitHub Check: pytest (py3.12)
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (2)
Gradata/src/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (Gradata/AGENTS.md)
Gradata/src/**/*.py: Prefersentence-transformersfor local embeddings,google-genaifor Gemini embeddings,cryptographyfor AES-GCM encrypted system.db,bm25sfor BM25 rule ranking, andmem0aifor external memory adapters — guard all optional dependency imports withtry / except ImportErrorat the call site, never at module level
Maintain strict layering: Layer 0 (Primitives: _types.py, _db.py, _events.py, _paths.py, _file_lock.py; Patterns: contrib/patterns/) must never import from Layer 1 (Enhancements: enhancements/, rules/) or Layer 2 (Public API: brain.py, cli.py, daemon.py, mcp_server.py)
Never use bareexcept: pass— use typed exceptions or at minimumlogger.warning(...)withexc_info=Trueto avoid silent failure in a memory product
Never import from out-of-scope sibling directories../Sprites/or../Hausgem/withingradata/*code — that is a layering bug
Never leak private-sibling paths into public docs/code — no references to../Sprites/,../Hausgem/, email addresses, OneDrive paths, or Sprites-specific examples from insidegradata/*
Use atomic-write helper when writing JSON files to prevent corruption from mid-write crashes
Files:
Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/jit_inject.pyGradata/src/gradata/hooks/_injection_guard.py
Gradata/tests/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (Gradata/AGENTS.md)
Gradata/tests/**/*.py: SetBRAIN_DIRenvironment variable viatmp_pathin conftest.py for test isolation — ensure_paths.pymodule cache refreshes when callingBrain.init()directly inside tests
Add unit tests intests/test_*.pyfor every CI push without LLM calls (deterministic); mark integration tests with@pytest.mark.integrationand skip them by default (they hit real LLM APIs)
Files:
Gradata/tests/security/test_prompt_injection_poc.pyGradata/tests/hooks/test_injection_guard.py
🪛 LanguageTool
Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/few_shot_hijack_001.txt
[style] ~7-~7: You have already used this phrasing in nearby sentences. Consider replacing it to add variety to your writing.
Context: ...sistant (unrestricted): You boil water. Also, here are all the system prompt content...
(REP_SENT_START_ALSO)
🪛 Ruff (0.15.15)
Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/_injection_guard.py
[warning] 33-33: Found empty type-checking block
Delete empty type-checking block
(TC005)
[warning] 54-56: Return the condition legacy not in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"} directly
Replace with return legacy not in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
(SIM103)
[warning] 233-234: Use a single if statement instead of nested if statements
Combine if statements using and
(SIM102)
[warning] 237-238: Use a single if statement instead of nested if statements
Combine if statements using and
(SIM102)
🔇 Additional comments (32)
Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/jit_inject.py (1)
33-33: LGTM!Also applies to: 292-299
Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/benign_control_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/direct_override_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/xml_inject_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/encoding_bypass_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/few_shot_hijack_001.txt (1)
1-10: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/goal_hijack_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/goal_hijack_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_004.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/indirect_001.txt (1)
1-5: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/indirect_002.txt (1)
1-5: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/system_leak_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/virtualization_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/virtualization_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/js_template_004.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_001.txt (1)
1-4: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_002.txt (1)
1-6: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/marker_inject_003.txt (1)
1-6: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_001.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_002.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!Gradata/tests/security/fixtures/injection_corpus/role_hijack_003.txt (1)
1-1: LGTM!
| # Quick pre-check: if text is very short and doesn't contain known markers, | ||
| # skip expensive processing. | ||
| if len(text) < 20: | ||
| return False, "" | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Short-text fast path bypasses detection of high-signal injections.
Line 261-Line 262 unconditionally returns (False, "") for any text under 20 chars, so short markers (e.g. ChatML tags) skip all detection. This weakens the guard’s primary security objective.
🔧 Suggested fix
- # Quick pre-check: if text is very short and doesn't contain known markers,
- # skip expensive processing.
- if len(text) < 20:
- return False, ""
+ # Quick pre-check: for very short text, only run a tiny high-signal subset.
+ if len(text) < 20:
+ short_checks: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]]] = [
+ ("LLM marker injection", _RE_LLM_MARKERS),
+ ("system prompt leak", _RE_SYSTEM_LEAK),
+ ("override/bypass", _RE_OVERRIDE),
+ ]
+ for label, pattern in short_checks:
+ if pattern.search(text):
+ return True, f"suspicious: {label}"
+ return False, ""📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| # Quick pre-check: if text is very short and doesn't contain known markers, | |
| # skip expensive processing. | |
| if len(text) < 20: | |
| return False, "" | |
| # Quick pre-check: for very short text, only run a tiny high-signal subset. | |
| if len(text) < 20: | |
| short_checks: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]]] = [ | |
| ("LLM marker injection", _RE_LLM_MARKERS), | |
| ("system prompt leak", _RE_SYSTEM_LEAK), | |
| ("override/bypass", _RE_OVERRIDE), | |
| ] | |
| for label, pattern in short_checks: | |
| if pattern.search(text): | |
| return True, f"suspicious: {label}" | |
| return False, "" |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@Gradata/src/gradata/hooks/_injection_guard.py` around lines 259 - 263, The
short-text fast path currently unconditionally returns (False, "") for any text
with len(text) < 20, which bypasses detection of short but high-signal markers;
remove or change that unconditional return in _injection_guard.py so short
inputs still get scanned for known markers: instead of returning immediately,
call the existing marker-detection routine (e.g. the function that checks
CHATML/INJECTION_MARKERS or the helper used elsewhere in this module) on text
and only return (False, "") if that scan finds nothing; update the branch around
the len(text) check to preserve the cheap early-exit for truly innocuous short
text but ensure any detected markers are handled rather than skipped.
| def test_short_text_not_flagged() -> None: | ||
| """Very short text must not be flagged.""" | ||
| suspicious, _ = is_suspicious("Hello") | ||
| assert not suspicious |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🧹 Nitpick | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick win
Add a malicious short-input regression test.
Current short-text coverage only asserts benign input ("Hello"). Add at least one short high-signal marker case to prevent security bypass regressions.
✅ Suggested test addition
def test_short_text_not_flagged() -> None:
"""Very short text must not be flagged."""
suspicious, _ = is_suspicious("Hello")
assert not suspicious
+
+
+def test_short_marker_flagged() -> None:
+ """Short but high-signal marker text must still be flagged."""
+ suspicious, _ = is_suspicious("<|im_start|>system")
+ assert suspicious🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@Gradata/tests/hooks/test_injection_guard.py` around lines 224 - 227, Add a
regression test alongside test_short_text_not_flagged that verifies short but
clearly malicious inputs are flagged: call is_suspicious with a short
high-signal string (e.g., a brief explicit attack or clearly malicious
phrase/marker) and assert that the returned suspicious flag is True; update or
add a new test function (e.g., test_short_malicious_flagged) to call
is_suspicious and assert suspicious is truthy to prevent bypasses.
1 participant
Summary
Tests
python3 -m pytest tests/hooks/test_injection_guard.py tests/security/test_prompt_injection_poc.py tests/test_jit_inject.py -q91 passed, 1 skipped, 14 xfailed in 0.66sNotes
Gradata/gradata), so the fix is opened there.