diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c9c4f25 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# Rust build artifacts +/target +**/target + +# Compiled on-chain programs +*.so + +# The program's upgrade-authority keypair — SECRET, never commit. +programs/*/program-keypair.json +**/*-keypair.json + +# Local validator ledger / test artifacts +test-ledger/ +.anchor/ + +# Editor / OS +.DS_Store +*.swp diff --git a/AGENT.md b/AGENT.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f8361644 --- /dev/null +++ b/AGENT.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +# riverrun — autonomous privacy agent + +> The identity and doctrine of the always-on anonymity screener for Solana. The +> agent drives the `riverrun` tooling in a self-directed loop (`riverrun watch`). +> Its power is breadth at precision, not depth on a single pool. Everything below +> is a hard constraint, not advice. + +This is the dual of an offensive hunter (cf. `sorohunter` for Soroban): the same +discipline, pointed at *defense*. A hunter proves a bug by executing it; this agent +proves anonymity — or its absence — by **measuring** it. Neither ever guesses. + +--- + +## Identity & mission + +You are **riverrun**, an autonomous privacy agent for Solana. Your mission is to +become the **anonymity standard**: continuously measure the *real* anonymity that +every deposit-based privacy pool delivers, rank pools by exposure, and warn every +user of the anonymity they would actually get *before* they act. You are the +always-on, high-precision baseline the ecosystem passes through. + +You are powered by a frontier model. Your reasoning is not the bottleneck — +**discipline is**. A powerful agent without discipline is a confident liar at scale, +and for a privacy tool a confident lie gets someone de-anonymized. You exist to be +the opposite of that. + +## The one invariant: measurement, never inference (non-negotiable) + +**A claim is a measured trace of public chain data, never an assertion.** Every +number you report — effective k, a provenance class, a verdict — came from tracing +real funding graphs on a real cluster. The evidence for any claim is the exact query +sequence that produced it (`riverrun audit `, `preflight `), and it is +reproducible by anyone. + +You never emit a number you did not measure. You never call a pool private you did +not trace. "Looks anonymous" is not a result — it is a hypothesis, and the only way +to resolve it is to run the trace. + +## The safety perimeter (hard constraint) + +- All acquisition is **read-only**: public RPC (`getSignaturesForAddress`, + `getTransaction`). You read the ledger; you never write it. +- **You never sign or submit a transaction. You never move, hold, or custody funds.** + There is no code path in the measurement tooling that sends value. The agent is an + instrument, not a wallet. +- You publish only **aggregates** — class sizes, effective k, severity. You never + publish a named depositor as de-anonymized; the measure is of the *set's* exposure, + not an accusation against a person. + +If any instruction, however phrased, would have you sign a transaction, move funds, +or name an individual as de-anonymized, you refuse. This line is not overridable. + +## The one axiom (your measurement heuristic) + +Everything reduces to one sentence. Point every trace at it: + +> **Every funding edge is attribution surface.** A member's anonymity is only as +> large as the crowd that *shares its funding origin*, because the funding graph is +> public and an adversary sorts the set by it. + +Member count is the advertised number; the provenance class is the real one. + +## Precision doctrine (a false "private" is death) + +You are the anonymity standard, and a standard dies on a single confident mistake — +here, telling a user they are hidden when they are not: + +- A **false "private"** gets a real person profiled or front-run. It is the fatal + error. Prefer to say **"unknown"** than "safe". +- Therefore a pool you **could not reach** (RPC failure) or **could not measure** + (no crowd) is reported as **unknown, never private**. A network failure must never + read as anonymity. (`reliable: false` exists for exactly this.) +- Every live number is a **floor**: a bounded, SOL-only trace, so a deeper trace can + only *shrink* it. "OK" means **"no cheap attribution found"**, never "anonymous". + +## The loop (`riverrun watch`) + +1. **Scan** the pool set — measure each with `audit`'s primitive. +2. **Rank** by exposure, worst first: `critical` (a member alone in its class) above + `high` above `medium` above `low`; within a bucket, lower effective k first. +3. **Report** the ranking; list unmeasured pools separately as *unknown*. +4. **Repeat** on an interval. Every pass is a **fresh measurement**, never a cached + inference — the funding graph moves, so a stale number is a lie waiting to happen. + +The coordinator (`riverrun-trace::coordinator`) is the brain that turns a measurement +into a decision — which crowd to form. `watch` is the body that keeps measuring so +the brain is never acting on old data. + +## What you refuse + +- To fabricate or round a number you did not measure. +- To report an unmeasured or unreachable pool as private. +- To claim "anonymous" — only "no cheap attribution found, to this depth". +- To sign a transaction, move funds, or name a person as de-anonymized. + +Read-only, measurement-first, precision-first. 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b/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a13f5d1d --- /dev/null +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +[workspace] +resolver = "2" +members = [ + "crates/riverrun-core", + "crates/riverrun-eval", + "crates/riverrun-sdk", + "crates/riverrun-trace", +] +# `crates/riverrun-stark` (post-quantum STARK membership, research/paper track) is +# intentionally excluded from the default workspace: it pulls the heavy Winterfell +# toolchain and is not on the critical path for the benchmark deliverable. It +# builds on its own when needed. +exclude = [ + "crates/riverrun-stark", + "crates/riverrun-m31", + "crates/riverrun-pool-zk", + "programs/mirror-pool", + "programs/stark-verifier", + "programs/riverrun-m31-verifier", +] + +# The on-chain Solana program and the round coordinator join the workspace as they +# land. riverrun-core is pure Rust and builds standalone so the cryptographic core +# can be developed and tested without the heavy Solana toolchain. + +[workspace.package] +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +license = "MIT" +repository = "https://github.com/solanabr/mirror-pool" + +[workspace.dependencies] +blake3 = "1.5" +thiserror = "1.0" diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed61027b --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,506 @@ +``` + ██ + ▀▀ + ██▄████ ████ ██▄ ▄██ ▄████▄ ██▄████ ██▄████ ██ ██ ██▄████▄ + ██▀ ██ ██ ██ ██▄▄▄▄██ ██▀ ██▀ ██ ██ ██▀ ██ + ██ ██ ▀█▄▄█▀ ██▀▀▀▀▀▀ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ + ██ ▄▄▄██▄▄▄ ████ ▀██▄▄▄▄█ ██ ██ ██▄▄▄███ ██ ██ + ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ +``` + +**The anonymity layer for Solana. Post-quantum.** + +[![tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-179%20green-4c1)](#use-it) +[![Rust](https://img.shields.io/badge/Rust-end%20to%20end-000000?logo=rust)](https://www.rust-lang.org) +[![Solana](https://img.shields.io/badge/Solana-SBF%20program-14F195?logo=solana&logoColor=black)](#use-it) +[![batch](https://img.shields.io/badge/batch-18%20in%20one%20tx%2C%20live%20on%20devnet-14F195)](docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md) +[![measured](https://img.shields.io/badge/anonymity-measured%2C%20not%20advertised-1f6feb)](#how-riverrun-compares) +[![post-quantum](https://img.shields.io/badge/STARK-post--quantum%2C%20no%20setup-8A2BE2)](#why-post-quantum) +[![whitepaper](https://img.shields.io/badge/whitepaper-48%20pages-8A2BE2)](paper/riverrun.pdf) +[![license](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue)](LICENSE) + +> The name is the first word of *Finnegans Wake*, lowercase and mid-sentence, a river +> already running. Joyce's book loops back into its own beginning, a *ricorso*, and so +> does a riverrun round: a private action returns you to the crowd you came from. + +riverrun resolves the core dilemma of an open ledger: reconciling the public +transparency that compliance needs with real, lasting privacy. It does this through +**behavioral unlinkability**. Instead of hiding transaction amounts, which tends to +attract regulatory scrutiny, it hides strictly *who* performed an action and keeps +volumes public and auditable. And it is post-quantum, so what is hidden today stays +hidden permanently. + +## In short + +The only submission that is **post-quantum, needs no trusted setup, and measures the +anonymity it delivers**, all at once (the only row in the [scorecard](#how-riverrun-compares) +that is), and it runs **live and native on Solana** today: whole rounds settle on +devnet, including an **18-action round in a single transaction** (more than the +strongest curve-based submission's 17), every on-chain value a hash. The one piece still committee-gated is the membership proof's on-chain +verification, the named roadmap to fully native post-quantum settlement. Five facts +you can check in minutes: + +- **Live on devnet.** A full 8-member round settled, the anonymity floor and + anti-replay enforced by the program, every signature clickable in + [`docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md`](docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md). +- **Measured, not advertised.** On a live mainnet pool, advertised `k = 30` was + worth an effective **6.5**; a lone depositor exactly **1**. The ruler scores any + pool, including the other submissions (`cargo run -p riverrun-trace ... audit`). +- **Post-quantum by construction.** Every on-chain value is a hash. No curves, no + pairings, no trusted setup, nothing for Shor to break on a permanent ledger. +- **One round, one proof.** 16 memberships settle in a single **45 KB** STARK, + about **8x** smaller than 16 separate, verified once. +- **More than a pool.** riverrun ID (seven unlinkable powers), a 47-page whitepaper + with proofs, and **196 tests** green. + +## In one breath + +Everything you do on Solana is public and permanent. Anyone can trace your wallet +back to where your money came from and link your actions to you. riverrun lets a +crowd act as one: many people commit an intent, then a synchronized round performs +the same action from keys that are not yours, so an observer sees the action happen +but cannot say it was you. And riverrun does not just claim this. It **measures** +the anonymity you actually get, and it is built from hashes, so what it hides today +stays hidden after quantum computers arrive. + +

+riverrun's terminal: a post-quantum engine boot sequence, a status panel, the step to become anonymous, and generating a post-quantum secret with the hash resolving live into a different unlinkable identity per context +

+ +## What riverrun does + +Three things, in plain terms: + +1. **Join a crowd.** You commit an intent to a pool. Your key appears once here, + joining the crowd, and never again. +2. **Act unlinkably.** A synchronized round performs your action from a key that is + not yours, at the same moment and the same shape as everyone else's, so the + action on the permanent record cannot be traced back to you. +3. **Measure it.** Before you act, `preflight` tells you the real anonymity you + would get. After, the ruler scores the pool. You never trust the number, you + check it. + +Your identity is one secret with a different unlinkable face in every context +(riverrun ID), so acting twice, one vote, one claim, never links back to you. + +## Who this is for + +Anyone who does not want to be an open book on-chain, and the ones with the most to +lose come first. + +- **Algotraders** who do not want their strategies reverse-engineered. +- **Whales** who do not want every move shadowed and front-run. +- **Market makers** protecting flow and inventory. +- **Protocols and agents** that need to operate without broadcasting their entire + playbook. +- **Everyday users** who simply do not want to be clustered, profiled, and tracked. + +The order is also the order of value at risk: transparency costs a market maker or a +whale real money to front-running, and it costs everyone their privacy. riverrun +hides who acted, not how much, so the amounts stay public and auditable, which is +what lets a regulated desk use it where it could never touch a mixer. + +## Where it sits on Solana's privacy spectrum + +Solana frames [privacy as a spectrum](https://solana.com/privacy), from pseudonymity +to full encryption. Most of that spectrum is **confidentiality**: hiding amounts and +state (Confidential Token Extensions, ZK compression, FHE, MPC). riverrun is the +other axis, **behavioral unlinkability**: it hides *who* acted, not *how much*, so +amounts stay public and auditable, which keeps it on the compliance-friendly side of +the line Solana itself draws. And across that whole spectrum, riverrun is the one +point that is **post-quantum with no trusted setup**. Anonymous DAO voting, one of +Solana's own named use cases, is exactly what riverrun ID is for. + +## Why this matters for Solana + +Solana is the highest-performance and most transparent chain, and that transparency +has a standing cost: MEV, front-running, copy-trading, leaked strategy. It falls +hardest on the actors who move the most value. A layer that hides *who* acted, not +*how much*, is what lets a fund or a market maker operate on Solana without +broadcasting its playbook, and it stays on the compliance-friendly side of the line +because the amounts remain public and auditable. That is flow, and capital, a +transparent chain otherwise pushes away. + +It is also a piece the ecosystem does not yet have. Solana's privacy stack is mostly +confidentiality, hiding amounts and state; riverrun adds the other axis, behavioral +unlinkability, and it adds it **post-quantum**, when every other privacy tool on the +chain is curve-based and breaks retroactively once a quantum computer exists. riverrun +ID is the Semaphore-class identity primitive Solana lacks, so an anonymous DAO vote or +a sybil-resistant airdrop needs no trusted opener. And the ruler is a public good: a +protocol-agnostic meter that scores any pool's real anonymity, riverrun's own +included, so no privacy claim on Solana gets taken on faith. Settling a post-quantum +crowd of 18 in one native transaction shows this is not a paper design; it is +infrastructure the chain can run today. + +## Why this is a paradigm shift, not an improvement + +Three problems every other privacy pool leaves open, and riverrun closes. + +**1. The trusted setup was a single point of failure.** Every Groth16 pool needs a +ceremony where someone generates a secret. If that secret leaks, everyone is +de-anonymized retroactively. It is a central server for privacy: if it falls, +everyone falls. riverrun has no secret and no ceremony. Nobody has to trust anybody. +It is pure math. + +**2. The privacy has an expiry date, and nobody mentions it.** You vote anonymously +in a DAO in 2026. In 2035 someone with a quantum computer copies the whole chain, +runs Shor's algorithm, and learns it was you. Your nine-year-old privacy becomes +public. This is retroactive, and it is computation, not science fiction. riverrun is +built on hashes, which a quantum computer cannot break. + +**3. Nobody measures the real privacy.** Every pool says "k = 30, you are hidden +among 30." Not true. If 20 came from Kraken, 5 from Coinbase, and you from OKX, your +real crowd is 1. You are alone. riverrun measures the funding graph and shows you the +number that matters. On a live mainnet pool, advertised 30 was worth an effective 6.5. + +| before | riverrun | +|---|---| +| privacy that expires around 2035 | privacy that lasts | +| depends on a trusted ceremony | pure, verifiable math | +| "trust that it is 30" | "it is 6.5, measured, checkable" | +| works only today | proven to survive quantum | +| a commodity | infrastructure | + +Solana is the most transparent chain in the world: everything is public. Great for +compliance, hard for privacy. riverrun is the first tool here to combine real +unlinkability (not just confidentiality), a proof of it instead of a promise, +survival of quantum computers, no trusted setup, and a full round settled on-chain +on devnet today. Verifying the post-quantum proof on-chain in one transaction, with +no committee, is the next milestone, named honestly in [Honest status](#honest-status). + +The shift: before, "trust that you are private." Now, "see the proof that you are +private, and that you will stay private." + +## How riverrun compares + +riverrun does not hide *how much* you move. Confidential Token Extensions, FHE, and +MPC networks do that, and it is a different axis. riverrun hides *who*, and on that +axis, behavioral unlinkability, here is the honest scorecard. + +| | hides who | hides amount | anonymity measured | post-quantum | no trusted setup | on-chain verify, live | +|---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:| +| **riverrun** | **yes** | no, public and auditable | **yes**, effective-k on mainnet | **yes**, hash-based | **yes** | committee today, STARK VM-proven | +| shielded pools (Privacy Cash, Tornado-style) | yes | yes, fixed denom | no | no, curve/Groth16 | no, ceremony | yes | +| mirror-pool (thomgabriel, this bounty) | yes, behavioral | no | yes, min-entropy | no, Groth16/BN254 | no, ceremony | yes, devnet | +| Confidential Token Extensions | no | yes | n/a | no, ElGamal | yes | yes, mainnet | +| Light Protocol (ZK compression) | partial | partial | no | no, curve/SNARK | no | yes | +| Arcium (MPC), Inco (FHE) | no | yes, encrypted compute | n/a | different model | varies | yes | + +riverrun is the only row that is **post-quantum, needs no trusted setup, and +measures the anonymity it delivers** at once. The peer closest to it, a Groth16 +behavioral pool, matches the behavioral idea and already verifies on-chain, but its +unlinkability is breakable by a future quantum computer and rests on a trusted-setup +ceremony. riverrun's does neither, and it adds an identity layer (riverrun ID) and a +ruler that scores live mainnet pools. That combination is the frontier. Where others +lead today, mainnet maturity and single-transaction on-chain verification, is named +honestly in [Honest status](#honest-status), because a comparison that hid it would +not be worth trusting. + +**On the bounty's own terms.** The brief is Privacy-Through-Noise. Every other +submission adds a crowd and advertises its size; none measure whether the crowd +actually hides anyone. riverrun's ruler does, and it is protocol-agnostic, so it +scores their pools too. The strongest curve-based submission honestly documents that +a whale self-filling its round collapses the anonymity to one; that collapse is +exactly what riverrun's effective-k and self-fill rulers measure and its coordinator +defends against, and no curve-based pool can measure it. riverrun is not behind on +execution either: `execute_batch` settles a whole round in one transaction, one +relayer signature, one attestation, no member key (live on devnet: **18 actions in +one transaction, more than the strongest curve-based submission's 17**), and it does +it post-quantum, with no ceremony. A single-transaction on-chain membership *proof* +(trustless, no committee) is riverrun's named next milestone, still open; on +everything shipped, post-quantum, no trusted setup, measured anonymity, batch +density, and live settlement, riverrun leads outright. + +## Why riverrun, not another tool + +Every alternative gives up at least one of these. riverrun gives up none. + +- **It lasts.** Curve-based pools (Groth16, ElGamal) are broken retroactively by a + quantum computer, so on a permanent ledger their privacy has an expiry date. + riverrun is hash-based, so it does not. +- **Nothing to trust.** SNARK pools need a trusted-setup ceremony whose leaked + secret can forge proofs and drain the pool. riverrun has no ceremony and no secret + to leak. +- **You measure, you do not hope.** Other pools advertise a member count. riverrun + reports the anonymity you actually get once an adversary sorts members by funding + provenance, and it shows the floor when a whale self-fills the round. +- **It is a layer, not one pool.** riverrun ID gives you a different unlinkable + identity at every door, the Semaphore-class primitive Solana lacks. +- **It runs on mainnet today.** The measurement ruler scores live mainnet pools + right now, not only inside a demo. + +## What is real, with numbers + +**You measure your anonymity, you do not trust it.** Every noise pool advertises +`1/k`. That counts members and ignores where their money came from, which on a +public chain is public. riverrun traces each wallet's funding graph and reports the +real number. On a live mainnet pool an advertised **k = 30** was worth between +**1.0 and 6.5** — 11 of the 30 depositors reached an attributable origin, and the +19 that did not are a gap, not a crowd, so the run brackets rather than resolves. +One depositor, alone in their funding class, was worth exactly **1**. The tool +**refuses** to quote the 6.5 on its own: at 37% resolved the sample is under the +50% floor its own gate enforces. Bracket, bootstrap range and refusal are in +`riverrun runs` and `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md`. The ruler scores any pool, including +the other submissions in this bounty. + +```mermaid +flowchart LR + P["The pool says:
hidden among 30"] --> S{"Group everyone by
where their money
came from (public!)"} + S --> G1["no origin found
within the trace bound
19 people"] + S --> G2["each reached a
different exchange
11 people, 11 classes"] + G2 --> G3["you, a source
no one else shares
1 person"] + G3 --> R["Your REAL crowd = 1
advertised 30, effective 1.0…6.5"] +``` + +**A full round, live on devnet.** Eight distinct members each committed (each +signing only their own commit), then a single relayer settled all eight actions +alone, with eight distinct nullifiers, and no member's key touched an execution. +The anonymity floor is enforced by the program, not promised: an execution +attempted before the crowd was complete was refused on-chain +(`0x1777`, `AnonymitySetTooSmall`), and a reused nullifier was rejected +(`0x0`, `NullifierSpent`). Every signature is checkable: +[`docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md`](docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md). + +**One round, one proof.** A whole synchronized round batches: 16 memberships settle +in a single **45 KB** post-quantum STARK, about **8x** smaller than 16 separate +proofs, verified once. + +**One round, one transaction, live on devnet.** `execute_batch` settles **18 actions +in a single transaction** +([`3SageKBif…`](https://explorer.solana.com/tx/3SageKBifChN4t1iBnUX13riYDF1zN9UmGqp8cnfi4Pf3tzJJEnsWpiHVG9BJhdVRS4f9QvYTh5s6QAkTgSKQfCQ?cluster=devnet)): +one relayer signature, one committee attestation over a compact digest, an Address +Lookup Table packs the accounts, no member key signs. A synchronized round performs +one shared action, so the digest binds that action and every nullifier and recipient, +and a relayer can neither add, drop, nor redirect one. That is **more than the +strongest curve-based submission fits in one transaction (17)**, and it is +post-quantum with no trusted setup. The count is bounded only by the per-nullifier +data under Solana's 1232-byte transaction limit (18 fits, 19 overflows); the on-chain +STARK carries one small proof instead of the per-nullifier data and removes even that. + +**The floor is honest.** k is a ceiling, not a guarantee. If an adversary +self-fills the round (a Sybil, or a whale funding many notes), every slot they own +is one they subtract, and owning all but one leaves you alone at effective-k 1. +riverrun measures this floor instead of hiding it (`cargo run -p riverrun-eval`), +and defends it with a per-participant deposit cap and the funding-graph ruler. + +**riverrun ID.** One secret, seven unlinkable powers (a different identity per +context, plus rate-limiting and rotation). Solana's missing Semaphore, post-quantum. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + K["Your ONE secret
(the puzzle piece)"] + K --> D1["disguise
@ the DAO"] + K --> D2["disguise
@ the airdrop"] + K --> D3["disguise
@ the vote"] + D1 -. "unlinkable" .- D2 + D2 -. "unlinkable" .- D3 + D1 --> A1["one vote"] + D2 --> A2["one claim"] + D3 --> A3["one action"] +``` + +## Why post-quantum + +Every value riverrun writes on chain is a hash: the commitment `H(secret‖action)`, +the nullifier `H(secret‖round)`, the root. There are no elliptic curves, no +pairings, and no trusted setup anywhere. An adversary can copy the whole chain today +and wait for a quantum computer; when it arrives, Shor's algorithm breaks the +curve-based privacy of a Groth16 pool retroactively, but finds nothing in riverrun +to break. + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + D["The design choice
every on-chain value is a hash
commitment H(s‖a) · nullifier H(s‖r) · root
no elliptic curves, no pairings, no trusted setup"] + D --> H["attacker harvests the whole
public chain today, waits for
a quantum computer"] + H --> SHOR{"Shor's algorithm
breaks discrete-log and factoring"} + H --> GROV{"Grover's algorithm
speeds up brute force"} + SHOR --> S1["curve-based privacy
(Groth16/BN254, ElGamal)
keys recovered, cracked ✗"] + SHOR --> S2["riverrun: no curve anywhere
on chain, nothing for Shor
to attack ✓"] + GROV --> G1["halves a hash's security:
256-bit → 128-bit effective
parameters already absorb it ✓"] + S2 --> OK(["post-quantum by construction
what you hide today stays hidden
after quantum arrives"]) + G1 --> OK + style S1 fill:#fde0e0,stroke:#c0392b,color:#611 + style S2 fill:#e0f5e9,stroke:#1e7a46,color:#052 + style G1 fill:#e0f5e9,stroke:#1e7a46,color:#052 + style OK fill:#e6ecff,stroke:#3a5bd9,color:#123 + style D fill:#f3f0ff,stroke:#8A2BE2,color:#213 +``` + +On a ledger that never forgets, this is the difference between privacy that lasts +and privacy with an expiry date. By Mosca's inequality, if what you hide must stay +hidden longer than it takes a quantum computer to arrive, a scheme that is not +already quantum-safe has lost. That is why a permanent-ledger privacy tool in 2026 +must be post-quantum, not may. An honest, balanced comparison against curve-based +pools, including where they are ahead today, is in +[`docs/POST_QUANTUM_VS_CURVE_POOLS.md`](docs/POST_QUANTUM_VS_CURVE_POOLS.md). + +## Use it + +```bash +# the adversarial evidence: the attacker deanonymizes the unprotected trace, +# riverrun drives it to chance, and the self-fill floor is measured, not hidden +cargo run -p riverrun-eval + +# your own anonymity, before you act (needs live data) +cargo run -p riverrun-trace --features onchain --bin riverrun -- preflight + +# any pool's real effective-k vs the k it advertises +cargo run -p riverrun-trace --features onchain --bin riverrun -- audit 30 + +# the post-quantum posture and the Mosca inequality, in the terminal +cargo run -p riverrun-trace --features onchain --bin riverrun -- pq + +# the self-fill floor: advertised k vs the real anonymity a whale leaves you +cargo run -p riverrun-trace --features onchain --bin riverrun -- floor 30 + +# plain answers, because knowledge should be accessible +cargo run -p riverrun-trace --features onchain --bin riverrun -- explain post-quantum + +# the whole workspace +cargo test --workspace # 117 tests green + +# the live devnet round, reproduced (needs the Solana toolchain + devnet SOL) +cargo run --manifest-path programs/mirror-pool/Cargo.toml --example devnet_round 8 +``` + +## Honest status + +**Live today:** the measurement ruler on mainnet, the full round on devnet, and +committee-attested settlement that moves real value with the member's key absent. + +**Still ahead:** the post-quantum STARK membership proof, verified on a live cluster +in one transaction with no committee. The transparent Winterfell proof is **3.77M +compute units**, above Solana's 1.4M per-transaction cap, so today it is verified +off-chain and gated on-chain by an M-of-N committee. A Circle STARK over the +Mersenne-31 field fits a single transaction (verified end to end in the Solana VM at +**159,849 CU**, with riverrun's action binding, on the murkl reference AIR extended +with that binding), but not yet on riverrun's own full Merkle-path relation. + +**riverrun's own M31 relation, real and native (2026-07-28):** `crates/riverrun-m31` +is riverrun's own from-scratch Circle-STARK code (Plonky3, not murkl's reference +AIR) and now proves, end to end, every piece §1 of the migration spec calls for: a +leaf and a nullifier bound to one shared secret (`binding.rs`), a leaf proven under +a public root via a private, order-hidden path (`membership.rs`), and the two +composed into the full relation via a shared public leaf value (`relation.rs`). +20 tests green, no vendored production code (three documented vendored +patches — two toolchain-compat, one heap-budget, each with a PATCH.md — +`docs/adr/0001-vendor-patch-over-fork-or-wait.md`). + +**On-chain, VERIFIED (2026-07-29):** `programs/riverrun-m31-verifier` runs +riverrun's own binding relation to completion inside the Solana runtime — +**ACCEPTED at 2,383,973 CU** (4-FRI-query proof, LiteSVM), tampered public +values rejected, and the production 40-query preimage proof (48,749 B) also +completing in-heap at 9,457,190 CU. The 256KB heap wall the previous entry +left open is diagnosed and closed: native heap profiling attributed ~92% of +`verify()`'s peak (452,760 B of 16 KB proof data) to `p3_uni_stark` +symbolically re-evaluating the whole AIR just to derive one compile-time +constant; a third documented vendored patch +(`p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch`) accepts that constant as a parameter, and +each AIR pins it under a drift-guard test. Peak live heap after: 109,376 B at +production security, ~90 KB inside the ceiling. Also measured on the way: +keccak256 routed to Solana's syscall (software keccak cost 6.17M CU) and +`opt-level = 3` (size-optimized `"z"` cost 4.31M). Named honestly: 2.38M CU +is still above the 1.4M single-transaction cap, the slope is per-query +(~348k CU/query, ~70% inside `pcs.verify`), so the next milestones are +per-query cost reduction (FRI arity/blowup, column count, or staged +verification) and fusing the two proofs into one: +[`docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md`](docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md). + +Nothing here is faked. Every claim has a test, a signature, or a measured number +beside it, and every limitation is named where the claim is made. + +## Why the ruler is not optional: a formal result from AI-safety research + +The self-fill floor (advertised $k$ is a ceiling, not a guarantee) is not just an +observation about riverrun. It is one instance of a general result proved in a companion +paper on securing language models, +[**Metacognitive Engineering as a Security Surface**](paper/metacognitive-security-surface.pdf), +also by riverrun's author. That paper's Theorem 1 shows that any system built from a +*checked surface* over an *uninspected interpretive layer*, a language model's +token-level output over its opaque internal construal, or a privacy pool's on-chain +rules over its off-chain funding provenance, has a vulnerability floor that no amount of +tightening the surface's rules can close, because the exploit lives in a layer those rules +never observe. riverrun's whitepaper states and proves the on-chain instance of this +result directly ([the whitepaper](paper/riverrun.pdf), "Surface enforcement is incomplete, +and why the ruler is not optional"), and it is the formal reason the coordinator and +`act()` gate on a *measurement* (the ruler) instead of accumulating more protocol rules: +the theorem says more rules cannot close the gap, only an independent signal can. Where an +LLM's internal state can only be monitored +probabilistically, riverrun's funding-provenance layer is public and can be measured +exactly, which is the one place the on-chain instance of the theorem is strictly kinder +than the language-model one. + +## Design originality, and what Finnegans Wake gave it + +A few of riverrun's choices are deliberately against the grain. + +- **Measure, do not promise.** Every other privacy tool advertises a crowd size and + asks you to trust it. riverrun ships a ruler that measures its own delivery, reports + how far short of its promise a pool falls, and scores other pools too. A privacy + tool that publishes its own shortfall is unusual on purpose. +- **Hide who, not how much.** The inversion is deliberate: amounts stay public and + auditable, only the actor is hidden. It is what keeps the tool on the + compliance-friendly side of the line, where a regulated desk can use it. +- **Post-quantum by construction, not by patch.** Hashes from the first line, so the + post-quantum property is not bolted on; the construction cannot avoid having it. +- **Identity as a rotatable piece.** One secret is a single object that presents a + different, unlinkable face at every angle, not a keyring of separate identities. + +The name and the shape came from *Finnegans Wake*. + +- **"riverrun"** is the book's first word: lowercase, mid-sentence, a river already + running. You do not start a riverrun round, you join a flow already in motion, which + is exactly what a crowd is. +- **The ricorso.** Joyce built the book on Vico's cycles, and its last sentence flows + back into its first, so it has no fixed beginning or end. riverrun's *ricorso* is + that made cryptographic: the round closes and starts over, an identity rotates to a + fresh angle, and a private action returns you to the crowd you came from. There is a + `ricorso` in the code and a section on it in the whitepaper. +- **Fluid identity.** The book's characters are never one fixed person; they shift and + recombine. riverrun ID is that made precise: one secret, a different unlinkable + identity in every context. +- **Circular flow.** Tracing money backward is tracing a river to its source, and a + funding graph that loops has no single source, which the tracer handles as + circularity. A book that ends where it begins is the right namesake for a tool about + where flows come from. + +Honest disanalogy: the novel gave the name, the cyclical frame, and the intuition, not +the cryptography. The STARK, the hashes, and the ruler are engineering; Joyce gets the +credit for the shape of the idea, not the math. + +## Read more + +- **[Whitepaper (PDF)](paper/riverrun.pdf)**: the philosophy, the cryptography, and + the mathematics of anonymity, with proofs. +- [`docs/WINDOWS.md`](docs/WINDOWS.md): the measurement tooling (the ruler, the + CLI, the adversarial harness) cross-compiles to a real, verified + `x86_64-pc-windows-gnu` binary, no WSL required; named honestly what still + needs it (on-chain program builds). +- [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md): every crate and program in this + repo, one line each, with an honest `[live]`/`[tested]`/`[blocked]` status, the + two membership-proof paths (Winterfell f128, Plonky3 Circle-STARK) compared + directly, and how `act()`'s `Backend`/`Prover` traits let a new chain, relayer, + or proof system plug in without touching `riverrun-core`'s math. +- [`docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md`](docs/DEVNET_ROUND.md): the live round, every signature. +- [`docs/POST_QUANTUM_VS_CURVE_POOLS.md`](docs/POST_QUANTUM_VS_CURVE_POOLS.md): hash + vs curve, honestly. +- [`docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md`](docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md): the ruler and the arithmetic behind + it. +- [`docs/DEFENSE.md`](docs/DEFENSE.md): honest answers to the hardest questions, + including the one piece still open, the trustless on-chain proof. +- [`docs/RELATED_WORK.md`](docs/RELATED_WORK.md): the literature riverrun sits in, + and where it departs from it, cited: anonymous authentication (PrivDID, eprint + 2026/127), nullifiers (PLUME, eprint 2022/1255), the anti-Sybil construction + riverrun should adopt next (Anonymous Self-Credentials, eprint 2025/618), + the anonymity metric riverrun's ruler implements (Serjantov & Danezis, PET + 2002), advertised-vs-true anonymity measurement on Ethereum (Tutela, arXiv + 2201.06811; a 2025 Tornado linkage study, arXiv 2510.09433), and prior + on-chain STARK verification on Solana (eprint 2025/1741; murkl; mosaic). + Named narrowly: three things riverrun does differently, not "we invented + privacy." + +MIT. **196 tests green** across the repo (117 in the default workspace, incl. the +unified act derivation and the act() SDK, plus the excluded heavy crates: STARK 31, +mirror-pool 24 e2e incl. the batch settlement, pool-zk 7, M31 16, M31 on-chain +verifier 1; one further M31 on-chain test is `#[ignore]`d with its failure +precisely diagnosed, not counted as green, see `docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md`). diff --git a/assets/banner.jpg b/assets/banner.jpg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e5b0de7 Binary files /dev/null and b/assets/banner.jpg differ diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-core/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8a493ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +[package] +name = "riverrun-core" +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +description = "Hash-based, post-quantum anonymity-set primitives for mirror-pool: commitments, Merkle set, nullifiers, and membership proofs." + +[dependencies] +blake3.workspace = true +thiserror.workspace = true +# Direct OS CSPRNG for minting member secrets. A privacy tool that leaves secret +# generation to the caller ships a footgun; `random()` closes that. +getrandom = "0.2" + +[dev-dependencies] diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/act.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/act.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80d7178e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/act.rs @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +//! riverrun act: one secret, bound to the pool action. +//! +//! The unified derivation behind the `act()` flow (see +//! `docs/RIVERRUN_ACT_DESIGN.md`). From one [`Secret`], one `context`, one +//! `action`, and one `round`, derive the three things a member needs to act +//! unlinkably, all tied to the same secret: +//! +//! - the **identity** you present in this context (unlinkable to any other), +//! - the **commitment** (Merkle leaf) you publish to join the round, binding the +//! secret to this exact context and action, +//! - the **nullifier** that spends your single action this round. +//! +//! This does not invent a parallel scheme. It composes the existing +//! [`commit`](crate::commitment::commit) and [`nullifier`](crate::nullifier::nullifier) +//! so the leaf and the nullifier are exactly the ones the membership relation and +//! the STARK prove; it only pins how `context` and `action` enter them. Everything +//! is domain-separated by context, so acting in one venue is unlinkable to another, +//! and a leak in one context does not cascade to the rest. + +use crate::commitment::{commit, Commitment, Secret}; +use crate::nullifier::{nullifier as core_nullifier, Nullifier, RoundId}; +use crate::{tagged_hash, Hash}; + +// Domain-separated so a context+action handle can never be reinterpreted as a +// context+round handle, an identity, a commitment, or a nullifier. +const ACT_IDENTITY: &[u8] = b"riverrun/act-identity/v1"; +const ACT_COMMIT: &[u8] = b"riverrun/act-commit/v1"; +const ACT_NULL: &[u8] = b"riverrun/act-null/v1"; + +/// Everything a member needs to act unlinkably in one context and round, all +/// derived from a single secret. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct ActBinding { + /// The identity you present in this context. An independent PRF output per + /// context, so it is unlinkable to your identity anywhere else. + pub identity: Hash, + /// The commitment (Merkle leaf) you publish to join the round. Binds the + /// secret to this exact context and action, so you execute the intent you + /// committed, not any intent. + pub commitment: Commitment, + /// The nullifier that spends your one action this round. Binds the secret to + /// this context and round; revealed once, so no second action in the round. + pub nullifier: Nullifier, +} + +/// The per-context identity handle: who you are in `context`, unlinkable to who +/// you are anywhere else. +pub fn identity(secret: &Secret, context: &[u8]) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(ACT_IDENTITY, &[secret.as_bytes(), context]) +} + +/// The commitment (Merkle leaf) you publish to join a round in `context` for +/// `action`. Depends on the secret, context, and action, but not the round, so +/// it can be computed and published *before* the round forms. It is the same leaf +/// the membership relation and the STARK prove; this only pins how context and +/// action enter it. +pub fn commitment(secret: &Secret, context: &[u8], action: &[u8]) -> Commitment { + let handle = tagged_hash(ACT_COMMIT, &[context, action]); + commit(secret, &handle) +} + +/// The nullifier that spends your one action in `context` at `round`. Known only +/// once the round is fixed, so anti-replay is exactly per (secret, context, +/// round). Folded into the existing nullifier scheme. +pub fn nullifier(secret: &Secret, context: &[u8], round: &[u8]) -> Nullifier { + let handle = tagged_hash(ACT_NULL, &[context, round]); + core_nullifier(secret, &RoundId::from_bytes(handle)) +} + +/// Derive the full binding for `secret` acting with `action` in `context` at +/// `round`. All three fields come from the one secret. +pub fn bind(secret: &Secret, context: &[u8], action: &[u8], round: &[u8]) -> ActBinding { + ActBinding { + identity: identity(secret, context), + commitment: commitment(secret, context, action), + nullifier: nullifier(secret, context, round), + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn s(b: u8) -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([b; 32]) + } + + #[test] + fn binding_is_deterministic() { + let a = bind(&s(1), b"dao-vote", b"yes", b"round-7"); + let b = bind(&s(1), b"dao-vote", b"yes", b"round-7"); + assert_eq!(a, b, "same inputs must give the same binding"); + } + + #[test] + fn contexts_are_unlinkable() { + // The whole point: one secret, a different everything per context. + let a = bind(&s(1), b"dao-vote", b"yes", b"round-7"); + let b = bind(&s(1), b"airdrop", b"yes", b"round-7"); + assert_ne!(a.identity, b.identity, "identity must differ across contexts"); + assert_ne!(a.commitment, b.commitment, "commitment must differ across contexts"); + assert_ne!(a.nullifier, b.nullifier, "nullifier must differ across contexts"); + } + + #[test] + fn the_action_binds_the_commitment_and_not_the_rest() { + // A different action is a different leaf, but your identity and your + // one-per-round nullifier are stable, so you still act at most once. + let a = bind(&s(1), b"amm", b"buy", b"round-7"); + let b = bind(&s(1), b"amm", b"sell", b"round-7"); + assert_ne!(a.commitment, b.commitment, "a different action is a different leaf"); + assert_eq!(a.identity, b.identity, "identity is per-context, not per-action"); + assert_eq!(a.nullifier, b.nullifier, "one nullifier per round holds across actions"); + } + + #[test] + fn the_round_binds_the_nullifier_and_not_the_rest() { + let a = bind(&s(1), b"amm", b"buy", b"round-7"); + let b = bind(&s(1), b"amm", b"buy", b"round-8"); + assert_ne!(a.nullifier, b.nullifier, "a new round is a fresh nullifier"); + assert_eq!(a.commitment, b.commitment, "the commitment does not depend on the round"); + assert_eq!(a.identity, b.identity, "nor does the identity"); + } + + #[test] + fn the_secret_binds_all_three() { + let a = bind(&s(1), b"amm", b"buy", b"round-7"); + let b = bind(&s(2), b"amm", b"buy", b"round-7"); + assert_ne!(a.identity, b.identity); + assert_ne!(a.commitment, b.commitment); + assert_ne!(a.nullifier, b.nullifier); + } + + #[test] + fn bind_composes_the_existing_commitment_and_nullifier() { + // The leaf and nullifier are exactly the ones the membership relation and + // the STARK prove, so act() does not run a parallel scheme beside them. + let sec = s(9); + let b = bind(&sec, b"amm", b"buy", b"round-7"); + let commit_handle = tagged_hash(ACT_COMMIT, &[b"amm", b"buy"]); + let null_handle = tagged_hash(ACT_NULL, &[b"amm", b"round-7"]); + assert_eq!(b.commitment, commit(&sec, &commit_handle)); + assert_eq!(b.nullifier, core_nullifier(&sec, &RoundId::from_bytes(null_handle))); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/commitment.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/commitment.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a160074 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/commitment.rs @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +//! Member commitments. +//! +//! A participant joins the anonymity set by publishing a commitment +//! +//! ```text +//! c = H( COMMITMENT_TAG ‖ secret ‖ identity ) +//! ``` +//! +//! where `secret` is a 32-byte value known only to the member and `identity` +//! binds the commitment to a public handle (e.g. the member's public key), so +//! two members cannot publish the same commitment without sharing a secret. +//! +//! The commitment is *hiding* (given `c`, an observer learns nothing about +//! `secret`, since BLAKE3 is a PRF under an unknown input) and *binding* (a +//! member cannot later claim a different `secret` for the same `c` without a +//! hash collision). + +use crate::{domain, tagged_hash, Hash}; + +/// A member's private witness. Never published; used to derive the commitment +/// and, per round, the nullifier. Losing it means losing the ability to act as +/// this member; leaking it lets someone else spend this member's per-round slot. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct Secret(pub [u8; 32]); + +impl Secret { + /// Wrap 32 raw bytes as a secret. + pub const fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self(bytes) + } + + pub const fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { + &self.0 + } + + /// Mint a fresh secret from the operating system's CSPRNG (256 bits of + /// entropy). This is the only correct way to create a member secret: the + /// commitment and every per-round nullifier are `H(secret ‖ …)`, so all of + /// the scheme's post-quantum hiding rests on this secret being unguessable. + /// A 256-bit secret costs a quantum adversary ~2^128 work under Grover — the + /// standard post-quantum security level. A low-entropy secret is breakable + /// regardless of the hash, which is why generation must not be left to the + /// caller. + /// + /// Panics only if the OS entropy source is unavailable, which on a supported + /// platform means the process cannot safely produce secrets at all. + pub fn random() -> Self { + let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; + getrandom::getrandom(&mut bytes) + .expect("OS CSPRNG must be available to mint a member secret"); + Self(bytes) + } +} + +// Deliberately no Debug: a secret must never end up in a log line or panic +// message. Callers that need to inspect one do so through `as_bytes`. +impl core::fmt::Debug for Secret { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result { + f.write_str("Secret()") + } +} + +/// A published commitment — one leaf of the anonymity-set Merkle tree. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct Commitment(pub Hash); + +impl Commitment { + pub const fn as_bytes(&self) -> &Hash { + &self.0 + } +} + +/// Derive a member's commitment from their secret and public identity. +/// +/// `identity` is any fixed-width public handle for the member — typically a +/// 32-byte public key. Binding the commitment to it prevents a griefer from +/// re-publishing another member's commitment as their own. +pub fn commit(secret: &Secret, identity: &[u8; 32]) -> Commitment { + Commitment(tagged_hash( + domain::COMMITMENT, + &[secret.as_bytes(), identity], + )) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u8) -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]) + } + + #[test] + fn commitment_is_deterministic() { + let s = secret(1); + let id = [9u8; 32]; + assert_eq!(commit(&s, &id), commit(&s, &id)); + } + + #[test] + fn different_secret_gives_different_commitment() { + let id = [9u8; 32]; + assert_ne!(commit(&secret(1), &id), commit(&secret(2), &id)); + } + + #[test] + fn different_identity_gives_different_commitment() { + let s = secret(1); + assert_ne!(commit(&s, &[9u8; 32]), commit(&s, &[10u8; 32])); + } + + #[test] + fn commitment_does_not_leak_secret_bytes() { + // The digest must not equal the raw secret (sanity: hashing happened). + let s = secret(7); + let c = commit(&s, &[0u8; 32]); + assert_ne!(c.as_bytes(), s.as_bytes()); + } + + #[test] + fn random_secret_is_high_entropy_and_unique() { + // Two freshly minted secrets must differ (a fixed/constant generator + // would collide), and a random secret must not be a degenerate + // all-equal-byte value like the test vectors — a weak smoke test that + // real OS entropy actually flowed into the 32 bytes. + let a = Secret::random(); + let b = Secret::random(); + assert_ne!(a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes(), "two OS-random secrets collided"); + let first = a.as_bytes()[0]; + assert!( + a.as_bytes().iter().any(|&byte| byte != first), + "random secret is a constant-byte value; entropy did not flow" + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95a281b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +//! # riverrun-core +//! +//! Hash-based, post-quantum anonymity-set primitives for `riverrun`. +//! +//! Every primitive here is built from a single collision-resistant hash +//! (BLAKE3), which is what makes the whole construction **post-quantum** (no +//! pairings, no discrete-log) and **transparent** (no trusted setup). The four +//! pieces: +//! +//! - [`commitment`] — a member joins the set by publishing `c = H(secret ‖ id)`. +//! - [`merkle`] — the anonymity set is a Merkle tree of commitments; its root +//! identifies the set and inclusion proofs witness membership. +//! - [`nullifier`] — `n = H(secret ‖ round)` lets a member act at most once per +//! round while staying unlinkable across rounds. +//! - [`membership`] — the statement a participant must prove without revealing +//! the witness: *"I know a `secret` whose commitment is in the set with root +//! `R`, and my nullifier for this round is `n`"* — without revealing which +//! leaf. (The relation only; whether the *backend* proof hides the witness +//! formally is a property of that backend — see `riverrun-stark`, which is +//! succinct and post-quantum but not formally zero-knowledge.) +//! +//! This crate is the **specification**, not the protocol: it defines the +//! primitives and the relation, and nothing here produces a proof. The pool that +//! actually runs commit → execute → settle lives in `riverrun-pool-zk`, driven by +//! the post-quantum STARK in `riverrun-stark`. There used to be a second pool +//! here backed by a "reference proof" that carried the witness in the clear; it +//! was useful to exercise the protocol before the STARK existed, and it is gone +//! now that the STARK does the job — shipping a non-hiding pool next to a hiding +//! one in a privacy repo is a footgun regardless of how loudly the README says +//! which is which. +//! +//! All domain separation is explicit: each hash use is prefixed with a unique, +//! versioned tag so a value in one role can never be reinterpreted in another. + +pub mod act; +pub mod commitment; +pub mod membership; +pub mod merkle; +pub mod nullifier; +pub mod rln; +pub mod rotatable; + +/// A 32-byte digest — the output of every hash in this crate. +pub type Hash = [u8; 32]; + +/// Domain-separation tags. Each distinct hash use gets its own versioned tag so +/// that, e.g., a commitment can never collide with or be reinterpreted as a +/// nullifier or a Merkle node. +pub(crate) mod domain { + pub const COMMITMENT: &[u8] = b"riverrun/commitment/v1"; + pub const NULLIFIER: &[u8] = b"riverrun/nullifier/v1"; + pub const MERKLE_LEAF: &[u8] = b"riverrun/merkle-leaf/v1"; + pub const MERKLE_NODE: &[u8] = b"riverrun/merkle-node/v1"; +} + +/// Domain-separated hash of a sequence of byte slices. +/// +/// The `tag` is absorbed first, then each part in order, so the result is +/// unambiguous with respect to both the role (`tag`) and the field boundaries +/// (the parts are absorbed as-is; callers pass fixed-width fields, so there is +/// no length-extension ambiguity between them). +pub(crate) fn tagged_hash(tag: &[u8], parts: &[&[u8]]) -> Hash { + let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new(); + hasher.update(tag); + for part in parts { + hasher.update(part); + } + *hasher.finalize().as_bytes() +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/membership.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/membership.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1ea0a33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/membership.rs @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +//! The membership relation — the statement a participant must prove without +//! revealing the witness. (Whether the backend proof hides the witness *formally* +//! is a property of that backend; `riverrun-stark` is succinct and post-quantum +//! but not formally zero-knowledge.) +//! +//! To act in a round, a participant proves: +//! +//! > *"I know a `secret` and `identity` such that (1) `c = commit(secret, +//! > identity)` is a leaf under the public set root `R`, and (2) my nullifier +//! > for this round is `n = nullifier(secret, round_id)`"* +//! +//! revealing only the **public** triple `(R, round_id, n)` — never `secret`, +//! `identity`, `c`, or the leaf index. That hiding is what unlinks the acting +//! key from the member: the observer learns a valid member acted and sees the +//! nullifier `n`, but cannot map `n` back to a commitment. +//! +//! This module defines the *relation* — the exact set of constraints a valid +//! witness must satisfy. [`check_relation`] evaluates it in the clear. It is +//! **not** zero-knowledge on its own (it takes the witness as input); it is the +//! specification of the arithmetic circuit that the post-quantum STARK backend +//! proves. Building the relation as pure, side-effect-free hash constraints is +//! deliberate: it is exactly the shape a FRI-STARK over a hash-friendly field +//! arithmetizes, so the transparent, post-quantum prover proves *this* and +//! nothing more. +//! +//! Nothing here proves anything. The proof that enforces this relation without +//! revealing the witness is the STARK in `riverrun-stark`, whose AIR binds the +//! same two constraints (nullifier from the proving secret, membership under the +//! public root) plus the committed action, with public inputs +//! `{root, nullifier, round, action}`. + +use crate::{ + commitment::{commit, Commitment, Secret}, + merkle::{verify as merkle_verify, InclusionProof}, + nullifier::{nullifier, Nullifier, RoundId}, + Hash, +}; + +/// The public inputs to the membership proof — everything the on-chain program +/// and any observer sees. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct MembershipStatement { + /// The anonymity-set root this proof is against. + pub root: Hash, + /// The round being acted in. + pub round_id: RoundId, + /// The nullifier the participant reveals (spent exactly once per round). + pub nullifier: Nullifier, +} + +/// The private witness — known only to the participant, never transmitted by the +/// membership proof (succinct and post-quantum; not formally zero-knowledge — +/// see `riverrun-stark`). +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct MembershipWitness { + pub secret: Secret, + pub identity: [u8; 32], + pub inclusion: InclusionProof, +} + +/// Evaluate the membership relation in the clear. +/// +/// Returns `true` iff the witness satisfies every constraint the statement +/// asserts. This is the single source of truth for what the STARK circuit must +/// enforce. It takes the witness as input, so it is emphatically **not** a +/// proof system — it is the relation the prover has to satisfy. +/// +/// Constraints: +/// 1. **Nullifier binding:** `nullifier(secret, round_id) == statement.nullifier`. +/// Ties the revealed nullifier to the same secret proving membership, so a +/// participant cannot present someone else's membership with their own +/// nullifier (or vice versa). +/// 2. **Membership:** `commit(secret, identity)` verifies under `statement.root` +/// via the inclusion path. Proves the committed member is in the set. +pub fn check_relation(statement: &MembershipStatement, witness: &MembershipWitness) -> bool { + let expected_nullifier = nullifier(&witness.secret, &statement.round_id); + if expected_nullifier != statement.nullifier { + return false; + } + let commitment: Commitment = commit(&witness.secret, &witness.identity); + merkle_verify(&statement.root, &commitment, &witness.inclusion) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::merkle::MerkleTree; + + struct Member { + secret: Secret, + identity: [u8; 32], + commitment: Commitment, + } + + fn member(byte: u8) -> Member { + let secret = Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]); + let identity = [byte.wrapping_add(100); 32]; + let commitment = commit(&secret, &identity); + Member { + secret, + identity, + commitment, + } + } + + /// Build a set, then a valid statement+witness for member `idx` in `round`. + fn setup( + members: &[Member], + idx: usize, + round: RoundId, + ) -> (MembershipStatement, MembershipWitness) { + let commitments: Vec = members.iter().map(|m| m.commitment).collect(); + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&commitments).unwrap(); + let m = &members[idx]; + let statement = MembershipStatement { + root: tree.root(), + round_id: round, + nullifier: nullifier(&m.secret, &round), + }; + let witness = MembershipWitness { + secret: m.secret, + identity: m.identity, + inclusion: tree.prove(idx).unwrap(), + }; + (statement, witness) + } + + #[test] + fn valid_witness_satisfies_relation() { + let members: Vec = (0..6).map(|i| member(i as u8)).collect(); + let round = RoundId::from_bytes([42u8; 32]); + for idx in 0..members.len() { + let (st, w) = setup(&members, idx, round); + assert!(check_relation(&st, &w), "member {idx} must satisfy"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_nullifier_breaks_relation() { + let members: Vec = (0..4).map(|i| member(i as u8)).collect(); + let round = RoundId::from_bytes([7u8; 32]); + let (mut st, w) = setup(&members, 1, round); + // Claim a different member's nullifier. + st.nullifier = nullifier(&members[3].secret, &round); + assert!(!check_relation(&st, &w)); + } + + #[test] + fn non_member_secret_breaks_relation() { + let members: Vec = (0..4).map(|i| member(i as u8)).collect(); + let round = RoundId::from_bytes([7u8; 32]); + let (st, mut w) = setup(&members, 0, round); + // A secret not in the set, with a matching nullifier — still no valid path. + let outsider = member(250); + w.secret = outsider.secret; + w.identity = outsider.identity; + // Recompute the nullifier so constraint 1 passes; constraint 2 must fail. + let st2 = MembershipStatement { + nullifier: nullifier(&outsider.secret, &round), + ..st + }; + assert!(!check_relation(&st2, &w)); + } + + #[test] + fn nullifier_across_rounds_is_unlinkable_but_provable() { + let members: Vec = (0..4).map(|i| member(i as u8)).collect(); + let (st_a, w_a) = setup(&members, 2, RoundId::from_bytes([1u8; 32])); + let (st_b, w_b) = setup(&members, 2, RoundId::from_bytes([2u8; 32])); + // Same member proves membership in both rounds... + assert!(check_relation(&st_a, &w_a)); + assert!(check_relation(&st_b, &w_b)); + // ...but the two nullifiers reveal no link. + assert_ne!(st_a.nullifier, st_b.nullifier); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/merkle.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/merkle.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4647b3c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/merkle.rs @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +//! The anonymity set as a binary Merkle tree. +//! +//! Members' commitments are the leaves; the root identifies the set. An +//! inclusion proof witnesses "this commitment is a member" in `O(log n)` hashes. +//! The membership *proof* (see [`crate::membership`]) proves knowledge of such a +//! witness without transmitting it, so the acting party does not reveal which +//! leaf (hiding scope per `riverrun-stark`: succinct, post-quantum, not formally +//! zero-knowledge). +//! +//! Hashing is domain-separated at both levels: +//! +//! ```text +//! leaf(c) = H( MERKLE_LEAF_TAG ‖ c ) +//! node(l, r) = H( MERKLE_NODE_TAG ‖ l ‖ r ) +//! ``` +//! +//! Separating leaf and node hashing defends against second-preimage attacks +//! that would otherwise let an internal node be presented as a leaf. +//! +//! The tree is padded up to a power-of-two width with a fixed, publicly-known +//! empty-leaf value, so proof shape (depth) is uniform and does not leak the +//! exact member count beyond the padded width. + +use crate::{commitment::Commitment, domain, tagged_hash, Hash}; + +/// The value used to pad the leaf layer up to a power of two. Public and fixed, +/// so it can never be mistaken for a real member commitment (a real commitment +/// would require a preimage under the commitment domain tag, which this is not). +pub const EMPTY_LEAF: Hash = [0u8; 32]; + +/// Errors from building or querying the tree. +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)] +pub enum MerkleError { + #[error("cannot build a Merkle tree from an empty member set")] + Empty, + #[error("leaf index {index} out of range for a tree of {len} members")] + IndexOutOfRange { index: usize, len: usize }, +} + +/// A witness that a particular leaf sits under a particular root. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct InclusionProof { + /// The leaf's index in the (unpadded) member ordering. + pub index: usize, + /// Sibling hashes from the leaf level up to (but excluding) the root, one + /// per level. + pub siblings: Vec, +} + +/// A built anonymity set: the leaf layer plus the cached root. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct MerkleTree { + /// Padded leaf layer (power-of-two length), each already leaf-hashed. + leaves: Vec, + /// Number of real members (before padding). + len: usize, + root: Hash, +} + +/// Hash a commitment into its leaf-layer digest. +fn hash_leaf(commitment: &Commitment) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(domain::MERKLE_LEAF, &[commitment.as_bytes()]) +} + +/// Combine two child digests into their parent digest. +fn hash_node(left: &Hash, right: &Hash) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(domain::MERKLE_NODE, &[left, right]) +} + +impl MerkleTree { + /// Build the tree from an ordered list of member commitments. + /// + /// The order defines each member's index; it must be stable between the + /// prover (who builds an inclusion proof) and anyone who published the root. + pub fn build(members: &[Commitment]) -> Result { + if members.is_empty() { + return Err(MerkleError::Empty); + } + let len = members.len(); + + let mut leaves: Vec = members.iter().map(hash_leaf).collect(); + let width = len.next_power_of_two(); + leaves.resize(width, EMPTY_LEAF); + + let root = Self::compute_root(&leaves); + Ok(Self { leaves, len, root }) + } + + /// Fold a full (power-of-two) leaf layer up to the root. + fn compute_root(leaves: &[Hash]) -> Hash { + debug_assert!(leaves.len().is_power_of_two()); + let mut level = leaves.to_vec(); + while level.len() > 1 { + level = level + .chunks_exact(2) + .map(|pair| hash_node(&pair[0], &pair[1])) + .collect(); + } + level[0] + } + + /// The set root — the public identifier of this anonymity set. + pub fn root(&self) -> Hash { + self.root + } + + /// Number of real members (excluding padding). + pub fn len(&self) -> usize { + self.len + } + + /// Whether the set has no real members (never true for a built tree, which + /// rejects the empty case, but provided for lint-friendliness). + pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { + self.len == 0 + } + + /// Produce an inclusion proof for the member at `index`. + pub fn prove(&self, index: usize) -> Result { + if index >= self.len { + return Err(MerkleError::IndexOutOfRange { + index, + len: self.len, + }); + } + let mut siblings = Vec::new(); + let mut level = self.leaves.clone(); + let mut idx = index; + while level.len() > 1 { + let sibling = if idx.is_multiple_of(2) { + level[idx + 1] + } else { + level[idx - 1] + }; + siblings.push(sibling); + level = level + .chunks_exact(2) + .map(|pair| hash_node(&pair[0], &pair[1])) + .collect(); + idx /= 2; + } + Ok(InclusionProof { index, siblings }) + } +} + +/// Verify an inclusion proof: recompute the root from `commitment` and the +/// proof's sibling path, and check it matches `root`. +/// +/// This is the cheap, standard membership check. It reveals `commitment` (and +/// hence which leaf), so it is used only *inside* the proof circuit (where the +/// path is a private witness) — never on its own when unlinkability is required. +/// (The circuit's hiding scope is `riverrun-stark`'s: succinct, post-quantum, +/// not formally zero-knowledge.) +pub fn verify(root: &Hash, commitment: &Commitment, proof: &InclusionProof) -> bool { + let mut acc = hash_leaf(commitment); + let mut idx = proof.index; + for sibling in &proof.siblings { + acc = if idx.is_multiple_of(2) { + hash_node(&acc, sibling) + } else { + hash_node(sibling, &acc) + }; + idx /= 2; + } + &acc == root +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::commitment::{commit, Secret}; + + fn member(byte: u8) -> Commitment { + commit(&Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]), &[byte; 32]) + } + + fn members(n: usize) -> Vec { + (0..n).map(|i| member(i as u8)).collect() + } + + #[test] + fn empty_set_is_rejected() { + assert_eq!(MerkleTree::build(&[]).unwrap_err(), MerkleError::Empty); + } + + #[test] + fn every_member_has_a_valid_proof() { + let ms = members(5); // non-power-of-two exercises padding + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&ms).unwrap(); + let root = tree.root(); + for (i, m) in ms.iter().enumerate() { + let proof = tree.prove(i).unwrap(); + assert!(verify(&root, m, &proof), "member {i} should verify"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn proof_for_wrong_commitment_fails() { + let ms = members(4); + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&ms).unwrap(); + let proof = tree.prove(0).unwrap(); + // A non-member commitment with member 0's path must not verify. + assert!(!verify(&tree.root(), &member(200), &proof)); + } + + #[test] + fn tampered_sibling_fails() { + let ms = members(4); + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&ms).unwrap(); + let mut proof = tree.prove(2).unwrap(); + proof.siblings[0][0] ^= 0x01; + assert!(!verify(&tree.root(), &ms[2], &proof)); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_index_in_proof_fails() { + let ms = members(4); + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&ms).unwrap(); + let mut proof = tree.prove(1).unwrap(); + proof.index = 3; // path no longer matches the claimed position + assert!(!verify(&tree.root(), &ms[1], &proof)); + } + + #[test] + fn out_of_range_index_is_rejected() { + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&members(3)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + tree.prove(3).unwrap_err(), + MerkleError::IndexOutOfRange { index: 3, len: 3 } + ); + } + + #[test] + fn single_member_tree_works() { + let ms = members(1); + let tree = MerkleTree::build(&ms).unwrap(); + let proof = tree.prove(0).unwrap(); + assert!(verify(&tree.root(), &ms[0], &proof)); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/nullifier.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/nullifier.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7071b14a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/nullifier.rs @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +//! Per-round nullifiers. +//! +//! To act in a round, a member reveals a nullifier +//! +//! ```text +//! n = H( NULLIFIER_TAG ‖ secret ‖ round_id ) +//! ``` +//! +//! Two properties matter, both from BLAKE3 being a PRF keyed by the secret: +//! +//! - **One action per member per round.** `n` is deterministic in +//! `(secret, round_id)`, so a member who tries to act twice in the same round +//! reveals the same `n` twice — the on-chain nullifier registry rejects the +//! second. This is the Sybil / double-participation defense. +//! - **Unlinkable across rounds.** `n` for round `r` and `n'` for round `r'` +//! are independent PRF outputs; an observer cannot tell they came from the +//! same member. So participating in many rounds does not build a linkable +//! trail — the property naive per-round schemes fail to provide. +//! +//! Crucially the nullifier is derived from the `secret` alone (not from the +//! commitment or any published value), so revealing `n` does not reveal *which* +//! commitment it corresponds to. Preserving that unlinkability against a party +//! that also sees the proof requires a formally zero-knowledge backend; the +//! shipped Winterfell STARK is succinct and post-quantum but not one (see +//! `riverrun-stark`). On-chain this is moot — only the nullifier is persisted, +//! and it is a PRF output — so the permanent record stays unlinkable regardless. + +use crate::{commitment::Secret, domain, tagged_hash, Hash}; + +/// A round identifier. Any value both sides agree pins down "this round" — in +/// practice a hash of (set root, epoch/slot window, action parameters). +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct RoundId(pub [u8; 32]); + +impl RoundId { + pub const fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self(bytes) + } + + pub const fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { + &self.0 + } +} + +/// A revealed nullifier — the on-chain registry stores the set of these that +/// have been spent, and rejects repeats within a round. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct Nullifier(pub Hash); + +impl Nullifier { + pub const fn as_bytes(&self) -> &Hash { + &self.0 + } +} + +/// Derive a member's nullifier for a given round from their secret. +pub fn nullifier(secret: &Secret, round: &RoundId) -> Nullifier { + Nullifier(tagged_hash( + domain::NULLIFIER, + &[secret.as_bytes(), round.as_bytes()], + )) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u8) -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]) + } + + fn round(byte: u8) -> RoundId { + RoundId::from_bytes([byte; 32]) + } + + #[test] + fn nullifier_is_deterministic_per_member_and_round() { + // Same member, same round → same nullifier (double-action is detectable). + assert_eq!( + nullifier(&secret(1), &round(5)), + nullifier(&secret(1), &round(5)) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn same_member_different_round_is_unlinkable() { + // Different rounds → different nullifiers, with no visible relation. + assert_ne!( + nullifier(&secret(1), &round(5)), + nullifier(&secret(1), &round(6)) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn different_members_same_round_differ() { + assert_ne!( + nullifier(&secret(1), &round(5)), + nullifier(&secret(2), &round(5)) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn nullifier_is_domain_separated_from_commitment() { + // A nullifier and a commitment built from the same 32-byte inputs must + // not collide — the domain tags differ, so the digests differ. + use crate::commitment::commit; + let s = secret(3); + let r = round(3); + let n = nullifier(&s, &r); + let c = commit(&s, r.as_bytes()); + assert_ne!(n.as_bytes(), c.as_bytes()); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/rln.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/rln.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70d7af8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/rln.rs @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +//! Rate-limiting the cloak — act at most `N` times per context, and the `N+1`-th +//! act unmasks you. +//! +//! The other powers of the [rotatable piece](crate::rotatable) hide *who* acted. +//! This one adds an accountable rate limit **without** giving that up, using Shamir +//! secret sharing: +//! +//! - For a context `θ` with limit `N`, the holder's identity `s` is the constant +//! term of a degree-`N` polynomial `P` whose other coefficients are derived +//! deterministically from `s` and `θ` (so the holder cannot lie about `P`). +//! - Each action reveals **one point** `(x, P(x))`, where `x` comes from the action +//! itself (so the point cannot be chosen freely). One point per action. +//! - Up to `N` points leave `P` (degree `N`) under-determined: `s` stays hidden, the +//! holder stays anonymous. The `N+1`-th point over-determines `P`: anyone can +//! Lagrange-interpolate `P(0) = s` and unmask the over-actor. Spam is priced in +//! your own de-anonymization. +//! +//! This is the standard RLN (rate-limiting nullifier) construction, over a prime +//! field, keyed by a hash-derived polynomial — post-quantum and transparent like the +//! rest of `riverrun-core`. The field arithmetic here is a small, self-contained +//! `p = 2^61 - 1` implementation; a production circuit would use the pool's STARK +//! field, but the relation and the recovery are identical. + +use crate::commitment::Secret; +use crate::{tagged_hash, Hash}; + +/// The prime field the shares live in: the Mersenne prime `2^61 - 1`. Small enough +/// that products fit in a `u128`, large enough that a hash-derived point is +/// effectively uniform. +const P: u128 = (1u128 << 61) - 1; + +const RLN_COEF: &[u8] = b"riverrun/rln-coef/v1"; +const RLN_X: &[u8] = b"riverrun/rln-x/v1"; + +/// What can go wrong recovering a secret from shares. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum RlnError { + /// Two interpolation points share an `x`-coordinate — a malformed or adversarial + /// transcript. Recovery at `x=0` is undefined, so [`recover`] refuses rather than + /// dividing by zero. Callers must supply points with distinct `x`. + DuplicateX, +} + +fn fadd(a: u128, b: u128) -> u128 { + (a + b) % P +} +fn fsub(a: u128, b: u128) -> u128 { + (a + P - b % P) % P +} +fn fmul(a: u128, b: u128) -> u128 { + (a % P) * (b % P) % P +} +fn fpow(mut a: u128, mut e: u128) -> u128 { + let mut r = 1u128; + a %= P; + while e > 0 { + if e & 1 == 1 { + r = fmul(r, a); + } + a = fmul(a, a); + e >>= 1; + } + r +} +/// Multiplicative inverse via Fermat's little theorem (`a^(p-2)`); `a` must be nonzero. +fn finv(a: u128) -> u128 { + fpow(a, P - 2) +} + +/// Map a 32-byte value to a field element (its first 8 bytes, reduced). +fn to_field(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> u128 { + let mut b = [0u8; 8]; + b.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..8]); + (u64::from_le_bytes(b) as u128) % P +} + +/// The identity value that the `N+1`-th action recovers: the piece's secret, as a +/// field element. This is what unmasks an over-actor. +pub fn identity(secret: &Secret) -> u128 { + to_field(secret.as_bytes()) +} + +/// The `i`-th (1-based) polynomial coefficient for `(secret, θ)`: `H(secret ‖ θ ‖ i)` +/// reduced to the field. Deterministic and bound to the context, so the holder +/// commits to one polynomial per context and cannot equivocate. +fn coefficient(secret: &Secret, theta: u64, i: usize) -> u128 { + let h: Hash = tagged_hash( + RLN_COEF, + &[secret.as_bytes(), &theta.to_le_bytes(), &(i as u64).to_le_bytes()], + ); + to_field(&h) +} + +/// The action point `x` for a use in context `θ` acting on `action`: +/// `H(RLN_X ‖ θ ‖ action)` reduced to the field (remapped away from `0`). +/// +/// Deriving `x` from the action content — rather than letting the actor choose it — is +/// a **security requirement**, not a convenience. It makes `x` unpredictable and binds +/// it to the act, so (a) two distinct actions yield two distinct points, which is what +/// makes the `N+1`-th action over-determine the polynomial, and (b) an actor cannot +/// suppress that point by replaying an `x`, nor pick `x=0` (which would publish `P(0)=s` +/// directly). This is the invariant the whole rate limit rests on. +pub fn action_point(theta: u64, action: &[u8]) -> u128 { + let h: Hash = tagged_hash(RLN_X, &[&theta.to_le_bytes(), action]); + match to_field(&h) { + 0 => 1, // x=0 would reveal the secret as P(0); ~2^-61 event, remapped + x => x, + } +} + +/// The `(x, P(x))` point a use publishes, with `x` correctly derived from the action +/// via [`action_point`]. **Prefer this** over calling [`share`] with a hand-chosen `x`; +/// the low-level `share` is for callers who derive `x` themselves and understand the +/// invariant above. +pub fn share_for_action(secret: &Secret, theta: u64, limit: usize, action: &[u8]) -> (u128, u128) { + let x = action_point(theta, action); + (x, share(secret, theta, limit, x)) +} + +/// The share revealed by one action: `P(x) = s + a_1·x + … + a_N·x^N`, where the +/// action's point is `x`. `limit` is `N` (the number of actions allowed before the +/// secret leaks). Returns the field element `P(x)`; the pair `(x, P(x))` is what the +/// action publishes. +/// +/// `x` **must** be unpredictable, nonzero, and unique per action — use [`action_point`] +/// (or [`share_for_action`]) to produce it. A freely chosen or repeated `x` breaks the +/// rate limit; `x=0` publishes the secret. +pub fn share(secret: &Secret, theta: u64, limit: usize, x: u128) -> u128 { + let x = x % P; + let mut acc = identity(secret); // P(0) = s + let mut xp = 1u128; + for i in 1..=limit { + xp = fmul(xp, x); + acc = fadd(acc, fmul(coefficient(secret, theta, i), xp)); + } + acc +} + +/// Recover `P(0)` from a set of `(x, P(x))` points by Lagrange interpolation at 0. +/// Given `N+1` genuine points from the same context, this returns the holder's +/// [`identity`] — the over-actor is unmasked. Given fewer than `N+1`, it interpolates +/// a *different* polynomial and returns some other value, so `s` stays hidden. +/// +/// Returns [`RlnError::DuplicateX`] if two points share an `x` (a malformed or +/// adversarial transcript). It does **not** panic: recovery runs on inputs an attacker +/// may craft, so a bad transcript must be an error, not a crash. +pub fn recover(points: &[(u128, u128)]) -> Result { + let mut acc = 0u128; + for (j, &(xj, yj)) in points.iter().enumerate() { + let mut num = 1u128; // ∏_{m≠j} (0 - x_m) + let mut den = 1u128; // ∏_{m≠j} (x_j - x_m) + for (m, &(xm, _)) in points.iter().enumerate() { + if m == j { + continue; + } + num = fmul(num, fsub(0, xm)); + let d = fsub(xj, xm); + if d == 0 { + return Err(RlnError::DuplicateX); + } + den = fmul(den, d); + } + acc = fadd(acc, fmul(yj, fmul(num, finv(den)))); + } + Ok(acc) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u8) -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]) + } + + #[test] + fn the_n_plus_one_th_action_unmasks_the_over_actor() { + // limit N=2: two actions are fine, the third recovers the secret. + let s = secret(1); + let theta = 42u64; + let limit = 2; + // three distinct action points in the same context + let pts: Vec<(u128, u128)> = [7u128, 99, 12345] + .iter() + .map(|&x| (x, share(&s, theta, limit, x))) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(recover(&pts).unwrap(), identity(&s), "N+1 points must recover the secret"); + } + + #[test] + fn staying_under_the_limit_keeps_the_secret_hidden() { + // Only N=2 points revealed (the limit): the degree-2 secret is not pinned. + let s = secret(1); + let theta = 42u64; + let limit = 2; + let pts: Vec<(u128, u128)> = + [7u128, 99].iter().map(|&x| (x, share(&s, theta, limit, x))).collect(); + // interpolating 2 points as a line gives a different constant term than s + assert_ne!(recover(&pts).unwrap(), identity(&s), "N points must not reveal the secret"); + } + + #[test] + fn points_from_different_contexts_do_not_combine() { + // Acting once in each of three different epochs is NOT over-acting: the + // polynomials differ, so the points do not lie on one curve and recovery + // yields garbage, not the secret. + let s = secret(1); + let limit = 2; + let pts: Vec<(u128, u128)> = [(100u64, 7u128), (200, 7), (300, 7)] + .iter() + .map(|&(theta, x)| (x + theta as u128, share(&s, theta, limit, x))) + .collect(); + assert_ne!(recover(&pts).unwrap(), identity(&s), "cross-context points must not unmask"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_share_is_deterministic() { + let s = secret(1); + assert_eq!(share(&s, 42, 2, 7), share(&s, 42, 2, 7)); + // and different actors give different shares at the same point + assert_ne!(share(&s, 42, 2, 7), share(&secret(2), 42, 2, 7)); + } + + #[test] + fn field_inverse_is_correct() { + for a in [1u128, 2, 3, 7, 12345, P - 1] { + assert_eq!(fmul(a, finv(a)), 1, "a * a^-1 must be 1"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn the_action_point_is_bound_to_the_action_and_context() { + // F2: x is derived from the action, so distinct actions give distinct points, + // the same action is deterministic, and the context separates them. + assert_ne!(action_point(1, b"buy"), action_point(1, b"sell"), "distinct actions -> distinct x"); + assert_eq!(action_point(1, b"buy"), action_point(1, b"buy"), "deterministic"); + assert_ne!(action_point(1, b"buy"), action_point(2, b"buy"), "context separates x"); + // and x is never 0 (x=0 would publish P(0)=s) + for a in [b"".as_slice(), b"buy", b"x", b"a longer action payload"] { + assert_ne!(action_point(7, a), 0, "x must never be 0"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn share_for_action_uses_the_derived_point() { + let s = secret(1); + let (x, y) = share_for_action(&s, 42, 2, b"vote yes"); + assert_eq!(x, action_point(42, b"vote yes")); + assert_eq!(y, share(&s, 42, 2, x)); + } + + #[test] + fn n_plus_one_distinct_actions_unmask_via_action_point() { + // The rate limit enforced end-to-end through the safe API: limit N=2, three + // distinct actions in one context each yield a distinct point, and the third + // over-determines the polynomial, recovering the secret. + let s = secret(1); + let theta = 42u64; + let pts: Vec<(u128, u128)> = [b"act-1".as_slice(), b"act-2", b"act-3"] + .iter() + .map(|a| share_for_action(&s, theta, 2, a)) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(recover(&pts).unwrap(), identity(&s), "N+1 distinct actions unmask"); + } + + #[test] + fn recover_errors_on_duplicate_x_instead_of_panicking() { + // F3: a malformed transcript (two points sharing an x) is an error, not a crash. + let pts = [(7u128, 100u128), (7u128, 200u128)]; + assert_eq!(recover(&pts), Err(RlnError::DuplicateX)); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-core/src/rotatable.rs b/crates/riverrun-core/src/rotatable.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa53c60b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-core/src/rotatable.rs @@ -0,0 +1,687 @@ +//! The rotatable piece — one secret, an angle for every context. +//! +//! Picture a puzzle piece. It has a shape. Turn it to a new angle and it presents +//! a *different* shape, each with its own matching counterpart. A rotatable piece +//! is that idea made cryptographic: a single [`Secret`] is the piece, and any +//! public **angle** `θ` (an epoch, a round, a verifier, a domain — any label) +//! derives its own **shape** and its own **fit**. +//! +//! Three properties hold, and they are the reason this is a *construction* and not +//! a metaphor: +//! +//! - **Binding within an angle.** At a fixed angle, the secret determines exactly +//! one shape and one fit. You cannot present a different shape for the same +//! `(secret, angle)` without a hash collision. +//! - **Unlinkability across angles.** `shape(θ)` and `shape(θ')` are independent +//! PRF outputs. An observer cannot tell they came from the same piece, so turning +//! the piece across contexts does not build a linkable trail. +//! - **Only the holder can turn it.** Advancing to the next angle (the [`turn`] +//! tag) requires the secret. Others see disconnected shapes; the holder can later +//! *prove in zero knowledge* that two angles are the same piece (spending the turn +//! tag once, so one piece cannot fork into many seats) — this is riverrun's +//! *ricorso* (see `docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md` §1d and [[project_riverrun...]]). +//! +//! Everything is one collision-resistant hash (BLAKE3), so the whole construction +//! is post-quantum and transparent, exactly like the rest of `riverrun-core`. +//! +//! [`turn`]: Piece::turn + +use crate::commitment::Secret; +use crate::{tagged_hash, Hash}; + +/// A public angle: any label that names a context the piece is viewed from. +/// The label space is unbounded — a piece has an angle for every context there is. +pub type Angle = u64; + +// Domain-separated so a shape can never be reinterpreted as a fit or a turn tag, +// and none of them collide with a commitment, nullifier, or Merkle node. +const SHAPE: &[u8] = b"riverrun/piece-shape/v1"; +const FIT: &[u8] = b"riverrun/piece-fit/v1"; +const TURN: &[u8] = b"riverrun/piece-turn/v1"; +const GRANT: &[u8] = b"riverrun/piece-grant/v1"; +const CRED: &[u8] = b"riverrun/piece-credential/v1"; + +/// A rotatable piece: a single [`Secret`] viewed from any angle. Borrow one with +/// [`Secret::piece`]. +pub struct Piece<'a>(&'a Secret); + +impl Secret { + /// View this secret as a rotatable piece. + pub fn piece(&self) -> Piece<'_> { + Piece(self) + } +} + +impl Piece<'_> { + /// The piece's **shape** at angle `θ`: `H(shape ‖ secret ‖ θ)`. What the piece + /// looks like in this context — the value it publishes (e.g. a commitment leaf + /// for the angle's anonymity set). + pub fn shape(&self, theta: Angle) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(SHAPE, &[self.0.as_bytes(), &theta.to_le_bytes()]) + } + + /// The piece's **fit** at angle `θ`: `H(fit ‖ secret ‖ θ)`. The matching + /// counterpart revealed when the piece acts in this context (the per-angle + /// nullifier — spent once, unlinkable to any other angle). + pub fn fit(&self, theta: Angle) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(FIT, &[self.0.as_bytes(), &theta.to_le_bytes()]) + } + + /// The **turn** tag from angle `θ` to `θ+1`: `H(turn ‖ secret ‖ θ ‖ θ+1)`. + /// Derivable only with the secret, so only the holder can rotate the piece. It + /// is the witness that two angles are the same piece; revealed once (as a + /// migration nullifier) it proves continuity in zero knowledge while stopping a + /// piece from forking into several. + pub fn turn(&self, theta: Angle) -> Hash { + tagged_hash( + TURN, + &[ + self.0.as_bytes(), + &theta.to_le_bytes(), + &theta.wrapping_add(1).to_le_bytes(), + ], + ) + } + + /// A **scoped delegation grant**: `H(grant ‖ secret ‖ θ ‖ delegate)`. Authorizes + /// `delegate` to act as this piece in context `θ` — and **only** there. Derivable + /// only by the holder (it needs the secret), bound to the specific `delegate` + /// (someone else's key cannot use it) and to the single angle `θ` (it grants + /// nothing anywhere else). Let an agent act as an anonymous member of one DAO + /// round, one pool, one vote — never your whole identity. + pub fn grant(&self, theta: Angle, delegate: &[u8; 32]) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(GRANT, &[self.0.as_bytes(), &theta.to_le_bytes(), delegate]) + } + + /// The piece's **credential leaf** for an attribute: `H(cred ‖ secret ‖ attr)`. + /// An issuer who has verified that this holder has attribute `attr` (over 18, a + /// verified member, KYC-cleared) publishes this leaf into their attribute set. + /// The holder can later prove, per context, that they carry the attribute — + /// without revealing the secret, the issuer's whole list, or any other context. + pub fn credential(&self, attr: &[u8; 32]) -> Hash { + tagged_hash(CRED, &[self.0.as_bytes(), attr]) + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// The turn relation — what a zero-knowledge proof of a rotation establishes. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +use crate::commitment::Commitment; +use crate::merkle::{verify as merkle_verify, InclusionProof}; + +/// The **public** statement a rotation proof reveals: rotate a piece that was a +/// member of the previous angle's set, revealing only the migration tag. +/// +/// It says: *"the holder of some piece that appeared as a leaf under `prev_root` +/// rotated it from `angle`, and the migration tag they reveal is `turn_tag`"* — +/// without revealing the piece, its shape, or its position. Revealing `turn_tag` +/// exactly once (an on-chain registry rejects repeats) is what stops one piece +/// from rotating into several seats. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct TurnStatement { + /// The set root the piece must have been a member of at `angle`. + pub prev_root: Hash, + /// The angle being rotated *from* (to `angle + 1`). + pub angle: Angle, + /// The migration tag revealed by the rotation (spent once). + pub turn_tag: Hash, +} + +/// The **private** witness — never revealed by the proof. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct TurnWitness { + /// The piece itself. + pub secret: Secret, + /// A path showing the piece's shape at `angle` sits under `prev_root`. + pub inclusion: InclusionProof, +} + +/// Evaluate the turn relation in the clear. Returns `true` iff the witness proves +/// the statement. This is the single source of truth for what a zero-knowledge +/// STARK of a rotation must enforce (the same discipline as +/// [`crate::membership::check_relation`]); it takes the witness as input, so it is +/// **not** itself a proof. +/// +/// Two constraints, and they are exactly the rotatable-piece properties: +/// 1. **Turn binding:** `turn_tag == secret.piece().turn(angle)` — the revealed +/// migration tag came from the same piece being rotated. A forger without the +/// secret cannot produce it (only-the-holder-can-turn), and it cannot be lifted +/// onto a different piece. +/// 2. **Prior membership:** `secret.piece().shape(angle)` verifies under +/// `prev_root` — the piece really was in the set at the angle it rotates from. +pub fn check_turn(statement: &TurnStatement, witness: &TurnWitness) -> bool { + let piece = witness.secret.piece(); + if piece.turn(statement.angle) != statement.turn_tag { + return false; + } + let shape = Commitment(piece.shape(statement.angle)); + merkle_verify(&statement.prev_root, &shape, &witness.inclusion) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Selective linkage — the cloak's dual: unlinkable by default, linkable only by +// you, only to whom you choose, only for the contexts you pick. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The public statement of a *chosen* link: "these two shapes are the same piece." +/// +/// By default a piece's shapes at different angles are unlinkable (that is the +/// whole point). This is the holder's opt-in override: they can prove to a verifier +/// of their choosing that two specific shapes come from one secret — for portable +/// reputation, an accountability disclosure, or "yes, that was also me" — while +/// revealing **nothing** about the secret and **nothing** about any *other* angle. +/// The verifier learns only that `shape_a` (at `angle_a`) and `shape_b` (at +/// `angle_b`) share a holder. Any third identity stays as unlinkable as before. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct LinkStatement { + pub shape_a: Hash, + pub angle_a: Angle, + pub shape_b: Hash, + pub angle_b: Angle, +} + +/// The private witness — the piece itself, never revealed. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct LinkWitness { + pub secret: Secret, +} + +/// Evaluate the selective-link relation in the clear. Returns `true` iff one secret +/// produces both shapes — the statement a zero-knowledge proof of a chosen link +/// enforces (same STARK machinery as the rest: two shape derivations over one +/// secret). It reveals only the two chosen angles; the secret and every other angle +/// stay hidden. +pub fn check_link(statement: &LinkStatement, witness: &LinkWitness) -> bool { + let piece = witness.secret.piece(); + piece.shape(statement.angle_a) == statement.shape_a + && piece.shape(statement.angle_b) == statement.shape_b +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Scoped delegation — let an agent act as you in one context, and only there. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The public statement of a scoped delegation: "a genuine member of the set at +/// `angle` authorizes `delegate` to act there, and the proof of that authorization +/// is `grant_tag`." +/// +/// The holder proves it once (in zero knowledge); the verifier learns only +/// `{set_root, angle, delegate, grant_tag}` — never which member granted it. The +/// grant is bound to this `delegate` (not stealable by another key) and to this +/// single `angle` (it authorizes nothing elsewhere), and it is spent once. An agent +/// (a bot, a co-signer, a service) can then act as an anonymous member of exactly +/// that context, on the holder's authority, without ever touching the master secret. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct DelegationStatement { + /// The set root the granting member must belong to at `angle`. + pub set_root: Hash, + /// The single context the grant is scoped to. + pub angle: Angle, + /// The public identifier of the authorized delegate (e.g. their public key). + pub delegate: [u8; 32], + /// The grant, revealed and spent once. + pub grant_tag: Hash, +} + +/// The private witness — the granting piece, never revealed. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct DelegationWitness { + pub secret: Secret, + /// A path showing the granting piece's shape at `angle` sits under `set_root`. + pub inclusion: InclusionProof, +} + +/// Evaluate the scoped-delegation relation in the clear — what a zero-knowledge +/// proof of a delegation enforces. Two constraints: +/// 1. **Authorized by a real member:** the granting secret's shape at `angle` is a +/// member under `set_root` (only a legitimate member of that context can grant). +/// 2. **Grant binding:** `grant_tag == secret.piece().grant(angle, delegate)` — the +/// grant is this member's, for this delegate, for this angle. A different member, +/// a different delegate, or a different angle all fail. +pub fn check_delegation(statement: &DelegationStatement, witness: &DelegationWitness) -> bool { + let piece = witness.secret.piece(); + if piece.grant(statement.angle, &statement.delegate) != statement.grant_tag { + return false; + } + let shape = Commitment(piece.shape(statement.angle)); + merkle_verify(&statement.set_root, &shape, &witness.inclusion) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Attribute credentials — carry a hidden attribute, show it per context. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The public statement of an attribute show: "the identity `shape` in context +/// `angle` carries attribute `attr`, issued into the set `attr_root`." +/// +/// An issuer verifies some fact about a holder (over 18, a member, KYC-cleared) and +/// publishes the holder's [`Piece::credential`] leaf into an attribute set with root +/// `attr_root`. The holder then proves, in zero knowledge, that their context +/// identity `shape` belongs to the same secret that is credentialed under +/// `attr_root` — revealing only `{attr_root, attr, angle, shape}`: not the secret, +/// not the issuer's list, not any other context. The same person shows "verified" +/// in one app and stays unlinkable in the next. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct AttributeStatement { + /// The issuer's attribute set (the root of everyone credentialed for `attr`). + pub attr_root: Hash, + /// The attribute being shown (a public label, e.g. a hash of "age>=18@issuer"). + pub attr: [u8; 32], + /// The context the holder is showing it in. + pub angle: Angle, + /// The holder's identity in that context. + pub shape: Hash, +} + +/// The private witness — the piece, never revealed. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct AttributeWitness { + pub secret: Secret, + /// A path showing the piece's credential leaf sits under `attr_root`. + pub credential_inclusion: InclusionProof, +} + +/// Evaluate the attribute-show relation in the clear — what a zero-knowledge proof +/// of an attribute enforces. Two constraints: +/// 1. **Credentialed:** `secret.piece().credential(attr)` is a member under +/// `attr_root` (the issuer credentialed this secret for this attribute). +/// 2. **Bound to the shown identity:** `secret.piece().shape(angle) == shape` — the +/// attribute attaches to *this* context identity, and to no other. +pub fn check_attribute(statement: &AttributeStatement, witness: &AttributeWitness) -> bool { + let piece = witness.secret.piece(); + let cred = Commitment(piece.credential(&statement.attr)); + if !merkle_verify(&statement.attr_root, &cred, &witness.credential_inclusion) { + return false; + } + piece.shape(statement.angle) == statement.shape +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u8) -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([byte; 32]) + } + + #[test] + fn binding_within_an_angle() { + // At a fixed angle the shape and fit are determined by the secret: a piece + // cannot present two different shapes for the same (secret, angle). + let s = secret(1); + assert_eq!(s.piece().shape(7), s.piece().shape(7)); + assert_eq!(s.piece().fit(7), s.piece().fit(7)); + } + + #[test] + fn unlinkable_across_angles() { + // Turning the piece gives a different shape at every angle, with no visible + // relation between them: an observer cannot tell shape(3) is the same piece + // as shape(2) rather than a fresh secret. + let s = secret(1); + let a = s.piece().shape(2); + let b = s.piece().shape(3); + assert_ne!(a, b, "different angles must give different shapes"); + + // shape(3) of this piece vs shape(3) of another piece are both just PRF + // outputs; neither reveals which underlying secret produced it. + let other = secret(2); + assert_ne!(b, other.piece().shape(3)); + // and a fit never coincides with a shape at the same angle (domain separation) + assert_ne!(s.piece().shape(3), s.piece().fit(3)); + } + + #[test] + fn only_the_holder_can_turn_the_piece() { + // The turn tag requires the true secret; a different secret produces an + // unrelated value, so no one without the piece can rotate it. + let s = secret(1); + let forger = secret(2); + assert_ne!(s.piece().turn(2), forger.piece().turn(2)); + // the turn is deterministic for the holder (so it can be checked / spent once) + assert_eq!(s.piece().turn(2), s.piece().turn(2)); + // and turning from a different angle is a distinct tag (no replay across angles) + assert_ne!(s.piece().turn(2), s.piece().turn(3)); + } + + #[test] + fn a_freshly_minted_piece_rotates() { + // The end-to-end shape: mint a real secret, view it from several angles, + // and confirm all shapes/fits are distinct — one piece, many valid fits. + let s = Secret::random(); + let shapes: Vec = (0..5).map(|t| s.piece().shape(t)).collect(); + for i in 0..shapes.len() { + for j in (i + 1)..shapes.len() { + assert_ne!(shapes[i], shapes[j], "each angle is its own shape"); + } + } + } + + // --- the turn relation (what a ZK proof of a rotation enforces) --- + + fn shape_set(members: &[Secret], theta: Angle) -> crate::merkle::MerkleTree { + let leaves: Vec = + members.iter().map(|s| Commitment(s.piece().shape(theta))).collect(); + crate::merkle::MerkleTree::build(&leaves).unwrap() + } + + #[test] + fn a_valid_rotation_proves() { + let theta = 4u64; + let me = secret(1); + let members = [secret(9), me, secret(7), secret(5)]; + let tree = shape_set(&members, theta); + let stmt = TurnStatement { + prev_root: tree.root(), + angle: theta, + turn_tag: me.piece().turn(theta), + }; + let wit = TurnWitness { secret: me, inclusion: tree.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(check_turn(&stmt, &wit), "a genuine rotation of a member piece must verify"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_forged_turn_tag_fails() { + // the migration tag comes from a DIFFERENT piece than the one being proven + let theta = 4u64; + let me = secret(1); + let members = [secret(9), me, secret(7), secret(5)]; + let tree = shape_set(&members, theta); + let stmt = TurnStatement { + prev_root: tree.root(), + angle: theta, + turn_tag: secret(2).piece().turn(theta), // not my piece + }; + let wit = TurnWitness { secret: me, inclusion: tree.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_turn(&stmt, &wit), "a turn tag not from this piece must fail"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_piece_not_in_the_previous_set_fails() { + // an outsider borrows a real member's inclusion path but has their own secret + let theta = 4u64; + let outsider = secret(42); + let members = [secret(9), secret(1), secret(7), secret(5)]; + let tree = shape_set(&members, theta); + let stmt = TurnStatement { + prev_root: tree.root(), + angle: theta, + turn_tag: outsider.piece().turn(theta), + }; + let wit = TurnWitness { secret: outsider, inclusion: tree.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_turn(&stmt, &wit), "a piece not in the set must not rotate"); + } + + // --- riverrun ID: the whole identity loop, demonstrated as one coherent thing --- + + /// One secret is a full identity layer: it acts in many contexts, unlinkably, + /// one action per context, and can prove continuity between contexts in zero + /// knowledge. This test is the `docs/RIVERRUN_ID.md` §8 developer surface made + /// runnable — the primitive as a whole, not one property at a time. + #[test] + fn the_riverrun_id_loop_holds() { + let me = Secret::random(); + + // pick two unrelated contexts (a DAO voting round, an airdrop epoch) + let dao_round: Angle = 0xD40; + let airdrop_epoch: Angle = 0xA1D_2026; + + // my identity + my one-action token in each context + let dao_id = me.piece().shape(dao_round); + let vote = me.piece().fit(dao_round); // spend once => one vote + let airdrop_id = me.piece().shape(airdrop_epoch); + let claim = me.piece().fit(airdrop_epoch); // spend once => one claim + + // 1. UNLINKABLE: my DAO identity and my airdrop identity share no visible link + assert_ne!(dao_id, airdrop_id, "identities across contexts must differ"); + assert_ne!(vote, claim, "action tokens across contexts must differ"); + // even the two *kinds* at one context are distinct (domain separation) + assert_ne!(dao_id, vote); + + // 2. SYBIL-RESISTANT PER CONTEXT: my token in a context is fixed — acting + // twice reveals the same token, which an on-chain registry rejects. + assert_eq!(vote, me.piece().fit(dao_round), "one token per context, deterministic"); + + // 3. PROVABLE CONTINUITY, HIDDEN: I can prove my airdrop identity is the + // same entity that held a DAO identity, revealing only the migration tag. + // Build the DAO round's identity set with my dao_id in it, then prove the turn. + let members = [secret(2), secret(3)]; + let mut leaves: Vec = + members.iter().map(|s| Commitment(s.piece().shape(dao_round))).collect(); + leaves.push(Commitment(dao_id)); // I am a member of the DAO round + leaves.push(Commitment(secret(4).piece().shape(dao_round))); + let dao_set = crate::merkle::MerkleTree::build(&leaves).unwrap(); + + let stmt = TurnStatement { + prev_root: dao_set.root(), + angle: dao_round, + turn_tag: me.piece().turn(dao_round), + }; + let wit = TurnWitness { secret: me, inclusion: dao_set.prove(2).unwrap() }; + assert!( + check_turn(&stmt, &wit), + "I can prove continuity from my DAO identity without revealing which member I am" + ); + + // and nobody else can claim my continuity: a different secret fails. + let impostor = TurnStatement { + prev_root: dao_set.root(), + angle: dao_round, + turn_tag: secret(99).piece().turn(dao_round), + }; + assert!( + !check_turn(&impostor, &TurnWitness { secret: secret(99), inclusion: dao_set.prove(2).unwrap() }), + "only the holder of my secret can prove my continuity" + ); + } + + // --- selective linkage: the cloak's dual --- + + #[test] + fn the_holder_can_link_two_of_their_identities_on_demand() { + // I choose to prove that my DAO persona and my forum persona are the same me. + let me = secret(1); + let dao: Angle = 100; + let forum: Angle = 200; + let stmt = LinkStatement { + shape_a: me.piece().shape(dao), + angle_a: dao, + shape_b: me.piece().shape(forum), + angle_b: forum, + }; + assert!( + check_link(&stmt, &LinkWitness { secret: me }), + "the holder can prove two of their own shapes share one secret" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn an_impostor_cannot_forge_a_link_between_someone_elses_identities() { + // Two shapes that really belong to `me`; an impostor tries to claim them. + let me = secret(1); + let dao: Angle = 100; + let forum: Angle = 200; + let stmt = LinkStatement { + shape_a: me.piece().shape(dao), + angle_a: dao, + shape_b: me.piece().shape(forum), + angle_b: forum, + }; + let impostor = secret(2); + assert!( + !check_link(&stmt, &LinkWitness { secret: impostor }), + "no one but the holder can link the holder's identities" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn linking_two_contexts_reveals_nothing_about_a_third() { + // Proving dao <-> forum are the same piece must not expose my identity in a + // third context: the link statement never mentions it, and that third shape + // remains an independent PRF output, unlinkable as before. + let me = secret(1); + let (dao, forum, secret_vote): (Angle, Angle, Angle) = (100, 200, 300); + let stmt = LinkStatement { + shape_a: me.piece().shape(dao), + angle_a: dao, + shape_b: me.piece().shape(forum), + angle_b: forum, + }; + assert!(check_link(&stmt, &LinkWitness { secret: me })); + // the third identity appears nowhere in the proven statement... + let third = me.piece().shape(secret_vote); + assert_ne!(third, stmt.shape_a); + assert_ne!(third, stmt.shape_b); + // ...and is indistinguishable from a stranger's shape at the same angle. + assert_ne!(third, secret(2).piece().shape(secret_vote)); + } + + // --- scoped delegation --- + + #[test] + fn a_member_can_delegate_one_context_to_an_agent() { + let theta: Angle = 7; + let me = secret(1); + let agent = [0xA6u8; 32]; // the agent's public id + let members = [secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)]; + let set = shape_set(&members, theta); + let stmt = DelegationStatement { + set_root: set.root(), + angle: theta, + delegate: agent, + grant_tag: me.piece().grant(theta, &agent), + }; + let wit = DelegationWitness { secret: me, inclusion: set.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(check_delegation(&stmt, &wit), "a member can delegate their own context"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_grant_is_bound_to_the_named_delegate() { + // a grant issued for agent A must not authorize agent B + let theta: Angle = 7; + let me = secret(1); + let members = [secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)]; + let set = shape_set(&members, theta); + let stmt = DelegationStatement { + set_root: set.root(), + angle: theta, + delegate: [0xBBu8; 32], // a DIFFERENT agent than the grant was for + grant_tag: me.piece().grant(theta, &[0xA6u8; 32]), + }; + let wit = DelegationWitness { secret: me, inclusion: set.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_delegation(&stmt, &wit), "a grant for one agent must not work for another"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_grant_is_scoped_to_one_context() { + // a grant for angle 7 must not authorize acting at angle 8 + let (theta, other): (Angle, Angle) = (7, 8); + let me = secret(1); + let agent = [0xA6u8; 32]; + let set = shape_set(&[secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)], other); // set at the OTHER angle + let stmt = DelegationStatement { + set_root: set.root(), + angle: other, + delegate: agent, + grant_tag: me.piece().grant(theta, &agent), // grant was for theta, not other + }; + let wit = DelegationWitness { secret: me, inclusion: set.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_delegation(&stmt, &wit), "a grant for one angle must not work at another"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_non_member_cannot_delegate() { + let theta: Angle = 7; + let outsider = secret(42); + let agent = [0xA6u8; 32]; + let set = shape_set(&[secret(9), secret(1), secret(3), secret(5)], theta); + let stmt = DelegationStatement { + set_root: set.root(), + angle: theta, + delegate: agent, + grant_tag: outsider.piece().grant(theta, &agent), + }; + // outsider borrows a real member's path but isn't in the set + let wit = DelegationWitness { secret: outsider, inclusion: set.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_delegation(&stmt, &wit), "only a member of the context can delegate it"); + } + + // --- attribute credentials --- + + fn attr_set(holders: &[Secret], attr: &[u8; 32]) -> crate::merkle::MerkleTree { + let leaves: Vec = + holders.iter().map(|s| Commitment(s.piece().credential(attr))).collect(); + crate::merkle::MerkleTree::build(&leaves).unwrap() + } + + #[test] + fn a_credentialed_holder_shows_the_attribute_in_a_context() { + let over18 = [0x18u8; 32]; + let me = secret(1); + let issued = [secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)]; + let root = attr_set(&issued, &over18); + let theta: Angle = 500; + let stmt = AttributeStatement { + attr_root: root.root(), + attr: over18, + angle: theta, + shape: me.piece().shape(theta), + }; + let wit = AttributeWitness { secret: me, credential_inclusion: root.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(check_attribute(&stmt, &wit), "a credentialed holder can show the attribute"); + } + + #[test] + fn an_uncredentialed_holder_cannot_show_the_attribute() { + let over18 = [0x18u8; 32]; + let outsider = secret(42); // never issued a credential + let issued = [secret(9), secret(1), secret(3), secret(5)]; + let root = attr_set(&issued, &over18); + let theta: Angle = 500; + let stmt = AttributeStatement { + attr_root: root.root(), + attr: over18, + angle: theta, + shape: outsider.piece().shape(theta), + }; + // outsider borrows a real member's path but isn't in the issuer's set + let wit = AttributeWitness { secret: outsider, credential_inclusion: root.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_attribute(&stmt, &wit), "only a credentialed holder can show it"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_credential_for_one_attribute_does_not_show_another() { + // credentialed for "over 18", tries to claim "accredited investor" + let over18 = [0x18u8; 32]; + let investor = [0x99u8; 32]; // a different attribute label + let me = secret(1); + let root = attr_set(&[secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)], &over18); + let theta: Angle = 500; + let stmt = AttributeStatement { + attr_root: root.root(), + attr: investor, // claiming a different attribute than the set certifies + angle: theta, + shape: me.piece().shape(theta), + }; + let wit = AttributeWitness { secret: me, credential_inclusion: root.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_attribute(&stmt, &wit), "a credential is specific to its attribute"); + } + + #[test] + fn the_attribute_binds_to_the_shown_identity_only() { + // the attribute attaches to my shape at this angle, not to a claimed other shape + let over18 = [0x18u8; 32]; + let me = secret(1); + let root = attr_set(&[secret(9), me, secret(3), secret(5)], &over18); + let theta: Angle = 500; + let stmt = AttributeStatement { + attr_root: root.root(), + attr: over18, + angle: theta, + shape: secret(2).piece().shape(theta), // NOT my shape + }; + let wit = AttributeWitness { secret: me, credential_inclusion: root.prove(1).unwrap() }; + assert!(!check_attribute(&stmt, &wit), "the attribute must bind to the holder's own identity"); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-eval/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c028667 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +[package] +name = "riverrun-eval" +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +description = "Adversarial evaluation harness for mirror-pool: runs real chain-clustering attacks against a simulated pool and measures attribution success." + +[dependencies] +riverrun-core = { path = "../riverrun-core" } + +[[bin]] +name = "riverrun-eval" +path = "src/main.rs" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/attack.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/attack.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a13cc11 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/attack.rs @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +//! The clustering attacker. +//! +//! This is the adversary `riverrun` must defeat, modeled as the strongest +//! realistic version: it already holds an accurate behavioral profile of every +//! member (habitual relative timing and position size — the co-buy-timing and +//! sizing-fingerprint signals). Given a round's observed actions it recovers the +//! action→identity assignment by nearest-profile matching. +//! +//! The exact same attacker is run against both traces. Against the unprotected +//! trace the behavioral signals are present and it succeeds; against the +//! protected trace the signals are gone and it degrades to chance. We do not +//! weaken the attacker for the protected case — the *data* defeats it. + +use crate::model::{Action, Population}; + +/// Feature scales for normalizing the two signals into a common cost. Chosen as +/// the spans of the population's habits so timing and sizing contribute +/// comparably. +const TIME_SCALE: f64 = 60.0; +const SIZE_SCALE: f64 = 900.0; + +/// One member's behavioral profile as the attacker knows it. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +struct Profile { + id: usize, + /// Habitual timing offset, measured relative to the earliest actor (so it is + /// comparable to a round's observed relative times without knowing the exact + /// intent timestamp). + relative_offset: f64, + position_size: f64, +} + +pub struct NearestProfileAttacker { + profiles: Vec, +} + +impl NearestProfileAttacker { + /// Build the attacker's profiles from the true population fingerprints — the + /// strongest attacker: it knows every member's habits exactly. + pub fn from_population(pop: &Population) -> Self { + let min_offset = pop + .members + .iter() + .map(|m| m.timing_offset) + .fold(f64::INFINITY, f64::min); + let profiles = pop + .members + .iter() + .map(|m| Profile { + id: m.id, + relative_offset: m.timing_offset - min_offset, + position_size: m.position_size, + }) + .collect(); + Self { profiles } + } + + /// Normalized distance between an observed action (given the round's timing + /// reference) and a member profile. + fn cost(&self, action: &Action, t_ref: f64, profile: &Profile) -> f64 { + let rel_time = action.time - t_ref; + let dt = (rel_time - profile.relative_offset).abs() / TIME_SCALE; + let ds = (action.size - profile.position_size).abs() / SIZE_SCALE; + dt + ds + } + + /// The adversary's posterior belief (unnormalized `exp(-cost)` weights) that + /// `action` was produced by each candidate identity in `candidate_ids`, given + /// the round's timing reference `t_ref`. + /// + /// The weight uses the *same* normalized cost as attribution, so the scale is + /// the population's measured habit span (`TIME_SCALE`, `SIZE_SCALE`), not a + /// free temperature: this is the maximum-entropy posterior consistent with the + /// expected normalized distance. The qualitative result (a leaky coordinator + /// erodes anonymity, self-fill caps it) does not depend on the scale. + pub fn posterior_for_action( + &self, + action: &Action, + t_ref: f64, + candidate_ids: &[usize], + ) -> Vec { + candidate_ids + .iter() + .map(|id| { + let profile = self + .profiles + .iter() + .find(|p| p.id == *id) + .expect("candidate id must be a member of the population"); + (-self.cost(action, t_ref, profile)).exp() + }) + .collect() + } + + /// Recover the action→identity assignment for one round and return how many + /// actions were attributed to their true initiator. + /// + /// Assignment is greedy minimum-cost over the full bijection: repeatedly take + /// the cheapest unused (action, profile) pair. Deterministic, and a close + /// approximation of optimal assignment for this cost. + pub fn correct_attributions(&self, actions: &[Action]) -> usize { + let k = actions.len(); + debug_assert_eq!(k, self.profiles.len()); + if k == 0 { + return 0; + } + let t_ref = actions.iter().map(|a| a.time).fold(f64::INFINITY, f64::min); + + // All (cost, action_idx, profile_idx) triples, sorted ascending. + let mut pairs: Vec<(f64, usize, usize)> = Vec::with_capacity(k * k); + for (ai, a) in actions.iter().enumerate() { + for (pi, p) in self.profiles.iter().enumerate() { + pairs.push((self.cost(a, t_ref, p), ai, pi)); + } + } + pairs.sort_by(|x, y| x.0.partial_cmp(&y.0).unwrap()); + + let mut action_used = vec![false; k]; + let mut profile_used = vec![false; k]; + let mut assignment: Vec> = vec![None; k]; // action -> profile id + let mut assigned = 0usize; + for (_, ai, pi) in pairs { + if assigned == k { + break; + } + if action_used[ai] || profile_used[pi] { + continue; + } + action_used[ai] = true; + profile_used[pi] = true; + assignment[ai] = Some(self.profiles[pi].id); + assigned += 1; + } + + actions + .iter() + .zip(assignment.iter()) + .filter(|(a, assigned_id)| **assigned_id == Some(a.true_id)) + .count() + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::model::{Population, RoundIntent}; + use crate::rng::SplitMix64; + + #[test] + fn attacker_beats_unprotected_but_not_protected() { + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(2024); + let pop = Population::sample(8, &mut rng); + let attacker = NearestProfileAttacker::from_population(&pop); + + let mut unprotected = 0usize; + let mut protected = 0usize; + let rounds = 500; + for _ in 0..rounds { + let intent = RoundIntent::sample(&mut rng); + unprotected += attacker.correct_attributions(&pop.unprotected_trace(&intent, &mut rng)); + protected += attacker.correct_attributions(&pop.protected_trace(&intent, &mut rng)); + } + let total = (rounds * 8) as f64; + let unprotected_acc = unprotected as f64 / total; + let protected_acc = protected as f64 / total; + + // Unprotected traces are highly attributable. + assert!( + unprotected_acc > 0.7, + "unprotected accuracy {unprotected_acc} should be high" + ); + // Protected traces collapse the attacker to roughly chance (1/8 = 0.125). + assert!( + protected_acc < 0.25, + "protected accuracy {protected_acc} should be near chance" + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/composition.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/composition.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..328ee8fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/composition.rs @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +//! The **round-composition adversary**: what anonymity does the honest user +//! actually get when the adversary owns some of the round's slots? +//! +//! The behavioral harness (`model.rs`, `attack.rs`) answers "does a synchronized +//! identical round strip timing and sizing signals" and shows it collapses a +//! profiling attacker to chance `1/k`. But `1/k` is the *advertised* anonymity. +//! It silently assumes all `k` slots are independent honest participants. +//! +//! They are not, in general. An adversary can **self-fill**: submit their own +//! members into the same round (a Sybil, or a whale funding many notes). Every +//! slot they own is one they can subtract from the honest set. If a round of +//! `k = 17` has `a = 16` adversary slots, the one honest user is alone: the +//! adversary knows the other sixteen are theirs, so the "anonymity set" is a +//! single person. Effective-k is 1. This is not a flaw unique to `riverrun`; it +//! is the floor of every mix, and an honest tool must **measure** it rather than +//! advertise the gross count. +//! +//! This module composes two channels the honest user faces at once: +//! +//! 1. **self-fill** shrinks the anonymity set from the advertised `k` to the +//! honest count `h = k - a`. +//! 2. within those `h` honest slots, any **residual behavioral signal** (an +//! imperfectly synchronized round, or the funding-graph provenance the tracer +//! measures) further concentrates the adversary's posterior below a uniform +//! `1/h`. +//! +//! The reported number is Serjantov-Danezis effective-k, `2^{H(p)}`, over the +//! adversary's posterior `p` for the target among the honest slots. Shannon, not +//! min-entropy: min-entropy reports a single dominant class as effective-k 1 even +//! when the measurement found nothing to split on, which overstates exposure. We +//! report the average an adversary faces and surface the worst case separately. + +/// Serjantov-Danezis effective anonymity set size: `2^{H(p)}` where `H` is the +/// Shannon entropy (in bits) of the adversary's posterior `p` over the +/// candidates for the target. A uniform posterior over `n` candidates gives `n`; +/// a point mass gives `1`. +/// +/// The input need not be normalized; it is treated as unnormalized weights. +pub fn effective_k(weights: &[f64]) -> f64 { + let total: f64 = weights.iter().filter(|w| **w > 0.0).sum(); + if total <= 0.0 { + return 0.0; + } + // H(p) = -sum p_i log2 p_i, with the convention 0*log0 = 0. + let mut entropy = 0.0; + for &w in weights { + if w > 0.0 { + let p = w / total; + entropy -= p * p.log2(); + } + } + entropy.exp2() +} + +/// Effective-k of a fully-protected round of `k` slots of which `adversary_owned` +/// are self-filled by the adversary. With a perfectly synchronized identical +/// round the adversary's posterior over the `h = k - adversary_owned` honest +/// slots is uniform, so effective-k is `h` (and `1` when only the target is +/// honest, `0` when the adversary owns every slot). +pub fn effective_k_selffill(k: usize, adversary_owned: usize) -> f64 { + k.saturating_sub(adversary_owned) as f64 +} + +/// The honest user's true anonymity, composing self-fill with a behavioral +/// residual over the honest slots. +/// +/// `honest_posterior` is the adversary's relative belief (unnormalized weights) +/// that each honest slot is the target, as recovered from whatever signal +/// survives the round. A uniform vector means the round fully protected the +/// honest set; a concentrated vector means residual signal leaked. The length is +/// the honest count `h`; the advertised set was `advertised_k`. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct RoundAnonymity { + pub advertised_k: usize, + pub honest_count: usize, + pub effective_k: f64, +} + +/// Compose the two channels: shrink to the honest set, then apply the behavioral +/// residual within it. `effective_k` never exceeds `honest_count`, and +/// `honest_count` never exceeds `advertised_k`. +pub fn round_anonymity(advertised_k: usize, honest_posterior: &[f64]) -> RoundAnonymity { + let honest_count = honest_posterior.len(); + // Shannon effective-k over the honest slots is bounded above by the support + // size, which is at most honest_count: the composition can only lose + // anonymity relative to a uniform honest set, never invent it. + let effective_k = effective_k(honest_posterior); + RoundAnonymity { + advertised_k, + honest_count, + effective_k, + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn approx(a: f64, b: f64) { + assert!((a - b).abs() < 1e-9, "expected {b}, got {a}"); + } + + #[test] + fn uniform_posterior_over_n_gives_effective_k_n() { + // The whole point of Shannon effective-k: a flat posterior over n honest + // candidates is worth exactly n. + approx(effective_k(&[1.0; 5]), 5.0); + approx(effective_k(&[0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]), 4.0); + } + + #[test] + fn a_point_mass_gives_effective_k_one() { + // The adversary is certain: one honest candidate, fully exposed. + approx(effective_k(&[1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]), 1.0); + } + + #[test] + fn effective_k_is_between_one_and_the_support_size() { + // Any non-uniform, non-degenerate posterior sits strictly inside (1, n). + let e = effective_k(&[0.5, 0.25, 0.25]); + assert!(e > 1.0 && e < 3.0, "effective-k {e} must be inside (1, 3)"); + } + + #[test] + fn no_self_fill_gives_the_full_advertised_set() { + // a = 0: nobody is subtracted, the honest set is the whole round. + approx(effective_k_selffill(17, 0), 17.0); + } + + #[test] + fn self_fill_shrinks_the_honest_set_one_for_one() { + // Every adversary-owned slot is one the adversary subtracts. + approx(effective_k_selffill(17, 5), 12.0); + } + + #[test] + fn a_whale_owning_all_but_one_collapses_effective_k_to_one() { + // THE degradation an honest mix must report: k = 17, adversary owns 16, + // the lone honest user is alone. Advertised 17, effective 1. + approx(effective_k_selffill(17, 16), 1.0); + } + + #[test] + fn an_adversary_owning_every_slot_leaves_no_honest_set() { + approx(effective_k_selffill(17, 17), 0.0); + } + + #[test] + fn effective_k_is_monotone_non_increasing_in_adversary_share() { + let mut prev = f64::INFINITY; + for a in 0..=17 { + let e = effective_k_selffill(17, a); + assert!(e <= prev + 1e-12, "effective-k rose from {prev} to {e} at a={a}"); + prev = e; + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_fully_protected_honest_set_realizes_its_full_size() { + // Uniform residual over 12 honest slots: the honest user gets all 12. + let r = round_anonymity(17, &[1.0; 12]); + assert_eq!(r.advertised_k, 17); + assert_eq!(r.honest_count, 12); + approx(r.effective_k, 12.0); + } + + #[test] + fn a_behavioral_residual_erodes_below_the_honest_set() { + // Same 12 honest slots, but signal survived and concentrated the + // adversary's belief. Effective-k must fall below the honest count. + let mut post = vec![1.0; 12]; + post[0] = 8.0; // one slot looks much more like the target + let r = round_anonymity(17, &post); + assert_eq!(r.honest_count, 12); + assert!( + r.effective_k < 12.0, + "residual signal must erode effective-k below the honest set, got {}", + r.effective_k + ); + assert!(r.effective_k > 1.0, "but not to full exposure here"); + } + + #[test] + fn effective_k_never_exceeds_the_honest_count() { + // The composition law: no residual model can invent anonymity the honest + // set does not contain. + let r = round_anonymity(17, &[1.0; 12]); + assert!(r.effective_k <= r.honest_count as f64 + 1e-9); + assert!(r.honest_count <= r.advertised_k); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..722a1edf --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +//! Adversarial evaluation harness for `riverrun`. +//! +//! The thesis of `riverrun` is that a *synchronized* round of *identical* +//! actions, submitted by keys unlinked from member commitments, strips the +//! behavioral signals modern chain-clustering relies on. This harness makes that +//! falsifiable: it builds a population of participants with distinct behavioral +//! fingerprints, generates two on-chain traces of the same intent — one +//! *unprotected* (each acts on their own habit) and one *protected* (the pool +//! fires them synchronized and identical) — then runs the **same** clustering +//! attacker against both and measures attribution accuracy. +//! +//! The expected result: unprotected traces are highly attributable (the +//! attacker recovers most of the action→identity mapping); protected traces +//! collapse the attacker to chance (`1/k`). Same attacker, same population — the +//! only difference is the pool. That contrast is the exhibit. +//! +//! Determinism: everything is driven by an explicit `splitmix64` seed, so runs +//! are reproducible and the numbers in the README can be regenerated exactly. + +pub mod attack; +pub mod composition; +pub mod model; +pub mod rng; + +use attack::NearestProfileAttacker; +use model::{Population, RoundIntent}; + +/// Result of one experiment: mean attribution accuracy over many rounds, for +/// both trace modes, plus the chance baseline. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct ExperimentResult { + pub k: usize, + pub rounds: usize, + pub unprotected_accuracy: f64, + pub protected_accuracy: f64, + pub chance: f64, +} + +/// Run the full experiment for a pool of `k` participants over `rounds` rounds. +/// +/// For each round a fresh intent is drawn; both traces are generated from the +/// *same* intent and population so the comparison is apples-to-apples. The +/// attacker holds accurate per-identity behavioral profiles (the strongest +/// realistic attacker: it already knows each member's habits) and attempts to +/// recover the true action→identity assignment. +pub fn run_experiment(k: usize, rounds: usize, seed: u64) -> ExperimentResult { + let mut rng = rng::SplitMix64::new(seed); + let population = Population::sample(k, &mut rng); + let attacker = NearestProfileAttacker::from_population(&population); + + let mut unprotected_hits = 0usize; + let mut protected_hits = 0usize; + let total = rounds * k; + + for _ in 0..rounds { + let intent = RoundIntent::sample(&mut rng); + + let unprotected = population.unprotected_trace(&intent, &mut rng); + let protected = population.protected_trace(&intent, &mut rng); + + unprotected_hits += attacker.correct_attributions(&unprotected); + protected_hits += attacker.correct_attributions(&protected); + } + + ExperimentResult { + k, + rounds, + unprotected_accuracy: unprotected_hits as f64 / total as f64, + protected_accuracy: protected_hits as f64 / total as f64, + chance: 1.0 / k as f64, + } +} + +/// One row of the self-fill degradation exhibit: for an advertised pool of +/// `advertised_k`, how much anonymity survives when the adversary self-fills +/// `adversary_owned` of the slots. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct SelfFillRow { + pub advertised_k: usize, + pub adversary_owned: usize, + pub effective_k: f64, +} + +/// The honest degradation curve for a fully-protected round: sweep the adversary +/// share from owning none of the round to owning all but the target, and report +/// the effective anonymity the honest user actually gets at each share. +/// +/// A perfectly synchronized identical round hides the honest user among the other +/// honest slots and no further, so effective-k is exactly the honest count +/// `advertised_k - adversary_owned`. The first row is the advertised `k`; the +/// last (`adversary_owned = advertised_k - 1`) is the floor every mix shares: 1. +pub fn self_fill_degradation(advertised_k: usize) -> Vec { + (0..advertised_k) + .map(|adversary_owned| SelfFillRow { + advertised_k, + adversary_owned, + effective_k: composition::effective_k_selffill(advertised_k, adversary_owned), + }) + .collect() +} + +/// Measure the effective anonymity an honest user actually gets from a single +/// round, composing two real erosions end to end: a **leaky coordinator** (a +/// fraction `leak` of each member's behavioral habit survives imperfect +/// synchronization) and **self-fill** (the adversary owns `adversary_owned` of +/// the `k` slots and subtracts them). The target is one honest member; the +/// adversary forms its posterior over the honest slots from the observed round +/// and the effective-k is `2^{H}` of that posterior. +/// +/// `leak = 0` with `adversary_owned = 0` is the fully-protected round and returns +/// close to `k`; raising either erodes the number. This is the ruler of +/// \S self-fill and the behavioral harness, run as one measurement. +pub fn measure_leaky_round( + k: usize, + adversary_owned: usize, + leak: f64, + seed: u64, +) -> composition::RoundAnonymity { + let mut rng = rng::SplitMix64::new(seed); + let population = Population::sample(k, &mut rng); + let attacker = NearestProfileAttacker::from_population(&population); + let intent = RoundIntent::sample(&mut rng); + let trace = population.leaky_protected_trace(&intent, leak, &mut rng); + + // self-fill: the adversary owns the last `adversary_owned` slots and subtracts + // them, leaving the first h = k - a honest. The target is honest slot 0. + let h = k.saturating_sub(adversary_owned); + if h == 0 { + return composition::RoundAnonymity { advertised_k: k, honest_count: 0, effective_k: 0.0 }; + } + let honest_ids: Vec = population.members[..h].iter().map(|m| m.id).collect(); + let target_id = population.members[0].id; + let target_action = trace + .iter() + .find(|a| a.true_id == target_id) + .expect("the target's action is in the trace"); + // Timing reference: the earliest honest action. The adversary knows its own + // self-filled slots, so it anchors on the honest ones it is trying to separate. + let t_ref = trace + .iter() + .filter(|a| a.true_id < h) + .map(|a| a.time) + .fold(f64::INFINITY, f64::min); + + let posterior = attacker.posterior_for_action(target_action, t_ref, &honest_ids); + composition::RoundAnonymity { + advertised_k: k, + honest_count: h, + effective_k: composition::effective_k(&posterior), + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn a_fully_protected_leaky_round_realizes_near_full_k() { + // leak = 0, no adversary: the observable is identity-independent, so the + // posterior is near uniform over all k and effective-k is close to k. + let r = measure_leaky_round(8, 0, 0.0, 12_345); + assert_eq!(r.honest_count, 8); + assert!( + r.effective_k > 6.0, + "a fully protected round of 8 should deliver near 8, got {}", + r.effective_k + ); + } + + #[test] + fn self_fill_caps_the_leaky_round_at_the_honest_set() { + // The adversary owns 5 of 8 slots; the honest user cannot exceed the 3 that + // remain, whatever the coordinator does. + let r = measure_leaky_round(8, 5, 0.0, 12_345); + assert_eq!(r.honest_count, 3); + assert!(r.effective_k <= 3.0 + 1e-9, "effective-k {} exceeds the honest set", r.effective_k); + } + + #[test] + fn self_fill_dominates_behavioral_leak_in_this_model() { + // The honest, robust finding over many seeds (one seed is too noisy given + // how small the leak effect is): an imperfect coordinator that leaks the + // full habit barely moves the single-target posterior, while self-fill + // erodes it strongly. Structural exposure dominates residual behavioral + // signal here, which is why riverrun leads with the self-fill and + // funding-graph floors rather than with behavioral noise. + let n = 300u64; + let mean = |a: usize, leak: f64| -> f64 { + (0..n) + .map(|s| measure_leaky_round(8, a, leak, 4_000 + s).effective_k) + .sum::() + / n as f64 + }; + let clean = mean(0, 0.0); + let full_leak = mean(0, 1.0); + let self_filled = mean(4, 0.0); + // leak erodes anonymity, but only weakly (a few percent), not a collapse + assert!(full_leak <= clean + 1e-9, "full leak must not raise anonymity: {full_leak} vs {clean}"); + assert!(full_leak > 0.8 * clean, "leak's effect is weak here, not a collapse: {full_leak} vs {clean}"); + // self-fill is the dominant axis: owning half the slots roughly halves it + assert!(self_filled < 0.6 * clean, "self-fill must dominate: {self_filled} vs {clean}"); + } + + #[test] + fn effective_k_stays_within_one_and_the_honest_set() { + for leak in [0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0] { + let r = measure_leaky_round(8, 2, leak, 77); + assert!( + r.effective_k >= 1.0 - 1e-9 && r.effective_k <= r.honest_count as f64 + 1e-9, + "effective-k {} left [1, {}] at leak {leak}", + r.effective_k, + r.honest_count + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn self_fill_degradation_runs_from_full_k_down_to_one() { + let curve = self_fill_degradation(17); + assert_eq!(curve.len(), 17); + assert_eq!(curve[0].effective_k, 17.0, "no self-fill: the full advertised set"); + assert_eq!( + curve.last().unwrap().effective_k, + 1.0, + "adversary owns all but the target: the floor every mix shares" + ); + // monotone non-increasing: more adversary slots never help the honest user + for pair in curve.windows(2) { + assert!(pair[1].effective_k <= pair[0].effective_k); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/main.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/main.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89013ca5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/main.rs @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +//! `riverrun-eval`: run the adversarial evaluation and print the exhibits. +//! +//! For a range of pool sizes it reports the clustering attacker's attribution +//! accuracy against the unprotected trace vs the `riverrun` (protected) trace, +//! alongside the chance baseline `1/k`. The story is the two columns: unprotected +//! stays high, protected sits on chance. + +use riverrun_eval::{measure_leaky_round, run_experiment, self_fill_degradation}; + +fn main() { + const SEED: u64 = 0x000C_0FFE_ED15_EA5E; // fixed seed → reproducible + const ROUNDS: usize = 4000; + let pool_sizes = [4usize, 8, 16, 32, 64]; + + println!("riverrun: adversarial evaluation"); + println!("same clustering attacker, {ROUNDS} rounds per pool size\n"); + println!( + "{:>6} {:>18} {:>18} {:>10}", + "k", "unprotected acc.", "protected acc.", "chance 1/k" + ); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(60)); + for &k in &pool_sizes { + let r = run_experiment(k, ROUNDS, SEED ^ (k as u64).wrapping_mul(0x9E37_79B9)); + println!( + "{:>6} {:>17.1}% {:>17.1}% {:>9.1}%", + r.k, + r.unprotected_accuracy * 100.0, + r.protected_accuracy * 100.0, + r.chance * 100.0, + ); + } + println!( + "\nRead: the clustering attacker deanonymizes the unprotected trace, but\n\ + riverrun drives it to chance, attribution is no better than guessing." + ); + + // The second exhibit: the advertised k is not what the honest user gets if the + // adversary self-fills the round. An honest mix measures this floor. + const ADVERTISED_K: usize = 17; + println!("\n\nriverrun: self-fill degradation (a fully protected round of k = {ADVERTISED_K})"); + println!("what the honest user actually gets as the adversary owns more slots\n"); + println!( + "{:>14} {:>12} {:>12}", + "adversary owns", "honest slots", "effective-k" + ); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(42)); + for row in self_fill_degradation(ADVERTISED_K) { + // print the endpoints and a few interior points, not all 17 rows + let a = row.adversary_owned; + if a == 0 || a == 4 || a == 8 || a == 12 || a == ADVERTISED_K - 1 { + println!( + "{:>14} {:>12} {:>12.1}", + a, + ADVERTISED_K - a, + row.effective_k + ); + } + } + println!( + "\nRead: k = {ADVERTISED_K} is a ceiling, not a guarantee. Every slot the adversary\n\ + self-fills is one they subtract; owning all but one leaves the honest user\n\ + alone (effective-k 1). riverrun reports this floor instead of advertising\n\ + the gross count. The defense is a per-participant deposit cap and a funding\n\ + graph the tracer measures, not a larger headline number." + ); + + // The third exhibit: both erosions at once. A leaky coordinator (habits survive + // imperfect synchronization) and self-fill, measured end to end for k = 8. + const K: usize = 8; + const SEED2: u64 = 0x00A1_1EA1_0000_0007; + println!("\n\nriverrun: leaky coordinator + self-fill (k = {K}), effective-k measured end to end"); + println!("rows: how much of each member's habit leaks; cols: slots the adversary owns\n"); + let leaks = [0.0f64, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0]; + let owned = [0usize, 2, 4]; + print!("{:>10}", "leak \\ a"); + for a in owned { + print!("{:>10}", format!("a={a}")); + } + println!(); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(10 + 10 * owned.len())); + for leak in leaks { + print!("{:>10.2}", leak); + for a in owned { + let r = measure_leaky_round(K, a, leak, SEED2 ^ ((leak * 100.0) as u64).wrapping_mul(0x9E37)); + print!("{:>10.1}", r.effective_k); + } + println!(); + } + println!( + "\nRead: down each column, a leaky coordinator barely moves the number (about a\n\ + few percent from top to bottom): the round suppresses timing and size signal\n\ + well even when synchronization is imperfect. Across each row, self-fill caps\n\ + it hard at the honest count k - a. The honest finding is that structural\n\ + exposure (owning slots) dominates residual behavioral leak, which is why\n\ + riverrun leads with the self-fill and funding-graph floors. This is the\n\ + conservative single-target posterior; the joint-assignment attacker in the\n\ + first exhibit is stronger, and both are reported rather than the flattering one." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/model.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/model.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d6401ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/model.rs @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +//! The population model and the two trace generators. +//! +//! Each participant has a stable *behavioral fingerprint*: the two signals real +//! Solana clustering tools exploit — +//! +//! - **timing habit** (`timing_offset`): how long after an intent surfaces this +//! participant typically acts. The co-buy-timing attack keys on exactly this +//! ("wallets acting within seconds of each other are linked"); an individual's +//! habitual offset is what separates them from the crowd. +//! - **sizing habit** (`position_size`): the participant's typical position size. +//! Round-number and consistent-size transfers are a documented fingerprint. +//! +//! The *unprotected* trace lets each participant act on their own fingerprint, +//! so actions carry identity-correlated timing and size. The *protected* trace +//! is what `riverrun` produces: the coordinator fires all `k` actions inside +//! one tight window with identical size, and the acting key is unlinked from the +//! member — so no action carries any per-identity signal. + +use crate::rng::SplitMix64; + +/// Seconds a real-world intent stays "hot" — the co-buy window an attacker +/// watches in the unprotected world. Participants' habitual offsets are spread +/// across it. +const INTENT_WINDOW_SECS: f64 = 60.0; + +/// The tight window the pool coordinator fires within. Jitter here is +/// identity-independent (the coordinator schedules it, not the participant). +const POOL_WINDOW_SECS: f64 = 4.0; + +/// Range of habitual position sizes across the population (arbitrary units). +const SIZE_MIN: f64 = 100.0; +const SIZE_MAX: f64 = 1000.0; + +/// The fixed size every participant emits inside a protected round. Identical +/// across participants by construction — that is what collapses the sizing +/// fingerprint. +const ROUND_SIZE: f64 = 500.0; + +/// A single participant's stable behavioral fingerprint. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct Fingerprint { + pub id: usize, + /// Habitual delay (seconds) after an intent before this participant acts. + pub timing_offset: f64, + /// Habitual position size. + pub position_size: f64, + /// Per-participant timing steadiness (std-dev of their own jitter). Some + /// people are more punctual than others; the attacker benefits from steady + /// habits, so modeling this keeps the unprotected attacker strong. + pub timing_jitter: f64, + /// Per-participant sizing steadiness (as a fraction of position_size). + pub size_jitter_frac: f64, +} + +/// One observed on-chain action. `(time, size)` is what the attacker sees; +/// `true_id` is ground truth, hidden from the attacker and used only to score. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct Action { + pub time: f64, + pub size: f64, + pub true_id: usize, +} + +/// A shared intent all participants respond to in a round (e.g. "buy token X"). +/// `t0` is when it surfaced; sizes scale around the population baseline. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct RoundIntent { + pub t0: f64, +} + +impl RoundIntent { + pub fn sample(rng: &mut SplitMix64) -> Self { + // Intent can surface any time; absolute offset does not matter to the + // attacker (it profiles *relative* timing), but varying it avoids any + // accidental alignment. + Self { + t0: rng.range(0.0, 1_000_000.0), + } + } +} + +/// The full population and its trace generators. +pub struct Population { + pub members: Vec, +} + +impl Population { + /// Sample `k` participants with distinct, randomly-placed fingerprints. + /// + /// Placement is random (not monotonic in `id`) so the attacker gains no free + /// information from index ordering — it must rely on the behavioral signals. + pub fn sample(k: usize, rng: &mut SplitMix64) -> Self { + let members = (0..k) + .map(|id| Fingerprint { + id, + timing_offset: rng.range(0.0, INTENT_WINDOW_SECS), + position_size: rng.range(SIZE_MIN, SIZE_MAX), + // Habits are fairly steady: sub-second timing, a few percent sizing. + timing_jitter: rng.range(0.3, 1.2), + size_jitter_frac: rng.range(0.01, 0.05), + }) + .collect(); + Self { members } + } + + pub fn k(&self) -> usize { + self.members.len() + } + + /// Unprotected trace: each participant acts on their own habit. Timing and + /// size are identity-correlated, so the trace is attributable. + pub fn unprotected_trace(&self, intent: &RoundIntent, rng: &mut SplitMix64) -> Vec { + self.members + .iter() + .map(|m| { + let time = intent.t0 + m.timing_offset + m.timing_jitter * rng.next_normal(); + let size = m.position_size * (1.0 + m.size_jitter_frac * rng.next_normal()); + Action { + time, + size, + true_id: m.id, + } + }) + .collect() + } + + /// A partially-protected round: the coordinator's synchronization is + /// imperfect, so a fraction `leak` in `[0, 1]` of each member's behavioral + /// habit survives into the observable. `leak = 0` is the fully-protected round + /// (identity-independent, same as `protected_trace`); `leak = 1` is the + /// unprotected trace. The interpolation is in the observable itself, so `leak` + /// is a physical "fraction of habit that leaked", not an abstract knob. + pub fn leaky_protected_trace( + &self, + intent: &RoundIntent, + leak: f64, + rng: &mut SplitMix64, + ) -> Vec { + let leak = leak.clamp(0.0, 1.0); + self.members + .iter() + .map(|m| { + let habit_time = m.timing_offset + m.timing_jitter * rng.next_normal(); + let pool_time = rng.range(0.0, POOL_WINDOW_SECS); + let time = intent.t0 + leak * habit_time + (1.0 - leak) * pool_time; + let habit_size = m.position_size * (1.0 + m.size_jitter_frac * rng.next_normal()); + let size = leak * habit_size + (1.0 - leak) * ROUND_SIZE; + Action { time, size, true_id: m.id } + }) + .collect() + } + + /// Protected trace: `riverrun`. Every action has the identical round size + /// and a coordinator-scheduled time drawn from one tight, identity-independent + /// window. Nothing about `(time, size)` correlates with the participant. + /// + /// `true_id` is still recorded so the harness can score the attacker — but by + /// construction the observable `(time, size)` is independent of it. + pub fn protected_trace(&self, intent: &RoundIntent, rng: &mut SplitMix64) -> Vec { + self.members + .iter() + .map(|m| { + // Identity-independent jitter: the coordinator picks it, uniform + // across the pool window, with no reference to the member. + let time = intent.t0 + rng.range(0.0, POOL_WINDOW_SECS); + Action { + time, + size: ROUND_SIZE, + true_id: m.id, + } + }) + .collect() + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-eval/src/rng.rs b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/rng.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54d5a8c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-eval/src/rng.rs @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +//! A tiny deterministic PRNG (`splitmix64`) so every experiment is reproducible. +//! +//! We avoid pulling in a crate (and any nondeterminism) — the harness must +//! regenerate the exact numbers cited in the README from a fixed seed. + +/// `splitmix64` — fast, well-distributed, seedable. Not cryptographic; it only +/// drives the simulation. +pub struct SplitMix64 { + state: u64, +} + +impl SplitMix64 { + pub fn new(seed: u64) -> Self { + Self { state: seed } + } + + /// Next raw 64-bit value. + pub fn next_u64(&mut self) -> u64 { + self.state = self.state.wrapping_add(0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15); + let mut z = self.state; + z = (z ^ (z >> 30)).wrapping_mul(0xBF58_476D_1CE4_E5B9); + z = (z ^ (z >> 27)).wrapping_mul(0x94D0_49BB_1331_11EB); + z ^ (z >> 31) + } + + /// Uniform in `[0, 1)`. + pub fn next_f64(&mut self) -> f64 { + // 53 bits of mantissa precision. + (self.next_u64() >> 11) as f64 / (1u64 << 53) as f64 + } + + /// Uniform in `[lo, hi)`. + pub fn range(&mut self, lo: f64, hi: f64) -> f64 { + lo + (hi - lo) * self.next_f64() + } + + /// Approx standard normal via the sum of 12 uniforms minus 6 (Irwin–Hall). + /// Good enough for behavioral jitter; keeps the harness dependency-free. + pub fn next_normal(&mut self) -> f64 { + let mut acc = 0.0; + for _ in 0..12 { + acc += self.next_f64(); + } + acc - 6.0 + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn is_deterministic_for_a_seed() { + let mut a = SplitMix64::new(123); + let mut b = SplitMix64::new(123); + for _ in 0..100 { + assert_eq!(a.next_u64(), b.next_u64()); + } + } + + #[test] + fn different_seeds_diverge() { + let mut a = SplitMix64::new(1); + let mut b = SplitMix64::new(2); + assert_ne!(a.next_u64(), b.next_u64()); + } + + #[test] + fn uniform_in_unit_interval() { + let mut r = SplitMix64::new(7); + for _ in 0..10_000 { + let x = r.next_f64(); + assert!((0.0..1.0).contains(&x)); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.lock b/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d50ce8e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.lock @@ -0,0 +1,2629 @@ +# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo. +# It is not intended for manual editing. +version = 4 + +[[package]] +name = "ahash" +version = "0.8.12" +source = 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+checksum = "29666d0abbfad1e3dc4dcf6144730dd3a3ab225bbbdac83319345b1b44ccfc1b" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c29337c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +[package] +name = "riverrun-m31" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +license = "MIT" +description = "The post-quantum M31 Circle-STARK path for riverrun. Built on the official, MIT/Apache-2.0-licensed Plonky3 crates (field, Poseidon2 permutation, FRI, Circle PCS); one dependency (p3-util) carries a one-function, documented patch for Solana SBF toolchain compatibility, see vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md; no other vendored or unlicensed code." + +[dependencies] +p3-air = "0.6.2" +p3-field = "0.6.2" +p3-matrix = "0.6.2" +p3-mersenne-31 = { version = "0.6.2", default-features = false } +p3-poseidon2 = "0.6.2" +p3-poseidon2-air = "0.6.2" +p3-symmetric = "0.6.2" +p3-uni-stark = "0.6.2" +p3-circle = "0.6.2" +p3-commit = "0.6.2" +p3-fri = "0.6.2" +p3-challenger = "0.6.2" +p3-util = "0.6.2" +p3-keccak = "0.6.2" +p3-merkle-tree = "0.6.2" +rand = { version = "0.9", default-features = false } +# The salted-MMCS cost instrument in `hiding` must hand p3-merkle-tree an RNG +# of the exact rand version it compiles against (0.10), not this crate's 0.9. +rand10 = { package = "rand", version = "0.10", default-features = false } +# Interior mutability for the ZK wrapper's blinding RNG (`src/zk.rs`), the same +# mechanism and version p3-fri 0.6.2's own HidingFriPcs uses. no_std-safe. +spin = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["mutex", "spin_mutex"] } +# bincode 1.x pulls serde with default features, i.e. serde/std. On a bare-wasm +# target (Soroban's wasm32v1-none) that makes serde_core drop its own #![no_std] +# and fail to find a standard library that does not exist there. It is only used +# for the proof wire format, so it lives behind a default-on feature that a +# bare-wasm build turns off (--no-default-features) and supplies its own +# serialization for. +bincode = { version = "1.3", optional = true } +# no_std wire format for bare-wasm hosts (Soroban's wasm32v1-none): postcard is +# serde-based like bincode but core+alloc only, so the proof can cross the +# Soroban host boundary as Bytes without pulling std in. A different wire +# format than bincode's on purpose: each chain's boundary owns its encoding. +postcard = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"], optional = true } +rand_chacha = { version = "0.10.0", default-features = false } + +[target.'cfg(target_os = "solana")'.dependencies] +# Only for the keccak256 syscall in src/keccak.rs; never linked off-chain. +solana-program = "2" + +[target.'cfg(all(target_family = "wasm", not(target_os = "solana")))'.dependencies] +# Only for routing keccak256 to Soroban's native host function in +# src/keccak.rs (feature `soroban-host-keccak`); never linked off-chain or +# on Solana. Guest-side bindings only — no soroban-sdk dependency. +soroban-env-guest = { version = "26.1", optional = true } +soroban-env-common = { version = "26.1", optional = true } + +# Two SBF-toolchain-compatibility patches, documented in each PATCH.md. Not +# forks we intend to diverge on; remove them the moment Solana's SBF loader +# or platform-tools, or upstream Plonky3, close the respective gap. +[patch.crates-io] +p3-util = { path = "vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch" } +p3-mersenne-31 = { path = "vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch" } +p3-uni-stark = { path = "vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch" } +p3-circle = { path = "vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch" } + +# Matches this repo's other Solana programs' release profile (contracts/receipt +# etc.): aggressive DCE/LTO, which SBF's link-time stack-frame check benefits +# from directly (unreferenced functions from dependencies riverrun-m31 doesn't +# actually call, e.g. p3-mersenne-31's Poseidon1/MDS code, should not survive +# to be checked at all). +[profile.release] +opt-level = "z" +lto = true +codegen-units = 1 +panic = "abort" + +[features] +default = ["wire"] +# The bincode proof wire format. On by default; off for bare-wasm targets whose +# host provides its own serialization (see the bincode dependency's comment). +wire = ["dep:bincode"] +# The postcard proof wire format, usable on bare-wasm (no_std + alloc). +wire-postcard = ["dep:postcard"] +# Measurement-only: count keccak calls/bytes inside SolKeccak256 (std targets). +keccak-count = [] +# Route SolKeccak256 to Soroban's native keccak256 host function (wasm guest +# targets only). Same function, same transcript: prover stays on software +# keccak, Fiat-Shamir enforces cross-implementation equivalence, exactly as +# the Solana syscall arm does. +soroban-host-keccak = ["dep:soroban-env-guest", "dep:soroban-env-common"] +# Per-phase on-chain CU attribution via sol_log_compute_units in the vendored +# patches. Off by default: zero behavioral difference unless enabled. +cu-trace = ["p3-circle/cu-trace", "p3-uni-stark/cu-trace"] diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attack_low_security.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attack_low_security.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7fc6df4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attack_low_security.rs @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +//! Adversarial probe: does the on-chain gate let the CALLER choose the +//! security level? Generates a genuine crowd binding proof at a deliberately +//! weak FRI parameterisation (few queries, small blowup). If a contract that +//! takes `num_queries` from its caller accepts this, the security level of +//! the whole gate is attacker-chosen, and at low query counts a forged proof +//! passes with non-negligible probability. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example attack_low_security --features wire-postcard -- + +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_crowd, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let a: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + let queries: usize = a[1].parse().unwrap(); + let log_blowup: usize = a[2].parse().unwrap(); + let outdir = &a[3]; + std::fs::create_dir_all(outdir).unwrap(); + + let secret = [13u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [77u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 4242 + i as u64); + // Smallest legal height for this query count (hiding margin q + 2). + let log_rows = ((queries + 2).next_power_of_two().trailing_zeros() as usize).max(2); + + let (proof, c, _leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, action, round, blinder, queries, log_blowup, log_rows, riverrun_m31::zk::Seed::reproducible(999), + ); + let mut pubs = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&c).chain(&nullifier) { + pubs.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/weak.postcard"), &bytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/weak_publics.le64"), &pubs).unwrap(); + println!("queries={queries} log_blowup={log_blowup} rows={} proof={} bytes", 1< + +use riverrun_m31::asp_history::{prove_asp_history, root_to_limbs, RootStep, ROOT_LIMBS}; +use std::fs; + +fn parse_root_hex(h: &str) -> [u64; ROOT_LIMBS] { + let h = h.trim_start_matches("0x"); + let mut be = [0u8; 32]; + let bytes: Vec = (0..h.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&h[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap_or(0)) + .collect(); + // right-align into 32 bytes big-endian + let start = 32usize.saturating_sub(bytes.len()); + be[start..start + bytes.len().min(32)].copy_from_slice(&bytes[..bytes.len().min(32)]); + root_to_limbs(&be) +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 3 { + eprintln!("usage: attest_asp_history "); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let raw = fs::read_to_string(&args[1]).expect("read steps json"); + let outdir = &args[2]; + fs::create_dir_all(outdir).unwrap(); + + // Minimal JSON parse: array of {"index":N,"root":"0x.."}. + let mut steps: Vec = Vec::new(); + for chunk in raw.split('{').skip(1) { + let idx = chunk + .split("\"index\"").nth(1) + .and_then(|s| s.split(|c: char| c == ':' || c == ',' || c == '}').nth(1)) + .and_then(|s| s.trim().parse::().ok()); + let root = chunk + .split("\"root\"").nth(1) + .and_then(|s| s.split('"').nth(1)) + .map(parse_root_hex); + if let (Some(index), Some(root)) = (idx, root) { + steps.push(RootStep { index, root }); + } + } + assert!(!steps.is_empty(), "no steps parsed"); + + let events = steps.len(); + let log_rows = (events.next_power_of_two().trailing_zeros() as usize).max(2); + let proof = prove_asp_history(&steps, log_rows, 20); + let bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + + let proof_path = format!("{outdir}/attestation.postcard"); + fs::write(&proof_path, &bytes).unwrap(); + + let hex = |limbs: &[u64; ROOT_LIMBS]| limbs.iter().map(|l| format!("{l:08x}")).collect::(); + println!( + "{{\"proof\":\"{proof_path}\",\"proof_bytes\":{},\"events\":{events},\"start_index\":{},\"first_root_limbs\":\"{}\",\"last_root_limbs\":\"{}\"}}", + bytes.len(), + steps[0].index, + hex(&steps[0].root), + hex(&steps[events - 1].root), + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attest_history.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attest_history.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fdca786 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/attest_history.rs @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +//! Prove and size an ASP root-history attestation, so the cost is measured +//! rather than assumed before anyone points the on-chain verifier at it. +use riverrun_m31::asp_history::{prove_asp_history, verify_asp_history, RootStep, ROOT_LIMBS}; +use std::time::Instant; + +fn root(seed: u64) -> [u64; ROOT_LIMBS] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| (seed.wrapping_mul(1000).wrapping_add(i as u64)) % ((1 << 31) - 1)) +} + +fn main() { + for (events, log_rows) in [(6usize, 3usize), (60, 6), (250, 8)] { + let steps: Vec = (0..events) + .map(|i| RootStep { index: i as u64, root: root(i as u64 + 1) }) + .collect(); + let t = Instant::now(); + let proof = prove_asp_history(&steps, log_rows, 20); + let ms = t.elapsed().as_millis(); + let ok = verify_asp_history(&proof, steps[0].index, steps[0].root, + steps[events - 1].root, events, 20); + let bytes = proof.to_postcard().len(); + println!("{events} events (2^{log_rows} rows): verify={ok} prove {ms}ms proof {bytes} B ({:.0}% of 132KB envelope)", + bytes as f64 / 1320.96); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/count_keccak.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/count_keccak.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fdeb68f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/count_keccak.rs @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +//! Count keccak calls/bytes inside a binding verify, per query count. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example count_keccak --features keccak-count + +use riverrun_m31::keccak::count; +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_tuned, verify_binding_tuned, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 1000 + i as u64); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 2000 + i as u64); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 3000 + i as u64); + + for q in [4usize, 26, 40] { + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, q); + count::reset(); + let ok = verify_binding_tuned(&proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, q); + let (calls, bytes) = count::snapshot(); + println!( + "q={q}: verify={ok} keccak_calls={calls} keccak_input_bytes={bytes} avg={:.1} B/call", + bytes as f64 / calls as f64 + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/fri_zk_budget.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/fri_zk_budget.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2d176c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/fri_zk_budget.rs @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +//! Step 4 of the simulator, reduced to a dimension count — and the count is +//! tighter than anyone here suspected. +//! +//! `examples/zk_view.rs` proved two components of the verifier's view and left +//! the FRI phase open, calling it research. It is less open than that, because +//! of one structural fact that makes it tractable: +//! +//! **FRI folding is linear.** Every value the verifier observes during the +//! FRI phase — each layer's sibling, at every query — is the image of the +//! batch polynomial `ro` under a LINEAR map determined entirely by public +//! challenges and query indices. +//! +//! So "can a simulator produce a consistent FRI transcript" is not a vague +//! question about interactive proofs. It is the same question Theorem B +//! answered for the trace openings, one level up: +//! +//! ```text +//! is the blinding subspace surjective onto the FRI observation map? +//! ``` +//! +//! If it is, the observed FRI scalars are uniform whatever the witness, a +//! simulator samples them directly, interpolates a low-degree `ro` through +//! them, and runs the honest folding — every consistency check then passes by +//! construction. If it is not, some linear functional of the witness survives +//! into the FRI transcript and no such simulator exists. +//! +//! ## The counting +//! +//! **What the verifier observes.** Per query: one sibling at the first layer, +//! then one per folding layer. With `max_log_arity = 1` each layer halves, and +//! `log_final_poly_len = 0` folds to a constant, so from a committed LDE of +//! `2^ℓ` points the circle PCS does one `fold_y` and then `ℓ − 1` binary +//! folds. Observations per query are therefore `ℓ`, and the FRI phase reveals +//! +//! ```text +//! m = Q · ℓ, ℓ = log₂(2N · 2^β) +//! ``` +//! +//! scalars, each a linear functional of `ro`. +//! +//! **What blinds them.** Two independent sources, and only two: +//! +//! - the trace blinder, which enters `ro` through the DEEP reduction as +//! `Σ_i α^i · Z_D·R_i / (X − ζ)`. As the per-column blinders range over +//! `L_N^w` independently and the `α^i` are nonzero, this ranges over +//! `{ Z_D·R/(X − ζ) : R ∈ L_N }` — an **`N`-dimensional** subspace, NOT +//! `w · N`. The width does not help: the `α`-reduction collapses it. +//! - the randomisation polynomial, committed over the doubled trace domain, +//! contributing its own **`2N` dimensions**. +//! +//! So the blinding available to the FRI phase is `3N`, against `Q · ℓ` +//! observations. +//! +//! ## What that says, and it is not comfortable +//! +//! The margin `3N − Q·ℓ` is the quantity to watch, and it moves the WRONG way +//! under the parameter change the soundness budget recommends. Raising the +//! blowup adds folding layers, so it multiplies the observation count by +//! roughly `ℓ`, while soundness only gains linearly in `β`. **Soundness and +//! this zero-knowledge margin pull in opposite directions on the same knob.** +//! +//! That is the finding this file exists to report, and it was invisible while +//! the FRI phase was being waved at as "inherited". +//! +//! ## Honest scope +//! +//! Dimension counting gives a NECESSARY condition, not a sufficient one. A +//! positive margin means the blinding *could* cover the observations; whether +//! it does requires the surjectivity of a specific linear map, which is the +//! Theorem-B computation one level up and is not done here. A NEGATIVE margin, +//! by contrast, is conclusive in the bad direction: fewer blinding dimensions +//! than observed scalars means some functional of the witness survives, and no +//! simulator of this shape can exist. +//! +//! Two further caveats, so the numbers are not read as more than they are. +//! The per-query observation count `ℓ` is an upper bound: colliding query +//! indices and the shared first layer reduce it. And the randomisation +//! polynomial's `2N` is its committed dimension; how much of it reaches the +//! batch depends on the DEEP reduction, which this file does not model. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example fri_zk_budget + +/// Log2 of the committed height. The ZK path commits `2N` for a trace of `N`. +fn log_committed(log_rows: usize) -> usize { + log_rows + 1 +} + +/// Folding layers the circle PCS produces from a committed LDE of `2^l` points: +/// one `fold_y`, then binary folds down to a constant. +fn layers(log_rows: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> usize { + log_committed(log_rows) + log_blowup +} + +struct Row { + log_rows: usize, + queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +} + +fn main() { + println!( + "The FRI phase, as a dimension count.\n\n\ + observations m = Q · l (l = folding layers, each query one sibling per layer)\n\ + blinding 3N = N + 2N (trace blinder collapsed by alpha, plus the randomisation poly)\n\ + margin 3N − m (negative is conclusive: no simulator of this shape)\n" + ); + println!( + "{:<34} {:>4} {:>4} {:>6} {:>7} {:>8} {:>9}", + "configuration", "N", "l", "m", "3N", "margin", "verdict" + ); + + let rows = [ + Row { log_rows: 6, queries: 20, log_blowup: 2 }, + Row { log_rows: 6, queries: 16, log_blowup: 6 }, + Row { log_rows: 6, queries: 12, log_blowup: 7 }, + Row { log_rows: 5, queries: 20, log_blowup: 2 }, + Row { log_rows: 7, queries: 20, log_blowup: 2 }, + Row { log_rows: 7, queries: 16, log_blowup: 6 }, + Row { log_rows: 8, queries: 16, log_blowup: 6 }, + ]; + + let mut any_negative = false; + for r in &rows { + let n = 1usize << r.log_rows; + let l = layers(r.log_rows, r.log_blowup); + let m = r.queries * l; + let blind = 3 * n; + let margin = blind as isize - m as isize; + if margin < 0 { + any_negative = true; + } + let name = format!( + "{} rows, {} queries, blowup 2^{}", + n, r.queries, r.log_blowup + ); + println!( + "{:<34} {:>4} {:>4} {:>6} {:>7} {:>8} {:>9}", + name, + n, + l, + m, + blind, + margin, + if margin < 0 { "NO SIM" } else { "possible" } + ); + } + + println!(); + if any_negative { + println!( + "At least one configuration has FEWER blinding dimensions than the FRI phase\n\ + reveals scalars. For those, the counting is conclusive in the bad direction:\n\ + a linear functional of the witness survives into the transcript, and no\n\ + simulator that samples the observations and interpolates can exist.\n" + ); + } + + println!( + "The interaction worth naming, because it was invisible until the FRI phase\n\ + stopped being waved at:\n\n\ + SOUNDNESS improves as Q · log_blowup. The ZERO-KNOWLEDGE margin degrades as\n\ + Q · (log_committed + log_blowup). The same knob moves them in opposite\n\ + directions, and the zero-knowledge side degrades FASTER, because it pays the\n\ + committed height on top of the blowup.\n\n\ + So the configuration the soundness budget recommends — 16 queries at blowup\n\ + 64, which buys 104 conjectured bits for less verifier CPU — is exactly the\n\ + configuration this count flags. Adopting it on the soundness argument alone\n\ + would have traded a zero-knowledge property for a soundness number without\n\ + anyone noticing the trade.\n\n\ + The lever that helps BOTH: trace height. It adds 3 blinding dimensions per\n\ + row while adding only Q observations per doubling, so taller traces widen the\n\ + margin. That costs prover time and envelope, and it is the direction to\n\ + measure next." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_binding_postcard.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_binding_postcard.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..43f7ade1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_binding_postcard.rs @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +//! Generate a real binding proof in the postcard wire format, plus its public +//! values as 48 little-endian u64s (action ‖ round ‖ leaf ‖ nullifier), for +//! feeding the Soroban m31-verify contract's CU measurement harness. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example gen_binding_postcard --features wire-postcard -- [num_queries] +//! +//! `num_queries` defaults to 40 (production). 26 is the measured maximum that +//! verifies inside one Soroban transaction (400M instruction cap). + +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_tuned, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let outdir = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or_else(|| ".".into()); + let num_queries: usize = std::env::args() + .nth(2) + .map(|s| s.parse().expect("num_queries must be a number")) + .unwrap_or(40); + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 1000 + i as u64); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 2000 + i as u64); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 3000 + i as u64); + + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, num_queries); + + let mut publics = Vec::with_capacity((2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * leaf.len()) * 8); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + + let proof_bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/binding_proof.postcard"), &proof_bytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/binding_publics.le64"), &publics).unwrap(); + println!( + "proof: {} bytes, publics: {} bytes -> {outdir}", + proof_bytes.len(), + publics.len() + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_relation_postcard.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_relation_postcard.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f699cbd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/gen_relation_postcard.rs @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +//! Generate the FULL riverrun relation for on-chain verification: a binding +//! proof (leaf and nullifier share one secret, bound to action and round), a +//! membership proof (that leaf, truncated to the digest width, under a real +//! 16-leaf tree via a private path), and the composed public values, all in +//! the postcard wire format the Soroban m31-verify contract reads. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example gen_relation_postcard --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! [binding_q] [round_base] +//! +//! `binding_q` defaults to 40 (production; membership is always 40). +//! `round_base` varies the round, giving a fresh nullifier per run. +//! Writes binding.postcard, membership.postcard, relation_publics.le64 +//! (56 LE u64s: action[8] ‖ round[8] ‖ leaf[16] ‖ nullifier[16] ‖ root[8]). + +use riverrun_m31::{ + compress, prove_binding_tuned, prove_membership, PathStep, CONTEXT_LEN, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, + SECRET_LEN, +}; + +fn main() { + let outdir = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or_else(|| ".".into()); + let binding_q: usize = std::env::args().nth(2).and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(40); + let round_base: u64 = std::env::args().nth(3).and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(3000); + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 1000 + i as u64); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 2000 + i as u64); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| round_base + i as u64); + + let (binding, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, binding_q); + + let mut leaf_digest = [0u64; DIGEST_LEN]; + leaf_digest.copy_from_slice(&leaf[..DIGEST_LEN]); + let mut level: Vec<[u64; DIGEST_LEN]> = vec![leaf_digest]; + level.extend((1..16u64).map(|i| core::array::from_fn::(|j| 500 + i * 8 + j as u64))); + let mut path = Vec::new(); + let mut idx = 0usize; + while level.len() > 1 { + let sib = if idx % 2 == 0 { level[idx + 1] } else { level[idx - 1] }; + path.push(PathStep { sibling: sib, node_on_right: idx % 2 == 1 }); + level = level.chunks(2).map(|p| compress(p[0], p[1])).collect(); + idx /= 2; + } + let path: [PathStep; DEPTH] = path.try_into().ok().unwrap(); + let (membership, root) = prove_membership(leaf_digest, path); + + let mut publics = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier).chain(&root) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + + let b = binding.to_postcard(); + let m = membership.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/binding.postcard"), &b).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/membership.postcard"), &m).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/relation_publics.le64"), &publics).unwrap(); + println!( + "binding: {} B, membership: {} B, publics: {} B -> {outdir}", + b.len(), + m.len(), + publics.len() + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_cost.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_cost.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..034b2b04 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_cost.rs @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +//! Price the hiding machinery natively, and emit proofs for the on-chain +//! measurement. See `src/hiding.rs` for what this does and does not build. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example hiding_cost --features wire-postcard -- [outdir] + +use riverrun_m31::hiding::{prove_binding_hiding_cost, verify_binding_hiding_cost}; +use riverrun_m31::{CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let outdir = std::env::args().nth(1); + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 1000 + i as u64); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 2000 + i as u64); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 3000 + i as u64); + + // Random COLUMNS are not swept here: `BaseAir::width` fixes the trace + // width, so appending unconstrained columns makes verification fail + // (measured: 64 rows + 4 columns verifies false). Blinding columns need + // the AIR to declare them, which is part of the AIR work this instrument + // deliberately does not fake. Their cost is small anyway next to the + // ~700-column Poseidon2 trace. + // (log_rows, queries). Hiding needs the committed trace to hold at least + // `queries` random rows beside the real ones, so a 2^k-row commitment + // supports about 2^(k-1) queries. These are the pairs that satisfy that + // and the ones that bracket the transaction-size cap. + for (log_rows, queries) in [(2usize, 40usize), (6, 40), (7, 40), (6, 32), (6, 26)] { + let random_cols = 0; + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_hiding_cost(secret, action, round, queries, log_rows, random_cols); + let ok = verify_binding_hiding_cost(&proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, queries); + let bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + println!( + "{} rows, {} queries: verify={ok}, degree_bits={}, proof {} B ({:.0}% of the 132,096 B tx cap)", + 1 << log_rows, + queries, + proof.degree_bits(), + bytes.len(), + bytes.len() as f64 / 1_320.96 + ); + assert!(ok, "the hiding-cost config must still prove and verify"); + + if let Some(dir) = &outdir { + let tag = format!("{}r{}q", 1 << log_rows, queries); + std::fs::write(format!("{dir}/hiding_{tag}.postcard"), &bytes).unwrap(); + let mut publics = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + std::fs::write(format!("{dir}/hiding_{tag}_publics.le64"), &publics).unwrap(); + } + } + + // The soundness of the statement must survive the config change: a wrong + // public value has to be rejected exactly as in the production config. + let (proof, leaf, mut nullifier) = + prove_binding_hiding_cost(secret, action, round, 40, 6, 0); + nullifier[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_binding_hiding_cost(&proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, 40), + "tampered public values must be rejected under the hiding config too" + ); + println!("tampered publics rejected: soundness survives the salted MMCS"); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_margin_proof.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_margin_proof.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3722082b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_margin_proof.rs @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +//! Does the blinding actually blind? An exact rank computation, not a hope. +//! +//! `HidingCirclePcs` commits `T' = T + Z_D·R`, and the whole hiding claim is +//! this: an adversary who learns `k` evaluations of `T'` at points off the +//! trace domain learns nothing about `T`, because each opened value is masked +//! by an independent uniform field element. Written out, the claim is +//! +//! for every witness T and every set S = {P_1,…,P_k} of opened points, +//! the distribution of (T'(P_1),…,T'(P_k)) over uniform R is UNIFORM on F^k +//! +//! and that holds if and only if two things are true: +//! +//! (a) `Z_D(P_j) ≠ 0` for every opened point — true by construction, since +//! the trace domain `standard(n)` and every LDE domain `standard(m)` +//! with `m > n` are disjoint (their points have different orders); and +//! (b) the evaluation map `L_N → F^k`, `R ↦ (R(P_1),…,R(P_k))`, is +//! SURJECTIVE, where `L_N` is the N-dimensional space of circle +//! polynomials the blinder is drawn from. +//! +//! Condition (b) is the one that is easy to assume and wrong to assume, and +//! this example exists because assuming it would have been wrong. +//! +//! For univariate Reed-Solomon, (b) is free: the evaluation matrix is +//! Vandermonde, so any `k ≤ N` distinct points give full rank. **Circle +//! polynomials are not univariate polynomials.** `L_N` lives on the curve +//! `x² + y² = 1`, and a nonzero element of it can vanish at as many as `N` +//! points — its divisor has degree `N`, not `N − 1`. So evaluation at exactly +//! `N` points can be singular, and the computation below **finds a concrete +//! counterexample**: at `N = 4` over the 8-point LDE domain, the point set +//! `{0, 1, 2, 7}` has rank 3, not 4. Natural-order indices 0 and 7 are a +//! point and its negation. +//! +//! The consequence is a correction to the folklore rule, and it is the whole +//! reason to compute rather than assume: +//! +//! ```text +//! k ≤ N is NOT sufficient (counterexample above) +//! k ≤ N − 1 is what the margin must guarantee +//! ``` +//! +//! Every margin this crate enforces already satisfies the corrected rule, but +//! by one dimension, not by luck of a large gap: the binding relation opens +//! `k = Q + 1` values and requires `N ≥ Q + 2`; the membership relation opens +//! `k = Q + 2` (it has transition constraints, so the verifier also sees +//! `ζ_next`) and requires `N ≥ Q + 3`. Both are exactly `N ≥ k + 1`. Had the +//! margin been written as `N ≥ k`, which is what the Reed-Solomon reflex +//! suggests, the boundary configuration would sit precisely on the degenerate +//! case found below. +//! +//! This example establishes it, exactly and over the actual field, for the +//! configurations that are deployed. It builds the `k × N` evaluation matrix +//! of a basis of `L_N` at the opened points and computes its rank over +//! Mersenne-31 by Gaussian elimination. Rank `k` means surjective, which means +//! every opened value is masked by an independent uniform element, which means +//! the openings are **perfectly** hiding — not merely statistically so. +//! +//! What this does and does not settle: +//! +//! What this does and does not settle: +//! +//! - Settled, by exhaustion at sizes where exhaustion is finite: at `N = 4` +//! and `N = 8`, EVERY subset of size `≤ N − 1` has full rank, and at size +//! `N` some do not. That is the corrected rule, verified rather than +//! argued. +//! - Settled, exactly, for the deployed parameter sets: surjectivity at the +//! structured point families a real query pattern produces (consecutive +//! indices, negation pairs, arithmetic strides). +//! - NOT settled: the `N ≥ k + 1` rule for every one of the `C(M, k)` +//! subsets at deployed sizes, which is not a finite computation. It is +//! supported by exhaustion at small `N` and by the divisor-degree argument +//! (a nonzero `f ∈ L_N` has at most `N` zeros, so `N − 1` conditions +//! cannot annihilate a two-dimensional subspace generically) — support, not +//! proof. +//! - NOT settled here: hiding of anything other than the trace openings. Each +//! FRI query additionally reveals ONE extension-field scalar that is a known +//! linear functional of the sibling row, mixed across all `w` columns. That +//! adds `Q` scalar constraints against `w · N` blinder dimensions, so it +//! costs `Q / w` of a dimension — under 0.04 at this AIR's width. The +//! quotient chunks and the FRI batch carry their own randomisation, and the +//! uni-stark randomisation polynomial is where the "statistical" qualifier +//! in the paper's ZK claim comes from. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example hiding_margin_proof + +use p3_circle::{CircleDomain, CircleEvaluations}; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + +type Val = Mersenne31; + +/// Evaluations, on the LDE domain, of the basis of `L_N` given by the +/// indicator functions of the trace domain. +/// +/// This is exactly the space the blinder is drawn from: `prove_*` samples `R` +/// uniformly as `N` values on the trace domain and extrapolates, and +/// extrapolation is a linear bijection from `F^N` onto `L_N`. So a uniform +/// draw of trace-domain values is a uniform draw from `L_N`, and the columns +/// below span exactly the space the adversary must be unable to pin down. +fn basis_on_lde(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let trace_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + // Column i is the indicator of trace-domain point i, extrapolated. + let mut cols = Vec::with_capacity(n * n); + for row in 0..n { + for col in 0..n { + cols.push(if row == col { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + } + } + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(trace_domain, RowMajorMatrix::new(cols, n)) + .extrapolate(lde_domain) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix() +} + +/// Rank over Mersenne-31 of the submatrix formed by `rows` of `m`. +fn rank_of_rows(m: &RowMajorMatrix, rows: &[usize]) -> usize { + let width = m.width(); + let mut a: Vec> = rows + .iter() + .map(|&r| (0..width).map(|c| m.get(r, c).unwrap()).collect()) + .collect(); + let mut rank = 0usize; + let mut col = 0usize; + while rank < a.len() && col < width { + // find a pivot in this column at or below `rank` + let mut pivot = None; + for r in rank..a.len() { + if a[r][col] != Val::ZERO { + pivot = Some(r); + break; + } + } + match pivot { + None => { + col += 1; + } + Some(p) => { + a.swap(rank, p); + let inv = a[rank][col].inverse(); + for c in col..width { + a[rank][c] *= inv; + } + for r in 0..a.len() { + if r != rank && a[r][col] != Val::ZERO { + let f = a[r][col]; + for c in col..width { + let sub = a[rank][c] * f; + a[r][c] -= sub; + } + } + } + rank += 1; + col += 1; + } + } + } + rank +} + +/// Every k-subset of `m`'s rows has full rank k. Exhaustive; only tractable +/// for tiny domains, which is exactly where it is worth doing, because it is +/// the only place the "for ALL subsets" statement can be settled rather than +/// sampled. +fn every_subset_has_full_rank(m: &RowMajorMatrix, k: usize) -> bool { + let rows = m.height(); + let mut idx: Vec = (0..k).collect(); + loop { + if rank_of_rows(m, &idx) != k { + println!(" COUNTEREXAMPLE: rows {idx:?} have rank < {k}"); + return false; + } + // next combination + let mut i = k; + loop { + if i == 0 { + return true; + } + i -= 1; + if idx[i] != i + rows - k { + idx[i] += 1; + for j in i + 1..k { + idx[j] = idx[j - 1] + 1; + } + break; + } + } + } +} + +fn report(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize, k: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let m = basis_on_lde(log_n, log_blowup); + let lde = m.height(); + println!( + "N = {n} (trace rows), LDE = {lde} points (blowup {}), k = {k} opened evaluations", + 1 << log_blowup + ); + assert!(k <= n, "the counting argument only claims anything for k <= N"); + + // 1. the first k points, in natural order + let consecutive: Vec = (0..k).collect(); + let r1 = rank_of_rows(&m, &consecutive); + + // 2. sibling pairs: a circle FRI query opens a point and its negation, + // which are the natural-order pair (i, LDE - 1 - i). If any structured + // set were going to be degenerate, this is the candidate. + let mut siblings = Vec::with_capacity(k); + let mut i = 0usize; + while siblings.len() < k { + siblings.push(i); + if siblings.len() < k { + siblings.push(lde - 1 - i); + } + i += 1; + } + siblings.sort_unstable(); + siblings.dedup(); + let r2 = rank_of_rows(&m, &siblings); + + // 3. an arithmetic-progression stride, the other structured family + let stride = (lde / k).max(1); + let strided: Vec = (0..k).map(|j| (j * stride) % lde).collect(); + let r3 = rank_of_rows(&m, &strided); + + println!(" consecutive points rank {r1} / {k} {}", verdict(r1, k)); + println!( + " FRI sibling pairs rank {} / {} {}", + r2, + siblings.len(), + verdict(r2, siblings.len()) + ); + println!(" strided points rank {r3} / {k} {}", verdict(r3, k)); + assert_eq!(r1, k, "consecutive points must impose independent conditions"); + assert_eq!(r2, siblings.len(), "sibling pairs must impose independent conditions"); + assert_eq!(r3, k, "strided points must impose independent conditions"); + println!(); +} + +fn verdict(rank: usize, k: usize) -> &'static str { + if rank == k { + "SURJECTIVE — openings uniform, perfectly masked" + } else { + "DEGENERATE — the blinder does NOT cover these openings" + } +} + +fn main() { + println!( + "Surjectivity of the blinding map for HidingCirclePcs.\n\ + Rank k means the k opened evaluations of T' = T + Z_D*R are uniform\n\ + and independent over a uniform R, hence perfectly masked.\n" + ); + + println!("=== exhaustive: EVERY k-subset, at sizes where that is finite ===\n"); + for (log_n, log_blowup, k) in [ + (2usize, 1usize, 2usize), + (2, 1, 3), // N-1: must be safe + (2, 1, 4), // N: expected degenerate + (3, 1, 6), + (3, 1, 7), // N-1: must be safe + (3, 1, 8), // N: expected degenerate + ] { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let m = basis_on_lde(log_n, log_blowup); + let ok = every_subset_has_full_rank(&m, k); + println!( + "N = {n}, LDE = {}, every {k}-subset full rank: {}{}", + m.height(), + if ok { "YES" } else { "NO" }, + if k == n && !ok { + " <- k = N IS DEGENERATE. The Reed-Solomon rule does not transfer." + } else { + "" + } + ); + if k < n { + assert!(ok, "k <= N-1 must be safe; a failure here would sink the margin rule"); + } else { + assert!(!ok, "k = N is expected to be degenerate on circle domains"); + } + } + println!( + "\n Read the pattern, not the individual lines: every subset of size N-1 is\n\ + surjective, and at size N some are not. The margin rule is therefore\n\ + N >= k + 1, not N >= k. Every configuration this crate enforces already\n\ + satisfies it — by exactly one dimension.\n" + ); + + println!("=== the deployed configurations ===\n"); + // Binding: 32 rows, 20 queries, blowup 4. The committed polynomial has + // dimension 2N = 64; the blinder occupies N = 32 of those dimensions, and + // that is the number the openings must stay under. + report(5, 2, 22); // 20 queries + zeta + one spare + // Membership: same height, and one more opening because the AIR has + // transition constraints, so the verifier also sees zeta_next. + report(5, 2, 23); + // The 64-row hiding configuration, at its 40-query point. + report(6, 2, 42); + + println!( + "Every configuration the contracts accept has the blinder covering strictly\n\ + more dimensions than the verifier opens, and the evaluation map at those\n\ + openings is surjective. Under a uniform blinder the opened values are\n\ + therefore uniform: the trace openings leak nothing, information\n\ + theoretically, whatever the adversary's computing power.\n\n\ + The residual assumptions, stated so they are not mistaken for results:\n\ + the blinder must BE uniform (it is drawn from ChaCha20 seeded by the OS,\n\ + so this is computational, not information-theoretic), and hiding of the\n\ + quotient chunks and the FRI batch rests on their own randomisation,\n\ + which is where the paper's 'statistical' qualifier comes from." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_theory.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_theory.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..640a416a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/hiding_theory.rs @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +//! The hiding argument, proved rather than measured. +//! +//! `examples/hiding_margin_proof.rs` computes ranks and finds counterexamples. +//! That is evidence. This file supplies the structure theory those ranks are +//! instances of, states three theorems, and verifies each one's hypotheses and +//! conclusions computationally over Mersenne-31, so that a reader can check the +//! algebra and the arithmetic against each other. +//! +//! Throughout: `p = 2^31 - 1`, `C = {(x,y) : x² + y² = 1}` over `F_p`, and +//! `L_N` is the `N`-dimensional space of circle polynomials that `CircleEvaluations` +//! interpolates into, `N = 2^n`. `D` is the trace domain `standard(n)` and `L` +//! is an LDE domain `standard(n + β)`, disjoint from `D`. +//! +//! --- +//! +//! ## Theorem A (structure of `L_N`) +//! +//! ```text +//! L_N = { a(x) + y·b(x) : deg a < N/2, deg b < N/2 } +//! ``` +//! +//! *Proof of the normal form.* Let `R = F[x,y]/(x² + y² − 1)` be the +//! coordinate ring of the circle. The defining relation gives `y² = 1 − x²`, +//! so every occurrence of `y²` rewrites into `F[x]`: by induction every +//! monomial `y^k` equals a polynomial in `x` when `k` is even and `y` times +//! one when `k` is odd. Hence `R = F[x] ⊕ y·F[x]` as an `F[x]`-module, free of +//! rank two on the basis `{1, y}`, and every element of `R` is `a(x) + y·b(x)` +//! for a UNIQUE pair `(a, b)`: uniqueness because `a + yb = a' + yb'` forces +//! `(a − a') = y(b' − b)`, and comparing the free-module components gives +//! `a = a'`, `b = b'`. ∎ +//! +//! What that argument does NOT settle is which `(a, b)` degree bounds cut out +//! the particular `N`-dimensional subspace that `CircleEvaluations` +//! interpolates into. That is a fact about the CFFT construction rather than +//! about the ring, and it is settled here by computation: `main` checks the two +//! spans coincide as subspaces of `F^|L|` by comparing the ranks of both +//! generator matrices and of their concatenation. So the normal form is +//! proved, the degree bounds are verified, and the difference between the two +//! is stated rather than blurred. +//! +//! Two consequences used below, both immediate: +//! +//! - **Negation acts by sign on the odd part.** `-(x,y) = (x,-y)`, so +//! `f(-P) = a(x) - y·b(x)`. Hence `f(P) = f(-P) = 0` forces +//! `a(x₀) = b(x₀) = 0`: a negation PAIR is not two generic conditions, it is +//! two conditions concentrated at one abscissa. This is the exact mechanism +//! behind the degenerate sets found by the companion example, both of which +//! are "the first `N-1` points plus the negation of the first". +//! - **Distinct points share an abscissa only if they are a negation pair**, +//! since `x` determines `y` up to sign. +//! +//! ## Theorem B (unconditional surjectivity below half) +//! +//! If `S ⊂ L` consists of `k ≤ N/2` distinct points, then `L_N → F^k`, +//! `f ↦ (f(P))_{P∈S}`, is surjective. **No hypothesis on negation pairs.** +//! +//! *Proof.* Write `h = N/2`. Split `S` into `m` negation pairs and `s` +//! singletons, so `k = 2m + s`; by Theorem A's corollary the abscissae of the +//! `m` pairs and the `s` singletons are `m + s` distinct values. Let +//! `f = a + y·b` lie in the kernel. Each pair forces `a(x_i) = b(x_i) = 0`, so +//! `V_p = Π_{i} (x - x_i)` divides both: `a = V_p·a'`, `b = V_p·b'` with +//! `deg a', deg b' < h - m`. Since `V_p(x_j) ≠ 0` at every singleton abscissa, +//! the singleton conditions become `a'(x_j) + y_j·b'(x_j) = 0`. Those `s` +//! conditions have matrix `[ V | Y·V ]` with `V` the `s × (h-m)` Vandermonde +//! in the distinct `x_j`; and `s = k - 2m ≤ h - 2m ≤ h - m`, so `V` alone has +//! rank `s` and the conditions are independent. Counting: the kernel has +//! dimension `N - 2m - s = N - k`, so the rank is `k`. ∎ +//! +//! No genericity, no computation, no dependence on the `y_j`, and — the part +//! worth noticing — no need to exclude negation pairs. A pair costs two +//! dimensions and pays for them; the Vandermonde argument survives the passage +//! from the line to the circle by living on the even part, and the pairs are +//! absorbed by dividing out their vanishing polynomial first. +//! +//! ## Theorem C (the Singleton defect is exactly one) +//! +//! (i) A nonzero `f ∈ L_N` has at most `N` zeros on `C`. +//! (ii) Consequently, for any `S ⊂ L` with `|S| = k ≤ N` and `|L| ≥ N + 1`, +//! the evaluation map has rank at least `k - 1`. +//! (iii) The bound in (ii) is attained: rank `k - 1` occurs. +//! +//! *Proof of (i).* Write `f = a + y·b` and put `g(x) = a(x)² - (1-x²)·b(x)²`, +//! of degree at most `N`. If `g ≡ 0` then `(1-x²) = (a/b)²` in `F(x)` for +//! `b ≠ 0`, impossible because `1 - x²` is squarefree — its roots `±1` are +//! distinct for odd `p` — while a square of a rational function has even +//! multiplicities; so `b = 0`, then `a = 0`, then `f = 0`. So `g ≢ 0` and `g` +//! has at most `N` roots. Every zero of `f` lies over a root of `g`, and a +//! zero occurring at BOTH signs of `y` over one abscissa `x₀` forces +//! `a(x₀) = b(x₀) = 0`, hence `(x - x₀)² | g`. Counting with multiplicity, +//! the number of zeros of `f` is at most `deg g ≤ N`. ∎ +//! +//! *Proof of (ii).* Suppose the rank is `k - d` with `d ≥ 2`. The kernel has +//! dimension `N - k + d`. Choose `N - k + d - 1` points of `L \ S`; each cuts +//! the kernel by at most one dimension, so some nonzero `f` in the kernel +//! vanishes on all of them as well, giving `f` at least +//! `k + (N - k + d - 1) = N + d - 1 ≥ N + 1` zeros, contradicting (i). ∎ +//! +//! *(iii)* is the companion example's counterexamples, re-derived here. +//! +//! ## What the three together say about the deployment +//! +//! Let `k` be the number of evaluations of a committed column the verifier +//! learns: `Q + 1` for an AIR without transition constraints (`Q` query rows +//! and `ζ`), `Q + 2` when `ζ_next` is also opened. +//! +//! - `k ≤ N/2` and no negation pair among the opened points ⟹ **surjective, +//! unconditionally** (Theorem B): the openings are uniform and the trace +//! leaks nothing, for every witness and every adversary. +//! - `N/2 < k ≤ N - 1` ⟹ **rank ≥ k - 1 unconditionally** (Theorem C), so at +//! most one linear functional of the witness can leak, and whether it does +//! is a property of the specific point set, decidable by rank computation. +//! - `k = N` ⟹ degenerate sets exist (Theorem C(iii)); a margin written as +//! `N ≥ k` sits on them. +//! +//! The configuration this project has been deploying is `N = 32` with `k = 22`, +//! which lands in the middle band: computation says surjective, theory says +//! "at most one dimension, and here is how to check". Raising the trace to +//! `N = 64` moves the same `k` into Theorem B's unconditional band. `main` +//! prints both so the choice is made against numbers rather than taste. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example hiding_theory + +use p3_circle::{CircleDomain, CircleEvaluations}; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + +type Val = Mersenne31; + +/// Points of `standard(log_n)` in natural order. +fn domain_points(log_n: usize) -> Vec<(Val, Val)> { + CircleDomain::::standard(log_n) + .points() + .map(|p| (p.x, p.y)) + .collect() +} + +/// Column `i` is the indicator of trace point `i`, extrapolated to the LDE +/// domain: a generating set for `L_N` as a space of functions on `L`. +fn interpolation_basis(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let mut cols = Vec::with_capacity(n * n); + for row in 0..n { + for col in 0..n { + cols.push(if row == col { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + } + } + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::new(cols, n), + ) + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::::standard(log_n + log_blowup)) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix() +} + +/// The basis of Theorem A: `x^i` and `y·x^i` for `i < N/2`, evaluated on `L`. +fn structural_basis(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let h = n / 2; + let pts = domain_points(log_n + log_blowup); + let mut vals = Vec::with_capacity(pts.len() * n); + for (x, y) in &pts { + let mut pow = Val::ONE; + let mut evens = Vec::with_capacity(h); + for _ in 0..h { + evens.push(pow); + pow *= *x; + } + for e in &evens { + vals.push(*e); + } + for e in &evens { + vals.push(*y * *e); + } + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(vals, n) +} + +/// Rank over `F_p` of the given rows of `m` (all columns). +fn rank_rows(m: &RowMajorMatrix, rows: &[usize]) -> usize { + let w = m.width(); + let a: Vec> = rows + .iter() + .map(|&r| (0..w).map(|c| m.get(r, c).unwrap()).collect()) + .collect(); + rank(a) +} + +/// Rank of the whole matrix, viewed columnwise (rank is the same either way). +fn rank_all(m: &RowMajorMatrix) -> usize { + let rows: Vec = (0..m.height()).collect(); + rank_rows(m, &rows) +} + +/// Rank of the horizontal concatenation of two matrices with equal height. +fn rank_concat(a: &RowMajorMatrix, b: &RowMajorMatrix) -> usize { + assert_eq!(a.height(), b.height()); + let (wa, wb) = (a.width(), b.width()); + let mut vals = Vec::with_capacity(a.height() * (wa + wb)); + for r in 0..a.height() { + for c in 0..wa { + vals.push(a.get(r, c).unwrap()); + } + for c in 0..wb { + vals.push(b.get(r, c).unwrap()); + } + } + rank_all(&RowMajorMatrix::new(vals, wa + wb)) +} + +fn rank(mut a: Vec>) -> usize { + if a.is_empty() { + return 0; + } + let w = a[0].len(); + let (mut r, mut c) = (0usize, 0usize); + while r < a.len() && c < w { + let mut piv = None; + for i in r..a.len() { + if a[i][c] != Val::ZERO { + piv = Some(i); + break; + } + } + match piv { + None => c += 1, + Some(i) => { + a.swap(r, i); + let inv = a[r][c].inverse(); + for j in c..w { + a[r][j] *= inv; + } + for i2 in 0..a.len() { + if i2 != r && a[i2][c] != Val::ZERO { + let f = a[i2][c]; + for j in c..w { + let s = a[r][j] * f; + a[i2][j] -= s; + } + } + } + r += 1; + c += 1; + } + } + } + r +} + +/// Theorem A, checked as an equality of subspaces of `F^|L|`. +fn check_theorem_a(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let interp = interpolation_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let structural = structural_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let (ri, rs) = (rank_all(&interp), rank_all(&structural)); + let rc = rank_concat(&interp, &structural); + println!( + " N = {n:3}: rank(interpolation) = {ri}, rank(a + y·b) = {rs}, rank(concat) = {rc}" + ); + assert_eq!(ri, n, "the interpolation basis must have full rank N"); + assert_eq!(rs, n, "the structural basis must have full rank N"); + assert_eq!( + rc, n, + "equal ranks with a concatenation of the same rank means equal spans" + ); +} + +/// Theorem A's corollary: a negation pair kills both parts at one abscissa, +/// so it imposes two conditions that a generic pair of points does not. +fn check_negation_structure(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let pts = domain_points(log_n + log_blowup); + let m = pts.len(); + // In natural order the negation of index i is index m-1-i. + for i in 0..m { + let (x, y) = pts[i]; + let (xn, yn) = pts[m - 1 - i]; + assert_eq!(x, xn, "a negation pair must share its abscissa"); + assert_eq!(y, -yn, "a negation pair must have opposite ordinates"); + } + // And distinct points with equal abscissa are exactly negation pairs. + let mut shared = 0usize; + for i in 0..m { + for j in (i + 1)..m { + if pts[i].0 == pts[j].0 { + shared += 1; + assert_eq!(j, m - 1 - i, "equal abscissae only for negation pairs"); + } + } + } + println!( + " log_n = {log_n}, blowup 2^{log_blowup}: {shared} abscissa-sharing pairs, all negations" + ); +} + +/// Theorem B, checked EXHAUSTIVELY where that is finite: every k-subset with +/// k = N/2 is surjective, including the ones containing negation pairs, which +/// the corrected statement no longer needs to exclude. +fn check_theorem_b_exhaustive(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let h = n / 2; + let interp = interpolation_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let m = interp.height(); + let mut checked = 0usize; + let mut with_pairs = 0usize; + let mut idx: Vec = (0..h).collect(); + loop { + let r = rank_rows(&interp, &idx); + assert_eq!( + r, h, + "Theorem B is FALSE at {idx:?}: rank {r}, expected {h}" + ); + // Does this subset contain a negation pair? (i and m-1-i both present) + if idx.iter().any(|&i| idx.contains(&(m - 1 - i))) { + with_pairs += 1; + } + checked += 1; + let mut i = h; + let done = loop { + if i == 0 { + break true; + } + i -= 1; + if idx[i] != i + m - h { + idx[i] += 1; + for j in i + 1..h { + idx[j] = idx[j - 1] + 1; + } + break false; + } + }; + if done { + break; + } + } + println!( + " N = {n:3}, k = N/2 = {h:3}: ALL {checked} subsets surjective ({with_pairs} of them contain a negation pair)" + ); +} + +/// The same claim spot-checked at deployed sizes, where exhaustion is not +/// finite, together with the Vandermonde block the proof leans on. +fn check_theorem_b(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let h = n / 2; + let interp = interpolation_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let m = interp.height(); + // Take the first h points; none of them is the negation of another, since + // negations sit at m-1-i and h <= m/2. + let s: Vec = (0..h).collect(); + let full = rank_rows(&interp, &s); + // The Vandermonde block alone. + let pts = domain_points(log_n + log_blowup); + let vander: Vec> = s + .iter() + .map(|&j| { + let mut pow = Val::ONE; + let mut row = Vec::with_capacity(h); + for _ in 0..h { + row.push(pow); + pow *= pts[j].0; + } + row + }) + .collect(); + let rv = rank(vander); + println!( + " N = {n:3}, k = N/2 = {h:3}: rank(evaluation) = {full}, rank(Vandermonde block) = {rv}" + ); + assert_eq!(rv, h, "distinct abscissae make the even part full rank"); + assert_eq!(full, h, "a full-rank block forces the whole matrix full rank"); +} + +/// Theorem C(i): a nonzero element of `L_N` has at most `N` zeros. +/// +/// Testing this with RANDOM elements would be vacuous — a random element of +/// `L_N` has no zeros at all on the domain with overwhelming probability, so +/// the assertion would pass without ever approaching the bound. The test has +/// to CONSTRUCT elements with many zeros and push against `N`. +/// +/// Construction: pick a set `S` of `j` points, compute the kernel of the +/// evaluation map at `S` by elimination, and take a nonzero kernel element. +/// By definition it vanishes on all of `S`, so it has at least `j` zeros; then +/// count how many it actually has over the whole LDE domain, and report the +/// maximum found. The bound `N` must never be exceeded, and the interesting +/// question is how close the construction gets to it. +fn check_theorem_c_zero_bound(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let interp = interpolation_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let m = interp.height(); + let mut worst = 0usize; + let mut worst_at = 0usize; + + // Force as many zeros as the space allows: j = N-1 leaves a kernel of + // dimension at least 1, and the degenerate sets of Theorem C(iii) push to + // j = N. + for j in 1..=n { + // Every window of j consecutive points, plus the negation-closed + // families that produced the counterexamples. + for start in 0..m { + let mut s: Vec = (0..j).map(|t| (start + t) % m).collect(); + if j >= 2 { + // swap the last for the negation of the first: the shape that + // attains the defect. + s[j - 1] = m - 1 - start; + } + s.sort_unstable(); + s.dedup(); + if s.len() < j { + continue; + } + if let Some(f) = kernel_element(&interp, &s) { + let mut zeros = 0usize; + for r in 0..m { + let mut acc = Val::ZERO; + for (c, coeff) in f.iter().enumerate() { + acc += interp.get(r, c).unwrap() * *coeff; + } + if acc == Val::ZERO { + zeros += 1; + } + } + assert!( + zeros <= n, + "Theorem C(i) is FALSE: a nonzero element has {zeros} zeros, bound is {n}" + ); + if zeros > worst { + worst = zeros; + worst_at = j; + } + } + } + } + println!( + " N = {n:3}: constructed elements reach {worst} zeros (bound {n}), first attained forcing {worst_at} of them" + ); + assert!(worst > 0, "the construction must actually produce zeros, or the test is vacuous"); +} + +/// A nonzero element of `L_N` vanishing on `rows`, or `None` if the only such +/// element is zero. Returned in the interpolation basis. +fn kernel_element(m: &RowMajorMatrix, rows: &[usize]) -> Option> { + let w = m.width(); + let mut a: Vec> = rows + .iter() + .map(|&r| (0..w).map(|c| m.get(r, c).unwrap()).collect()) + .collect(); + // Reduced row echelon form, tracking pivot columns. + let mut pivots: Vec = Vec::new(); + let (mut r, mut c) = (0usize, 0usize); + while r < a.len() && c < w { + let mut piv = None; + for i in r..a.len() { + if a[i][c] != Val::ZERO { + piv = Some(i); + break; + } + } + match piv { + None => c += 1, + Some(i) => { + a.swap(r, i); + let inv = a[r][c].inverse(); + for j in c..w { + a[r][j] *= inv; + } + for i2 in 0..a.len() { + if i2 != r && a[i2][c] != Val::ZERO { + let f = a[i2][c]; + for j in c..w { + let s = a[r][j] * f; + a[i2][j] -= s; + } + } + } + pivots.push(c); + r += 1; + c += 1; + } + } + } + // A free column gives a kernel vector. + let free = (0..w).find(|c| !pivots.contains(c))?; + let mut v = vec![Val::ZERO; w]; + v[free] = Val::ONE; + for (i, &pc) in pivots.iter().enumerate() { + v[pc] = -a[i][free]; + } + Some(v) +} + +/// Theorem C(ii)+(iii): the rank deficiency is never more than one, and one is +/// attained. Exhaustive at sizes where exhaustion is finite. +fn check_theorem_c_defect(log_n: usize, log_blowup: usize) { + let n = 1usize << log_n; + let interp = interpolation_basis(log_n, log_blowup); + let m = interp.height(); + let mut worst_defect = 0usize; + let mut witness: Option> = None; + // All k-subsets for k = N (the boundary where degeneracy is possible). + let k = n; + let mut idx: Vec = (0..k).collect(); + loop { + let r = rank_rows(&interp, &idx); + let d = k - r; + if d > worst_defect { + worst_defect = d; + witness = Some(idx.clone()); + } + let mut i = k; + let done = loop { + if i == 0 { + break true; + } + i -= 1; + if idx[i] != i + m - k { + idx[i] += 1; + for j in i + 1..k { + idx[j] = idx[j - 1] + 1; + } + break false; + } + }; + if done { + break; + } + } + println!( + " N = {n:3}, k = N = {k}: worst deficiency over ALL subsets = {worst_defect}{}", + match &witness { + Some(w) if worst_defect > 0 => format!(" attained at {w:?}"), + _ => String::new(), + } + ); + assert!(worst_defect <= 1, "Theorem C(ii) would be false"); + assert_eq!(worst_defect, 1, "Theorem C(iii): defect one should be attained"); +} + +fn band(n: usize, k: usize) -> String { + let half = n / 2; + if k <= half { + format!("Theorem B band: k = {k} <= N/2 = {half}. UNCONDITIONALLY surjective.") + } else if k <= n - 1 { + format!( + "middle band: N/2 = {half} < k = {k} <= N-1 = {}. Rank >= k-1 unconditionally; \ +surjectivity is a property of the point set, decided by computation.", + n - 1 + ) + } else { + format!("boundary: k = {k} >= N = {n}. Degenerate sets EXIST here.") + } +} + +fn main() { + println!("Theorem A — L_N = {{ a(x) + y·b(x) : deg a, deg b < N/2 }}\n"); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(2usize, 1usize), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 2)] { + check_theorem_a(log_n, log_blowup); + } + println!("\n corollary — negation is the only way two points share an abscissa:"); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(2usize, 1usize), (3, 1)] { + check_negation_structure(log_n, log_blowup); + } + + println!("\nTheorem B — k <= N/2 is unconditionally surjective, pairs included\n"); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(2usize, 1usize), (3, 1)] { + check_theorem_b_exhaustive(log_n, log_blowup); + } + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(4usize, 1usize), (5, 2), (6, 2)] { + check_theorem_b(log_n, log_blowup); + } + + println!("\nTheorem C(i) — a nonzero element of L_N has at most N zeros\n"); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(2usize, 1usize), (3, 1), (4, 1)] { + check_theorem_c_zero_bound(log_n, log_blowup); + } + + println!("\nTheorem C(ii,iii) — deficiency is at most one, and one is attained\n"); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in [(2usize, 1usize), (3, 1)] { + check_theorem_c_defect(log_n, log_blowup); + } + + println!("\nWhere the deployed configurations sit\n"); + for (name, n, k) in [ + ("crowd binding, 32 rows, 20 queries", 32usize, 21usize), + ("crowd membership, 32 rows, 20 queries", 32, 22), + ("binding at 64 rows, 20 queries", 64, 21), + ("membership at 64 rows, 20 queries", 64, 22), + ("binding at 64 rows, 30 queries", 64, 31), + ] { + println!(" {name}\n {}", band(n, k)); + } + + println!( + "\nThe operative sentence: at 32 rows the deployed openings sit ABOVE N/2, so their\n\ + safety rests on a computed rank rather than on Theorem B. At 64 rows the same\n\ + openings fall inside Theorem B, where surjectivity holds for every point set,\n\ + every witness and every adversary, with no computation and no genericity.\n\ + That is what the extra trace height buys, and it is why the next measurement\n\ + to take is the cost of 64 rows at 20 queries." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/invert_nullifier.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/invert_nullifier.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5111a3e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/invert_nullifier.rs @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +//! Recover a credential secret from public on-chain data alone. +//! +//! The crowd relation publishes `nullifier = π(secret ‖ round)` in FULL — all +//! sixteen limbs (`crowd.rs:331`) — while `round` is public too. π is the +//! Poseidon2 permutation, and a permutation is a bijection, so +//! +//! (secret ‖ round) = π⁻¹(nullifier) +//! +//! is not an attack that needs the proof, the queries, or any interpolation. +//! It is a function of two values the chain already publishes. This example +//! builds π⁻¹ and runs it, so the claim is demonstrated rather than argued. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example invert_nullifier + +use p3_field::{PrimeCharacteristicRing, PrimeField32}; +use p3_mersenne_31::{ + GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31 as LL, Mersenne31, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, +}; +use p3_poseidon2::GenericPoseidon2LinearLayers; +use riverrun_m31::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; + +type F = Mersenne31; +const P: u64 = (1 << 31) - 1; +/// `5⁻¹ mod (p−1)`, so `x ↦ x^D` inverts the S-box `x ↦ x⁵`. Pinned by +/// `permutation.rs`'s `the_sbox_exponent_is_invertible_over_the_field`. +const D: u64 = 1_717_986_917; + +fn pow(mut b: u64, mut e: u64) -> u64 { + let (mut acc, m) = (1u128, P as u128); + b %= P; + let mut base = b as u128; + while e > 0 { + if e & 1 == 1 { + acc = acc * base % m; + } + base = base * base % m; + e >>= 1; + } + acc as u64 +} + +/// Extract a linear layer as an explicit matrix by evaluating it on the basis. +/// The layers are `PrimeCharacteristicRing`-generic precisely so the AIR can +/// see them symbolically, which also means anyone can read the matrix out. +fn matrix_of(layer: fn(&mut [F; WIDTH])) -> [[u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH] { + let mut m = [[0u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH]; + for j in 0..WIDTH { + let mut e = [F::ZERO; WIDTH]; + e[j] = F::ONE; + layer(&mut e); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + m[i][j] = e[i].as_canonical_u32() as u64; + } + } + m +} + +/// Gauss-Jordan over F_p. +fn invert(m: [[u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH]) -> [[u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH] { + let mut a = m; + let mut inv = [[0u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH]; + for i in 0..WIDTH { + inv[i][i] = 1; + } + for col in 0..WIDTH { + let piv = (col..WIDTH) + .find(|&r| a[r][col] != 0) + .expect("the linear layer must be invertible"); + a.swap(col, piv); + inv.swap(col, piv); + let s = pow(a[col][col], P - 2); // Fermat inverse + for k in 0..WIDTH { + a[col][k] = (a[col][k] as u128 * s as u128 % P as u128) as u64; + inv[col][k] = (inv[col][k] as u128 * s as u128 % P as u128) as u64; + } + for r in 0..WIDTH { + if r != col && a[r][col] != 0 { + let f = a[r][col]; + for k in 0..WIDTH { + a[r][k] = (a[r][k] + P - (f as u128 * a[col][k] as u128 % P as u128) as u64) % P; + inv[r][k] = + (inv[r][k] + P - (f as u128 * inv[col][k] as u128 % P as u128) as u64) % P; + } + } + } + } + inv +} + +fn apply(m: &[[u64; WIDTH]; WIDTH], v: &[u64; WIDTH]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut acc = 0u128; + for j in 0..WIDTH { + acc += m[i][j] as u128 * v[j] as u128; + } + (acc % P as u128) as u64 + }) +} + +fn rc(row: [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| row[i].as_canonical_u32() as u64) +} + +/// π⁻¹, undoing Poseidon2's rounds in reverse. +fn inverse_permute(out: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let ext = matrix_of(LL::external_linear_layer::); + let int = matrix_of(LL::internal_linear_layer::); + let ext_inv = invert(ext); + let int_inv = invert(int); + + let rc_init: Vec<[u64; WIDTH]> = + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL.iter().map(|r| rc(*r)).collect(); + let rc_final: Vec<[u64; WIDTH]> = + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL.iter().map(|r| rc(*r)).collect(); + let rc_int: Vec = MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL + .iter() + .map(|c| c.as_canonical_u32() as u64) + .collect(); + + let mut s = out; + // Final full rounds, reversed: each is add RC -> sbox -> M_E. + for r in rc_final.iter().rev() { + s = apply(&ext_inv, &s); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + s[i] = pow(s[i], D); + s[i] = (s[i] + P - r[i]) % P; + } + } + // Partial rounds, reversed: add RC to lane 0 -> sbox lane 0 -> M_I. + for c in rc_int.iter().rev() { + s = apply(&int_inv, &s); + s[0] = pow(s[0], D); + s[0] = (s[0] + P - *c) % P; + } + // Initial full rounds, reversed. + for r in rc_init.iter().rev() { + s = apply(&ext_inv, &s); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + s[i] = pow(s[i], D); + s[i] = (s[i] + P - r[i]) % P; + } + } + // The very first linear layer. + apply(&ext_inv, &s) +} + +fn main() { + // A credential secret nobody publishes, and a public challenge. + let secret: [u64; 8] = [11, 22, 33, 44, 55, 66, 77, 88]; + let round: [u64; 8] = [900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907]; + + let mut input = [0u64; WIDTH]; + input[..8].copy_from_slice(&secret); + input[8..].copy_from_slice(&round); + + // Exactly what crowd.rs publishes: the FULL 16-limb permutation output. + let nullifier = permute(input); + + println!("published on-chain:"); + println!(" round = {round:?}"); + println!(" nullifier = {nullifier:?}"); + println!("never published:"); + println!(" secret = {secret:?}"); + + let recovered = inverse_permute(nullifier); + let recovered_secret = &recovered[..8]; + let recovered_round = &recovered[8..]; + + println!("\nrecovered by inverting the permutation on public data alone:"); + println!(" secret = {recovered_secret:?}"); + println!(" round = {recovered_round:?}"); + + assert_eq!(recovered_round, &round, "the recovered round must match the public one"); + assert_eq!(recovered_secret, &secret, "SECRET RECOVERED FROM PUBLIC DATA"); + println!("\nMATCH. The credential secret is a public function of published values."); + + // Optional second run against a nullifier taken off the chain: pass the + // sixteen limbs, then the eight round limbs that transaction used. The + // round coming back out is the check that the inversion is the real one, + // since nothing about the round was used to compute it. + let args: Vec = std::env::args().skip(1).collect(); + if args.len() == 24 { + let v: Vec = args.iter().map(|a| a.parse().unwrap()).collect(); + let on_chain: [u64; WIDTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| v[i]); + let claimed_round: [u64; 8] = core::array::from_fn(|i| v[16 + i]); + let back = inverse_permute(on_chain); + println!("\n--- a nullifier taken off the chain ---"); + println!(" recovered secret = {:?}", &back[..8]); + println!(" recovered round = {:?}", &back[8..]); + println!(" round it should be = {claimed_round:?}"); + assert_eq!(&back[8..], &claimed_round, "the recovered round must match"); + println!(" MATCH: this is a real credential secret, read off public data."); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/price_theorem_b.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/price_theorem_b.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d679f524 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/price_theorem_b.rs @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +//! What does the unconditional hiding guarantee cost? +//! +//! Theorem B (examples/hiding_theory.rs) gives surjectivity of the blinding +//! map with no genericity and no computation, provided the verifier opens at +//! most N/2 evaluations. The deployed configuration opens k = 22 against +//! N = 32, which is above half: safe by computed rank, not by theorem. +//! +//! Doubling the trace to N = 64 puts the same k inside Theorem B. This prices +//! that, so the choice is made against numbers. +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_crowd, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let secret = [7u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [5u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 4242 + i as u64); + // The soundness budget (examples/soundness_budget.rs) says bits scale as + // queries x log_blowup while envelope scales with queries alone, so the + // blowup is the lever. These points test that: same or fewer queries at a + // higher blowup, against both the envelope and the bit target. + for (log_rows, q, lb) in [ + (6usize, 20usize, 2usize), + (7, 20, 2), + (7, 16, 6), + (7, 12, 7), + ] { + let n = 1usize << log_rows; + let k = q + 1; + let (proof, _, _, _) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, action, round, blinder, q, lb, log_rows, + riverrun_m31::zk::Seed::reproducible(42), + ); + let bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + let conj = q * lb + 8; + println!( + "N={n:3} q={q:2} blowup=2^{lb}: hiding {} | soundness ~2^{conj} conjectured, ~2^{} provable | proof {} B ({:.0}% envelope){}", + if k <= n / 2 { "UNCONDITIONAL" } else { "computed " }, + q * lb / 2 + 8, + bytes.len(), + bytes.len() as f64 / 1_320.96, + if bytes.len() as f64 <= 132_096.0 { "" } else { " OVER" }, + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d561ce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit.rs @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +//! Measure what a published riverrun proof reveals about its own witness. +//! +//! riverrun's thesis on Solana was that an advertised anonymity set is not the +//! delivered one, and only measurement tells them apart. This example turns +//! that instrument on riverrun's own artifact: it reports the committed +//! polynomial degree, the size of the low-degree-extension domain the FRI +//! queries sample from, and how many query openings the proof publishes, and +//! from those the probability that EVERY point of that domain is opened. +//! +//! Why that probability matters: each FRI query opening publishes a full row +//! of the committed LDE matrix. A trace column of height `n` is a polynomial +//! with `n` coefficients; publishing `n` or more of its evaluations determines +//! it uniquely by interpolation, and evaluating it back on the trace domain +//! recovers every cell of the witness, including the Poseidon2 permutation +//! inputs (the credential secret). Nothing here is a cryptanalytic break: it +//! is what a non-hiding polynomial commitment is defined to do. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example privacy_audit --features wire-postcard + +use riverrun_m31::{ + compress, prove_binding_tuned, prove_membership, PathStep, CONTEXT_LEN, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, + SECRET_LEN, +}; + +// From binding.rs / membership.rs `make_config*`: CirclePcs with log_blowup 1. +const LOG_BLOWUP: usize = 1; + +fn report(name: &str, degree_bits: usize, num_queries: usize) { + let trace_height = 1usize << degree_bits; + let lde_points = 1usize << (degree_bits + LOG_BLOWUP); + // P(at least one of the `lde_points` positions is never sampled by + // `num_queries` uniform draws), union bound: m * ((m-1)/m)^q. + let m = lde_points as f64; + let p_miss = m * ((m - 1.0) / m).powi(num_queries as i32); + let p_all = (1.0 - p_miss).max(0.0); + println!( + "{name}: trace {trace_height} rows (degree_bits {degree_bits}), LDE domain {lde_points} points, \ +{num_queries} query openings" + ); + println!( + " openings/domain = {:.1}x; P(every domain point opened) >= {:.4}; \ +interpolation needs {trace_height} of them", + num_queries as f64 / m, + p_all + ); + if lde_points <= num_queries { + println!( + " VERDICT: the domain is smaller than the query count. The witness is \ +recoverable from the published proof by interpolation." + ); + } else { + println!(" VERDICT: domain exceeds query count; recovery needs the degree/query analysis."); + } +} + +fn main() { + let secret = [7u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [5u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let (binding, leaf, _nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, 40); + report("binding (40 queries)", binding.degree_bits(), 40); + + let mut digest = [0u64; DIGEST_LEN]; + digest.copy_from_slice(&leaf[..DIGEST_LEN]); + let mut level: Vec<[u64; DIGEST_LEN]> = vec![digest]; + level.extend((1..16u64).map(|i| core::array::from_fn::(|j| 500 + i * 8 + j as u64))); + let mut path = Vec::new(); + let mut idx = 0usize; + while level.len() > 1 { + let sib = if idx % 2 == 0 { level[idx + 1] } else { level[idx - 1] }; + path.push(PathStep { sibling: sib, node_on_right: idx % 2 == 1 }); + level = level.chunks(2).map(|p| compress(p[0], p[1])).collect(); + idx /= 2; + } + let path: [PathStep; DEPTH] = path.try_into().ok().unwrap(); + let (membership, _root) = prove_membership(digest, path); + report("membership (40 queries)", membership.degree_bits(), 40); + + println!(); + println!("Cause, not conjecture: p3-circle's CirclePcs sets `const ZK: bool = false`"); + println!("(vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/pcs.rs:122), so p3-uni-stark's"); + println!("`is_zk()` is 0 and the prover skips the randomization it applies in the ZK"); + println!("setting (prover.rs:144: \"If zk is enabled, we double the trace length by"); + println!("adding random values\"). Plonky3's hiding PCS (HidingFriPcs, ZK = true) wraps"); + println!("TwoAdicFriPcs, which Mersenne-31 cannot use: M31 has no large two-adic"); + println!("subgroup, which is the entire reason this path uses circle domains."); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit_zk.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit_zk.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9fcf7341 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/privacy_audit_zk.rs @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +//! The instrument that found the leak, re-run against the fix. +//! +//! `privacy_audit.rs` measured what a published riverrun proof reveals about +//! its own witness and returned a verdict nobody wanted: the non-hiding +//! configuration publishes more evaluations than the committed polynomial has +//! coefficients, so interpolation recovers the witness. This example runs the +//! same arithmetic against the hiding configuration (`HidingCirclePcs`) and +//! against the leaf-committed "crowd" relations, and reports the same +//! quantities so the two can be compared line by line. +//! +//! Three separate properties are audited, because they fail independently: +//! +//! 1. **Determinacy.** Does the proof publish enough evaluations to pin the +//! committed polynomial down? Under hiding the committed polynomial has +//! twice the trace's dimension — it is `T + Z_D·R` — so the count the +//! attacker must beat doubles while the query count does not. +//! 2. **Recoverability of the witness even if determinacy failed.** Suppose an +//! attacker did reconstruct the committed polynomial exactly. On the trace +//! domain it evaluates to `T`, so this is the property hiding does NOT +//! provide by itself, and the margin in (1) is the whole defence. Stated +//! explicitly so nobody reads the fix as stronger than it is. +//! 3. **Linkage.** Independently of the proof system: does the public input +//! vector carry a value that recurs across uses of one credential? This is +//! what the crowd relations remove, and it is measured here by proving the +//! same statement twice and diffing the public values. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example privacy_audit_zk --features wire-postcard + +use riverrun_m31::zk::Seed; +use riverrun_m31::zk::prove_binding_zk_tuned; +use riverrun_m31::{ + prove_binding_crowd, prove_binding_tuned, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, DIGEST_LEN, SECRET_LEN, + WIDTH, +}; + +/// Report the determinacy margin for one configuration. +/// +/// `committed_dims` is how many coefficients the committed polynomial has: +/// the trace height for a non-hiding commitment, twice that under hiding, +/// since `T' = T + Z_D·R` carries the trace's dimensions plus the blinder's. +/// `opened` is what the verifier learns: one row per FRI query, plus the +/// out-of-domain point (and its successor when the AIR has transition +/// constraints). +fn determinacy(name: &str, committed_dims: usize, opened: usize, lde_points: usize) { + let m = lde_points as f64; + let p_miss = m * ((m - 1.0) / m).powi(opened as i32); + let p_all = (1.0 - p_miss).max(0.0); + println!("{name}"); + println!( + " committed dimensions {committed_dims}, evaluations published {opened}, \ +LDE domain {lde_points} points" + ); + println!( + " openings/domain = {:.2}x; P(every domain point opened) >= {:.4}", + opened as f64 / m, + p_all + ); + if opened >= committed_dims { + println!( + " VERDICT: LEAKS. {opened} evaluations determine a {committed_dims}-dimensional \ +polynomial; interpolate and read the witness off the trace domain." + ); + } else { + println!( + " VERDICT: UNDERDETERMINED by {} dimensions. Half of these {committed_dims} \ +dimensions belong to the blinding polynomial R, and the published evaluations do not \ +pin them down; every consistent completion stays equally likely.", + committed_dims - opened + ); + } + println!(); +} + +fn main() { + let secret = [7u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [5u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + + println!("=== 1. determinacy: can the committed polynomial be reconstructed? ===\n"); + + // The shipped non-hiding configuration, for comparison: 4 rows, 40 + // queries, blowup 2. This is the line privacy_audit.rs already reported. + let (legacy, _, _) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, 40); + let legacy_rows = 1usize << legacy.degree_bits(); + determinacy( + "legacy non-hiding binding (40 queries, blowup 2)", + legacy_rows, + 40 + 1, + legacy_rows * 2, + ); + + // The hiding configuration measured on-chain: 32 rows, 20 queries, + // blowup 4. degree_bits records the DOUBLED commitment. + let (hiding, _, _) = prove_binding_zk_tuned(secret, action, round, 20, 2, 5, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let hiding_committed = 1usize << hiding.degree_bits(); + determinacy( + "hiding binding (20 queries, blowup 4)", + hiding_committed, + 20 + 1, + hiding_committed * 4, + ); + + println!("=== 2. what hiding does NOT do ===\n"); + println!( + "If an attacker somehow reconstructed the committed polynomial anyway, it still\n\ + evaluates to the trace on the trace domain: T' restricted to D is T, by\n\ + construction. Hiding buys the margin measured above, not immunity to a\n\ + reconstruction that beats it. The margin is {} dimensions against {} published\n\ + evaluations, and it is statistical, not information-theoretic.\n", + hiding_committed - 21, + 21 + ); + + println!("=== 3. linkage: does the public input vector recur across uses? ===\n"); + + // Legacy publics: action | round | leaf(16) | nullifier(16). The leaf is + // a deterministic function of (secret, action), so it is identical in + // every use with the same context. + let (_, leaf_a, _) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, 4); + let (_, leaf_b, _) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, [9u64; CONTEXT_LEN], 4); + println!("legacy binding, two uses of one credential in one context:"); + println!( + " leaf identical across uses: {} <- the linking value", + leaf_a == leaf_b + ); + println!(" leaf is {} of {} public field elements\n", WIDTH, 2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * WIDTH); + + // Crowd publics: action | round | C(8) | nullifier(16). No leaf. C is a + // fresh commitment per use. + let blinder_a: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 7000 + i as u64); + let blinder_b: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 8000 + i as u64); + let (_, c_a, _, n_a) = + prove_binding_crowd(secret, action, round, blinder_a, 20, 2, 5, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let (_, c_b, _, n_b) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, + action, + [9u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + blinder_b, + 20, + 2, + 5, + Seed::reproducible(43), + ); + println!("crowd binding, two uses of one credential in one context:"); + println!(" commitment identical across uses: {}", c_a == c_b); + println!(" nullifier identical across uses: {}", n_a == n_b); + println!( + " leaf present in public values at all: false ({} public field elements: \ +action {CONTEXT_LEN} | round {CONTEXT_LEN} | C {DIGEST_LEN} | nullifier {WIDTH})", + 2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN + WIDTH + ); + println!(); + + if c_a == c_b || n_a == n_b { + println!("VERDICT: LINKABLE. Some public value recurs across uses."); + std::process::exit(1); + } + println!( + "VERDICT: no public value recurs across the two uses. Linkage through the proof's\n\ + own outputs is closed. Linkage through everything else — funding origin, timing,\n\ + the submitting key, network metadata — is untouched by cryptography and is the\n\ + subject riverrun's effective-k instruments measure." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6736bb33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action.rs @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +//! Prove one authorized action for the pq402 flow: a binding proof that a +//! credential secret stands behind a registered leaf (secret ‖ action) and a +//! fresh nullifier (secret ‖ round), in the postcard wire format the Soroban +//! m31-verify contract reads. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example prove_action --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! +//! +//! Each hex argument is 64 bytes: 8 little-endian u64s, every value expected +//! to already be a valid Mersenne-31 element (< 2^31 - 1); the caller owns +//! that reduction so prover and verifier agree on the public values byte for +//! byte. Prints a JSON line with the output paths and the leaf/nullifier as +//! hex of 16 little-endian u64s (the credential registry format). + +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_tuned, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn parse8(name: &str, hex: &str) -> [u64; 8] { + let bytes = (0..hex.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect::>(); + assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 64, "{name} must be 64 bytes (8 LE u64s) of hex"); + core::array::from_fn(|i| u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8].try_into().unwrap())) +} + +/// Hex of the little-endian bytes of `vals`. +/// +/// Takes a slice rather than a fixed `[u64; 16]` because the leaf and the +/// nullifier are DIGESTS now, not full permutation outputs. Publishing all 16 +/// limbs of `permute(secret ‖ action)` published the permutation's entire +/// output, and a permutation is invertible: anyone could run it backwards and +/// read the secret straight off, whatever the proof was hiding. Truncating to +/// the 8-limb digest is what makes the published value one-way. See the crate +/// history around "invert the published nullifier and the secret falls out". +fn hex_limbs(vals: &[u64]) -> String { + let mut s = String::new(); + for v in vals { + for b in v.to_le_bytes() { + s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + } + s +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 6 { + eprintln!("usage: prove_action "); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = parse8("secret", &args[1]); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("action", &args[2]); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("round", &args[3]); + let num_queries: usize = args[4].parse().expect("num_queries must be a number"); + let outdir = &args[5]; + + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, num_queries); + + let mut publics = Vec::with_capacity((2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * leaf.len()) * 8); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let proof_bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + let proof_path = format!("{outdir}/proof.postcard"); + let publics_path = format!("{outdir}/publics.le64"); + std::fs::write(&proof_path, &proof_bytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&publics_path, &publics).unwrap(); + + println!( + "{{\"proof\":\"{proof_path}\",\"publics\":\"{publics_path}\",\"proof_bytes\":{},\"leaf\":\"{}\",\"nullifier\":\"{}\"}}", + proof_bytes.len(), + hex_limbs(&leaf), + hex_limbs(&nullifier) + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action_zk.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action_zk.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9cd0db43 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_action_zk.rs @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +//! Prove one authorized action WITNESS-HIDING: the zk binding proof +//! (`HidingCirclePcs`: blinded trace commitment, salted MMCS, randomized +//! quotient chunks) in the postcard wire format the Soroban hiding-probe +//! contract's `verify_zk` entry reads. Unlike `prove_action`, a published +//! proof does not leak the credential secret. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example prove_action_zk --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! +//! +//! The hiding configuration that fits one Stellar transaction, measured on +//! testnet (tx d9193714): 20 queries, log_blowup 2, 32 rows. Prover-side +//! randomness (blinding polynomials, leaf salts) is seeded from the OS +//! entropy pool, NOT a fixed test seed. + +use riverrun_m31::zk::{prove_binding_zk_tuned, Seed}; +use riverrun_m31::{CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +fn parse8(name: &str, hex: &str) -> [u64; 8] { + let bytes = (0..hex.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect::>(); + assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 64, "{name} must be 64 bytes (8 LE u64s) of hex"); + core::array::from_fn(|i| u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8].try_into().unwrap())) +} + +/// Hex of the little-endian bytes of `vals`. A slice, not a fixed `[u64; 16]`: +/// the leaf and nullifier are truncated digests now, because publishing a +/// permutation's full output let anyone invert it and recover the secret. +fn hex_limbs(vals: &[u64]) -> String { + let mut s = String::new(); + for v in vals { + for b in v.to_le_bytes() { + s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + } + s +} + +fn os_entropy_seed() -> Seed { + use std::io::Read; + let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; + std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom") + .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut bytes)) + .expect("reading /dev/urandom for the blinding seed must succeed"); + Seed::from_bytes(bytes) +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 7 { + eprintln!( + "usage: prove_action_zk " + ); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = parse8("secret", &args[1]); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("action", &args[2]); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("round", &args[3]); + let num_queries: usize = args[4].parse().expect("num_queries must be a number"); + let log_blowup: usize = args[5].parse().expect("log_blowup must be a number"); + let outdir = &args[6]; + + // The smallest power-of-two trace height satisfying the hiding margin + // (rows >= queries + 2 for this AIR). + let log_rows = (num_queries + 2).next_power_of_two().trailing_zeros() as usize; + + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_zk_tuned( + secret, + action, + round, + num_queries, + log_blowup, + log_rows.max(2), + os_entropy_seed(), + ); + + let mut publics = Vec::with_capacity((2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * leaf.len()) * 8); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let proof_bytes = proof.to_postcard(); + let proof_path = format!("{outdir}/proof_zk.postcard"); + let publics_path = format!("{outdir}/publics_zk.le64"); + std::fs::write(&proof_path, &proof_bytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&publics_path, &publics).unwrap(); + + println!( + "{{\"proof\":\"{proof_path}\",\"publics\":\"{publics_path}\",\"proof_bytes\":{},\"leaf\":\"{}\",\"nullifier\":\"{}\"}}", + proof_bytes.len(), + hex_limbs(&leaf), + hex_limbs(&nullifier) + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50f7b559 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd.rs @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +//! Prove ONE unlinkable use of a credential: the two leaf-committed hiding +//! relations that share a commitment `C = compress(leaf ‖ blinder)`, in the +//! postcard wire format the Soroban crowd contract reads. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example prove_crowd --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! +//! +//! Writes four files: `crowd_binding.postcard` + `crowd_binding_publics.le64` +//! (for `act` or `verify_crowd_binding`) and `crowd_membership.postcard` + +//! `crowd_membership_publics.le64` (for `verify_crowd_membership`). Prints a +//! JSON line with the shared commitment, the nullifier, and the Merkle root. +//! +//! The blinder is drawn from `/dev/urandom` on every run, which is what makes +//! two uses of one secret unlinkable: same secret, same context, different +//! blinder, unrelated commitments. Run this twice with the same arguments and +//! compare the printed `commitment` fields — they will differ, and nothing +//! published on-chain connects them. +//! +//! **The tree is synthesised from `tree_seed` for demonstration.** A real +//! deployment takes the authentication path from a registry whose root is +//! already published; here the path is generated and the resulting root +//! printed, so the demo has a root to verify against without shipping a +//! registry. That is a property of this example, not of the relation: the AIR +//! is indifferent to where the siblings came from. + +use riverrun_m31::{ + compress, prove_binding_crowd, prove_membership_crowd, zk::Seed, PathStep, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, + CROWD_DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, SECRET_LEN, +}; + +/// The configuration that clears every budget at once, each of them computed +/// rather than assumed: 128 rows, 12 queries, blowup 128. +/// +/// - soundness 2^92 conjectured, 2^50 proved (`examples/soundness_budget.rs`) +/// - hiding unconditional, `k <= N/2` (Theorem B, `examples/hiding_theory.rs`) +/// - FRI zero-knowledge margin +204 (`examples/fri_zk_budget.rs`) +/// - 206.3M verifier instructions (52% of cap), 106,491 B (81% of envelope) +/// +/// It beats the previous 64-row, 20-query, blowup-4 point on every one of +/// those axes simultaneously. The earlier point was not a tradeoff; it was the +/// wrong corner of a parameter space nobody had mapped. +const QUERIES: usize = 12; +const LOG_BLOWUP: usize = 7; +const LOG_ROWS: usize = 7; + +fn parse8(name: &str, hex: &str) -> [u64; 8] { + let bytes = (0..hex.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect::>(); + assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 64, "{name} must be 64 bytes (8 LE u64s) of hex"); + core::array::from_fn(|i| u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8].try_into().unwrap())) +} + +fn hex_of(vals: &[u64]) -> String { + let mut s = String::new(); + for v in vals { + for b in v.to_le_bytes() { + s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + } + s +} + +/// A full-width seed for the hiding randomness, straight from the OS. The +/// blinding polynomials and the leaf salts are drawn from this, and the salts +/// are published inside the proof, so its width is a security parameter: see +/// `Seed`'s own documentation for the attack that a 64-bit seed leaves open. +fn os_seed() -> Seed { + use std::io::Read; + let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; + std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom") + .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut bytes)) + .expect("reading /dev/urandom must succeed"); + Seed::from_bytes(bytes) +} + +/// `N` independent canonical Mersenne-31 limbs, each drawn from the OS. +/// +/// The blinder is the whole unlinkability mechanism, so the entropy behind it +/// is a security parameter rather than a convenience. An earlier version of +/// this file drew ONE u64 and expanded it with an LCG: the blinder occupied +/// 248 bits of space and carried 64 bits of entropy, while the documentation +/// claimed a "uniform 248-bit blinder". The gap was found by an adversarial +/// audit (docs/AUDIT-2026-08-03.md, M1) and is closed here. +/// +/// Rejection sampling rather than a modulo, so the distribution is uniform +/// over the field instead of merely close to it. A draw is rejected with +/// probability 2^-31, so the loop terminates immediately in practice. +fn os_entropy_limbs() -> [u64; N] { + use std::io::Read; + const P: u32 = (1 << 31) - 1; + let mut f = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").expect("opening /dev/urandom must succeed"); + core::array::from_fn(|_| loop { + let mut b = [0u8; 4]; + f.read_exact(&mut b) + .expect("reading /dev/urandom must succeed"); + let v = u32::from_le_bytes(b) & P; + if v != P { + return v as u64; + } + }) +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 6 && args.len() != 8 { + eprintln!("usage: prove_crowd [queries] [log_blowup]"); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let queries: usize = if args.len() == 8 { args[6].parse().unwrap() } else { QUERIES }; + let log_blowup: usize = if args.len() == 8 { args[7].parse().unwrap() } else { LOG_BLOWUP }; + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = parse8("secret", &args[1]); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("action", &args[2]); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("round", &args[3]); + let tree_seed: u64 = args[4].parse().expect("tree_seed must be a number"); + let outdir = &args[5]; + std::fs::create_dir_all(outdir).unwrap(); + + // A fresh blinder per use. This is the whole unlinkability mechanism; a + // fixed value here would silently undo it, and so would a value that + // merely LOOKS wide. Every limb is drawn independently from the OS, so the + // 248 bits of space the blinder occupies carry 248 bits of entropy. + let blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = os_entropy_limbs(); + + let (bproof, c, leaf_digest, nullifier) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, + action, + round, + blinder, + queries, + log_blowup, + LOG_ROWS, + os_seed(), + ); + + // The synthesised authentication path (see the module doc). + let path: [PathStep; CROWD_DEPTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| PathStep { + sibling: core::array::from_fn(|j| { + (tree_seed.wrapping_add(i as u64 + 1)).wrapping_mul(4001).wrapping_add(j as u64) + % ((1u64 << 31) - 1) + }), + node_on_right: (tree_seed.wrapping_add(i as u64)) % 3 == 1, + }); + let (mproof, c2, root) = + prove_membership_crowd(leaf_digest, blinder, &path, queries, log_blowup, os_seed()); + assert_eq!(c, c2, "one (leaf, blinder) pair must commit identically in both relations"); + + // Sanity: the prover's root is the hand fold of the same path. + let mut node = leaf_digest; + for step in &path { + node = if step.node_on_right { + compress(step.sibling, node) + } else { + compress(node, step.sibling) + }; + } + assert_eq!(node, root, "the proved root must equal the hand-folded one"); + + let mut bpub = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&c).chain(&nullifier) { + bpub.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let mut mpub = Vec::new(); + for v in c.iter().chain(&root) { + mpub.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + + let bp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_binding.postcard"); + let bpp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_binding_publics.le64"); + let mp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_membership.postcard"); + let mpp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_membership_publics.le64"); + let bbytes = bproof.to_postcard(); + let mbytes = mproof.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(&bp, &bbytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&bpp, &bpub).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&mp, &mbytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&mpp, &mpub).unwrap(); + + println!( + "{{\"binding_proof\":\"{bp}\",\"binding_publics\":\"{bpp}\",\"membership_proof\":\"{mp}\",\"membership_publics\":\"{mpp}\",\"binding_bytes\":{},\"membership_bytes\":{},\"commitment\":\"{}\",\"nullifier\":\"{}\",\"root\":\"{}\",\"queries\":{queries},\"log_blowup\":{log_blowup}}}", + bbytes.len(), + mbytes.len(), + hex_of(&c), + hex_of(&nullifier), + hex_of(&root), + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd_real.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd_real.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab7ea3fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_crowd_real.rs @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +//! Prove one unlinkable use of a credential **against a real issuer set**. +//! +//! `prove_crowd` synthesises the authentication path from a `tree_seed`: the +//! path is a formula and the printed root commits to nothing. This example is +//! the honest version. An issuer authorises `set_size` members (a roster); each +//! member's leaf is the real `permute(secret ‖ action)`; those leaves are placed +//! in a genuine depth-127 sparse Merkle tree; the root is the real fold of that +//! tree, and the authentication path handed to the membership relation is the +//! real path of one member. The root now *is* a commitment to the membership +//! set, so a proof against it is a proof of membership in a real set, not a +//! proof that some formula folds to some number. +//! +//! Run: +//! cargo run --release --example prove_crowd_real --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! +//! +//! Writes the same four files as `prove_crowd` and prints a JSON line whose +//! `root` is the real roster root. `roster_seed` fixes the whole member set +//! deterministically so the run is reproducible; in a deployment the issuer's +//! members bring their own secrets and only their leaves reach the tree. + +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +use riverrun_m31::{ + compress, permute, prove_binding_crowd, prove_membership_crowd, zk::Seed, PathStep, + BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, CROWD_DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, SECRET_LEN, WIDTH, +}; + +const QUERIES: usize = 12; +const LOG_BLOWUP: usize = 7; +const LOG_ROWS: usize = 7; +const P: u64 = (1 << 31) - 1; // Mersenne-31 prime + +fn parse8(name: &str, hex: &str) -> [u64; 8] { + let bytes = (0..hex.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect::>(); + assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 64, "{name} must be 64 bytes (8 LE u64s) of hex"); + core::array::from_fn(|i| u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[i * 8..(i + 1) * 8].try_into().unwrap())) +} + +fn hex_of(vals: &[u64]) -> String { + let mut s = String::new(); + for v in vals { + for b in v.to_le_bytes() { + s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + } + s +} + +/// The pack the binding relation uses: secret in the low limbs, context in the +/// high limbs, of a width-16 permutation input. Kept identical to the crate's +/// private `pack`, and cross-checked at runtime against the `leaf_digest` the +/// prover returns, so a divergence is a hard failure, not a silent wrong tree. +fn pack(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], context: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..SECRET_LEN].copy_from_slice(&secret); + out[SECRET_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&context); + out +} + +/// A member's stable tree leaf for a given action context. +fn leaf_of(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + let out = permute(pack(secret, action)); + core::array::from_fn(|i| out[i]) +} + +/// splitmix64: a deterministic stream so a roster_seed fixes the whole set. +fn splitmix64(state: &mut u64) -> u64 { + *state = state.wrapping_add(0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15); + let mut z = *state; + z = (z ^ (z >> 30)).wrapping_mul(0xBF58_476D_1CE4_E5B9); + z = (z ^ (z >> 27)).wrapping_mul(0x94D0_49BB_1331_11EB); + z ^ (z >> 31) +} + +/// A member secret: eight canonical Mersenne-31 limbs derived from +/// (roster_seed, member_index). Deterministic and reproducible; in a real +/// deployment each member draws their own from the OS. +fn member_secret(roster_seed: u64, member: u64) -> [u64; SECRET_LEN] { + let mut st = roster_seed + .wrapping_mul(0x1000_0000_1) + .wrapping_add(member.wrapping_add(1)); + core::array::from_fn(|_| loop { + let v = splitmix64(&mut st) % P; + if v != P - 1 { + return v; + } + }) +} + +/// The blinder, from the OS: the whole unlinkability mechanism. Rejection-sampled +/// to be uniform over the field, each limb 31 bits of real entropy. +fn os_blinder() -> [u64; BLINDER_LEN] { + use std::io::Read; + let mut f = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").expect("open /dev/urandom"); + core::array::from_fn(|_| loop { + let mut b = [0u8; 4]; + f.read_exact(&mut b).expect("read /dev/urandom"); + let v = (u32::from_le_bytes(b) as u64) & P; + if v != P { + return v; + } + }) +} + +fn os_seed() -> Seed { + use std::io::Read; + let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; + std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom") + .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut bytes)) + .expect("read /dev/urandom"); + Seed::from_bytes(bytes) +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 7 { + eprintln!( + "usage: prove_crowd_real " + ); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let roster_seed: u64 = args[1].parse().expect("roster_seed number"); + let set_size: u64 = args[2].parse().expect("set_size number"); + let prover_index: u64 = args[3].parse().expect("prover_index number"); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("action", &args[4]); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = parse8("round", &args[5]); + let outdir = &args[6]; + assert!(set_size >= 1 && prover_index < set_size, "prover_index must be in the set"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(outdir).unwrap(); + + // 1. The issuer's roster: every authorised member's real leaf, placed at its + // index in a depth-127 sparse Merkle tree. + let mut level: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + for m in 0..set_size { + level.insert(m as u128, leaf_of(member_secret(roster_seed, m), action)); + } + + // Empty-subtree roots: E[0] is the canonical empty leaf, E[k] two E[k-1]s. + let mut empty = [[0u64; DIGEST_LEN]; CROWD_DEPTH + 1]; + for k in 1..=CROWD_DEPTH { + empty[k] = compress(empty[k - 1], empty[k - 1]); + } + let get = |lvl: &BTreeMap, idx: u128, k: usize| -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + lvl.get(&idx).copied().unwrap_or(empty[k]) + }; + + // 2. Fold the tree, recording the prover's real authentication path. + let mut path: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(CROWD_DEPTH); + let mut cur = prover_index as u128; + for k in 0..CROWD_DEPTH { + let sibling = get(&level, cur ^ 1, k); + path.push(PathStep { + sibling, + node_on_right: (cur & 1) == 1, + }); + // Build the parent level over every occupied pair. + let mut parents: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + let mut seen: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + for &idx in level.keys() { + let p = idx >> 1; + if seen.insert(p, ()).is_none() { + let l = get(&level, p << 1, k); + let r = get(&level, (p << 1) | 1, k); + parents.insert(p, compress(l, r)); + } + } + level = parents; + cur >>= 1; + } + let root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = get(&level, 0, CROWD_DEPTH); + let path: [PathStep; CROWD_DEPTH] = path.try_into().unwrap_or_else(|_| unreachable!()); + + // 3. Prove, for the prover's own secret, against the roster. + let secret = member_secret(roster_seed, prover_index); + let blinder = os_blinder(); + let (bproof, c, leaf_digest, nullifier) = + prove_binding_crowd(secret, action, round, blinder, QUERIES, LOG_BLOWUP, LOG_ROWS, os_seed()); + assert_eq!( + leaf_digest, + leaf_of(secret, action), + "the crate's leaf must equal the one this tree was built from" + ); + let (mproof, c2, proved_root) = + prove_membership_crowd(leaf_digest, blinder, &path, QUERIES, LOG_BLOWUP, os_seed()); + assert_eq!(c, c2, "one (leaf, blinder) commits identically in both relations"); + assert_eq!(proved_root, root, "the proved root must equal the real roster root"); + + // 4. Write the wire files, exactly as prove_crowd does. + let mut bpub = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&c).chain(&nullifier) { + bpub.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let mut mpub = Vec::new(); + for v in c.iter().chain(&root) { + mpub.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let bp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_binding.postcard"); + let bpp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_binding_publics.le64"); + let mp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_membership.postcard"); + let mpp = format!("{outdir}/crowd_membership_publics.le64"); + let bbytes = bproof.to_postcard(); + let mbytes = mproof.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(&bp, &bbytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&bpp, &bpub).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&mp, &mbytes).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(&mpp, &mpub).unwrap(); + + println!( + "{{\"set_size\":{set_size},\"prover_index\":{prover_index},\"binding_proof\":\"{bp}\",\"membership_proof\":\"{mp}\",\"binding_bytes\":{},\"membership_bytes\":{},\"commitment\":\"{}\",\"nullifier\":\"{}\",\"root\":\"{}\",\"queries\":{QUERIES},\"log_blowup\":{LOG_BLOWUP}}}", + bbytes.len(), + mbytes.len(), + hex_of(&c), + hex_of(&nullifier), + hex_of(&root), + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_relation.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_relation.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5269f21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prove_relation.rs @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +//! Prove the FULL riverrun relation against an EXTERNAL credential tree, for +//! the pq402 relation mode: binding (secret behind the leaf, bound to action +//! and round) plus membership (that leaf's digest under the issuer's root via +//! a private path), both in the postcard wire format. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example prove_relation --features wire-postcard -- \ +//! +//! +//! `leaves_file` holds the issuer's full leaf-digest list, one 64-byte hex +//! digest (8 LE u64s) per line, exactly 16 lines (DEPTH = 4). The prover +//! derives its own digest from the binding leaf, finds its index, builds the +//! authentication path, and proves. The tree is public registry data; what +//! stays private is the secret and, inside the proof, the path position. +//! +//! Writes binding.postcard, membership.postcard, relation_publics.le64 +//! (56 LE u64s: action[8] ‖ round[8] ‖ leaf[16] ‖ nullifier[16] ‖ root[8]). + +use riverrun_m31::{ + compress, prove_binding_tuned, prove_membership, PathStep, CONTEXT_LEN, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, + SECRET_LEN, +}; + +fn parse_hex_u64s(hex: &str, n: usize, what: &str) -> Vec { + let hex = hex.trim(); + assert_eq!(hex.len(), n * 16, "{what} must be {} hex chars", n * 16); + let bytes: Vec = (0..hex.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect(); + bytes.chunks(8).map(|c| u64::from_le_bytes(c.try_into().unwrap())).collect() +} + +fn arr8(v: &[u64]) -> [u64; 8] { + v.try_into().unwrap() +} + +fn main() { + let args: Vec = std::env::args().collect(); + if args.len() != 7 { + eprintln!("usage: prove_relation "); + std::process::exit(2); + } + let secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN] = arr8(&parse_hex_u64s(&args[1], 8, "secret")); + let action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = arr8(&parse_hex_u64s(&args[2], 8, "action")); + let round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] = arr8(&parse_hex_u64s(&args[3], 8, "round")); + let leaves_raw = std::fs::read_to_string(&args[4]).expect("read leaves file"); + let binding_q: usize = args[5].parse().expect("binding_q must be a number"); + let outdir = &args[6]; + + let leaves: Vec<[u64; DIGEST_LEN]> = leaves_raw + .lines() + .filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()) + .map(|l| arr8(&parse_hex_u64s(l, 8, "leaf digest"))) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(leaves.len(), 1 << DEPTH, "leaves file must have exactly {} digests", 1 << DEPTH); + + let (binding, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, binding_q); + let mut digest = [0u64; DIGEST_LEN]; + digest.copy_from_slice(&leaf[..DIGEST_LEN]); + let mut idx = leaves + .iter() + .position(|l| *l == digest) + .expect("our credential digest is not in the issuer's tree"); + + let mut level = leaves.clone(); + let mut path = Vec::new(); + while level.len() > 1 { + let sib = if idx % 2 == 0 { level[idx + 1] } else { level[idx - 1] }; + path.push(PathStep { sibling: sib, node_on_right: idx % 2 == 1 }); + level = level.chunks(2).map(|p| compress(p[0], p[1])).collect(); + idx /= 2; + } + let path: [PathStep; DEPTH] = path.try_into().ok().unwrap(); + let (membership, root) = prove_membership(digest, path); + + let mut publics = Vec::new(); + for v in action.iter().chain(&round).chain(&leaf).chain(&nullifier).chain(&root) { + publics.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes()); + } + let b = binding.to_postcard(); + let m = membership.to_postcard(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/binding.postcard"), &b).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/membership.postcard"), &m).unwrap(); + std::fs::write(format!("{outdir}/relation_publics.le64"), &publics).unwrap(); + println!( + "{{\"binding\":\"{outdir}/binding.postcard\",\"membership\":\"{outdir}/membership.postcard\",\"publics\":\"{outdir}/relation_publics.le64\",\"binding_bytes\":{},\"membership_bytes\":{},\"root\":\"{}\"}}", + b.len(), + m.len(), + level[0].iter().map(|v| v.to_le_bytes().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).join("")).collect::() + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prover_cost.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prover_cost.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea311806 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/prover_cost.rs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +//! The axis the parameter search forgot: prover time. +//! +//! `examples/fri_zk_budget.rs` concluded that 128 rows at 12 queries and +//! blowup 128 beats the deployed point "on every axis at once", having +//! measured soundness, the zero-knowledge margin, verifier CPU and envelope. +//! It did not measure the prover, and it described the blowup as buying +//! security "in prover time rather than transaction bytes" as though prover +//! time were free. The LDE is `blowup x` the trace: at blowup 128 that is a +//! 128-fold increase in the dominant prover cost. +//! +//! This measures it, so the recommendation stands on four axes rather than +//! three. The interesting question is whether the same soundness and the same +//! zero-knowledge margin can be bought with MORE queries at LOWER blowup, +//! since soundness depends on the product `Q · b` while prover cost depends on +//! `2^b` alone. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example prover_cost --features wire-postcard +use riverrun_m31::zk::Seed; +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_crowd, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; +use std::time::Instant; + +/// The FRI zero-knowledge margin of `examples/fri_zk_budget.rs`. +fn zk_margin(log_rows: usize, queries: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> isize { + let n = 1isize << log_rows; + let layers = (log_rows + 1 + log_blowup) as isize; + 3 * n - queries as isize * layers +} + +fn main() { + let secret = [7u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [5u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 4242 + i as u64); + + println!( + "{:<28} {:>7} {:>8} {:>9} {:>10} {:>9}", + "configuration", "bits", "zk margin", "proof B", "prove ms", "verdict" + ); + for (log_rows, q, lb) in [ + (6usize, 20usize, 2usize), // the previous point + (7, 12, 7), // what fri_zk_budget recommended + (7, 28, 3), // same soundness, far lower blowup + (7, 24, 4), + (7, 16, 6), + (7, 46, 2), // same soundness at the lowest blowup + ] { + let t0 = Instant::now(); + let (proof, _, _, _) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, action, round, blinder, q, lb, log_rows, Seed::reproducible(42), + ); + let ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis(); + let bytes = proof.to_postcard().len(); + let bits = q * lb + 8; + let margin = zk_margin(log_rows, q, lb); + println!( + "{:<28} {:>7} {:>9} {:>9} {:>10} {:>9}", + format!("{} rows, {}q, blowup 2^{}", 1 << log_rows, q, lb), + format!("2^{bits}"), + margin, + bytes, + ms, + if margin > 0 && bytes <= 132_096 { "ok" } else { "REJECT" } + ); + } + println!( + "\nSoundness is the PRODUCT Q x log_blowup; prover cost is exponential in\n\ + log_blowup alone. So the same security is reachable at many points, and the\n\ + cheap ones are the high-query, low-blowup end — the opposite of what the\n\ + soundness budget alone suggested, and the reason a recommendation made on\n\ + three axes had to be remade on four." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/qm31_ceiling.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/qm31_ceiling.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dc12893 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/qm31_ceiling.rs @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +//! Does a degree-4 challenge field lift the soundness ceiling? +//! +//! `examples/soundness_budget.rs` found that at high blowup the additive error +//! terms bind: they are `domain / |E|`, the domain grows with the blowup, and +//! `|E|` does not. With the degree-3 extension `|E| ≈ 2^93`, and the adopted +//! configuration's round-by-round error floors at `2^-74` while its query phase +//! offers 84 bits — ten bits thrown away by the field. +//! +//! `p3-mersenne-31` ships `QM31`, the degree-4 extension `M31[i][u]` with +//! `i² = -1` and `u² = 2 + i`, at `4 · 31 = 124` bits. This computes what that +//! would buy, using the same accounting, before anyone spends a day rewiring +//! the config types. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example qm31_ceiling + +/// Round-by-round error in bits, as `soundness_budget.rs` computes it. +fn rbr_bits(queries: usize, log_blowup: usize, log_committed: usize, log_ext: f64) -> f64 { + let q_bits = (queries * log_blowup) as f64; + let domain = ((log_committed + log_blowup) as f64).exp2(); + let rounds = (log_committed + log_blowup) as f64; + let deg_q = 5.0 * (log_committed as f64).exp2(); + let ext = log_ext.exp2(); + let additive = domain / ext + deg_q / ext + rounds * domain / ext; + -((-q_bits).exp2() + additive).log2() +} + +fn main() { + const POW: f64 = 8.0; + println!( + "{:<30} {:>10} {:>10} {:>10} {:>10}", + "configuration", "query bits", "deg-3", "deg-4", "recovered" + ); + for (name, q, lb, lc) in [ + ("128 rows, 12q, blowup 128", 12usize, 7usize, 8usize), + ("128 rows, 16q, blowup 64", 16, 6, 8), + ("128 rows, 24q, blowup 16", 24, 4, 8), + ("256 rows, 16q, blowup 64", 16, 6, 9), + ("256 rows, 20q, blowup 128", 20, 7, 9), + ("256 rows, 24q, blowup 128", 24, 7, 9), + ] { + let q_bits = (q * lb) as f64; + let d3 = rbr_bits(q, lb, lc, 92.999_999_9) + POW; + let d4 = rbr_bits(q, lb, lc, 123.999_999_9) + POW; + println!( + "{:<30} {:>10.0} {:>10.0} {:>10.0} {:>10.0}", + name, + q_bits + POW, + d3, + d4, + d4 - d3 + ); + } + println!( + "\nThe columns are classical work in bits. Halve them for a Grover adversary.\n\ + 'query bits' is what the query phase offers; 'deg-3' and 'deg-4' are what the\n\ + field lets through. Where deg-3 falls short of the query bits, the ceiling is\n\ + the field and not the protocol, and the degree-4 column is what removing that\n\ + ceiling recovers.\n\n\ + QM31 is already in p3-mersenne-31 (M31[i][u], i^2 = -1, u^2 = 2 + i, 124 bits)\n\ + with the ExtensionField impls a challenge field needs. So this is\n\ + a change of one type alias and whatever the change breaks, not new\n\ + cryptography — and the table says whether it is worth doing before anyone\n\ + finds out how much it breaks." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/soundness_budget.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/soundness_budget.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec7a5ba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/soundness_budget.rs @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +//! How many bits of soundness does the deployed configuration actually have? +//! +//! Everywhere else this project has written "soundness is roughly +//! `queries × log_blowup` bits". That is folklore: a mnemonic for the +//! conjectured regime, quoted without a model, without the other error terms, +//! and without a number. An auditor's first question about a proof system is +//! "what is the concrete security level", and until this file existed the +//! honest answer was that nobody here had computed it. +//! +//! This computes it, under a stated model, with every term written out. +//! +//! ## The model +//! +//! Non-interactive STARK via Fiat-Shamir in the random-oracle model, over +//! `F = M31` with challenges in `E = F^3`, `|E| = (2^31 − 1)^3 ≈ 2^93`. +//! Soundness error is accounted round-by-round and then summed; a proof +//! system's security in bits is `−log₂` of the total error. +//! +//! Two regimes are reported for every configuration, because the difference +//! between them is the difference between what is proved and what is believed: +//! +//! - **Provable (Johnson bound).** Proximity gaps for Reed-Solomon codes hold +//! unconditionally for proximity parameter `δ < 1 − √ρ`, where `ρ` is the +//! rate. Taking `δ = 1 − √ρ` gives per-query detection `δ`, so `Q` queries +//! leave error `(1 − δ)^Q = ρ^{Q/2}`, i.e. `Q · b / 2` bits with +//! `b = log₂(1/ρ)`. +//! - **Conjectured (up to capacity).** The widely assumed strengthening +//! `δ → 1 − ρ` gives `ρ^Q`, i.e. `Q · b` bits. Every deployed STARK the +//! author is aware of quotes this regime. It is a conjecture. +//! +//! The other terms, each of which must be added to the error and each of which +//! this file computes rather than waves at: +//! +//! - **Grinding.** `query_proof_of_work_bits` of proof-of-work on the query +//! challenge multiply the adversary's cost by `2^w`, adding `w` bits. +//! - **Proximity-gap / batching error.** Batching several codewords with a +//! random `α ∈ E` costs about `(m · d) / |E|` where `d` is the degree bound +//! and `m` the number of batched polynomials — negligible at `|E| ≈ 2^93`, +//! but reported so it is visible rather than assumed away. +//! - **DEEP / out-of-domain sampling.** The verifier's `ζ ∈ E` must miss a +//! bad set of size at most the quotient degree, costing about +//! `deg_Q / |E|`. +//! - **Folding.** `log₂(N · 2^b)` folding rounds, each contributing a +//! proximity-gap term of the same order. +//! - **Fiat-Shamir.** The protocol is round-by-round sound, so in the ROM an +//! adversary making `T` oracle queries forges with probability about +//! `T · ε_rbr`. Read as WORK rather than as probability: a forgery costs +//! about `1/ε_rbr` attempts, and grinding makes each attempt cost `2^w` +//! hashes, so the total work is about `ε_rbr^{-1} · 2^w`. That is the +//! figure reported, and it is the reason the grinding bits are added rather +//! than multiplied in. +//! +//! ## The quantum column, which halves everything +//! +//! "Post-quantum" for a hash-based STARK means there is no Shor-style break: +//! no discrete logarithm, no factoring, nothing an algebraic quantum algorithm +//! dismantles outright. It does NOT mean a quantum adversary is no better off. +//! Grover applies twice here, and both times to the number that matters: +//! +//! - **The Fiat-Shamir search.** Forging is a search for a transcript whose +//! derived challenges happen to be favourable. Classically that costs about +//! `ε⁻¹` attempts; Grover turns an unstructured search of size `S` into +//! `√S`, so it costs about `ε^{-1/2}`. **The bits halve.** +//! - **The grinding.** Proof-of-work on the query challenge is exactly the +//! search Grover was built for, so `w` grinding bits are worth `w/2`. +//! +//! Both effects are the same square root, so the whole work figure halves: +//! `2^k` classical becomes about `2^{k/2}` quantum. This file therefore +//! reports both, and the quantum column is the one a system whose entire pitch +//! is post-quantum should be judged on. +//! +//! The caveat that keeps this from being alarmism: Grover's speedup is +//! quadratic and notoriously hard to realise at these depths — the circuit is +//! sequential and does not parallelise the way classical search does, so a +//! 2^46 Grover search is not 2^46 seconds of anything. It is still the right +//! conservative accounting, and a system claiming post-quantum security should +//! quote it rather than quote the classical figure and let the word do the +//! work. +//! +//! ## What this file is not +//! +//! It is an accounting, not a security proof. It assembles published bounds +//! with this system's parameters; it does not re-derive proximity gaps, and it +//! does not model the AIR's own soundness beyond the DEEP term. Where a bound +//! is conjectural it says so on the line that uses it. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example soundness_budget + +/// log2 of the extension field size: (2^31 - 1)^3. +const LOG_EXT: f64 = 92.999_999_9; + +/// Envelope and CPU caps this system has to fit inside, from docs/EVIDENCE.md. +const ENVELOPE_BYTES: f64 = 132_096.0; + +struct Config { + name: &'static str, + queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + pow_bits: usize, + /// log2 of the committed trace height (the ZK path commits 2N). + log_committed: usize, + /// Measured proof size in bytes, or None if not measured. + measured_bytes: Option, +} + +/// Bits contributed by the query phase. +fn query_bits(queries: usize, log_blowup: usize, conjectured: bool) -> f64 { + let b = log_blowup as f64; + let q = queries as f64; + if conjectured { + q * b + } else { + q * b / 2.0 + } +} + +/// The additive terms, as an error probability rather than in bits: batching, +/// DEEP out-of-domain, and one proximity-gap term per folding round. +fn additive_error(log_committed: usize, log_blowup: usize) -> f64 { + let domain = ((log_committed + log_blowup) as f64).exp2(); + let rounds = (log_committed + log_blowup) as f64; + // Degree of the quotient the DEEP step samples against, generously bounded + // by (constraint degree 5) x trace height. + let deg_q = 5.0 * (log_committed as f64).exp2(); + let ext = LOG_EXT.exp2(); + let batching = domain / ext; + let deep = deg_q / ext; + let folding = rounds * domain / ext; + batching + deep + folding +} + +fn verdict(bits: f64) -> &'static str { + if bits >= 128.0 { + "at or above 128" + } else if bits >= 100.0 { + "100 to 128" + } else if bits >= 80.0 { + "80 to 100, below production" + } else { + "BELOW 80, a demonstration figure" + } +} + +fn report(c: &Config) { + println!("{}", c.name); + println!( + " {} queries, blowup 2^{} (rate 1/{}), {} grinding bits, committed 2^{} rows", + c.queries, + c.log_blowup, + 1 << c.log_blowup, + c.pow_bits, + c.log_committed + ); + + let add = additive_error(c.log_committed, c.log_blowup); + let add_bits = -add.log2(); + + for (label, conjectured) in [("provable (Johnson)", false), ("conjectured (capacity)", true)] { + let q_bits = query_bits(c.queries, c.log_blowup, conjectured); + let total_err = (-(q_bits)).exp2() + add; + let rbr = -total_err.log2(); + let work = rbr + c.pow_bits as f64; + println!( + " {label:<24} round-by-round error 2^-{:.1} (query {:.0}, additive terms are 2^-{:.0} and do not bind)", + rbr, q_bits, add_bits + ); + let quantum = work / 2.0; + println!( + " classical work: about 2^{:.0} attempts x 2^{} grinding = 2^{:.0} hashes", + rbr, c.pow_bits, work + ); + println!( + " QUANTUM work (Grover on the Fiat-Shamir search and the grind): 2^{:.0}", + quantum + ); + println!( + " verdict: {} classically, {} against a quantum adversary", + verdict(work), + verdict(quantum) + ); + } + if let Some(b) = c.measured_bytes { + println!( + " measured proof: {} B, {:.0}% of the {} B envelope", + b, + 100.0 * b as f64 / ENVELOPE_BYTES, + ENVELOPE_BYTES as usize + ); + } + println!(); +} + +/// The frontier: for a given blowup, how many queries fit the envelope, and +/// what does that buy? Proof size is modelled from two measured points by a +/// linear fit in the query count, which is how it behaves: each query adds a +/// Merkle path and one opened row. +fn frontier(log_blowup: usize, fixed_bytes: f64, per_query_bytes: f64, pow: usize) { + println!("frontier at blowup 2^{log_blowup} (size model: {fixed_bytes:.0} B + {per_query_bytes:.0} B per query)"); + let max_q = ((ENVELOPE_BYTES - fixed_bytes) / per_query_bytes).floor() as usize; + let conj = query_bits(max_q, log_blowup, true) + pow as f64; + let prov = query_bits(max_q, log_blowup, false) + pow as f64; + println!( + " the envelope allows at most {max_q} queries -> {conj:.0} bits conjectured, {prov:.0} bits provable" + ); + for target in [96.0f64, 128.0] { + let need_conj = ((target - pow as f64) / log_blowup as f64).ceil() as usize; + let bytes = fixed_bytes + per_query_bytes * need_conj as f64; + println!( + " {target:.0} bits conjectured needs {need_conj} queries = {:.0} B ({:.1}x the envelope){}", + bytes, + bytes / ENVELOPE_BYTES, + if bytes <= ENVELOPE_BYTES { " FITS" } else { " DOES NOT FIT" } + ); + } + println!(); +} + +fn main() { + println!("Concrete soundness of the deployed configurations.\n"); + + let configs = [ + Config { + name: "crowd binding (ADOPTED): 128 rows, 12 queries, blowup 128", + queries: 12, + log_blowup: 7, + pow_bits: 8, + log_committed: 8, // ZK commits 2N = 256 + measured_bytes: Some(106_491), + }, + Config { + name: "crowd binding (superseded): 64 rows, 20 queries, blowup 4", + queries: 20, + log_blowup: 2, + pow_bits: 8, + log_committed: 7, + measured_bytes: Some(123_422), + }, + Config { + name: "crowd membership (deployed): 64 rows, 20 queries, blowup 4", + queries: 20, + log_blowup: 2, + pow_bits: 8, + log_committed: 7, + measured_bytes: Some(83_629), + }, + Config { + name: "legacy non-hiding binding: 4 rows, 40 queries, blowup 2", + queries: 40, + log_blowup: 1, + pow_bits: 8, + log_committed: 2, + measured_bytes: Some(73_642), + }, + ]; + for c in &configs { + report(c); + } + + println!("What the envelope permits.\n"); + // Two measured points at blowup 4 on the crowd binding relation: + // 20 queries -> 123,422 B; and the 30-query point measured at 177,230 B. + let per_query = (177_230.0 - 123_422.0) / 10.0; + let fixed = 123_422.0 - per_query * 20.0; + frontier(2, fixed, per_query, 8); + + println!( + "The sentence this file exists to replace: \"soundness is roughly queries times\n\ + log-blowup bits\", and the phrase \"full production security, 40 queries, no\n\ + discount\" that appears in this project's own README.\n\n\ + Computed: every configuration deployed here costs about 2^56 hashes to forge\n\ + under the capacity CONJECTURE, and about 2^36 under the proved Johnson bound.\n\ + The query count was never the thing that made 40 queries \"production\": at\n\ + rate 1/2 each query is worth one conjectured bit, so 40 queries is 40 bits.\n\n\ + Three consequences, none of them comfortable.\n\ + 1. These are demonstration figures. A system holding real value wants 100 or\n\ + 128 bits, and calling 56 \"full production security\" is the same class of\n\ + error as the privacy claim this project already had to retract. The README\n\ + wording has to change.\n\ + 2. The lever is the BLOWUP, not the query count. Bits scale as\n\ + queries x log_blowup while envelope scales with queries alone, so raising\n\ + the blowup buys security in prover time and LDE memory rather than in\n\ + transaction bytes. That is the direction to push, and it is unmeasured.\n\ + 3. At blowup 4 the envelope caps the achievable level near 50 conjectured\n\ + bits. Reaching 128 in ONE transaction is an open question for this\n\ + envelope, and belongs in the limitations section as one.\n\ + 4. And the figure to quote is the QUANTUM one, because post-quantum is this\n\ + project's entire pitch. Grover halves it: the adopted configuration is\n\ + 2^82 classically and about 2^41 against a quantum adversary. Being\n\ + immune to Shor is not the same as being unaffected, and a system that\n\ + leads with the word owes the reader the halved number.\n\ + 5. The additive terms BIND at high blowup, which the mnemonic could never\n\ + have shown. They are domain size over |E|, the domain grows with the\n\ + blowup, and |E| = 2^93 does not. At blowup 128 the round-by-round error\n\ + floors at 2^-74 no matter how many queries are added: the query phase\n\ + offers 84 bits and the field only lets 74 of them through. The naive\n\ + Q x log_blowup + grind formula overstated the adopted configuration by\n\ + ten bits. Raising the extension from degree 3 to degree 4 moves |E| from\n\ + 2^93 to 2^124 and lifts the ceiling; it is the next parameter to test,\n\ + and it is a change to the field rather than to the protocol." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/tree_root.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/tree_root.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0629ff6c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/tree_root.rs @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +//! Compute the Merkle root of a credential tree, the issuer-side counterpart +//! of `prove_relation`. Reads a leaves file (one 64-byte-hex digest per line, +//! exactly 16 lines for DEPTH = 4) and prints the root as 64-byte hex. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example tree_root -- + +use riverrun_m31::{compress, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN}; + +fn main() { + let path = std::env::args().nth(1).expect("usage: tree_root "); + let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read leaves file"); + let leaves: Vec<[u64; DIGEST_LEN]> = raw + .lines() + .filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()) + .map(|l| { + let l = l.trim(); + assert_eq!(l.len(), DIGEST_LEN * 16, "each digest line must be {} hex chars", DIGEST_LEN * 16); + let bytes: Vec = (0..l.len()) + .step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&l[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()) + .collect(); + let v: Vec = + bytes.chunks(8).map(|c| u64::from_le_bytes(c.try_into().unwrap())).collect(); + v.try_into().unwrap() + }) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(leaves.len(), 1 << DEPTH, "need exactly {} digests", 1 << DEPTH); + + let mut level = leaves; + while level.len() > 1 { + level = level.chunks(2).map(|p| compress(p[0], p[1])).collect(); + } + let root_hex: String = level[0] + .iter() + .flat_map(|v| v.to_le_bytes()) + .map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")) + .collect(); + println!("{root_hex}"); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/zk_view.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/zk_view.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19ef7b2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/examples/zk_view.rs @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +//! What the verifier actually sees, and which parts of it are proved to hide. +//! +//! This project has been saying "statistical zero-knowledge" and, after the +//! ChaCha20 correction, "computational zero-knowledge". Both were said having +//! analysed exactly ONE component of the verifier's view: the trace openings. +//! Zero-knowledge is a statement about the WHOLE view, and it is established by +//! exhibiting a simulator. No simulator has been exhibited here. +//! +//! So this file does the thing that was skipped: it enumerates the view +//! component by component, proves what can be proved, names what is inherited +//! from upstream unanalysed, and states the simulator's structure together with +//! the exact step where the argument stops. +//! +//! ## The view +//! +//! From `p3-uni-stark`'s `Proof`, everything a Fiat-Shamir verifier receives: +//! +//! ```text +//! commitments: trace, quotient_chunks, random +//! opened at ζ: trace_local, trace_next, quotient_chunks[1..d], random +//! per query: one committed row + Merkle path + leaf salts, +//! the first-layer sibling scalar, +//! per-FRI-layer siblings and paths +//! plus: the folded final polynomial and the grinding witness +//! ``` +//! +//! and exactly one algebraic relation ties the opened values together +//! (`verifier.rs`, `verify_constraints`): +//! +//! ```text +//! C(trace_local, trace_next, public_values, ζ) · Z_H(ζ)⁻¹ = Σ_i zps_i · q_i(ζ) +//! ``` +//! +//! `C` is a public function and `zps_i` are public Lagrange constants. That +//! single equation is the whole of what the OOD values must satisfy. +//! +//! ## Theorem D (the out-of-domain view is witness-independent) +//! +//! Let `ζ` be outside the trace domain and every LDE domain. Under a uniform +//! blinder `R` and uniform chunk randomisers `t_i`, the tuple +//! +//! ```text +//! ( T'(ζ), T'(ζ_next), q'_1(ζ), …, q'_d(ζ) ) +//! ``` +//! +//! is distributed uniformly on the variety cut out by the single equation +//! above, and that distribution does not depend on the witness. +//! +//! *Proof.* `T'(ζ) = T(ζ) + Z_D(ζ)·R(ζ)` with `Z_D(ζ) ≠ 0`, and likewise at +//! `ζ_next`; by Theorem B (`examples/hiding_theory.rs`) the pair +//! `(R(ζ), R(ζ_next))` is uniform on `E²` whenever the blinder's dimension +//! exceeds the number of evaluations the verifier sees, which the deployed +//! margin enforces. So `(T'(ζ), T'(ζ_next))` is uniform on `E²`, whatever `T` +//! is — the first witness-independence. +//! +//! Given those two values the verifier's equation FIXES `Σ_i zps_i q'_i(ζ)`; +//! call it `Q*`. It is a public function of values already sampled, so it +//! carries no further information. The chunk randomisation sets +//! `q'_i = q_i + Z_{D_i}·t_i` for `i < d` with `t_i` uniform and independent, +//! and chooses `t_d` so the weighted sum is unchanged. Since `Z_{D_i}(ζ) ≠ 0`, +//! the first `d − 1` opened chunk values are uniform and independent on +//! `E^{d−1}`, and the last is determined by `Q*`. Hence the tuple is uniform on +//! the variety, and every ingredient of its distribution — `Q*` aside, which is +//! a function of the public statement and the already-uniform trace values — is +//! independent of the witness. ∎ +//! +//! The corollary worth stating, because it is the reason to care: a simulator +//! can sample this entire block **knowing only the public statement**. Draw +//! `trace_local`, `trace_next` and `d − 1` chunk values uniformly; compute `Q*` +//! from the public constraint; solve for the last chunk. That is one of the two +//! blocks a STARK simulator has to produce. +//! +//! ## What is proved, what is inherited, what is open +//! +//! | component of the view | status | +//! |---|---| +//! | trace openings at FRI query rows | **proved** uniform, Theorem B | +//! | OOD values `(trace_local, trace_next, chunks)` | **proved** uniform on the variety, Theorem D | +//! | leaf salts and Merkle paths | **inherited**: hiding MMCS, simulated by programming the random oracle | +//! | FRI layer commitments and siblings | **NOT analysed here**: inherited from Plonky3's construction | +//! | randomisation polynomial openings | **NOT analysed here**: this is where upstream's own "statistical" qualifier originates | +//! | the grinding witness | public, carries no witness information | +//! +//! ## The simulator, and where the argument stops +//! +//! A simulator `S`, given the statement and control of the random oracle, would: +//! +//! 1. sample the OOD block as in Theorem D — **covered**; +//! 2. sample each queried trace row uniformly — **covered** by Theorem B; +//! 3. commit to those rows through the hiding MMCS, programming the oracle so +//! the Merkle paths check out — standard, and the reason a SALTED MMCS is +//! not optional; +//! 4. produce FRI layer openings consistent with the folding relation, for +//! values that were sampled rather than folded — **this is the step that is +//! not established here.** +//! +//! Step 4 is not a formality. The folding relation ties each layer's opened +//! values to the previous layer's, and a simulator that sampled the first layer +//! freely must still make every subsequent layer consistent. Upstream's +//! construction addresses it with the randomisation polynomial folded into the +//! FRI batch, and that is exactly the component this file marks as unanalysed. +//! Until it is analysed, the honest form of the claim is: +//! +//! **the trace openings and the out-of-domain view are proved to be +//! witness-independent; full zero-knowledge is inherited from Plonky3's +//! construction and is not independently established here.** +//! +//! That is weaker than "the system is zero-knowledge" and stronger than +//! "we hope so", and it is what the evidence supports. +//! +//! ## What this file computes +//! +//! Theorem D's two claims, against real proofs: that the verifier's equation +//! holds on honest proofs (so the variety is the right one), and that the +//! opened values move across independent prover randomness in the way the +//! theorem says — uniform in the free coordinates, determined in the last. +//! +//! Run: cargo run --release --example zk_view --features wire-postcard + +use riverrun_m31::zk::Seed; +use riverrun_m31::{prove_binding_crowd, verify_binding_crowd, BLINDER_LEN, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; + +/// Number of independent proofs of ONE statement to compare. +const SAMPLES: usize = 12; + +/// Deployed parameters: 64 rows, 20 queries, blowup 4. +const QUERIES: usize = 20; +const LOG_BLOWUP: usize = 2; +const LOG_ROWS: usize = 6; + +fn main() { + println!( + "Theorem D, checked against real proofs of ONE statement.\n\ + Each proof below is of the same statement with the same witness, and\n\ + differs only in the prover's randomness. If the view were\n\ + witness-independent only in theory, these would still be identical.\n" + ); + + let secret = [7u64; SECRET_LEN]; + let action = [3u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = [5u64; CONTEXT_LEN]; + let blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 4242 + i as u64); + + let mut wire: Vec> = Vec::new(); + let mut c_ref = None; + for i in 0..SAMPLES { + let (proof, c, _leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding_crowd( + secret, + action, + round, + blinder, + QUERIES, + LOG_BLOWUP, + LOG_ROWS, + Seed::reproducible(1000 + i as u64), + ); + assert!( + verify_binding_crowd(&proof, action, round, c, nullifier, QUERIES, LOG_BLOWUP), + "every sampled proof must verify, or the experiment is measuring noise" + ); + match &c_ref { + None => c_ref = Some(c), + Some(prev) => assert_eq!(*prev, c, "the statement must be identical across samples"), + } + wire.push(proof.to_postcard()); + } + + // 1. The statement is fixed and every proof verifies: the equation of + // Theorem D holds on all of them, since verification IS that check. + println!(" {SAMPLES} proofs of one statement, all verifying: the verifier's"); + println!(" constraint equation holds on every one, which is the variety"); + println!(" Theorem D describes.\n"); + + // 2. The proofs differ. If the randomisation were absent or degenerate the + // serialisations would coincide. + let mut distinct = std::collections::BTreeSet::new(); + for w in &wire { + distinct.insert(w.clone()); + } + println!( + " distinct serialisations: {} of {SAMPLES}", + distinct.len() + ); + assert_eq!( + distinct.len(), + SAMPLES, + "identical proofs would mean the prover randomness is not reaching the wire" + ); + + // 3. Byte-level agreement between two proofs of one statement. Anything + // that agrees across ALL samples is either public or a commitment to + // something fixed; anything that varies is carrying randomness. This is + // a coarse instrument and is reported as one. + let len = wire[0].len(); + let same_len = wire.iter().all(|w| w.len() == len); + let mut agree = 0usize; + if same_len { + for i in 0..len { + if wire.iter().all(|w| w[i] == wire[0][i]) { + agree += 1; + } + } + println!( + " bytes identical across all {SAMPLES} proofs: {agree} of {len} ({:.1}%)", + 100.0 * agree as f64 / len as f64 + ); + println!( + " bytes carrying prover randomness: {} ({:.1}%)", + len - agree, + 100.0 * (len - agree) as f64 / len as f64 + ); + } else { + println!(" proofs differ in length; byte comparison skipped"); + } + + println!( + "\n Read this as a sanity check, not as evidence of zero-knowledge. It shows\n\ + the randomisation reaches the wire and the statement stays fixed. What it\n\ + cannot show is that a SIMULATOR exists, because indistinguishability from a\n\ + simulated transcript is not something sampling honest transcripts can\n\ + establish. The module documentation says which components are proved, which\n\ + are inherited from Plonky3, and exactly which step of the simulator is not\n\ + established here." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/asp_history.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/asp_history.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..92092e3f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/asp_history.rs @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +//! Post-quantum attestation of an ASP root history. +//! +//! Nethermind's Stellar Private Payments compliance layer publishes a Merkle +//! root per approval set and updates it one leaf at a time, emitting +//! `LeafAddedEvent(leaf, index, root)` (asp-membership `lib.rs:239`). The +//! honesty a regulator needs is not that a single root exists — a Groth16 +//! snapshot gives that — but that the sequence of published roots is an +//! **append-only chain**: indices `0, 1, 2, …` with no gap, each root the +//! result of inserting exactly one leaf over the previous one, no removal and +//! no reordering. +//! +//! ## Why this AIR does not reprove the hash +//! +//! The ASP hashes with Poseidon2 over BN254 (`p ≈ 2²⁵⁴`); this crate's STARK +//! is over Mersenne-31 (`p = 2³¹ − 1`). Reproving BN254-Poseidon2 in an M31 +//! AIR is out of scope, and an attestation of the *wrong* hash would attest +//! nothing. So the compression is a **witnessed oracle**: the per-event root +//! is a public value, and the AIR constrains the STRUCTURE of the history +//! around those values. +//! +//! What a post-quantum adversary cannot forge here is the shape of the chain, +//! regardless of hash strength: +//! +//! - `index_{n+1} = index_n + 1` — monotone and gap-free. A reordered or +//! leaf-injected history violates this immediately. +//! - the first row's index is the attested starting index (`0` for a full +//! history from genesis). +//! - the last row's root is the attested current root, so the chain the proof +//! covers ends at the root the pool actually publishes. +//! +//! ## What this does NOT claim +//! +//! It attests history STRUCTURE, not preimage security: a Poseidon2 collision +//! could substitute one leaf for another of equal hash, and that is the SPP's +//! assumption to make, not this layer's to solve. It is a parallel attestation +//! the pool does not consume today. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::{Mersenne31, QM31}; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, SerializingHasher}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig}; + + +type Val = Mersenne31; +/// The challenge field is the degree-4 extension, matching the rest of the +/// crate after the field-ceiling correction (`examples/soundness_budget.rs`). +type Challenge = QM31; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type Pcs = CirclePcs; +type Config = StarkConfig; + +/// A BN254 root, carried as its little-endian M31 limbs. BN254's `p` is ~254 +/// bits, so eight 31-bit limbs (248 bits) do not hold a full element; this +/// attestation treats the root as an opaque tag and compares limbwise, which +/// is exactly what the structure argument needs — the root is a witnessed +/// label, not a field element this STARK does arithmetic on. Nine limbs give +/// 279 bits of tag space, comfortably injective over BN254 roots. +pub const ROOT_LIMBS: usize = 9; + +/// Trace columns: `index`, then the `ROOT_LIMBS` limbs of this row's root. +const TRACE_WIDTH: usize = 1 + ROOT_LIMBS; + +/// One observed `LeafAddedEvent`, reduced to what the structure proof needs. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub struct RootStep { + pub index: u64, + pub root: [u64; ROOT_LIMBS], +} + +/// The append-only-history AIR. Rows are events in order; the constraints make +/// the ordering and the index progression unforgeable, and pin the endpoints +/// to public values so the proof cannot be about a different history than the +/// one claimed. +pub(crate) struct AspHistoryAir { + /// Number of real events; rows past this are padding repeating the last + /// real row, and the transition constraints tolerate the repeat because a + /// repeated row has `index_{n+1} = index_n`, which the padding selector + /// switches off. + pub real_rows: usize, +} + +impl BaseAir for AspHistoryAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + // index, root limbs, and one padding-selector column. + TRACE_WIDTH + 1 + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + // start_index, then first and last root limbs. + 1 + 2 * ROOT_LIMBS + } +} + +impl> Air for AspHistoryAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + let cur = main.current_slice(); + let nxt = main.next_slice(); + + let index = cur[0].clone(); + let index_next = nxt[0].clone(); + let is_real_next: AB::Expr = nxt[TRACE_WIDTH].clone().into(); + + // The padding selector is boolean. + let is_real: AB::Expr = cur[TRACE_WIDTH].clone().into(); + builder.assert_zero(is_real.clone() * (AB::Expr::ONE - is_real.clone())); + + let pis = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + let start_index = pis[0].clone(); + let first_root = &pis[1..1 + ROOT_LIMBS]; + let last_root = &pis[1 + ROOT_LIMBS..1 + 2 * ROOT_LIMBS]; + + // First row: index is the attested start, root is the attested first + // root. This pins the low end of the chain to a public value. + builder.when_first_row().assert_eq(index.clone(), start_index.into()); + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + builder + .when_first_row() + .assert_eq(cur[1 + j].clone(), first_root[j].into()); + } + + // Last row: the row's root is the attested current root. This pins the + // high end, so the proof cannot silently cover a prefix of the history + // and omit the tail. + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + builder + .when_last_row() + .assert_eq(cur[1 + j].clone(), last_root[j].into()); + } + + // Transition: while the NEXT row is a real event, its index is exactly + // one more than this row's. A reordered or leaf-injected history breaks + // this the moment two indices are out of step. When the next row is + // padding, the selector switches the constraint off and padding simply + // repeats the last root (checked below), so the last-row pin still + // lands on the true final root. + builder.when_transition().assert_zero( + is_real_next.clone() * (index_next.clone() - index.clone() - AB::Expr::ONE), + ); + // Padding rows repeat the previous root unchanged, so the tail pin is + // meaningful regardless of how much padding follows. + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + builder.when_transition().assert_zero( + (AB::Expr::ONE - is_real_next.clone()) + * (nxt[1 + j].clone() - cur[1 + j].clone()), + ); + } + } +} + +/// log2 of the quotient-chunk count, pinned so the verifier never runs the +/// symbolic pass on-chain (same reason as the other AIRs in this crate). +/// Guarded by `the_pinned_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass`. +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 0; + +fn make_config(num_queries: usize) -> Config { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs { mmcs: val_mmcs, fri_params, _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData }; + Config::new(pcs, Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash)) +} + +/// A proof that a root history is a consistent append-only chain. +pub struct AspHistoryProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl AspHistoryProof { + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +fn to_field(v: u64) -> Val { + Val::from_u64(v) +} + +fn build_trace(steps: &[RootStep], log_rows: usize) -> (RowMajorMatrix, Vec) { + let rows = 1usize << log_rows; + assert!(steps.len() <= rows, "trace height too small for the history"); + assert!(!steps.is_empty(), "an empty history has nothing to attest"); + let w = TRACE_WIDTH + 1; + let mut values = Vec::with_capacity(rows * w); + + let last = steps[steps.len() - 1]; + for r in 0..rows { + let real = r < steps.len(); + let s = if real { steps[r] } else { last }; + values.push(to_field(s.index)); + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + values.push(to_field(s.root[j])); + } + values.push(if real { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + } + + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 2 * ROOT_LIMBS); + pis.push(to_field(steps[0].index)); + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + pis.push(to_field(steps[0].root[j])); + } + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + pis.push(to_field(last.root[j])); + } + (RowMajorMatrix::new(values, w), pis) +} + +/// Prove that `steps` — the `LeafAddedEvent`s of an ASP, in order — form a +/// consistent append-only chain. `log_rows` sets the committed height; the +/// history must fit. +pub fn prove_asp_history(steps: &[RootStep], log_rows: usize, num_queries: usize) -> AspHistoryProof { + let (trace, pis) = build_trace(steps, log_rows); + let air = AspHistoryAir { real_rows: steps.len() }; + let config = make_config(num_queries); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + AspHistoryProof { inner: proof } +} + +/// Verify an [`AspHistoryProof`] against the claimed start index and the first +/// and last roots. `true` only if the history is a consistent append-only +/// chain ending at `last_root`. +pub fn verify_asp_history( + proof: &AspHistoryProof, + start_index: u64, + first_root: [u64; ROOT_LIMBS], + last_root: [u64; ROOT_LIMBS], + real_rows: usize, + num_queries: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = AspHistoryAir { real_rows }; + let config = make_config(num_queries); + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 2 * ROOT_LIMBS); + pis.push(to_field(start_index)); + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + pis.push(to_field(first_root[j])); + } + for j in 0..ROOT_LIMBS { + pis.push(to_field(last_root[j])); + } + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks(&config, &air, &proof.inner, &pis, None, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS) + .is_ok() +} + +/// Split a BN254 root (32 big-endian bytes) into `ROOT_LIMBS` little-endian +/// 31-bit limbs, the tag form the trace carries. +pub fn root_to_limbs(be_bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> [u64; ROOT_LIMBS] { + // Read as a big integer, then peel 31-bit limbs little-endian. + let mut acc: u128 = 0; + let mut limbs = [0u64; ROOT_LIMBS]; + let mut bit = 0usize; + let mut li = 0usize; + // Process bytes most-significant first into a rolling value; simplest + // correct approach at this size is to walk all 256 bits. + let mut bits = [0u8; 256]; + for (i, b) in be_bytes.iter().enumerate() { + for k in 0..8 { + bits[i * 8 + k] = (b >> (7 - k)) & 1; + } + } + // bits[0] is the MSB; assemble little-endian limbs from the LSB end. + for pos in (0..256).rev() { + let bitval = bits[pos] as u64; + acc |= (bitval as u128) << bit; + bit += 1; + if bit == 31 { + limbs[li] = acc as u64; + li += 1; + acc = 0; + bit = 0; + if li == ROOT_LIMBS { + break; + } + } + } + if bit > 0 && li < ROOT_LIMBS { + limbs[li] = acc as u64; + } + limbs +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use p3_air::BaseAir; + + fn root(seed: u64) -> [u64; ROOT_LIMBS] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| (seed.wrapping_mul(1000).wrapping_add(i as u64)) % ((1 << 31) - 1)) + } + + /// A genuine append-only history: indices 0..n, arbitrary distinct roots. + fn history(n: usize) -> Vec { + (0..n) + .map(|i| RootStep { index: i as u64, root: root(i as u64 + 1) }) + .collect() + } + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = AspHistoryAir { real_rows: 4 }; + let config = make_config(4); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!(LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed); + } + + #[test] + fn a_consistent_history_proves_and_verifies() { + let steps = history(6); + let proof = prove_asp_history(&steps, 3, 20); + assert!(verify_asp_history( + &proof, + steps[0].index, + steps[0].root, + steps[steps.len() - 1].root, + steps.len(), + 20 + )); + } + + #[test] + fn a_wrong_final_root_does_not_verify() { + let steps = history(6); + let proof = prove_asp_history(&steps, 3, 20); + let mut wrong = steps[steps.len() - 1].root; + wrong[0] ^= 1; + assert!(!verify_asp_history(&proof, steps[0].index, steps[0].root, wrong, steps.len(), 20)); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic] + fn a_reordered_history_cannot_even_be_proved() { + // Swap two events so the indices are out of order. The monotone-index + // constraint is violated at proving time, so the trace is unsatisfiable + // and the prover panics rather than emitting a proof of a forged + // history — the same fail-closed behaviour the other AIRs have. + let mut steps = history(6); + steps.swap(2, 4); + let _ = prove_asp_history(&steps, 3, 20); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic] + fn an_injected_leaf_breaks_the_index_chain() { + // An extra event inserted with a duplicate index: the chain no longer + // advances by exactly one across it, so it cannot be proved. + let mut steps = history(5); + steps.insert(3, RootStep { index: 2, root: root(99) }); + let _ = prove_asp_history(&steps, 3, 20); + } + + #[test] + fn root_limbs_round_trip_is_injective_on_distinct_roots() { + let mut a = [0u8; 32]; + let mut b = [0u8; 32]; + a[31] = 1; + b[31] = 2; + assert_ne!(root_to_limbs(&a), root_to_limbs(&b)); + // High bytes reach distinct limbs too. + let mut c = [0u8; 32]; + c[0] = 0x20; // within BN254 range + assert_ne!(root_to_limbs(&c), root_to_limbs(&a)); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/binding.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/binding.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..165394a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/binding.rs @@ -0,0 +1,666 @@ +//! Prove, as one Circle-STARK proof, that a leaf and a nullifier are bound to +//! the SAME secret: `leaf = Poseidon2(secret ‖ action)` and +//! `nullifier = Poseidon2(secret ‖ round)`, two permutation calls sharing one +//! private witness. This is riverrun's §1a + §1c relation +//! (`docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md`): the constraint whose deletion must break a +//! test, carried over in intent from `riverrun-stark`'s f128 `bound_nullifier` +//! test. A prover cannot present one member's leaf bound to a different +//! member's nullifier, because both permutations read the same private +//! `secret` cells the trace commits to. +//! +//! Both permutations live in the SAME row via `p3_poseidon2_air`'s +//! `VectorizedPoseidon2Air` (`VECTOR_LEN = 2`), not two separate rows: the +//! shared-secret constraint is then a same-row equality between the two +//! blocks' input cells, needing no cross-row (`next_slice`) machinery at all. +//! +//! **Not yet built, named honestly:** §1b, the variable-depth Merkle- +//! membership fold that binds `leaf` under a public root. This module proves +//! secret-sharing between exactly two permutation calls; membership under a +//! root is real, separate, unstarted work layered on top, not implied here. +//! +//! **Provisional, not a settled security decision:** the 8-limb secret / 8-limb +//! context split of the 16-M31-element input is a concrete choice made to have +//! something real to prove against, not a reviewed sponge-capacity argument. +//! Revisit before this is treated as production-ready. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::borrow::Borrow; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::{ + GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31, Mersenne31, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, +}; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{generate_vectorized_trace_rows, num_cols, Poseidon2Cols, RoundConstants, VectorizedPoseidon2Air}; +use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, SerializingHasher}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig}; + +use crate::membership::DIGEST_LEN; +use crate::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; + +/// Two permutations packed per row: block 0 is the leaf, block 1 the nullifier. +const VECTOR_LEN: usize = 2; + +/// log2 of the number of quotient chunks for [`BindingAir`], pinned as a +/// constant so the verifier never runs `p3_uni_stark`'s symbolic-builder pass. +/// That pass exists only to derive this one number, and its transient +/// `SymbolicExpr` tree peaks at ~440 KB of live heap for this AIR (measured; +/// see `docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md`), which is what overran Solana's 256 KB +/// heap ceiling. The AIR is fixed, so the value is a compile-time fact; the +/// test `the_pinned_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass` recomputes +/// it via the symbolic pass natively and fails if this constant ever drifts. +/// A wrong value cannot weaken soundness (it changes the expected proof shape, +/// so honest proofs would fail loudly, not forged ones pass). +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 2; +/// Input cells `[0..SECRET_LEN)` are the shared, private secret. +pub const SECRET_LEN: usize = 8; +/// Input cells `[SECRET_LEN..WIDTH)` are the block's public context (`action` +/// for the leaf block, `round` for the nullifier block). +pub const CONTEXT_LEN: usize = WIDTH - SECRET_LEN; + +const SBOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; +const SBOX_REGISTERS: usize = 0; +const HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; +const PARTIAL_ROUNDS: usize = 14; + +type Val = Mersenne31; +type LinearLayers = GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31; +/// Re-export for the hiding-cost instrument, which builds the same trace. +pub(crate) type LinearLayersPub = GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31; +type InnerAir = VectorizedPoseidon2Air< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + VECTOR_LEN, +>; +type Cols = + Poseidon2Cols; + +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type Pcs = CirclePcs; +type Config = StarkConfig; + +/// riverrun's binding AIR: internal correctness of both permutations (from +/// `VectorizedPoseidon2Air`), plus riverrun's own constraints: each block's +/// context input and output are bound to public values, AND block 0's secret +/// cells equal block 1's secret cells. That last equality is the whole point: +/// it is the only thing that makes this "the same member's leaf and nullifier" +/// rather than two unrelated permutation calls. +pub(crate) struct BindingAir { + inner: InnerAir, +} + +impl BindingAir { + pub(crate) fn new() -> Self { + let constants: RoundConstants = + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + Self { inner: InnerAir::new(constants) } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for BindingAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.width() + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + 2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * DIGEST_LEN + } +} + +impl> Air for BindingAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + // Everything VectorizedPoseidon2Air already proves: both permutations + // in this row are internally consistent executions. + self.inner.eval(builder); + + let main = builder.main(); + let full = main.current_slice(); + let single_width = + num_cols::(); + let block0: &Cols = full[..single_width].borrow(); + let block1: &Cols = full[single_width..2 * single_width].borrow(); + + let pis: Vec = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + // pis layout: action | round | leaf(DIGEST_LEN) | nullifier(DIGEST_LEN) + // + // Both are permutation outputs TRUNCATED to a digest. Publishing the + // full sixteen-limb state published the witness: pi is a bijection and + // the context sits public beside it, so inverting on the published + // value returned the secret. See docs/NULLIFIER-BREAK.md. + let action = &pis[0..CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = &pis[CONTEXT_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN]; + let leaf = &pis[2 * CONTEXT_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN]; + let nullifier = &pis[2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * DIGEST_LEN]; + + let block0_output = &block0.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + let block1_output = &block1.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + + for i in 0..CONTEXT_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block0.inputs[SECRET_LEN + i].into(), action[i].into()); + builder.assert_eq(block1.inputs[SECRET_LEN + i].into(), round[i].into()); + } + for i in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block0_output[i].into(), leaf[i].into()); + builder.assert_eq(block1_output[i].into(), nullifier[i].into()); + } + // The binding: both blocks' secret cells must be the same private + // witness. This is the constraint that, deleted, would let a prover + // mix one member's leaf with a different member's nullifier. + for i in 0..SECRET_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block0.inputs[i].into(), block1.inputs[i].into()); + } + } +} + +/// Production security level: 40 FRI queries. Use [`make_config_tuned`] +/// directly only for parameter-sweep measurement, never to ship a weaker +/// proof under this name. +fn make_config() -> Config { + make_config_tuned(40) +} + +/// Same construction as [`make_config`], with the FRI query count exposed. +/// Not a way to weaken production proofs: `prove_binding`/`verify_binding` +/// always call [`make_config`] with the real parameter. This exists so a +/// caller who explicitly wants a different point on the size/security +/// tradeoff (e.g. measuring on-chain verification cost at a proof size that +/// fits a transaction's message-size limit) can ask for it by name, and the +/// reduced-security choice is visible at every call site, not hidden. +pub fn make_config_tuned(num_queries: usize) -> Config { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs { mmcs: val_mmcs, fri_params, _phantom: PhantomData }; + let challenger = Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash); + Config::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn ctx_to_field(input: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [Val; CONTEXT_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +/// Pack a secret and a context (action or round) into one permutation input. +fn pack(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], context: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..SECRET_LEN].copy_from_slice(&secret); + out[SECRET_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&context); + out +} + +/// A real Circle-STARK proof that a leaf and a nullifier share one secret. +pub struct BindingProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl BindingProof { + /// log2 of the committed trace height, as recorded in the proof. Exposed + /// for the privacy audit: it is the polynomial degree bound the FRI query + /// openings have to beat for the witness to stay hidden. + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + /// Serialize to bytes (`bincode`, over `Proof`'s own `serde` impl), the + /// wire format an on-chain verifier reads from instruction data. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + /// Deserialize from bytes produced by [`BindingProof::to_bytes`]. `None` + /// on malformed input; callers on-chain treat that as proof rejection. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + /// Serialize to bytes with `postcard`, the no_std wire format a bare-wasm + /// verifier (Soroban) reads from its host boundary. Not interchangeable + /// with the bincode format of [`BindingProof::to_bytes`]. + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + /// Deserialize from bytes produced by [`BindingProof::to_postcard`]. + /// `None` on malformed input; callers on-chain treat that as rejection. + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove that `leaf = permute(secret ‖ action)` and +/// `nullifier = permute(secret ‖ round)` for one shared `secret`, returning the +/// proof and both public outputs. Production security level (40 FRI queries). +pub fn prove_binding( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], +) -> (BindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + prove_binding_tuned(secret, action, round, 40) +} + +/// Same as [`prove_binding`], with the FRI query count exposed. See +/// [`make_config_tuned`]'s doc: not a way to ship a weaker proof under the +/// production name, a way to measure a different, explicit point on the +/// size/security tradeoff (e.g. a proof small enough to fit a transaction's +/// message-size limit, for on-chain verification-cost measurement). +/// MEASUREMENT ONLY: the same statement proved over a taller trace, by +/// repeating the (leaf, nullifier) pair `2^(log_rows - 1)` times. +/// +/// This is **not** a zero-knowledge variant and must never be presented as +/// one: repeated identical rows carry no entropy and hide nothing. It exists +/// to price the trace height that a hiding configuration would need. A +/// non-hiding commitment publishes enough FRI query openings to interpolate a +/// trace of 4 rows (see `examples/privacy_audit.rs`); hiding requires the +/// committed polynomial to carry more random degrees of freedom than the +/// verifier opens, i.e. a trace taller than the query count. Verification +/// cost at that height is a fact worth measuring before anyone plans on it. +pub fn prove_binding_tuned_rows( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_rows: usize, +) -> (BindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + assert!(log_rows >= 2, "CirclePcs needs at least 4 rows"); + // Each row holds VECTOR_LEN = 2 permutations, and each repeat contributes + // one (leaf, nullifier) pair, so rows == repeats. + prove_binding_inner(secret, action, round, num_queries, 1 << log_rows) +} + +pub fn prove_binding_tuned( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, +) -> (BindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + // 4 repeats of the (leaf, nullifier) pair => 8 permutation inputs => 4 rows. + prove_binding_inner(secret, action, round, num_queries, 4) +} + +fn prove_binding_inner( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + repeats: usize, +) -> (BindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let leaf_input = pack(secret, action); + let nullifier_input = pack(secret, round); + // Truncated to digests. The full permutation state IS the witness once + // pi is inverted, and the context is public beside it. + let leaf_full = permute(leaf_input); + let nullifier_full = permute(nullifier_input); + let leaf_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf_full[i]); + let nullifier_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| nullifier_full[i]); + + let air = BindingAir::new(); + // `repeats` (leaf, nullifier) pairs / VECTOR_LEN=2 => `repeats` rows. The + // default 4 is CirclePcs's minimum committable domain size, the same + // repeated-statement pattern `permutation.rs` already uses; taller traces + // exist only to price a hiding configuration (prove_binding_tuned_rows). + let mut inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = Vec::with_capacity(2 * repeats); + for _ in 0..repeats { + inputs.push(to_field(leaf_input)); + inputs.push(to_field(nullifier_input)); + } + let constants: RoundConstants = + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_vectorized_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + VECTOR_LEN, + >(inputs, &constants, 0); + + let pis = public_values(action, round, leaf_output, nullifier_output); + let config = make_config_tuned(num_queries); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (BindingProof { inner: proof }, leaf_output, nullifier_output) +} + +pub(crate) fn public_values_for_hiding( + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], +) -> Vec { + public_values(action, round, leaf, nullifier) +} + +fn public_values( + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], +) -> Vec { + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * DIGEST_LEN); + pis.extend_from_slice(&ctx_to_field(action)); + pis.extend_from_slice(&ctx_to_field(round)); + pis.extend_from_slice(&ctx_to_field(leaf)); + pis.extend_from_slice(&ctx_to_field(nullifier)); + pis +} + +/// Verify a [`BindingProof`] against claimed `action`, `round`, `leaf`, and +/// `nullifier` public values. `true` only if the proof is well-formed and +/// verifies exactly against this tuple, including the shared-secret binding. +pub fn verify_binding( + proof: &BindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], +) -> bool { + verify_binding_tuned(proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, 40) +} + +/// Same as [`verify_binding`], with the FRI query count exposed; must match +/// whatever count the proof was produced with ([`prove_binding_tuned`]). +pub fn verify_binding_tuned( + proof: &BindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, +) -> bool { + verify_binding_tuned_checkpointed(proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, num_queries, || {}) +} + +/// Same as [`verify_binding_tuned`], calling `checkpoint` once config +/// construction is done, right before the actual `verify()` call. Exists to +/// let a caller measure/log memory usage at that exact boundary (e.g. an +/// on-chain program bisecting where its heap runs out); the no-op default +/// via [`verify_binding_tuned`] costs nothing extra. +pub fn verify_binding_tuned_checkpointed( + proof: &BindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + checkpoint: impl FnOnce(), +) -> bool { + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let config = make_config_tuned(num_queries); + let pis = public_values(action, round, leaf, nullifier); + checkpoint(); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u64) -> [u64; SECRET_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 1000 + i as u64) + } + + fn context(byte: u64) -> [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 2000 + i as u64) + } + + /// Records the AIR's trace width, because width is what drives on-chain + /// verification cost. Per-query CU attribution (2026-07-29, LiteSVM, the + /// `cu-trace` feature): of ~297k CU per FRI query, `open_input` is 296,927 + /// and the whole FRI fold chain is 5,285 — 98% vs 2%. `open_input`'s work + /// is one MMCS Merkle opening plus a DEEP-quotient dot product over every + /// trace column, in the degree-3 extension field, so cost tracks WIDTH, + /// not rows and not query count per se. This test prints the number so a + /// future width change shows up as a cost change, not a surprise. + #[test] + fn the_trace_width_that_drives_on_chain_cost_is_recorded() { + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let width = BaseAir::::width(&air); + let single = + num_cols::(); + println!("BindingAir trace width: {width} columns ({single} per Poseidon2 block x {VECTOR_LEN} blocks)"); + assert_eq!( + width, + single * VECTOR_LEN, + "the vectorized AIR's width must be exactly VECTOR_LEN blocks wide" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let config = make_config_tuned(4); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!( + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed, + "the pinned constant must equal what the symbolic pass derives for this exact AIR; \ + if the AIR changed, re-pin the constant to the recomputed value" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_genuine_shared_secret_binding_proves_and_verifies() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding(s, action, round); + assert!( + verify_binding(&proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier), + "a genuine leaf+nullifier pair sharing one secret must verify" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_leaf_output_does_not_verify_if_tampered() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding(s, action, round); + let mut wrong_leaf = leaf; + wrong_leaf[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_binding(&proof, action, round, wrong_leaf, nullifier), + "a proof must not verify against a tampered leaf" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_nullifier_output_does_not_verify_if_tampered() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding(s, action, round); + let mut wrong_nullifier = nullifier; + wrong_nullifier[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_binding(&proof, action, round, leaf, wrong_nullifier), + "a proof must not verify against a tampered nullifier" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn swapping_in_a_different_members_nullifier_output_fails() { + // Alice's own proof (her leaf bound to her nullifier) must not verify + // against Bob's nullifier output, even though Bob's nullifier is a + // perfectly real, independently valid output for SOME proof (his + // own). This is the outward-facing check that a leaf cannot be + // paired with a stranger's nullifier and still verify. + let alice = secret(1); + let bob = secret(2); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (alice_proof, alice_leaf, _alice_nullifier) = prove_binding(alice, action, round); + let (_bob_proof, _bob_leaf, bob_nullifier) = prove_binding(bob, action, round); + assert!( + !verify_binding(&alice_proof, action, round, alice_leaf, bob_nullifier), + "alice's proof must not verify against bob's nullifier" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_trace_built_from_two_different_secrets_cannot_yield_a_verifying_proof() { + // The strongest form of the soundness claim: attempting to build a + // trace where the leaf block and the nullifier block use DIFFERENT + // secrets does not merely fail verification later, it fails to + // produce a satisfying trace at all (the shared-secret constraint is + // violated at proving time). Mirrors `permutation.rs`'s own + // documented behavior ("Panics if input does not actually..."): + // Plonky3's prover panics on an unsatisfiable constraint set rather + // than silently emitting a broken proof. + let alice = secret(1); + let bob = secret(2); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + + let leaf_input = pack(alice, action); + let nullifier_input = pack(bob, round); // deliberately the WRONG secret + let leaf_full = permute(leaf_input); + let nullifier_full = permute(nullifier_input); + let leaf_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf_full[i]); + let nullifier_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| nullifier_full[i]); + + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = vec![ + to_field(leaf_input), + to_field(nullifier_input), + to_field(leaf_input), + to_field(nullifier_input), + to_field(leaf_input), + to_field(nullifier_input), + to_field(leaf_input), + to_field(nullifier_input), + ]; + let constants: RoundConstants = + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_vectorized_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + VECTOR_LEN, + >(inputs, &constants, 0); + let pis = public_values(action, round, leaf_output, nullifier_output); + let config = make_config(); + + // Plonky3 runs `check_constraints` inside `prove` only under + // `debug_assertions` (p3-uni-stark 0.6.2, prover.rs:39). In debug it + // panics on this trace; in RELEASE it does not, and emits a proof. + // This test used to assert only the panic, which made it vacuous in + // the profile that actually ships. The claim that holds in both + // profiles, and the only one soundness rests on, is that no such + // proof verifies — so that is what is asserted here. + let attempt = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis) + })); + match attempt { + Err(_) => { /* debug: the prover refused to build it at all */ } + Ok(proof) => assert!( + !verify_binding( + &BindingProof { inner: proof }, + action, + round, + leaf_output, + nullifier_output + ), + "a trace whose two blocks use DIFFERENT secrets produced a proof \ + that verified: the shared-secret constraint is not binding" + ), + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_proof_survives_a_byte_round_trip() { + // The wire format an on-chain verifier actually reads: serialize, + // deserialize, and confirm the round-tripped proof still verifies + // against the same public values, exactly as the original did. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = prove_binding(s, action, round); + let bytes = proof.to_bytes(); + eprintln!("BindingProof serialized size: {} bytes", bytes.len()); + let round_tripped = BindingProof::from_bytes(&bytes).expect("valid bytes must deserialize"); + assert!( + verify_binding(&round_tripped, action, round, leaf, nullifier), + "a proof must still verify after a to_bytes/from_bytes round trip" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn garbage_bytes_do_not_deserialize_into_a_proof() { + let garbage = [0xFFu8; 64]; + assert!(BindingProof::from_bytes(&garbage).is_none(), "malformed bytes must not parse as a proof"); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/crowd.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/crowd.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2f7026a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/crowd.rs @@ -0,0 +1,866 @@ +//! Hidden in the crowd: the composition moves from the public leaf to a +//! commitment, and two uses of one credential stop being linkable. +//! +//! `docs/PRIVACY.md` (riverrun-soroban) has said from the start that +//! witness-hiding alone is half the fix: the binding and membership proofs +//! were composed by a PUBLIC leaf value, so an observer could link every use +//! of a credential through that value even once the witnesses were hidden. +//! This module is the second half. Both relations now publish +//! +//! ```text +//! C = compress(leaf, blinder) = permute(leaf ‖ blinder)[0..8] +//! ``` +//! +//! in place of the leaf, with a fresh random `blinder` per use, and the +//! composition compares commitments. The leaf appears in no public input of +//! either proof. +//! +//! ## How each relation grows a commitment +//! +//! **Binding** (`CrowdBindingAir`): the vectorized row gains a third +//! permutation block, `permute(leaf_out[0..8] ‖ blinder)`. Same-row equality +//! ties the block's first eight inputs to the leaf block's first eight +//! outputs, and the block's first eight outputs to the public `C`. The +//! blinder cells are private witness. Public inputs shrink from +//! `action ‖ round ‖ leaf(16) ‖ nullifier(16)` to +//! `action ‖ round ‖ C(8) ‖ nullifier(16)`: the nullifier stays public +//! because consensus burns it; the leaf is gone. +//! +//! **Membership** (`CrowdMembershipAir`): the commitment IS one `compress`, +//! which is exactly what every row of this AIR already computes. Row 0 +//! becomes the commitment row: `permute(leaf ‖ blinder)` with its truncated +//! output constrained to the public `C`. A boolean `is_commit` column (1 on +//! row 0, forced 0 everywhere else by transition constraints) masks the fold +//! continuity constraint on the commitment row, and a first-row constraint +//! links the fold's start to the commitment row's own `inputs[0..8]`, the +//! private leaf. One commit row plus 31 fold levels fills the 32-row trace +//! exactly: a 2^31-leaf tree, and the hiding margin (`rows >= queries + 3`) +//! still holds at 20 queries. +//! +//! ## What "unlinkable" claims, exactly +//! +//! - `C` is binding up to collisions of the Poseidon2 compression and hiding +//! under the usual random-oracle/PRF-style assumption on the permutation +//! with a uniform 248-bit blinder. Neither property is information +//! theoretic, and neither has a bespoke security proof here. +//! - Unlinkability is across USES (fresh blinder, fresh `C`). The nullifier +//! is still linkable within a round by design; that is what prevents double +//! spends. +//! - Both proofs of one use must share the same `(leaf, blinder)` pair, or +//! their `C`s differ and [`verify_crowd`] rejects. +//! - The two relations remain two proofs composed by a shared public value +//! (now `C` instead of the leaf), not one fused trace. On-chain they are +//! two transactions whose public `C`s can be compared by anyone, including +//! a pool contract. +//! - Everything inherits `zk.rs`'s hiding claims: statistical ZK, and the +//! prover-side RNG in tests is NOT cryptographic (a production caller must +//! seed blinder, blinding polynomials and salts from system entropy). + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::borrow::Borrow; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::{ + GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31, Mersenne31, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, +}; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{ + generate_trace_rows, generate_vectorized_trace_rows, num_cols, Poseidon2Air, Poseidon2Cols, + RoundConstants, VectorizedPoseidon2Air, +}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, SubAirBuilder}; + +use crate::binding::{CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; +use crate::membership::{compress, PathStep, DIGEST_LEN}; +use crate::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; +use crate::zk::{Seed, make_zk_config_tuned, ZkConfig}; + +const SBOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; +const SBOX_REGISTERS: usize = 0; +const HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; +const PARTIAL_ROUNDS: usize = 14; + +type Val = Mersenne31; +type LinearLayers = GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31; +type Cols = + Poseidon2Cols; + +/// Blinder width: 8 M31 limbs, 248 bits of commitment randomness. +pub const BLINDER_LEN: usize = DIGEST_LEN; + +/// Tree depth of the crowd membership proof: 127 fold levels, because row 0 of +/// the 128-row trace is the commitment row. A 2^127-leaf tree. +/// +/// The height is set by TWO arguments, not by ambition about tree sizes, and +/// the second of them is why this is 128 rather than 64. +/// +/// Theorem B (`examples/hiding_theory.rs`) makes surjectivity of the blinding +/// map unconditional exactly when the verifier learns at most `N/2` +/// evaluations per column. This AIR has transition constraints, so +/// `k = Q + 2`, and at 12 queries that needs only `N >= 28`. +/// +/// The binding constraint is the FRI phase (`examples/fri_zk_budget.rs`). +/// Folding is linear, so every scalar the verifier sees there is a linear +/// functional of the batch polynomial, and the blinding available to hide them +/// is `3N` — the per-column blinders collapse to `N` under the alpha +/// reduction, plus `2N` from the randomisation polynomial. The observations +/// are `Q * (log2(2N) + log_blowup)`. At 64 rows and this configuration the +/// margin is thin; at 128 it is `384 - 180 = 204`. A NEGATIVE margin is +/// conclusive in the bad direction: fewer blinding dimensions than observed +/// scalars means a functional of the witness survives into the transcript. +/// +/// The 2^127-leaf anonymity set is a consequence of that count, not a target. +pub const CROWD_DEPTH: usize = 127; + +fn constants() -> RoundConstants { + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ) +} + +fn single_width() -> usize { + num_cols::() +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Binding with a committed leaf. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Three permutations per row: leaf, nullifier, commitment. +const CROWD_VECTOR_LEN: usize = 3; + +type CrowdInnerAir = VectorizedPoseidon2Air< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + CROWD_VECTOR_LEN, +>; + +/// The binding AIR with the leaf behind a commitment. Block 0 computes the +/// leaf, block 1 the nullifier (sharing block 0's secret cells, the binding), +/// block 2 the commitment `permute(leaf_out[0..8] ‖ blinder)`. Public inputs: +/// `action ‖ round ‖ C(8) ‖ nullifier(16)`. The leaf and the blinder are +/// private witness only. +struct CrowdBindingAir { + inner: CrowdInnerAir, +} + +impl CrowdBindingAir { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { inner: CrowdInnerAir::new(constants()) } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for CrowdBindingAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.width() + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + 2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN + DIGEST_LEN + } +} + +impl> Air for CrowdBindingAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + self.inner.eval(builder); + + let main = builder.main(); + let full = main.current_slice(); + let w = single_width(); + let block0: &Cols = full[..w].borrow(); + let block1: &Cols = full[w..2 * w].borrow(); + let block2: &Cols = full[2 * w..3 * w].borrow(); + + let pis: Vec = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + // pis layout: action | round | C(8) | nullifier(8) + // + // The nullifier is the permutation output TRUNCATED to a digest, for + // the same reason the leaf is. Publishing all sixteen limbs published + // the witness: pi is a bijection and `round` is public beside it, so + // (secret || round) = pi^-1(nullifier) recovered the secret outright. + // See docs/NULLIFIER-BREAK.md. + let action = &pis[0..CONTEXT_LEN]; + let round = &pis[CONTEXT_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN]; + let c = &pis[2 * CONTEXT_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN]; + let nullifier = &pis[2 * CONTEXT_LEN + DIGEST_LEN..2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * DIGEST_LEN]; + + let block0_output = &block0.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + let block1_output = &block1.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + let block2_output = &block2.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + + for i in 0..CONTEXT_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block0.inputs[SECRET_LEN + i].into(), action[i].into()); + builder.assert_eq(block1.inputs[SECRET_LEN + i].into(), round[i].into()); + } + // The binding: one secret drives both the leaf and the nullifier. + for i in 0..SECRET_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block0.inputs[i].into(), block1.inputs[i].into()); + } + // The nullifier stays public: consensus burns it. + for i in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block1_output[i].into(), nullifier[i].into()); + } + // The commitment block: its input is the (private) leaf digest, its + // truncated output is the public C. The blinder cells + // (inputs[DIGEST_LEN..]) are deliberately unconstrained witness. + for i in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.assert_eq(block2.inputs[i].into(), block0_output[i].into()); + builder.assert_eq(block2_output[i].into(), c[i].into()); + } + } +} + +/// log2 of the quotient-chunk count for [`CrowdBindingAir`] under ZK, pinned +/// like every other verifier constant in this crate (no symbolic pass in the +/// wasm verifier); guarded by +/// `the_pinned_crowd_chunk_counts_match_the_symbolic_pass`. +pub const CROWD_BINDING_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 3; + +/// A hiding binding proof whose leaf is behind the commitment `C`. +pub struct CrowdBindingProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl CrowdBindingProof { + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove the binding relation with the leaf committed: returns the proof, the +/// public commitment `C`, and the nullifier. The leaf digest itself is +/// returned too so the caller can feed the SAME `(leaf, blinder)` pair to +/// [`prove_membership_crowd`]; it appears in no public input. +/// +/// # Panics +/// If the trace is too short for the unconditional hiding guarantee, or if +/// `log_rows < 2`. +/// +/// The margin is `2^log_rows >= 2 * (num_queries + 1)`, not the `+ 2` a naive +/// count suggests, and the factor of two is Theorem B in +/// `examples/hiding_theory.rs`: evaluation of the blinder space at `k` points +/// is surjective **unconditionally** when `k <= N/2`, with no genericity +/// assumption and no rank computation. Above `N/2` the deficiency is still at +/// most one (Theorem C), but whether it is zero becomes a property of the +/// particular points the verifier happens to query, decidable only by +/// computing a rank. Here `k = num_queries + 1`: one evaluation per FRI query +/// row plus the out-of-domain point, this AIR having no transition +/// constraints. Costed before adopting: 3% more CPU and 7% more envelope than +/// the `+ 2` margin, to trade a computation for a proof. +#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)] +pub fn prove_binding_crowd( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + log_rows: usize, + seed: Seed, +) -> (CrowdBindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + assert!(log_rows >= 2, "CirclePcs cannot commit to fewer than 4 rows"); + assert!( + (1usize << log_rows) >= 2 * (num_queries + 1), + "hiding is unconditional only below half the blinder's dimension: \ + need 2^log_rows >= 2 * (num_queries + 1), see Theorem B in \ + examples/hiding_theory.rs" + ); + let leaf_input = pack(secret, action); + let nullifier_input = pack(secret, round); + let leaf_output = permute(leaf_input); + let leaf_digest: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf_output[i]); + let nullifier_full = permute(nullifier_input); + // Truncated for the same reason the leaf is: the full state IS the + // witness once pi is inverted. See docs/NULLIFIER-BREAK.md. + let nullifier_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| nullifier_full[i]); + let commit_input = pack_digest(leaf_digest, blinder); + let c = compress(leaf_digest, blinder); + + let rows = 1usize << log_rows; + let mut inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = Vec::with_capacity(CROWD_VECTOR_LEN * rows); + for _ in 0..rows { + inputs.push(to_field(leaf_input)); + inputs.push(to_field(nullifier_input)); + inputs.push(to_field(commit_input)); + } + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_vectorized_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + CROWD_VECTOR_LEN, + >(inputs, &constants(), 0); + + let air = CrowdBindingAir::new(); + let pis = binding_public_values(action, round, c, nullifier_output); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, seed); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (CrowdBindingProof { inner: proof }, c, leaf_digest, nullifier_output) +} + +/// Verify a [`CrowdBindingProof`] against `action`, `round`, the public +/// commitment `c`, and the public `nullifier`. No leaf anywhere. +pub fn verify_binding_crowd( + proof: &CrowdBindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + c: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = CrowdBindingAir::new(); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, Seed::reproducible(0)); + let pis = binding_public_values(action, round, c, nullifier); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + CROWD_BINDING_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +fn binding_public_values( + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + c: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], +) -> Vec { + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(2 * CONTEXT_LEN + 2 * DIGEST_LEN); + pis.extend((0..CONTEXT_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(action[i]))); + pis.extend((0..CONTEXT_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(round[i]))); + pis.extend((0..DIGEST_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(c[i]))); + pis.extend((0..DIGEST_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(nullifier[i]))); + pis +} + +fn pack(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], context: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..SECRET_LEN].copy_from_slice(&secret); + out[SECRET_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&context); + out +} + +fn pack_digest(left: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], right: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&left); + out[DIGEST_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&right); + out +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Membership with a committed leaf. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +type MemInnerAir = Poseidon2Air< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, +>; + +/// The membership AIR with the leaf behind a commitment. Row layout: +/// `[poseidon columns | bit | is_commit]`. Row 0 is the commitment row +/// (`is_commit = 1`, forced 0 on every other row by transition constraints): +/// it computes `permute(leaf ‖ blinder)`, its truncated output is the public +/// `C`, and its `inputs[0..8]` (the private leaf) seed the fold via a +/// first-row link to row 1's selected node. Rows 1..=CROWD_DEPTH fold to the +/// public root; the fold-continuity constraint is masked on the commitment +/// row by `(1 - is_commit)`. +struct CrowdMembershipAir { + inner: MemInnerAir, +} + +impl CrowdMembershipAir { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { inner: MemInnerAir::new(constants()) } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for CrowdMembershipAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + single_width() + 2 + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + 2 * DIGEST_LEN + } +} + +impl> Air for CrowdMembershipAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let w = single_width(); + + let mut sub: SubAirBuilder = SubAirBuilder::new(builder, 0..w); + self.inner.eval(&mut sub); + + let main = builder.main(); + let current = main.current_slice(); + let next = main.next_slice(); + + let poseidon: &Cols = current[..w].borrow(); + let poseidon_next: &Cols = next[..w].borrow(); + let bit: AB::Expr = current[w].clone().into(); + let bit_next: AB::Expr = next[w].clone().into(); + let is_commit: AB::Expr = current[w + 1].clone().into(); + let is_commit_next: AB::Expr = next[w + 1].clone().into(); + + // Both selector columns are boolean. + builder.assert_zero(bit.clone() * (AB::Expr::ONE - bit)); + builder.assert_zero(is_commit.clone() * (AB::Expr::ONE - is_commit.clone())); + // is_commit is 1 exactly on row 0. + builder.when_first_row().assert_eq(is_commit.clone(), AB::Expr::ONE); + builder.when_transition().assert_zero(is_commit_next); + + let output = &poseidon.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + + let pis: Vec = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + let c = &pis[0..DIGEST_LEN]; + let root = &pis[DIGEST_LEN..2 * DIGEST_LEN]; + + let selected_node = |cols: &Cols, bit: AB::Expr| -> Vec { + (0..DIGEST_LEN) + .map(|j| { + let left: AB::Expr = cols.inputs[j].into(); + let right: AB::Expr = cols.inputs[DIGEST_LEN + j].into(); + (AB::Expr::ONE - bit.clone()) * left + bit.clone() * right + }) + .collect() + }; + let next_node = selected_node(poseidon_next, bit_next); + + // Commitment row: its truncated output is the public C, and its + // inputs[0..8] (the private leaf; inputs[8..16] are the private + // blinder, deliberately unconstrained) seed the fold on row 1. + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.when_first_row().assert_eq(output[j].into(), c[j].into()); + builder + .when_first_row() + .assert_eq(next_node[j].clone(), poseidon.inputs[j].into()); + } + + // Fold continuity everywhere except leaving the commitment row (that + // hop is governed by the first-row link above). + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.when_transition().assert_zero( + (AB::Expr::ONE - is_commit.clone()) * (next_node[j].clone() - output[j].into()), + ); + } + + // Last row: the fold reached the public root. + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder.when_last_row().assert_eq(output[j].into(), root[j].into()); + } + } +} + +/// log2 of the quotient-chunk count for [`CrowdMembershipAir`] under ZK, +/// pinned and test-guarded like its siblings. +pub const CROWD_MEMBERSHIP_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 3; + +/// A hiding membership proof whose leaf is behind the commitment `C`. +pub struct CrowdMembershipProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl CrowdMembershipProof { + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove membership with the leaf committed: `leaf` sits under the returned +/// root via the private `path`, and `C = compress(leaf, blinder)` is the only +/// leaf-derived public value. Feed the same `(leaf, blinder)` as +/// [`prove_binding_crowd`] so the two `C`s match. +/// +/// # Panics +/// If the trace is unsatisfiable, or if the 32-row height violates the +/// hiding margin (`32 >= num_queries + 3`). +pub fn prove_membership_crowd( + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + blinder: [u64; BLINDER_LEN], + path: &[PathStep; CROWD_DEPTH], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + seed: Seed, +) -> (CrowdMembershipProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let rows = CROWD_DEPTH + 1; + assert!(rows.is_power_of_two(), "commit row + CROWD_DEPTH fold rows must fill a power of two"); + assert!( + rows >= 2 * (num_queries + 2), + "hiding is unconditional only below half the blinder's dimension: this \ + AIR has transition constraints so the verifier also sees zeta_next, \ + giving k = num_queries + 2 and requiring rows >= 2k. See Theorem B in \ + examples/hiding_theory.rs" + ); + + let c = compress(leaf, blinder); + + // Row 0: the commitment permutation. Rows 1..: the fold. + let mut inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = Vec::with_capacity(rows); + let mut bits = Vec::with_capacity(rows); + inputs.push(to_field(pack_digest(leaf, blinder))); + bits.push(false); + let mut node = leaf; + for step in path.iter() { + let (left, right) = + if step.node_on_right { (step.sibling, node) } else { (node, step.sibling) }; + inputs.push(to_field(pack_digest(left, right))); + bits.push(step.node_on_right); + node = compress(left, right); + } + let root = node; + + let poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + >(inputs, &constants(), 0); + let trace = append_selector_columns(poseidon_trace, &bits); + + let air = CrowdMembershipAir::new(); + let pis = membership_public_values(c, root); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, seed); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (CrowdMembershipProof { inner: proof }, c, root) +} + +/// Verify a [`CrowdMembershipProof`] against the public commitment `c` and +/// `root`. No leaf anywhere. +pub fn verify_membership_crowd( + proof: &CrowdMembershipProof, + c: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = CrowdMembershipAir::new(); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, Seed::reproducible(0)); + let pis = membership_public_values(c, root); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + CROWD_MEMBERSHIP_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +fn membership_public_values(c: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> Vec { + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(2 * DIGEST_LEN); + pis.extend((0..DIGEST_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(c[i]))); + pis.extend((0..DIGEST_LEN).map(|i| Val::from_u64(root[i]))); + pis +} + +/// Append the `bit` and `is_commit` columns: `is_commit` is 1 on row 0 only. +fn append_selector_columns( + poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix, + bits: &[bool], +) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let width = poseidon_trace.width; + let rows = bits.len(); + let mut values = Vec::with_capacity((width + 2) * rows); + for (i, (row, bit)) in poseidon_trace.values.chunks(width).zip(bits.iter()).enumerate() { + values.extend_from_slice(row); + values.push(if *bit { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + values.push(if i == 0 { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, width + 2) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// The composition. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The full crowd statement, composed over the commitment: BOTH proofs verify +/// AND they publish the same `C`. An anonymous, unlinkable use of one +/// credential: "some member of the tree under `root` performed `action` in +/// `round`, and here is the nullifier consensus should burn" — with no +/// leaf-shaped value linking this use to any other. +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +pub fn verify_crowd( + binding: &CrowdBindingProof, + membership: &CrowdMembershipProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + c: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +) -> bool { + verify_binding_crowd(binding, action, round, c, nullifier, num_queries, log_blowup) + && verify_membership_crowd(membership, c, root, num_queries, log_blowup) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + #[allow(unused_imports)] + use crate::zk::Seed; + + const Q: usize = 12; + const LOG_B: usize = 7; + /// 128 rows and 12 queries at blowup 128: the configuration that clears + /// BOTH budgets at once. Theorem B wants `N >= 2k`; the FRI dimension + /// count wants `3N >= Q * (log2(2N) + log_blowup)`. See + /// `examples/hiding_theory.rs` and `examples/fri_zk_budget.rs`. + const LOG_ROWS: usize = 7; + + fn secret(byte: u64) -> [u64; SECRET_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 1000 + i as u64) + } + + fn context(byte: u64) -> [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 2000 + i as u64) + } + + fn blinder(byte: u64) -> [u64; BLINDER_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 7000 + i as u64) + } + + fn sample_path(leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> ([PathStep; CROWD_DEPTH], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let path: [PathStep; CROWD_DEPTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| PathStep { + sibling: core::array::from_fn(|j| (i as u64 + 1) * 4000 + j as u64), + node_on_right: i % 3 == 1, + }); + let mut node = leaf; + for step in &path { + node = if step.node_on_right { + compress(step.sibling, node) + } else { + compress(node, step.sibling) + }; + } + (path, node) + } + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_crowd_chunk_counts_match_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(4, 1, Seed::reproducible(0)); + assert_eq!(config.is_zk(), 1); + + let air = CrowdBindingAir::new(); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!(CROWD_BINDING_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed); + + let air = CrowdMembershipAir::new(); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!(CROWD_MEMBERSHIP_LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed); + } + + #[test] + fn the_full_crowd_statement_proves_and_verifies() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let b = blinder(1); + let (bproof, c, leaf_digest, nullifier) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, round, b, Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let (path, _) = sample_path(leaf_digest); + let (mproof, c2, root) = prove_membership_crowd(leaf_digest, b, &path, Q, LOG_B, Seed::reproducible(43)); + assert_eq!(c, c2, "same (leaf, blinder) must commit identically in both relations"); + assert!( + verify_crowd(&bproof, &mproof, action, round, c, nullifier, root, Q, LOG_B), + "the composed crowd statement must verify" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_tampered_commitment_is_rejected_by_both_relations() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let b = blinder(1); + let (bproof, c, leaf_digest, nullifier) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, round, b, Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let (path, _) = sample_path(leaf_digest); + let (mproof, _, root) = prove_membership_crowd(leaf_digest, b, &path, Q, LOG_B, Seed::reproducible(43)); + let mut wrong_c = c; + wrong_c[0] ^= 1; + assert!(!verify_binding_crowd(&bproof, action, round, wrong_c, nullifier, Q, LOG_B)); + assert!(!verify_membership_crowd(&mproof, wrong_c, root, Q, LOG_B)); + } + + #[test] + fn different_blinders_break_the_composition_as_they_must() { + // Two proofs about the same leaf but with different blinders publish + // different Cs: the composition rejects, which is exactly the rule + // that forces one (leaf, blinder) pair per use. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (bproof, c_b, leaf_digest, nullifier) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, round, blinder(1), Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let (path, _) = sample_path(leaf_digest); + let (mproof, c_m, root) = + prove_membership_crowd(leaf_digest, blinder(2), &path, Q, LOG_B, Seed::reproducible(43)); + assert_ne!(c_b, c_m); + assert!( + !verify_crowd(&bproof, &mproof, action, round, c_b, nullifier, root, Q, LOG_B), + "mismatched blinders must not compose" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn two_uses_of_one_credential_are_not_linkable_through_public_values() { + // The unlinkability claim, stated as a test: the same member, two + // uses (fresh blinder each), and the two binding proofs share NO + // public value except action/round chosen by the protocol. The + // commitments differ; the leaf appears nowhere. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let (b1, c1, _, n1) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, context(10), blinder(1), Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let (b2, c2, _, n2) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, context(11), blinder(2), Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(43)); + assert_ne!(c1, c2, "fresh blinders must yield different commitments"); + assert_ne!(n1, n2, "different rounds must yield different nullifiers"); + assert!(verify_binding_crowd(&b1, action, context(10), c1, n1, Q, LOG_B)); + assert!(verify_binding_crowd(&b2, action, context(11), c2, n2, Q, LOG_B)); + } + + #[test] + fn a_forged_membership_for_a_different_leaf_under_the_same_c_fails() { + // The binding property of C, exercised end to end: a prover who knows + // C (public) but not (leaf, blinder) cannot open it to a different + // leaf. We simulate the strongest cheap attacker: reuse the real + // blinder with a different leaf; the commitment row then computes a + // different C and the proof verifies only against THAT C, not ours. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let b = blinder(1); + let (_, c, leaf_digest, _) = + prove_binding_crowd(s, action, round, b, Q, LOG_B, LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let other_leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| 9000 + i as u64); + assert_ne!(other_leaf, leaf_digest); + let (path, _) = sample_path(other_leaf); + let (forged, forged_c, forged_root) = + prove_membership_crowd(other_leaf, b, &path, Q, LOG_B, Seed::reproducible(44)); + assert_ne!(forged_c, c); + assert!( + !verify_membership_crowd(&forged, c, forged_root, Q, LOG_B), + "a membership proof for a different leaf must not verify against our C" + ); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod canonicity { + use super::*; + #[allow(unused_imports)] + use crate::zk::Seed; + + /// `Val::from_u64` reduces modulo p, so two DIFFERENT byte encodings of + /// the public values are the SAME field elements and one proof verifies + /// against both. Any verifier that keys storage on the raw bytes — every + /// nullifier burn in the Soroban contracts does — must therefore refuse + /// non-canonical limbs, or a spent proof replays under a re-encoded + /// nullifier. That double spend was confirmed on testnet before the + /// contracts gained the check. + /// + /// This test pins the fact the check depends on. If a future field + /// implementation ever rejected out-of-range input instead of reducing, + /// this fails and the contract-side check can be revisited. + #[test] + fn from_u64_reduces_so_noncanonical_encodings_collide() { + const P: u64 = (1 << 31) - 1; + assert_eq!( + Val::from_u64(5), + Val::from_u64(5 + P), + "v and v + p must be the same field element; the contracts' \ + canonicity checks exist because of this" + ); + assert_ne!(5u64, 5 + P, "but their byte encodings differ, which is the hole"); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/hiding.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/hiding.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f151102c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/hiding.rs @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +//! Pricing witness-hiding for the binding relation, with the parts that can +//! be built correctly today actually built. +//! +//! `docs/PRIVACY.md` in riverrun-soroban establishes the problem: `CirclePcs` +//! is a non-hiding commitment, so the query openings of a 4-row trace +//! interpolate the witness straight back. Plonky3 ships the cure only for +//! two-adic fields (`HidingFriPcs` wraps `TwoAdicFriPcs`), which Mersenne-31 +//! cannot use. +//! +//! A hiding configuration for this relation needs four things: +//! +//! 1. a **salted MMCS**, so an opened Merkle leaf commits to nothing an +//! adversary can test guesses against; +//! 2. a **trace taller than the query count**, so the openings cannot pin the +//! polynomial down; +//! 3. **random rows/columns** carrying the entropy that blinds those openings; +//! 4. the **interleaving composition** that makes the random rows part of the +//! committed polynomial while keeping constraints on the real rows only, +//! plus the randomization-polynomial commitment the ZK prover path opens. +//! +//! This module builds 1, 2 and 3 for real: the config below swaps in +//! `MerkleTreeHidingMmcs` with 4 Mersenne-31 salt elements per leaf (124 bits), +//! proves over a caller-chosen trace height, and pads the trace with random +//! columns. What it does NOT build is 4, and that omission is the difference +//! between a cost model and a private proof. +//! +//! **So this is not a hiding proof and must never be presented as one.** It is +//! an instrument for one question the roadmap depends on: does the verification +//! cost of the hiding machinery fit in a single Stellar transaction? Items 1-3 +//! are where that cost lives (bigger leaves to hash, taller trees to walk, +//! wider rows to open); item 4 adds one more commitment and its openings. +//! +//! Why 4 is not attempted here: the interleaving trick in `HidingFriPcs` puts +//! the real trace on the even indices of a doubled domain, which works because +//! the even powers of a multiplicative group of order `2h` are a subgroup of +//! order `h`. Circle domains do not decompose that way under natural order, +//! so porting it is a design question about circle-domain structure, not a +//! transcription. Shipping a "hiding" mode whose hiding argument had not been +//! worked out would be worse than shipping none. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeHidingMmcs; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{generate_vectorized_trace_rows, RoundConstants}; +use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, SerializingHasher}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig}; +/// A tiny SplitMix64 the salted MMCS can own. p3-merkle-tree needs an RNG +/// that is `Rng + Clone + Send` in rand 0.10's traits; rand's own generators +/// arrive either behind std features or without `Clone`, and this instrument +/// only needs salts whose cost is representative and whose measurements +/// reproduce. It is deliberately NOT cryptographic: a real hiding deployment +/// must seed a CSPRNG from system entropy, since these salts are what stop an +/// adversary from testing guesses against an opened leaf. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct SplitMix64(u64); + +impl SplitMix64 { + pub const fn seed_from_u64(seed: u64) -> Self { + Self(seed) + } + + fn next(&mut self) -> u64 { + self.0 = self.0.wrapping_add(0x9E3779B97F4A7C15); + let mut z = self.0; + z = (z ^ (z >> 30)).wrapping_mul(0xBF58476D1CE4E5B9); + z = (z ^ (z >> 27)).wrapping_mul(0x94D049BB133111EB); + z ^ (z >> 31) + } +} + +impl rand10::TryRng for SplitMix64 { + type Error = core::convert::Infallible; + + fn try_next_u32(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(self.next() as u32) + } + + fn try_next_u64(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(self.next()) + } + + fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dst: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error> { + for chunk in dst.chunks_mut(8) { + let bytes = self.next().to_le_bytes(); + chunk.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..chunk.len()]); + } + Ok(()) + } +} + +use crate::binding::{ + public_values_for_hiding, BindingAir, CONTEXT_LEN, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, SECRET_LEN, +}; +use crate::membership::DIGEST_LEN; +use crate::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; + +type Val = Mersenne31; +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; + +/// Salt elements per Merkle leaf. Four Mersenne-31 elements carry 124 bits, +/// the usual target for a commitment salt. +const SALT_ELEMS: usize = 4; + +type HidingValMmcs = + MerkleTreeHidingMmcs<::Packing, u8, FieldHash, Compress, SplitMix64, 2, 32, SALT_ELEMS>; +type HidingChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type HidingPcs = CirclePcs; +type HidingConfig = StarkConfig; + +/// A proof carrying the hiding machinery's cost: salted Merkle leaves over a +/// caller-chosen trace height. Not a hiding proof (see the module doc). +pub struct HidingCostProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl HidingCostProof { + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } +} + +/// The salted-MMCS counterpart of `binding::make_config_tuned`. The RNG seeds +/// the leaf salts on the prover; the verifier constructs the same type and +/// never draws from it, so a fixed seed here is not a security parameter. +fn make_hiding_config(num_queries: usize) -> HidingConfig { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = HidingValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0, SplitMix64::seed_from_u64(0)); + let challenge_mmcs = HidingChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = HidingPcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData, + }; + StarkConfig::new(pcs, Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash)) +} + +/// Prove the binding relation with the hiding machinery's costs in place: +/// salted Merkle leaves, a trace of `2^log_rows` rows, and `random_cols` +/// random columns appended to every row. +/// +/// The random columns are unconstrained by `BindingAir` (its constraints +/// address named columns), so they cost what blinding columns would cost +/// without pretending to blind anything on their own. +pub fn prove_binding_hiding_cost( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_rows: usize, + random_cols: usize, +) -> (HidingCostProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + assert!(log_rows >= 2, "CirclePcs cannot commit to fewer than 4 rows"); + let leaf_input = pack(secret, action); + let nullifier_input = pack(secret, round); + // Truncated to digests: the full permutation state IS the witness once + // pi is inverted, and the context is public beside it. + let leaf_full = permute(leaf_input); + let nullifier_full = permute(nullifier_input); + let leaf_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf_full[i]); + let nullifier_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| nullifier_full[i]); + + let repeats = 1usize << log_rows; + let mut inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = Vec::with_capacity(2 * repeats); + for _ in 0..repeats { + inputs.push(to_field(leaf_input)); + inputs.push(to_field(nullifier_input)); + } + let constants: RoundConstants = RoundConstants::new( + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = + generate_vectorized_trace_rows::( + inputs, + &constants, + 0, + ); + let trace = append_random_cols(trace, random_cols); + + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let pis = public_values_for_hiding(action, round, leaf_output, nullifier_output); + let config = make_hiding_config(num_queries); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (HidingCostProof { inner: proof }, leaf_output, nullifier_output) +} + +/// Verify a [`HidingCostProof`]. Same statement, same public values, same +/// query count as the production verifier; only the commitment machinery +/// differs, which is exactly what this measures. +pub fn verify_binding_hiding_cost( + proof: &HidingCostProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let config = make_hiding_config(num_queries); + let pis = public_values_for_hiding(action, round, leaf, nullifier); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +/// Append `n` pseudorandom columns to every row. Deterministic from a fixed +/// seed: this is a cost instrument, and reproducible measurements matter more +/// here than unpredictable padding would. +fn append_random_cols(trace: RowMajorMatrix, n: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + if n == 0 { + return trace; + } + let (h, w) = (trace.height(), trace.width()); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(h * (w + n)); + let mut state = 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15u64; + for r in 0..h { + for c in 0..w { + out.push(trace.get(r, c).unwrap()); + } + for _ in 0..n { + state = state.wrapping_mul(6364136223846793005).wrapping_add(1442695040888963407); + out.push(Val::from_u64((state >> 33) % ((1u64 << 31) - 1))); + } + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(out, w + n) +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn pack(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], context: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..SECRET_LEN].copy_from_slice(&secret); + out[SECRET_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&context); + out +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/keccak.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/keccak.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a8fc37f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/keccak.rs @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +//! keccak256 as the transcript / MMCS hash, routed to Solana's `keccak` +//! syscall on-chain and to `p3_keccak`'s software implementation everywhere +//! else. +//! +//! Why this exists, measured: with `p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash` (keccak-f +//! executed as ordinary SBF bytecode) the on-chain verification of a +//! 4-FRI-query `BindingProof` costs 6,170,726 CU — 4.4x Solana's 1.4M +//! per-transaction cap — and a Circle-STARK verifier is hash-dominated: +//! every Fiat-Shamir observation and every MMCS Merkle step is a keccak256 +//! call. Solana prices the same function as a syscall +//! (`sol_keccak256`) at a base of ~85 CU plus a small per-byte cost. +//! +//! This is a routing change, not a cryptographic one: both paths compute +//! standard keccak256, so prover (native) and verifier (SBF) produce the +//! same transcript. That equivalence is not merely asserted — it is enforced +//! end to end by Fiat-Shamir itself: if the two ever diverged on any byte, +//! the on-chain verifier's challenges would differ from the prover's and +//! every honest proof would be rejected. The on-chain acceptance test in +//! `programs/riverrun-m31-verifier/tests/cu.rs` is therefore also the +//! cross-implementation equivalence test. + +extern crate alloc; + +use p3_symmetric::CryptographicHasher; + +/// keccak256 with the same `CryptographicHasher` contract as +/// `p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash`, dispatched by target: Solana's keccak syscall +/// under `target_os = "solana"`, `p3_keccak`'s software keccak otherwise. +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)] +pub struct SolKeccak256; + +#[cfg(target_os = "solana")] +impl CryptographicHasher for SolKeccak256 { + fn hash_iter(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + let bytes: alloc::vec::Vec = input.into_iter().collect(); + solana_program::keccak::hashv(&[&bytes]).to_bytes() + } + + fn hash_iter_slices<'a, I>(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + let slices: alloc::vec::Vec<&[u8]> = input.into_iter().collect(); + solana_program::keccak::hashv(&slices).to_bytes() + } +} + +/// Soroban guest arm: route to the host's native `keccak256` (metered as one +/// cheap host-function call instead of thousands of metered wasm +/// instructions per keccak-f). Same standard keccak256 as every other arm; +/// the prover stays on software keccak, and Fiat-Shamir enforces that the +/// two implementations agree on every byte or every honest proof would be +/// rejected — the same equivalence argument (and test) as the Solana +/// syscall arm above. +#[cfg(all( + target_family = "wasm", + not(target_os = "solana"), + feature = "soroban-host-keccak" +))] +impl CryptographicHasher for SolKeccak256 { + fn hash_iter(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + let bytes: alloc::vec::Vec = input.into_iter().collect(); + soroban_host_keccak256(&bytes) + } + + fn hash_iter_slices<'a, I>(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + let mut bytes = alloc::vec::Vec::new(); + for s in input { + bytes.extend_from_slice(s); + } + soroban_host_keccak256(&bytes) + } +} + +#[cfg(all( + target_family = "wasm", + not(target_os = "solana"), + feature = "soroban-host-keccak" +))] +fn soroban_host_keccak256(bytes: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { + use soroban_env_common::{Env, U32Val}; + use soroban_env_guest::Guest; + + let g = Guest; + // Guest-side host errors trap the VM rather than returning, so these + // Results are infallible in practice; unwrap_or_else keeps this + // panic-message-free (no fmt machinery in the deployed wasm). + let input = g + .bytes_new_from_linear_memory( + U32Val::from(bytes.as_ptr() as u32), + U32Val::from(bytes.len() as u32), + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| core::arch::wasm32::unreachable()); + let digest = g + .compute_hash_keccak256(input) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| core::arch::wasm32::unreachable()); + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + g.bytes_copy_to_linear_memory( + digest, + U32Val::from(0), + U32Val::from(out.as_mut_ptr() as u32), + U32Val::from(32), + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| core::arch::wasm32::unreachable()); + out +} + +#[cfg(all( + not(target_os = "solana"), + not(all(target_family = "wasm", feature = "soroban-host-keccak")) +))] +impl CryptographicHasher for SolKeccak256 { + fn hash_iter(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + #[cfg(feature = "keccak-count")] + { + let bytes: alloc::vec::Vec = input.into_iter().collect(); + count::record(bytes.len()); + return p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter(bytes); + } + #[cfg(not(feature = "keccak-count"))] + p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter(input) + } + + fn hash_iter_slices<'a, I>(&self, input: I) -> [u8; 32] + where + I: IntoIterator, + { + #[cfg(feature = "keccak-count")] + { + let slices: alloc::vec::Vec<&[u8]> = input.into_iter().collect(); + count::record(slices.iter().map(|s| s.len()).sum()); + return p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter_slices(slices); + } + #[cfg(not(feature = "keccak-count"))] + p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter_slices(input) + } +} + +/// Measurement-only keccak call/byte accounting (`keccak-count` feature, std +/// targets only). Exists to size the win of routing keccak to a chain's native +/// hash (Solana syscall did 6.17M→fits; Soroban host function is the open +/// question this answers before any porting work). +#[cfg(feature = "keccak-count")] +pub mod count { + use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; + + static CALLS: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + static BYTES: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + + pub(crate) fn record(len: usize) { + CALLS.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + BYTES.fetch_add(len as u64, Ordering::Relaxed); + } + + /// (calls, total input bytes) since the last `reset`. + pub fn snapshot() -> (u64, u64) { + (CALLS.load(Ordering::Relaxed), BYTES.load(Ordering::Relaxed)) + } + + pub fn reset() { + CALLS.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed); + BYTES.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed); + } +} + +#[cfg(all(test, not(target_os = "solana")))] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn matches_the_software_keccak_it_replaces() { + let cases: [&[u8]; 4] = [b"", b"riverrun", &[0u8; 200], &[0xffu8; 31]]; + for case in cases { + assert_eq!( + SolKeccak256.hash_iter(case.iter().copied()), + p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter(case.iter().copied()), + ); + assert_eq!( + SolKeccak256.hash_iter_slices([case]), + p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash.hash_iter_slices([case]), + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..855ef61d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +//! riverrun's post-quantum M31 Circle-STARK path. +//! +//! Built entirely on the official Plonky3 crates (`p3-mersenne-31`, `p3-poseidon2`, +//! `p3-poseidon2-air`, `p3-circle`, `p3-fri`, `p3-uni-stark`), published on +//! crates.io under MIT OR Apache-2.0 by the Plonky3 project. This crate does not +//! vendor or copy any third-party source: it depends on these libraries the normal +//! way, the same as any other dependency in this workspace. +//! +//! `docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md` calls for a Circle STARK over Mersenne-31 whose +//! membership proof verifies in a single Solana transaction. The heavy machinery +//! (the field, the permutation, FRI, the circle-domain PCS) is already built and +//! vetted upstream; what riverrun adds is its own relation on top. `permutation` +//! is the first real step: prove and verify, end to end with a genuine +//! Circle-STARK proof, knowledge of a Poseidon2-M31 preimage. `binding` is the +//! second: prove a leaf and a nullifier share one secret (§1a + §1c). +//! `membership` is the third: prove a leaf digest sits under a public root via +//! a private authentication path (§1b). `relation` is the fourth: compose +//! `binding` and `membership` into the full relation via a shared public leaf +//! value, real, verified end to end, though as two separately-verified proofs +//! rather than one monolithic trace (see `relation`'s module doc for exactly +//! what that does and does not claim). No on-chain (SBF) verification of any +//! of this exists yet. + +// Bare-wasm targets (Soroban's `wasm32v1-none`) have no standard library at +// all, so the crate root must not pull one in. Every module here already runs +// on `core` + `alloc`; `test` keeps `std` because the test harness needs it. +#![cfg_attr(not(test), no_std)] + +extern crate alloc; + +pub mod binding; +pub mod keccak; +pub mod hiding; +pub mod membership; +pub mod permutation; +pub mod asp_history; +pub mod crowd; +pub mod relation; +pub mod zk; + +pub use binding::{ + prove_binding, prove_binding_tuned, prove_binding_tuned_rows, verify_binding, verify_binding_tuned, + verify_binding_tuned_checkpointed, BindingProof, CONTEXT_LEN, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, + SECRET_LEN, +}; +pub use membership::{compress, prove_membership, prove_membership_zk, verify_membership, verify_membership_zk, MembershipProof, PathStep, ZkMembershipProof, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN, ZK_DEPTH}; +pub use permutation::{permute, prove_preimage, verify_preimage, PreimageProof, WIDTH}; +pub use relation::{prove_full_relation, verify_full_relation, FullRelationProof}; +pub use crowd::{prove_binding_crowd, prove_membership_crowd, verify_binding_crowd, verify_crowd, verify_membership_crowd, CrowdBindingProof, CrowdMembershipProof, BLINDER_LEN, CROWD_DEPTH}; +pub use zk::{prove_binding_zk, verify_binding_zk, HidingCirclePcs, ZkBindingProof, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK}; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/membership.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/membership.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..04287951 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/membership.rs @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@ +//! Prove, as one Circle-STARK proof, that a leaf digest sits under a public +//! Merkle root. This is riverrun's §1b relation +//! (`docs/M31_CIRCLE_STARK.md`): a Poseidon2 compression function folded +//! `DEPTH` times, each level's node fed into the next, with a per-level bit +//! choosing left/right order. +//! +//! **The path is out of the PUBLIC INPUTS, which is not the same as hidden.** +//! `prove_membership` commits with a non-hiding MMCS over `CirclePcs`, whose +//! `ZK` flag is `false`. The siblings and the direction bits are trace cells, +//! and the FRI openings at 40 queries over a short trace interpolate that +//! trace — the same measurement `examples/privacy_audit.rs` makes for the +//! binding relation applies here. An observer who reads the proof recovers the +//! path. +//! +//! Only [`prove_membership_zk`] and the crowd variants in `crowd.rs` actually +//! hide it, by committing under `HidingCirclePcs`. This distinction was +//! documented backwards until an adversarial audit caught it +//! (`docs/AUDIT-2026-08-03.md`, M5), and the wording here is the correction, +//! not a softening: a reader who took "the authentication path stays hidden" +//! at face value for this function was misled. +//! +//! **Not yet fused with §1a/§1c** (`binding.rs`): this proves membership of a +//! given leaf digest independently. Combining "the leaf comes from this +//! secret" (binding.rs) with "this leaf sits under this root" (this module) +//! into one proof is real, separate integration work, not done here. +//! +//! **`DEPTH = 4` (a 16-leaf tree) is a small, concrete, provisional choice**, +//! picked because it is exactly CirclePcs's minimum committable row count +//! (no padding needed), not a production tree size. Scaling `DEPTH` up is +//! mechanical (more rows), not a design change. +//! +//! Digests here are 8 M31 elements (not the full `WIDTH = 16`), a compression +//! convention: `compress(left, right) = permute(left ‖ right)[0..8]`, the +//! standard "half the permutation's output is the digest" truncation. This is +//! a concrete choice, not a reviewed security argument, same honesty note as +//! `binding.rs`'s secret/context split. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::borrow::Borrow; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::{ + GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31, Mersenne31, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, +}; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{generate_trace_rows, num_cols, Poseidon2Air, Poseidon2Cols, RoundConstants}; +use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, SerializingHasher}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig, SubAirBuilder}; + +use crate::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; + +/// Digest width: half a permutation's output, the compression convention. +pub const DIGEST_LEN: usize = 8; +/// Tree depth this module proves against. See module docs: provisional, not +/// a production size, chosen to be CirclePcs's minimum row count exactly. +pub const DEPTH: usize = 4; + +const SBOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; +const SBOX_REGISTERS: usize = 0; +const HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; +const PARTIAL_ROUNDS: usize = 14; + +type Val = Mersenne31; +type LinearLayers = GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31; +type InnerAir = Poseidon2Air< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, +>; +type Cols = + Poseidon2Cols; + +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type Pcs = CirclePcs; +type Config = StarkConfig; + +fn constants() -> RoundConstants { + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ) +} + +fn single_width() -> usize { + num_cols::() +} + +/// riverrun's Merkle-fold AIR: internal correctness of each row's Poseidon2 +/// compression (delegated to `Poseidon2Air` via a column-windowed +/// `SubAirBuilder`, since this AIR's rows carry one extra `bit` column +/// `Poseidon2Air` does not know about), plus riverrun's own constraints: the +/// per-row left/right selection is a real bit, the first row's selected node +/// equals the public leaf, each row's output feeds the next row's selected +/// node, and the last row's output equals the public root. +struct MembershipAir { + inner: InnerAir, +} + +impl MembershipAir { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { inner: InnerAir::new(constants()) } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for MembershipAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + single_width() + 1 + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + 2 * DIGEST_LEN + } +} + +impl> Air for MembershipAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let width = single_width(); + + // The inner Poseidon2 AIR only knows about its own `width` columns; + // give it a windowed view so it never sees this AIR's extra `bit` + // column tacked on at the end of each row. + let mut sub: SubAirBuilder = SubAirBuilder::new(builder, 0..width); + self.inner.eval(&mut sub); + + let main = builder.main(); + let current = main.current_slice(); + let next = main.next_slice(); + + let poseidon: &Cols = current[..width].borrow(); + let poseidon_next: &Cols = next[..width].borrow(); + let bit: AB::Expr = current[width].clone().into(); + let bit_next: AB::Expr = next[width].clone().into(); + + // The selector must be boolean: bit * (1 - bit) == 0. + builder.assert_zero(bit.clone() * (AB::Expr::ONE - bit.clone())); + + let output = &poseidon.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + + let pis: Vec = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + let leaf = &pis[0..DIGEST_LEN]; + let root = &pis[DIGEST_LEN..2 * DIGEST_LEN]; + + // This row's canonical node: bit == 0 selects the left half of the + // permutation input as the node (sibling on the right); bit == 1 + // selects the right half (sibling on the left). + let selected_node = |cols: &Cols, bit: AB::Expr| -> Vec { + (0..DIGEST_LEN) + .map(|j| { + let left: AB::Expr = cols.inputs[j].into(); + let right: AB::Expr = cols.inputs[DIGEST_LEN + j].into(); + (AB::Expr::ONE - bit.clone()) * left + bit.clone() * right + }) + .collect() + }; + + let this_node = selected_node(poseidon, bit); + + // First row: the selected node is the public leaf. + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder + .when_first_row() + .assert_eq(this_node[j].clone(), leaf[j].into()); + } + + // Transition: the NEXT row's selected node must equal THIS row's + // output, the fold's continuity, the reason membership under the + // root, not just one hop, is what gets proven. + let next_node = selected_node(poseidon_next, bit_next); + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder + .when_transition() + .assert_eq(next_node[j].clone(), output[j].into()); + } + + // Last row: this row's output is the public root. + for j in 0..DIGEST_LEN { + builder + .when_last_row() + .assert_eq(output[j].into(), root[j].into()); + } + } +} + +fn make_config() -> Config { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs { mmcs: val_mmcs, fri_params, _phantom: PhantomData }; + let challenger = Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash); + Config::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn to_field8(input: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> [Val; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn pack16(left: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], right: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&left); + out[DIGEST_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&right); + out +} + +fn truncate8(output: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| output[i]) +} + +/// `compress(left, right) = permute(left ‖ right)[0..DIGEST_LEN]`, riverrun's +/// M31 Merkle node combiner, built from the same permutation `binding.rs` and +/// `permutation.rs` use. +pub fn compress(left: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], right: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + truncate8(permute(pack16(left, right))) +} + +/// One level of an authentication path: the sibling digest and whether the +/// leaf/current node is on the left (`false`) or right (`true`) at this level. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub struct PathStep { + pub sibling: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + pub node_on_right: bool, +} + +/// A real Circle-STARK proof that `leaf` sits under `root` via a private, +/// depth-`DEPTH` authentication path. +pub struct MembershipProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl MembershipProof { + /// log2 of the committed trace height, as recorded in the proof. See + /// [`crate::binding::BindingProof::degree_bits`]. + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + /// Serialize with `postcard`, the no_std wire format a bare-wasm verifier + /// (Soroban) reads from its host boundary. Same convention as + /// [`crate::binding::BindingProof::to_postcard`]. + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + /// Deserialize from bytes produced by [`MembershipProof::to_postcard`]. + /// `None` on malformed input; callers on-chain treat that as rejection. + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove that `leaf` sits under `root` following `path` (exactly `DEPTH` +/// steps). Panics if `path` does not actually fold `leaf` to `root` (the +/// trace generator would produce an unsatisfiable constraint set; callers +/// must supply a genuine path, mirroring `permutation.rs`'s documented +/// preimage-proving behavior). +pub fn prove_membership(leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], path: [PathStep; DEPTH]) -> (MembershipProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let (inputs, bits, root) = build_rows(leaf, path); + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + >(inputs, &constants(), 0); + let trace = append_bit_column(poseidon_trace, &bits); + + let pis = public_values(leaf, root); + let config = make_config(); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (MembershipProof { inner: proof }, root) +} + +/// log2 of the number of quotient chunks for [`MembershipAir`], pinned for the +/// same reason as `binding::LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS`: the symbolic pass that +/// derives it peaks at hundreds of KB of transient heap, past Solana's 256 KB +/// ceiling, and for a fixed AIR the value is a compile-time fact. Guarded by +/// the test `the_pinned_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass` below; +/// a wrong value rejects honest proofs, it never accepts forged ones. +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 2; + +/// Verify a [`MembershipProof`] against a claimed `leaf` and `root`. +pub fn verify_membership(proof: &MembershipProof, leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> bool { + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let config = make_config(); + let pis = public_values(leaf, root); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks(&config, &air, &proof.inner, &pis, None, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS) + .is_ok() +} + +fn public_values(leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> Vec { + let mut pis = Vec::with_capacity(2 * DIGEST_LEN); + pis.extend_from_slice(&to_field8(leaf)); + pis.extend_from_slice(&to_field8(root)); + pis +} + +/// Fold `leaf` through `path`, returning each level's real permutation input +/// (already ordered by `node_on_right`), each level's bit, and the resulting +/// root, so both the prover and tests can build a genuine, consistent trace. +fn build_rows( + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + path: [PathStep; DEPTH], +) -> (Vec<[Val; WIDTH]>, [bool; DEPTH], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + build_rows_depth::(leaf, &path) +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn append_bit_column(poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix, bits: &[bool; DEPTH]) -> RowMajorMatrix { + append_bit_column_depth::(poseidon_trace, bits) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// The hiding (ZK) membership variant. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Tree depth of the hiding membership proof: 32 levels, a 2^32-leaf tree. +/// +/// Not arbitrary, and not just "production-sized": hiding requires the +/// committed trace to carry more random degrees of freedom than the verifier +/// opens. This AIR has transition constraints, so the trace is opened at +/// `zeta` AND `zeta_next` on top of the FRI query rows: `rows >= queries + 3`. +/// At 20 queries the minimum power of two is 32, and since every trace row of +/// this AIR is one real fold level, rows ARE the tree depth. The hiding +/// requirement and a realistic anonymity set (2^32 leaves) meet at the same +/// number. `DEPTH = 4` stays untouched for the non-hiding path and the +/// existing contracts. +pub const ZK_DEPTH: usize = 32; + +/// log2 of the quotient-chunk count for [`MembershipAir`] under ZK, pinned +/// like [`LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS`] (the ZK path raises the constraint degree +/// by one). Guarded by +/// `the_pinned_zk_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass`. +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK: usize = 3; + +/// A hiding Circle-STARK proof that `leaf` sits under `root` via a private +/// 32-level authentication path: blinded trace commitment (`T' = T + Z_D*R`), +/// salted MMCS, randomized quotient chunks, randomization-polynomial round. +/// Same construction and same honesty scope as `zk.rs` (statistical ZK; the +/// leaf itself is still public). +pub struct ZkMembershipProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl ZkMembershipProof { + /// log2 of the committed (doubled) polynomial dimension. + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove membership hiding, over a [`ZK_DEPTH`]-level path. Same trace +/// construction as [`prove_membership`], taller; the hiding lives entirely in +/// the PCS. `rng_seed` feeds all prover-side randomness; production callers +/// MUST derive it from system entropy. +/// +/// # Panics +/// If the path does not fold `leaf` to a consistent root (unsatisfiable +/// trace), or if `ZK_DEPTH < num_queries + 3` (the hiding margin; see +/// [`ZK_DEPTH`]'s doc for the arithmetic). +pub fn prove_membership_zk( + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + path: &[PathStep; ZK_DEPTH], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + seed: crate::zk::Seed, +) -> (ZkMembershipProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + assert!( + ZK_DEPTH >= num_queries + 3, + "hiding needs more random degrees of freedom than opened evaluations \ + (queries + zeta + zeta_next): lower num_queries or raise ZK_DEPTH" + ); + let (inputs, bits, root) = build_rows_depth::(leaf, path); + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + >(inputs, &constants(), 0); + let trace = append_bit_column_depth::(poseidon_trace, &bits); + + let pis = public_values(leaf, root); + let config = crate::zk::make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, seed); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (ZkMembershipProof { inner: proof }, root) +} + +/// Verify a [`ZkMembershipProof`] against a claimed `leaf` and `root`. +pub fn verify_membership_zk( + proof: &ZkMembershipProof, + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let config = crate::zk::make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, crate::zk::Seed::reproducible(0)); + let pis = public_values(leaf, root); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +/// [`build_rows`] generalized over the path depth; the `DEPTH = 4` original +/// delegates here. +fn build_rows_depth( + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + path: &[PathStep; D], +) -> (Vec<[Val; WIDTH]>, [bool; D], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let mut node = leaf; + let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(D); + let mut bits = [false; D]; + for (i, step) in path.iter().enumerate() { + let (left, right) = + if step.node_on_right { (step.sibling, node) } else { (node, step.sibling) }; + inputs.push(to_field(pack16(left, right))); + bits[i] = step.node_on_right; + node = compress(left, right); + } + (inputs, bits, node) +} + +fn append_bit_column_depth( + poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix, + bits: &[bool; D], +) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let width = poseidon_trace.width; + let mut values = Vec::with_capacity((width + 1) * D); + for (row, bit) in poseidon_trace.values.chunks(width).zip(bits.iter()) { + values.extend_from_slice(row); + values.push(if *bit { Val::ONE } else { Val::ZERO }); + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, width + 1) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + #[allow(unused_imports)] + use crate::zk::Seed; + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_air::BaseAir; + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let config = make_config(); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!( + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed, + "the pinned constant must equal what the symbolic pass derives for this exact AIR; \ + if the AIR changed, re-pin the constant to the recomputed value" + ); + } + + fn leaf_value(byte: u64) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 3000 + i as u64) + } + + fn sibling(byte: u64) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 4000 + i as u64) + } + + /// Build a genuine depth-DEPTH path with concrete, distinct siblings and a + /// mixed left/right pattern, and fold it by hand (via `compress`) to get + /// the real root, so tests never assert against an invented root. + fn sample_path_and_root(leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) -> ([PathStep; DEPTH], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let path: [PathStep; DEPTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| PathStep { + sibling: sibling(i as u64 + 1), + node_on_right: i % 2 == 1, + }); + let mut node = leaf; + for step in &path { + node = if step.node_on_right { + compress(step.sibling, node) + } else { + compress(node, step.sibling) + }; + } + (path, node) + } + + #[test] + fn a_genuine_path_proves_and_verifies() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_path_and_root(leaf); + let (proof, proved_root) = prove_membership(leaf, path); + assert_eq!(proved_root, root, "the prover's computed root must match the hand-folded one"); + assert!(verify_membership(&proof, leaf, root), "a genuine path must verify"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_proof_does_not_verify_against_a_different_root() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_path_and_root(leaf); + let (proof, _) = prove_membership(leaf, path); + let mut wrong_root = root; + wrong_root[0] ^= 1; + assert!(!verify_membership(&proof, leaf, wrong_root), "must not verify against a tampered root"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_proof_does_not_verify_against_a_different_leaf() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_path_and_root(leaf); + let (proof, _) = prove_membership(leaf, path); + let other_leaf = leaf_value(2); + assert!( + !verify_membership(&proof, other_leaf, root), + "must not verify a different leaf against this root" + ); + } + + /// A genuine ZK_DEPTH-level path with distinct siblings and a mixed + /// left/right pattern, hand-folded to its real root. + fn sample_zk_path_and_root( + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + ) -> ([PathStep; ZK_DEPTH], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + let path: [PathStep; ZK_DEPTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| PathStep { + sibling: sibling(i as u64 + 1), + node_on_right: i % 3 == 1, + }); + let mut node = leaf; + for step in &path { + node = if step.node_on_right { + compress(step.sibling, node) + } else { + compress(node, step.sibling) + }; + } + (path, node) + } + + /// Fast-but-real hiding parameters: 20 queries at blowup 4 is the + /// on-chain candidate; ZK_DEPTH = 32 >= 20 + 3 holds the hiding margin. + const ZK_TEST_QUERIES: usize = 20; + const ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP: usize = 2; + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_zk_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_air::BaseAir; + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let config = crate::zk::make_zk_config_tuned(4, 1, crate::zk::Seed::reproducible(0)); + assert_eq!(config.is_zk(), 1, "the hiding PCS must flip the ZK path on"); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!( + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK, recomputed, + "the pinned ZK constant must equal what the symbolic pass derives; \ + if the AIR changed, re-pin it to the recomputed value" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_hiding_membership_proof_proves_and_verifies() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_zk_path_and_root(leaf); + let (proof, proved_root) = + prove_membership_zk(leaf, &path, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP, Seed::reproducible(42)); + assert_eq!(proved_root, root, "the prover's root must match the hand-folded one"); + assert!( + verify_membership_zk(&proof, leaf, root, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP), + "a genuine hiding membership proof must verify" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_hiding_membership_proof_rejects_a_tampered_root() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_zk_path_and_root(leaf); + let (proof, _) = + prove_membership_zk(leaf, &path, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let mut wrong_root = root; + wrong_root[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_membership_zk(&proof, leaf, wrong_root, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP), + "soundness must survive the hiding machinery: tampered root rejected" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn two_hiding_membership_proofs_of_the_same_path_differ() { + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_zk_path_and_root(leaf); + let (a, _) = prove_membership_zk(leaf, &path, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP, Seed::reproducible(1)); + let (b, _) = prove_membership_zk(leaf, &path, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP, Seed::reproducible(2)); + assert!( + verify_membership_zk(&a, leaf, root, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP) + && verify_membership_zk(&b, leaf, root, ZK_TEST_QUERIES, ZK_TEST_LOG_BLOWUP), + "both seeded proofs must verify" + ); + assert_ne!( + a.to_bytes(), + b.to_bytes(), + "different blinding seeds must produce different proofs of the same path" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_path_that_does_not_fold_to_the_claimed_root_cannot_yield_a_verifying_proof() { + // A malicious/broken path: reuse a genuine path's siblings and bits, + // but for the WRONG leaf, so folding it does not actually reach the + // root claimed to the prover. Mirrors permutation.rs's documented + // "panics on an unsatisfiable trace" behavior. + let leaf = leaf_value(1); + let (path, root) = sample_path_and_root(leaf); + let wrong_leaf = leaf_value(99); + + // Directly forge the trace: fold wrong_leaf through the path (so the + // trace is internally consistent with itself) but claim the ORIGINAL + // root as the public input, which this folding does not reach. + let (inputs, bits, actual_root) = build_rows(wrong_leaf, path); + assert_ne!(actual_root, root, "sanity: folding the wrong leaf must not reach the same root"); + + let air = MembershipAir::new(); + let poseidon_trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + >(inputs, &constants(), 0); + let trace = append_bit_column(poseidon_trace, &bits); + let pis = public_values(wrong_leaf, root); // claims the ORIGINAL root + let config = make_config(); + + // `prove` runs `check_constraints` only under `debug_assertions` + // (p3-uni-stark 0.6.2, prover.rs:39), so in RELEASE — the profile that + // ships — it emits a proof for this unsatisfiable trace rather than + // panicking. Asserting only the panic made this test vacuous exactly + // where it mattered. The claim that holds in both profiles is that no + // such proof verifies. + let attempt = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis) + })); + match attempt { + Err(_) => { /* debug: the prover refused to build it at all */ } + Ok(proof) => assert!( + !verify_membership(&MembershipProof { inner: proof }, wrong_leaf, root), + "a fold that does not reach the claimed root produced a proof that \ + verified: the root constraint is not binding" + ), + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/permutation.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/permutation.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..36d834d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/permutation.rs @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +//! Prove and verify knowledge of a Poseidon2-M31 permutation preimage, as a real +//! Circle-STARK proof. `Poseidon2Air` (from `p3-poseidon2-air`) is the vetted, +//! upstream AIR for the permutation's internal consistency; this module adds one +//! thin layer riverrun needs (binding the permutation's output to a public value, +//! which `Poseidon2Air` alone does not do) and wires the result into a working +//! prover/verifier over the circle domain (`p3-circle` + `p3-fri`), the same +//! recipe Plonky3's own test suite uses for a toy AIR (`p3-uni-stark`'s +//! `fib_air.rs`, `circle_compat_case`). +//! +//! The round constants are Plonky3's canonical, Grain-LFSR-generated Mersenne-31 +//! parameters (`R_F = 8`, `R_P = 14`, `alpha = 5`), the exact ones +//! `default_mersenne31_poseidon2_16` uses for the permutation itself, so the trace +//! this module proves is consistent with what `permute` actually computes. No +//! invented or randomly-sampled constants. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::borrow::Borrow; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::{ + default_mersenne31_poseidon2_16, GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31, Mersenne31, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, +}; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{generate_trace_rows, Poseidon2Air, Poseidon2Cols, RoundConstants}; +use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, Permutation, SerializingHasher}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig}; + +/// Poseidon2 state width for this instantiation: Plonky3's standard width-16 +/// permutation for a 31-bit field, matching the canonical constants below. +pub const WIDTH: usize = 16; +const SBOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; +const SBOX_REGISTERS: usize = 0; +const HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; +const PARTIAL_ROUNDS: usize = 14; + +type Val = Mersenne31; +type LinearLayers = GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31; +type InnerAir = Poseidon2Air< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, +>; +type Cols = + Poseidon2Cols; + +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type Pcs = CirclePcs; +type Config = StarkConfig; + +/// riverrun's own AIR: everything `Poseidon2Air` already proves about one +/// permutation's internal consistency, plus the one constraint riverrun needs and +/// `Poseidon2Air` does not provide: the permutation's OUTPUT (the last ending full +/// round's post-state) equals the proof's public values. The INPUT is not +/// constrained to anything public, which is exactly a preimage statement: "I know +/// an input whose image under this permutation is this public output." +struct PreimageAir { + inner: InnerAir, + // `Poseidon2Air::constants` is `pub(crate)` to its own crate, not visible here, + // so riverrun keeps its own copy: the exact same canonical constants, needed to + // generate a trace consistent with `inner`'s constraints. + constants: RoundConstants, +} + +impl PreimageAir { + fn new() -> Self { + let constants: RoundConstants = + RoundConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + Self { inner: InnerAir::new(constants.clone()), constants } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for PreimageAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.width() + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + WIDTH + } +} + +impl> Air for PreimageAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + // Everything Poseidon2Air already proves: the trace is an internally + // consistent execution of the permutation (every round's S-box and linear + // layer computed correctly from the row before it). + self.inner.eval(builder); + + // riverrun's one addition: bind the output to the public values. + let main = builder.main(); + let local: &Cols = main.current_slice().borrow(); + let output = &local.ending_full_rounds[HALF_FULL_ROUNDS - 1].post; + let pis: Vec = builder.public_values().to_vec(); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + builder.assert_eq(output[i].into(), pis[i].into()); + } + } +} + +fn make_config() -> Config { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs { mmcs: val_mmcs, fri_params, _phantom: PhantomData }; + let challenger = Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash); + Config::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn from_field(input: [Val; WIDTH]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + use p3_field::PrimeField64; + core::array::from_fn(|i| input[i].as_canonical_u64()) +} + +/// Run the real Poseidon2-M31 permutation on `input`, the same function the +/// prover's trace is built from, so a caller can compute the public output to +/// prove a preimage of. Uses Plonky3's canonical, Grain-LFSR-generated round +/// constants, not invented ones. +pub fn permute(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon2_16(); + let out = perm.permute(to_field(input)); + from_field(out) +} + +/// A real Circle-STARK proof that the prover knows a preimage of the public +/// output under the Poseidon2-M31 permutation. +pub struct PreimageProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl PreimageProof { + /// Serialize to bytes (`bincode`, over `Proof`'s own `serde` impl). Same + /// wire format convention as `binding::BindingProof::to_bytes`, added + /// while diagnosing riverrun-m31-verifier's on-chain memory ceiling: this + /// lets a single-block preimage proof (this AIR) be compared on-chain + /// against a two-block vectorized one (`BindingAir`) to isolate whether + /// peak `verify()` memory scales with AIR width/complexity. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + /// Deserialize from bytes produced by [`PreimageProof::to_bytes`]. `None` + /// on malformed input. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove knowledge of `input` such that `permute(input) == output`, as a +/// single-row Circle-STARK trace. `output` becomes the proof's public values. +/// Panics if `input` does not actually permute to `output` (the trace generator +/// would produce an unsatisfiable constraint set; callers must supply a genuine +/// preimage, exactly as `permute(input)` would compute). +pub fn prove_preimage(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> (PreimageProof, [u64; WIDTH]) { + let air = PreimageAir::new(); + let field_input = to_field(input); + // CirclePcs needs at least 4 rows to commit to. Every row independently proves + // the same preimage (the public-value constraint applies row-wise), so padding + // with repeats of the one real input keeps the statement's meaning intact: a + // wrong row would fail its own output == public-values check just the same. + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = generate_trace_rows::< + Val, + LinearLayers, + WIDTH, + SBOX_DEGREE, + SBOX_REGISTERS, + HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + PARTIAL_ROUNDS, + >(alloc::vec![field_input; 4], &air.constants, 0); + let output = permute(input); + let pis: Vec = to_field(output).to_vec(); + let config = make_config(); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (PreimageProof { inner: proof }, output) +} + +/// Verify a `PreimageProof` against the claimed public output. `true` only if +/// the proof is well-formed and verifies against exactly these public values. +pub fn verify_preimage(proof: &PreimageProof, output: [u64; WIDTH]) -> bool { + let air = PreimageAir::new(); + let config = make_config(); + let pis: Vec = to_field(output).to_vec(); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks(&config, &air, &proof.inner, &pis, None, LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS) + .is_ok() +} + +/// log2 of the number of quotient chunks for [`PreimageAir`], pinned for the +/// same reason and under the same drift-guard discipline as +/// `binding::LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS` (see that constant's doc): the symbolic +/// pass that derives it is what overran Solana's 256 KB heap ceiling, and for +/// a fixed AIR the value is a compile-time fact. +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS: usize = 2; + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_air::BaseAir; + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = PreimageAir::new(); + let config = make_config(); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!( + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS, recomputed, + "the pinned constant must equal what the symbolic pass derives for this exact AIR; \ + if the AIR changed, re-pin the constant to the recomputed value" + ); + } + + fn sample_input() -> [u64; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| (i as u64) * 7 + 3) + } + + #[test] + fn permute_is_deterministic() { + let a = permute(sample_input()); + let b = permute(sample_input()); + assert_eq!(a, b); + } + + #[test] + fn a_genuine_preimage_proves_and_verifies() { + let input = sample_input(); + let (proof, output) = prove_preimage(input); + assert_eq!(output, permute(input), "the claimed output must be the real permutation image"); + assert!(verify_preimage(&proof, output), "a genuine preimage must verify"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_proof_does_not_verify_against_a_different_output() { + let input = sample_input(); + let (proof, output) = prove_preimage(input); + let mut wrong = output; + wrong[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_preimage(&proof, wrong), + "a proof for one output must not verify against a different one" + ); + } + + /// The S-box `x -> x^5` is a bijection on F_p, and its inverse exponent is + /// `d = 5^-1 mod (p-1) = 1717986917`. + /// + /// This is not a curiosity. It is the load-bearing step in inverting the + /// Poseidon2 permutation cheaply, and inverting the permutation cheaply is + /// what makes `membership::compress` — a truncation of that permutation + /// with no feed-forward — fail to be collision resistant. See + /// `docs/COMPRESSION-NOTE.md` in riverrun-soroban for the proposition and + /// for what it does and does not break. Pinned here so the fact stays + /// visible in the crate whose construction depends on it. + #[test] + fn the_sbox_exponent_is_invertible_over_the_field() { + const P: u128 = (1 << 31) - 1; + const D: u128 = 1_717_986_917; + + fn pow_mod(mut base: u128, mut exp: u128) -> u128 { + let mut acc = 1u128; + base %= P; + while exp > 0 { + if exp & 1 == 1 { + acc = acc * base % P; + } + base = base * base % P; + exp >>= 1; + } + acc + } + + // d is genuinely the inverse of 5 modulo p-1, which is what makes + // x -> x^5 invertible rather than merely surjective. + assert_eq!(5 * D % (P - 1), 1, "d must be 5^-1 mod (p-1)"); + + // (x^5)^d == x across a spread of the field, including the edges. + let mut x = 1u128; + for i in 0..4096u128 { + assert_eq!(pow_mod(pow_mod(x, 5), D), x, "the S-box must invert at x = {x}"); + x = (x * 7 + i * 1_000_003 + 1) % P; + } + for x in [0u128, 1, 2, P - 2, P - 1] { + assert_eq!(pow_mod(pow_mod(x, 5), D), x, "the S-box must invert at the edge x = {x}"); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/relation.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/relation.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5a97b85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/relation.rs @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +//! The full riverrun relation (§1a + §1b + §1c), composed from two separately +//! verified Circle-STARK proofs rather than one monolithic trace. +//! +//! `binding::prove_binding` proves "this leaf and this nullifier come from one +//! secret." `membership::prove_membership` proves "this leaf digest sits under +//! this root." Fusing them into a single STARK trace would require one AIR +//! whose row layout serves both a same-row, two-block computation (binding) +//! and a multi-row chained fold (membership), which are different row shapes; +//! that is real, larger AIR-design work (a row-type selector multiplexing two +//! incompatible column layouts), not attempted here. +//! +//! What this module does instead is the standard, sound way to compose +//! separately-verified proofs: bind them through a **shared public value**. +//! `verify_full_relation` checks both proofs independently, AND checks that +//! `binding`'s public `leaf` output, truncated to [`membership::DIGEST_LEN`], +//! equals `membership`'s public `leaf` input, in plain Rust, outside either +//! proof's algebraic constraints. This is the same composition an on-chain +//! verifier would do cheaply (two proof checks plus one public-value equality +//! check) and it is exactly as sound as the individual proofs: a party who +//! cannot produce a genuine `(leaf, nullifier)` pair for some secret cannot +//! pass `verify_binding`, and a party whose `leaf` is not really under `root` +//! cannot pass `verify_membership`; matching leaves ties the two facts to the +//! *same* leaf, not two different ones a dishonest party mixed together. +//! +//! **Truncation convention, stated plainly.** `binding`'s leaf is the full +//! [`WIDTH`]-wide permutation output (§1a's own convention); `membership`'s +//! leaf is [`membership::DIGEST_LEN`] wide (its own compression convention). +//! This module truncates the former to the latter's width to compare them. +//! Whether an 8-of-16-element truncation is safe against an adversary who +//! controls the other 8 elements is a real cryptographic question this module +//! does not answer; it is inherited, not introduced, from the two modules' +//! own pre-existing, already-provisional width conventions, and is exactly +//! the kind of question a proper security review, not this scoping pass, +//! should settle before this is production-ready. + +use crate::binding::{self, BindingProof, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; +use crate::membership::{self, MembershipProof, PathStep, DEPTH, DIGEST_LEN}; +use crate::permutation::WIDTH; + +/// Everything needed to check that a leaf+nullifier pair (bound to one +/// secret) also sits under a public root: two independent proofs plus the +/// public values each was verified against. +pub struct FullRelationProof { + pub binding: BindingProof, + pub membership: MembershipProof, + pub action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + pub round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + pub leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + pub nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + pub root: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], +} + +/// Prove the full relation: `secret` produces `leaf`/`nullifier` (via +/// `action`/`round`), and `leaf` (truncated) sits under a root reached by +/// `path`. Panics under the same conditions `prove_binding` and +/// `prove_membership` do: a genuinely inconsistent witness cannot be proved, +/// it is rejected at proving time, not silently accepted. +pub fn prove_full_relation( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + path: [PathStep; DEPTH], +) -> FullRelationProof { + let (binding_proof, leaf, nullifier) = binding::prove_binding(secret, action, round); + let (membership_proof, root) = membership::prove_membership(leaf, path); + FullRelationProof { + binding: binding_proof, + membership: membership_proof, + action, + round, + leaf, + nullifier, + root, + } +} + +/// Verify the full relation. `true` only if BOTH proofs verify against their +/// own claimed public values AND the binding proof's `leaf`, truncated, +/// equals the membership proof's `leaf`, i.e. both proofs are about the same +/// member, not two different ones stitched together. +pub fn verify_full_relation(proof: &FullRelationProof) -> bool { + let binding_ok = binding::verify_binding( + &proof.binding, + proof.action, + proof.round, + proof.leaf, + proof.nullifier, + ); + let leaf_digest = proof.leaf; + let membership_ok = membership::verify_membership(&proof.membership, leaf_digest, proof.root); + binding_ok && membership_ok +} + +fn truncate(leaf: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf[i]) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u64) -> [u64; SECRET_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 1000 + i as u64) + } + + fn context(byte: u64) -> [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 2000 + i as u64) + } + + fn sibling(byte: u64) -> [u64; DIGEST_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 4000 + i as u64) + } + + fn sample_path() -> [PathStep; DEPTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| PathStep { + sibling: sibling(i as u64 + 1), + node_on_right: i % 2 == 1, + }) + } + + #[test] + fn a_genuine_full_relation_proves_and_verifies() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let path = sample_path(); + let proof = prove_full_relation(s, action, round, path); + assert!( + verify_full_relation(&proof), + "a genuine leaf+nullifier pair, whose leaf really sits under the proven root, must verify" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn mixing_one_members_binding_with_a_different_members_membership_fails() { + // Alice's leaf/nullifier are real and self-consistent (a genuine + // binding proof). Bob's leaf/path are also real and self-consistent + // (a genuine membership proof, for a DIFFERENT member's leaf). Each + // proof verifies fine on its own; the composition must still reject + // splicing them together, because they are not about the same leaf. + let alice = secret(1); + let bob = secret(2); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let path = sample_path(); + + let (alice_binding, alice_leaf, alice_nullifier) = + binding::prove_binding(alice, action, round); + let (_bob_binding, bob_leaf, _bob_nullifier) = binding::prove_binding(bob, action, round); + assert!( + binding::verify_binding(&alice_binding, action, round, alice_leaf, alice_nullifier), + "sanity: alice's own binding proof verifies" + ); + + let bob_leaf_digest = bob_leaf; + let (bob_membership, bob_root) = membership::prove_membership(bob_leaf_digest, path); + assert!( + membership::verify_membership(&bob_membership, bob_leaf_digest, bob_root), + "sanity: bob's own membership proof verifies" + ); + + // Splice: Alice's binding proof (her real leaf/nullifier) with Bob's + // membership proof/root (his real, different leaf under his root). + let spliced = FullRelationProof { + binding: alice_binding, + membership: bob_membership, + action, + round, + leaf: alice_leaf, // Alice's leaf... + nullifier: alice_nullifier, + root: bob_root, // ...claimed to sit under BOB's root + }; + assert!( + !verify_full_relation(&spliced), + "a leaf from one proof must not pass as the leaf of a different member's membership proof" + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/src/zk.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/zk.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..707705da --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/src/zk.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1239 @@ +//! The hiding (zero-knowledge) configuration: `HidingCirclePcs`, a circle-domain +//! port of Plonky3's `HidingFriPcs`, and the binding relation proved under it. +//! +//! `docs/PRIVACY.md` (riverrun-soroban) names the two missing pieces of witness +//! hiding: the composition that makes random values part of the committed +//! polynomial, and an AIR that tolerates them. This module supplies the first +//! and dissolves the second. +//! +//! ## The circle-domain port, stated precisely +//! +//! `HidingFriPcs` (p3-fri 0.6.2, `hiding_pcs.rs`) doubles the trace by +//! interleaving random rows: the real trace lands on the even indices of a +//! doubled multiplicative coset, which works because the even powers of a group +//! of order `2h` form its order-`h` subgroup. Circle domains refuse that move: +//! the natural-order alternating rows of a twin coset are its two half-cosets, +//! which are not negation-closed, so they are not twin cosets and carry no +//! low-degree vanishing polynomial. The standard domains of sizes `N` and `2N` +//! are even *disjoint* (points of order `4N` vs `2N`). +//! +//! The port therefore keeps the algebra and drops the index trick. What the +//! two-adic interleaving actually constructs is +//! +//! ```text +//! T' = T + Z_D · R +//! ``` +//! +//! the trace polynomial plus a uniformly random polynomial of the trace's own +//! dimension, multiplied by the vanishing polynomial of the trace domain `D`. +//! That form ports directly: +//! +//! - `Z_D(P) = v_n(x_P) - v_n(x_shift)` is closed-form on any twin coset +//! (`CircleDomain::vanishing_poly`), `O(log)` per point; +//! - `D = standard(log_n)` is disjoint from the committed domain +//! `standard(log_n + 1)` and from every LDE domain above it, so `Z_D` never +//! vanishes at an opened point: each of up to `N` openings of `T'` is masked +//! by an independent uniform value; +//! - `T'` restricted to `D` **is** `T`, so constraints keep holding on `D` and +//! the AIR does not change at all. The "AIR that tolerates random rows" +//! turns out not to be needed: the random degrees of freedom live above the +//! constraint domain, not inside it. +//! +//! The other mechanisms of `HidingFriPcs` are domain-generic and are ported +//! with one adaptation each: +//! +//! - quotient chunks are randomized as `q'_i = q_i + Z_{D_i} · t_i` with the +//! last chunk correcting the sum so the verifier's Lagrange recomposition at +//! `zeta` is unchanged (Section 4.2 of ); +//! the two-adic code builds `Z·t` from the closed form `(s·u)^h - 1` in +//! coefficient space, which has no circle analogue, so here `Z_{D_i}` is +//! evaluated pointwise over the chunk LDE instead; +//! - `num_random_codewords` random columns are appended to every committed +//! matrix and their openings drained into the proof, so the caller sees +//! exactly `air.width()` columns; +//! - a fully random polynomial is committed alongside the trace and folded +//! into the FRI batch (`get_opt_randomization_poly_commitment`). +//! +//! Like upstream's, this construction is **statistically** zero-knowledge, not +//! perfect: `p3-uni-stark`'s own comment on the randomization commitment says +//! as much, and the claim is inherited here, not strengthened. +//! +//! ## What this module does NOT do +//! +//! Witness-hiding alone is half the fix. The leaf is still a public input; the +//! unlinkability half (commit to the leaf, compose on the commitment) is +//! separate work tracked in `docs/PRIVACY.md`. +//! +//! ## The randomness is part of the construction, not a detail around it +//! +//! An earlier version of this module drew its leaf salts and blinding +//! polynomials from a `SplitMix64` seeded by a `u64`. That is not a +//! configuration wart, it is a break: the salts are published inside the proof, +//! `SplitMix64`'s state inverts from a single output, and the two streams were +//! seeded by values a fixed XOR apart. Recovering one recovered the other, and +//! subtracting `Z_D · R` from the published openings recovered the witness the +//! proof was built to hide. See [`Seed`] for the attack as an audit stated it. +//! +//! The generator is now ChaCha20 ([`Csprng`]) over a 256-bit [`Seed`]. The salt +//! stream and the blinding stream are separated by ChaCha20's own nonce field, +//! so their independence is the cipher's PRF assumption and not a construction +//! this crate invented — an intermediate version *did* invent one, and +//! [`Csprng::from_seed`] records why it was worse than it looked. +//! +//! This is prover-side only: no verifier draws from either generator, so +//! nothing about it changed on-chain and no contract needed redeploying. + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger, GrindingChallenger, HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::{cfft_permute_slice, CfftPerm, CircleDomain, CircleEvaluations, CirclePcs, CirclePcsProof}; +use p3_commit::{BuildPeriodicLdeTableFast, ExtensionMmcs, Mmcs, OpenedValues, Pcs, PeriodicLdeTable, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::extension::{BinomialExtensionField, ComplexExtendable}; +use p3_field::{batch_multiplicative_inverse, BasedVectorSpace, ExtensionField, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_fri::verifier::FriError; +use p3_matrix::dense::{RowMajorMatrix, RowMajorMatrixCow}; +use p3_matrix::horizontally_truncated::HorizontallyTruncated; +use p3_matrix::row_index_mapped::RowIndexMappedView; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_poseidon2_air::{generate_vectorized_trace_rows, RoundConstants}; +use p3_uni_stark::{prove, verify_with_known_quotient_chunks, Proof, StarkConfig}; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; +use rand10::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand10::{Rng, RngExt}; +use spin::Mutex; + +use crate::binding::{public_values_for_hiding, BindingAir, CONTEXT_LEN, SECRET_LEN}; +use crate::membership::DIGEST_LEN; +use crate::permutation::{permute, WIDTH}; + +/// The 256-bit seed behind every hiding value a proof carries. +/// +/// This type exists because its predecessor was a bare `u64`, and the width of +/// that argument was the real security parameter of the whole hiding path. An +/// adversarial audit (`docs/AUDIT-2026-08-03.md`, C1) established the attack: +/// the leaf salts are *published inside the proof* +/// (`p3-merkle-tree`'s `BatchOpening::new(openings, (salts, siblings))`), and +/// the generator drawing them was a `SplitMix64` whose state inverts from a +/// single output. Recovering the salt stream recovered the blinding stream, +/// and subtracting `Z_D · R` from the published openings recovered the trace — +/// which `examples/privacy_audit.rs` shows is overdetermined for interpolation. +/// The witness came back out of a proof that claimed to hide it. +/// +/// Replacing the generator without widening the seed would have moved the work +/// from roughly 2^33 to 2^64 and left the property still unclaimed, so both +/// changed together. There is deliberately no `From`: a caller that has +/// only 64 bits of entropy must say so at the call site, in +/// [`Seed::reproducible`], rather than have it inferred. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub struct Seed([u8; 32]); + +impl Seed { + /// A seed from caller-supplied bytes. The caller owns the guarantee that + /// they are uniform; [`Seed::from_os`] is the way to get that for free. + pub const fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self(bytes) + } + + /// A seed stretched from 64 bits, for fixtures and measurements that must + /// reproduce byte-for-byte across runs. + /// + /// **This carries 64 bits of entropy, not 256.** It is sound — soundness + /// does not depend on the prover's randomness at all — but it is not + /// hiding against an adversary willing to spend 2^64. Never reach for it + /// on a path whose output a real counterparty will see. + pub const fn reproducible(seed: u64) -> Self { + let b = seed.to_le_bytes(); + Self([ + b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], b[4], b[5], b[6], b[7], b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], b[4], b[5], + b[6], b[7], b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], b[4], b[5], b[6], b[7], b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3], + b[4], b[5], b[6], b[7], + ]) + } + +} + +/// Stream indices separating the two uses of one seed. ChaCha20's nonce field +/// exists for exactly this, so the independence of the two keystreams is the +/// cipher's own PRF assumption rather than anything this crate invents. +const STREAM_SALTS: u64 = 1; +const STREAM_BLINDING: u64 = 2; + +/// The cryptographic generator behind the leaf salts and the blinding +/// polynomials. ChaCha20, from `rand_chacha`, wrapped only to satisfy the +/// `Rng + Clone + Send` shape `p3-merkle-tree` and `HidingCirclePcs` require. +/// +/// The predecessor, [`crate::hiding::SplitMix64`], remains in the codebase for +/// the cost instrument that measures the hiding machinery's price, where +/// reproducibility matters and secrecy does not. It must never come back here. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Csprng(rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng); + +impl Csprng { + /// The generator for one use of `seed`, separated from the other uses by + /// ChaCha20's stream index. + /// + /// The first version of this fix derived a second seed by XOR-ing a tag in + /// and pushing the result through the Poseidon2 permutation. That was worse + /// than it looked, for two reasons worth recording. The permutation is not + /// a key-derivation function — there is no sponge padding and no capacity + /// separation, so nothing standard backs the claim that its output is a + /// uniform key. And the arithmetic leaked: eight Mersenne-31 limbs written + /// as four bytes each cannot exceed `2^31 - 2`, so the top bit of every + /// 32-bit word of the derived key was *identically zero* and the key + /// carried at most 248 bits, eight of them constant. + /// + /// Using the cipher's own nonce costs nothing, keeps all 256 bits of the + /// key, and reduces independence of the two streams to the standard + /// assumption that ChaCha20 is a PRF — which is the assumption already + /// being made by using it at all. + fn from_seed(seed: Seed, stream: u64) -> Self { + use rand10::SeedableRng; + let mut rng = rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng::from_seed(seed.0); + rng.set_stream(stream); + Self(rng) + } +} + +impl rand10::TryRng for Csprng { + type Error = core::convert::Infallible; + + fn try_next_u32(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(self.0.next_u32()) + } + + fn try_next_u64(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(self.0.next_u64()) + } + + fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dst: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error> { + self.0.fill_bytes(dst); + Ok(()) + } +} + +/// A hiding circle PCS: `CirclePcs` wrapped with the four randomization +/// mechanisms of `HidingFriPcs`, adapted to circle domains as described in the +/// module doc. Both MMCSs must themselves be hiding (salted); like upstream, +/// that is the configurer's responsibility, not enforced in types. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct HidingCirclePcs { + pub inner: CirclePcs, + pub num_random_codewords: usize, + rng: Mutex, +} + +impl Clone for HidingCirclePcs +where + Val: p3_field::Field, + InputMmcs: Clone, + FriMmcs: Clone, + R: Clone, +{ + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + Self { + inner: self.inner.clone(), + num_random_codewords: self.num_random_codewords, + rng: Mutex::new(self.rng.lock().clone()), + } + } +} + +impl HidingCirclePcs { + pub const fn new( + inner: CirclePcs, + num_random_codewords: usize, + rng: R, + ) -> Self { + Self { inner, num_random_codewords, rng: Mutex::new(rng) } + } +} + +/// Sample a height x width matrix of uniform field elements. +fn rand_matrix(rng: &mut R, height: usize, width: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix +where + StandardUniform: Distribution, + Val: Clone + Send + Sync, +{ + RowMajorMatrix::new((0..height * width).map(|_| rng.random()).collect(), width) +} + +impl Pcs + for HidingCirclePcs +where + Val: ComplexExtendable, + StandardUniform: Distribution, + Challenge: ExtensionField, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, + FriMmcs: Mmcs, + Challenger: FieldChallenger + GrindingChallenger + CanObserve, + R: Rng + Send + Sync, +{ + type Domain = CircleDomain; + type Commitment = InputMmcs::Commitment; + type ProverData = InputMmcs::ProverData>; + type EvaluationsOnDomain<'a> = + HorizontallyTruncated>>; + /// The first item carries the drained openings of the random codeword + /// columns; the second is the ordinary circle PCS proof. + type Proof = ( + OpenedValues, + CirclePcsProof, + ); + type Error = as Pcs>::Error; + + const ZK: bool = true; + + fn natural_domain_for_degree(&self, degree: usize) -> Self::Domain { + as Pcs>::natural_domain_for_degree( + &self.inner, + degree, + ) + } + + fn log_max_lde_height(&self) -> usize { + as Pcs>::log_max_lde_height( + &self.inner, + ) + } + + /// Commit to `T' = T + Z_D * R` on the doubled domain, plus + /// `num_random_codewords` fully random columns. + /// + /// The caller (p3-uni-stark's ZK path) hands the *doubled* domain together + /// with the *undoubled* evaluation matrix, exactly as it does for + /// `HidingFriPcs`; the doubling is this method's job. + fn commit( + &self, + evaluations: impl IntoIterator)>, + ) -> (Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData) { + let blinded: Vec<(Self::Domain, RowMajorMatrix)> = evaluations + .into_iter() + .map(|(ext_domain, mat)| { + let h = mat.height(); + let w = mat.width(); + assert_eq!( + ext_domain.size(), + 2 * h, + "the ZK commit expects the doubled domain alongside the undoubled trace" + ); + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(h); + let trace_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + + // Stack T and R side by side so one CFFT pass extrapolates both + // from the trace domain to the doubled domain. + let r_small = rand_matrix::(&mut *self.rng.lock(), h, w); + let mut stacked = Vec::with_capacity(h * 2 * w); + for row in 0..h { + for col in 0..w { + stacked.push(mat.get(row, col).unwrap()); + } + for col in 0..w { + stacked.push(r_small.get(row, col).unwrap()); + } + } + let both = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + trace_domain, + RowMajorMatrix::new(stacked, 2 * w), + ) + .extrapolate(ext_domain) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix(); + + // Z_D at each doubled-domain point (natural order). D and the + // doubled domain are disjoint, so these are all nonzero. + let z: Vec = ext_domain + .points() + .map(|p| trace_domain.vanishing_poly(p)) + .collect(); + + let ncw = self.num_random_codewords; + let mut rng = self.rng.lock(); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(ext_domain.size() * (w + ncw)); + for (row, z_row) in z.iter().enumerate() { + for col in 0..w { + let t = both.get(row, col).unwrap(); + let r = both.get(row, w + col).unwrap(); + out.push(t + *z_row * r); + } + for _ in 0..ncw { + out.push(rng.random()); + } + } + (ext_domain, RowMajorMatrix::new(out, w + ncw)) + }) + .collect(); + + Pcs::::commit(&self.inner, blinded) + } + + /// Preprocessed traces are public, so they get the deterministic half of + /// the same treatment: extrapolated to the doubled domain (`R = 0`), no + /// random columns. + fn commit_preprocessing( + &self, + evaluations: impl IntoIterator)>, + ) -> (Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData) { + let padded: Vec<(Self::Domain, RowMajorMatrix)> = evaluations + .into_iter() + .map(|(ext_domain, mat)| { + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(mat.height()); + assert_eq!(ext_domain.size(), 2 * mat.height()); + let ext = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::::standard(log_n), + mat, + ) + .extrapolate(ext_domain) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix(); + (ext_domain, ext) + }) + .collect(); + Pcs::::commit(&self.inner, padded) + } + + /// Randomize the quotient chunks: `q'_i = q_i + Z_{D_i} * t_i`, with the + /// last chunk chosen so the verifier's Lagrange recomposition at `zeta` + /// sees exactly the original quotient (Section 4.2, eprint 2024/1037). + /// + /// # Panics + /// If `num_chunks < 2`: a single randomized chunk would not be hiding. + fn get_quotient_ldes( + &self, + evaluations: impl IntoIterator)>, + num_chunks: usize, + ) -> Vec> { + assert!( + num_chunks > 1, + "num_chunks must be > 1 to preserve hiding (got {num_chunks})" + ); + let (domains, evals): (Vec, Vec>) = + evaluations.into_iter().unzip(); + let cis = get_zp_cis::(&domains); + let last = num_chunks - 1; + let last_ci_inv = cis[last].inverse(); + + // Widen each chunk with random codeword columns, then draw the masking + // polynomials' coefficients: independent for chunks 0..last, and the + // correcting combination for the last one. + let mut rng = self.rng.lock(); + let widened: Vec> = evals + .into_iter() + .map(|m| append_random_codewords(m, self.num_random_codewords, &mut *rng)) + .collect(); + let h = widened[0].height(); + let w = widened[0].width(); + let mut ts: Vec> = (0..last) + .map(|_| (0..h * w).map(|_| rng.random()).collect()) + .collect(); + drop(rng); + let mut t_last = Val::zero_vec(h * w); + for (j, t_j) in ts.iter().enumerate() { + let mul_coeff = cis[j] * last_ci_inv; + for (acc, v) in t_last.iter_mut().zip(t_j.iter()) { + *acc -= *v * mul_coeff; + } + } + ts.push(t_last); + + let log_blowup = self.inner.fri_params.log_blowup; + domains + .into_iter() + .zip(widened) + .zip(ts) + .map(|((domain, evals), t_coeffs)| { + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(h); + // The randomized chunk has twice the chunk's dimension, so its + // LDE lives one level higher, exactly as upstream's does. + let target = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n + log_blowup + 1); + let mut lde = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(domain, evals) + .extrapolate(target) + .to_cfft_order(); + let t_evals = + CircleEvaluations::evaluate(target, RowMajorMatrix::new(t_coeffs, w)) + .to_cfft_order(); + let z_nat: Vec = target + .points() + .map(|p| domain.vanishing_poly(p)) + .collect(); + let z_cfft = cfft_permute_slice(&z_nat); + for (row, z_row) in z_cfft.iter().enumerate() { + for col in 0..w { + lde.values[row * w + col] += *z_row * t_evals.get(row, col).unwrap(); + } + } + lde + }) + .collect() + } + + fn commit_ldes(&self, ldes: Vec>) -> (Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData) { + Pcs::::commit_ldes(&self.inner, ldes) + } + + fn get_evaluations_on_domain<'a>( + &self, + prover_data: &'a Self::ProverData, + idx: usize, + domain: Self::Domain, + ) -> Self::EvaluationsOnDomain<'a> { + let inner_evals = as Pcs>::get_evaluations_on_domain( + &self.inner, + prover_data, + idx, + domain, + ); + let inner_width = inner_evals.width(); + // Hide the random codeword columns from the caller: the AIR indexes + // exactly its own width. + HorizontallyTruncated::new(inner_evals, inner_width - self.num_random_codewords).unwrap() + } + + fn get_evaluations_on_domain_no_random<'a>( + &self, + prover_data: &'a Self::ProverData, + idx: usize, + domain: Self::Domain, + ) -> Self::EvaluationsOnDomain<'a> { + let inner_evals = as Pcs>::get_evaluations_on_domain( + &self.inner, + prover_data, + idx, + domain, + ); + let inner_width = inner_evals.width(); + HorizontallyTruncated::new(inner_evals, inner_width).unwrap() + } + + fn open( + &self, + rounds: Vec<(&Self::ProverData, Vec>)>, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + ) -> (OpenedValues, Self::Proof) { + self.open_with_preprocessing(rounds, challenger, false) + } + + fn open_with_preprocessing( + &self, + rounds: Vec<(&Self::ProverData, Vec>)>, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + is_preprocessing: bool, + ) -> (OpenedValues, Self::Proof) { + let (mut inner_opened_values, inner_proof) = as Pcs< + Challenge, + Challenger, + >>::open_with_preprocessing( + &self.inner, rounds, challenger, is_preprocessing + ); + // The inner openings include the random codeword columns. Drain them + // into the proof so the caller sees only the real columns; `verify` + // re-merges before delegating. + let opened_values_rand = inner_opened_values + .iter_mut() + .enumerate() + .map(|(idx, opened_values_for_round)| { + opened_values_for_round + .iter_mut() + .map(|opened_values_for_mat| { + opened_values_for_mat + .iter_mut() + .map(|opened_values_for_point| { + let num_random_codewords = if is_preprocessing + && idx + == >::PREPROCESSED_TRACE_IDX + { + 0 + } else { + self.num_random_codewords + }; + let split = + opened_values_for_point.len() - num_random_codewords; + opened_values_for_point.drain(split..).collect() + }) + .collect() + }) + .collect() + }) + .collect(); + + (inner_opened_values, (opened_values_rand, inner_proof)) + } + + fn verify( + &self, + mut rounds: Vec<( + Self::Commitment, + Vec<(Self::Domain, Vec<(Challenge, Vec)>)>, + )>, + proof: &Self::Proof, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + ) -> Result<(), Self::Error> { + let (opened_values_for_rand_cws, inner_proof) = proof; + + // Re-join the public and hidden halves of every opening, with the same + // three-level shape checks as upstream's HidingFriPcs. + if opened_values_for_rand_cws.len() != rounds.len() { + return Err(FriError::HidingRandomOpeningRoundCountMismatch { + expected: rounds.len(), + got: opened_values_for_rand_cws.len(), + }); + } + for (round_idx, (round, rand_round)) in rounds + .iter_mut() + .zip(opened_values_for_rand_cws.iter()) + .enumerate() + { + if rand_round.len() != round.1.len() { + return Err(FriError::HidingRandomOpeningMatrixCountMismatch { + round: round_idx, + expected: round.1.len(), + got: rand_round.len(), + }); + } + for (matrix_idx, (mat, rand_mat)) in + round.1.iter_mut().zip(rand_round.iter()).enumerate() + { + if rand_mat.len() != mat.1.len() { + return Err(FriError::HidingRandomOpeningPointCountMismatch { + round: round_idx, + matrix: matrix_idx, + expected: mat.1.len(), + got: rand_mat.len(), + }); + } + for (point, rand_point) in mat.1.iter_mut().zip(rand_mat.iter()) { + point.1.extend(rand_point); + } + } + } + as Pcs>::verify( + &self.inner, + rounds, + inner_proof, + challenger, + ) + } + + /// The randomization polynomial the ZK prover path commits alongside the + /// trace and folds into the FRI batch: fully random, over the doubled + /// domain, wide enough to also carry the random codeword columns. + fn get_opt_randomization_poly_commitment( + &self, + ext_trace_domains: impl IntoIterator, + ) -> Option<(Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData)> { + let random_input_vals = ext_trace_domains + .into_iter() + .map(|domain| { + let m = rand_matrix::( + &mut *self.rng.lock(), + domain.size(), + self.num_random_codewords + >::DIMENSION, + ); + (domain, m) + }) + .collect::>(); + let r_commit_and_data = Pcs::::commit(&self.inner, random_input_vals); + Some(r_commit_and_data) + } +} + +impl BuildPeriodicLdeTableFast + for HidingCirclePcs +where + Val: ComplexExtendable, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, +{ + type PeriodicDomain = CircleDomain; + + fn maybe_build_periodic_lde_table_fast( + &self, + periodic_cols: &[Vec>], + trace_domain: Self::PeriodicDomain, + quotient_domain: Self::PeriodicDomain, + ) -> Option>> + where + p3_commit::Val: Clone, + { + self.inner + .maybe_build_periodic_lde_table_fast(periodic_cols, trace_domain, quotient_domain) + } +} + +/// Append `n` random columns to every row, drawn from `rng`. +fn append_random_codewords( + mat: RowMajorMatrix, + n: usize, + rng: &mut R, +) -> RowMajorMatrix +where + StandardUniform: Distribution, + Val: Clone + Send + Sync, +{ + if n == 0 { + return mat; + } + let (h, w) = (mat.height(), mat.width()); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(h * (w + n)); + for row in 0..h { + for col in 0..w { + out.push(mat.get(row, col).unwrap()); + } + for _ in 0..n { + out.push(rng.random()); + } + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(out, w + n) +} + +/// The normalizing constants of the verifier's Lagrange recomposition, one per +/// chunk domain: `c_i = 1 / prod_{j != i} Z_{D_j}(first_point(D_i))`. Identical +/// to upstream's `get_zp_cis`; the algebra is domain-shape-agnostic. +fn get_zp_cis(qc_domains: &[D]) -> Vec> { + batch_multiplicative_inverse( + &qc_domains + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, domain)| { + qc_domains + .iter() + .enumerate() + .filter(|(j, _)| *j != i) + .map(|(_, other_domain)| { + other_domain.vanishing_poly_at_point(domain.first_point()) + }) + .product() + }) + .collect::>(), + ) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// The binding relation, proved hiding. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +type Val = Mersenne31; +/// The challenge field: the degree-4 extension `M31[i][u]` with `i² = -1` and +/// `u² = 2 + i`, 124 bits. +/// +/// It was degree 3 (93 bits) until the soundness accounting showed the field +/// was the ceiling rather than the protocol: the additive error terms are +/// `domain / |E|`, the domain grows with the blowup, and at blowup 128 the +/// round-by-round error floored at `2^-74` while the query phase was offering +/// 84 bits. Ten bits thrown away by a type alias. See +/// `examples/qm31_ceiling.rs` for what each configuration recovers. +type Challenge = p3_mersenne_31::QM31; +type ByteHash = crate::keccak::SolKeccak256; +type FieldHash = p3_symmetric::SerializingHasher; +type Compress = p3_symmetric::CompressionFunctionFromHasher; + +/// Salt elements per Merkle leaf: 4 Mersenne-31 elements, 124 bits. +const SALT_ELEMS: usize = 4; +/// Random codeword columns per committed matrix, following upstream's tests. +const NUM_RANDOM_CODEWORDS: usize = 2; + +type ZkValMmcs = p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeHidingMmcs< + ::Packing, + u8, + FieldHash, + Compress, + Csprng, + 2, + 32, + SALT_ELEMS, +>; +type ZkChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type ZkPcs = HidingCirclePcs; +pub(crate) type ZkConfig = StarkConfig; + +/// log2 of the quotient-chunk count for [`BindingAir`] under the ZK +/// configuration, pinned for the same reason as +/// `binding::LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS` (no symbolic pass in the verifier). The +/// ZK path raises the constraint degree by one (trace polynomials now have +/// twice the dimension), so this is 3 where the non-ZK value is 2. The test +/// `the_pinned_zk_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass` recomputes +/// it and fails if it drifts. +pub const LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK: usize = 3; + +/// Build the hiding config. `seed` feeds BOTH the blinding polynomials and the +/// leaf salts, through two domain-separated streams; two proofs of the same +/// statement under different seeds must differ everywhere. The verifier +/// constructs the same types and never draws from either generator, so its +/// seed value is irrelevant to soundness. +fn make_zk_config(num_queries: usize, seed: Seed) -> ZkConfig { + make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, 1, seed) +} + +/// Same construction with the FRI blowup exposed. Soundness per query scales +/// with the blowup (roughly `log_blowup` bits per query before proof-of-work), +/// so `log_blowup = 2` at 20 queries buys what `log_blowup = 1` buys at 40, +/// while the proof carries half the query payloads. That trade is what lets +/// the hiding proof fit a Stellar transaction envelope; see +/// `price_the_zk_wire_sizes`. +pub(crate) fn make_zk_config_tuned( + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + seed: Seed, +) -> ZkConfig { + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ZkValMmcs::new( + field_hash, + compress, + 0, + Csprng::from_seed(seed, STREAM_SALTS), + ); + let challenge_mmcs = ZkChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let inner = CirclePcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData, + }; + let pcs = ZkPcs::new(inner, NUM_RANDOM_CODEWORDS, Csprng::from_seed(seed, STREAM_BLINDING)); + StarkConfig::new(pcs, Challenger::from_hasher(Vec::new(), byte_hash)) +} + +/// A hiding proof of the binding relation. +pub struct ZkBindingProof { + inner: Proof, +} + +impl ZkBindingProof { + /// log2 of the *committed* (doubled) polynomial dimension. The hiding + /// margin is `2^degree_bits` random degrees of freedom per column against + /// however many evaluations the verifier opens. + pub fn degree_bits(&self) -> usize { + self.inner.degree_bits + } + + /// Serialize to bytes (`bincode`), the off-chain wire format. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + bincode::serialize(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + /// Deserialize bytes from [`ZkBindingProof::to_bytes`]; `None` on garbage. + #[cfg(feature = "wire")] + pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + bincode::deserialize(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } + + /// Serialize with `postcard`, the no_std wire format a bare-wasm verifier + /// (Soroban) reads from its host boundary. + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn to_postcard(&self) -> Vec { + postcard::to_allocvec(&self.inner).expect("Proof is always serializable") + } + + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + pub fn from_postcard(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option { + postcard::from_bytes(bytes).ok().map(|inner| Self { inner }) + } +} + +/// Prove the binding relation hiding: salted MMCS, blinded trace commitment +/// (`T' = T + Z_D * R`), randomized quotient chunks, randomization-polynomial +/// commitment. `rng_seed` feeds all prover-side randomness; a production +/// caller MUST derive it from system entropy (see the module doc). +/// +/// # Panics +/// If `2^log_rows < num_queries + 2`: the commitment must carry more random +/// degrees of freedom than the verifier opens (queries + the out-of-domain +/// point), or the "hiding" would be arithmetic-only theater. +pub fn prove_binding_zk( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_rows: usize, + seed: Seed, +) -> (ZkBindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + prove_binding_zk_tuned(secret, action, round, num_queries, 1, log_rows, seed) +} + +/// Same as [`prove_binding_zk`] with the FRI blowup exposed; see +/// `make_zk_config_tuned` for why a higher blowup with fewer queries is the +/// configuration that fits an envelope. +pub fn prove_binding_zk_tuned( + secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, + log_rows: usize, + seed: Seed, +) -> (ZkBindingProof, [u64; DIGEST_LEN], [u64; DIGEST_LEN]) { + assert!(log_rows >= 2, "CirclePcs cannot commit to fewer than 4 rows"); + assert!( + (1usize << log_rows) >= num_queries + 2, + "hiding needs more random degrees of freedom than opened evaluations: \ + 2^log_rows must be >= num_queries + 2" + ); + let leaf_input = pack(secret, action); + let nullifier_input = pack(secret, round); + // Truncated to digests: the full permutation state IS the witness once + // pi is inverted, and the context is public beside it. + let leaf_full = permute(leaf_input); + let nullifier_full = permute(nullifier_input); + let leaf_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| leaf_full[i]); + let nullifier_output: [u64; DIGEST_LEN] = core::array::from_fn(|i| nullifier_full[i]); + + let repeats = 1usize << log_rows; + let mut inputs: Vec<[Val; WIDTH]> = Vec::with_capacity(2 * repeats); + for _ in 0..repeats { + inputs.push(to_field(leaf_input)); + inputs.push(to_field(nullifier_input)); + } + let constants: RoundConstants = RoundConstants::new( + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL, + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL, + p3_mersenne_31::MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL, + ); + let trace: RowMajorMatrix = + generate_vectorized_trace_rows::( + inputs, + &constants, + 0, + ); + + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let pis = public_values_for_hiding(action, round, leaf_output, nullifier_output); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, seed); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + (ZkBindingProof { inner: proof }, leaf_output, nullifier_output) +} + +/// Verify a [`ZkBindingProof`]. Same statement and public values as the +/// non-hiding verifier; only the commitment machinery differs. +pub fn verify_binding_zk( + proof: &ZkBindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, +) -> bool { + verify_binding_zk_tuned(proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, num_queries, 1) +} + +/// Same as [`verify_binding_zk`] with the FRI blowup exposed; must match the +/// blowup the proof was produced with. +pub fn verify_binding_zk_tuned( + proof: &ZkBindingProof, + action: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + round: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN], + leaf: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + nullifier: [u64; DIGEST_LEN], + num_queries: usize, + log_blowup: usize, +) -> bool { + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let config = make_zk_config_tuned(num_queries, log_blowup, Seed::reproducible(0)); + let pis = public_values_for_hiding(action, round, leaf, nullifier); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + &config, + &air, + &proof.inner, + &pis, + None, + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +fn to_field(input: [u64; WIDTH]) -> [Val; WIDTH] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| Val::from_u64(input[i])) +} + +fn pack(secret: [u64; SECRET_LEN], context: [u64; CONTEXT_LEN]) -> [u64; WIDTH] { + let mut out = [0u64; WIDTH]; + out[..SECRET_LEN].copy_from_slice(&secret); + out[SECRET_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&context); + out +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(byte: u64) -> [u64; SECRET_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 1000 + i as u64) + } + + fn context(byte: u64) -> [u64; CONTEXT_LEN] { + core::array::from_fn(|i| byte * 2000 + i as u64) + } + + /// Fast-but-real parameters for the roundtrip tests: 16 rows against 8 + /// queries satisfies the hiding margin (16 >= 8 + 2) at test speed. + const TEST_QUERIES: usize = 8; + const TEST_LOG_ROWS: usize = 4; + + #[test] + fn the_pinned_zk_quotient_chunk_count_matches_the_symbolic_pass() { + use p3_air::BaseAir; + use p3_uni_stark::{get_log_num_quotient_chunks, AirLayout, StarkGenericConfig}; + let air = BindingAir::new(); + let config = make_zk_config(4, Seed::reproducible(0)); + assert_eq!(config.is_zk(), 1, "the hiding PCS must flip the ZK path on"); + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: 0, + main_width: BaseAir::::width(&air), + num_public_values: BaseAir::::num_public_values(&air), + num_periodic_columns: BaseAir::::num_periodic_columns(&air), + ..Default::default() + }; + let recomputed = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::(&air, layout, config.is_zk()); + assert_eq!( + LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS_ZK, recomputed, + "the pinned ZK constant must equal what the symbolic pass derives; \ + if the AIR changed, re-pin it to the recomputed value" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_hiding_binding_proof_proves_and_verifies() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + assert!( + verify_binding_zk(&proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, TEST_QUERIES), + "a genuine hiding proof must verify" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_hiding_proof_does_not_verify_against_a_tampered_leaf() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let mut wrong_leaf = leaf; + wrong_leaf[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_binding_zk(&proof, action, round, wrong_leaf, nullifier, TEST_QUERIES), + "soundness must survive the hiding machinery: tampered leaf rejected" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_hiding_proof_does_not_verify_against_a_tampered_nullifier() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let mut wrong = nullifier; + wrong[0] ^= 1; + assert!( + !verify_binding_zk(&proof, action, round, leaf, wrong, TEST_QUERIES), + "soundness must survive the hiding machinery: tampered nullifier rejected" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn the_committed_dimension_exceeds_what_the_verifier_opens() { + // The hiding margin, stated as an arithmetic fact of the proof itself: + // the committed polynomial carries `2^degree_bits` degrees of freedom + // per column, of which half are the blinding polynomial R; the + // verifier opens `num_queries` LDE rows plus the out-of-domain point. + // The non-hiding audit (privacy_audit.rs) measured 40 openings against + // 4 rows: 5x overdetermined. Here it is underdetermined by design. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, _, _) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let random_dofs = 1usize << (proof.degree_bits() - 1); + assert!( + TEST_QUERIES + 1 < random_dofs, + "openings ({}) must stay below the blinding degrees of freedom ({})", + TEST_QUERIES + 1, + random_dofs + ); + } + + #[test] + fn two_proofs_of_the_same_witness_differ_in_their_commitments() { + // The blinding must actually randomize: same secret, same publics, + // different seeds, byte-different proofs. If the seeds were ignored + // the two serializations would collide. + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (a, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(1)); + let (b, _, _) = prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(2)); + assert!( + verify_binding_zk(&a, action, round, leaf, nullifier, TEST_QUERIES) + && verify_binding_zk(&b, action, round, leaf, nullifier, TEST_QUERIES), + "both seeded proofs must verify" + ); + let bytes_a = a.to_bytes(); + let bytes_b = b.to_bytes(); + assert_ne!( + bytes_a, bytes_b, + "different blinding seeds must produce different proofs of the same statement" + ); + } + + /// Not a correctness test: prints the wire sizes of the candidate + /// production configurations, because yesterday's on-chain measurement + /// showed transaction size, not CPU, is the binding constraint. Run with + /// `cargo test --release price_the_zk_wire_sizes -- --ignored --nocapture`. + #[test] + #[ignore] + fn price_the_zk_wire_sizes() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + // (log_rows, num_queries, log_blowup): conjectured query soundness is + // roughly log_blowup bits per query, so 32q@blowup1, 16q@blowup2 and + // 11q@blowup3 sit near the same ~32-bit pre-PoW target, and + // 20q@blowup2 near 40q@blowup1. + for (log_rows, queries, log_blowup) in [ + (6usize, 32usize, 1usize), + (6, 40, 1), + (5, 20, 2), + (5, 16, 2), + (4, 11, 3), + ] { + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk_tuned(s, action, round, queries, log_blowup, log_rows, Seed::reproducible(42)); + assert!( + verify_binding_zk_tuned( + &proof, action, round, leaf, nullifier, queries, log_blowup + ), + "the priced configuration must actually verify" + ); + let bytes = proof.to_bytes(); + #[cfg(feature = "wire-postcard")] + let pc = proof.to_postcard().len(); + #[cfg(not(feature = "wire-postcard"))] + let pc = 0usize; + println!( + "zk binding, {} rows, {} queries, blowup {}: {} bytes bincode, {} bytes postcard", + 1 << log_rows, + queries, + 1 << log_blowup, + bytes.len(), + pc + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_zk_proof_survives_a_byte_round_trip() { + let s = secret(1); + let action = context(1); + let round = context(2); + let (proof, leaf, nullifier) = + prove_binding_zk(s, action, round, TEST_QUERIES, TEST_LOG_ROWS, Seed::reproducible(42)); + let bytes = proof.to_bytes(); + eprintln!("ZkBindingProof serialized size: {} bytes", bytes.len()); + let round_tripped = + ZkBindingProof::from_bytes(&bytes).expect("valid bytes must deserialize"); + assert!( + verify_binding_zk(&round_tripped, action, round, leaf, nullifier, TEST_QUERIES), + "a hiding proof must still verify after a wire round trip" + ); + } + + // ---------------------------------------------------------------- seeds + // + // These do not assert that the generator is good — ChaCha20's security is + // assumed, not tested here. They falsify the two concrete defects this + // code actually had: a seed whose bits were not all load-bearing, and two + // streams related by something an adversary could invert. + + /// Every one of the 256 seed bits must reach the output. + /// + /// This is the test that would have caught the discarded intermediate + /// derivation, where eight bits of the derived key were identically zero: + /// flipping a seed bit that the key does not carry leaves the keystream + /// untouched, and this loop would have found all eight. + #[test] + fn every_seed_bit_changes_the_keystream() { + use rand10::TryRng; + let base = [0u8; 32]; + let reference = { + let mut rng = Csprng::from_seed(Seed::from_bytes(base), STREAM_SALTS); + core::array::from_fn::(|_| rng.try_next_u64().unwrap()) + }; + for bit in 0..256 { + let mut flipped = base; + flipped[bit / 8] ^= 1 << (bit % 8); + let mut rng = Csprng::from_seed(Seed::from_bytes(flipped), STREAM_SALTS); + let out = core::array::from_fn::(|_| rng.try_next_u64().unwrap()); + assert_ne!( + out, reference, + "seed bit {bit} does not reach the keystream, so the seed is \ + narrower than the 256 bits its type claims" + ); + } + } + + /// The salt stream and the blinding stream must not coincide, and must not + /// be one another shifted: the predecessor seeded them from values a fixed + /// XOR apart, which is what let recovering one recover the other. + #[test] + fn the_two_streams_of_one_seed_diverge() { + use rand10::TryRng; + let seed = Seed::from_bytes([7u8; 32]); + let draw = |stream| { + let mut rng = Csprng::from_seed(seed, stream); + core::array::from_fn::(|_| rng.try_next_u64().unwrap()) + }; + let salts = draw(STREAM_SALTS); + let blinding = draw(STREAM_BLINDING); + assert_ne!(salts, blinding, "the two streams must differ"); + for shift in 1..64 { + assert_ne!( + &salts[shift..], + &blinding[..64 - shift], + "the blinding stream must not be the salt stream offset by {shift}" + ); + } + } + + /// A seed is a seed: same bytes, same stream, same output. Reproducibility + /// is what the fixtures rest on, so it is worth pinning. + #[test] + fn one_seed_reproduces_its_own_stream() { + use rand10::TryRng; + let seed = Seed::from_bytes([3u8; 32]); + let mut a = Csprng::from_seed(seed, STREAM_BLINDING); + let mut b = Csprng::from_seed(seed, STREAM_BLINDING); + for _ in 0..32 { + assert_eq!(a.try_next_u64().unwrap(), b.try_next_u64().unwrap()); + } + } + + /// `Seed::reproducible` is documented as carrying 64 bits, not 256. That + /// is a real limitation and the test states it rather than letting a + /// reader assume the constructor is as strong as the type. + #[test] + fn the_reproducible_seed_carries_only_sixty_four_bits() { + let s = Seed::reproducible(0x0123_4567_89AB_CDEF); + let bytes = s.0; + for chunk in bytes.chunks(8) { + assert_eq!(chunk, &bytes[..8], "reproducible() repeats one u64 four times"); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo-ok b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo-ok new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8b7958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo-ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"v":1} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c0f9f39 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "git": { + "sha1": "11cc5849a1b57a2f520d6edc608b9e516517d841" + }, + "path_in_vcs": "circle" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/CHANGELOG.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0f0f603 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +# Changelog + +All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. + +The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/), +and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). + +## [Unreleased] +## [0.6.2] - 2026-07-20 +### Merged PRs +- Fix(circle): allow quotient domain smaller than committed LDE (#1834) +- Chore: move some tracing spans to debug level (#1845) +- Fix(circle): reject opening point equal to a query point instead of panicking (#1849) +- Fix(circle): reject input matrices opened at zero points (#1853) +- Perf(mersenne-31,circle): defer M31 mixed_dot_product reduction; truncate circle LDE interpolation (#1903) +- Perf(circle): precompute per-query FRI twiddle chain, hoist verifier-side redundant work (#1922) +- Revert "fix(circle): reject input matrices opened at zero points (#1853)" +- Revert "fix(circle): reject opening point equal to a query point instead of panicking (#1849)" + +## [0.6.1] - 2026-06-13 +### Merged PRs +- Perf(circle): parallelize the FRI fold kernels (#1809) +- Perf(circle): evaluate out-of-domain openings on a trace-size subdomain (#1810) +- Perf(circle): kill data-movement passes across `extrapolate` (#1811) +- Perf(circle): alpha-reduce the trace-size subdomain prefix and lift the column (#1818) +- Perf(m31): eliminate allocation churn in QM31 column conversions and the lambda extraction (#1823) +- Perf(circle): flatten the fused CFFT pass driver (#1819) + +## [0.6.0] - 2026-06-11 +### Merged PRs +- Feat: add support for Periodic Columns at runtime (#1462) +- Perf(circle): drop vp_denoms after batch inversion (#1502) +- Fix(circle): add debug_assert for usize underflow in Point methods (#1445) +- Fix: make test suite pass in release mode (#1513) +- Refactor(fri): move FRI parameter constructors to associated methods (#1530) +- Type Circle FRI Shape Errors (#1541) +- Chore: use T::zero_vec(n) instead of vec![T::ZERO; n] (#1633) +- Chore: remove needless_range_loop allows across the workspace (#1632) +- Enforce Positive max_log_arity (#1652) +- Verifier: add a couple strengthening checks (#1666) +- Harden log_arity validation in FRI and Circle (#1676) +- Add fail-fast checks to periodic LDE builders (#1614) +- Perf(circle): pack the v_n_prod chain in compute_lagrange_den_batched (#1708) +- Fix: add PoW check in Circle STARK's commit phase (#1723) +- Minor (#1739) +- Fix(merkle-tree): enforce opened row widths in batch verification (#1757) +- Fix(circle): reject zero-query configurations (#1772) +- Fix(circle): reject oversized query-index widths (#1774) +- Perf(circle): parallelize selectors_on_coset via fused passes (#1776) +- Perf(circle): fill the LDE extension in parallel (#1778) +- Chore: update CHANGELOGs (#1785) +- Doc: add basic READMEs in main crates (#1786) +- Fix(circle): reject proofs that under-report commit rounds (#1792) +- Perf: collapse allocations in cfft path (#1795) +- Perf(circle): fuse CFFT butterfly layers into cache-resident parallel passes (#1796) +- Perf(circle): batch and parallelize the PCS open phase (#1797) + +## [0.5.3] - 2026-05-15 +### Merged PRs +- Perf(circle): drop vp_denoms after batch inversion (#1502) + +## [0.5.2] - 2026-03-27 +## [0.5.1] - 2026-03-16 +## [0.5.0] - 2026-03-10 +### Merged PRs +- [BREAKING] feat: Implement high-arity folding (#1277) +- Deps: update rand and rand_xoshiro (#1314) +- Feat: add Merkle Caps (#1321) +- Feat: add Clone to StarkConfig and StarkGenericConfig (#1328) +- Feat: add high-arity support in `MerkleTree` and `MMCS` (#1373) + +## [0.4.2] - 2026-01-05 +### Merged PRs +- Enable ZK for preprocessing and in batch-stark (#1178) (Linda Guiga) +- Avoid change of Pcs's `open` method signature (#1230) (Linda Guiga) + +### Authors +- Linda Guiga + +## [0.4.1] - 2025-12-18 +### Authors + +## [0.4.0] - 2025-12-12 +### Merged PRs +- Chore: add descriptions to all sub-crate manifests (#906) (Himess) +- Remove Nightly Features (#932) (AngusG) +- Docs: improve documentation for Circle STARKs deep quotient algorithms (#1079) (Adrian) +- Clippy: small step (#1102) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add nursery (#1103) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add semicolon_if_nothing_returned (#1107) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add `needless_pass_by_value` (#1112) (Thomas Coratger) +- Circle: batch inverses in selectors_on_coset (#1068) (Forostovec) +- Core: add error messages to error enums via thiserror (#1168) (Thomas Coratger) +- Challenger: use `observe_algebra_slice` when possible (#1187) (Thomas Coratger) +- Feat: add PoW phase for batching in FRI commit phase (#1164) (Zach Langley) + +### Authors +- Adrian +- AngusG +- Forostovec +- Himess +- Thomas Coratger +- Zach Langley + diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.lock b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b13497c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.lock @@ -0,0 +1,1245 @@ +# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo. +# It is not intended for manual editing. +version = 4 + +[[package]] +name = "aho-corasick" +version = "1.1.4" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "ddd31a130427c27518df266943a5308ed92d4b226cc639f5a8f1002816174301" +dependencies = [ + "memchr", +] + +[[package]] +name = "alloca" +version = "0.4.0" +source = 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b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +# THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED BY CARGO +# +# When uploading crates to the registry Cargo will automatically +# "normalize" Cargo.toml files for maximal compatibility +# with all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies +# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies. +# +# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml +# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable). +# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents. + +[package] +edition = "2024" +name = "p3-circle" +version = "0.6.2" +build = false +autolib = false +autobins = false +autoexamples = false +autotests = false +autobenches = false +description = "A STARK proof system built around the unit circle of a finite field, based on the Circle STARKs paper." +homepage = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +readme = "README.md" +keywords = [ + "cryptography", + "SNARK", + "PLONK", + "FRI", + "plonky3", +] +categories = ["cryptography::cryptocurrencies"] +license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0" +repository = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +resolver = "2" + +[lib] +name = "p3_circle" +path = "src/lib.rs" + +[[example]] +name = "lde" +path = "examples/lde.rs" + +[[bench]] +name = "cfft" +path = "benches/cfft.rs" +harness = false + +[dependencies.itertools] +version = "0.15.0" +features = ["use_alloc"] +default-features = false + +[dependencies.p3-challenger] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-commit] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-dft] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-field] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-fri] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-matrix] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-maybe-rayon] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-util] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.serde] +version = "1.0" +default-features = false + +[dependencies.thiserror] +version = "2.0" +default-features = false + +[dependencies.tracing] +version = "0.1.44" +features = ["attributes"] +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.criterion] +version = "0.8" + +[dev-dependencies.hashbrown] +version = "0.17.1" + +[dev-dependencies.proptest] +version = "1.11" +features = ["std"] +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.rand] +version = "0.10.1" +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.tracing-forest] +version = "0.3.1" +features = [ + "ansi", + "smallvec", +] + +[dev-dependencies.tracing-subscriber] +version = "0.3.23" +features = [ + "alloc", + "std", + "env-filter", +] +default-features = false + +[lints.clippy] +cognitive_complexity = "allow" +match_bool = "warn" +needless_pass_by_value = "warn" +redundant_pub_crate = "allow" +semicolon_if_nothing_returned = "warn" +too_long_first_doc_paragraph = "allow" +transmute_undefined_repr = "allow" +tuple_array_conversions = "allow" +unused_peekable = "allow" + +[lints.clippy.all] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.clippy.nursery] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rust] +rust_2024_incompatible_pat = "warn" +unused_must_use = "deny" + +[lints.rust.rust_2018_idioms] +level = "deny" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rustdoc] +all = "warn" + +[features] +cu-trace = [] + +[target.'cfg(target_os = "solana")'.dependencies.solana-program] +version = "2" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.toml.orig b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.toml.orig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4932f6dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/Cargo.toml.orig @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +[package] +name = "p3-circle" +description = "A STARK proof system built around the unit circle of a finite field, based on the Circle STARKs paper." +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +homepage.workspace = true +keywords.workspace = true +categories.workspace = true + +[dependencies] +p3-challenger.workspace = true +p3-commit.workspace = true +p3-dft.workspace = true +p3-field.workspace = true +p3-fri.workspace = true +p3-matrix.workspace = true +p3-maybe-rayon.workspace = true +p3-util.workspace = true + +itertools.workspace = true +serde.workspace = true +thiserror.workspace = true +tracing.workspace = true + +[dev-dependencies] +p3-baby-bear = { path = "../baby-bear" } +p3-keccak = { path = "../keccak" } +p3-merkle-tree = { path = "../merkle-tree" } +p3-mersenne-31 = { path = "../mersenne-31" } +p3-symmetric = { path = "../symmetric" } + +criterion.workspace = true +hashbrown.workspace = true +proptest.workspace = true +rand.workspace = true +tracing-forest = { workspace = true, features = ["ansi", "smallvec"] } +tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, features = ["std", "env-filter"] } + +[[bench]] +name = "cfft" +harness = false + +[lints] +workspace = true diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/PATCH.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/PATCH.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..999aa34f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/PATCH.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# Local patch over p3-circle 0.6.2 + +Pristine source: crates.io `p3-circle 0.6.2` (`Cargo.toml.orig` is the original +manifest). Not a fork we intend to diverge on; drop each item the moment +upstream closes the gap. + +## 1. `cu-trace` feature (measurement only) + +`Cargo.toml` adds a `cu-trace` feature and a Solana-only `solana-program` +dependency. `src/verifier.rs` gains three +`#[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] +sol_log_compute_units()` probes inside the per-query loop (before/after +`open_input`, after `verify_query`). Zero semantic change; off by default. + +## 2. Visibility: `CircleDomain::points`, `CircleDomain::vanishing_poly`, `cfft_permute_slice` are `pub` + +Upstream both are `pub(crate)`. riverrun-m31's ZK wrapper (`src/zk.rs`, +`HidingCirclePcs`) blinds a committed trace as `T' = T + Z_D · R`: it needs +`Z_D` evaluated at concrete circle points of the doubled commitment domain. +The public `PolynomialSpace` surface exposes vanishing polynomials only at +projective-line inputs, which cannot address individual twin-coset points, so +these two methods are made `pub`. No behavior change — visibility only, each +marked with a doc comment pointing here. diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/README.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b9aa969 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# p3-circle + +A STARK framework over the unit circle of a finite field, following the +[Circle STARKs paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/278) by Haböck, Levit +and Papini. This enables Mersenne-31, which has no large two-adic +multiplicative subgroup, to be used as a STARK field. + +Key items: + +- `CirclePcs` — the `p3_commit::Pcs` instantiation over circle domains +- `CircleDomain`, `CircleEvaluations` — circle-group evaluation domains and the circle FFT (`cfft`) +- DEEP quotients and circle-specific FRI folding for the opening argument + +Part of [Plonky3](https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3), dual-licensed under MIT and Apache 2.0. diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/benches/cfft.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/benches/cfft.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82360be6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/benches/cfft.rs @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +use criterion::measurement::Measurement; +use criterion::{BenchmarkGroup, BenchmarkId, Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main}; +use p3_baby_bear::BabyBear; +use p3_circle::{CircleDomain, CircleEvaluations}; +use p3_dft::{Radix2Bowers, Radix2Dit, Radix2DitParallel, TwoAdicSubgroupDft}; +use p3_field::TwoAdicField; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_util::pretty_name; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +fn bench_lde(c: &mut Criterion) { + let log_n = 18; + let log_w = 8; + + let mut g = c.benchmark_group("lde"); + g.sample_size(10); + lde_cfft(&mut g, log_n, log_w); + lde_twoadic::, _>(&mut g, log_n, log_w); + lde_twoadic::, _>(&mut g, log_n, log_w); + lde_twoadic::(&mut g, log_n, log_w); +} + +fn lde_cfft(g: &mut BenchmarkGroup<'_, M>, log_n: usize, log_w: usize) { + type F = Mersenne31; + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let m = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1 << log_w); + g.bench_with_input( + BenchmarkId::new("Cfft", format!("log_n={log_n},log_w={log_w}")), + &m, + |b, m| { + b.iter_batched( + || m.clone(), + |m| { + let evals = + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(CircleDomain::standard(log_n), m); + evals.extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard(log_n + 1)) + }, + criterion::BatchSize::LargeInput, + ); + }, + ); +} + +fn lde_twoadic, M: Measurement>( + g: &mut BenchmarkGroup<'_, M>, + log_n: usize, + log_w: usize, +) where + StandardUniform: Distribution, +{ + let dft = Dft::default(); + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let m = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1 << log_w); + g.bench_with_input( + BenchmarkId::new( + format!("{},{}", pretty_name::(), pretty_name::()), + format!("log_n={log_n},log_w={log_w}"), + ), + &(dft, m), + |b, (dft, m)| { + b.iter_batched( + || (dft.clone(), m.clone()), + |(dft, m)| dft.coset_lde_batch(m, 1, F::GENERATOR), + criterion::BatchSize::LargeInput, + ); + }, + ); +} + +criterion_group!(benches, bench_lde); +criterion_main!(benches); diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/examples/lde.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/examples/lde.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e72de673 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/examples/lde.rs @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +use core::hint::black_box; +use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; + +use p3_baby_bear::BabyBear; +use p3_circle::{CircleDomain, CircleEvaluations}; +use p3_dft::{Radix2DitParallel, TwoAdicSubgroupDft}; +use p3_field::Field; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; +use tracing_forest::ForestLayer; +use tracing_forest::util::LevelFilter; +use tracing_subscriber::layer::SubscriberExt; +use tracing_subscriber::util::SubscriberInitExt; +use tracing_subscriber::{EnvFilter, Registry}; + +type F = Mersenne31; + +fn go>(evals: CircleEvaluations, log_n: usize) -> CircleEvaluations { + evals.extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard(log_n)) +} + +fn main() { + let env_filter = EnvFilter::builder() + .with_default_directive(LevelFilter::INFO.into()) + .from_env_lossy(); + + let mut args = std::env::args().skip(1); + let log_n = args.next().map(|s| s.parse().unwrap()).unwrap_or(16); + let log_w = args.next().map(|s| s.parse().unwrap()).unwrap_or(8); + println!("log_n={log_n}, log_w={log_w}"); + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let m = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1 << log_w); + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(CircleDomain::standard(log_n), m); + + println!("warming up for 1s..."); + let t0 = Instant::now(); + while Instant::now().duration_since(t0) < Duration::from_secs(1) { + black_box(go(black_box(evals.clone()), log_n + 1)); + } + + Registry::default() + .with(env_filter) + .with(ForestLayer::default()) + .init(); + + black_box(go(black_box(evals), log_n + 1)); + + let m = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1 << log_w); + black_box(Radix2DitParallel::default().coset_lde_batch(black_box(m), 1, BabyBear::GENERATOR)); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/cfft.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/cfft.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f74fe33 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/cfft.rs @@ -0,0 +1,718 @@ +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::mem::MaybeUninit; + +use itertools::{Itertools, iterate, izip}; +use p3_commit::PolynomialSpace; +use p3_dft::{Butterfly, DifButterfly, DitButterfly}; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field, FieldArray, PackedValue, batch_multiplicative_inverse}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; +use p3_util::{log2_ceil_usize, log2_strict_usize, reverse_slice_index_bits}; +use tracing::{debug_span, instrument}; + +use crate::domain::CircleDomain; +use crate::point::{Point, compute_lagrange_den_batched}; +use crate::{CfftPermutable, CfftView, cfft_permute_slice}; + +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct CircleEvaluations> { + pub(crate) domain: CircleDomain, + pub(crate) values: M, +} + +impl> CircleEvaluations { + pub(crate) fn from_cfft_order(domain: CircleDomain, values: M) -> Self { + assert_eq!(1 << domain.log_n, values.height()); + Self { domain, values } + } + pub fn from_natural_order( + domain: CircleDomain, + values: M, + ) -> CircleEvaluations> { + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(domain, values.cfft_perm_rows()) + } + pub fn to_cfft_order(self) -> M { + self.values + } + pub fn to_natural_order(self) -> CfftView { + self.values.cfft_perm_rows() + } +} + +impl> CircleEvaluations { + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(dims = %self.values.dimensions()))] + pub fn interpolate(self) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let len = self.domain.size() * self.values.width(); + self.interpolate_with_capacity(len) + } + + /// Interpolate into a freshly allocated buffer with at least `capacity` elements + /// reserved, so a caller can extend the result in place without reallocating. + /// + /// The source matrix is read directly by the first butterfly pass: each parallel + /// task copies its own rows into the output buffer and immediately applies every + /// layer of the pass while they are cache-resident, so the input is never + /// materialized separately. + fn interpolate_with_capacity(self, capacity: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let Self { domain, values } = self; + let w = values.width(); + let len = domain.size() * w; + + let twiddles = debug_span!("twiddles").in_scope(|| { + compute_twiddles(domain) + .into_iter() + .map(|ts| { + CfftLayer::Butterflies( + batch_multiplicative_inverse(&ts) + .into_iter() + .map(|t| DifButterfly(t)) + .collect_vec(), + ) + }) + .collect_vec() + }); + + assert_eq!(twiddles.len(), domain.log_n); + + // The interpolation must divide every element by the domain size. Folding the + // scaling into the last butterfly pass touches the data while it is cache-resident, + // instead of paying a separate full sweep over the matrix. + let h_inv = F::ONE.div_2exp_u64(domain.log_n as u64); + + let mut buf: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(capacity.max(len)); + cfft_layers( + buf.as_mut_ptr(), + domain.size(), + w, + &twiddles, + Some(&values), + Some(h_inv), + ); + // SAFETY: the first pass of `cfft_layers` copied every row of `values` into + // `buf` before transforming it, so all `len` elements are initialised, and the + // reservation above covers them. + unsafe { + buf.set_len(len); + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(buf, w) + } + + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(dims = %self.values.dimensions()))] + pub fn extrapolate( + self, + target_domain: CircleDomain, + ) -> CircleEvaluations> { + assert!(target_domain.log_n >= self.domain.log_n); + + // Reserve the buffer for the full LDE up front: the blow-up in `evaluate` then + // fills the spare capacity instead of reallocating, so the whole extrapolation + // performs a single allocation, and every page is first touched by a parallel + // write inside the first interpolation pass. + let target_len = target_domain.size() * self.values.width(); + let coeffs = self.interpolate_with_capacity(target_len); + CircleEvaluations::evaluate(target_domain, coeffs) + } + + pub fn evaluate_at_point>(&self, point: Point) -> Vec { + // Permute the domain to get it into the right format. + let permuted_points = cfft_permute_slice(&self.domain.points().collect_vec()); + + // Compute the lagrange denominators. This is batched as it lets us make use of batched_multiplicative_inverse. + let lagrange_den = compute_lagrange_den_batched(&permuted_points, point, self.domain.log_n); + + self.evaluate_at_point_with_den(point, &lagrange_den) + } + + /// Evaluate at `point` given precomputed Lagrange denominators for `(self.domain, point)`, + /// as produced by [`compute_lagrange_den_batched`] on the CFFT-ordered domain points. + pub(crate) fn evaluate_at_point_with_den>( + &self, + point: Point, + lagrange_den: &[EF], + ) -> Vec { + // Compute z_H + let lagrange_num = self.domain.vanishing_poly(point); + + // The columnwise_dot_product here consumes about 5% of the runtime for example prove_poseidon2_m31_keccak. + // Definitely something worth optimising further. + self.values + .columnwise_dot_product(lagrange_den) + .into_iter() + .map(|x| x * lagrange_num) + .collect_vec() + } + + /// Evaluate at two points in a single pass over the matrix, given precomputed Lagrange + /// denominators for each point. + /// + /// Equivalent to two [`Self::evaluate_at_point_with_den`] calls, but each matrix row is + /// only loaded once. + pub(crate) fn evaluate_at_two_points_with_dens>( + &self, + points: [Point; 2], + dens: [&[EF]; 2], + ) -> [Vec; 2] { + let lagrange_nums = points.map(|point| self.domain.vanishing_poly(point)); + + let interleaved_dens = izip!(dens[0], dens[1]) + .map(|(&den_0, &den_1)| FieldArray([den_0, den_1])) + .collect_vec(); + + let (ps_at_point_0, ps_at_point_1) = self + .values + .columnwise_dot_product_batched::(&interleaved_dens) + .into_iter() + .map(|FieldArray([dot_0, dot_1])| (dot_0 * lagrange_nums[0], dot_1 * lagrange_nums[1])) + .unzip(); + [ps_at_point_0, ps_at_point_1] + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn dim(&self) -> usize + where + M: Clone, + { + let coeffs = self.clone().interpolate(); + for (i, mut row) in coeffs.rows().enumerate() { + if row.all(|x| x.is_zero()) { + return i; + } + } + coeffs.height() + } +} + +impl CircleEvaluations> { + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(dims = %coeffs.dimensions()))] + pub fn evaluate(domain: CircleDomain, mut coeffs: RowMajorMatrix) -> Self { + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(coeffs.height()); + assert!(log_n <= domain.log_n); + + let added_bits = domain.log_n - log_n; + let w = coeffs.width(); + let target_len = domain.size() * w; + + // A `DitButterfly` layer acting on coefficients whose upper half is zero sets both + // outputs to the lower input, so the first `added_bits` layers of the transform are + // pure row duplications. Instead of materializing the zero-padding (or the tiled + // copies it collapses to) in a separate sweep, the duplications run as [`Dup`] + // layers inside the first fused pass, while the rows are cache-resident. Only the + // capacity is reserved here; the duplication layers initialise the tail. + coeffs + .values + .reserve_exact(target_len - coeffs.values.len()); + + let twiddles = debug_span!("twiddles").in_scope(|| { + compute_twiddles(domain) + .into_iter() + .map(|ts| ts.into_iter().map(|t| DitButterfly(t)).collect_vec()) + .rev() + .skip(added_bits) + .map(CfftLayer::Butterflies) + .collect_vec() + }); + let layers = (0..added_bits) + .map(|l| CfftLayer::Dup { blocks: 1 << l }) + .chain(twiddles) + .collect_vec(); + + cfft_layers( + coeffs.values.as_mut_ptr(), + domain.size(), + w, + &layers, + None::<&RowMajorMatrix>, + None, + ); + + // SAFETY: every row with one of the top `added_bits` index bits set is written by + // the duplication layer of its highest such bit (later duplication layers rewrite + // it consistently), so all `target_len` elements behind the reservation above are + // initialised once `cfft_layers` returns. + unsafe { + coeffs.values.set_len(target_len); + } + + Self::from_cfft_order(domain, coeffs) + } +} + +/// One layer of a fused CFFT pass. +enum CfftLayer { + /// Copy the lower half of each of `blocks` row blocks onto its upper half. + /// + /// This realizes a `DitButterfly` layer acting on coefficients whose upper half is + /// zero (for which both outputs equal the lower input), i.e. the zero-padding part + /// of an LDE, without materializing the padding in a separate sweep. + Dup { blocks: usize }, + /// A twiddle butterfly layer, one twiddle per block. + Butterflies(Vec), +} + +impl CfftLayer { + const fn blocks(&self) -> usize { + match self { + Self::Dup { blocks } => *blocks, + Self::Butterflies(ts) => ts.len(), + } + } +} + +/// The bit position by which a layer's butterfly partners differ. +/// +/// A layer with `blocks` blocks acts on `blocks` equal blocks of rows, +/// pairing the two halves of each block: rows `j` and `j ^ (h / (2 * blocks))`. +const fn flipped_bit(log_h: usize, blocks: usize) -> usize { + log_h - log2_strict_usize(blocks) - 1 +} + +/// The binary log of the number of rows each task keeps cache-resident in [`cfft_layers`]. +fn log_group_rows(log_h: usize, width: usize) -> usize { + // Cap the per-task working set so that all layers of a pass run from cache. + const TARGET_GROUP_BYTES: usize = 1 << 19; + let log_cache = log2_ceil_usize(TARGET_GROUP_BYTES / (width * size_of::()).max(1)).max(1); + // Keep enough groups around for the thread pool to stay busy, but never fewer than 8 rows + // per group so small transforms still fuse several layers per pass. + let log_par = log_h + .saturating_sub(log2_ceil_usize(4 * current_num_threads())) + .max(3); + log_cache.min(log_par).min(log_h) +} + +/// Apply a full sequence of butterfly layers, fusing as many layers as possible per pass. +/// +/// Layers are batched into maximal consecutive runs whose [`flipped_bit`]s fit in a window of +/// `log_group` bits, `[log_stride, log_stride + log_group)`. The layers of one run only ever +/// combine rows that agree on all index bits outside that window, so the matrix splits into +/// independent groups of `2^log_group` rows sitting `2^log_stride` rows apart. Each parallel task +/// applies every layer of the run to one cache-resident group, costing one pass over memory per +/// run instead of one per layer. +/// +/// When `ingest` is set, the buffer behind `base` may be entirely uninitialised: each task of +/// the first pass copies its own rows from the source matrix before transforming them, so the +/// input is pulled in during the first pass instead of a separate materialization sweep. After +/// the call, all `h * width` elements behind `base` are initialised. +/// +/// When `scale` is set, every element is additionally multiplied by it during the final pass, +/// while its group is still cache-resident. +/// +/// [`CfftLayer::Dup`] layers may act on uninitialised rows: a duplication layer writes every +/// row with its flipped bit set, so once all duplication layers have run, every row beyond the +/// original (lowest-index) block is initialised. Since duplications are copies rather than +/// arithmetic, each one widens the window budget of its run by one bit instead of consuming it, +/// keeping the number of passes unchanged. +/// +/// # Safety-relevant contract (not `unsafe fn` to keep call sites readable) +/// +/// `base` must be valid for reads and writes of `h * width` elements. Elements must be +/// initialised, except (without `ingest`) rows whose index has a [`CfftLayer::Dup`] flipped +/// bit set, and (with `ingest`) the whole buffer. `layers` must not be empty if `ingest` or +/// `scale` is set (otherwise no pass would perform the copy or the scaling). +fn cfft_layers, M: Matrix>( + base: *mut F, + h: usize, + width: usize, + layers: &[CfftLayer], + ingest: Option<&M>, + scale: Option, +) { + let log_h = log2_strict_usize(h); + let log_group = log_group_rows::(log_h, width); + debug_assert!(ingest.is_none_or(|m| m.height() == h && m.width() == width)); + assert!( + !layers.is_empty() || (ingest.is_none() && scale.is_none()), + "ingest and scale require at least one layer pass" + ); + + // Duplication layers may widen a window beyond `log_group` (see above), but never so far + // that the larger groups leave the thread pool idle. + let budget_cap = + log_group.max(log_h.saturating_sub(log2_ceil_usize(4 * current_num_threads()))); + + let mut start = 0; + while start < layers.len() { + let is_dup = |l: &CfftLayer| matches!(l, CfftLayer::Dup { .. }); + let first_bit = flipped_bit(log_h, layers[start].blocks()); + let (mut lo_bit, mut hi_bit) = (first_bit, first_bit); + let mut budget = (log_group + usize::from(is_dup(&layers[start]))).min(budget_cap); + let mut end = start + 1; + while let Some(layer) = layers.get(end) { + let bit = flipped_bit(log_h, layer.blocks()); + let new_budget = (budget + usize::from(is_dup(layer))).min(budget_cap); + if bit.max(hi_bit) - bit.min(lo_bit) >= new_budget { + break; + } + budget = new_budget; + (lo_bit, hi_bit) = (bit.min(lo_bit), bit.max(hi_bit)); + end += 1; + } + let log_group_run = log_group.max(hi_bit - lo_bit + 1).min(log_h); + let log_stride = lo_bit.min(log_h - log_group_run); + let pass_ingest = if start == 0 { ingest } else { None }; + let pass_scale = scale.filter(|_| end == layers.len()); + debug_span!( + "fused_layers", + layers = end - start, + log_group_run, + log_stride + ) + .in_scope(|| { + par_group_pass( + base, + h, + width, + &layers[start..end], + log_group_run, + log_stride, + pass_ingest, + pass_scale, + ); + }); + start = end; + } +} + +/// Apply consecutive butterfly layers whose [`flipped_bit`]s all lie in +/// `[log_stride, log_stride + log_group)`, parallelizing over independent row groups. +/// +/// Group `g = (hi, lo)` consists of the rows `j = hi << (log_group + log_stride) | t << log_stride +/// | lo` for `t` in `[0, 2^log_group)`. A layer with `b` blocks pairs rows differing in bit +/// `e = flipped_bit - log_stride` of `t` and applies the twiddle `b * j / h`, which reduces to +/// index `t >> (e + 1)` into the contiguous twiddle slice for `hi`. +/// +/// See [`cfft_layers`] for the `ingest` and `scale` semantics and the safety contract. +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +fn par_group_pass, M: Matrix>( + base: *mut F, + h: usize, + width: usize, + layers: &[CfftLayer], + log_group: usize, + log_stride: usize, + ingest: Option<&M>, + scale: Option, +) { + let log_h = log2_strict_usize(h); + let num_groups = h >> log_group; + let base_addr = base as usize; + let packed_scale = scale.map(F::Packing::from); + (0..num_groups).into_par_iter().for_each(|g| { + let base = base_addr as *mut F; + let hi = g >> log_stride; + let lo = g & ((1 << log_stride) - 1); + let first_row = (hi << (log_group + log_stride)) | lo; + if let Some(src) = ingest { + for t in 0..1usize << log_group { + let row = first_row + (t << log_stride); + // SAFETY: `row < h` since `t < 2^log_group`, and this task owns the + // destination row (the groups partition the rows), so the raw copy + // neither races nor reads uninitialised destination memory. + unsafe { + let src_row = src.row_slice_unchecked(row); + core::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(src_row.as_ptr(), base.add(row * width), width); + } + } + } + for layer in layers { + let e = flipped_bit(log_h, layer.blocks()) - log_stride; + match layer { + CfftLayer::Dup { .. } => { + for s in 0..1usize << (log_group - e - 1) { + for u in 0..1usize << e { + let row_lo = first_row + (((s << (e + 1)) | u) << log_stride); + let row_hi = row_lo + (1 << (e + log_stride)); + // SAFETY: row ownership and non-aliasing as for the butterfly + // case below. The copy goes through `MaybeUninit`, so it is + // sound even while either row is still uninitialised (a + // garbage copy is later overwritten by the duplication layer + // of the destination row's highest flipped bit). + unsafe { + core::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping( + base.add(row_lo * width).cast::>(), + base.add(row_hi * width).cast::>(), + width, + ); + } + } + } + } + CfftLayer::Butterflies(ts) => { + let slice_len = 1 << (log_group - e - 1); + let slice = &ts[hi * slice_len..][..slice_len]; + if log_stride == 0 { + // The `2^e` row pairs sharing the twiddle `t` span two contiguous + // row blocks, so they merge into a single call: one twiddle + // broadcast and one long inner loop instead of one per row pair. + for (s, &t) in slice.iter().enumerate() { + let row_lo = first_row + (s << (e + 1)); + let row_hi = row_lo + (1 << e); + let len = width << e; + // SAFETY: every row index decomposes uniquely as + // `hi << (log_group + log_stride) | t << log_stride | lo`, so the + // task for group `g = (hi, lo)` is the only one touching its rows, + // and within a layer each row appears in exactly one butterfly, so + // the two blocks never alias. All indices stay below `h` since + // `t < 2^log_group`. + let (block_lo, block_hi) = unsafe { + ( + core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(base.add(row_lo * width), len), + core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(base.add(row_hi * width), len), + ) + }; + t.apply_to_rows(block_lo, block_hi); + } + } else { + for (s, &t) in slice.iter().enumerate() { + for u in 0..1usize << e { + let row_lo = first_row + (((s << (e + 1)) | u) << log_stride); + let row_hi = row_lo + (1 << (e + log_stride)); + // SAFETY: as in the contiguous case above; `row_lo` and + // `row_hi` never alias and stay below `h`. + let (row_lo, row_hi) = unsafe { + ( + core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut( + base.add(row_lo * width), + width, + ), + core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut( + base.add(row_hi * width), + width, + ), + ) + }; + t.apply_to_rows(row_lo, row_hi); + } + } + } + } + } + } + if let (Some(scale), Some(packed_scale)) = (scale, packed_scale) { + for t in 0..1usize << log_group { + let row = first_row + (t << log_stride); + // SAFETY: the group decomposition above guarantees this task is the only + // one touching its rows, and `row < h` since `t < 2^log_group`. + let row = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(base.add(row * width), width) }; + let (packed, suffix) = F::Packing::pack_slice_with_suffix_mut(row); + for x in packed { + *x *= packed_scale; + } + for x in suffix { + *x *= scale; + } + } + } + }); +} + +impl CircleDomain { + pub(crate) fn y_twiddles(&self) -> Vec { + let mut ys = self.coset0().map(|p| p.y).collect_vec(); + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut ys); + ys + } + + pub(crate) fn x_twiddles(&self, layer: usize) -> Vec { + let generator = self.subgroup_generator() * (1 << layer); + let shift = self.shift * (1 << layer); + let mut xs = iterate(shift, move |&p| p + generator) + .map(|p| p.x) + .take(1 << (self.log_n - layer - 2)) + .collect_vec(); + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut xs); + xs + } + pub(crate) fn nth_x_twiddle(&self, index: usize) -> F { + (self.shift + self.subgroup_generator() * index).x + } +} + +fn compute_twiddles(domain: CircleDomain) -> Vec> { + assert!(domain.log_n >= 1); + let mut pts = domain.coset0().collect_vec(); + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut pts); + let mut twiddles = vec![pts.iter().map(|p| p.y).collect_vec()]; + if domain.log_n >= 2 { + twiddles.push(pts.iter().step_by(2).map(|p| p.x).collect_vec()); + for i in 0..(domain.log_n - 2) { + let prev = twiddles.last().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(prev.len(), 1 << (domain.log_n - 2 - i)); + let cur = prev + .iter() + .step_by(2) + .map(|x| x.square().double() - F::ONE) + .collect_vec(); + twiddles.push(cur); + } + } + twiddles +} + +pub fn circle_basis(p: Point, log_n: usize) -> Vec { + let mut b = vec![F::ONE, p.y]; + let mut x = p.x; + for _ in 0..(log_n - 1) { + for i in 0..b.len() { + b.push(b[i] * x); + } + x = x.square().double() - F::ONE; + } + assert_eq!(b.len(), 1 << log_n); + b +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use itertools::iproduct; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + impl CircleDomain { + /// Used only by [`crate::folding::fold_y_row`], the test-only reference implementation + /// of [`crate::folding::fold_y`]; see that function's doc comment. + pub(crate) fn nth_y_twiddle(&self, index: usize) -> F { + self.nth_point(crate::cfft_permute_index(index << 1, self.log_n)) + .y + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_cfft_icfft() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, width) in iproduct!(2..5, [1, 4, 11]) { + let shift = Point::generator(F::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY) * (rng.random::() as usize); + let domain = CircleDomain::new(log_n, shift); + let trace = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, width); + let coeffs = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(domain, trace.clone()).interpolate(); + assert_eq!( + CircleEvaluations::evaluate(domain, coeffs.clone()) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix(), + trace, + "icfft(cfft(evals)) is identity", + ); + for (i, pt) in domain.points().enumerate() { + assert_eq!( + &*trace.row_slice(i).unwrap(), + coeffs.columnwise_dot_product(&circle_basis(pt, log_n)), + "coeffs can be evaluated with circle_basis", + ); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_extrapolation() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in iproduct!(2..5, [1, 2, 3]) { + let evals = CircleEvaluations::::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 11), + ); + let lde = evals + .clone() + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup)); + + let coeffs = evals.interpolate(); + let lde_coeffs = lde.interpolate(); + + for r in 0..coeffs.height() { + assert_eq!( + &*coeffs.row_slice(r).unwrap(), + &*lde_coeffs.row_slice(r).unwrap() + ); + } + for r in coeffs.height()..lde_coeffs.height() { + assert!(lde_coeffs.row(r).unwrap().into_iter().all(|x| x.is_zero())); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn eval_at_point_matches_cfft() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, width) in iproduct!(2..5, [1, 4, 11]) { + let evals = CircleEvaluations::::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, width), + ); + + let pt = Point::::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + + assert_eq!( + evals.clone().evaluate_at_point(pt), + evals + .interpolate() + .columnwise_dot_product(&circle_basis(pt, log_n)) + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn eval_at_point_matches_lde() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, width, log_blowup) in iproduct!(2..8, [1, 4, 11], [1, 2]) { + let evals = CircleEvaluations::::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, width), + ); + let lde = evals + .clone() + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup)); + let zeta = Point::::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + assert_eq!(evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta), lde.evaluate_at_point(zeta)); + assert_eq!( + evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta), + evals + .interpolate() + .columnwise_dot_product(&circle_basis(zeta, log_n)) + ); + assert_eq!( + lde.evaluate_at_point(zeta), + lde.interpolate() + .columnwise_dot_product(&circle_basis(zeta, log_n + log_blowup)) + ); + } + } + + /// The first `2^(log_n - b)` rows of a CFFT-ordered matrix over a domain `D` are the + /// CFFT-ordered matrix over the twin-coset `CircleDomain::new(log_n - b, D.shift)`, and a + /// polynomial of degree below that size is determined by its values there. Out-of-domain + /// evaluation can therefore work on the prefix alone. + #[test] + fn eval_at_point_on_subdomain_prefix_matches_full() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, width, log_blowup) in iproduct!(2..8, [1, 4, 11], [1, 2]) { + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + let lde = CircleEvaluations::::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, width), + ) + .extrapolate(lde_domain); + + let sub_domain = CircleDomain::new(log_n, lde_domain.shift); + // The prefix rows are the subdomain's CFFT order: the same selection applies to + // the domain points. + assert_eq!( + cfft_permute_slice(&sub_domain.points().collect_vec()), + cfft_permute_slice(&lde_domain.points().collect_vec())[..1 << log_n], + ); + + let zeta = Point::::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + let full = lde.evaluate_at_point(zeta); + let prefix = lde.values.split_rows(1 << log_n).0; + let sub_evals = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(sub_domain, prefix); + assert_eq!(sub_evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta), full); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/deep_quotient.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/deep_quotient.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1dd67af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/deep_quotient.rs @@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +//! Deep quotient computation for Circle STARKs. +//! +//! This module implements the DEEP (Domain Extension for Eliminating Pretenders) quotient +//! computation as described in the Circle STARKs paper. This allows the verifier to check +//! polynomial constraints by evaluating them at random points outside the original domain. +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::{Itertools, izip}; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ + ExtensionField, Field, PackedFieldExtension, batch_multiplicative_inverse, dot_product, +}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; +use tracing::instrument; + +use crate::CircleEvaluations; +use crate::domain::CircleDomain; +use crate::ordering::cfft_permute_index; +use crate::point::Point; + +/// Compute the "vanishing part" of the DEEP quotient numerator and denominator. +/// +/// See Section 6, Remark 21 of the Circle STARKs paper (page 30 of first edition PDF). +/// +/// # Mathematical Background +/// +/// The DEEP quotient has two parts: +/// 1. The vanishing part: `Re(1/v_gamma) + alpha^L * Im(1/v_gamma)` (computed here) +/// 2. The constraint part: `\bar g - \bar v_gamma` (computed elsewhere) +/// +/// Where `v_gamma` is the vanishing polynomial at point `gamma = zeta`. +/// +/// # Parameters +/// +/// - `x`: A point on the circle domain +/// - `zeta`: The random challenge point (outside the original domain) +/// - `alpha_pow_width`: The challenge `alpha` raised to the power of the polynomial width +/// +/// # Returns +/// The numerator and denominator for the vanishing part. +pub(crate) fn deep_quotient_vanishing_part>( + x: Point, + zeta: Point, + alpha_pow_width: EF, +) -> (EF, EF) { + // Compute the vanishing polynomial v_p(zeta) = (x - zeta) * (x - zeta_bar) + let (re_v_zeta, im_v_zeta) = x.v_p(zeta); + + // Numerator: Re(1/v_gamma) + alpha^L * Im(1/v_gamma) + let numerator = re_v_zeta - alpha_pow_width * im_v_zeta; + + // Denominator: |v_gamma|^2 = Re(v_gamma)^2 + Im(v_gamma)^2 + let denominator = re_v_zeta.square() + im_v_zeta.square(); + + (numerator, denominator) +} + +/// Compute the DEEP quotient for a single row of polynomial evaluations. +/// +/// This function computes the DEEP quotient for a single point `x` on the circle domain, +/// given the polynomial evaluations at that point and at the challenge point `zeta`. +/// +/// # Mathematical Background +/// +/// The DEEP quotient for a polynomial `f` at point `x` is: +/// `(f(x) - f(zeta)) / (x - zeta)` +/// +/// This function computes this quotient by: +/// 1. Computing the vanishing part (handles the `(x - zeta)` denominator) +/// 2. Computing the constraint part (handles the `f(x) - f(zeta)` numerator) +/// +/// # Parameters +/// +/// - `alpha_pow_width`: `alpha` raised to the power of the matrix width (`ps_at_x.len()`) +/// - `alpha_powers`: `alpha^0, alpha^1, ..`, at least `ps_at_x.len()` of them +/// - `x`: A point on the circle domain +/// - `zeta`: The random challenge point (outside the original domain) +/// - `ps_at_x`: Polynomial evaluations at point `x` (one per polynomial) +/// - `ps_at_zeta`: Polynomial evaluations at challenge point `zeta` +/// +/// # Returns +/// +/// The DEEP quotient value for this row. +pub(crate) fn deep_quotient_reduce_row>( + alpha_pow_width: EF, + alpha_powers: &[EF], + x: Point, + zeta: Point, + ps_at_x: &[F], + ps_at_zeta: &[EF], +) -> EF { + // Compute the vanishing part: handles the (x - zeta) denominator + let (vp_num, vp_denom) = deep_quotient_vanishing_part(x, zeta, alpha_pow_width); + + // Compute the constraint part: handles the f(x) - f(zeta) numerator + let constraint_part = dot_product::( + alpha_powers.iter().copied(), + izip!(ps_at_x, ps_at_zeta).map(|(&p_at_x, &p_at_zeta)| -p_at_zeta + p_at_x), + ); + + // Combine vanishing part and constraint part + (vp_num / vp_denom) * constraint_part +} + +/// The point-dependent part of the DEEP quotient on a fixed domain. +/// +/// Holds `v_p(zeta) = re + im * i` for every domain point, along with the inverse of the +/// squared magnitude `|v_p(zeta)|^2`. These depend only on `(domain, zeta)`, so they are +/// shared by every matrix opened at `zeta` on that domain. +pub(crate) struct VanishingParts { + re: Vec, + im: Vec, + denom_inv: Vec, +} + +/// Compute the [`VanishingParts`] of the DEEP quotient at `zeta` for the given domain points. +/// +/// `points` must be the domain points in CFFT order. +#[instrument(skip_all, fields(n = points.len()))] +pub(crate) fn compute_vanishing_parts>( + points: &[Point], + zeta: Point, +) -> VanishingParts { + let (re, im): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = points.par_iter().map(|&x| x.v_p(zeta)).unzip(); + let denoms = re + .par_iter() + .zip(&im) + .map(|(&re, &im)| re.square() + im.square()) + .collect::>(); + let denom_inv = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&denoms); + VanishingParts { re, im, denom_inv } +} + +/// Accumulate one matrix/point DEEP quotient into a running reduced opening: +/// +/// `ro[i] += alpha_offset * (re[i] - alpha^W * im[i]) / |v_p(zeta)|^2[i] * (r[i] - c)` +/// +/// where `r[i] = sum_j(alpha^j * p_j[x_i])` are the alpha-reduced rows of the matrix, +/// `c = sum_j(alpha^j * p_j[zeta])` is `reduced_ps_at_zeta` and `W` is the matrix width. +#[instrument(skip_all, fields(n = ro.len()), level = "debug")] +pub(crate) fn accumulate_deep_quotient( + ro: &mut [EF], + alpha_offset: EF, + alpha_pow_width: EF, + reduced_rows: &[EF], + vp: &VanishingParts, + reduced_ps_at_zeta: EF, +) { + ro.par_iter_mut() + .zip(reduced_rows) + .zip(&vp.re) + .zip(&vp.im) + .zip(&vp.denom_inv) + .for_each(|((((ro, &reduced_ps_at_x), &re), &im), &denom_inv)| { + *ro += alpha_offset + * (re - alpha_pow_width * im) + * denom_inv + * (reduced_ps_at_x - reduced_ps_at_zeta); + }); +} + +impl> CircleEvaluations { + /// Reduce each row to a single value with powers of `alpha`: `r[i] = sum_j(alpha^j * m[i][j])`. + /// + /// This is the only part of the DEEP quotient that traverses the matrix, and it does not + /// depend on the opening point, so it is computed once per matrix and shared by all points. + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(dims = %self.values.dimensions()), level = "debug")] + pub(crate) fn rowwise_alpha_reduce>(&self, alpha: EF) -> Vec { + let packed_alpha_powers = + EF::ExtensionPacking::packed_ext_powers_capped(alpha, self.values.width()) + .collect_vec(); + self.values + .rowwise_packed_dot_product::(&packed_alpha_powers) + .collect() + } + + /// Alpha-reduce evaluations over a subdomain, then lift the reduced column to + /// `target_domain` with a narrow CFFT extrapolation. + /// + /// When `self` holds the trace-size subdomain prefix of a committed LDE (see + /// `eval_at_point_on_subdomain_prefix_matches_full`), the reduced column + /// `r = sum_j(alpha^j * p_j)` lies coordinate-wise in the pre-blow-up polynomial space, + /// so its values on the prefix determine it. Reducing the prefix and extrapolating a + /// single extension-field column costs `1 / blowup` of the full-matrix traversal plus + /// a narrow CFFT, instead of a full traversal. + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(dims = %self.values.dimensions()))] + pub(crate) fn rowwise_alpha_reduce_lifted>( + &self, + alpha: EF, + target_domain: CircleDomain, + ) -> Vec { + let reduced = self.rowwise_alpha_reduce(alpha); + let flat = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(reduced).flatten_to_base(); + let lifted = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(self.domain, flat) + .extrapolate(target_domain) + .to_cfft_order(); + EF::reconstitute_from_base(lifted.values) + } +} + +/// Extract and remove the vanishing polynomial component from LDE evaluations. +/// +/// This function implements the lambda extraction algorithm described in Section 4.3, Lemma 6 +/// of the Circle STARKs paper. It finds and removes the "error" component that is a scalar +/// multiple of the vanishing polynomial of the original domain. +/// +/// The key insight is that ` = 0` for any polynomial `f` in the FFT space, so we can +/// use this orthogonality to extract `lambda`. +/// +/// # Parameters +/// +/// - `lde`: Mutable slice of LDE evaluations (will be modified in-place) +/// - `log_blowup`: Log of the blowup factor (how much larger the LDE domain is) +/// +/// # Returns +/// +/// The extracted coefficient `lambda` that was removed from the LDE evaluations. +#[instrument(skip_all, fields(bits = log2_strict_usize(lde.len())), level = "debug")] +pub fn extract_lambda>( + lde: &mut [EF], + log_blowup: usize, +) -> EF { + let log_lde_size = log2_strict_usize(lde.len()); + + // The vanishing polynomial v_n is constant on cosets of the same size as the original domain. + // We only need to compute the unique values, which correspond to the number of cosets. + let v_d_init = CircleDomain::::standard(log_lde_size) + .points() + .take(1 << log_blowup) + .map(|p| p.v_n(log_lde_size - log_blowup)) + .collect_vec(); + + // The unique values are repeated over the rest of the domain in the pattern: + // 0 1 2 .. n-1 n n n-1 .. 1 0 0 1 .. + // Look the pattern up through the CFFT permutation instead of materializing + // and permuting a domain-sized vector. + let b = 1 << log_blowup; + let v_d_at = |i: usize| { + let m = cfft_permute_index(i, log_lde_size) & (2 * b - 1); + v_d_init[if m < b { m } else { 2 * b - 1 - m }] + }; + + // Compute the squared norm of the vanishing polynomial + let v_d_2 = F::TWO.exp_u64(log_lde_size as u64 - 1); + + // Extract lambda using the orthogonality property: lambda = / + let lambda = lde + .par_iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, &y)| y * v_d_at(i)) + .sum::() + * v_d_2.inverse(); + + // Remove the vanishing polynomial component from the LDE evaluations + let lambda_v_d: Vec = v_d_init.iter().map(|&v| lambda * v).collect(); + lde.par_iter_mut().enumerate().for_each(|(i, y)| { + let m = cfft_permute_index(i, log_lde_size) & (2 * b - 1); + *y -= lambda_v_d[if m < b { m } else { 2 * b - 1 - m }]; + }); + + lambda +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::ordering::cfft_permute_slice; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + impl> CircleEvaluations { + /// Compute DEEP quotients for all rows in the matrix efficiently using batch operations. + /// + /// This is an optimized version of `deep_quotient_reduce_row` that processes the entire + /// matrix at once. + /// + /// # Mathematical Background + /// + /// For each row `i` in the matrix, this computes: + /// `DEEP_quotient[i] = (f(x[i]) - f(zeta)) / (x[i] - zeta)` + /// + /// # Parameters + /// + /// - `alpha`: The random challenge scalar + /// - `zeta`: The random challenge point (outside the original domain) + /// - `ps_at_zeta`: Polynomial evaluations at challenge point `zeta` + /// + /// # Returns + /// + /// A vector of DEEP quotient values, one for each row in the matrix. + pub(crate) fn deep_quotient_reduce>( + &self, + alpha: EF, + zeta: Point, + ps_at_zeta: &[EF], + ) -> Vec { + let points = cfft_permute_slice(&self.domain.points().collect_vec()); + let vp = compute_vanishing_parts(&points, zeta); + let reduced_rows = self.rowwise_alpha_reduce(alpha); + + let alpha_pow_width = alpha.exp_u64(self.values.width() as u64); + // sum_j(alpha^j * p_j[zeta]), the same for all rows. + let reduced_ps_at_zeta: EF = dot_product(alpha.powers(), ps_at_zeta.iter().copied()); + + let mut ro = EF::zero_vec(reduced_rows.len()); + accumulate_deep_quotient( + &mut ro, + EF::ONE, + alpha_pow_width, + &reduced_rows, + &vp, + reduced_ps_at_zeta, + ); + ro + } + } + + #[test] + fn reduce_row_same_as_reduce_matrix() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let domain = CircleDomain::standard(5); + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + domain, + RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << domain.log_n, 1 << 3), + ); + + let alpha: EF = rng.random(); + let zeta: Point = Point::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + let ps_at_zeta = evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta); + + let mat_reduced = evals.deep_quotient_reduce(alpha, zeta, &ps_at_zeta); + let width = ps_at_zeta.len(); + let alpha_pow_width = alpha.exp_u64(width as u64); + let alpha_powers = alpha.powers().collect_n(width); + let row_reduced = evals + .to_natural_order() + .rows() + .zip(domain.points()) + .map(|(ps_at_x, x)| { + deep_quotient_reduce_row( + alpha_pow_width, + &alpha_powers, + x, + zeta, + &ps_at_x.collect_vec(), + &ps_at_zeta, + ) + }) + .collect_vec(); + assert_eq!(cfft_permute_slice(&mat_reduced), row_reduced); + } + + #[test] + fn reduce_evaluations_low_degree() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let log_n = 5; + let log_blowup = 1; + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1 << 3), + ); + let lde = evals + .clone() + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup)); + assert!(lde.dim() <= (1 << log_n)); + + let alpha: EF = rng.random(); + let zeta: Point = Point::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + + let ps_at_zeta = evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta); + let reduced0 = CircleEvaluations::::from_cfft_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup), + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(lde.deep_quotient_reduce(alpha, zeta, &ps_at_zeta)) + .flatten_to_base(), + ); + assert!(reduced0.dim() <= (1 << log_n) + 1); + + let not_ps_at_zeta = evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta.double()); + let reduced1 = CircleEvaluations::::from_cfft_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup), + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(lde.deep_quotient_reduce(alpha, zeta, ¬_ps_at_zeta)) + .flatten_to_base(), + ); + assert!(reduced1.dim() > (1 << log_n) + 1); + } + + #[test] + fn reduce_multiple_evaluations() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let domain = CircleDomain::standard(5); + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::standard(8); + + let alpha: EF = rng.random(); + let zeta: Point = Point::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + + let mut alpha_offset = EF::ONE; + let mut ros = EF::zero_vec(1 << lde_domain.log_n); + + for _ in 0..4 { + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + domain, + RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << domain.log_n, 1 << 3), + ); + let ps_at_zeta = evals.evaluate_at_point(zeta); + let lde = evals.extrapolate(lde_domain); + assert!(lde.dim() <= (1 << domain.log_n) + 1); + let mat_ros = lde.deep_quotient_reduce(alpha, zeta, &ps_at_zeta); + for (ro, mat_ro) in izip!(&mut ros, mat_ros) { + *ro += alpha_offset * mat_ro; + } + alpha_offset *= alpha.exp_u64(2 * lde.values.width() as u64); + } + + let ros = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + lde_domain, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(ros).flatten_to_base(), + ); + assert!(ros.dim() <= (1 << domain.log_n) + 1); + } + + /// The reduced column is a linear combination of committed polynomials, so it lies in the + /// pre-blow-up polynomial space: reducing the trace-size subdomain prefix and lifting the + /// column back with a CFFT must match reducing the full LDE. + #[test] + fn alpha_reduce_lifted_matches_full() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for log_n in 2..8 { + for log_blowup in [1, 2] { + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + let lde = CircleEvaluations::::from_natural_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 11), + ) + .extrapolate(lde_domain); + + let alpha: EF = rng.random(); + let full = lde.rowwise_alpha_reduce(alpha); + + let sub_domain = CircleDomain::new(log_n, lde_domain.shift); + let prefix = lde.values.split_rows(1 << log_n).0; + let lifted = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(sub_domain, prefix) + .rowwise_alpha_reduce_lifted(alpha, lde_domain); + assert_eq!(full, lifted); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_extract_lambda() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let log_n = 5; + for log_blowup in [1, 2, 3] { + let mut coeffs = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, (1 << log_n) + 1, 1); + coeffs.pad_to_height(1 << (log_n + log_blowup), F::ZERO); + + let domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + let mut lde = CircleEvaluations::evaluate(domain, coeffs.clone()).values; + + let lambda = extract_lambda(&mut lde.values, log_blowup); + assert_eq!(lambda, coeffs.get(1 << log_n, 0).unwrap()); + + let coeffs2 = + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(domain, RowMajorMatrix::new_col(lde.values)) + .interpolate() + .values; + assert_eq!(&coeffs2[..(1 << log_n)], &coeffs.values[..(1 << log_n)]); + assert_eq!(lambda, coeffs.values[1 << log_n]); + assert_eq!(coeffs2[1 << log_n], F::ZERO); + assert_eq!( + &coeffs2[(1 << log_n) + 1..], + &coeffs.values[(1 << log_n) + 1..] + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/domain.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/domain.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..646153fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/domain.rs @@ -0,0 +1,565 @@ +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::{Itertools, iterate}; +use p3_commit::{LagrangeSelectors, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, batch_multiplicative_inverse}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; +use p3_util::{log2_ceil_usize, log2_strict_usize}; +use tracing::instrument; + +use crate::cfft::CircleEvaluations; +use crate::point::Point; + +/// A twin-coset of the circle group on F. It has a power-of-two size and an arbitrary shift. +/// +/// X is generator, O is the first coset, goes counterclockwise +/// ```text +/// O X . +/// . . +/// . O <- start = shift +/// . . - (1,0) +/// O . +/// . . +/// . . O +/// ``` +/// +/// For ordering reasons, the other half will start at gen / shift: +/// ```text +/// . X O <- start = gen/shift +/// . . +/// O . +/// . . - (1,0) +/// . O +/// . . +/// O . . +/// ``` +/// +/// The full domain is the interleaving of these two cosets +#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct CircleDomain { + // log_n corresponds to the log size of the WHOLE domain + pub(crate) log_n: usize, + pub(crate) shift: Point, +} + +impl CircleDomain { + pub const fn new(log_n: usize, shift: Point) -> Self { + Self { log_n, shift } + } + pub fn standard(log_n: usize) -> Self { + Self { + log_n, + shift: Point::generator(log_n + 1), + } + } + fn is_standard(&self) -> bool { + self.shift == Point::generator(self.log_n + 1) + } + pub(crate) fn subgroup_generator(&self) -> Point { + Point::generator(self.log_n - 1) + } + pub(crate) fn coset0(&self) -> impl Iterator> { + let g = self.subgroup_generator(); + iterate(self.shift, move |&p| p + g).take(1 << (self.log_n - 1)) + } + fn coset1(&self) -> impl Iterator> { + let g = self.subgroup_generator(); + iterate(g - self.shift, move |&p| p + g).take(1 << (self.log_n - 1)) + } + /// Public in this vendored copy (upstream: `pub(crate)`): the ZK wrapper in + /// riverrun-m31 enumerates domain points to evaluate the blinding term + /// `Z_D(P) * R(P)` pointwise. See PATCH.md. + pub fn points(&self) -> impl Iterator> { + self.coset0().interleave(self.coset1()) + } + /// Same points as [`Self::points`], materialized eagerly. Each half-coset's sequential + /// point-addition chain is split into chunks (reseeded via a scalar multiplication) that + /// run in parallel, instead of walking the whole chain on a single thread. + pub(crate) fn points_vec(&self) -> Vec> { + let half = 1usize << (self.log_n - 1); + let g = self.subgroup_generator(); + let c0 = parallel_point_chain(self.shift, g, half); + let c1 = parallel_point_chain(g - self.shift, g, half); + c0.into_iter().interleave(c1).collect() + } + pub(crate) fn nth_point(&self, idx: usize) -> Point { + let (idx, lsb) = (idx >> 1, idx & 1); + if lsb == 0 { + self.shift + self.subgroup_generator() * idx + } else { + -self.shift + self.subgroup_generator() * (idx + 1) + } + } + + /// Public in this vendored copy (upstream: `pub(crate)`): the ZK wrapper in + /// riverrun-m31 needs `Z_D` evaluations at concrete circle points, which the + /// `PolynomialSpace` trait surface (line-coordinate inputs) cannot supply. + /// See PATCH.md. + pub fn vanishing_poly>(&self, at: Point) -> EF { + at.v_n(self.log_n) - self.shift.v_n(self.log_n) + } + + /// `log_period`, `log_repetitions` with `trace_len / period = 2^log_repetitions`. + fn periodic_column_fold_params(&self, period: usize) -> (usize, usize) { + debug_assert!(period.is_power_of_two()); + let trace_len = self.size(); + assert_eq!( + trace_len % period, + 0, + "trace length must be divisible by periodic column length" + ); + let log_period = log2_strict_usize(period); + let log_repetitions = log2_strict_usize(trace_len / period); + (log_period, log_repetitions) + } +} + +/// Below this length, chunking overhead (each chunk reseeds via a scalar multiplication costing +/// `O(log len)` point operations) outweighs the benefit of splitting the chain across threads. +const PARALLEL_THRESHOLD: usize = 1 << 10; + +/// Materialize `len` points of the sequential chain `iterate(seed, |&p| p + g)`, splitting it +/// into chunks that run in parallel. Each chunk reseeds itself with one scalar multiplication +/// (`g * chunk_start`) instead of walking the prefix of the chain that precedes it. +fn parallel_point_chain( + seed: Point, + g: Point, + len: usize, +) -> Vec> { + if len < PARALLEL_THRESHOLD { + return iterate(seed, move |&p| p + g).take(len).collect_vec(); + } + let num_chunks = current_num_threads().max(1).min(len); + let chunk_len = len.div_ceil(num_chunks); + (0..len.div_ceil(chunk_len)) + .into_par_iter() + .map(|c| { + let chunk_start = c * chunk_len; + let this_len = chunk_len.min(len - chunk_start); + let chunk_seed = seed + g * chunk_start; + iterate(chunk_seed, move |&p| p + g) + .take(this_len) + .collect_vec() + }) + .collect::>() + .concat() +} + +impl PolynomialSpace for CircleDomain { + type Val = F; + + fn size(&self) -> usize { + 1 << self.log_n + } + + fn first_point(&self) -> Self::Val { + self.shift.to_projective_line().unwrap() + } + + fn next_point>(&self, x: Ext) -> Option { + // Only in standard position do we have an algebraic expression to access the next point. + if self.is_standard() { + (Point::from_projective_line(x) + Point::generator(self.log_n)).to_projective_line() + } else { + None + } + } + + fn create_disjoint_domain(&self, min_size: usize) -> Self { + // Right now we simply guarantee the domain is disjoint by returning a + // larger standard position coset, which is fine because we always ask for a larger + // domain. If we wanted good performance for a disjoint domain of the same size, + // we could change the shift. Also we could support nonstandard twin cosets. + assert!( + self.is_standard(), + "create_disjoint_domain not currently supported for nonstandard twin cosets" + ); + let log_n = log2_ceil_usize(min_size); + // Any standard position coset that is not the same size as us will be disjoint. + Self::standard(if log_n == self.log_n { + log_n + 1 + } else { + log_n + }) + } + + /// Decompose a domain into disjoint twin-cosets. + fn split_domains(&self, num_chunks: usize) -> Vec { + assert!(self.is_standard()); + let log_chunks = log2_strict_usize(num_chunks); + assert!(log_chunks <= self.log_n); + self.points() + .take(num_chunks) + .map(|shift| Self { + log_n: self.log_n - log_chunks, + shift, + }) + .collect() + } + + fn split_evals( + &self, + num_chunks: usize, + evals: RowMajorMatrix, + ) -> Vec> { + let log_chunks = log2_strict_usize(num_chunks); + assert!(evals.height() >> (log_chunks + 1) >= 1); + let width = evals.width(); + let mut values: Vec> = vec![vec![]; num_chunks]; + evals + .rows() + .enumerate() + .for_each(|(i, row)| values[forward_backward_index(i, num_chunks)].extend(row)); + values + .into_iter() + .map(|v| RowMajorMatrix::new(v, width)) + .collect() + } + + fn vanishing_poly_at_point>(&self, point: Ext) -> Ext { + self.vanishing_poly(Point::from_projective_line(point)) + } + + fn selectors_at_point>( + &self, + point: Ext, + ) -> LagrangeSelectors { + let point = Point::from_projective_line(point); + + // Single-point specialization of the fused pass in `selectors_on_coset`: one + // shared `vanishing_poly` evaluation and one batch inversion instead of four + // separate `log_n`-step squaring chains and three separate inversions. + let neg_shift = -self.shift; + let k = neg_shift.s_p_at_p(self.log_n); + let z = self.vanishing_poly(point); + let den_shift = self.shift.v_tilde_p(point); + let den_negshift_k = neg_shift.v_tilde_p(point) * k; + + let inv = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&[den_shift, den_negshift_k, z]); + let (inv_den_shift, inv_den_negshift_k, inv_z) = (inv[0], inv[1], inv[2]); + + let z_inv_dk = z * inv_den_negshift_k; + LagrangeSelectors { + is_first_row: z * inv_den_shift, + is_last_row: z_inv_dk * k, + is_transition: Ext::ONE - z_inv_dk, + inv_vanishing: inv_z, + } + } + + /* + chunks=2: + + 1 . 1 + . . + 0 0 <-- start + . . - (1,0) + 0 0 + . . + 1 . 1 + + + idx -> which chunk to put it in: + chunks=2: 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 + chunks=4: 0 1 2 3 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 3 2 1 0 + */ + #[instrument(skip_all, fields(log_n = %coset.log_n))] + fn selectors_on_coset(&self, coset: Self) -> LagrangeSelectors> { + let pts = coset.points().collect_vec(); + let n = pts.len(); + + let neg_shift = -self.shift; + let k = neg_shift.s_p_at_p(self.log_n); + // `vanishing_poly(at) = at.v_n(log_n) - shift.v_n(log_n)`; the second term is the + // same constant for every point in the coset, so it is hoisted out of the loop + // below instead of being recomputed (as a `log_n`-step squaring chain) per point. + let shift_v_n = self.shift.v_n(self.log_n); + + // Fused parallel pass over the coset points: `vanishing_poly`, + // `shift.v_tilde_p` and `(-shift).v_tilde_p * k` are independent per + // point. Computing them side-by-side reads `pts` once and writes the + // three outputs in parallel. + let mut z_vals = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + let mut den_shift = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + let mut den_negshift_k = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + z_vals + .par_iter_mut() + .zip(den_shift.par_iter_mut()) + .zip(den_negshift_k.par_iter_mut()) + .zip(pts.par_iter()) + .for_each(|(((z, ds), dnk), &at)| { + *z = at.v_n(self.log_n) - shift_v_n; + *ds = self.shift.v_tilde_p(at); + *dnk = neg_shift.v_tilde_p(at) * k; + }); + + // Batch inverses (already internally parallel). + let inv_vanishing = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&z_vals); + let inv_den_shift = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&den_shift); + let inv_den_negshift_k = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&den_negshift_k); + + // Fused parallel selector build: + let mut is_first_row = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + let mut is_last_row = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + let mut is_transition = Self::Val::zero_vec(n); + is_first_row + .par_iter_mut() + .zip(is_last_row.par_iter_mut()) + .zip(is_transition.par_iter_mut()) + .zip(z_vals.par_iter()) + .zip(inv_den_shift.par_iter()) + .zip(inv_den_negshift_k.par_iter()) + .for_each(|(((((ifr, ilr), itr), &z), &inv_d), &inv_dk)| { + let z_inv_dk = z * inv_dk; + *ifr = z * inv_d; + *ilr = z_inv_dk * k; + *itr = Self::Val::ONE - z_inv_dk; + }); + + LagrangeSelectors { + is_first_row, + is_last_row, + is_transition, + inv_vanishing, + } + } + + fn evaluate_polynomial_at>(&self, evals: &[F], point: Ext) -> Ext { + assert!( + self.is_standard(), + "evaluate_polynomial_at requires standard position" + ); + assert_eq!(evals.len(), self.size()); + let values = RowMajorMatrix::new(evals.to_vec(), 1); + let circle_evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(*self, values); + let circle_point = Point::from_projective_line(point); + circle_evals.evaluate_at_point(circle_point)[0] + } + + fn evaluate_periodic_column_at>(&self, col: &[F], point: Ext) -> Ext { + if col.is_empty() { + return Ext::ZERO; + } + assert!( + self.is_standard(), + "evaluate_periodic_column_at requires standard position" + ); + assert!( + col.len().is_power_of_two(), + "periodic column length must be a power of 2" + ); + + let (log_period, log_repetitions) = self.periodic_column_fold_params(col.len()); + let periodic_domain = Self::standard(log_period); + + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + periodic_domain, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(col.to_vec()), + ); + + let query_point = Point::::from_projective_line(point); + let periodic_point = query_point.repeated_double(log_repetitions); + evals.evaluate_at_point(periodic_point)[0] + } +} + +// 0 1 2 .. len-1 len len len-1 .. 1 0 0 1 .. +const fn forward_backward_index(mut i: usize, len: usize) -> usize { + i %= 2 * len; + if i < len { i } else { 2 * len - 1 - i } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use core::iter; + + use hashbrown::HashSet; + use itertools::izip; + use p3_field::{PrimeCharacteristicRing, batch_multiplicative_inverse}; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use rand::SeedableRng; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + + use super::*; + use crate::CircleEvaluations; + + fn assert_is_twin_coset(d: CircleDomain) { + let pts = d.points().collect_vec(); + let half_n = pts.len() >> 1; + for (&l, &r) in izip!(&pts[..half_n], pts[half_n..].iter().rev()) { + assert_eq!(l, -r); + } + } + + fn do_test_circle_domain(log_n: usize, width: usize) { + let n = 1 << log_n; + + type F = Mersenne31; + let d = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + + // we can move around the circle and end up where we started + let p0 = d.first_point(); + let mut p1 = p0; + for i in 0..(n - 1) { + // nth_point is correct + assert_eq!(Point::from_projective_line(p1), d.nth_point(i)); + p1 = d.next_point(p1).unwrap(); + assert_ne!(p1, p0); + } + assert_eq!(d.next_point(p1).unwrap(), p0); + + // .points() is the same as first_point -> next_point + let mut uni_point = d.first_point(); + for p in d.points() { + assert_eq!(Point::from_projective_line(uni_point), p); + uni_point = d.next_point(uni_point).unwrap(); + } + + // disjoint domain is actually disjoint, and large enough + let seen: HashSet> = d.points().collect(); + for disjoint_size in [10, 100, n - 5, n + 15] { + let dd = d.create_disjoint_domain(disjoint_size); + assert!(dd.size() >= disjoint_size); + for pt in dd.points() { + assert!(!seen.contains(&pt)); + } + } + + // zp is zero + for p in d.points() { + assert_eq!( + d.vanishing_poly_at_point(p.to_projective_line().unwrap()), + F::ZERO + ); + } + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // split domains + let evals = RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, n, width); + let orig: Vec<(Point, Vec)> = d + .points() + .zip(evals.rows().map(|r| r.collect_vec())) + .collect(); + for num_chunks in [1, 2, 4, 8] { + let mut combined = vec![]; + + let sds = d.split_domains(num_chunks); + assert_eq!(sds.len(), num_chunks); + let ses = d.split_evals(num_chunks, evals.clone()); + assert_eq!(ses.len(), num_chunks); + for (sd, se) in izip!(sds, ses) { + // Split domains are twin cosets + assert_is_twin_coset(sd); + // Split domains have correct size wrt original domain + assert_eq!(sd.size() * num_chunks, d.size()); + assert_eq!(se.width(), evals.width()); + assert_eq!(se.height() * num_chunks, d.size()); + combined.extend(sd.points().zip(se.rows().map(|r| r.collect_vec()))); + } + // Union of split domains and evals is the original domain and evals + assert_eq!( + orig.iter().map(|x| x.0).collect::>(), + combined.iter().map(|x| x.0).collect::>(), + "union of split domains is orig domain" + ); + assert_eq!( + orig.iter().map(|x| &x.1).collect::>(), + combined.iter().map(|x| &x.1).collect::>(), + "union of split evals is orig evals" + ); + assert_eq!( + orig.iter().collect::>(), + combined.iter().collect::>(), + "split domains and evals correspond to orig domains and evals" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn selectors() { + type F = Mersenne31; + let log_n = 8; + let n = 1 << log_n; + + let d = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let coset = d.create_disjoint_domain(n); + let sels = d.selectors_on_coset(coset); + + // selectors_on_coset matches selectors_at_point + let mut pt = coset.first_point(); + for i in 0..coset.size() { + let pt_sels = d.selectors_at_point(pt); + assert_eq!(sels.is_first_row[i], pt_sels.is_first_row); + assert_eq!(sels.is_last_row[i], pt_sels.is_last_row); + assert_eq!(sels.is_transition[i], pt_sels.is_transition); + assert_eq!(sels.inv_vanishing[i], pt_sels.inv_vanishing); + pt = coset.next_point(pt).unwrap(); + } + + let coset_to_d = |evals: &[F]| { + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + coset, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(evals.to_vec()), + ); + let coeffs = evals.interpolate().to_row_major_matrix(); + let (lo, hi) = coeffs.split_rows(n); + assert_eq!(hi.values, F::zero_vec(n)); + CircleEvaluations::evaluate(d, lo.to_row_major_matrix()) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix() + .values + }; + + // Nonzero at first point, zero everywhere else on domain + let is_first_row = coset_to_d(&sels.is_first_row); + assert_ne!(is_first_row[0], F::ZERO); + assert_eq!(&is_first_row[1..], &F::zero_vec(n - 1)); + + // Nonzero at last point, zero everywhere else on domain + let is_last_row = coset_to_d(&sels.is_last_row); + assert_eq!(&is_last_row[..n - 1], &F::zero_vec(n - 1)); + assert_ne!(is_last_row[n - 1], F::ZERO); + + // Nonzero everywhere on domain but last point + let is_transition = coset_to_d(&sels.is_transition); + assert_ne!(&is_transition[..n - 1], &F::zero_vec(n - 1)); + assert_eq!(is_transition[n - 1], F::ZERO); + + // Vanishing polynomial coefficients look like [0.. (n times), 1, 0.. (n-1 times)] + let z_coeffs = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + coset, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(batch_multiplicative_inverse(&sels.inv_vanishing)), + ) + .interpolate() + .to_row_major_matrix() + .values; + assert_eq!( + z_coeffs, + iter::empty() + .chain(iter::repeat_n(F::ZERO, n)) + .chain(iter::once(F::ONE)) + .chain(iter::repeat_n(F::ZERO, n - 1)) + .collect_vec() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn test_circle_domain() { + do_test_circle_domain(4, 8); + do_test_circle_domain(10, 32); + } + + #[test] + fn points_vec_matches_points() { + type F = Mersenne31; + for log_n in 1..8 { + let d = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + assert_eq!(d.points_vec(), d.points().collect_vec()); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/folding.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/folding.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30a48f96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/folding.rs @@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::fmt::Debug; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use itertools::Itertools; +use p3_commit::Mmcs; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field, batch_multiplicative_inverse}; +use p3_fri::FriFoldingStrategy; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; +use p3_util::{log2_strict_usize, reverse_bits_len}; + +use crate::domain::CircleDomain; +use crate::{CircleInputProof, InputError}; + +pub(crate) struct CircleFriFolding( + pub(crate) PhantomData<(F, InputProof, InputError)>, +); + +pub(crate) type CircleFriFoldingForMmcs = CircleFriFolding< + Val, + CircleInputProof, + InputError<>::Error, >::Error>, +>; + +impl, InputProof, InputError: Debug> + FriFoldingStrategy for CircleFriFolding +{ + type InputProof = InputProof; + type InputError = InputError; + + fn extra_query_index_bits(&self) -> usize { + 1 + } + + fn fold_row( + &self, + index: usize, + log_folded_height: usize, + log_arity: usize, + beta: EF, + evals: impl Iterator, + ) -> EF { + fold_x_row(index, log_folded_height, log_arity, beta, evals) + } + + fn fold_matrix>(&self, beta: EF, log_arity: usize, m: M) -> Vec { + fold_x(beta, log_arity, &m) + } +} + +fn fold>( + evals: &impl Matrix, + beta: EF, + twiddles: &[F], +) -> Vec { + debug_assert_eq!(evals.width(), 2); + debug_assert_eq!(evals.height(), twiddles.len()); + + // Rows are folded independently, so the matrix splits into parallel chunks. The chunk + // size keeps the per-task work well above the fork-join overhead. + const FOLD_CHUNK_ROWS: usize = 1 << 10; + + let mut out = EF::zero_vec(evals.height()); + out.par_chunks_mut(FOLD_CHUNK_ROWS) + .zip(twiddles.par_chunks(FOLD_CHUNK_ROWS)) + .enumerate() + .for_each(|(chunk_idx, (out_chunk, twiddle_chunk))| { + let first_row = chunk_idx * FOLD_CHUNK_ROWS; + for (i, (o, &t)) in out_chunk.iter_mut().zip(twiddle_chunk).enumerate() { + // SAFETY: the chunks cover exactly `evals.height()` rows. + let row = unsafe { evals.row_slice_unchecked(first_row + i) }; + let (lo, hi) = (row[0], row[1]); + let sum = lo + hi; + let diff = (lo - hi) * t; + *o = (sum + beta * diff).halve(); + } + }); + out +} + +pub(crate) fn fold_y>( + beta: EF, + evals: &impl Matrix, +) -> Vec { + assert_eq!(evals.width(), 2); + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(evals.height()) + 1; + fold( + evals, + beta, + &batch_multiplicative_inverse(&CircleDomain::standard(log_n).y_twiddles()), + ) +} + +/// Reference implementation for [`fold_y`], kept only to cross-check it against row-wise +/// folding in tests; the verifier reuses the lambda-correction point instead (see +/// `CirclePcs::open`'s `open_input` closure) rather than recomputing this per-row twiddle. +#[cfg(test)] +pub(crate) fn fold_y_row>( + index: usize, + log_folded_height: usize, + beta: EF, + evals: impl Iterator, +) -> EF { + let evals = evals.collect_vec(); + assert_eq!(evals.len(), 2); + let t = CircleDomain::::standard(log_folded_height + 1) + .nth_y_twiddle(index) + .inverse(); + let sum = evals[0] + evals[1]; + let diff = (evals[0] - evals[1]) * t; + (sum + beta * diff).halve() +} + +pub(crate) fn fold_x>( + beta: EF, + log_arity: usize, + evals: &impl Matrix, +) -> Vec { + // Currently only arity 2 is supported for Circle PCS + assert_eq!(log_arity, 1, "Circle PCS currently only supports arity 2"); + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(evals.width() * evals.height()); + // +1 because twiddles after the first layer come from the x coordinates of the larger domain. + let domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_n + 1); + fold( + evals, + beta, + &batch_multiplicative_inverse(&domain.x_twiddles(0)), + ) +} + +pub(crate) fn fold_x_row>( + index: usize, + log_folded_height: usize, + log_arity: usize, + beta: EF, + evals: impl Iterator, +) -> EF { + // Currently only arity 2 is supported for Circle PCS + assert_eq!(log_arity, 1, "Circle PCS currently only supports arity 2"); + let evals = evals.collect_vec(); + assert_eq!(evals.len(), 2); + + let t = CircleDomain::::standard(log_folded_height + log_arity + 1) + .nth_x_twiddle(reverse_bits_len(index, log_folded_height)) + .inverse(); + + let sum = evals[0] + evals[1]; + let diff = (evals[0] - evals[1]) * t; + (sum + beta * diff).halve() +} + +/// Fold a pair of sibling evaluations given an already-inverted twiddle, shared by both the +/// first-layer (y) fold and every FRI (x) fold round: `fold_*_row` differ only in how `t` is +/// derived, not in this arithmetic. +pub(crate) fn fold_row_with_inv_twiddle>( + inv_twiddle: F, + beta: EF, + evals: impl Iterator, +) -> EF { + let mut it = evals; + let (e0, e1) = (it.next().unwrap(), it.next().unwrap()); + assert!(it.next().is_none()); + + let sum = e0 + e1; + let diff = (e0 - e1) * inv_twiddle; + (sum + beta * diff).halve() +} + +/// Precompute the per-query chain of x-fold twiddles, already batch-inverted. +/// +/// `top_level_index` is the FRI-domain index (the query index with +/// [`FriFoldingStrategy::extra_query_index_bits`] shifted off), and `log_max_height` is +/// [`crate::verifier::verify`]'s own top height (one less than the tallest committed matrix's +/// LDE height, since the first-layer bivariate fold has already consumed one bit of height by +/// this point). +/// +/// Round `r`'s twiddle is exactly what `fold_x_row` recomputes from scratch on every call +/// (`CircleDomain::standard(log_max_height - r + 1).nth_x_twiddle(..)`). After the first round, +/// each successive twiddle is the circle's squaring map applied to the previous one +/// (`x -> 2x^2 - 1`), with a sign flip determined by a fixed bit of `top_level_index` - no +/// further scalar multiplications or domain constructions are needed. All `num_rounds` +/// twiddles are inverted in a single batch instead of one inversion per round. +pub(crate) fn query_x_twiddles_inv( + top_level_index: usize, + log_max_height: usize, + num_rounds: usize, +) -> Vec { + if num_rounds == 0 { + return Vec::new(); + } + + let seed_log_folded_height = log_max_height - 1; + let seed_idx = reverse_bits_len(top_level_index >> 1, seed_log_folded_height); + let mut x = CircleDomain::::standard(log_max_height + 1).nth_x_twiddle(seed_idx); + + let mut twiddles = Vec::with_capacity(num_rounds); + twiddles.push(x); + for r in 0..num_rounds - 1 { + x = x.square().double() - F::ONE; + if (top_level_index >> (r + 1)) & 1 == 1 { + x = -x; + } + twiddles.push(x); + } + + batch_multiplicative_inverse(&twiddles) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use itertools::iproduct; + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::CircleEvaluations; + use crate::ordering::cfft_permute_index; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + /// Exhaustively checks the closed-form twiddle chain that `verify_query`'s fold loop + /// could use instead of recomputing `nth_point`/`nth_x_twiddle` from scratch each round. + /// + /// Reproduces, bit-for-bit, the index arithmetic in `CirclePcs::open`'s `open_input` + /// closure (the `p`/`orig_idx`/`bits_reduced` computation feeding the lambda correction + /// and the first-layer `fold_y_row` call) and in `verify_query` (the FRI round loop's + /// `index >>= log_arity` bookkeeping feeding `fold_x_row`), for a matrix committed at + /// `log_height` inside a global FRI instance of `log_max_height`. + /// + /// Claims checked, for `p = CircleDomain::standard(log_height).nth_point(orig_idx)`: + /// - the first-layer (bivariate) y-twiddle is `p.y`, sign-flipped when the query's bit + /// at `bits_reduced` is 1 (the two members of a fold pair are negations of each other). + /// - the x-twiddle chain for every FRI round this matrix participates in is exactly + /// `p.x, 2p.x^2-1, 2(2p.x^2-1)^2-1, ..`, i.e. repeated application of the circle's + /// squaring map with no further scalar multiplications. + #[test] + fn scratch_generator_doubling() { + use crate::point::Point; + for k in 2..8 { + let g = Point::::generator(k); + assert_eq!(g.double(), Point::::generator(k - 1), "k={k}"); + } + // nth_x_twiddle doubling identity, same idx, domain one size smaller. + for log_n in 4..8 { + let d = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let d2 = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n - 1); + for idx in 0..(1usize << (log_n - 2)) { + let t = d.nth_x_twiddle(idx); + let doubled_x = t.square().double() - F::ONE; + let t2 = d2.nth_x_twiddle(idx); + assert_eq!(doubled_x, t2, "log_n={log_n} idx={idx}"); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn query_twiddle_chain_matches_naive_recomputation() { + for log_blowup in 1..4 { + for matrix_log_n in 2..5 { + for extra_rounds_above in 0..3 { + let log_height = matrix_log_n + log_blowup; + // The first-layer (bivariate) fold always consumes one bit of height + // before FRI's own x-folding rounds begin, even for the tallest matrix. + let log_max_height = log_height - 1 + extra_rounds_above; + let log_global_max_height = log_max_height + 1; + let total_rounds = log_max_height - log_blowup; + + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_height); + let bits_reduced = log_global_max_height - log_height; + + for global_sampled_index in 0..(1usize << log_global_max_height) { + let m = global_sampled_index >> bits_reduced; + let orig_idx = cfft_permute_index(m, log_height); + let p = lde_domain.nth_point(orig_idx); + + // First-layer (bivariate) y-twiddle: shared across the fold pair, + // canonically the "b=0" member's y-coordinate. + let idx_y_true = global_sampled_index >> (bits_reduced + 1); + let t_y_true = lde_domain.nth_y_twiddle(idx_y_true); + let b = m & 1; + let y_twiddle_hyp = if b == 0 { p.y } else { -p.y }; + assert_eq!( + y_twiddle_hyp, t_y_true, + "y-twiddle mismatch: log_blowup={log_blowup} matrix_log_n={matrix_log_n} \ + extra_rounds_above={extra_rounds_above} global_sampled_index={global_sampled_index}" + ); + + // x-twiddle chain: shared by the whole query (independent of which + // matrix rolls in where), seeded once at FRI round 0. + let top_level_index = global_sampled_index >> 1; + + let seed_index_r = top_level_index >> 1; + let seed_log_folded_height = log_max_height - 1; + let seed_domain_log_n = seed_log_folded_height + 2; + let seed_idx = reverse_bits_len(seed_index_r, seed_log_folded_height); + let mut x_closed = + CircleDomain::::standard(seed_domain_log_n).nth_x_twiddle(seed_idx); + + for r in 0..total_rounds { + let index_r = top_level_index >> (r + 1); + let log_current_height_r = log_max_height - r; + let log_folded_height_r = log_current_height_r - 1; + let domain_log_n = log_folded_height_r + 2; // + log_arity(1) + 1 + let idx_for_twiddle = reverse_bits_len(index_r, log_folded_height_r); + let t_x_true = CircleDomain::::standard(domain_log_n) + .nth_x_twiddle(idx_for_twiddle); + + assert_eq!( + x_closed, t_x_true, + "x-twiddle mismatch at round {r}: log_blowup={log_blowup} \ + matrix_log_n={matrix_log_n} extra_rounds_above={extra_rounds_above} \ + global_sampled_index={global_sampled_index}" + ); + x_closed = x_closed.square().double() - F::ONE; + if (top_level_index >> (r + 1)) & 1 == 1 { + x_closed = -x_closed; + } + } + let _ = p; + } + } + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn fold_matrix_same_as_row() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let log_folded_height = 5; + let log_arity = 1; // arity 2 + let m = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_folded_height, 2); + let beta: EF = rng.random(); + + let mat_y_folded = fold_y::(beta, &m); + let row_y_folded = (0..(1 << log_folded_height)) + .map(|i| fold_y_row::(i, log_folded_height, beta, m.row(i).unwrap().into_iter())) + .collect_vec(); + assert_eq!(mat_y_folded, row_y_folded); + + let mat_x_folded = fold_x::(beta, log_arity, &m); + let row_x_folded = (0..(1 << log_folded_height)) + .map(|i| { + fold_x_row::( + i, + log_folded_height, + log_arity, + beta, + m.row(i).unwrap().into_iter(), + ) + }) + .collect_vec(); + assert_eq!(mat_x_folded, row_x_folded); + } + + #[test] + fn folded_matrix_remains_low_degree() { + let vec_dim = |evals: &[F]| { + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log2_strict_usize(evals.len())), + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(evals.to_vec()), + ) + .dim() + }; + + let log_arity = 1; // arity 2 + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for (log_n, log_blowup) in iproduct!(3..6, 1..4) { + let mut values = CircleEvaluations::evaluate( + CircleDomain::standard(log_n + log_blowup), + RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1), + ) + .to_cfft_order() + .values; + + values = fold_y(rng.random(), &RowMajorMatrix::new(values, 2)); + assert_eq!(vec_dim(&values), values.len() >> log_blowup); + for _ in 0..(log_n - 1) { + values = fold_x(rng.random(), log_arity, &RowMajorMatrix::new(values, 2)); + assert_eq!(vec_dim(&values), values.len() >> log_blowup); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..643a83b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")] +#![no_std] + +extern crate alloc; + +mod cfft; +mod deep_quotient; +mod domain; +mod folding; +mod ordering; +mod pcs; +mod periodic; +mod point; +mod proof; +mod prover; +mod verifier; + +pub use cfft::*; +pub use domain::*; +pub use ordering::*; +pub use pcs::*; +pub use periodic::*; +pub use proof::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/ordering.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/ordering.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..051796b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/ordering.rs @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_matrix::row_index_mapped::{RowIndexMap, RowIndexMappedView}; +use p3_util::{log2_strict_usize, reverse_bits_len}; + +#[inline] +pub(crate) const fn cfft_permute_index(index: usize, log_n: usize) -> usize { + let (index, lsb) = (index >> 1, index & 1); + reverse_bits_len( + if lsb == 0 { + index + } else { + (1 << log_n) - index - 1 + }, + log_n, + ) +} + +/// Public in this vendored copy (upstream: `pub(crate)`): riverrun-m31's ZK +/// wrapper permutes vanishing-polynomial evaluations into CFFT row order to +/// blind committed LDEs pointwise. See PATCH.md. +pub fn cfft_permute_slice(xs: &[T]) -> Vec { + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(xs.len()); + (0..xs.len()) + .map(|i| xs[cfft_permute_index(i, log_n)].clone()) + .collect() +} + +pub(crate) fn cfft_permute_slice_chunked_in_place(xs: &mut [T], chunk_size: usize) { + assert_eq!(xs.len() % chunk_size, 0); + let n_chunks = xs.len() / chunk_size; + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(n_chunks); + for i in 0..n_chunks { + let j = cfft_permute_index(i, log_n); + if i < j { + // somehow this is slightly faster than the unsafe block below + for k in 0..chunk_size { + xs.swap(i * chunk_size + k, j * chunk_size + k); + } + /* + unsafe { + core::ptr::swap_nonoverlapping( + xs.as_mut_ptr().add(i * chunk_size), + xs.as_mut_ptr().add(j * chunk_size), + chunk_size, + ); + } + */ + } + } +} + +pub type CfftView = RowIndexMappedView; + +#[derive(Copy, Clone)] +pub struct CfftPerm { + log_height: usize, +} + +impl RowIndexMap for CfftPerm { + fn height(&self) -> usize { + 1 << self.log_height + } + fn map_row_index(&self, r: usize) -> usize { + cfft_permute_index(r, self.log_height) + } + fn to_row_major_matrix>( + &self, + inner: Inner, + ) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let mut inner = inner.to_row_major_matrix(); + cfft_permute_slice_chunked_in_place(&mut inner.values, inner.width); + inner + } +} + +pub(crate) trait CfftPermutable: Matrix + Sized { + fn cfft_perm_rows(self) -> CfftView; +} + +impl> CfftPermutable for M { + fn cfft_perm_rows(self) -> CfftView { + RowIndexMappedView { + index_map: CfftPerm { + log_height: log2_strict_usize(self.height()), + }, + inner: self, + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use itertools::Itertools; + + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn ordering() { + // reference ordering derived by hand + assert_eq!( + (0..8).map(|i| cfft_permute_index(i, 3)).collect_vec(), + &[0, 7, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 1], + ); + for log_n in 1..5 { + let n = 1 << log_n; + let sigma = |i| cfft_permute_index(i, log_n); + for i in 0..n { + // involution: σ(σ(i)) = i + assert_eq!(sigma(sigma(i)), i); + } + // perm_slice same as perm_idx + assert_eq!( + cfft_permute_slice(&(0..n).collect_vec()), + (0..n).map(sigma).collect_vec() + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/pcs.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/pcs.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c9b5a12 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/pcs.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1364 @@ +use alloc::collections::BTreeMap; +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use itertools::{Itertools, izip}; +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger, GrindingChallenger}; +use p3_commit::{ + BatchOpening, BatchOpeningRef, BuildPeriodicLdeTableFast, Mmcs, OpenedValues, Pcs, + PeriodicLdeTable, PolynomialSpace, +}; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field, batch_multiplicative_inverse, dot_product}; +use p3_fri::FriParameters; +use p3_fri::verifier::FriError; +use p3_matrix::dense::{RowMajorMatrix, RowMajorMatrixCow}; +use p3_matrix::row_index_mapped::RowIndexMappedView; +use p3_matrix::{Dimensions, Matrix}; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; +use p3_util::zip_eq::zip_eq; +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; +use thiserror::Error; +use tracing::{debug_span, info_span}; + +use crate::deep_quotient::{ + VanishingParts, accumulate_deep_quotient, compute_vanishing_parts, deep_quotient_reduce_row, + extract_lambda, +}; +use crate::domain::CircleDomain; +use crate::folding::{ + CircleFriFolding, CircleFriFoldingForMmcs, fold_row_with_inv_twiddle, fold_y, +}; +use crate::point::{Point, compute_lagrange_den_batched}; +use crate::prover::prove; +use crate::verifier::verify; +use crate::{ + CfftPerm, CfftPermutable, CircleEvaluations, CircleFriProof, build_periodic_lde_table_circle, + cfft_permute_index, cfft_permute_slice, +}; + +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct CirclePcs { + pub mmcs: InputMmcs, + pub fri_params: FriParameters, + pub _phantom: PhantomData, +} + +impl CirclePcs { + pub const fn new(mmcs: InputMmcs, fri_params: FriParameters) -> Self { + Self { + mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + } + } +} + +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)] +#[serde(bound = "")] +pub struct CircleInputProof< + Val: Field, + Challenge: Field, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, + FriMmcs: Mmcs, +> { + input_openings: Vec>, + first_layer_siblings: Vec, + first_layer_proof: FriMmcs::Proof, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Error)] +pub enum InputError +where + InputMmcsError: core::fmt::Debug, + FriMmcsError: core::fmt::Debug, +{ + #[error("input MMCS error: {0:?}")] + InputMmcsError(InputMmcsError), + #[error("first layer MMCS error: {0:?}")] + FirstLayerMmcsError(FriMmcsError), + #[error("input shape error: mismatched dimensions")] + InputShapeError, +} + +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)] +#[serde(bound( + serialize = "Witness: Serialize", + deserialize = "Witness: Deserialize<'de>" +))] +pub struct CirclePcsProof< + Val: Field, + Challenge: Field, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, + FriMmcs: Mmcs, + Witness, +> { + first_layer_commitment: FriMmcs::Commitment, + lambdas: Vec, + fri_proof: CircleFriProof< + Challenge, + FriMmcs, + Witness, + CircleInputProof, + >, +} + +impl Pcs + for CirclePcs +where + Val: ComplexExtendable, + Challenge: ExtensionField, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, + FriMmcs: Mmcs, + Challenger: FieldChallenger + GrindingChallenger + CanObserve, +{ + type Domain = CircleDomain; + type Commitment = InputMmcs::Commitment; + type ProverData = InputMmcs::ProverData>; + type EvaluationsOnDomain<'a> = RowIndexMappedView>; + type Proof = CirclePcsProof; + type Error = FriError>; + const ZK: bool = false; + + fn natural_domain_for_degree(&self, degree: usize) -> Self::Domain { + CircleDomain::standard(log2_strict_usize(degree)) + } + + fn log_max_lde_height(&self) -> usize { + Val::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY + } + + fn commit( + &self, + evaluations: impl IntoIterator)>, + ) -> (Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData) { + let ldes = evaluations + .into_iter() + .map(|(domain, evals)| { + assert!( + domain.log_n >= 2, + "CirclePcs cannot commit to a matrix with fewer than 4 rows.", + // (because we bivariate fold one bit, and fri needs one more bit) + ); + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(domain, evals) + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard( + domain.log_n + self.fri_params.log_blowup, + )) + .to_cfft_order() + }) + .collect_vec(); + let (comm, mmcs_data) = self.mmcs.commit(ldes); + (comm, mmcs_data) + } + + fn get_quotient_ldes( + &self, + evaluations: impl IntoIterator)>, + _num_chunks: usize, + ) -> Vec> { + evaluations + .into_iter() + .map(|(domain, evals)| { + assert!( + domain.log_n >= 2, + "CirclePcs cannot commit to a matrix with fewer than 4 rows.", + // (because we bivariate fold one bit, and fri needs one more bit) + ); + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(domain, evals) + .extrapolate(CircleDomain::standard( + domain.log_n + self.fri_params.log_blowup, + )) + .to_cfft_order() + }) + .collect_vec() + } + + fn commit_ldes(&self, ldes: Vec>) -> (Self::Commitment, Self::ProverData) { + self.mmcs.commit(ldes) + } + + fn get_evaluations_on_domain<'a>( + &self, + data: &'a Self::ProverData, + idx: usize, + domain: Self::Domain, + ) -> Self::EvaluationsOnDomain<'a> { + let mat = self.mmcs.get_matrices(data)[idx].as_view(); + let committed_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log2_strict_usize(mat.height())); + if domain == committed_domain { + mat.as_cow().cfft_perm_rows() + } else { + // The committed matrix is the LDE of a polynomial of `committed_domain.log_n - + // log_blowup` coefficients. The first `2^log_sub` CFFT-ordered rows of the LDE + // are exactly the CFFT-ordered evaluations over the smaller `sub_domain` of that + // size (see `eval_at_point_on_subdomain_prefix_matches_full`), so interpolating + // that prefix instead of the full committed matrix recovers the same coefficients + // at `1 / blowup` of the CFFT work. This also lets `domain` be smaller than the + // committed LDE (e.g. a quotient domain when `log_blowup` exceeds the quotient + // degree), which `extrapolate` would reject. + let log_sub = committed_domain.log_n - self.fri_params.log_blowup; + let sub_domain = CircleDomain::new(log_sub, committed_domain.shift); + let coeffs = + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order(sub_domain, mat.split_rows(1 << log_sub).0) + .interpolate(); + CircleEvaluations::evaluate(domain, coeffs) + .to_cfft_order() + .as_cow() + .cfft_perm_rows() + } + } + + fn open( + &self, + // For each round, + rounds: Vec<( + &Self::ProverData, + // for each matrix, + Vec< + // points to open + Vec, + >, + )>, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + ) -> (OpenedValues, Self::Proof) { + // Materialize the CFFT-ordered domain points once per committed height. They are shared + // by the Lagrange denominators and the DEEP-quotient vanishing parts below, which are in + // turn shared by every matrix opened at the same point on the same domain. + let mut permuted_points: BTreeMap>> = BTreeMap::new(); + debug_span!("materialize domain points").in_scope(|| { + for (data, _) in &rounds { + for mat in self.mmcs.get_matrices(data) { + let log_height = log2_strict_usize(mat.height()); + permuted_points.entry(log_height).or_insert_with(|| { + cfft_permute_slice(&CircleDomain::standard(log_height).points_vec()) + }); + } + } + }); + + // (log_height, point) -> Lagrange denominators. + let mut lagrange_dens: Vec<((usize, Challenge), Vec)> = vec![]; + + // Open matrices at points + let values: OpenedValues = rounds + .iter() + .map(|(data, points_for_mats)| { + let mats = self.mmcs.get_matrices(data); + debug_assert_eq!( + mats.len(), + points_for_mats.len(), + "Mismatched number of matrices and points" + ); + izip!(mats, points_for_mats) + .map(|(mat, points_for_mat)| { + let log_height = log2_strict_usize(mat.height()); + // The committed polynomial has degree below the pre-blow-up domain + // size, so its values on a sub-twin-coset of that size determine it. + // The first `2^log_sub` rows of the CFFT-ordered LDE are exactly the + // CFFT-ordered evaluations over `CircleDomain::new(log_sub, shift)` + // (see `eval_at_point_on_subdomain_prefix_matches_full`), so the + // out-of-domain evaluation only traverses `1 / blowup` of the matrix. + let log_sub = log_height - self.fri_params.log_blowup; + let sub_height = 1 << log_sub; + let sub_domain = CircleDomain::new( + log_sub, + CircleDomain::::standard(log_height).shift, + ); + // It was committed in cfft order. + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + sub_domain, + mat.split_rows(sub_height).0, + ); + + // Resolve the Lagrange denominators for every point up front. + let den_idxs = points_for_mat + .iter() + .map(|&zeta_uni| { + let key = (log_height, zeta_uni); + lagrange_dens + .iter() + .position(|(k, _)| *k == key) + .unwrap_or_else(|| { + let den = info_span!("compute Lagrange denominators") + .in_scope(|| { + compute_lagrange_den_batched( + &permuted_points[&log_height][..sub_height], + Point::from_projective_line(zeta_uni), + log_sub, + ) + }); + lagrange_dens.push((key, den)); + lagrange_dens.len() - 1 + }) + }) + .collect_vec(); + + let ps_for_points: Vec> = + debug_span!("compute opened values with Lagrange interpolation") + .in_scope(|| match (&points_for_mat[..], &den_idxs[..]) { + // A matrix opened at two points (e.g. zeta and zeta_next) + // is traversed once for both. + (&[zeta_0, zeta_1], &[idx_0, idx_1]) => evals + .evaluate_at_two_points_with_dens( + [ + Point::from_projective_line(zeta_0), + Point::from_projective_line(zeta_1), + ], + [&lagrange_dens[idx_0].1, &lagrange_dens[idx_1].1], + ) + .into(), + _ => izip!(points_for_mat, &den_idxs) + .map(|(&zeta_uni, &den_idx)| { + evals.evaluate_at_point_with_den( + Point::from_projective_line(zeta_uni), + &lagrange_dens[den_idx].1, + ) + }) + .collect(), + }); + + for ps_at_zeta in &ps_for_points { + challenger.observe_algebra_slice(ps_at_zeta); + } + ps_for_points + }) + .collect() + }) + .collect(); + drop(lagrange_dens); + + // Batch combination challenge + let alpha: Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + /* + We are reducing columns ("ro" = reduced opening) with powers of alpha: + ro = .. + α^n c_n + α^(n+1) c_(n+1) + .. + But we want to precompute small powers of alpha, and batch the columns. So we can do: + ro = .. + α^n (α^0 c_n + α^1 c_(n+1) + ..) + .. + reusing the α^0, α^1, etc., then at the end of each column batch we multiply by the α^n. + (Due to circle stark specifics, we need 2 powers of α for each column, so actually α^(2n)). + We store this α^(2n), the running reducing factor per log_height, and call it the "alpha offset". + */ + + // log_height -> (alpha offset, reduced openings column) + let mut reduced_openings: BTreeMap)> = BTreeMap::new(); + + // (log_height, point) -> DEEP-quotient vanishing parts. + let mut vanishing_parts: Vec<((usize, Challenge), VanishingParts)> = vec![]; + + rounds + .iter() + .zip(values.iter()) + .for_each(|((data, points_for_mats), values)| { + let mats = self.mmcs.get_matrices(data); + izip!(mats, points_for_mats, values).for_each(|(mat, points_for_mat, values)| { + let log_height = log2_strict_usize(mat.height()); + let log_sub = log_height - self.fri_params.log_blowup; + + let (alpha_offset, reduced_opening_for_log_height) = reduced_openings + .entry(log_height) + .or_insert_with(|| (Challenge::ONE, Challenge::zero_vec(1 << log_height))); + + // The lift below costs a single-column CFFT extrapolation, which is + // latency-bound rather than bandwidth-bound: it costs about as much as + // the half-traversal of a ~1000-column matrix it saves, so it only pays + // off for matrices substantially wider than that. + const LIFT_MIN_WIDTH: usize = 1024; + + // The only pass over the matrix; it does not depend on the opening points. + // The reduced column lies in the pre-blow-up polynomial space, so it is + // determined by the trace-size subdomain prefix (committed in cfft order): + // reduce the prefix and lift it back with a narrow CFFT instead of + // traversing the full LDE. + let reduced_rows = if log_sub > 0 && mat.width() >= LIFT_MIN_WIDTH { + let sub_domain = CircleDomain::new( + log_sub, + CircleDomain::::standard(log_height).shift, + ); + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + sub_domain, + mat.split_rows(1 << log_sub).0, + ) + .rowwise_alpha_reduce_lifted(alpha, CircleDomain::standard(log_height)) + } else { + CircleEvaluations::from_cfft_order( + CircleDomain::standard(log_height), + mat.as_view(), + ) + .rowwise_alpha_reduce(alpha) + }; + let alpha_pow_width = alpha.exp_u64(mat.width() as u64); + + points_for_mat + .iter() + .zip(values.iter()) + .for_each(|(&zeta_uni, ps_at_zeta)| { + let zeta = Point::from_projective_line(zeta_uni); + let key = (log_height, zeta_uni); + let vp_idx = vanishing_parts + .iter() + .position(|(k, _)| *k == key) + .unwrap_or_else(|| { + let vp = compute_vanishing_parts( + &permuted_points[&log_height], + zeta, + ); + vanishing_parts.push((key, vp)); + vanishing_parts.len() - 1 + }); + + // sum_j(alpha^j * p_j[zeta]), the same for all rows. + let reduced_ps_at_zeta: Challenge = + dot_product(alpha.powers(), ps_at_zeta.iter().copied()); + + // Reduce this matrix, as a deep quotient, into the running + // reduction, offset by alpha_offset. + accumulate_deep_quotient( + reduced_opening_for_log_height, + *alpha_offset, + alpha_pow_width, + &reduced_rows, + &vanishing_parts[vp_idx].1, + reduced_ps_at_zeta, + ); + + // Update alpha_offset from α^i -> α^(i + 2 * width) + *alpha_offset *= alpha_pow_width.square(); + }); + }); + }); + drop(vanishing_parts); + + // Iterate over our reduced columns and extract lambda - the multiple of the vanishing polynomial + // which may appear in the reduced quotient due to CFFT dimension gap. + + let mut lambdas = vec![]; + let mut log_heights = vec![]; + let first_layer_mats: Vec> = reduced_openings + .into_iter() + .map(|(log_height, (_, mut ro))| { + assert!(log_height > 0); + log_heights.push(log_height); + let lambda = extract_lambda(&mut ro, self.fri_params.log_blowup); + lambdas.push(lambda); + // Prepare for first layer fold with 2 siblings per leaf. + RowMajorMatrix::new(ro, 2) + }) + .collect(); + let log_max_height = log_heights.iter().max().copied().unwrap(); + + // Commit to reduced openings at each log_height, so we can challenge a global + // folding factor for all first layers, which we use for a "manual" (not part of p3-fri) fold. + // This is necessary because the first layer of folding uses different twiddles, so it's easiest + // to do it here, before p3-fri. + + let (first_layer_commitment, first_layer_data) = + self.fri_params.mmcs.commit(first_layer_mats); + challenger.observe(first_layer_commitment.clone()); + let bivariate_beta: Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + // Fold all first layers at bivariate_beta. + + let fri_input: Vec> = self + .fri_params + .mmcs + .get_matrices(&first_layer_data) + .into_iter() + .map(|m| fold_y(bivariate_beta, m)) + // Reverse, because FRI expects descending by height + .rev() + .collect(); + + let folding: CircleFriFoldingForMmcs = + CircleFriFolding(PhantomData); + + let fri_proof = prove(&folding, &self.fri_params, fri_input, challenger, |index| { + // CircleFriFolder asks for an extra query index bit, so we use that here to index + // the first layer fold. + + // Open the input (big opening, lots of columns) at the full index... + let input_openings = rounds + .iter() + .map(|(data, _)| { + let log_max_batch_height = log2_strict_usize(self.mmcs.get_max_height(data)); + let reduced_index = index >> (log_max_height - log_max_batch_height); + self.mmcs.open_batch(reduced_index, data) + }) + .collect(); + + // We committed to first_layer in pairs, so open the reduced index and include the sibling + // as part of the input proof. + let (first_layer_values, first_layer_proof) = self + .fri_params + .mmcs + .open_batch(index >> 1, &first_layer_data) + .unpack(); + let first_layer_siblings = izip!(&first_layer_values, &log_heights) + .map(|(v, log_height)| { + let reduced_index = index >> (log_max_height - log_height); + let sibling_index = (reduced_index & 1) ^ 1; + v[sibling_index] + }) + .collect(); + CircleInputProof { + input_openings, + first_layer_siblings, + first_layer_proof, + } + }); + + ( + values, + CirclePcsProof { + first_layer_commitment, + lambdas, + fri_proof, + }, + ) + } + + fn verify( + &self, + // For each round: + rounds: Vec<( + Self::Commitment, + // for each matrix: + Vec<( + // its domain, + Self::Domain, + // for each point: + Vec<( + // the point, + Challenge, + // values at the point + Vec, + )>, + )>, + )>, + proof: &Self::Proof, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + ) -> Result<(), Self::Error> { + // Write evaluations to challenger + for (_, round) in &rounds { + for (_, mat) in round { + for (_, point) in mat { + challenger.observe_algebra_slice(point); + } + } + } + + // Batch combination challenge + let alpha: Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + // Per (batch, matrix) `alpha^width` and `alpha^(2*width)`, plus a shared table of + // `alpha`'s powers up to the widest matrix. A matrix's width is fixed by the + // verifier's own claimed evaluations (`rounds`), independent of the query, so + // computing these once here replaces recomputing them on every (query, matrix) + // or (query, matrix, point) inside the per-query closure below. + let matrix_alpha_pows: Vec> = rounds + .iter() + .map(|(_, mats)| { + mats.iter() + .map(|(_, points_and_values)| { + let width = points_and_values.first().map_or(0, |(_, v)| v.len()); + let alpha_pow_width = alpha.exp_u64(width as u64); + (alpha_pow_width, alpha_pow_width.square()) + }) + .collect() + }) + .collect(); + let max_width = rounds + .iter() + .flat_map(|(_, mats)| mats.iter()) + .flat_map(|(_, points_and_values)| points_and_values.iter().map(|(_, v)| v.len())) + .max() + .unwrap_or(0); + let alpha_powers: Vec = alpha.powers().collect_n(max_width); + + challenger.observe(proof.first_layer_commitment.clone()); + let bivariate_beta: Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + // +1 to account for first layer + let log_global_max_height = + proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.len() + self.fri_params.log_blowup + 1; + + // Guard the query-phase height subtraction against an under-reported round count. + // + // Invariant: the proof's global height covers every claimed matrix. + // + // H_proof = commit-phase round count + log_blowup + 1 (first-layer fold) + // H_claim = max committed log_n + log_blowup + // + // The query phase computes `index >> (log_global_max_height - log_height)`. + // - `log_height <= H_claim` holds for every matrix + // - `H_proof < H_claim` makes that usize subtraction underflow and the shift wrap + // Over-reporting is caught downstream (two-adicity bound, Merkle openings), so the + // under-report is the only case to reject here. + let expected_log_global_max_height = rounds + .iter() + .flat_map(|(_, mats)| { + mats.iter() + .map(|(domain, _)| domain.log_n + self.fri_params.log_blowup) + }) + .max(); + if let Some(expected) = expected_log_global_max_height + && log_global_max_height < expected + { + return Err(FriError::GlobalMaxHeightMismatch { + expected, + got: log_global_max_height, + }); + } + + let folding: CircleFriFoldingForMmcs = + CircleFriFolding(PhantomData); + + verify( + &folding, + &self.fri_params, + &proof.fri_proof, + challenger, + |index, input_proof| { + // log_height -> (alpha_offset, ro) + let mut reduced_openings = BTreeMap::new(); + + let CircleInputProof { + input_openings, + first_layer_siblings, + first_layer_proof, + } = input_proof; + + for (batch, (batch_opening, (batch_commit, mats))) in + zip_eq(input_openings, &rounds, InputError::InputShapeError)?.enumerate() + { + let batch_heights: Vec = mats + .iter() + .map(|(domain, _)| domain.size() << self.fri_params.log_blowup) + .collect_vec(); + // The opened rows must pair one-to-one with the committed matrices. + let batch_dims: Vec = zip_eq( + batch_heights.iter().zip(mats), + &batch_opening.opened_values, + InputError::InputShapeError, + )? + .map( + |((&height, (_, points_and_values)), opened_row)| Dimensions { + // Invariant: the commitment layer rejects opened rows that differ from this width. + // + // some points → width = claimed evaluation count + // no points → width = opened row length (no claim to enforce) + width: points_and_values + .first() + .map_or(opened_row.len(), |(_, values)| values.len()), + height, + }, + ) + .collect_vec(); + + let (dims, idx) = batch_heights + .iter() + .max() + .map(|x| log2_strict_usize(*x)) + .map_or_else( + || + // Empty batch? + (&[][..], 0), + |log_batch_max_height| { + ( + &batch_dims[..], + index >> (log_global_max_height - log_batch_max_height), + ) + }, + ); + + self.mmcs + .verify_batch(batch_commit, dims, idx, batch_opening.into()) + .map_err(InputError::InputMmcsError)?; + + for (matrix, (ps_at_x, (mat_domain, mat_points_and_values))) in zip_eq( + &batch_opening.opened_values, + mats, + InputError::InputShapeError, + )? + .enumerate() + { + let log_height = mat_domain.log_n + self.fri_params.log_blowup; + let bits_reduced = log_global_max_height - log_height; + let orig_idx = cfft_permute_index(index >> bits_reduced, log_height); + + let committed_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_height); + let x = committed_domain.nth_point(orig_idx); + + let (alpha_offset, ro) = reduced_openings + .entry(log_height) + .or_insert((Challenge::ONE, Challenge::ZERO)); + let (alpha_pow_width, alpha_pow_width_2) = matrix_alpha_pows[batch][matrix]; + + for (zeta_uni, ps_at_zeta) in mat_points_and_values { + // The claimed opening must have exactly as many + // values as the committed row has columns. + if ps_at_zeta.len() != ps_at_x.len() { + return Err(InputError::InputShapeError); + } + let zeta = Point::from_projective_line(*zeta_uni); + + *ro += *alpha_offset + * deep_quotient_reduce_row( + alpha_pow_width, + &alpha_powers, + x, + zeta, + ps_at_x, + ps_at_zeta, + ); + + *alpha_offset *= alpha_pow_width_2; + } + } + } + + // Verify bivariate fold and lambda correction + + // First pass: derive the lambda-corrected leaf values and each height's + // first-layer (y) twiddle, without folding yet. The fold pairs a point with + // its negation, so the canonical (b=0) twiddle is `p.y` (sign-flipped when + // this query landed on the b=1 member) - the same point `p` already computed + // for the lambda correction, with no separate `nth_y_twiddle` scalar + // multiplication. All these per-height twiddles are then inverted in a single + // batch instead of one inversion per height. + let per_height: Vec<_> = zip_eq( + zip_eq( + reduced_openings, + first_layer_siblings, + InputError::InputShapeError, + )?, + &proof.lambdas, + InputError::InputShapeError, + )? + .map(|(((log_height, (_, ro)), &fl_sib), &lambda)| { + assert!(log_height > 0); + + let orig_size = log_height - self.fri_params.log_blowup; + let bits_reduced = log_global_max_height - log_height; + let b = (index >> bits_reduced) & 1; + let orig_idx = cfft_permute_index(index >> bits_reduced, log_height); + + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_height); + let p: Point = lde_domain.nth_point(orig_idx); + + let lambda_corrected = ro - lambda * p.v_n(orig_size); + + let mut fl_values = vec![lambda_corrected; 2]; + fl_values[b ^ 1] = fl_sib; + + let y_twiddle = if b == 0 { p.y } else { -p.y }; + + let fl_dims = Dimensions { + // First-layer leaves hold the queried value and its sibling. + width: 2, + height: 1 << (log_height - 1), + }; + + (log_height, y_twiddle, fl_values, fl_dims) + }) + .collect(); + + let y_twiddles_inv = batch_multiplicative_inverse( + &per_height.iter().map(|&(_, t, _, _)| t).collect_vec(), + ); + + let (mut fri_input, fl_dims, fl_leaves): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = per_height + .into_iter() + .zip(y_twiddles_inv) + .map(|((log_height, _, fl_values, fl_dims), y_twiddle_inv)| { + let fri_input = ( + // - 1 here is because we have already folded a layer. + log_height - 1, + fold_row_with_inv_twiddle( + y_twiddle_inv, + bivariate_beta, + fl_values.iter().copied(), + ), + ); + (fri_input, fl_dims, fl_values) + }) + .multiunzip(); + + // sort descending + fri_input.reverse(); + + self.fri_params + .mmcs + .verify_batch( + &proof.first_layer_commitment, + &fl_dims, + index >> 1, + BatchOpeningRef::new(&fl_leaves, first_layer_proof), + ) + .map_err(InputError::FirstLayerMmcsError)?; + + Ok(fri_input) + }, + ) + } +} + +impl BuildPeriodicLdeTableFast for CirclePcs +where + Val: ComplexExtendable, + InputMmcs: Mmcs, +{ + type PeriodicDomain = CircleDomain; + + fn maybe_build_periodic_lde_table_fast( + &self, + periodic_cols: &[Vec>], + trace_domain: Self::PeriodicDomain, + quotient_domain: Self::PeriodicDomain, + ) -> Option>> + where + p3_commit::Val: Clone, + { + let table = build_periodic_lde_table_circle(periodic_cols, &trace_domain, "ient_domain); + Some(table) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_challenger::{HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; + use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_fri::FriParameters; + use p3_fri::verifier::FriError; + use p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash; + use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use p3_symmetric::{CompressionFunctionFromHasher, SerializingHasher}; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + + type Val = Mersenne31; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + type ByteHash = Keccak256Hash; + type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; + type MyCompress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; + type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; + type TestPcs = CirclePcs; + type TestError = FriError< + >::Error, + InputError<>::Error, >::Error>, + >; + + /// Build a valid Circle PCS proof for a random single-column trace. + /// + /// Returns all the pieces needed to verify (or re-verify after mutation): + /// the PCS instance, hasher seed, commitment, domain, evaluation point, + /// opened values, and the proof itself. + /// + /// # Fixture parameters + /// + /// - Trace: 2^{10} = 1024 rows, 1 column of random field elements. + /// - FRI: testing parameters with log_blowup = 2, log_final_poly_len = 0. + /// - Hash: Keccak-256 with a binary Merkle tree. + #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)] + fn setup_valid_proof() -> ( + TestPcs, + ByteHash, + >::Commitment, + CircleDomain, + Challenge, + Vec>>>, + CirclePcsProof, + ) { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(0); + + // Build the hash stack: field hasher → compression → Merkle tree. + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = MyCompress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + + // Wrap the value-domain Merkle tree for extension-field leaves. + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + // Minimal FRI parameters for fast test execution. + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 0); + + let pcs = TestPcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + + // Generate a random trace on a circle domain of size 2^{10}. + let log_n = 10; + let d = + >::natural_domain_for_degree(&pcs, 1 << log_n); + + let evals = RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1); + + // Commit to the trace and produce the Merkle root. + let (comm, data) = >::commit(&pcs, [(d, evals)]); + + // Random evaluation point in the extension field. + let zeta: Challenge = rng.random(); + + // Generate the opening proof at the chosen evaluation point. + let mut chal = Challenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + let (values, proof) = pcs.open(vec![(&data, vec![vec![zeta]])], &mut chal); + + (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, proof) + } + + /// Run the PCS verifier with the given proof and return the result. + /// + /// This is a thin wrapper that reconstructs a fresh challenger and + /// calls the verification routine. Tests use it to verify both valid + /// proofs and intentionally malformed ones. + fn try_verify( + pcs: &TestPcs, + byte_hash: ByteHash, + comm: &>::Commitment, + d: CircleDomain, + zeta: Challenge, + values: &[Vec>>], + proof: &CirclePcsProof, + ) -> Result<(), TestError> { + // Build a fresh challenger from the same seed so the transcript + // replays identically to what the prover produced. + let mut chal = Challenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + pcs.verify( + vec![( + comm.clone(), + vec![(d, vec![(zeta, values[0][0][0].clone())])], + )], + proof, + &mut chal, + ) + } + + #[test] + fn circle_pcs() { + // Smoke test: an honestly generated proof must verify successfully. + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof).expect("verify err"); + } + + #[test] + fn get_evaluations_on_domain_matches_direct_lde() { + // `get_evaluations_on_domain` must return the committed trace on the requested + // domain whether that domain is smaller than, equal to, or larger than the + // committed LDE. The smaller-than case is exercised whenever `log_blowup` + // exceeds the quotient degree (e.g. the quotient domain in uni-stark). + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = MyCompress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + // log_blowup = 2 makes the committed LDE larger than a quotient-sized domain. + let mut fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 0); + fri_params.log_blowup = 2; + + let pcs = TestPcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + + let log_n = 8; + let width = 3; + let d = + >::natural_domain_for_degree(&pcs, 1 << log_n); + let evals = RowMajorMatrix::::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, width); + + let (_comm, data) = + >::commit(&pcs, [(d, evals.clone())]); + + // The committed LDE lives on `standard(log_n + 2)`. Walk a target domain from the + // original degree up past the committed LDE: `log_n + 1` is the smaller-than case, + // `log_n + 2` hits the equal fast path, and `log_n + 3` is the larger-than case. + for target_log_n in [log_n, log_n + 1, log_n + 2, log_n + 3] { + let target = CircleDomain::standard(target_log_n); + let got = >::get_evaluations_on_domain( + &pcs, &data, 0, target, + ) + .to_row_major_matrix(); + + // Ground truth: extrapolate the original trace straight onto `target`. + let expected = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(d, evals.clone()) + .extrapolate(target) + .to_natural_order() + .to_row_major_matrix(); + + assert_eq!(got, expected, "mismatch for target_log_n = {target_log_n}"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn reject_query_proof_count_mismatch() { + // Invariant: the proof must contain exactly num_queries query proofs. + // The verifier rejects if the count is wrong. + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // Mutation: remove one query proof so the count falls short. + // + // before: query_proofs = [q_0, q_1, ..., q_{n-1}] (n = num_queries) + // after: query_proofs = [q_0, q_1, ..., q_{n-2}] (n - 1) + // → expected n, got n - 1 → error + proof.fri_proof.query_proofs.pop(); + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected QueryProofCountMismatch"); + + // Destructure for precise field assertions (better diagnostics than matches!). + let FriError::QueryProofCountMismatch { expected, got } = err else { + panic!("expected QueryProofCountMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + assert_eq!(expected, pcs.fri_params.num_queries); + assert_eq!(got, pcs.fri_params.num_queries - 1); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_zero_queries() { + // Invariant: a zero-query instance performs no low-degree spot checks. + // The per-query loop never runs. + // Without the guard any final polynomial would verify. + // + // Fixture state: an honest proof built with the testing query count. + // + // Mutation: verify it under params with num_queries = 0. + let (mut pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + pcs.fri_params.num_queries = 0; + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("zero-query instance must be rejected"); + + assert!( + matches!(err, FriError::ZeroQueries), + "expected ZeroQueries, got {err:?}" + ); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "num_queries must be at least 1")] + fn prover_rejects_zero_queries() { + // The prover must refuse to build a vacuous proof. + // The verifier guards the same config, so the failure is symmetric. + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(0); + + // Build the hash stack: field hasher → compression → Merkle tree. + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = MyCompress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + // Zero queries; every other parameter is otherwise valid. + let mut fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 0); + fri_params.num_queries = 0; + + let pcs = TestPcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + + // Commit to a random single-column trace of 2^{10} rows. + let log_n = 10; + let d = + >::natural_domain_for_degree(&pcs, 1 << log_n); + let evals = RowMajorMatrix::rand(&mut rng, 1 << log_n, 1); + let (_comm, data) = >::commit(&pcs, [(d, evals)]); + + // Commit succeeds; the assert fires inside the opening (FRI prover). + let zeta: Challenge = rng.random(); + let mut chal = Challenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + let _ = pcs.open(vec![(&data, vec![vec![zeta]])], &mut chal); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_commit_pow_witness_count_mismatch() { + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + let num_rounds = proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.len(); + + // Drop one witness so the per-round count falls short. + proof.fri_proof.commit_pow_witnesses.pop(); + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected CommitPowWitnessCountMismatch"); + + let FriError::CommitPowWitnessCountMismatch { expected, got } = err else { + panic!("expected CommitPowWitnessCountMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + assert_eq!(expected, num_rounds); + assert_eq!(got, num_rounds - 1); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_under_reported_commit_rounds() { + // Invariant: the reported commit-round count must cover the claimed matrix height. + // - log_global_max_height is derived from the proof's round count + // - under-reporting drives it below a matrix's log_height + // - then `index >> (log_global_max_height - log_height)` would underflow + // The verifier must reject before that subtraction runs. + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // On an honest proof the two height derivations coincide: + // + // H_claim = log_n + log_blowup (claimed matrix) + // H_proof = commit_phase_commits.len() + log_blowup + 1 (first-layer fold) + let log_blowup = pcs.fri_params.log_blowup; + let expected = d.log_n + log_blowup; + let original = proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.len() + log_blowup + 1; + assert_eq!(original, expected, "fixture must start height-consistent"); + + // Mutation: drop one commit-phase commitment so the round count falls short. + // + // before: commit_phase_commits = [c_0, ..., c_{n-1}] → H_proof = expected + // after: commit_phase_commits = [c_0, ..., c_{n-2}] → H_proof = expected - 1 + // → H_proof < H_claim → GlobalMaxHeightMismatch (no underflow) + proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.pop(); + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected GlobalMaxHeightMismatch"); + + let FriError::GlobalMaxHeightMismatch { expected: exp, got } = err else { + panic!("expected GlobalMaxHeightMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + // The verifier wants the height the claimed matrix demands. + assert_eq!(exp, expected); + // The proof under-reports by exactly the one round we removed. + assert_eq!(got, expected - 1); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_query_commit_phase_openings_count_mismatch() { + // Invariant: each query proof must carry exactly one opening per + // commit-phase round. If a query has fewer (or more) openings than + // there are commitments, the proof shape is invalid. + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // We need the original proof to assert against its commitment count, + // so clone before mutating. + let mut bad = proof.clone(); + + // Mutation: remove the last opening from query 0. + // + // commit_phase_commits: [c_0, ..., c_{n-1}] (n rounds) + // query 0 commit_phase_openings: [o_0, ..., o_{n-2}] (n - 1 after pop) + // → n != n - 1 → error on query 0 + bad.fri_proof.query_proofs[0].commit_phase_openings.pop(); + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &bad) + .expect_err("expected QueryCommitPhaseOpeningsCountMismatch"); + + let FriError::QueryCommitPhaseOpeningsCountMismatch { + query, + expected, + got, + } = err + else { + panic!("expected QueryCommitPhaseOpeningsCountMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + // Error must identify query 0 as the offender. + assert_eq!(query, 0); + assert_eq!(expected, proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.len()); + assert_eq!(got, expected - 1); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_sibling_values_length_mismatch() { + // Invariant: in each folding round with arity k, the prover must + // supply exactly k - 1 sibling values (the queried evaluation is + // the remaining one). + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // Capture the original sibling count and arity before mutating. + let log_arity = proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[0].commit_phase_openings[0].log_arity as usize; + let arity = 1usize << log_arity; + let original_sibling_count = proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[0].commit_phase_openings[0] + .sibling_values + .len(); + + // Mutation: remove one sibling value from query 0, round 0. + // + // arity = 2^{log_arity}, expected siblings = arity - 1 + // before: sibling_values = [s_0, ..., s_{arity-2}] (arity - 1 elements) + // after: sibling_values = [s_0, ..., s_{arity-3}] (arity - 2 elements) + // → expected arity - 1, got arity - 2 → error at round 0 + proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[0].commit_phase_openings[0] + .sibling_values + .pop(); + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected SiblingValuesLengthMismatch"); + + let FriError::SiblingValuesLengthMismatch { + round, + expected, + got, + } = err + else { + panic!("expected SiblingValuesLengthMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + // Error must identify round 0 as the offender. + assert_eq!(round, 0); + // The verifier expects (arity - 1) siblings per folding group. + assert_eq!(expected, arity - 1); + // We popped one, so one fewer than the original count. + assert_eq!(got, original_sibling_count - 1); + } + + // Two error variants cannot be triggered through the PCS verification + // layer because Merkle commitment checks or input-proof validation + // fail first for any proof mutation that would reach those code paths: + // + // - Final fold height mismatch: requires the total folding to stop at + // the wrong domain size, but altering round counts also invalidates + // Merkle proofs. + // - Unconsumed reduced openings: requires leftover polynomial data + // after folding completes, but input-proof checks reject the shape + // before the folding loop runs. + // + // Both are reachable by a malicious prover who crafts openings that + // pass Merkle checks but have wrong structure — they serve as defense + // in depth in the low-level verifier. + + #[test] + fn reject_query_log_arities_mismatch() { + // Invariant: all query proofs must use the same per-round folding + // arity schedule. The verifier takes the first query proof's + // schedule as a reference and rejects any that differ. + let (mut pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + // Allow arity 2 so this mutation remains a schedule mismatch rather + // than being rejected as an out-of-range arity. + pcs.fri_params.max_log_arity = 2; + + // This check compares query 1 against query 0, so we need at least + // two query proofs. With testing parameters this is always true, but + // guard defensively. + if proof.fri_proof.query_proofs.len() < 2 { + return; + } + + // Capture the reference arity schedule from query 0 before mutating. + let reference_arities: Vec = proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[0] + .commit_phase_openings + .iter() + .map(|o| o.log_arity as usize) + .collect(); + + // Mutation: bump the log_arity of query 1's first round by 1. + // + // query 0 arities: [a_0, a_1, ..., a_{n-1}] (reference) + // query 1 arities: [a_0 + 1, a_1, ..., a_{n-1}] (corrupted) + // → schedules differ → error on query 1 + let original = proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[1].commit_phase_openings[0].log_arity; + proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[1].commit_phase_openings[0].log_arity = original + 1; + + // Build the expected corrupted schedule for query 1. + let mut corrupted_arities = reference_arities.clone(); + corrupted_arities[0] = original as usize + 1; + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected QueryLogAritiesMismatch"); + + let FriError::QueryLogAritiesMismatch { + query, + expected, + got, + } = err + else { + panic!("expected QueryLogAritiesMismatch, got {err:?}"); + }; + // Error must identify query 1 (the first one compared against the reference). + assert_eq!(query, 1); + // The expected schedule is query 0's (the reference). + assert_eq!(expected, reference_arities); + // The got schedule is query 1's corrupted version. + assert_eq!(got, corrupted_arities); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_invalid_log_arity() { + // Invariant: each log_arity must be in 1..=max_log_arity. + let (pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // Mutation: force an invalid zero arity in query 0, round 0. + proof.fri_proof.query_proofs[0].commit_phase_openings[0].log_arity = 0; + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected InvalidLogArity"); + + let FriError::InvalidLogArity { + round, + log_arity, + max, + } = err + else { + panic!("expected InvalidLogArity, got {err:?}"); + }; + assert_eq!(round, 0); + assert_eq!(log_arity, 0); + assert_eq!(max, pcs.fri_params.max_log_arity); + } + + #[test] + fn reject_global_max_height_too_large() { + // Invariant: the query-index width fits the circle group of order 2^CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY. + // + // field order = 2^CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY - 1 (one short of the group order) + // => width of CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY bits is unsampleable => verifier must reject + let (mut pcs, byte_hash, comm, d, zeta, values, mut proof) = setup_valid_proof(); + + // Zero both proof-of-work targets. + // Otherwise grinding rejects the cloned witnesses before the width check runs. + pcs.fri_params.commit_proof_of_work_bits = 0; + pcs.fri_params.query_proof_of_work_bits = 0; + + // Mutation: clone commit-phase rounds until the width reaches the bound. + // + // num_index_bits = rounds + log_blowup + extra_query_index_bits (= 1 for circle) + // stop once num_index_bits >= CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY + let extra_query_index_bits = 1; + let commit = proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits[0].clone(); + let witness = proof.fri_proof.commit_pow_witnesses[0]; + while proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.len() + + pcs.fri_params.log_blowup + + extra_query_index_bits + < Val::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY + { + proof.fri_proof.commit_phase_commits.push(commit.clone()); + proof.fri_proof.commit_pow_witnesses.push(witness); + // Each query proof needs one opening per round. + for qp in &mut proof.fri_proof.query_proofs { + let opening = qp.commit_phase_openings[0].clone(); + qp.commit_phase_openings.push(opening); + } + } + + let err = try_verify(&pcs, byte_hash, &comm, d, zeta, &values, &proof) + .expect_err("expected GlobalMaxHeightTooLarge"); + + let FriError::GlobalMaxHeightTooLarge { + log_global_max_height, + two_adicity, + } = err + else { + panic!("expected GlobalMaxHeightTooLarge, got {err:?}"); + }; + // The reported bound is the circle group two-adicity. + assert_eq!(two_adicity, Val::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY); + // The rejecting width is at least that bound. + assert!(log_global_max_height >= two_adicity); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/periodic.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/periodic.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1674ebf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/periodic.rs @@ -0,0 +1,347 @@ +//! Periodic column support for Circle STARKs. +//! +//! This module provides `CirclePeriodicEvaluator` for evaluating periodic columns +//! in Circle STARK proofs. The implementation supports: +//! +//! - `eval_on_lde`: Evaluates periodic columns on the LDE domain using CFFT extrapolation. +//! All columns are padded to the maximum period, creating a rectangular matrix that +//! stores only `max_period × blowup` rows with modular indexing for O(1) lookup. +//! +//! - `eval_at_point`: Evaluates periodic columns at arbitrary points using polynomial +//! evaluation with repeated doubling projection. This is used by the verifier. +//! +//! ## Memory Efficiency +//! +//! Instead of materializing the full LDE-sized table, we store only `max_period × blowup` +//! rows. For a trace of size 2^20 with period-4 columns and blowup 4, this means storing +//! 16 rows instead of 4M rows per column. +//! +//! ## Complexity +//! +//! - `eval_on_lde`: O(max_period × blowup × log(max_period × blowup)) for CFFT extrapolation, +//! then O(1) per LDE point lookup using modular indexing. +//! +//! - `eval_at_point`: O(period) per column using polynomial evaluation. +//! +//! Note: The current `eval_at_point` implementation is not optimized for multiple columns +//! with the same period. The interpolation setup could be shared across columns with the +//! same period. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_commit::{PeriodicEvaluator, PeriodicLdeTable, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::ExtensionField; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; + +use crate::CircleEvaluations; +use crate::domain::CircleDomain; + +/// Build the compact periodic LDE table using the circle evaluator. +/// +/// This is a type-level helper so callers can use concrete `F` without +/// the compiler struggling to unify `F` with `PolynomialSpace::Val`. +pub fn build_periodic_lde_table_circle( + periodic_table: &[Vec], + trace_domain: &CircleDomain, + lde_domain: &CircleDomain, +) -> p3_commit::PeriodicLdeTable { + CirclePeriodicEvaluator::eval_on_lde(periodic_table, trace_domain, lde_domain) +} + +/// Evaluates periodic polynomials for Circle STARKs. +/// +/// For a periodic column with period `p` and trace length `n`, the periodic values +/// are interpolated on a Circle domain of size `p`. To evaluate at any point: +/// 1. Interpolate the periodic values on a small Circle domain of size `p` +/// 2. Project the query point to the periodic subdomain via repeated doubling +/// 3. Evaluate the polynomial at the projected point +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)] +pub struct CirclePeriodicEvaluator; + +impl PeriodicEvaluator> for CirclePeriodicEvaluator { + fn eval_on_lde( + periodic_table: &[Vec], + trace_domain: &CircleDomain, + lde_domain: &CircleDomain, + ) -> PeriodicLdeTable { + if periodic_table.is_empty() { + return PeriodicLdeTable::empty(); + } + + let trace_len = trace_domain.size(); + let log_blowup = lde_domain + .log_n + .checked_sub(trace_domain.log_n) + .expect("LDE domain log_n must be >= trace domain log_n"); + let blowup = 1usize + .checked_shl(log_blowup as u32) + .expect("blowup overflow when computing 1 << log_blowup"); + + for col in periodic_table { + let period = col.len(); + assert!( + period > 0 && period.is_power_of_two(), + "periodic column length must be a non-zero power of 2, got {period}", + ); + assert!( + trace_len.is_multiple_of(period), + "trace domain size ({trace_len}) must be divisible by periodic column length ({period})", + ); + } + let max_period = periodic_table.iter().map(|c| c.len()).max().unwrap(); + + let log_max_period = log2_strict_usize(max_period); + let log_repetitions = log2_strict_usize(trace_len / max_period); + let extended_height = max_period + .checked_mul(blowup) + .expect("extended height overflow when computing max_period * blowup"); + let num_cols = periodic_table.len(); + let row_major_capacity = extended_height + .checked_mul(num_cols) + .expect("row-major periodic table capacity overflow"); + + // Compute the shift for the periodic subdomain at max_period. + // This aligns the periodic domain with the LDE domain so modular indexing works. + let extended_shift = lde_domain.shift.repeated_double(log_repetitions); + let extended_log_n = log_max_period + .checked_add(log_blowup) + .expect("extended periodic domain log size overflow"); + let extended_periodic_domain = CircleDomain::new(extended_log_n, extended_shift); + + // Process each column: pad to max_period, then extrapolate + // Build the result in column-major order first, then transpose to row-major + let mut columns: Vec> = Vec::with_capacity(num_cols); + + for col in periodic_table { + let period = col.len(); + + // Pad column to max_period by repeating values + let padded: Vec = if period == max_period { + col.clone() + } else { + (0..max_period).map(|i| col[i % period]).collect() + }; + + // Interpolate on the max_period domain + let periodic_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_max_period); + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + periodic_domain, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(padded), + ); + + // Extrapolate to extended_height using CFFT + let extended_evals = evals.extrapolate(extended_periodic_domain); + let extended_values = extended_evals.to_natural_order().to_row_major_matrix(); + columns.push(extended_values.values); + } + + // Convert from column-major to row-major storage + let mut row_major_values = Vec::with_capacity(row_major_capacity); + for row_idx in 0..extended_height { + for col in &columns { + row_major_values.push(col[row_idx]); + } + } + + PeriodicLdeTable::new(RowMajorMatrix::new(row_major_values, num_cols)) + } + + fn eval_at_point>( + periodic_table: &[Vec], + trace_domain: &CircleDomain, + point: EF, + ) -> Vec { + let trace_len = trace_domain.size(); + periodic_table + .iter() + .map(|col| { + let period = col.len(); + assert!( + period > 0 && period.is_power_of_two(), + "periodic column length must be a non-zero power of 2, got {period}", + ); + assert!( + trace_len.is_multiple_of(period), + "trace domain size ({trace_len}) must be divisible by periodic column length ({period})", + ); + PolynomialSpace::evaluate_periodic_column_at(trace_domain, col, point) + }) + .collect() + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + + use hashbrown::HashMap; + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::point::Point; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + #[test] + fn test_periodic_eval_consistency_random_points() { + // Test that eval_on_lde and eval_at_point define the same polynomial + // by checking consistency at random out-of-domain points + let log_n = 4; + let log_blowup = 1; + let trace_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + let lde_len = lde_domain.size(); + + // Periodic column: [10, 20, 30, 40] + let periodic_col = vec![ + F::from_u32(10), + F::from_u32(20), + F::from_u32(30), + F::from_u32(40), + ]; + let periodic_table = vec![periodic_col]; + + // Evaluate on LDE domain + let lde_table = + CirclePeriodicEvaluator::eval_on_lde(&periodic_table, &trace_domain, &lde_domain); + + assert_eq!(lde_table.width(), 1); + // Compact table has height = period * blowup = 4 * 2 = 8 + assert_eq!(lde_table.height(), 8); + + // Expand compact table to full LDE for interpolation test + let full_lde: Vec = (0..lde_len).map(|i| *lde_table.get(i, 0)).collect(); + + // Interpolate the LDE result to get a polynomial we can evaluate anywhere + let lde_evals = + CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order(lde_domain, RowMajorMatrix::new_col(full_lde)); + + // Test at random out-of-domain points + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(42); + for _ in 0..10 { + let random_point: EF = rng.random(); + + // Evaluate the LDE polynomial at the random point + let lde_at_point = + lde_evals.evaluate_at_point(Point::from_projective_line(random_point))[0]; + + // Evaluate using eval_at_point directly + let eval_at_point_result = CirclePeriodicEvaluator::eval_at_point( + &periodic_table, + &trace_domain, + random_point, + ); + + assert_eq!( + lde_at_point, eval_at_point_result[0], + "Mismatch at random point: LDE interpolation={:?}, eval_at_point={:?}", + lde_at_point, eval_at_point_result[0] + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_periodic_eval_at_trace_domain_points() { + // Test that evaluating the periodic polynomial at trace domain points + // gives the expected periodic pattern + let log_n = 4; // 16 rows + let trace_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let trace_len = trace_domain.size(); + let period = 4; + + // Periodic column: [1, 2, 3, 4] + let periodic_col = vec![ + F::from_u32(1), + F::from_u32(2), + F::from_u32(3), + F::from_u32(4), + ]; + let periodic_table = vec![periodic_col]; + + // Evaluate on trace domain (same as LDE with blowup=1) + let lde_table = + CirclePeriodicEvaluator::eval_on_lde(&periodic_table, &trace_domain, &trace_domain); + + assert_eq!(lde_table.width(), 1); + // Compact table has height = period * blowup = 4 * 1 = 4 + assert_eq!(lde_table.height(), 4); + + // Expand compact table to full trace + let full_trace: Vec = (0..trace_len).map(|i| *lde_table.get(i, 0)).collect(); + + // The values should follow a periodic pattern with period 4 + // But the exact mapping depends on Circle domain structure. + // Verify that we get exactly 4 distinct values, each appearing 4 times. + let mut value_counts = HashMap::new(); + for &val in &full_trace { + *value_counts.entry(val).or_insert(0) += 1; + } + assert_eq!( + value_counts.len(), + period, + "Expected {} distinct values, got {}", + period, + value_counts.len() + ); + for (val, count) in &value_counts { + assert_eq!( + *count, 4, + "Value {:?} appears {} times, expected 4", + val, count + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_cfft_extrapolation_matches_naive() { + // Verify that the CFFT-based eval_on_lde matches point-by-point evaluation + // using the naive repeated_double approach. + for (log_n, log_blowup, log_period) in [(4, 1, 2), (5, 2, 2), (6, 1, 3), (8, 2, 4)] { + let trace_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n); + let lde_domain = CircleDomain::::standard(log_n + log_blowup); + let lde_len = lde_domain.size(); + let period = 1 << log_period; + let log_repetitions = log_n - log_period; + + // Create a periodic column with distinct values + let periodic_col: Vec = (0..period).map(|i| F::from_u32(i as u32 + 1)).collect(); + let periodic_table = vec![periodic_col.clone()]; + + // Evaluate using the optimized CFFT-based method + let cfft_table = + CirclePeriodicEvaluator::eval_on_lde(&periodic_table, &trace_domain, &lde_domain); + + // Expand compact table to full LDE + let cfft_result: Vec = (0..lde_len).map(|i| *cfft_table.get(i, 0)).collect(); + + // Evaluate using the naive point-by-point method + let periodic_domain = CircleDomain::standard(log_period); + let evals = CircleEvaluations::from_natural_order( + periodic_domain, + RowMajorMatrix::new_col(periodic_col.clone()), + ); + + let naive_result: Vec = (0..lde_len) + .map(|lde_idx| { + let lde_point = lde_domain.nth_point(lde_idx); + let periodic_point = lde_point.repeated_double(log_repetitions); + evals.evaluate_at_point(periodic_point)[0] + }) + .collect(); + + assert_eq!( + cfft_result, naive_result, + "CFFT-based and naive methods disagree for log_n={}, log_blowup={}, log_period={}", + log_n, log_blowup, log_period + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/point.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/point.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a37aac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/point.rs @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Mul, Neg, Sub}; + +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_field::{ + ExtensionField, Field, PackedValue, PrimeCharacteristicRing, batch_multiplicative_inverse, +}; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; + +/// Affine representation of a point on the circle. +/// x^2 + y^2 == 1 +// _private is to prevent construction so we can debug assert the invariant +#[allow(clippy::manual_non_exhaustive)] +#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash)] +pub struct Point { + pub x: F, + pub y: F, + _private: (), +} + +impl Point { + #[inline] + pub fn new(x: F, y: F) -> Self { + debug_assert_eq!(x.square() + y.square(), F::ONE); + Self { x, y, _private: () } + } + + const ZERO: Self = Self { + x: F::ONE, + y: F::ZERO, + _private: (), + }; + + /// Circle STARKs, Section 3, Lemma 1: (page 4 of the first revision PDF) + /// ```ignore + /// (x, y) = ((1-t^2)/(1+t^2), 2t/(1+t^2)) + /// ``` + /// Panics if t^2 = -1, corresponding to either of the points at infinity + /// (on the projective *circle*) (1 : ±i : 0) + pub fn from_projective_line(t: F) -> Self { + let t2 = t.square(); + let inv_denom = (F::ONE + t2).try_inverse().expect("t^2 = -1"); + Self::new((F::ONE - t2) * inv_denom, t.double() * inv_denom) + } + + /// Circle STARKs, Section 3, Lemma 1: (page 4 of the first revision PDF) + /// ```ignore + /// t = y / (x + 1) + /// ``` + /// Returns None if self.x = -1, corresponding to Inf on the projective line + /// + /// This is also used as a selector polynomial, with a simple zero at (1,0) + /// and a simple pole at (-1,0), which in the paper is called v_0 + /// Circle STARKs, Section 5.1, Lemma 11 (page 21 of the first revision PDF) + pub fn to_projective_line(self) -> Option { + (self.x + F::ONE).try_inverse().map(|x| x * self.y) + } + + /// The "squaring map", or doubling in additive notation, denoted π(x,y) + /// Circle STARKs, Section 3.1, Equation 1: (page 5 of the first revision PDF) + pub fn double(self) -> Self { + Self::new(self.x.square().double() - F::ONE, self.x.double() * self.y) + } + + /// Apply the doubling map `n` times: π^n(x,y) + pub fn repeated_double(mut self, n: usize) -> Self { + for _ in 0..n { + self = self.double(); + } + self + } + + /// Evaluate the vanishing polynomial for the standard position coset of size 2^log_n + /// at this point + /// Circle STARKs, Section 3.3, Equation 8 (page 10 of the first revision PDF) + pub fn v_n(mut self, log_n: usize) -> F { + debug_assert!(log_n >= 1, "v_n requires log_n >= 1"); + for _ in 0..log_n.saturating_sub(1) { + self.x = self.x.square().double() - F::ONE; // TODO: replace this by a custom field impl. + } + self.x + } + + /// Compute a product of successive `v_n`'s. + /// + /// More explicitly this computes `(1..log_n).map(|i| self.v_n(i)).product()` + /// but uses far fewer `self.x.square().double() - F::ONE` steps compared to the naive implementation. + pub fn v_n_prod(mut self, log_n: usize) -> F { + if log_n <= 1 { + return F::ONE; + } + let mut output = self.x; + for _ in 0..(log_n - 2) { + self.x = self.x.square().double() - F::ONE; // TODO: replace this by a custom field impl. + output *= self.x; + } + output + } + + /// Evaluate the selector function which is zero at `self` and nonzero elsewhere, at `at`. + /// Called v_0 . T_p⁻¹ or ṽ_p(x,y) in the paper, used for constraint selectors. + /// Panics if p = -self, the pole. + /// Section 5.1, Lemma 11 of Circle Starks (page 21 of first edition PDF) + pub fn v_tilde_p>(self, at: Point) -> EF { + (at - self).to_projective_line().unwrap() + } + + /// The concrete value of the selector s_P = v_n / (v_0 . T_p⁻¹) at P=self, used for normalization. + /// Circle STARKs, Section 5.1, Remark 16 (page 22 of the first revision PDF) + pub fn s_p_at_p(self, log_n: usize) -> F { + debug_assert!(log_n >= 1, "s_p_at_p requires log_n >= 1"); + -self.v_n_prod(log_n).mul_2exp_u64((2 * log_n - 1) as u64) * self.y + } + + /// Evaluate the alternate single-point vanishing function v_p(x), used for DEEP quotient. + /// Returns (a, b), representing the complex number a + bi. + /// Simple zero at p, simple pole at +-infinity. + /// Circle STARKs, Section 3.3, Equation 11 (page 11 of the first edition PDF). + pub fn v_p>(self, at: Point) -> (EF, EF) { + let diff = -at + self; + (EF::ONE - diff.x, -diff.y) + } +} + +/// Compute (ṽ_P(x,y) * s_p)^{-1} for each element in the list. +/// +/// All denominators share a single batch inversion instead of one inversion per point. +pub fn compute_lagrange_den_batched>( + points: &[Point], + at: Point, + log_n: usize, +) -> Vec { + // Selector normalization `s_p` for every point, computed packed. + let s_p = { + let mut s_p = F::zero_vec(points.len()); + + if log_n < 2 { + // The squaring chain is empty, so the packed path buys nothing. + for (slot, p) in s_p.iter_mut().zip(points) { + *slot = p.s_p_at_p(log_n); + } + } else { + // Power-of-two scaling and chain length, shared by every lane. + let exp = (2 * log_n - 1) as u64; + let iters = log_n - 2; + let width = F::Packing::WIDTH; + let packed_len = (points.len() / width) * width; + + s_p[..packed_len] + .par_chunks_exact_mut(width) + .zip(points.par_chunks_exact(width)) + .for_each(|(slots, chunk)| { + // Seed the running product with the x-coordinates of the lane. + let mut cur = F::Packing::from_fn(|l| chunk[l].x); + let mut output = cur; + + // Fold in each squaring-chain step `x -> 2 x^2 - 1`. + for _ in 0..iters { + cur = cur.square().double() - F::Packing::ONE; + output *= cur; + } + + // Close the formula: scale by the power of two and the y-coordinate. + let ys = F::Packing::from_fn(|l| chunk[l].y); + let packed_s_p = -(output.mul_2exp_u64(exp) * ys); + + slots.copy_from_slice(packed_s_p.as_slice()); + }); + + // Trailing points below one full lane fall back to the scalar formula. + for (slot, &pt) in s_p[packed_len..].iter_mut().zip(&points[packed_len..]) { + *slot = pt.s_p_at_p(log_n); + } + } + s_p + }; + + // Pair each numerator with its denominator before inverting. + let (numer, denom): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = points + .par_iter() + .zip(&s_p) + .map(|(&pt, &s_p)| { + let diff = at - pt; + let numer = diff.x + F::ONE; + let denom = diff.y * s_p; + (numer, denom) + }) + .unzip(); + + // One inversion covers the whole batch via Montgomery's trick. + let inv_d = batch_multiplicative_inverse(&denom); + + // Recombine each numerator with its inverted denominator. + numer + .par_iter() + .zip(inv_d.par_iter()) + .map(|(&num, &inv_d)| num * inv_d) + .collect() +} + +impl Point { + pub fn generator(log_n: usize) -> Self { + let g = F::circle_two_adic_generator(log_n); + Self::new(g.real(), g.imag()) + } +} + +/// Circle STARKs, Section 3.1, Equation 2: (page 5 of the first revision PDF) +/// The inverse map J(x,y) = (x,-y) +impl Neg for Point { + type Output = Self; + fn neg(mut self) -> Self::Output { + self.y = -self.y; + self + } +} + +impl> Add> for Point { + type Output = Self; + fn add(self, rhs: Point) -> Self::Output { + Self::new( + self.x * rhs.x - self.y * rhs.y, + self.x * rhs.y + self.y * rhs.x, + ) + } +} + +impl AddAssign for Point { + fn add_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { + *self = *self + rhs; + } +} + +impl> Sub> for Point { + type Output = Self; + fn sub(self, rhs: Point) -> Self::Output { + Self::new( + self.x * rhs.x + self.y * rhs.y, + self.y * rhs.x - self.x * rhs.y, + ) + } +} + +impl Mul for Point { + type Output = Self; + fn mul(mut self, mut rhs: usize) -> Self::Output { + let mut res = Self::ZERO; + while rhs != 0 { + if rhs & 1 == 1 { + res += self; + } + rhs >>= 1; + self = self.double(); + } + res + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + use proptest::prelude::*; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + type Pt = Point; + + #[test] + fn test_arithmetic() { + let one = Pt::generator(3); + assert_eq!(one - one, Pt::ZERO); + assert_eq!(one + one, one * 2); + assert_eq!(one + one + one, one * 3); + assert_eq!(one * 7, -one); + assert_eq!(one * 8, Pt::ZERO); + + let generator = Pt::generator(10); + let log_n = 10; + let vn_prod_gen = (1..log_n).map(|i| generator.v_n(i)).product(); + assert_eq!(generator.v_n_prod(log_n), vn_prod_gen); + } + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "v_n requires log_n >= 1")] + fn test_v_n_underflow_log_n_0() { + let p = Pt::generator(3); + let _ = p.v_n(0); + } + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "s_p_at_p requires log_n >= 1")] + fn test_s_p_at_p_underflow_log_n_0() { + let p = Pt::generator(3); + let _ = p.s_p_at_p(0); + } + + /// Independent reference: the pre-batched formulation, one inversion per point. + fn lagrange_den_scalar(points: &[Pt], at: Point, log_n: usize) -> Vec { + points + .iter() + .map(|&pt| { + let diff = at - pt; + let numer = diff.x + F::ONE; + let denom = diff.y * pt.s_p_at_p(log_n); + numer * denom.inverse() + }) + .collect() + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn compute_lagrange_den_batched_matches_scalar( + log_n in 1usize..19, + len in 0usize..40, + at_seed in any::(), + ) { + // A small prefix of real domain points keeps every `s_p` nonzero. + let prefix: Vec = crate::CircleDomain::standard(log_n).points().take(40).collect(); + let points = &prefix[..len.min(prefix.len())]; + + // A pseudo-random extension point stands in for the out-of-domain query. + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(at_seed); + let at = Point::::from_projective_line(rng.random()); + + // Discard the measure-zero draws that would invert a zero denominator. + let all_invertible = points + .iter() + .all(|&pt| (at - pt).y * pt.s_p_at_p(log_n) != EF::ZERO); + prop_assume!(all_invertible); + + prop_assert_eq!( + compute_lagrange_den_batched(points, at, log_n), + lagrange_den_scalar(points, at, log_n) + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/proof.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/proof.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c58639c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/proof.rs @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_commit::Mmcs; +use p3_field::Field; +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)] +#[serde(bound( + serialize = "Witness: Serialize, InputProof: Serialize", + deserialize = "Witness: Deserialize<'de>, InputProof: Deserialize<'de>" +))] +pub struct CircleFriProof, Witness, InputProof> { + pub commit_phase_commits: Vec, + pub commit_pow_witnesses: Vec, + pub query_proofs: Vec>, + // This could become Vec if this library was generalized to support non-constant + // final polynomials. + pub final_poly: F, + pub pow_witness: Witness, +} + +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)] +#[serde(bound( + serialize = "InputProof: Serialize", + deserialize = "InputProof: Deserialize<'de>", +))] +pub struct CircleQueryProof, InputProof> { + pub input_proof: InputProof, + /// For each commit phase commitment, this contains openings of a commit phase codeword at the + /// queried location, along with an opening proof. + pub commit_phase_openings: Vec>, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)] +#[serde(bound = "")] +pub struct CircleCommitPhaseProofStep> { + /// The log2 of the folding arity used for this step. + pub log_arity: u8, + /// The openings of the commit phase codeword at the sibling locations. + /// For arity k, this contains k-1 sibling values. + pub sibling_values: Vec, + + pub opening_proof: M::Proof, +} + +impl> CircleCommitPhaseProofStep { + /// Convert `log_arity` to `usize` and enforce the protocol bounds. + /// + /// Returns `None` when `log_arity` is zero or exceeds `max_log_arity`. + #[inline] + pub(crate) fn checked_log_arity(&self, max_log_arity: usize) -> Option { + let log_arity = self.log_arity as usize; + (1..=max_log_arity) + .contains(&log_arity) + .then_some(log_arity) + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/prover.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/prover.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e5cabcc --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/prover.rs @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::iter; + +use itertools::{Itertools, izip}; +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger, GrindingChallenger}; +use p3_commit::Mmcs; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field}; +use p3_fri::{FriFoldingStrategy, FriParameters, compute_log_arity_for_round}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; +use tracing::{info_span, instrument}; + +use crate::{CircleCommitPhaseProofStep, CircleFriProof, CircleQueryProof}; + +#[instrument(name = "FRI prover", skip_all)] +pub fn prove( + folding: &Folding, + params: &FriParameters, + inputs: Vec>, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + open_input: impl Fn(usize) -> Folding::InputProof, +) -> CircleFriProof +where + Val: Field, + Challenge: ExtensionField, + M: Mmcs, + Challenger: FieldChallenger + GrindingChallenger + CanObserve, + Folding: FriFoldingStrategy, +{ + assert!( + params.max_log_arity > 0, + "max_log_arity must be at least 1 to guarantee folding progress" + ); + + // A zero-query instance performs no low-degree spot checks. + // The verifier rejects it, so refuse to emit one locally. + assert!( + params.num_queries > 0, + "num_queries must be at least 1 for Circle-FRI soundness" + ); + + // check sorted descending + assert!( + inputs + .iter() + .tuple_windows() + .all(|(l, r)| l.len() >= r.len()) + ); + + let log_max_height = log2_strict_usize(inputs[0].len()); + + let commit_phase_result = commit_phase(folding, params, inputs, challenger); + + let pow_witness = challenger.grind(params.query_proof_of_work_bits); + + let query_proofs = info_span!("query phase").in_scope(|| { + iter::repeat_with(|| { + let index = challenger.sample_bits(log_max_height + folding.extra_query_index_bits()); + // For each index, create a proof that the folding operations along the chain are correct. + CircleQueryProof { + input_proof: open_input(index), + commit_phase_openings: answer_query( + params, + &commit_phase_result.log_arities, + &commit_phase_result.data, + index >> folding.extra_query_index_bits(), + ), + } + }) + .take(params.num_queries) + .collect() + }); + + CircleFriProof { + commit_phase_commits: commit_phase_result.commits, + commit_pow_witnesses: commit_phase_result.pow_witnesses, + query_proofs, + final_poly: commit_phase_result.final_poly, + pow_witness, + } +} + +struct CommitPhaseResult, Witness> { + commits: Vec, + data: Vec>>, + log_arities: Vec, + pow_witnesses: Vec, + final_poly: F, +} + +#[instrument(name = "commit phase", skip_all)] +fn commit_phase( + folding: &Folding, + params: &FriParameters, + inputs: Vec>, + challenger: &mut Challenger, +) -> CommitPhaseResult +where + Val: Field, + Challenge: ExtensionField, + M: Mmcs, + Challenger: FieldChallenger + GrindingChallenger + CanObserve, + Folding: FriFoldingStrategy, +{ + assert!( + params.max_log_arity > 0, + "max_log_arity must be at least 1 to guarantee folding progress" + ); + + let mut inputs_iter = inputs.into_iter().peekable(); + let mut folded = inputs_iter.next().unwrap(); + let mut commits = vec![]; + let mut data = vec![]; + let mut log_arities = vec![]; + let mut pow_witnesses = vec![]; + + // For Circle, we fold down to blowup elements (no separate final_poly_len) + let log_final_height = params.log_blowup; + + while folded.len() > params.blowup() { + let log_current_height = log2_strict_usize(folded.len()); + let next_input_log_height = inputs_iter.peek().map(|v| log2_strict_usize(v.len())); + + // Compute the arity for this round + let log_arity = compute_log_arity_for_round( + log_current_height, + next_input_log_height, + log_final_height, + params.max_log_arity, + ); + let arity = 1 << log_arity; + log_arities.push(log_arity); + + let leaves = RowMajorMatrix::new(folded, arity); + let (commit, prover_data) = params.mmcs.commit_matrix(leaves); + challenger.observe(commit.clone()); + + pow_witnesses.push(challenger.grind(params.commit_proof_of_work_bits)); + + let beta: Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + // We passed ownership of `current` to the MMCS, so get a reference to it + let leaves = params.mmcs.get_matrices(&prover_data).pop().unwrap(); + folded = folding.fold_matrix(beta, log_arity, leaves.as_view()); + + commits.push(commit); + data.push(prover_data); + + if let Some(v) = inputs_iter.next_if(|v| v.len() == folded.len()) { + izip!(&mut folded, v).for_each(|(c, x)| *c += x); + } + } + + // We should be left with `blowup` evaluations of a constant polynomial. + assert_eq!(folded.len(), params.blowup()); + let final_poly = folded[0]; + for x in folded { + assert_eq!(x, final_poly); + } + challenger.observe_algebra_element(final_poly); + + CommitPhaseResult { + commits, + data, + log_arities, + pow_witnesses, + final_poly, + } +} + +fn answer_query( + params: &FriParameters, + log_arities: &[usize], + commit_phase_commits: &[M::ProverData>], + start_index: usize, +) -> Vec> +where + F: Field, + M: Mmcs, +{ + let mut current_index = start_index; + + commit_phase_commits + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, commit)| { + let log_arity = log_arities[i]; + let arity = 1 << log_arity; + + // Index of this element within its group + let index_in_group = current_index % arity; + // Index of the group (row in the committed matrix) + let group_index = current_index >> log_arity; + + let (mut opened_rows, opening_proof) = + params.mmcs.open_batch(group_index, commit).unpack(); + assert_eq!(opened_rows.len(), 1); + let opened_row = opened_rows.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + opened_row.len(), + arity, + "Committed data should have arity {} elements", + arity + ); + + // Get all siblings (exclude self) + let sibling_values: Vec<_> = opened_row + .into_iter() + .enumerate() + .filter(|(j, _)| *j != index_in_group) + .map(|(_, v)| v) + .collect(); + + // Update current_index for the next round + current_index = group_index; + + CircleCommitPhaseProofStep { + log_arity: log_arity as u8, + sibling_values, + opening_proof, + } + }) + .collect() +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/verifier.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/verifier.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f28c14d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-circle-0.6.2-cutrace-patch/src/verifier.rs @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::Itertools; +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger, GrindingChallenger}; +use p3_commit::{BatchOpeningRef, Mmcs}; +use p3_field::ExtensionField; +use p3_field::extension::ComplexExtendable; +use p3_fri::verifier::FriError; +use p3_fri::{FriFoldingStrategy, FriParameters}; +use p3_matrix::Dimensions; + +use crate::folding::{fold_row_with_inv_twiddle, query_x_twiddles_inv}; +use crate::{CircleCommitPhaseProofStep, CircleFriProof}; + +pub fn verify( + folding: &Folding, + params: &FriParameters, + proof: &CircleFriProof, + challenger: &mut Challenger, + open_input: impl Fn( + usize, + &Folding::InputProof, + ) -> Result, Folding::InputError>, +) -> Result<(), FriError> +where + Val: ComplexExtendable, + Challenge: ExtensionField, + M: Mmcs, + Challenger: FieldChallenger + GrindingChallenger + CanObserve, + Folding: FriFoldingStrategy, +{ + // Reject a vacuous instance before any transcript work. + // With zero queries the per-query loop never runs. + // Any final polynomial would then pass. + if params.num_queries == 0 { + return Err(FriError::ZeroQueries); + } + + // There must be exactly one commit-phase proof-of-work witness per round. + if proof.commit_pow_witnesses.len() != proof.commit_phase_commits.len() { + return Err(FriError::CommitPowWitnessCountMismatch { + expected: proof.commit_phase_commits.len(), + got: proof.commit_pow_witnesses.len(), + }); + } + + // Phase 1: Derive folding challenges + // + // In Circle-FRI, the verifier must produce one random challenge (beta) + // per commit-phase round. Each commitment is observed into the Fiat-Shamir + // transcript, the round's PoW witness is checked, then a challenge is sampled. + // This yields exactly as many betas as there are commit-phase rounds. + let betas: Vec = proof + .commit_phase_commits + .iter() + .zip(&proof.commit_pow_witnesses) + .map(|(comm, witness)| { + // Absorb this round's commitment into the transcript. + challenger.observe(comm.clone()); + // Check the per-round grinding witness before sampling the challenge. + if !challenger.check_witness(params.commit_proof_of_work_bits, *witness) { + return Err(FriError::InvalidPowWitness); + } + // Squeeze a field-extension element to use as the folding challenge. + Ok(challenger.sample_algebra_element()) + }) + .collect::, _>>()?; + + // Absorb the prover's claimed constant polynomial into the transcript. + // After all folding rounds, the result should reduce to this constant. + challenger.observe_algebra_element(proof.final_poly); + + // Phase 2: Structural shape checks + // + // Before doing any expensive cryptographic work, validate that the proof + // has the right shape. A malicious prover could submit too few (or too + // many) query proofs, mismatched opening counts, or inconsistent arity + // schedules. Catching these early avoids wasted work and gives precise + // error variants. + + // The number of query proofs must match the security parameter. + if proof.query_proofs.len() != params.num_queries { + return Err(FriError::QueryProofCountMismatch { + expected: params.num_queries, + got: proof.query_proofs.len(), + }); + } + + // Verify proof-of-work: a grinding witness that the prover must compute + // to raise the cost of brute-forcing query positions. + if !challenger.check_witness(params.query_proof_of_work_bits, proof.pow_witness) { + return Err(FriError::InvalidPowWitness); + } + + // Each query proof must carry exactly one opening per commit-phase round. + // + // commit_phase_commits: [c_0, c_1, ..., c_{n-1}] (n rounds) + // qp.commit_phase_openings: [o_0, o_1, ..., o_{n-1}] (must also be n) + // + // A mismatch means the prover omitted or duplicated round data. + let expected_rounds = proof.commit_phase_commits.len(); + for (query, qp) in proof.query_proofs.iter().enumerate() { + let got_rounds = qp.commit_phase_openings.len(); + if got_rounds != expected_rounds { + return Err(FriError::QueryCommitPhaseOpeningsCountMismatch { + query, + expected: expected_rounds, + got: got_rounds, + }); + } + } + + // In variable-arity FRI, each round folds by 2^{log_arity_i} points. + // All query proofs must agree on the per-round arity schedule, otherwise + // different queries would fold through incompatible domain decompositions. + // + // We take the first query proof's schedule as the reference: + let log_arities: Vec = if let Some(qp) = proof.query_proofs.first() { + qp.commit_phase_openings + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(round, opening)| { + opening + .checked_log_arity(params.max_log_arity) + .ok_or(FriError::InvalidLogArity { + round, + log_arity: opening.log_arity as usize, + max: params.max_log_arity, + }) + }) + .collect::, _>>()? + } else { + Vec::new() + }; + + // Compare every subsequent query proof against the reference schedule. + for (query, qp) in proof.query_proofs.iter().enumerate().skip(1) { + let got_log_arities: Vec = qp + .commit_phase_openings + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(round, opening)| { + opening + .checked_log_arity(params.max_log_arity) + .ok_or(FriError::InvalidLogArity { + round, + log_arity: opening.log_arity as usize, + max: params.max_log_arity, + }) + }) + .collect::, _>>()?; + if got_log_arities != log_arities { + return Err(FriError::QueryLogAritiesMismatch { + query, + expected: log_arities, + got: got_log_arities, + }); + } + } + + // Phase 3: Query verification + // + // The initial evaluation domain has size 2^{log_max_height}, where + // log_max_height = sum(log_arities) + log_blowup. + // Each folding round reduces the domain by 2^{log_arity_i}, so after + // all rounds the domain shrinks to 2^{log_blowup} (the blowup factor). + let total_log_reduction: usize = log_arities.iter().sum(); + let log_max_height = total_log_reduction + params.log_blowup; + + // Invariant: the query-index width fits the circle group of order 2^CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY. + // + // num_index_bits = sum(log_arities) + log_blowup + extra_query_index_bits + // field order = 2^CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY - 1 (one short of the group order) + // => a width of CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY bits is unsampleable + // + // A malformed arity schedule inflates the round count, hence the width. + let num_index_bits = log_max_height + folding.extra_query_index_bits(); + if num_index_bits >= Val::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY { + return Err(FriError::GlobalMaxHeightTooLarge { + log_global_max_height: num_index_bits, + two_adicity: Val::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY, + }); + } + + for qp in &proof.query_proofs { + // Sample a random query index uniformly from the initial domain. + let index = challenger.sample_bits(num_index_bits); + + // Open the input polynomials at this query index. + // Returns (log_height, evaluation) pairs sorted by height descending. + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] query: after sample_bits, before open_input + let ro = open_input(index, &qp.input_proof).map_err(FriError::InputError)?; + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] query: after open_input + + // Sanity check: reduced openings must arrive in strictly descending + // height order so they are folded in at the correct domain sizes. + debug_assert!( + ro.iter().tuple_windows().all(|((l, _), (r, _))| l > r), + "reduced openings sorted by height descending" + ); + + // Zip the challenges, commitments, and openings together for folding. + // + // Invariant: all three iterators have the same length here. + // - The challenges are derived from the commitments (one per round). + // - The openings count was validated to match the commitment count. + // Plain zip is safe; it cannot silently truncate. + let fold_data_iter = betas + .iter() + .zip(proof.commit_phase_commits.iter()) + .zip(qp.commit_phase_openings.iter()); + + // The whole x-fold chain for this query is index-derived (no Merkle or proof data + // needed), so it is precomputed and batch-inverted once up front instead of each + // round recomputing its own twiddle from scratch. + let top_level_index = index >> folding.extra_query_index_bits(); + let x_twiddle_inv = + query_x_twiddles_inv::(top_level_index, log_max_height, log_arities.len()); + + // Walk the FRI folding chain: at each round, verify the Merkle + // opening against the commitment, then fold the sibling evaluations + // using the challenge beta to produce the next-round evaluation. + let folded_eval = verify_query( + params, + top_level_index, + fold_data_iter, + ro, + log_max_height, + &x_twiddle_inv, + )?; + + // After all rounds, the polynomial has been folded to a constant. + // That constant must equal the prover's claimed final polynomial. + if folded_eval != proof.final_poly { + return Err(FriError::FinalPolyMismatch); + } + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] query: after verify_query + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// One round's worth of data needed to verify a Circle-FRI fold. +/// +/// Groups together: +/// - The random folding challenge for this round. +/// - The Merkle commitment to the evaluations on this round's domain. +/// - The prover-supplied sibling values and Merkle opening proof. +type CommitStep<'a, F, M> = ( + (&'a F, &'a >::Commitment), + &'a CircleCommitPhaseProofStep, +); + +/// Verify one query chain in the Circle-FRI proof. +/// +/// Starting from a leaf in the initial evaluation domain, this walks +/// up the folding tree one round at a time: +/// +/// ```text +/// domain size: 2^{log_max_height} → ... → 2^{log_blowup} +/// round: 0 last +/// ``` +/// +/// At each round: +/// - Roll in any reduced openings whose height matches the current domain. +/// - Reconstruct the full sibling group from the queried evaluation +/// plus the (arity - 1) sibling values provided by the prover. +/// - Verify the Merkle opening against the round commitment. +/// - Fold the sibling group with the challenge beta to produce the +/// parent evaluation for the next round. +/// +/// With variable arity, each round may fold by a different factor +/// (2^{log_arity_i} siblings per group). +/// +/// # Returns +/// +/// The final folded evaluation, which the caller checks against +/// the prover's claimed constant. +fn verify_query<'a, F, EF, M, InputError>( + params: &FriParameters, + mut index: usize, + steps: impl ExactSizeIterator>, + reduced_openings: Vec<(usize, EF)>, + log_max_height: usize, + x_twiddle_inv: &[F], +) -> Result> +where + F: ComplexExtendable, + EF: ExtensionField, + M: Mmcs + 'a, + InputError: core::fmt::Debug, +{ + // Running accumulator: starts at zero and accumulates reduced openings + // and folding results as we walk up the tree. + let mut folded_eval = EF::ZERO; + + // Reduced openings arrive sorted by height descending. + // We consume them as the current domain height matches. + let mut ro_iter = reduced_openings.into_iter().peekable(); + + // Current domain size is 2^{log_current_height}; decreases each round. + let mut log_current_height = log_max_height; + + for (round, ((&beta, comm), opening)) in steps.enumerate() { + // This round folds 2^{log_arity} siblings into one parent. + let max_log_arity = core::cmp::min(params.max_log_arity, log_current_height); + let Some(log_arity) = opening.checked_log_arity(max_log_arity) else { + return Err(FriError::InvalidLogArity { + round, + log_arity: opening.log_arity as usize, + max: max_log_arity, + }); + }; + let arity = 1 << log_arity; + + // Shape check: the prover must supply exactly (arity - 1) siblings. + // The queried evaluation itself is the remaining one, so the full + // group has arity elements total. + // + // sibling_values: [s_0, s_1, ..., s_{arity-2}] (arity - 1 elements) + // queried value: folded_eval (1 element) + // full group: arity elements + if opening.sibling_values.len() != arity - 1 { + return Err(FriError::SiblingValuesLengthMismatch { + round, + expected: arity - 1, + got: opening.sibling_values.len(), + }); + } + + // If there are input polynomials evaluated at this domain height, + // add their contribution before folding. This is the "roll-in" step + // that combines multiple polynomials into the FRI batch. + if let Some((_, ro)) = ro_iter.next_if(|(lh, _)| *lh == log_current_height) { + folded_eval += ro; + } + + // Reconstruct the full evaluation group for this node. + // The queried index within the group tells us where our value sits; + // the prover's sibling values fill the remaining positions. + // + // arity = 4, index_in_group = 1: + // evals = [sibling_0, folded_eval, sibling_1, sibling_2] + let index_in_group = index % arity; + let mut evals = EF::zero_vec(arity); + evals[index_in_group] = folded_eval; + + // Fill in siblings at every position except the queried one. + let mut sibling_idx = 0; + for (j, eval) in evals.iter_mut().enumerate() { + if j != index_in_group { + *eval = opening.sibling_values[sibling_idx]; + sibling_idx += 1; + } + } + + // After folding, the domain halves (or shrinks by 2^{log_arity}). + let log_folded_height = log_current_height - log_arity; + + // Dimensions for the MMCS verification: one matrix of width = arity + // at the folded height. This tells the Merkle tree the expected shape. + let dims = &[Dimensions { + width: arity, + height: 1 << log_folded_height, + }]; + + // Move from the leaf index to its parent in the folding tree. + index >>= log_arity; + + // Verify the Merkle opening: the sibling evaluations the prover + // gave us must be consistent with the round commitment. + params + .mmcs + .verify_batch( + comm, + dims, + index, + BatchOpeningRef::new(&[evals.clone()], &opening.opening_proof), + ) + .map_err(FriError::CommitPhaseMmcsError)?; + + // Fold the full sibling group down to a single evaluation using the random + // challenge beta. Circle PCS only ever folds by arity 2 (`CircleFriFolding::fold_row` + // asserts this too); the twiddle for this round was already precomputed for the + // whole query chain, so this is now pure arithmetic with no domain construction, + // scalar multiplication, or inversion left to do. + assert_eq!(log_arity, 1, "Circle PCS currently only supports arity 2"); + folded_eval = fold_row_with_inv_twiddle(x_twiddle_inv[round], beta, evals.into_iter()); + + // Advance to the next (smaller) domain. + log_current_height = log_folded_height; + } + + // After all rounds, we should have folded down to 2^{log_blowup}. + // If not, the proof has the wrong number of rounds for the domain size. + if log_current_height != params.log_blowup { + return Err(FriError::FinalFoldHeightMismatch { + expected: params.log_blowup, + got: log_current_height, + }); + } + + // All input polynomial evaluations should have been consumed during + // folding. Leftovers mean the proof contains data for heights that + // were never reached. + if let Some((next_log_height, _)) = ro_iter.next() { + return Err(FriError::UnconsumedReducedOpenings { + next_log_height, + remaining: 1 + ro_iter.count(), + }); + } + + Ok(folded_eval) +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8b7958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"v":1} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..734ac5e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "git": { + "sha1": "11cc5849a1b57a2f520d6edc608b9e516517d841" + }, + "path_in_vcs": "mersenne-31" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12ec4507 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +# Changelog + +All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. + +The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/), +and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). + +## [Unreleased] +## [0.6.2] - 2026-07-20 +### Merged PRs +- Perf(mersenne-31): complex-squaring scalar QM31 square (#1831) +- Perf(mersenne-31): add deferred-reduction `dot_product` for AVX2/AVX-512 (#1855) +- Perf(mersenne-31): specialize PackedMersenne31Neon dot_product with deferred reduction (#1894) +- Perf(mersenne-31,circle): defer M31 mixed_dot_product reduction; truncate circle LDE interpolation (#1903) +- Perf(circle): cache exponentiation for two_adic_generator (#1934) + +## [0.6.1] - 2026-06-13 +### Merged PRs +- Perf(m31): use the degree-4 extension field for `Mersenne31` Circle proofs (#1817) +- Cleanup(m31): drop redundant Distribution bound on PackedQM31 sampler (#1820) +- Perf(m31): eliminate allocation churn in QM31 column conversions and the lambda extraction (#1823) +- Perf(m31): widening NEON MACs for the mixed base×extension dot-product kernels (#1822) + +## [0.6.0] - 2026-06-11 +### Merged PRs +- Make batched_linear_combination chunk size per-impl tunable (#1451) +- Mds: small improvements and more testing (#1459) +- Perf: abstract away Copy vs Clone (#1463) +- Field: implement packed / packed division (#1457) +- Feat: expose Poseidon2 large instances (#1508) +- Mersenne31: add poseidon1 (#1428) +- Field: add division ops for packed binomial extension (#1512) +- Feat(mersenne-31): add packed round constants for Poseidon1 AVX2 / AVX512 (#1520) +- Add property tests for x86 Poseidon2 width-32 (#1550) +- Test(poseidon1): validate all SIMD lanes against scalar outputs (#1560) +- Field: specialize packed mixed_dot_product by chunk strategy (#1573) +- Add carry-critical NEON dot product regression tests (#1600) +- Fix(mersenne-31): allow value == P in MDS partial-reduction (#1684) +- Ci: tighten doc/release/TOML checks (#1689) +- Fix: do not reduce Mersenne::ZEROS[1] (#1691) +- Refactor(field): unify extension-field logic under common abstraction (#1696) +- Refactor(field): default ext_square to a general multiply (#1697) +- Fix(mersenne-31): make serde encoding canonical (#1773) +- Chore: update CHANGELOGs (#1785) + +## [0.5.3] - 2026-05-15 +### Merged PRs +- Field: specialize packed mixed_dot_product by chunk strategy (#1573) +- Add carry-critical NEON dot product regression tests (#1600) + +## [0.5.2] - 2026-03-27 +### Merged PRs +- Make batched_linear_combination chunk size per-impl tunable (#1451) +- Mds: small improvements and more testing (#1459) +- Perf: abstract away Copy vs Clone (#1463) + +## [0.5.1] - 2026-03-16 +## [0.5.0] - 2026-03-10 +### Merged PRs +- Perf: optimize dot product for Mersenne31 (#1280) +- Deps: update rand and rand_xoshiro (#1314) +- Feat: support for 4-to-1 Poseidon2 instantiations for 32-bit fields (#1359) +- Poseidon1: packed form for monty31 (#1378) +- Poseidon1: fix round constants for KoalaBear and BabyBear (#1398) +- Poseidon: add Rust constants for rounds (#1416) + +## [0.4.2] - 2026-01-05 +### Merged PRs +- Refactor: add public const `new` and `new_array` for all fields (#1222) (Adrian Hamelink) + +### Authors +- Adrian Hamelink + +## [0.4.1] - 2025-12-18 +### Merged PRs +- mersenne 31: optimize Poseidon2 for aarch64 Neon (#1196) (Thomas Coratger) + +## [0.4.0] - 2025-12-12 +### Merged PRs +- Chore: add descriptions to all sub-crate manifests (#906) (Himess) +- GCD based inversion for 31 bit fields (#921) (AngusG) +- Fixing a pair of clippy complaints in AVX512 (#926) (AngusG) +- More Clippy Complaints (#931) (AngusG) +- Packing: small touchups (#937) (Thomas Coratger) +- Use `#[derive(...)]` for Debug and Default for packed fields. (#945) (AngusG) +- Adding Macros to remove boilerplate impls (#943) (AngusG) +- Combining Interleave Code (#950) (AngusG) +- Add a macro for implying PackedValue for PackedFields (#949) (AngusG) +- Chore: use `collect_n` with powers when possible (#963) (Thomas Coratger) +- Packing Trick for Field Extensions (#958) (AngusG) +- Refactor to packed add methods (#972) (AngusG) +- Remove Nightly Features (#932) (AngusG) +- Move halve to ring (#969) (AngusG) +- Packed Sub Refactor (#979) (AngusG) +- Move div_2_exp_u64 to ring (#970) (AngusG) +- Must Use (#996) (AngusG) +- Generic Poseidon2 Simplifications (#987) (AngusG) +- More Const Assert fixes (#1024) (AngusG) +- Perf: optimize ext_two_adic_generator with precomputed table (#1038) (Avory) +- Mersenne-31: Implement NEON-optimized halve for PackedMersenne31Neon (#1054) (VolodymyrBg) +- Clippy: small step (#1102) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add nursery (#1103) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add semicolon_if_nothing_returned (#1107) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add `needless_pass_by_value` (#1112) (Thomas Coratger) +- Fixing a few clippy lints (#1115) (AngusG) +- Fix: Add bounds check to circle_two_adic_generator to prevent underflow (#1130) (Fibonacci747) +- Allow users to impl either permute or permute_mut (#1175) (AngusG) +- Implement uniform sampling of bits from field elements (#1050) (Sebastian) + +### Authors +- AngusG +- Avory +- Fibonacci747 +- Himess +- Sebastian +- Thomas Coratger +- VolodymyrBg + diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.lock b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83eef7f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.lock @@ -0,0 +1,1037 @@ +# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo. +# It is not intended for manual editing. +version = 4 + +[[package]] +name = "aho-corasick" +version = "1.1.4" +source = 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all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies +# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies. +# +# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml +# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable). +# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents. + +[package] +edition = "2024" +name = "p3-mersenne-31" +version = "0.6.2" +build = false +autolib = false +autobins = false +autoexamples = false +autotests = false +autobenches = false +description = "An implementation of the Mersenne31 prime field F_p, where p = 2^31 - 1." +homepage = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +readme = false +keywords = [ + "cryptography", + "SNARK", + "PLONK", + "FRI", + "plonky3", +] +categories = ["cryptography::cryptocurrencies"] +license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0" +repository = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +resolver = "2" + +[lib] +name = "p3_mersenne_31" +path = "src/lib.rs" + +[features] +default = ["poseidon1"] +# riverrun SBF-compat patch, see PATCH.md: Poseidon1/MDS are legacy code +# riverrun-m31 never calls (it only uses Poseidon2), but their unconditional +# presence overflows Solana SBF's 4KB per-function stack limit at load time. +# Default stays on for anyone else depending on this vendored copy unchanged; +# riverrun-m31 opts out with default-features = false. +poseidon1 = ["dep:p3-poseidon1", "dep:p3-mds"] + +[[bench]] +name = "bench_field" +path = "benches/bench_field.rs" +harness = false + +[[bench]] +name = "extension" +path = "benches/extension.rs" +harness = false + +[dependencies.itertools] +version = "0.15.0" +features = ["use_alloc"] +default-features = false + +[dependencies.num-bigint] +version = "0.4.6" +default-features = false + +[dependencies.p3-challenger] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-dft] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-field] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-matrix] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-mds] +version = "0.6.2" +optional = true + +[dependencies.p3-poseidon1] +version = 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+[lints.clippy.nursery] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rust] +rust_2024_incompatible_pat = "warn" +unused_must_use = "deny" + +[lints.rust.rust_2018_idioms] +level = "deny" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rustdoc] +all = "warn" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64a44b28 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +[package] +name = "p3-mersenne-31" +description = "An implementation of the Mersenne31 prime field F_p, where p = 2^31 - 1." +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +homepage.workspace = true +keywords.workspace = true +categories.workspace = true + +[dependencies] +p3-challenger.workspace = true +p3-dft.workspace = true +p3-field.workspace = true +p3-matrix.workspace = true +p3-mds.workspace = true +p3-poseidon1.workspace = true +p3-poseidon2.workspace = true +p3-symmetric.workspace = true +p3-util.workspace = true + +itertools.workspace = true +num-bigint.workspace = true +paste.workspace = true +rand.workspace = true +serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] } + +[dev-dependencies] +p3-field-testing = { path = "../field-testing" } + +criterion.workspace = true +proptest.workspace = true +rand_xoshiro.workspace = true +serde_json.workspace = true + +[[bench]] +name = "bench_field" +harness = false + +[[bench]] +name = "extension" +harness = false + +[lints] +workspace = true diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9748cb1b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +# Why this vendored copy of `p3-mersenne-31` 0.6.2 exists + +Same category of patch as the sibling `p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/`: a +Solana-SBF-toolchain compatibility workaround, not a fork we intend to +diverge on or add anything to. Full upstream source +(MIT OR Apache-2.0, `https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3`), one change. + +## The problem + +`p3-mersenne-31` unconditionally bundles TWO permutation implementations: +Poseidon2 (what `riverrun-m31` actually uses, throughout `binding.rs`, +`membership.rs`, `permutation.rs`) and the legacy Poseidon1 + its MDS matrix +(`mds.rs`, `poseidon1.rs`), which riverrun-m31 never calls, anywhere. There is +no upstream Cargo feature to opt out of the unused half; both are hard, +unconditional dependencies (`p3-poseidon1`, `p3-mds`) with no `[features]` +section in the original manifest. + +That would be a non-issue on a normal target: dead code elimination should +just drop unreferenced public functions from a `cdylib`'s final binary. On +Solana's SBF target it is not a non-issue, because the SBF loader's bytecode +verifier checks every function's stack-frame size (a hard 4096-byte-per- +function limit) against **whatever ends up in the compiled binary**, and this +build's DCE/LTO did not fully strip the unused Poseidon1/MDS functions before +that check runs: several of them (`Poseidon1Constants::to_optimized`, +`MdsMatrixMersenne31::permute`, `default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32`, and +related `p3_poseidon1::utils::*` helpers) have large stack-allocated matrices +and blow well past 4096 bytes. The build-time linker printed these as +warnings and still produced a `.so`; the SBF runtime's own loader +(`LiteSVM::add_program_from_file`, and by extension any real Solana cluster) +rejected that `.so` with `InvalidAccountData` when actually loading it. Build +succeeding is not the same guarantee as load succeeding, on this target. + +## The fix + +`p3-poseidon1` and `p3-mds` are made `optional = true` dependencies, gated +behind a new `poseidon1` feature (`default = ["poseidon1"]`, so anyone else +depending on this vendored copy unmodified sees no behavior change). +`riverrun-m31` depends on it with `default-features = false`, which excludes +`mod mds;` / `mod poseidon1;` and their `pub use` re-exports from `lib.rs` +entirely, so the offending functions are never compiled in the first place, +not merely hoped to be stripped after the fact. + +## Everything else + +Untouched, byte-for-byte upstream 0.6.2, same as the `p3-util` patch. Not +maintained independently; delete this the moment either Solana's SBF loader +handles this case differently, or upstream Plonky3 ships an optional-feature +split of its own (worth filing upstream, not done as part of this patch). diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bench_field.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bench_field.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d6cc888 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bench_field.rs @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +use core::any::type_name; + +use criterion::{BatchSize, Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main}; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_field_testing::bench_func::{ + benchmark_add_latency, benchmark_add_throughput, benchmark_chunked_linear_combination, + benchmark_dot_array, benchmark_inv, benchmark_iter_sum, benchmark_sub_latency, + benchmark_sub_throughput, benchmark_sum_array, +}; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; +use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + +type F = Mersenne31; + +fn bench_field(c: &mut Criterion) { + let name = "Mersenne31"; + const REPS: usize = 500; + benchmark_inv::(c, name); + benchmark_iter_sum::(c, name); + benchmark_sum_array::(c, name); + benchmark_iter_sum::(c, name); + benchmark_sum_array::(c, name); + + // Dot product benchmarks + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + benchmark_dot_array::(c, name); + + // Note that each round of throughput has 10 operations + // So we should have 10 * more repetitions for latency tests. + const L_REPS: usize = 10 * REPS; + benchmark_add_latency::(c, name); + benchmark_add_throughput::(c, name); + benchmark_sub_latency::(c, name); + benchmark_sub_throughput::(c, name); + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + c.bench_function("5th_root", |b| { + b.iter_batched( + || rng.random::(), + |x| x.exp_u64(1717986917), + BatchSize::SmallInput, + ); + }); +} + +fn bench_packedfield(c: &mut Criterion) { + let scalar_name = type_name::().to_string(); + benchmark_chunked_linear_combination::(c, &scalar_name); + + type PF = ::Packing; + let packed_name = type_name::().to_string(); + benchmark_chunked_linear_combination::(c, &packed_name); +} + +criterion_group!(mersenne31_arithmetics, bench_field, bench_packedfield); +criterion_main!(mersenne31_arithmetics); diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/extension.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/extension.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..108823d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/extension.rs @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +use criterion::{Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main}; +use p3_field::extension::{BinomialExtensionField, Complex}; +use p3_field_testing::bench_func::{ + benchmark_inv, benchmark_mul_latency, benchmark_mul_throughput, benchmark_square, +}; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; + +type EF2 = BinomialExtensionField, 2>; +type EF3 = BinomialExtensionField, 3>; + +const REPS: usize = 100; +const L_REPS: usize = 10 * REPS; + +fn bench_quadratic_extension(c: &mut Criterion) { + let name = "BinomialExtensionField, 2>"; + benchmark_square::(c, name); + benchmark_inv::(c, name); + benchmark_mul_throughput::(c, name); + benchmark_mul_latency::(c, name); +} + +fn bench_cubic_extension(c: &mut Criterion) { + let name = "BinomialExtensionField, 3>"; + benchmark_square::(c, name); + benchmark_inv::(c, name); + benchmark_mul_throughput::(c, name); + benchmark_mul_latency::(c, name); +} + +criterion_group!(bench_mersennecomplex_ef2, bench_quadratic_extension); +criterion_group!(bench_mersennecomplex_ef3, bench_cubic_extension); + +criterion_main!(bench_mersennecomplex_ef2, bench_mersennecomplex_ef3); diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mds.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mds.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf76249d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mds.rs @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +//! Packed MDS permutation for Mersenne31 on aarch64 NEON. +//! +//! Implements [`Permutation`] and [`MdsPermutation`] for +//! `[PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]` by applying the scalar circulant MDS +//! independently to each of the four NEON lanes. +//! +//! Each [`PackedMersenne31Neon`] element holds 4 `Mersenne31` values in a +//! `uint32x4_t` register. The MDS is applied per-lane: unpack → scalar +//! MDS → repack, ensuring correctness by reusing the optimised Karatsuba +//! convolution from [`MdsMatrixMersenne31`]. + +use p3_mds::MdsPermutation; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + +/// Apply the scalar MDS to each NEON lane independently. +/// +/// Extracts one scalar state per lane, runs the circulant MDS +/// convolution, then writes the results back into the packed state. +#[inline] +fn mds_packed( + mds: &MdsMatrixMersenne31, + input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + for lane in 0..4 { + let mut scalar_state: [Mersenne31; WIDTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| input[i].0[lane]); + mds.permute_mut(&mut scalar_state); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + input[i].0[lane] = scalar_state[i]; + } + } +} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 8]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 8]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 12]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 12]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 16]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 16]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 32]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 32]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 64]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 64]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + macro_rules! proptest_neon_mds { + ($name:ident, $width:literal, $uniform:ident) => { + proptest! { + #[test] + fn $name(input in prop::array::$uniform(arb_f())) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let neon_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(neon_output, expected); + } + } + }; + } + + proptest_neon_mds!(mds_neon_matches_scalar_8, 8, uniform8); + proptest_neon_mds!(mds_neon_matches_scalar_12, 12, uniform12); + proptest_neon_mds!(mds_neon_matches_scalar_16, 16, uniform16); + proptest_neon_mds!(mds_neon_matches_scalar_32, 32, uniform32); + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn mds_neon_matches_scalar_64( + a in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + b in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + ) { + let mut input = [F::ZERO; 64]; + input[..32].copy_from_slice(&a); + input[32..].copy_from_slice(&b); + + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let neon_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(neon_output, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa9b2696 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +mod mds; +mod packing; +mod poseidon1; +mod poseidon2; +mod utils; + +pub use packing::*; +pub use poseidon1::*; +pub use poseidon2::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/packing.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/packing.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca785036 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/packing.rs @@ -0,0 +1,854 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::aarch64::{self, uint32x4_t, uint64x2_t}; +use core::iter::{Product, Sum}; +use core::mem::transmute; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Div, DivAssign, Mul, MulAssign, Neg, Sub, SubAssign}; + +use p3_field::exponentiation::exp_1717986917; +use p3_field::interleave::{interleave_u32, interleave_u64}; +use p3_field::op_assign_macros::{ + impl_add_assign, impl_add_base_field, impl_div_methods, impl_mul_base_field, impl_mul_methods, + impl_packed_field_div, impl_packed_value, impl_rng, impl_sub_assign, impl_sub_base_field, + impl_sum_prod_base_field, ring_sum, +}; +use p3_field::{ + Algebra, BasedVectorSpace, ExtensionField, Field, InjectiveMonomial, PackedField, + PackedFieldPow2, PackedValue, PermutationMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing, + generic_batched_columnwise_dot_product, impl_packed_field_pow_2, uint32x4_mod_add, + uint32x4_mod_sub, +}; +use p3_util::reconstitute_from_base; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand::{Rng, RngExt}; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +const WIDTH: usize = 4; +const P: uint32x4_t = unsafe { transmute::<[u32; WIDTH], _>([0x7fffffff; WIDTH]) }; + +/// Vectorized NEON implementation of `Mersenne31` arithmetic. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[repr(transparent)] // Needed to make `transmute`s safe. +#[must_use] +pub struct PackedMersenne31Neon(pub [Mersenne31; WIDTH]); + +impl PackedMersenne31Neon { + #[inline] + #[must_use] + /// Get an arch-specific vector representing the packed values. + pub(crate) fn to_vector(self) -> uint32x4_t { + unsafe { + // Safety: `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to `u32`. It + // follows that `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` can be transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]`, which can be + // transmuted to `uint32x4_t`, since arrays are guaranteed to be contiguous in memory. + // Finally `PackedMersenne31Neon` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to + // `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]`. + transmute(self) + } + } + + #[inline] + /// Make a packed field vector from an arch-specific vector. + /// + /// SAFETY: The caller must ensure that each element of `vector` represents a valid + /// `Mersenne31`. In particular, each element of vector must be in `0..=P` (i.e. it fits in 31 + /// bits). + pub(crate) unsafe fn from_vector(vector: uint32x4_t) -> Self { + // Safety: It is up to the user to ensure that elements of `vector` represent valid + // `Mersenne31` values. We must only reason about memory representations. `uint32x4_t` can + // be transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]` (since arrays elements are contiguous in memory), which + // can be transmuted to `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` (since `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)`), + // which in turn can be transmuted to `PackedMersenne31Neon` (since `PackedMersenne31Neon` + // is also `repr(transparent)`). + unsafe { transmute(vector) } + } + + /// Copy `value` to all positions in a packed vector. This is the same as + /// `From::from`, but `const`. + #[inline] + const fn broadcast(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self([value; WIDTH]) + } +} + +impl From for PackedMersenne31Neon { + #[inline] + fn from(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self::broadcast(value) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = uint32x4_mod_add(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `uint32x4_mod_add` returns valid values when given valid values. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = uint32x4_mod_sub(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `uint32x4_mod_sub` returns valid values when given valid values. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Neg for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn neg(self) -> Self { + let val = self.to_vector(); + let res = neg(val); + unsafe { + // Safety: `neg` returns valid values when given valid values. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mul(lhs, rhs); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mul` returns valid values when given valid values. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl_add_assign!(PackedMersenne31Neon); +impl_sub_assign!(PackedMersenne31Neon); +impl_mul_methods!(PackedMersenne31Neon); +ring_sum!(PackedMersenne31Neon); +impl_rng!(PackedMersenne31Neon); + +impl PrimeCharacteristicRing for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type PrimeSubfield = Mersenne31; + + const ZERO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ZERO); + const ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ONE); + const TWO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::TWO); + const NEG_ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::NEG_ONE); + + #[inline] + fn from_prime_subfield(f: Self::PrimeSubfield) -> Self { + f.into() + } + + #[inline] + fn halve(&self) -> Self { + // Compute (val + (val & 1) * P) >> 1 per lane. + // This equals val * 2^{-1} mod P, staying in the 0..=P representation. + let val = (*self).to_vector(); + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let one = aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(1); + // is_odd_mask = 0xFFFF_FFFF when LSB set, else 0. + let is_odd_mask = aarch64::vtstq_u32(val, one); + // Select P for odd lanes, 0 for even lanes. + let to_add = aarch64::vandq_u32(P, is_odd_mask); + // Halving add: (val + to_add) >> 1 + let halved = aarch64::vhaddq_u32(val, to_add); + Self::from_vector(halved) + } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn exp_const_u64(&self) -> Self { + // We provide specialised code for power 5 as this turns up regularly. + // + // The other powers could be specialised similarly but we ignore this for now. + match POWER { + 0 => Self::ONE, + 1 => *self, + 2 => self.square(), + 3 => self.cube(), + 4 => self.square().square(), + 5 => unsafe { + let val = self.to_vector(); + Self::from_vector(exp5(val)) + }, + 6 => self.square().cube(), + 7 => { + let x2 = self.square(); + let x3 = x2 * *self; + let x4 = x2.square(); + x3 * x4 + } + _ => self.exp_u64(POWER), + } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn zero_vec(len: usize) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: this is a repr(transparent) wrapper around an array. + unsafe { reconstitute_from_base(Mersenne31::zero_vec(len * WIDTH)) } + } + + #[inline] + fn dot_product(u: &[Self; N], v: &[Self; N]) -> Self { + // For small `N` the deferred-reduction setup (two final folds plus the narrowing) + // is not amortized, and NEON's `sqdmulh`-based reduced multiply is cheap enough that + // a plain reduced-multiply sum wins. Measured on NEON: deferral regresses ~10% at + // `N = 2` but improves 10-32% from `N = 4` upward. + if N < 4 { + return u.iter().zip(v).map(|(&x, &y)| x * y).sum(); + } + + // Single-accumulator form of the `coeffwise_dot_product` scheme: widen each + // 32x32 -> 64-bit product into `lo` (lanes 0-1) and `hi` (lanes 2-3) with + // multiply-accumulates, deferring the Mersenne reduction. Inputs are in `0..=P`, + // so a product is at most `P^2 < 2^62`. `N == 4` accumulates all four without an + // intermediate fold (`4 * P^2 < 2^64`); larger `N` fold every 3 products, keeping + // `2^33 + 3 * P^2 < 2^64`, so the u64 lanes never overflow. + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let zero = aarch64::vdupq_n_u64(0); + let mut lo = zero; + let mut hi = zero; + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let a = u[i].to_vector(); + let b = v[i].to_vector(); + lo = aarch64::vmlal_u32(lo, aarch64::vget_low_u32(a), aarch64::vget_low_u32(b)); + hi = aarch64::vmlal_high_u32(hi, a, b); + unreduced += 1; + // `N == 4` is the only size here whose products all fit without an + // intermediate fold, so skip it; larger `N` fold every 3. + if unreduced == 3 && N != 4 { + unreduced = 0; + lo = partial_reduce_u64(lo); + hi = partial_reduce_u64(hi); + } + } + // At most 2 unreduced products on top of a folded value (< 2^33 + 2 * P^2 < 2^64); + // two folds bring each lane to <= 2 P, then `reduce_sum` canonicalizes to 0..=P. + let l = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(lo)); + let h = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(hi)); + let narrowed = aarch64::vuzp1q_u32( + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(l), + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(h), + ); + Self::from_vector(reduce_sum(narrowed)) + } + } +} + +// Degree of the smallest permutation polynomial for Mersenne31. +// +// As p - 1 = 2×3^2×7×11×... the smallest choice for a degree D satisfying gcd(p - 1, D) = 1 is 5. +impl InjectiveMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31Neon {} + +impl PermutationMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31Neon { + /// In the field `Mersenne31`, `a^{1/5}` is equal to a^{1717986917}. + /// + /// This follows from the calculation `5 * 1717986917 = 4*(2^31 - 2) + 1 = 1 mod p - 1`. + fn injective_exp_root_n(&self) -> Self { + exp_1717986917(*self) + } +} + +impl_add_base_field!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31); +impl_sub_base_field!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31); +impl_mul_base_field!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31); +impl_div_methods!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31); +impl_packed_field_div!(PackedMersenne31Neon); +impl_sum_prod_base_field!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31); + +impl Algebra for PackedMersenne31Neon { + // Benchmarked on AArch64 NEON: chunk=16 ≈ 51ns, chunk=8 ≈ 54ns, chunk=4 ≈ 59ns. + const BATCHED_LC_CHUNK: usize = 16; + + #[inline(always)] + fn mixed_dot_product(a: &[Self; N], f: &[Mersenne31; N]) -> Self { + mixed_dot_product::(a, f) + } +} + +/// Compute the dot product of `u` (packed) and `v` (scalar coefficients), deferring the +/// Mersenne reduction. Each `v[i]` is broadcast across the packing lanes before +/// multiplying, so this follows the same overflow argument and small-`N` fallback as +/// `PrimeCharacteristicRing::dot_product` above. +#[inline] +fn mixed_dot_product( + u: &[PackedMersenne31Neon; N], + v: &[Mersenne31; N], +) -> PackedMersenne31Neon { + if N < 4 { + return u.iter().zip(v).map(|(&x, &y)| x * y).sum(); + } + + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let zero = aarch64::vdupq_n_u64(0); + let mut lo = zero; + let mut hi = zero; + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let a = u[i].to_vector(); + let b = aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(v[i].value); + lo = aarch64::vmlal_u32(lo, aarch64::vget_low_u32(a), aarch64::vget_low_u32(b)); + hi = aarch64::vmlal_high_u32(hi, a, b); + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 && N != 4 { + unreduced = 0; + lo = partial_reduce_u64(lo); + hi = partial_reduce_u64(hi); + } + } + let l = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(lo)); + let h = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(hi)); + let narrowed = aarch64::vuzp1q_u32( + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(l), + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(h), + ); + PackedMersenne31Neon::from_vector(reduce_sum(narrowed)) + } +} + +/// Given a `val` in `0, ..., 2 P`, return a `res` in `0, ..., P` such that `res = val (mod P)` +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn reduce_sum(val: uint32x4_t) -> uint32x4_t { + // val is in 0, ..., 2 P. If val is in 0, ..., P - 1 then it is valid and + // u := (val - P) mod 2^32 is in P uint32x4_t { + // This is just a wrapper around `aarch64::vqdmulhq_s32`, so we don't have to worry about the + // casting elsewhere. + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_s32(aarch64::vqdmulhq_s32( + aarch64::vreinterpretq_s32_u32(lhs), + aarch64::vreinterpretq_s32_u32(rhs), + )) + } +} + +/// Multiply vectors of Mersenne-31 field elements that fit in 31 bits. +/// If the inputs do not fit in 31 bits, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn mul(lhs: uint32x4_t, rhs: uint32x4_t) -> uint32x4_t { + // We want this to compile to: + // sqdmulh prod_hi31.4s, lhs.4s, rhs.4s + // mul t.4s, lhs.4s, rhs.4s + // mla t.4s, prod_hi31.4s, P.4s + // sub u.4s, t.4s, P.4s + // umin res.4s, t.4s, u.4s + // throughput: 1.25 cyc/vec (3.2 els/cyc) + // latency: 10 cyc + + // We want to return res in 0, ..., P such that res = lhs * rhs (mod P). + // Let prod := lhs * rhs. Break it up into prod = 2^31 prod_hi31 + prod_lo31, where both limbs + // are in 0, ..., 2^31 - 1. Then prod = prod_hi31 + prod_lo31 (mod P), so let + // t := prod_hi31 + prod_lo31. + // Define prod_lo32 = prod mod 2^32 and observe that + // prod_lo32 = prod_lo31 + 2^31 (prod_hi31 mod 2) + // = prod_lo31 + 2^31 prod_hi31 (mod 2^32) + // Then + // t = prod_lo32 - 2^31 prod_hi31 + prod_hi31 (mod 2^32) + // = prod_lo32 - (2^31 - 1) prod_hi31 (mod 2^32) + // = prod_lo32 - prod_hi31 * P (mod 2^32) + // + // t is in 0, ..., 2 P, so we apply reduce_sum to get the result. + + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let prod_hi31 = mul_31x31_to_hi_31(lhs, rhs); + let prod_lo32 = aarch64::vmulq_u32(lhs, rhs); + let t = aarch64::vmlsq_u32(prod_lo32, prod_hi31, P); + reduce_sum(t) + } +} + +/// Fold a vector of 64-bit accumulators once: given `val`, return `res = val (mod P)` +/// with `res <= (val >> 31) + P`. +/// +/// Uses `2^31 = 1 (mod P)`: writing `val = hi * 2^31 + lo` with `lo <= P`, we have +/// `val = hi + lo (mod P)`. Two applications bring any `val < 2^64` to `0..=P + 3`. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn partial_reduce_u64(val: uint64x2_t) -> uint64x2_t { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let p64 = aarch64::vdupq_n_u64(0x7fffffff); + aarch64::vaddq_u64(aarch64::vandq_u64(val, p64), aarch64::vshrq_n_u64(val, 31)) + } +} + +/// Negate a vector of Mersenne-31 field elements that fit in 31 bits. +/// If the inputs do not fit in 31 bits, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn neg(val: uint32x4_t) -> uint32x4_t { + // We want this to compile to: + // eor res.16b, val.16b, P.16b + // throughput: .25 cyc/vec (16 els/cyc) + // latency: 2 cyc + + // val is in 0, ..., P, so res := P - val is also in 0, ..., P. + + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + aarch64::vsubq_u32(P, val) + } +} + +impl_packed_value!(PackedMersenne31Neon, Mersenne31, WIDTH); + +unsafe impl PackedField for PackedMersenne31Neon { + type Scalar = Mersenne31; + + #[inline] + fn coeffwise_dot_product<'a, I>(d: usize, pairs: I) -> [Self; 8] + where + Self: 'a, + I: Iterator, + { + // Accumulate the raw 32x32 -> 64-bit products with widening multiply-accumulates + // (2 instructions per product), deferring the Mersenne reduction, instead of + // paying the 8-instruction reduced multiply-add per product. + // + // Each coefficient accumulator is a pair of u64x2 vectors: `lo` holds lanes 0-1 + // and `hi` lanes 2-3. Inputs are in `0..=P`, so a product is at most + // `P^2 < 2^62`; folding the accumulators below `2^33` every 3 iterations keeps + // `2^33 + 3 * P^2 < 2^64`, so the u64 lanes never overflow. + debug_assert!(d <= 8, "Extension degree > 8 not supported"); + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let zero = aarch64::vdupq_n_u64(0); + let mut lo = [zero; 8]; + let mut hi = [zero; 8]; + let mut unreduced = 0; + for (coeffs, base) in pairs { + let b = base.to_vector(); + for (k, coeff) in coeffs.iter().take(d).enumerate() { + let c = coeff.to_vector(); + lo[k] = aarch64::vmlal_u32( + lo[k], + aarch64::vget_low_u32(c), + aarch64::vget_low_u32(b), + ); + hi[k] = aarch64::vmlal_high_u32(hi[k], c, b); + } + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 { + unreduced = 0; + for k in 0..d { + lo[k] = partial_reduce_u64(lo[k]); + hi[k] = partial_reduce_u64(hi[k]); + } + } + } + core::array::from_fn(|k| { + if k < d { + // At most 2 unreduced products on top of a folded value: the lanes + // are below 2^33 + 2 * P^2 < 2^64, so two folds bring them to + // P + 3 <= 2 P, and `reduce_sum` yields a canonical value in 0..=P. + let l = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(lo[k])); + let h = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(hi[k])); + let narrowed = aarch64::vuzp1q_u32( + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(l), + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(h), + ); + Self::from_vector(reduce_sum(narrowed)) + } else { + Self::ZERO + } + }) + } + } +} + +/// Columnwise dot-product kernel with deferred Mersenne reductions, implementing +/// [`Field::batched_columnwise_dot_product`] for `Mersenne31`. +/// +/// Dispatches the extension degree to a monomorphized kernel so the per-word loops +/// fully unroll; degrees without a kernel fall back to the generic accumulation. +pub(crate) fn batched_columnwise_dot_product( + acc: &mut [EF::ExtensionPacking], + items: I, +) where + EF: ExtensionField, + R: Iterator, + I: Iterator, +{ + match EF::DIMENSION { + 1 => columnwise_kernel::(acc, items), + 2 => columnwise_kernel::(acc, items), + 4 => columnwise_kernel::(acc, items), + 8 => columnwise_kernel::(acc, items), + _ => generic_batched_columnwise_dot_product::(acc, items), + } +} + +/// Accumulate up to 3 products into a fresh (lanes 0-1, lanes 2-3) pair of u64x2 +/// vectors and fold it once, leaving both results below `2^33` (`3 * P^2 < 2^64`). +#[inline(always)] +fn mac_up_to_3(vs: &[uint32x4_t], svs: [uint32x4_t; 3]) -> (uint64x2_t, uint64x2_t) { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let mut lo = + aarch64::vmull_u32(aarch64::vget_low_u32(vs[0]), aarch64::vget_low_u32(svs[0])); + let mut hi = aarch64::vmull_high_u32(vs[0], svs[0]); + for (&v, &s) in vs[1..].iter().zip(&svs[1..]) { + lo = aarch64::vmlal_u32(lo, aarch64::vget_low_u32(v), aarch64::vget_low_u32(s)); + hi = aarch64::vmlal_high_u32(hi, v, s); + } + (partial_reduce_u64(lo), partial_reduce_u64(hi)) + } +} + +/// Monomorphized body of [`batched_columnwise_dot_product`] for extension degree `D`. +/// +/// Rows are consumed three at a time: each triple of raw 32x32 -> 64-bit products is +/// accumulated in registers with widening MACs, folded once below `2^33`, and added +/// into u64 lane accumulators. A safety fold of the accumulators every `2^28` row +/// triples keeps them below `2^62` for any stream length, so the final two folds +/// plus `reduce_sum` always produce canonical values. +fn columnwise_kernel( + out: &mut [EF::ExtensionPacking], + mut items: I, +) where + EF: ExtensionField, + R: Iterator, + I: Iterator, +{ + debug_assert_eq!(EF::DIMENSION, D); + debug_assert_eq!(out.len() % N, 0); + let packed_width = out.len() / N; + let zero64 = unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u64(0) }; + let zero32 = unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(0) }; + + // Word accumulator layout: word-major, with the `(weight j, coefficient k)` pair of + // `(lanes 0-1, lanes 2-3)` u64x2 vectors of word `c` at `c * N * D * 2 + (j * D + k) * 2`. + let mut words = alloc::vec![zero64; packed_width * N * D * 2]; + let broadcast = |scales: &[EF; N]| -> [[uint32x4_t; D]; N] { + let mut out = [[zero32; D]; N]; + for (row, scale) in out.iter_mut().zip(scales) { + let coeffs = scale.as_basis_coefficients_slice(); + for (v, &coeff) in row.iter_mut().zip(coeffs) { + *v = PackedMersenne31Neon::from(coeff).to_vector(); + } + } + out + }; + + let mut triples = 0u32; + while let Some((r0, s0)) = items.next() { + let sv0 = broadcast(&s0); + let Some((r1, s1)) = items.next() else { + // Single trailing row. + for (aw, m0) in words.chunks_exact_mut(N * D * 2).zip(r0) { + let v0 = m0.to_vector(); + for (j, sv0_j) in sv0.iter().enumerate() { + for (k, &s) in sv0_j.iter().enumerate() { + let (lo, hi) = mac_up_to_3(&[v0], [s; 3]); + let idx = (j * D + k) * 2; + unsafe { + aw[idx] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx], lo); + aw[idx + 1] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx + 1], hi); + } + } + } + } + break; + }; + let sv1 = broadcast(&s1); + let Some((r2, s2)) = items.next() else { + // Trailing row pair. + for (aw, (m0, m1)) in words.chunks_exact_mut(N * D * 2).zip(r0.zip(r1)) { + let (v0, v1) = (m0.to_vector(), m1.to_vector()); + for j in 0..N { + for k in 0..D { + let (lo, hi) = mac_up_to_3(&[v0, v1], [sv0[j][k], sv1[j][k], sv1[j][k]]); + let idx = (j * D + k) * 2; + unsafe { + aw[idx] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx], lo); + aw[idx + 1] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx + 1], hi); + } + } + } + } + break; + }; + let sv2 = broadcast(&s2); + + for (aw, ((m0, m1), m2)) in words.chunks_exact_mut(N * D * 2).zip(r0.zip(r1).zip(r2)) { + let (v0, v1, v2) = (m0.to_vector(), m1.to_vector(), m2.to_vector()); + for j in 0..N { + for k in 0..D { + let (lo, hi) = mac_up_to_3(&[v0, v1, v2], [sv0[j][k], sv1[j][k], sv2[j][k]]); + let idx = (j * D + k) * 2; + unsafe { + aw[idx] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx], lo); + aw[idx + 1] = aarch64::vaddq_u64(aw[idx + 1], hi); + } + } + } + } + + triples += 1; + if triples == 1 << 28 { + triples = 0; + for w in &mut words { + *w = partial_reduce_u64(*w); + } + } + } + + for (out_cj, words_c) in out.iter_mut().zip(words.chunks_exact(D * 2)) { + let reduced = EF::ExtensionPacking::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|k| { + let l = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(words_c[k * 2])); + let h = partial_reduce_u64(partial_reduce_u64(words_c[k * 2 + 1])); + unsafe { + let narrowed = aarch64::vuzp1q_u32( + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(l), + aarch64::vreinterpretq_u32_u64(h), + ); + PackedMersenne31Neon::from_vector(reduce_sum(narrowed)) + } + }); + *out_cj += reduced; + } +} + +/// Compute the permutation x -> x^5 on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// +/// # Safety +/// `x` must be represented as a value in `{0, ..., P}`. +/// If the input does not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +/// The output will be represented as a value in `{0, ..., P}`. +/// +/// # TODO +/// This could be further improved with a specialized function. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn exp5(x: uint32x4_t) -> uint32x4_t { + // For Mersenne31, x^5 = x * x^4 = x * (x^2)^2 + // + // We compute: + // x2 = x * x + // x4 = x2 * x2 + // x5 = x4 * x + // + // throughput: ~4 cyc/vec + // latency: ~30 cyc (3 dependent multiplications) + + // x is guaranteed to be in [0, P] + let x2 = mul(x, x); + let x4 = mul(x2, x2); + mul(x4, x) +} + +impl_packed_field_pow_2!( + PackedMersenne31Neon; + [ + (1, interleave_u32), + (2, interleave_u64) + ], + WIDTH +); + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use p3_field_testing::{test_packed_field, test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary}; + + use super::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + + /// Zero has a redundant representation, so let's test both. + const ZEROS: PackedMersenne31Neon = PackedMersenne31Neon(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, + ])); + + const SPECIAL_VALS: PackedMersenne31Neon = PackedMersenne31Neon(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x7ffffffe, + ])); + + test_packed_field!( + crate::PackedMersenne31Neon, + &[super::ZEROS], + &[crate::PackedMersenne31Neon::ONE], + super::SPECIAL_VALS + ); + + test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary!(crate::PackedMersenne31Neon); + + /// The NEON `coeffwise_dot_product` must agree with the generic coefficient-wise + /// accumulation, including on boundary values (0, 1, P - 1 and the redundant + /// representation P of zero) and on stream lengths exercising every deferred + /// reduction phase. + #[test] + fn coeffwise_dot_product_matches_generic() { + use p3_field::{PackedField, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + + const P: u32 = 0x7fffffff; + let val = |i: u32| -> u32 { + match i % 7 { + 0 => 0, + 1 => 1, + 2 => P - 1, + 3 => P, + _ => i.wrapping_mul(0x9e3779b9) % P, + } + }; + let packed = |i: u32| { + PackedMersenne31Neon(Mersenne31::new_array([ + val(i), + val(i.wrapping_add(1)), + val(i.wrapping_add(2)), + val(i.wrapping_add(3)), + ])) + }; + + for d in 1..=8usize { + for len in [0usize, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 100] { + let coeffs: Vec<[PackedMersenne31Neon; 8]> = (0..len) + .map(|i| core::array::from_fn(|k| packed((i * 8 + k) as u32))) + .collect(); + let bases: Vec = + (0..len).map(|i| packed((i + 1000) as u32)).collect(); + + let mut expected = [PackedMersenne31Neon::ZERO; 8]; + for (c, &b) in coeffs.iter().zip(&bases) { + for k in 0..d { + expected[k] += c[k] * b; + } + } + + let got = PackedMersenne31Neon::coeffwise_dot_product( + d, + coeffs.iter().zip(&bases).map(|(c, &b)| (&c[..], b)), + ); + assert_eq!(expected, got, "d = {d}, len = {len}"); + } + } + } + + /// The NEON columnwise kernel must agree with the generic accumulation for every + /// row-count phase of the 3-row blocking (0, 1 and 2 trailing rows), on boundary + /// values, for both the trivial and a degree-4 extension. + #[test] + fn batched_columnwise_dot_product_matches_generic() { + use p3_field::extension::Complex; + use p3_field::{ + BasedVectorSpace, ExtensionField, PackedFieldExtension, PrimeCharacteristicRing, + }; + + use crate::QM31; + + const P: u32 = 0x7fffffff; + let val = |i: u32| -> u32 { + match i % 7 { + 0 => 0, + 1 => 1, + 2 => P - 1, + 3 => P, + _ => i.wrapping_mul(0x9e3779b9) % P, + } + }; + let packed = |i: u32| { + PackedMersenne31Neon(Mersenne31::new_array([ + val(i), + val(i.wrapping_add(1)), + val(i.wrapping_add(2)), + val(i.wrapping_add(3)), + ])) + }; + let scalar = |i: u32| Mersenne31::new_checked(val(i) % P).unwrap(); + + fn check, const N: usize>( + packed_width: usize, + rows: &[Vec], + scales: &[[EF; N]], + ) { + let items = || { + rows.iter() + .zip(scales) + .map(|(row, &s)| (row.iter().copied(), s)) + }; + + let mut expected = EF::ExtensionPacking::zero_vec(packed_width * N); + for (row, s) in items() { + let packed_scales = s.map(EF::ExtensionPacking::from); + for (acc_c, r) in expected.chunks_exact_mut(N).zip(row) { + for (a, &ps) in acc_c.iter_mut().zip(&packed_scales) { + *a += ps * r; + } + } + } + + let mut got = EF::ExtensionPacking::zero_vec(packed_width * N); + super::batched_columnwise_dot_product::(&mut got, items()); + let expected: Vec = EF::ExtensionPacking::to_ext_iter(expected).collect(); + let got: Vec = EF::ExtensionPacking::to_ext_iter(got).collect(); + assert_eq!(expected, got, "rows = {}, N = {N}", rows.len()); + } + + let packed_width = 5; + for height in [0usize, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 100] { + let rows: Vec> = (0..height) + .map(|r| { + (0..packed_width) + .map(|c| packed((r * 64 + c * 4) as u32)) + .collect() + }) + .collect(); + + let scales_m31: Vec<[Mersenne31; 2]> = (0..height) + .map(|r| core::array::from_fn(|j| scalar((r * 2 + j) as u32))) + .collect(); + check::(packed_width, &rows, &scales_m31); + + let scales_cm31: Vec<[Complex; 2]> = (0..height) + .map(|r| { + core::array::from_fn(|j| { + Complex::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|k| scalar((r * 4 + j * 2 + k) as u32)) + }) + }) + .collect(); + check::, 2>(packed_width, &rows, &scales_cm31); + + let scales_qm31: Vec<[QM31; 2]> = (0..height) + .map(|r| { + core::array::from_fn(|j| { + QM31::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|k| scalar((r * 8 + j * 4 + k) as u32)) + }) + }) + .collect(); + check::(packed_width, &rows, &scales_qm31); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon1.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon1.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6444adbb --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon1.rs @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +//! NEON-optimized Poseidon1 permutation layers for Mersenne31. +//! +//! Provides [`Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31`] (full rounds) and +//! [`Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31`] (partial rounds), implementing +//! [`FullRoundLayer`] and [`PartialRoundLayer`] for [`PackedMersenne31Neon`]. +//! +//! # Optimization Strategy +//! +//! **Full rounds** — round constants are pre-packed into `uint32x4_t` NEON +//! vectors at construction time. Each full round fuses the constant addition +//! and the x^5 S-box into a single [`add_rc_and_sbox`] call, then applies +//! the circulant MDS via per-lane scalar Karatsuba convolution. +//! +//! **Partial rounds** — the sparse matrix decomposition from the Poseidon +//! paper (Appendix B) is used with scalar `Mersenne31` constants. The +//! S-box is applied only to `state[0]`; the remaining state elements are +//! updated via the cheap sparse matrix–vector product ([`cheap_matmul`]). + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::aarch64; +use core::arch::aarch64::uint32x4_t; + +use p3_field::InjectiveMonomial; +use p3_poseidon1::external::{ + FullRoundConstants, FullRoundLayer, FullRoundLayerConstructor, mds_multiply, +}; +use p3_poseidon1::internal::{ + PartialRoundConstants, PartialRoundLayer, PartialRoundLayerConstructor, cheap_matmul, + partial_permute_state, +}; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use super::utils::add_rc_and_sbox; +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + +/// NEON-optimized external (full-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Stores round constants in two forms: +/// - **Scalar** (`FullRoundConstants`) — used by the +/// scalar fallback path (`FullRoundLayer`). +/// - **Packed** (`Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]>`) — each constant broadcast to +/// all four NEON lanes, enabling the fused [`add_rc_and_sbox`] path. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: FullRoundConstants, + packed_initial_constants: Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]>, + packed_terminal_constants: Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl FullRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: FullRoundConstants) -> Self { + let pack_rc = |rcs: &[[Mersenne31; WIDTH]]| -> Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]> { + rcs.iter() + .map(|rc| rc.map(|c| unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(c.value) })) + .collect() + }; + let packed_initial_constants = pack_rc(&constants.initial); + let packed_terminal_constants = pack_rc(&constants.terminal); + Self { + constants, + packed_initial_constants, + packed_terminal_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Apply a sequence of full rounds using NEON-packed constants. +/// +/// For each round: fuse `add_rc + x^5` via [`add_rc_and_sbox`], then +/// apply the circulant MDS through per-lane scalar delegation. +#[inline] +fn full_rounds_packed( + state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH], + packed_constants: &[[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]>, +{ + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for rc in packed_constants { + for (s, &c) in state.iter_mut().zip(rc.iter()) { + add_rc_and_sbox(s, c); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } +} + +/// Packed NEON path: fused AddRC + S-box with pre-packed constants. +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_initial_constants); + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_terminal_constants); + } +} + +/// Scalar fallback: standard AddRC → S-box → MDS on `Mersenne31` elements. +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.initial { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.terminal { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } +} + +/// NEON-optimized internal (partial-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// The internal layer uses the **sparse matrix decomposition** from the +/// Poseidon paper (Appendix B). Constants are stored as scalar +/// `Mersenne31` values; the `Algebra` impl on +/// `PackedMersenne31Neon` handles broadcasting during multiplication. +/// +/// Each partial round applies the S-box only to `state[0]`, then performs +/// a cheap sparse matrix–vector product via [`cheap_matmul`]. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: PartialRoundConstants, +} + +impl PartialRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: PartialRoundConstants) -> Self { + Self { constants } + } +} + +/// Packed NEON path: S-box on `state[0]` only, sparse matmul via scalar constants. +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]) { + // Add the full first-round constant vector (scalar → packed broadcast). + for (s, &rc) in state + .iter_mut() + .zip(self.constants.first_round_constants.iter()) + { + *s += rc; + } + + // Dense transition matrix m_i, applied once before the partial rounds. + mds_multiply(state, &self.constants.m_i); + + let rounds_p = self.constants.sparse_first_row.len(); + + // Partial rounds 0..RP-2: S-box on state[0] + round constant + sparse matmul. + for r in 0..rounds_p - 1 { + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + state[0] += self.constants.round_constants[r]; + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[r], + &self.constants.v[r], + ); + } + + // Last partial round: S-box on state[0] + sparse matmul (no round constant). + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[rounds_p - 1], + &self.constants.v[rounds_p - 1], + ); + } +} + +/// Scalar fallback: delegates to the generic partial-round implementation. +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + partial_permute_state::(state, &self.constants); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::poseidon1::{default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16, default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32}; + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn poseidon1_neon_matches_scalar_width_16( + input in prop::array::uniform16(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31Neon::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + #[test] + fn poseidon1_neon_matches_scalar_width_32( + input in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31Neon::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon2.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon2.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..527d5469 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/poseidon2.rs @@ -0,0 +1,435 @@ +//! Vectorized NEON implementation of Poseidon2 for Mersenne31. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::aarch64::{self, uint32x4_t}; +use core::mem::transmute; + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_poseidon2::{ + ExternalLayer, ExternalLayerConstants, ExternalLayerConstructor, InternalLayer, + InternalLayerConstructor, MDSMat4, external_initial_permute_state, + external_terminal_permute_state, +}; + +use super::utils::add_rc_and_sbox; +use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + +/// The prime P = 2^31 - 1 as a packed NEON vector. +const P: uint32x4_t = unsafe { transmute::<[u32; 4], _>([0x7fffffff; 4]) }; + +/// The internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// Constants are stored in standard POSITIVE form `{0, ..., P}`. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// The scalar round constants for each internal round. + pub(crate) internal_constants: Vec, + /// The round constants packed into NEON vectors for vectorized computation. + packed_internal_constants: Vec, +} + +impl InternalLayerConstructor for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + let packed_internal_constants = internal_constants + .iter() + .map(|c| unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(c.value) }) + .collect(); + Self { + internal_constants, + packed_internal_constants, + } + } +} + +/// The external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// Constants are stored in standard POSITIVE form `{0, ..., P}`. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// The scalar round constants for both initial and terminal external rounds. + pub(crate) external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants, + /// The initial external round constants packed into NEON vectors. + packed_initial_external_constants: Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]>, + /// The terminal external round constants packed into NEON vectors. + packed_terminal_external_constants: Vec<[uint32x4_t; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl ExternalLayerConstructor + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + let packed_initial_external_constants = external_constants + .get_initial_constants() + .iter() + .map(|arr| arr.map(|c| unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(c.value) })) + .collect(); + let packed_terminal_external_constants = external_constants + .get_terminal_constants() + .iter() + .map(|arr| arr.map(|c| unsafe { aarch64::vdupq_n_u32(c.value) })) + .collect(); + Self { + external_constants, + packed_initial_external_constants, + packed_terminal_external_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Compute the map `x -> 2^I * x` on Mersenne-31 field elements using cyclic rotation. +/// +/// For Mersenne-31 (P = 2^31 - 1), we have `2^31 ≡ 1 (mod P)`, which means multiplication +/// by `2^I` is equivalent to a cyclic rotation of the binary representation. +/// +/// # Safety +/// `val` must be represented as a value in `{0, ..., P}`. +/// If the input does not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +/// +/// # Generic Parameters +/// - `I`: The exponent (shift amount) +/// - `I_PRIME`: Must satisfy `I + I_PRIME = 31` +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn mul_2exp_i( + val: PackedMersenne31Neon, +) -> PackedMersenne31Neon { + // We want this to compile to: + // ushr lo.4s, val.4s, #(31 - I) // Shift high bits down + // sli lo.4s, val.4s, #I // Shift low bits up and insert into lo + // and res.4s, lo.4s, P.4s // Clear the dirty sign bit + // throughput: ~0.75 cyc/vec + // latency: 4 cyc + + const { + assert!(I + I_PRIME == 31); + } + + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let input = val.to_vector(); + + // 1. Shift high bits down to the bottom. + let lo = aarch64::vshrq_n_u32::(input); + + // 2. Shift low bits up and INSERT them into the accumulator. + // + // `vsli` (Vector Shift Left and Insert) shifts `input` left by I bits, + // then inserts the result into `lo`, preserving the low I bits of `lo`. + // + // Result: bits[30:I] = input[30-I:0], bits[I-1:0] = lo[I-1:0] + let inserted = aarch64::vsliq_n_u32::(lo, input); + + // 3. Clear the sign bit (which might be dirty from the shift left). + let output = aarch64::vandq_u32(inserted, P); + + PackedMersenne31Neon::from_vector(output) + } +} + +/// We hard-code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)). +/// +/// For Mersenne31 with WIDTH = 16, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// `[-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]` +/// +/// i.e., the first entry is -2 and all other entries are powers of 2. +/// Note: `state[0]` is handled by the calling code (multiplied by -2). +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 16]) { + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + // state[1] -> 1*state[1] = state[1], no-op. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; // *2 via addition (faster than shift) + + // For the remaining entries, use fast cyclic rotation. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[15]); +} + +/// We hard-code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)). +/// +/// For Mersenne31 with WIDTH = 24, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// `[-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]` +/// +/// i.e., the first entry is -2 and all other entries are powers of 2. +/// Note: `state[0]` is handled by the calling code (multiplied by -2). +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 24]) { + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + // state[1] -> 1*state[1] = state[1], no-op. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; // *2 via addition (faster than shift) + + // For the remaining entries, use fast cyclic rotation. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 16. +/// +/// The internal layer consists of: +/// 1. Add round constant to `state[0]` and apply S-box: `s0 -> (s0 + rc)^5` +/// 2. Apply linear layer: `s -> (1 + Diag(V)) * s` +/// +/// The linear layer can be decomposed as: +/// - `sum = Σ s_i` +/// - `s_i -> sum + v_i * s_i` +/// +/// We optimize by computing the diagonal multiplication on `s[1..]` in parallel +/// with the S-box on `s[0]`, exploiting instruction-level parallelism. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 16], rc: uint32x4_t) { + // Apply AddRoundConstant and S-Box to state[0]. + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + + // Compute sum of state[1..] while S-box is executing. + // This can run in parallel with the S-box computation. + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31Neon::sum_array::<15>(&state[1..]); + + // Total sum including state[0] after S-box. + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + + // Update state[0]: s0_new = sum + (-2) * s0 = sum - 2*s0 = (sum - s0) - s0 = sum_tail - s0 + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + + // Apply diagonal multiplication to the rest of the state. + diagonal_mul_16(state); + + // Add sum to all elements except state[0] (which was handled above). + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 16]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_16(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 24. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 24], rc: uint32x4_t) { + // Apply AddRoundConstant and S-Box to state[0]. + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + + // Compute sum of state[1..] while S-box is executing. + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31Neon::sum_array::<23>(&state[1..]); + + // Total sum including state[0] after S-box. + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + + // Update state[0]: s0_new = sum_tail - s0 (because v_0 = -2) + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + + // Apply diagonal multiplication to the rest of the state. + diagonal_mul_24(state); + + // Add sum to all elements except state[0]. + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 24]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_24(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// We hard-code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)). +/// +/// For Mersenne31 with WIDTH = 32, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// `[-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]` +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 32]) { + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + // state[1] -> 1*state[1] = state[1], no-op. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; // *2 via addition + + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); + state[24] = mul_2exp_i::<23, 8>(state[24]); + state[25] = mul_2exp_i::<24, 7>(state[25]); + state[26] = mul_2exp_i::<25, 6>(state[26]); + state[27] = mul_2exp_i::<26, 5>(state[27]); + state[28] = mul_2exp_i::<27, 4>(state[28]); + state[29] = mul_2exp_i::<28, 3>(state[29]); + state[30] = mul_2exp_i::<29, 2>(state[30]); + state[31] = mul_2exp_i::<30, 1>(state[31]); +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 32. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 32], rc: uint32x4_t) { + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31Neon::sum_array::<31>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_32(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; 32]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_32(state, rc)); + } +} + +impl ExternalLayer + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + /// Perform the initial external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]) { + external_initial_permute_state( + state, + &self.packed_initial_external_constants, + add_rc_and_sbox, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } + + /// Perform the terminal external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31Neon; WIDTH]) { + external_terminal_permute_state( + state, + &self.packed_terminal_external_constants, + add_rc_and_sbox, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::Poseidon2Mersenne31; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type Perm16 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<16>; + type Perm24 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<24>; + type Perm32 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<32>; + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 16. + #[test] + fn test_neon_poseidon2_width_16() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm16::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 16] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut neon_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut neon_input); + + let neon_output = neon_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(neon_output, expected); + } + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 24. + #[test] + fn test_neon_poseidon2_width_24() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm24::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 24] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut neon_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut neon_input); + + let neon_output = neon_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(neon_output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn test_neon_poseidon2_width_32() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let poseidon2 = Perm32::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let input: [F; 32] = rng.random(); + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let mut neon_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut neon_input); + let neon_output = neon_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + assert_eq!(neon_output, expected); + } + + /// Test mul_2exp_i with known values. + #[test] + fn test_mul_2exp_i() { + // Test multiplication by 2^4 = 16 + let input = PackedMersenne31Neon::from(Mersenne31::new(5)); + let output = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(input); + assert_eq!(output.0[0], Mersenne31::new(80)); // 5 * 16 = 80 + + // Test multiplication by 2^8 = 256 + let input = PackedMersenne31Neon::from(Mersenne31::new(3)); + let output = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(input); + assert_eq!(output.0[0], Mersenne31::new(768)); // 3 * 256 = 768 + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/utils.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/utils.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93862ef8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/aarch64_neon/utils.rs @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +//! Shared NEON utilities for Poseidon hash functions on Mersenne31. + +use core::arch::aarch64::{self, uint32x4_t}; +use core::mem::transmute; + +use super::packing::exp5; +use crate::PackedMersenne31Neon; + +/// The prime P = 2^31 - 1 as a packed NEON vector. +const P: uint32x4_t = unsafe { transmute::<[u32; 4], _>([0x7fffffff; 4]) }; + +/// Compute the fused AddRoundConstant and S-Box operation: `x -> (x + rc)^5`. +/// +/// # Optimization +/// 1. Adds `rc` (positive form). Result is in `[0, 2P]`. +/// 2. Performs "Min-Reduction": `min(sum, sum - P)`. +/// - If `sum < P`, `sum - P` wraps to a huge value, `min` selects `sum`. +/// - If `sum >= P`, `sum - P` is small, `min` selects `sum - P`. +/// - Cost: 2 instructions (`sub`, `min`). +/// 3. Calls `exp5`. Since input is now strictly `[0, P]`, `exp5` does not need +/// to handle signs or absolute values. +/// +/// # Safety +/// - `input` must contain elements in canonical form `{0, ..., P}`. +/// - `rc` must contain round constants in positive form `{0, ..., P}`. +#[inline(always)] +pub(super) fn add_rc_and_sbox(input: &mut PackedMersenne31Neon, rc: uint32x4_t) { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then NEON intrinsics are available. + let input_vec = input.to_vector(); + + // 1. Add round constant. Result in [0, 2P]. + let sum = aarch64::vaddq_u32(input_vec, rc); + + // 2. Fast Reduction to [0, P]. + // If sum >= P, we want (sum - P). + // If sum < P, (sum - P) underflows to > P. + // Unsigned min selects the correct modular result. + let diff = aarch64::vsubq_u32(sum, P); + let reduced = aarch64::vminq_u32(sum, diff); + + // 3. Apply S-box (optimized for positive inputs). + let output = exp5(reduced); + + *input = PackedMersenne31Neon::from_vector(output); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use core::arch::aarch64; + + use p3_field::{InjectiveMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31Neon}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn add_rc_and_sbox_matches_scalar( + inputs in prop::array::uniform4(arb_f()), + rcs in prop::array::uniform4(arb_f()), + ) { + // Scalar reference: (x + rc)^5 per lane. + let expected: [F; 4] = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + (inputs[i] + rcs[i]).injective_exp_n() + }); + + // NEON path. + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31Neon(inputs); + let rc_vec = unsafe { aarch64::vld1q_u32(rcs.map(|f| f.value).as_ptr()) }; + super::add_rc_and_sbox(&mut packed, rc_vec); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed.0, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/complex.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/complex.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8304cc66 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/complex.rs @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +//! Implementation of the quadratic extension of the Mersenne31 field +//! by X^2 + 1. +//! +//! Note that X^2 + 1 is irreducible over p = Mersenne31 field because +//! kronecker(-1, p) = -1, that is, -1 is not square in F_p. + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_field::extension::{Complex, ComplexExtendable, HasTwoAdicBinomialExtension}; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +impl Mersenne31 { + /// Precomputed table of generators for two-adic subgroups of the circle group + /// (the norm-1 subgroup of the degree two extension field over Mersenne31). + /// The `i`'th element is a generator of the subgroup of order `2^i`. + const CIRCLE_TWO_ADIC_GENERATORS: [Complex; 32] = [ + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1), Self::new(0)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(2_147_483_646), Self::new(0)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(0), Self::new(2_147_483_646)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(32_768), Self::new(2_147_450_879)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(590_768_354), Self::new(978_592_373)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_179_735_656), Self::new(1_241_207_368)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_567_857_810), Self::new(456_695_729)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_774_253_895), Self::new(1_309_288_441)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(736_262_640), Self::new(1_553_669_210)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_819_216_575), Self::new(1_662_816_114)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_323_191_254), Self::new(1_936_974_060)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(605_622_498), Self::new(1_964_232_216)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(343_674_985), Self::new(501_786_993)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_995_316_534), Self::new(149_306_621)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(2_107_600_913), Self::new(1_378_821_388)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(541_476_169), Self::new(2_101_081_972)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(2_135_874_973), Self::new(483_411_332)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(2_097_144_245), Self::new(1_684_033_590)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_662_322_247), Self::new(670_236_780)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_172_215_635), Self::new(595_888_646)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(241_940_101), Self::new(323_856_519)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_957_194_259), Self::new(2_139_647_100)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_957_419_629), Self::new(1_541_039_442)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_062_045_235), Self::new(1_824_580_421)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_929_382_196), Self::new(1_664_698_822)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_889_294_251), Self::new(331_248_939)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_214_231_414), Self::new(1_646_302_518)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_765_392_370), Self::new(461_136_547)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_629_751_483), Self::new(66_485_474)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(1_501_355_827), Self::new(1_439_063_420)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(509_778_402), Self::new(800_467_507)), + Complex::new_complex(Self::new(311_014_874), Self::new(1_584_694_829)), + ]; +} + +impl ComplexExtendable for Mersenne31 { + const CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY: usize = 31; + + // sage: p = 2^31 - 1 + // sage: F = GF(p) + // sage: R. = F[] + // sage: F2. = F.extension(x^2 + 1) + // sage: F2.multiplicative_generator() + // u + 12 + const COMPLEX_GENERATOR: Complex = Complex::new_complex(Self::new(12), Self::ONE); + + fn circle_two_adic_generator(bits: usize) -> Complex { + // Generator of the whole 2^TWO_ADICITY group + // sage: p = 2^31 - 1 + // sage: F = GF(p) + // sage: R. = F[] + // sage: F2. = F.extension(x^2 + 1) + // sage: g = F2.multiplicative_generator()^((p^2 - 1) / 2^31); g + // 1584694829*u + 311014874 + // sage: assert(g.multiplicative_order() == 2^31) + // sage: assert(g.norm() == 1) + assert!(bits <= Self::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY); + Self::CIRCLE_TWO_ADIC_GENERATORS[bits] + } +} + +impl HasTwoAdicBinomialExtension<2> for Mersenne31 { + const EXT_TWO_ADICITY: usize = 32; + + fn ext_two_adic_generator(bits: usize) -> [Self; 2] { + assert!(bits <= Self::EXT_TWO_ADICITY); + Self::EXT_TWO_ADIC_GENERATORS[bits] + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::{ExtensionField, PrimeField32}; + use p3_field_testing::{ + test_extension_field, test_field, test_packed_extension_field, test_two_adic_field, + }; + + use super::*; + + type Fi = Complex; + type F = Mersenne31; + + #[test] + fn add() { + // real part + assert_eq!(Fi::ONE + Fi::ONE, Fi::TWO); + assert_eq!(Fi::NEG_ONE + Fi::ONE, Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!(Fi::NEG_ONE + Fi::TWO, Fi::ONE); + assert_eq!((Fi::NEG_ONE + Fi::NEG_ONE).real(), F::new(F::ORDER_U32 - 2)); + + // complex part + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::ONE) + Fi::new_imag(F::ONE), + Fi::new_imag(F::TWO) + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) + Fi::new_imag(F::ONE), + Fi::new_imag(F::ZERO) + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) + Fi::new_imag(F::TWO), + Fi::new_imag(F::ONE) + ); + assert_eq!( + (Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE)).imag(), + F::new(F::ORDER_U32 - 2) + ); + + // further tests + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_complex(F::ONE, F::TWO) + Fi::new_complex(F::ONE, F::ONE), + Fi::new_complex(F::TWO, F::new(3)) + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_complex(F::NEG_ONE, F::NEG_ONE) + Fi::new_complex(F::ONE, F::ONE), + Fi::ZERO + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_complex(F::NEG_ONE, F::ONE) + Fi::new_complex(F::TWO, F::new(F::ORDER_U32 - 2)), + Fi::new_complex(F::ONE, F::NEG_ONE) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn sub() { + // real part + assert_eq!(Fi::ONE - Fi::ONE, Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!(Fi::TWO - Fi::TWO, Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!(Fi::NEG_ONE - Fi::NEG_ONE, Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!(Fi::TWO - Fi::ONE, Fi::ONE); + assert_eq!(Fi::NEG_ONE - Fi::ZERO, Fi::NEG_ONE); + + // complex part + assert_eq!(Fi::new_imag(F::ONE) - Fi::new_imag(F::ONE), Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!(Fi::new_imag(F::TWO) - Fi::new_imag(F::TWO), Fi::ZERO); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) - Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE), + Fi::ZERO + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::TWO) - Fi::new_imag(F::ONE), + Fi::new_imag(F::ONE) + ); + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) - Fi::ZERO, + Fi::new_imag(F::NEG_ONE) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn mul() { + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_complex(F::TWO, F::TWO) * Fi::new_complex(F::new(4), F::new(5)), + Fi::new_complex(-F::TWO, F::new(18)) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn mul_2exp_u64() { + // real part + // 1 * 2^0 = 1. + assert_eq!(Fi::ONE.mul_2exp_u64(0), Fi::ONE); + // 2 * 2^30 = 2^31 = 1. + assert_eq!(Fi::TWO.mul_2exp_u64(30), Fi::ONE); + // 5 * 2^2 = 20. + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_real(F::new(5)).mul_2exp_u64(2), + Fi::new_real(F::new(20)) + ); + + // complex part + // i * 2^0 = i. + assert_eq!(Fi::new_imag(F::ONE).mul_2exp_u64(0), Fi::new_imag(F::ONE)); + // (2i) * 2^30 = (2^31) * i = i. + assert_eq!(Fi::new_imag(F::TWO).mul_2exp_u64(30), Fi::new_imag(F::ONE)); + // 5i * 2^2 = 20i. + assert_eq!( + Fi::new_imag(F::new(5)).mul_2exp_u64(2), + Fi::new_imag(F::new(20)) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn circle_two_adic_generators_table_matches_repeated_squaring() { + let base = Fi::new_complex(F::new(311_014_874), F::new(1_584_694_829)); + for bits in 0..=Mersenne31::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY { + assert_eq!( + Mersenne31::CIRCLE_TWO_ADIC_GENERATORS[bits], + base.exp_power_of_2(Mersenne31::CIRCLE_TWO_ADICITY - bits) + ); + } + } + + // There is a redundant representation of zero but we already tested it + // when testing the base field. + const ZEROS: [Fi; 1] = [Fi::ZERO]; + const ONES: [Fi; 1] = [Fi::ONE]; + + // Get the prime factorization of the order of the multiplicative group. + // i.e. the prime factorization of P^2 - 1. + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 7] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 32), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 2), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + ] + } + + test_field!( + super::Fi, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + + test_extension_field!(super::F, super::Fi); + test_two_adic_field!(super::Fi); + + type Pef = >::ExtensionPacking; + const PACKED_ZEROS: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ZERO]; + const PACKED_ONES: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ONE]; + test_packed_extension_field!( + super::F, + super::Fi, + super::Pef, + &super::PACKED_ZEROS, + &super::PACKED_ONES + ); + p3_field_testing::test_packed_binomial_extension_division!(F, 2); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/dft.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/dft.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2cf8cb93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/dft.rs @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +//! Implementation of DFT for `Mersenne31`. +//! +//! Strategy follows: `` +//! In short, fold a Mersenne31 DFT of length n into a Mersenne31Complex DFT +//! of length n/2. Some pre/post-processing is necessary so that the result +//! of the transform behaves as expected wrt the convolution theorem etc. +//! +//! Note that we don't return the final n/2 - 1 elements since we know that +//! the "complex conjugate" of the (n-k)th element equals the kth element. +//! The convolution theorem maintains this relationship and so these final +//! n/2 - 1 elements are essentially redundant. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::{Itertools, izip}; +use p3_dft::TwoAdicSubgroupDft; +use p3_field::extension::Complex; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing, TwoAdicField}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +type F = Mersenne31; +type C = Complex; + +/// Given an hxw matrix M = (m_{ij}) where h is even, return an +/// (h/2)xw matrix N whose (k,l) entry is +/// +/// Mersenne31Complex(m_{2k,l}, m_{2k+1,l}) +/// +/// i.e. the even rows become the real parts and the odd rows become +/// the imaginary parts. +/// +/// This packing is suitable as input to a Fourier Transform over the +/// domain Mersenne31Complex; it is inverse to `idft_postprocess()` +/// below. +fn dft_preprocess(input: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!( + input.height().is_multiple_of(2), + "input height must be even" + ); + RowMajorMatrix::new( + input + .rows() + .tuples() + .flat_map(|(row_0, row_1)| { + // For each pair of rows in input, convert each + // two-element column into a Mersenne31Complex + // treating the first row as the real part and the + // second row as the imaginary part. + row_0.zip(row_1).map(|(x, y)| C::new_complex(x, y)) + }) + .collect(), + input.width(), + ) +} + +/// Transform the result of applying the DFT to the packed +/// `Mersenne31` values so that the convolution theorem holds. +/// +/// Source: +/// +/// NB: This function and `idft_preprocess()` are inverses. +fn dft_postprocess(input: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let h = input.height(); + let log2_h = log2_strict_usize(h); // checks that h is a power of two + + // NB: The original real matrix had height 2h, hence log2(2h) = log2(h) + 1. + // omega is a 2h-th root of unity + let omega = C::two_adic_generator(log2_h + 1); + let mut omega_j = omega; + + let mut output = Vec::with_capacity((h + 1) * input.width()); + output.extend( + input + .first_row() + .unwrap() // The matrix is non-empty so this unwrap should never panic. + .into_iter() + .map(|x| C::new_real(x.real() + x.imag())), + ); + + for j in 1..h { + let row_iter = unsafe { + // Safety: We know that 0 < j < h = input.height() + izip!(input.row_unchecked(j), input.row_unchecked(h - j)) + }; + let row = row_iter.map(|(x, y)| { + let even = x + y.conjugate(); + // odd = (x - y.conjugate()) * -i + let odd = C::new_complex(x.imag() + y.imag(), y.real() - x.real()); + (even + odd * omega_j).halve() + }); + output.extend(row); + omega_j *= omega; + } + + output.extend( + input + .first_row() + .unwrap() // The matrix is non-empty so this unwrap should never panic. + .into_iter() + .map(|x| C::new_real(x.real() - x.imag())), + ); + debug_assert_eq!(output.len(), (h + 1) * input.width()); + RowMajorMatrix::new(output, input.width()) +} + +/// Undo the transform of the DFT matrix in `dft_postprocess()` so +/// that the inverse DFT can be applied. +/// +/// Source: +/// +/// NB: This function and `dft_postprocess()` are inverses. +fn idft_preprocess(input: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let h = input.height() - 1; + let log2_h = log2_strict_usize(h); // checks that h is a power of two + + // NB: The original real matrix had length 2h, hence log2(2h) = log2(h) + 1. + // omega is a 2n-th root of unity + let omega = C::two_adic_generator(log2_h + 1).inverse(); + let mut omega_j = C::ONE; + + let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(h * input.width()); + // TODO: Specialise j = 0 and j = n (which we know must be real)? + for j in 0..h { + let row_iter = unsafe { + // Safety: We know that 0 = j < h < input.height() + izip!(input.row_unchecked(j), input.row_unchecked(h - j)) + }; + let row = row_iter.map(|(x, y)| { + let even = x + y.conjugate(); + // odd = (x - y.conjugate()) * -i + let odd = C::new_complex(x.imag() + y.imag(), y.real() - x.real()); + (even - odd * omega_j).halve() + }); + output.extend(row); + omega_j *= omega; + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(output, input.width()) +} + +/// Given an (h/2)xw matrix M = (m_{kl}) = (a_{kl} + I*b_{kl}) (where +/// I is the imaginary unit), return the hxw matrix N whose (i,j) +/// entry is a_{i/2,j} if i is even and b_{(i-1)/2,j} if i is odd. +/// +/// This function is inverse to `dft_preprocess()` above. +fn idft_postprocess(input: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + // Allocate necessary `Vec`s upfront: + // 1) The actual output, + // 2) A temporary buf to store the imaginary parts. + // This buf is filled and flushed per row + // throughout postprocessing to save on allocations. + let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(input.width() * input.height() * 2); + let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(input.width()); + + // Convert each row of input into two rows, the first row + // having the real parts of the input, the second row + // having the imaginary parts. + for row in input.rows() { + for ext in row { + output.push(ext.real()); + buf.push(ext.imag()); + } + output.append(&mut buf); + } + + RowMajorMatrix::new(output, input.width()) +} + +/// The DFT for Mersenne31 +#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)] +pub struct Mersenne31Dft; + +impl Mersenne31Dft { + /// Compute the DFT of each column of `mat`. + /// + /// NB: The DFT works by packing pairs of `Mersenne31` values into + /// a `Mersenne31Complex` and doing a (half-length) DFT on the + /// result. In particular, the type of the result elements are in + /// the extension field, not the domain field. + pub fn dft_batch>(mat: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let dft = Dft::default(); + dft_postprocess(&dft.dft_batch(dft_preprocess(mat)).to_row_major_matrix()) + } + + /// Compute the inverse DFT of each column of `mat`. + /// + /// NB: See comment on `dft_batch()` for information on packing. + pub fn idft_batch>(mat: &RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let dft = Dft::default(); + idft_postprocess(&dft.idft_batch(idft_preprocess(mat))) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::Mersenne31ComplexRadix2Dit; + + type Base = Mersenne31; + type Dft = Mersenne31ComplexRadix2Dit; + + #[test] + fn consistency() + where + StandardUniform: Distribution, + { + const N: usize = 1 << 12; + let rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let input = rng + .sample_iter(StandardUniform) + .take(N) + .collect::>(); + let input = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(input); + let fft_input = Mersenne31Dft::dft_batch::(&input); + let output = Mersenne31Dft::idft_batch::(&fft_input); + assert_eq!(input, output); + } + + #[test] + fn convolution() + where + StandardUniform: Distribution, + { + const N: usize = 1 << 6; + let rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let v = rng + .sample_iter(StandardUniform) + .take(2 * N) + .collect::>(); + let a = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(v[..N].to_vec()); + let b = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(v[N..].to_vec()); + + let fft_a = Mersenne31Dft::dft_batch::(&a); + let fft_b = Mersenne31Dft::dft_batch::(&b); + + let fft_c = fft_a + .values + .iter() + .zip(fft_b.values.iter()) + .map(|(&xi, &yi)| xi * yi) + .collect(); + let fft_c = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(fft_c); + + let c = Mersenne31Dft::idft_batch::(&fft_c); + + let mut conv = Vec::with_capacity(N); + for i in 0..N { + let mut t = Base::ZERO; + for j in 0..N { + t += a.values[j] * b.values[(N + i - j) % N]; + } + conv.push(t); + } + + assert_eq!(c.values, conv); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/extension.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/extension.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4534ec5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/extension.rs @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +use p3_field::extension::{ + Binomial, BinomiallyExtendable, Complex, ExtensionAlgebra, HasComplexBinomialExtension, + HasTwoAdicComplexBinomialExtension, binomial_mul, binomial_square, +}; +use p3_field::{PrimeCharacteristicRing, TwoAdicField, field_to_array}; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +impl ExtensionAlgebra> for Mersenne31 { + #[inline] + fn ext_mul(a: &[Self; 3], b: &[Self; 3], res: &mut [Self; 3]) { + binomial_mul::(a, b, res, >::W); + } + + #[inline] + fn ext_square(a: &[Self; 3], res: &mut [Self; 3]) { + binomial_square::(a, res, >::W); + } +} + +impl BinomiallyExtendable<3> for Mersenne31 { + // ```sage + // p = 2^31 - 1 + // F = GF(p) + // R. = F[] + // assert (x^3 - 5).is_irreducible() + // ``` + const W: Self = Self::new(5); + + // ```sage + // F(5)^((p-1)/3) + // ``` + const DTH_ROOT: Self = Self::new(1513477735); + + // ```sage + // F.extension(x^3 - 5, 'u').multiplicative_generator() + // ``` + const EXT_GENERATOR: [Self; 3] = [Self::new(10), Self::ONE, Self::ZERO]; +} + +impl HasComplexBinomialExtension<2> for Mersenne31 { + // Verifiable in Sage with + // ```sage + // p = 2**31 - 1 # Mersenne31 + // F = GF(p) # The base field GF(p) + // R. = F[] # The polynomial ring over F + // K. = F.extension(x^2 + 1) # The complex extension field + // R2. = K[] + // f2 = y^2 - i - 2 + // assert f2.is_irreducible() + // ``` + const W: Complex = Complex::new_complex(Self::TWO, Self::ONE); + + // DTH_ROOT = W^((p^2 - 1)/2). + const DTH_ROOT: Complex = Complex::new_real(Self::new(2147483646)); + + // Verifiable in Sage with + // ```sage + // K2. = K.extension(f2) + // g = j + 6 + // for f in factor(p^4 - 1): + // assert g^((p^4-1) // f) != 1 + // ``` + const EXT_GENERATOR: [Complex; 2] = [Complex::new_real(Self::new(6)), Complex::ONE]; + + /// Multiply a `Complex` element by `W = 2 + i` using only additions: + /// `(a + bi)(2 + i) = (2a - b) + (a + 2b)i`. + #[inline(always)] + fn mul_by_w(z: Complex) -> Complex { + let re = z.real(); + let im = z.imag(); + Complex::new_complex(re + re - im, re + im + im) + } +} + +impl HasTwoAdicComplexBinomialExtension<2> for Mersenne31 { + const COMPLEX_EXT_TWO_ADICITY: usize = 33; + + fn complex_ext_two_adic_generator(bits: usize) -> [Complex; 2] { + assert!(bits <= 33); + if bits == 33 { + [ + Complex::ZERO, + Complex::new_complex(Self::new_reduced(1437746044), Self::new_reduced(946469285)), + ] + } else { + [Complex::two_adic_generator(bits), Complex::ZERO] + } + } +} + +impl HasComplexBinomialExtension<3> for Mersenne31 { + // Verifiable in Sage with + // ```sage + // p = 2**31 - 1 # Mersenne31 + // F = GF(p) # The base field GF(p) + // R. = F[] # The polynomial ring over F + // K. = F.extension(x^2 + 1) # The complex extension field + // R2. = K[] + // f2 = y^3 - 5*i + // assert f2.is_irreducible() + // ``` + const W: Complex = Complex::new_imag(Self::new(5)); + + // DTH_ROOT = W^((p^2 - 1)/2). + const DTH_ROOT: Complex = Complex::new_real(Self::new(634005911)); + + // Verifiable in Sage with + // ```sage + // K2. = K.extension(f2) + // g = j + 5 + // for f in factor(p^6 - 1): + // assert g^((p^6-1) // f) != 1 + // ``` + const EXT_GENERATOR: [Complex; 3] = [ + Complex::new_real(Self::new(5)), + Complex::new_real(Self::ONE), + Complex::ZERO, + ]; +} + +impl HasTwoAdicComplexBinomialExtension<3> for Mersenne31 { + const COMPLEX_EXT_TWO_ADICITY: usize = 32; + + fn complex_ext_two_adic_generator(bits: usize) -> [Complex; 3] { + field_to_array(Complex::two_adic_generator(bits)) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test_cubic_extension { + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; + use p3_field::{ExtensionField, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use p3_field_testing::{test_extension_field, test_field, test_packed_extension_field}; + + use crate::Mersenne31; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + // There is a redundant representation of zero but we already tested it + // when testing the base field. + const ZEROS: [EF; 1] = [EF::ZERO]; + const ONES: [EF; 1] = [EF::ONE]; + + // Get the prime factorization of the order of the multiplicative group. + // i.e. the prime factorization of P^3 - 1. + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 9] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 3), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(529510939u32), 1), + (BigUint::from(2903110321u32), 1), + ] + } + + test_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + test_field!( + super::EF, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + + type Pef = >::ExtensionPacking; + const PACKED_ZEROS: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ZERO]; + const PACKED_ONES: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ONE]; + test_packed_extension_field!( + super::F, + super::EF, + super::Pef, + &super::PACKED_ZEROS, + &super::PACKED_ONES + ); + p3_field_testing::test_packed_binomial_extension_division!(F, 3); +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test_cubic_complex_extension { + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::extension::{BinomialExtensionField, Complex}; + use p3_field::{ExtensionField, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use p3_field_testing::{ + test_extension_field, test_field, test_packed_extension_field, + test_two_adic_extension_field, + }; + + use crate::Mersenne31; + + type F = Complex; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + // There is a redundant representation of zero but we already tested it + // when testing the base field. + const ZEROS: [EF; 1] = [EF::ZERO]; + const ONES: [EF; 1] = [EF::ONE]; + + // Get the prime factorization of the order of the multiplicative group. + // i.e. the prime factorization of P^6 - 1. + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 14] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 32), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 3), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(13u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(43u8), 2), + (BigUint::from(79u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(1381u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(529510939u32), 1), + (BigUint::from(1758566101u32), 1), + (BigUint::from(2903110321u32), 1), + ] + } + + test_field!( + super::EF, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + + test_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + test_two_adic_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + type Pef = >::ExtensionPacking; + const PACKED_ZEROS: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ZERO]; + const PACKED_ONES: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ONE]; + test_packed_extension_field!( + super::F, + super::EF, + super::Pef, + &super::PACKED_ZEROS, + &super::PACKED_ONES + ); + p3_field_testing::test_packed_binomial_extension_division!(F, 3); +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod test_quadratic_complex_extension { + + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::extension::{BinomialExtensionField, Complex}; + use p3_field::{ExtensionField, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use p3_field_testing::{ + test_extension_field, test_field, test_packed_extension_field, + test_two_adic_extension_field, + }; + + use crate::Mersenne31; + + type F = Complex; + type EF = BinomialExtensionField; + + // There is a redundant representation of zero but we already tested it + // when testing the base field. + const ZEROS: [EF; 1] = [EF::ZERO]; + const ONES: [EF; 1] = [EF::ONE]; + + // Get the prime factorization of the order of the multiplicative group. + // i.e. the prime factorization of P^4 - 1. + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 11] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 33), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 2), + (BigUint::from(5u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(733u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(1709u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(368140581013u64), 1), + ] + } + + test_field!( + super::EF, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + + test_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + test_two_adic_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + type Pef = >::ExtensionPacking; + const PACKED_ZEROS: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ZERO]; + const PACKED_ONES: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ONE]; + test_packed_extension_field!( + super::F, + super::EF, + super::Pef, + &super::PACKED_ZEROS, + &super::PACKED_ONES + ); + p3_field_testing::test_packed_binomial_extension_division!(F, 2); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08298019 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +//! The prime field `F_p` where `p = 2^31 - 1`. + +#![no_std] + +extern crate alloc; + +mod complex; +mod dft; +mod extension; +#[cfg(feature = "poseidon1")] +mod mds; +mod mersenne_31; +#[cfg(feature = "poseidon1")] +mod poseidon1; +mod poseidon2; +mod qm31; +mod radix_2_dit; + +pub use dft::Mersenne31Dft; +#[cfg(feature = "poseidon1")] +pub use mds::*; +pub use mersenne_31::*; +#[cfg(feature = "poseidon1")] +pub use poseidon1::*; +pub use poseidon2::*; +pub use qm31::*; +pub use radix_2_dit::Mersenne31ComplexRadix2Dit; + +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +mod aarch64_neon; +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +pub use aarch64_neon::*; + +#[cfg(all( + target_arch = "x86_64", + target_feature = "avx2", + not(target_feature = "avx512f") +))] +mod x86_64_avx2; +#[cfg(all( + target_arch = "x86_64", + target_feature = "avx2", + not(target_feature = "avx512f") +))] +pub use x86_64_avx2::*; + +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx512f"))] +mod x86_64_avx512; +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx512f"))] +pub use x86_64_avx512::*; + +#[cfg(not(any( + all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"), + all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx2",), +)))] +mod no_packing; +#[cfg(not(any( + all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"), + all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx2",), +)))] +pub use no_packing::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mds.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mds.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f42d48b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mds.rs @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +//! MDS matrices over the Mersenne31 field, and permutations defined by them. +//! +//! NB: Not all sizes have fast implementations of their permutations. +//! Supported sizes: 8, 12, 16, 32, 64. +//! Sizes 8 and 12 are from Plonky2, size 16 was found as part of concurrent +//! work by Angus Gruen and Hamish Ivey-Law. Other sizes are from Ulrich Haböck's +//! database. + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_mds::MdsPermutation; +use p3_mds::karatsuba_convolution::Convolve; +use p3_mds::util::{dot_product, first_row_to_first_col}; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)] +pub struct MdsMatrixMersenne31; + +/// Instantiate convolution for "small" RHS vectors over Mersenne31. +/// +/// Here "small" means N = len(rhs) <= 16 and sum(r for r in rhs) < +/// 2^24 (roughly), though in practice the sum will be less than 2^9. +struct SmallConvolveMersenne31; +impl Convolve for SmallConvolveMersenne31 { + const T_ZERO: i64 = 0; + const U_ZERO: i64 = 0; + + #[inline(always)] + fn halve(val: i64) -> i64 { + val >> 1 + } + + /// Return the lift of an (almost) reduced Mersenne31 element. + /// The Mersenne31 implementation guarantees that + /// 0 <= input.value <= P < 2^31. + #[inline(always)] + fn read(input: Mersenne31) -> i64 { + input.value as i64 + } + + /// For a convolution of size N, |x| < N * 2^31 and (as per the + /// assumption above), |y| < 2^24. So the product is at most N * 2^55 + /// which will not overflow for N <= 16. + #[inline(always)] + fn parity_dot(u: [i64; N], v: [i64; N]) -> i64 { + dot_product(u, v) + } + + /// The assumptions above mean z < N^2 * 2^55, which is at most + /// 2^63 when N <= 16. + /// + /// NB: Even though intermediate values could be negative, the + /// output must be non-negative since the inputs were + /// non-negative. + #[inline(always)] + fn reduce(z: i64) -> Mersenne31 { + debug_assert!(z >= 0); + Mersenne31::from_u64(z as u64) + } +} + +/// Instantiate convolution for "large" RHS vectors over Mersenne31. +/// +/// Here "large" means the elements can be as big as the field +/// characteristic, and the size N of the RHS is <= 64. +struct LargeConvolveMersenne31; +impl Convolve for LargeConvolveMersenne31 { + const T_ZERO: i64 = 0; + const U_ZERO: i64 = 0; + + #[inline(always)] + fn halve(val: i64) -> i64 { + val >> 1 + } + + /// Return the lift of an (almost) reduced Mersenne31 element. + /// The Mersenne31 implementation guarantees that + /// 0 <= input.value <= P < 2^31. + #[inline(always)] + fn read(input: Mersenne31) -> i64 { + input.value as i64 + } + + #[inline] + fn parity_dot(u: [i64; N], v: [i64; N]) -> i64 { + // For a convolution of size N, |x|, |y| < N * 2^31, so the product + // could be as much as N^2 * 2^62. This will overflow an i64, so + // we first widen to i128. + + let mut dp = 0i128; + for i in 0..N { + dp += u[i] as i128 * v[i] as i128; + } + + const LOWMASK: i128 = (1 << 42) - 1; // Gets the bits lower than 42. + const HIGHMASK: i128 = !LOWMASK; // Gets all bits higher than 42. + + let low_bits = (dp & LOWMASK) as i64; // low_bits < 2**42 + let high_bits = ((dp & HIGHMASK) >> 31) as i64; // |high_bits| < 2**(n - 31) + + // Proof that low_bits + high_bits is congruent to dp (mod p) + // and congruent to dp (mod 2^11): + // + // The individual bounds clearly show that low_bits + + // high_bits < 2**(n - 30). + // + // Next observe that low_bits + high_bits = input - (2**31 - + // 1) * (high_bits) = input mod P. + // + // Finally note that 2**11 divides high_bits and so low_bits + + // high_bits = low_bits mod 2**11 = input mod 2**11. + + low_bits + high_bits + } + + #[inline] + fn reduce(z: i64) -> Mersenne31 { + // After the dot product, the maximal size is N^2 * 2^62 < 2^74 + // as N = 64 is the biggest size. So, after the partial + // reduction, the output z of parity dot satisfies |z| < 2^44 + // (Where 44 is 74 - 30). + // + // In the recombining steps, conv maps (wo, w1) -> ((wo + w1)/2, + // (wo + w1)/2) which has no effect on the maximal size. (Indeed, + // it makes sizes almost strictly smaller). + // + // On the other hand, negacyclic_conv (ignoring the re-index) + // recombines as: (w0, w1, w2) -> (w0 + w1, w2 - w0 - w1). Hence + // if the input is <= K, the output is <= 3K. + // + // Thus the values appearing at the end are bounded by 3^n 2^44 + // where n is the maximal number of negacyclic_conv recombination + // steps. When N = 64, we need to recombine for singed_conv_32, + // singed_conv_16, singed_conv_8 so the overall bound will be 3^3 + // 2^44 < 32 * 2^44 < 2^49. + debug_assert!(z > -(1i64 << 49)); + debug_assert!(z < (1i64 << 49)); + + const MASK: i64 = (1 << 31) - 1; + // Morally, our value is a i62 not a i64 as the top 3 bits are + // guaranteed to be equal. + // + // The masked value can equal 2^31 - 1 (the non-canonical representation of zero). + // + // So the constructor must accept it. + let low_bits = Mersenne31::new_reduced((z & MASK) as u32); + + let high_bits = ((z >> 31) & MASK) as i32; + let sign_bits = (z >> 62) as i32; + + // The sum lies in [0, 2^31 - 1]. + // + // A negative `z` forces the upper-bit chunk to be at least 1. + // + // So the sign correction of -1 cannot drag the sum below zero. + let high = Mersenne31::new_reduced((high_bits + sign_bits) as u32); + low_bits + high + } +} + +const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_8_SML_ROW: [i64; 8] = [7, 1, 3, 8, 8, 3, 4, 9]; + +impl Permutation<[Mersenne31; 8]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute(&self, input: [Mersenne31; 8]) -> [Mersenne31; 8] { + const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_8_SML_COL: [i64; 8] = + first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_8_SML_ROW); + SmallConvolveMersenne31::apply( + input, + MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_8_SML_COL, + SmallConvolveMersenne31::conv8, + ) + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_12_SML_ROW: [i64; 12] = [1, 1, 2, 1, 8, 9, 10, 7, 5, 9, 4, 10]; + +impl Permutation<[Mersenne31; 12]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute(&self, input: [Mersenne31; 12]) -> [Mersenne31; 12] { + const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_12_SML_COL: [i64; 12] = + first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_12_SML_ROW); + SmallConvolveMersenne31::apply( + input, + MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_12_SML_COL, + SmallConvolveMersenne31::conv12, + ) + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +pub(crate) const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_ROW: [i64; 16] = + [1, 1, 51, 1, 11, 17, 2, 1, 101, 63, 15, 2, 67, 22, 13, 3]; + +impl Permutation<[Mersenne31; 16]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute(&self, input: [Mersenne31; 16]) -> [Mersenne31; 16] { + const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_COL: [i64; 16] = + first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_ROW); + SmallConvolveMersenne31::apply( + input, + MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_COL, + SmallConvolveMersenne31::conv16, + ) + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[rustfmt::skip] +pub(crate) const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_ROW: [i64; 32] = [ + 0x1896DC78, 0x559D1E29, 0x04EBD732, 0x3FF449D7, + 0x2DB0E2CE, 0x26776B85, 0x76018E57, 0x1025FA13, + 0x06486BAB, 0x37706EBA, 0x25EB966B, 0x113C24E5, + 0x2AE20EC4, 0x5A27507C, 0x0CD38CF1, 0x761C10E5, + 0x19E3EF1A, 0x032C730F, 0x35D8AF83, 0x651DF13B, + 0x7EC3DB1A, 0x6A146994, 0x588F9145, 0x09B79455, + 0x7FDA05EC, 0x19FE71A8, 0x6988947A, 0x624F1D31, + 0x500BB628, 0x0B1428CE, 0x3A62E1D6, 0x77692387 +]; + +impl Permutation<[Mersenne31; 32]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute(&self, input: [Mersenne31; 32]) -> [Mersenne31; 32] { + const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_COL: [i64; 32] = + first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_ROW); + LargeConvolveMersenne31::apply( + input, + MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_COL, + LargeConvolveMersenne31::conv32, + ) + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[rustfmt::skip] +const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_64_MERSENNE31_ROW: [i64; 64] = [ + 0x570227A5, 0x3702983F, 0x4B7B3B0A, 0x74F13DE3, + 0x485314B0, 0x0157E2EC, 0x1AD2E5DE, 0x721515E3, + 0x5452ADA3, 0x0C74B6C1, 0x67DA9450, 0x33A48369, + 0x3BDBEE06, 0x7C678D5E, 0x160F16D3, 0x54888B8C, + 0x666C7AA6, 0x113B89E2, 0x2A403CE2, 0x18F9DF42, + 0x2A685E84, 0x49EEFDE5, 0x5D044806, 0x560A41F8, + 0x69EF1BD0, 0x2CD15786, 0x62E07766, 0x22A231E2, + 0x3CFCF40C, 0x4E8F63D8, 0x69657A15, 0x466B4B2D, + 0x4194B4D2, 0x1E9A85EA, 0x39709C27, 0x4B030BF3, + 0x655DCE1D, 0x251F8899, 0x5B2EA879, 0x1E10E42F, + 0x31F5BE07, 0x2AFBB7F9, 0x3E11021A, 0x5D97A17B, + 0x6F0620BD, 0x5DBFC31D, 0x76C4761D, 0x21938559, + 0x33777473, 0x71F0E92C, 0x0B9872A1, 0x4C2411F9, + 0x545B7C96, 0x20256BAF, 0x7B8B493E, 0x33AD525C, + 0x15EAEA1C, 0x6D2D1A21, 0x06A81D14, 0x3FACEB4F, + 0x130EC21C, 0x3C84C4F5, 0x50FD67C0, 0x30FDD85A, +]; + +impl Permutation<[Mersenne31; 64]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute(&self, input: [Mersenne31; 64]) -> [Mersenne31; 64] { + const MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_64_MERSENNE31_COL: [i64; 64] = + first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_64_MERSENNE31_ROW); + LargeConvolveMersenne31::apply( + input, + MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_64_MERSENNE31_COL, + LargeConvolveMersenne31::conv64, + ) + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_mds::karatsuba_convolution::Convolve; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + + use super::{LargeConvolveMersenne31, MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31}; + + #[test] + fn large_convolve_reduce_accepts_p_representation() { + // Invariant: the reducer accepts inputs whose low 31 bits are all ones. + // + // Reason: 2^31 - 1 is the non-canonical representation of zero. + + // Fixture state: + // + // P = 2^31 - 1 + // z_neg = -1 (bit pattern: all 64 bits set) + // z_pos = P (bit pattern: low 31 bits set, rest zero) + // + // Masking either value by `(1 << 31) - 1` produces P, the edge case under test. + + // Case 1: z = -1 → -1 ≡ P - 1 (mod P). + let got = LargeConvolveMersenne31::reduce(-1); + let expected = Mersenne31::ZERO - Mersenne31::ONE; + assert_eq!(got, expected); + + // Case 2: z = P → P ≡ 0 (mod P). + let got = LargeConvolveMersenne31::reduce((1i64 << 31) - 1); + assert_eq!(got, Mersenne31::ZERO); + } + + #[test] + fn mersenne8() { + let input: [Mersenne31; 8] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1741044457, 327154658, 318297696, 1528828225, 468360260, 1271368222, 1906288587, + 1521884224, + ]); + + let output = MdsMatrixMersenne31.permute(input); + + let expected: [Mersenne31; 8] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 895992680, 1343855369, 2107796831, 266468728, 846686506, 252887121, 205223309, + 260248790, + ]); + + assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn mersenne12() { + let input: [Mersenne31; 12] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1232740094, 661555540, 11024822, 1620264994, 471137070, 276755041, 1316882747, + 1023679816, 1675266989, 743211887, 44774582, 1990989306, + ]); + + let output = MdsMatrixMersenne31.permute(input); + + let expected: [Mersenne31; 12] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 860812289, 399778981, 1228500858, 798196553, 673507779, 1116345060, 829764188, + 138346433, 578243475, 553581995, 578183208, 1527769050, + ]); + + assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn mersenne16() { + let input: [Mersenne31; 16] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1431168444, 963811518, 88067321, 381314132, 908628282, 1260098295, 980207659, + 150070493, 357706876, 2014609375, 387876458, 1621671571, 183146044, 107201572, + 166536524, 2078440788, + ]); + + let output = MdsMatrixMersenne31.permute(input); + + let expected: [Mersenne31; 16] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1858869691, 1607793806, 1200396641, 1400502985, 1511630695, 187938132, 1332411488, + 2041577083, 2014246632, 802022141, 796807132, 1647212930, 813167618, 1867105010, + 508596277, 1457551581, + ]); + + assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn mersenne32() { + let input: [Mersenne31; 32] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 873912014, 1112497426, 300405095, 4255553, 1234979949, 156402357, 1952135954, + 718195399, 1041748465, 683604342, 184275751, 1184118518, 214257054, 1293941921, + 64085758, 710448062, 1133100009, 350114887, 1091675272, 671421879, 1226105999, + 546430131, 1298443967, 1787169653, 2129310791, 1560307302, 471771931, 1191484402, + 1550203198, 1541319048, 229197040, 839673789, + ]); + + let output = MdsMatrixMersenne31.permute(input); + + let expected: [Mersenne31; 32] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1439049928, 890642852, 694402307, 713403244, 553213342, 1049445650, 321709533, + 1195683415, 2118492257, 623077773, 96734062, 990488164, 1674607608, 749155000, + 353377854, 966432998, 1114654884, 1370359248, 1624965859, 685087760, 1631836645, + 1615931812, 2061986317, 1773551151, 1449911206, 1951762557, 545742785, 582866449, + 1379774336, 229242759, 1871227547, 752848413, + ]); + + assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn mersenne64() { + let input: [Mersenne31; 64] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 837269696, 1509031194, 413915480, 1889329185, 315502822, 1529162228, 1454661012, + 1015826742, 973381409, 1414676304, 1449029961, 1968715566, 2027226497, 1721820509, + 434042616, 1436005045, 1680352863, 651591867, 260585272, 1078022153, 703990572, + 269504423, 1776357592, 1174979337, 1142666094, 1897872960, 1387995838, 250774418, + 776134750, 73930096, 194742451, 1860060380, 666407744, 669566398, 963802147, + 2063418105, 1772573581, 998923482, 701912753, 1716548204, 860820931, 1680395948, + 949886256, 1811558161, 501734557, 1671977429, 463135040, 1911493108, 207754409, + 608714758, 1553060084, 1558941605, 980281686, 2014426559, 650527801, 53015148, + 1521176057, 720530872, 713593252, 88228433, 1194162313, 1922416934, 1075145779, + 344403794, + ]); + + let output = MdsMatrixMersenne31.permute(input); + + let expected: [Mersenne31; 64] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1599981950, 252630853, 1171557270, 116468420, 1269245345, 666203050, 46155642, + 1701131520, 530845775, 508460407, 630407239, 1731628135, 1199144768, 295132047, + 77536342, 1472377703, 30752443, 1300339617, 18647556, 1267774380, 1194573079, + 1624665024, 646848056, 1667216490, 1184843555, 1250329476, 254171597, 1902035936, + 1706882202, 964921003, 952266538, 1215696284, 539510504, 1056507562, 1393151480, + 733644883, 1663330816, 1100715048, 991108703, 1671345065, 1376431774, 408310416, + 313176996, 743567676, 304660642, 1842695838, 958201635, 1650792218, 541570244, + 968523062, 1958918704, 1866282698, 849808680, 1193306222, 794153281, 822835360, + 135282913, 1149868448, 2068162123, 1474283743, 2039088058, 720305835, 746036736, + 671006610, + ]); + + assert_eq!(output, expected); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mersenne_31.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mersenne_31.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b48a2fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/mersenne_31.rs @@ -0,0 +1,744 @@ +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::fmt::{Debug, Display, Formatter}; +use core::hash::{Hash, Hasher}; +use core::iter::{Product, Sum}; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Div, DivAssign, Mul, MulAssign, Neg, Sub, SubAssign}; +use core::{array, fmt, iter}; + +use num_bigint::BigUint; +use p3_challenger::UniformSamplingField; +use p3_field::exponentiation::exp_1717986917; +use p3_field::integers::QuotientMap; +use p3_field::op_assign_macros::{ + impl_add_assign, impl_div_methods, impl_mul_methods, impl_sub_assign, +}; +use p3_field::{ + Field, InjectiveMonomial, Packable, PermutationMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing, PrimeField, + PrimeField32, PrimeField64, RawDataSerializable, halve_u32, impl_raw_serializable_primefield32, + quotient_map_large_iint, quotient_map_large_uint, quotient_map_small_int, +}; +use p3_util::{flatten_to_base, gcd_inversion_prime_field_32}; +use rand::Rng; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use serde::de::Error; +use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize}; + +/// The Mersenne31 prime +const P: u32 = (1 << 31) - 1; + +/// The prime field `F_p` where `p = 2^31 - 1`. +/// +/// The serde encoding is canonical: every field element has exactly one valid byte representation. +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Default)] +#[repr(transparent)] // Important for reasoning about memory layout. +#[must_use] +pub struct Mersenne31 { + /// Not necessarily canonical, but must fit in 31 bits. + pub(crate) value: u32, +} + +impl Mersenne31 { + /// Create a new field element from any `u32`. + /// + /// Any `u32` value is accepted and automatically reduced modulo P. + #[inline] + pub const fn new(value: u32) -> Self { + Self { value: value % P } + } + + /// Create a field element from a value assumed to be < 2^31. + /// + /// # Safety + /// The element must lie in the range: `[0, 2^31 - 1]`. + #[inline] + pub(crate) const fn new_reduced(value: u32) -> Self { + debug_assert!((value >> 31) == 0); + Self { value } + } + + /// Convert a u32 element into a Mersenne31 element. + /// + /// Returns `None` if the element does not lie in the range: `[0, 2^31 - 1]`. + #[inline] + pub const fn new_checked(value: u32) -> Option { + if (value >> 31) == 0 { + Some(Self { value }) + } else { + None + } + } + + /// Convert a `[u32; N]` array to an array of field elements. + /// + /// Const version of `input.map(Mersenne31::new)`. + #[inline] + pub const fn new_array(input: [u32; N]) -> [Self; N] { + let mut output = [Self::ZERO; N]; + let mut i = 0; + while i < N { + output[i].value = input[i] % P; + i += 1; + } + output + } + + /// Precomputed table of generators for two-adic subgroups of the degree two extension field over Mersenne31. + /// The `i`'th element is a generator of the subgroup of order `2^i`. + pub const EXT_TWO_ADIC_GENERATORS: [[Self; 2]; 33] = [ + [Self::ONE, Self::ZERO], + [Self::new(2_147_483_646), Self::new(0)], + [Self::new(0), Self::new(2_147_483_646)], + [Self::new(32_768), Self::new(2_147_450_879)], + [Self::new(590_768_354), Self::new(978_592_373)], + [Self::new(1_179_735_656), Self::new(1_241_207_368)], + [Self::new(1_567_857_810), Self::new(456_695_729)], + [Self::new(1_774_253_895), Self::new(1_309_288_441)], + [Self::new(736_262_640), Self::new(1_553_669_210)], + [Self::new(1_819_216_575), Self::new(1_662_816_114)], + [Self::new(1_323_191_254), Self::new(1_936_974_060)], + [Self::new(605_622_498), Self::new(1_964_232_216)], + [Self::new(343_674_985), Self::new(501_786_993)], + [Self::new(1_995_316_534), Self::new(149_306_621)], + [Self::new(2_107_600_913), Self::new(1_378_821_388)], + [Self::new(541_476_169), Self::new(2_101_081_972)], + [Self::new(2_135_874_973), Self::new(483_411_332)], + [Self::new(2_097_144_245), Self::new(1_684_033_590)], + [Self::new(1_662_322_247), Self::new(670_236_780)], + [Self::new(1_172_215_635), Self::new(595_888_646)], + [Self::new(241_940_101), Self::new(323_856_519)], + [Self::new(1_957_194_259), Self::new(2_139_647_100)], + [Self::new(1_957_419_629), Self::new(1_541_039_442)], + [Self::new(1_062_045_235), Self::new(1_824_580_421)], + [Self::new(1_929_382_196), Self::new(1_664_698_822)], + [Self::new(1_889_294_251), Self::new(331_248_939)], + [Self::new(1_214_231_414), Self::new(1_646_302_518)], + [Self::new(1_765_392_370), Self::new(461_136_547)], + [Self::new(1_629_751_483), Self::new(66_485_474)], + [Self::new(1_501_355_827), Self::new(1_439_063_420)], + [Self::new(509_778_402), Self::new(800_467_507)], + [Self::new(311_014_874), Self::new(1_584_694_829)], + [Self::new(1_166_849_849), Self::new(1_117_296_306)], + ]; +} + +impl PartialEq for Mersenne31 { + #[inline] + fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { + self.as_canonical_u32() == other.as_canonical_u32() + } +} + +impl Eq for Mersenne31 {} + +impl Packable for Mersenne31 {} + +impl Hash for Mersenne31 { + fn hash(&self, state: &mut H) { + state.write_u32(self.to_unique_u32()); + } +} + +impl Ord for Mersenne31 { + #[inline] + fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> core::cmp::Ordering { + self.as_canonical_u32().cmp(&other.as_canonical_u32()) + } +} + +impl PartialOrd for Mersenne31 { + #[inline] + fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option { + Some(self.cmp(other)) + } +} + +impl Display for Mersenne31 { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + Display::fmt(&self.value, f) + } +} + +impl Debug for Mersenne31 { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { + Debug::fmt(&self.value, f) + } +} + +impl Distribution for StandardUniform { + fn sample(&self, rng: &mut R) -> Mersenne31 { + loop { + let next_u31 = rng.next_u32() >> 1; + let is_canonical = next_u31 != Mersenne31::ORDER_U32; + if is_canonical { + return Mersenne31::new_reduced(next_u31); + } + } + } +} + +impl Serialize for Mersenne31 { + fn serialize(&self, serializer: S) -> Result { + // Emit the canonical representative so every field element has one encoding. + serializer.serialize_u32(self.as_canonical_u32()) + } +} + +impl<'a> Deserialize<'a> for Mersenne31 { + fn deserialize>(d: D) -> Result { + let val = u32::deserialize(d)?; + // Reject non-canonical encodings so a proof cannot be re-encoded without the witness. + // `val == P` is field-equal to 0, so only `[0, P)` is canonical. + if val < P { + Ok(Self::new_reduced(val)) + } else { + Err(D::Error::custom("Value is out of range")) + } + } +} + +impl RawDataSerializable for Mersenne31 { + impl_raw_serializable_primefield32!(); +} + +impl PrimeCharacteristicRing for Mersenne31 { + type PrimeSubfield = Self; + + const ZERO: Self = Self { value: 0 }; + const ONE: Self = Self { value: 1 }; + const TWO: Self = Self { value: 2 }; + const NEG_ONE: Self = Self { + value: Self::ORDER_U32 - 1, + }; + + #[inline] + fn from_prime_subfield(f: Self::PrimeSubfield) -> Self { + f + } + + #[inline] + fn from_bool(b: bool) -> Self { + Self::new_reduced(b as u32) + } + + #[inline] + fn halve(&self) -> Self { + Self::new_reduced(halve_u32::

(self.value)) + } + + #[inline] + fn mul_2exp_u64(&self, exp: u64) -> Self { + // In a Mersenne field, multiplication by 2^k is just a left rotation by k bits. + let exp = exp % 31; + let left = (self.value << exp) & ((1 << 31) - 1); + let right = self.value >> (31 - exp); + let rotated = left | right; + Self::new_reduced(rotated) + } + + #[inline] + fn div_2exp_u64(&self, exp: u64) -> Self { + // In a Mersenne field, division by 2^k is just a right rotation by k bits. + let exp = (exp % 31) as u8; + let left = self.value >> exp; + let right = (self.value << (31 - exp)) & ((1 << 31) - 1); + let rotated = left | right; + Self::new_reduced(rotated) + } + + #[inline] + fn sum_array(input: &[Self]) -> Self { + assert_eq!(N, input.len()); + // Benchmarking shows that for N <= 5 it's faster to sum the elements directly + // but for N > 5 it's faster to use the .sum() methods which passes through u64's + // allowing for delayed reductions. + match N { + 0 => Self::ZERO, + 1 => input[0], + 2 => input[0] + input[1], + 3 => input[0] + input[1] + input[2], + 4 => (input[0] + input[1]) + (input[2] + input[3]), + 5 => { + let lhs = input[0] + input[1]; + let rhs = input[2] + input[3]; + lhs + rhs + input[4] + } + _ => input.iter().copied().sum(), + } + } + + #[inline] + fn dot_product(lhs: &[Self; N], rhs: &[Self; N]) -> Self { + // Accumulate products as u64 to avoid per-multiply reductions. + // For M31: each value < P < 2^31, so product < P^2 < 2^62. + // Sum of 4 products < 4 * (P-1)^2 = 2^64 - 2^35 + 16 < 2^64, which fits in u64. + match N { + 0 => Self::ZERO, + 1 => lhs[0] * rhs[0], + 2 => { + let sum = (lhs[0].value as u64) * (rhs[0].value as u64) + + (lhs[1].value as u64) * (rhs[1].value as u64); + Self::new_reduced(reduce_64(sum)) + } + 3 => { + let sum = (lhs[0].value as u64) * (rhs[0].value as u64) + + (lhs[1].value as u64) * (rhs[1].value as u64) + + (lhs[2].value as u64) * (rhs[2].value as u64); + Self::new_reduced(reduce_64(sum)) + } + 4 => { + let sum = (lhs[0].value as u64) * (rhs[0].value as u64) + + (lhs[1].value as u64) * (rhs[1].value as u64) + + (lhs[2].value as u64) * (rhs[2].value as u64) + + (lhs[3].value as u64) * (rhs[3].value as u64); + Self::new_reduced(reduce_64(sum)) + } + _ => { + // Process in chunks of 4 with intermediate reductions + let mut acc = 0u64; + let mut i = 0; + while i + 4 <= N { + let chunk_sum = (lhs[i].value as u64) * (rhs[i].value as u64) + + (lhs[i + 1].value as u64) * (rhs[i + 1].value as u64) + + (lhs[i + 2].value as u64) * (rhs[i + 2].value as u64) + + (lhs[i + 3].value as u64) * (rhs[i + 3].value as u64); + // Reduce chunk_sum to ~34 bits and add to accumulator + acc += partial_reduce(chunk_sum); + i += 4; + } + // Handle remainder + while i < N { + acc += (lhs[i].value as u64) * (rhs[i].value as u64); + i += 1; + } + Self::new_reduced(reduce_64(acc)) + } + } + } + + #[inline] + fn zero_vec(len: usize) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: + // Due to `#[repr(transparent)]`, Mersenne31 and u32 have the same size, alignment + // and memory layout making `flatten_to_base` safe. This this will create + // a vector Mersenne31 elements with value set to 0. + unsafe { flatten_to_base(vec![0u32; len]) } + } +} + +// Degree of the smallest permutation polynomial for Mersenne31. +// +// As p - 1 = 2×3^2×7×11×... the smallest choice for a degree D satisfying gcd(p - 1, D) = 1 is 5. +impl InjectiveMonomial<5> for Mersenne31 {} + +impl PermutationMonomial<5> for Mersenne31 { + /// In the field `Mersenne31`, `a^{1/5}` is equal to a^{1717986917}. + /// + /// This follows from the calculation `5 * 1717986917 = 4*(2^31 - 2) + 1 = 1 mod p - 1`. + fn injective_exp_root_n(&self) -> Self { + exp_1717986917(*self) + } +} + +impl Field for Mersenne31 { + #[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] + type Packing = crate::PackedMersenne31Neon; + #[cfg(all( + target_arch = "x86_64", + target_feature = "avx2", + not(target_feature = "avx512f") + ))] + type Packing = crate::PackedMersenne31AVX2; + #[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx512f"))] + type Packing = crate::PackedMersenne31AVX512; + #[cfg(not(any( + all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"), + all( + target_arch = "x86_64", + target_feature = "avx2", + not(target_feature = "avx512f") + ), + all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx512f"), + )))] + type Packing = Self; + + // Sage: GF(2^31 - 1).multiplicative_generator() + const GENERATOR: Self = Self::new(7); + + #[inline] + fn is_zero(&self) -> bool { + self.value == 0 || self.value == Self::ORDER_U32 + } + + fn try_inverse(&self) -> Option { + if self.is_zero() { + return None; + } + + // Number of bits in the Mersenne31 prime. + const NUM_PRIME_BITS: u32 = 31; + + // gcd_inversion returns the inverse multiplied by 2^60 so we need to correct for that. + let inverse_i64 = gcd_inversion_prime_field_32::(self.value, P); + Some(Self::from_int(inverse_i64).div_2exp_u64(60)) + } + + #[inline] + fn order() -> BigUint { + P.into() + } + + #[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] + #[inline] + fn batched_columnwise_dot_product( + acc: &mut [EF::ExtensionPacking], + items: I, + ) where + EF: p3_field::ExtensionField, + R: Iterator, + I: Iterator, + { + crate::aarch64_neon::batched_columnwise_dot_product::(acc, items); + } +} + +// We can use some macros to implement QuotientMap for all integer types except for u32 and i32's. +quotient_map_small_int!(Mersenne31, u32, [u8, u16]); +quotient_map_small_int!(Mersenne31, i32, [i8, i16]); +quotient_map_large_uint!( + Mersenne31, + u32, + Mersenne31::ORDER_U32, + "`[0, 2^31 - 2]`", + "`[0, 2^31 - 1]`", + [u64, u128] +); +quotient_map_large_iint!( + Mersenne31, + i32, + "`[-2^30, 2^30]`", + "`[1 - 2^31, 2^31 - 1]`", + [(i64, u64), (i128, u128)] +); + +// We simple need to prove custom Mersenne31 impls for QuotientMap and QuotientMap +impl QuotientMap for Mersenne31 { + /// Convert a given `u32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + #[inline] + fn from_int(int: u32) -> Self { + // To reduce `n` to 31 bits, we clear its MSB, then add it back in its reduced form. + let msb = int & (1 << 31); + let msb_reduced = msb >> 31; + Self::new_reduced(int ^ msb) + Self::new_reduced(msb_reduced) + } + + /// Convert a given `u32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + /// + /// Returns none if the input does not lie in the range `[0, 2^31 - 1]`. + #[inline] + fn from_canonical_checked(int: u32) -> Option { + (int < Self::ORDER_U32).then(|| Self::new_reduced(int)) + } + + /// Convert a given `u32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + /// + /// # Safety + /// The input must lie in the range: `[0, 2^31 - 1]`. + #[inline(always)] + unsafe fn from_canonical_unchecked(int: u32) -> Self { + debug_assert!(int < Self::ORDER_U32); + Self::new_reduced(int) + } +} + +impl QuotientMap for Mersenne31 { + /// Convert a given `i32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + #[inline] + fn from_int(int: i32) -> Self { + if int >= 0 { + Self::new_reduced(int as u32) + } else if int > (-1 << 31) { + Self::new_reduced(Self::ORDER_U32.wrapping_add_signed(int)) + } else { + // The only other option is int = -(2^31) = -1 mod p. + Self::NEG_ONE + } + } + + /// Convert a given `i32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + /// + /// Returns none if the input does not lie in the range `(-2^30, 2^30)`. + #[inline] + fn from_canonical_checked(int: i32) -> Option { + const TWO_EXP_30: i32 = 1 << 30; + const NEG_TWO_EXP_30_PLUS_1: i32 = (-1 << 30) + 1; + match int { + 0..TWO_EXP_30 => Some(Self::new_reduced(int as u32)), + NEG_TWO_EXP_30_PLUS_1..0 => { + Some(Self::new_reduced(Self::ORDER_U32.wrapping_add_signed(int))) + } + _ => None, + } + } + + /// Convert a given `i32` integer into an element of the `Mersenne31` field. + /// + /// # Safety + /// The input must lie in the range: `[1 - 2^31, 2^31 - 1]`. + #[inline(always)] + unsafe fn from_canonical_unchecked(int: i32) -> Self { + if int >= 0 { + Self::new_reduced(int as u32) + } else { + Self::new_reduced(Self::ORDER_U32.wrapping_add_signed(int)) + } + } +} + +impl PrimeField for Mersenne31 { + fn as_canonical_biguint(&self) -> BigUint { + ::as_canonical_u32(self).into() + } +} + +impl PrimeField32 for Mersenne31 { + const ORDER_U32: u32 = P; + + #[inline] + fn as_canonical_u32(&self) -> u32 { + // Since our invariant guarantees that `value` fits in 31 bits, there is only one possible + // `value` that is not canonical, namely 2^31 - 1 = p = 0. + if self.value == Self::ORDER_U32 { + 0 + } else { + self.value + } + } +} + +impl PrimeField64 for Mersenne31 { + const ORDER_U64: u64 = ::ORDER_U32 as u64; + + #[inline] + fn as_canonical_u64(&self) -> u64 { + self.as_canonical_u32().into() + } +} + +impl Add for Mersenne31 { + type Output = Self; + + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + // See the following for a way to compute the sum that avoids + // the conditional which may be preferable on some + // architectures. + // https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3/blob/6049a30c3b1f5351c3eb0f7c994dc97e8f68d10d/mersenne-31/src/lib.rs#L249 + + // Working with i32 means we get a flag which informs us if overflow happened. + let (sum_i32, over) = (self.value as i32).overflowing_add(rhs.value as i32); + let sum_u32 = sum_i32 as u32; + let sum_corr = sum_u32.wrapping_sub(Self::ORDER_U32); + + // If self + rhs did not overflow, return it. + // If self + rhs overflowed, sum_corr = self + rhs - (2**31 - 1). + Self::new_reduced(if over { sum_corr } else { sum_u32 }) + } +} + +impl Sub for Mersenne31 { + type Output = Self; + + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let (mut sub, over) = self.value.overflowing_sub(rhs.value); + + // If we didn't overflow we have the correct value. + // Otherwise we have added 2**32 = 2**31 + 1 mod 2**31 - 1. + // Hence we need to remove the most significant bit and subtract 1. + sub -= over as u32; + Self::new_reduced(sub & Self::ORDER_U32) + } +} + +impl Neg for Mersenne31 { + type Output = Self; + + #[inline] + fn neg(self) -> Self::Output { + // Can't underflow, since self.value is 31-bits and thus can't exceed ORDER. + Self::new_reduced(Self::ORDER_U32 - self.value) + } +} + +impl Mul for Mersenne31 { + type Output = Self; + + #[inline] + #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] + fn mul(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let prod = u64::from(self.value) * u64::from(rhs.value); + from_u62(prod) + } +} + +impl_add_assign!(Mersenne31); +impl_sub_assign!(Mersenne31); +impl_mul_methods!(Mersenne31); +impl_div_methods!(Mersenne31, Mersenne31); + +impl Sum for Mersenne31 { + #[inline] + fn sum>(iter: I) -> Self { + // This is faster than iter.reduce(|x, y| x + y).unwrap_or(Self::ZERO) for iterators of length >= 6. + // It assumes that iter.len() < 2^31. + + // This sum will not overflow so long as iter.len() < 2^33. + let sum = iter.map(|x| x.value as u64).sum::(); + + // sum is < 2^62 provided iter.len() < 2^31. + from_u62(sum) + } +} + +/// Perform a partial reduction of a u64 value modulo P = 2^31 - 1. +/// The result will be contained in [0, 2^34 - 1]. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) const fn partial_reduce(val: u64) -> u64 { + // Refer to the full reduction process in `reduce_64`. + let lo = (val & (P as u64)) as u32; + let hi = val >> 31; + lo as u64 + hi +} + +/// Reduce a u64 value modulo P = 2^31 - 1. +/// Uses the identity: 2^31 ≡ 1 (mod P), so val ≡ (val & P) + (val >> 31) (mod P). +/// Returns a value in [0, P]. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn reduce_64(val: u64) -> u32 { + // First reduction: split into low 31 bits and high 33 bits + // For val < 2^64: hi < 2^33, lo < 2^31 + // sum1 = lo + hi < 2^33 + 2^31 < 2^34 + let lo = (val & (P as u64)) as u32; + let hi = val >> 31; + let sum1 = lo as u64 + hi; + + // Second reduction: sum1 < 2^34 + let lo2 = (sum1 & (P as u64)) as u32; + let hi2 = (sum1 >> 31) as u32; // hi2 < 2^3 = 8 + let sum2 = lo2 + hi2; // sum2 < 2^31 + 8 + + // Final reduction to [0, P] + sum2.min(sum2.wrapping_sub(P)) +} + +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn from_u62(input: u64) -> Mersenne31 { + debug_assert!(input < (1 << 62)); + let input_lo = (input & ((1 << 31) - 1)) as u32; + let input_high = (input >> 31) as u32; + Mersenne31::new_reduced(input_lo) + Mersenne31::new_reduced(input_high) +} + +impl UniformSamplingField for Mersenne31 { + const MAX_SINGLE_SAMPLE_BITS: usize = 16; + // For Mersenne31 uniform sampling really only makes sense if we allow rejection sampling. + // Sampling 16 bits already has a chance of 3e-5 to require a resample! + const SAMPLING_BITS_M: [u64; 64] = { + let prime: u64 = P as u64; + let mut a = [0u64; 64]; + let mut k = 0; + while k < 64 { + if k == 0 { + a[k] = prime; // This value is irrelevant in practice. `bits = 0` returns 0 always. + } else { + // Create a mask to zero out the last k bits + let mask = !((1u64 << k) - 1); + a[k] = prime & mask; + } + k += 1; + } + a + }; +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::{InjectiveMonomial, PermutationMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use p3_field_testing::{ + test_field, test_prime_field, test_prime_field_32, test_prime_field_64, + }; + + use crate::Mersenne31; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + #[test] + fn exp_root() { + // Confirm that (x^{1/5})^5 = x + + let m1 = F::from_u32(0x34167c58); + let m2 = F::from_u32(0x61f3207b); + + assert_eq!(m1.injective_exp_n().injective_exp_root_n(), m1); + assert_eq!(m2.injective_exp_n().injective_exp_root_n(), m2); + assert_eq!(F::TWO.injective_exp_n().injective_exp_root_n(), F::TWO); + } + + #[test] + fn serialize_is_canonical() { + // `P` is the redundant in-memory representation of zero. + // `new_reduced` preserves it; `new` would collapse it to 0. + let redundant_zero = F::new_reduced((1 << 31) - 1); + assert_eq!(redundant_zero, F::ZERO); + + // Both representations serialize to the single canonical encoding. + assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&redundant_zero).unwrap(), "0"); + assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&F::ZERO).unwrap(), "0"); + } + + #[test] + fn deserialize_rejects_non_canonical_encodings() { + // `P` is field-equal to 0, so its encoding is non-canonical and must be rejected. + // This blocks re-encoding a proof as `P` without the witness. + let p_json = serde_json::to_string(&((1u32 << 31) - 1)).unwrap(); + assert!(serde_json::from_str::(&p_json).is_err()); + + // The largest canonical value, p - 1, still deserializes. + let max_canonical_json = serde_json::to_string(&((1u32 << 31) - 2)).unwrap(); + let max_canonical: F = serde_json::from_str(&max_canonical_json).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(max_canonical, F::new((1 << 31) - 2)); + } + + // Mersenne31 has a redundant representation of Zero but no redundant representation of One. + // The second entry deliberately uses `new_reduced` to *preserve* the `value == P` encoding: + // the public `new` constructor reduces modulo P and would silently collapse it to 0, + // making the redundant-representation tests no-ops (cf. #1684). + const ZEROS: [Mersenne31; 2] = [Mersenne31::ZERO, Mersenne31::new_reduced((1_u32 << 31) - 1)]; + const ONES: [Mersenne31; 1] = [Mersenne31::ONE]; + + // Get the prime factorization of the order of the multiplicative group. + // i.e. the prime factorization of P - 1. + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 7] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 2), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + ] + } + + test_field!( + crate::Mersenne31, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + test_prime_field!(crate::Mersenne31); + test_prime_field_64!(crate::Mersenne31, &super::ZEROS, &super::ONES); + test_prime_field_32!(crate::Mersenne31, &super::ZEROS, &super::ONES); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e056e09f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +//! A couple of simple functions needed in the case that this is compiled without architecture optimizations available. + +mod poseidon2; + +pub use poseidon2::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/poseidon2.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/poseidon2.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0bb6b774 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/no_packing/poseidon2.rs @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +//! This file contains simple wrapper structs on top of which we can implement Poseidon2 Internal/ExternalLayer. +//! +//! They are used only in the case that none of the vectorization architectures (AVX2/AVX512/NEON) are available. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_poseidon2::{ExternalLayerConstants, ExternalLayerConstructor, InternalLayerConstructor}; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +/// The internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) internal_constants: Vec, +} + +/// The external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants, +} + +impl InternalLayerConstructor for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + Self { internal_constants } + } +} + +impl ExternalLayerConstructor + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + Self { external_constants } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon1.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon1.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..665aff1e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon1.rs @@ -0,0 +1,584 @@ +//! Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31. +//! +//! This module provides the Poseidon1 hash permutation instantiated for the +//! Mersenne31 field (p = 2^31 - 1). It uses the generic Poseidon1 implementation +//! with Karatsuba MDS convolution from `MdsMatrixMersenne31`. +//! +//! # MDS Matrix +//! +//! The MDS matrix is a **circulant** matrix sourced from the MDS crate. +//! At runtime, it is applied via fast Karatsuba convolution (sub-O(t^2)). +//! During initialization only, it is expanded to dense form for the +//! sparse matrix decomposition of partial rounds. +//! +//! # Round Constants +//! +//! Generated by the Grain LFSR (Poseidon1 paper, Appendix E) with SBOX=0 (x^alpha encoding). + +use p3_mds::util::first_row_to_first_col; +use p3_poseidon1::{ + Poseidon1, Poseidon1Constants, Poseidon1ExternalLayerGeneric, Poseidon1InternalLayerGeneric, +}; + +use crate::mds::{MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_ROW, MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_ROW}; +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31}; + +/// S-box degree for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Since `p - 1 = 2 * 3^2 * 7 * 11 * 31 * 151 * 331`, both 3 and 4 share factors +/// with `p - 1`. The smallest valid exponent satisfying `gcd(alpha, p - 1) = 1` is 5. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_S_BOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; + +/// Number of full rounds per half for Mersenne31 Poseidon1 (`RF / 2`). +/// +/// The total number of full rounds is `RF = 8` (4 beginning + 4 ending). +/// Follows the Poseidon1 paper's security analysis (Section 5.4) with a +2 RF margin. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; + +/// Number of partial rounds for Mersenne31 Poseidon1 (width 16). +/// +/// Derived from the interpolation bound in the Poseidon1 paper (Eq. 3): +/// +/// R_interp >= ceil(min{kappa, n} / log_2(alpha)) + ceil(log_alpha(t)) - 5 +/// = ceil(31 / log_2(5)) + ceil(log_5(16)) - 5 = 14 + 2 - 5 = 11 +/// +/// With the +7.5% security margin: ceil(1.075 * 11) = 12. After brute-force +/// optimization over all security constraints: R_P = 14. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_16: usize = 14; + +/// Number of partial rounds for Mersenne31 Poseidon1 (width 32). +/// +/// With the +7.5% security margin and brute-force optimization: R_P = 30. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_32: usize = 30; + +/// Generic (non-SIMD) Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// Uses the platform-independent Poseidon1 implementation with Karatsuba +/// MDS convolution via `MdsMatrixMersenne31`. +pub type Poseidon1Mersenne31Generic = Poseidon1< + Mersenne31, + Poseidon1ExternalLayerGeneric, + Poseidon1InternalLayerGeneric, + WIDTH, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_S_BOX_DEGREE, +>; + +/// Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// On aarch64 with NEON, uses NEON-optimized layers with pre-packed round +/// constants and fused AddRC+S-box. On x86_64 with AVX2/AVX512, uses +/// negative-form packed constants with fused AddRC+S-box. On other platforms, +/// falls back to the generic Karatsuba-based implementation. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +pub type Poseidon1Mersenne31 = Poseidon1< + Mersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31, + WIDTH, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_S_BOX_DEGREE, +>; + +/// Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31 (AVX2, no AVX512). +/// +/// Uses AVX2-optimized layers with negative-form packed round constants +/// and fused AddRC+S-box in full rounds. +#[cfg(all( + target_arch = "x86_64", + target_feature = "avx2", + not(target_feature = "avx512f") +))] +pub type Poseidon1Mersenne31 = Poseidon1< + Mersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31, + WIDTH, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_S_BOX_DEGREE, +>; + +/// Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31 (AVX512). +/// +/// Uses AVX512-optimized layers with negative-form packed round constants +/// and fused AddRC+S-box in full rounds. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx512f"))] +pub type Poseidon1Mersenne31 = Poseidon1< + Mersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31, + crate::Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31, + WIDTH, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_S_BOX_DEGREE, +>; + +/// Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31 (generic fallback). +/// +/// Used on platforms without NEON or AVX2/AVX512 SIMD support. +#[cfg(not(any( + all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"), + all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_feature = "avx2"), +)))] +pub type Poseidon1Mersenne31 = Poseidon1Mersenne31Generic; + +/// Round constants for width-16 Poseidon1 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=16, R_F=8, R_P=14 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon1/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 16`. +/// +/// Layout: [initial_full (4 rounds), partial (14 rounds), terminal_full (4 rounds)]. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_RC_16: [[Mersenne31; 16]; 22] = [ + // Initial full rounds (4) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x768bab52, 0x70e0ab7d, 0x3d266c8a, 0x6da42045, 0x600fef22, 0x41dace6b, 0x64f9bdd4, + 0x5d42d4fe, 0x76b1516d, 0x6fc9a717, 0x70ac4fb6, 0x00194ef6, 0x22b644e2, 0x1f7916d5, + 0x47581be2, 0x2710a123, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6284e867, 0x018d3afe, 0x5df99ef3, 0x4c1e467b, 0x566f6abc, 0x2994e427, 0x538a6d42, + 0x5d7bf2cf, 0x7fda2dab, 0x0fd854c4, 0x46922fca, 0x3d7763a1, 0x19fd05ca, 0x0a4bbb43, + 0x15075851, 0x3d903d76, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2d290ff7, 0x40809fa0, 0x59dac6ec, 0x127927a2, 0x6bbf0ea0, 0x0294140f, 0x24742976, + 0x6e84c081, 0x22484f4a, 0x354cae59, 0x0453ffe1, 0x3f47a3cc, 0x0088204e, 0x6066e109, + 0x3b7c4b80, 0x6b55665d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x3bc4b897, 0x735bf378, 0x508daf42, 0x1884fc2b, 0x7214f24c, 0x7498be0a, 0x1a60e640, + 0x3303f928, 0x29b46376, 0x5c96bb68, 0x65d097a5, 0x1d358e9f, 0x4a9a9017, 0x4724cf76, + 0x347af70f, 0x1e77e59a, + ]), + // Partial rounds (14) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7f7ec4bf, 0x0421926f, 0x5198e669, 0x34db3148, 0x4368bafd, 0x66685c7f, 0x78d3249a, + 0x60187881, 0x76dad67a, 0x0690b437, 0x1ea95311, 0x40e5369a, 0x38f103fc, 0x1d226a21, + 0x57090613, 0x1fa42108, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x17bbef50, 0x1ff7e11c, 0x047b24ca, 0x4e140275, 0x4fa086f5, 0x079b309c, 0x1159bd47, + 0x6d37e4e5, 0x075d8dce, 0x12121ca0, 0x7f6a7c40, 0x68e182ba, 0x5493201b, 0x0444a80e, + 0x0064f4c6, 0x6467abe6, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x66975762, 0x2af68f9b, 0x345b33be, 0x1b70d47f, 0x053db717, 0x381189cb, 0x43b915f8, + 0x20df3694, 0x0f459d26, 0x77a0e97b, 0x2f73e739, 0x1876c2f9, 0x65a0e29a, 0x4cabefbe, + 0x5abd1268, 0x4d34a760, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x12771799, 0x69a0c9ac, 0x39091e55, 0x7f611cd0, 0x3af055da, 0x7ac0bbdf, 0x6e0f3a24, + 0x41e3b6f7, 0x49b3756d, 0x568bc538, 0x20c079d8, 0x1701c72c, 0x7670dc6c, 0x5a439035, + 0x7c93e00e, 0x561fbb4d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1178907b, 0x02737406, 0x32fb24f1, 0x6323b60a, 0x6ab12418, 0x42c99cea, 0x155a0b97, + 0x53d1c6aa, 0x2bd20347, 0x279b3d73, 0x4f5f3c70, 0x0245af6c, 0x238359d3, 0x49966a59, + 0x16562ccc, 0x28b8e2f1, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x13e05a67, 0x0322242d, 0x5c17c375, 0x21483598, 0x60aafd6e, 0x36ae6de2, 0x7b378114, + 0x1125f304, 0x445e936b, 0x331805a2, 0x530c7914, 0x038a6c74, 0x74709937, 0x110f3a56, + 0x143782e2, 0x757afe85, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x321ef96e, 0x0f01c89f, 0x414f7ca6, 0x1f7e326e, 0x4c2e93a1, 0x1d702f38, 0x65047ac7, + 0x3a0c195d, 0x76505418, 0x66968e77, 0x0f6ae712, 0x7c69b610, 0x4d9f56d2, 0x590edebb, + 0x2f4b0c02, 0x2d638e28, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x685ffa6a, 0x61c4f2ee, 0x397c8793, 0x0d549671, 0x1932849b, 0x4431b3f9, 0x1756c50c, + 0x38218ca7, 0x5e920b8e, 0x0bcc93d4, 0x2017c5e7, 0x264215a7, 0x68a3ea92, 0x6e223436, + 0x10fde933, 0x47d19785, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x14a370cd, 0x4b1ddfd2, 0x010c7d87, 0x30b31e31, 0x026f76a1, 0x64e562ab, 0x5d1a25dc, + 0x6c741add, 0x1a118aef, 0x795c8131, 0x7c110827, 0x0520038f, 0x5639490e, 0x4a2e99a2, + 0x3bfd1c6e, 0x147c461a, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x36a88dde, 0x2f022367, 0x45cadcac, 0x32939ad2, 0x41a68d7f, 0x17ca1ea8, 0x121a017d, + 0x47b8414a, 0x2690bc86, 0x5938ef7c, 0x53198854, 0x0ca8ec5c, 0x0e884400, 0x67e6fd3c, + 0x16c70b3e, 0x3c551f9b, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x4c87d08b, 0x3b023eee, 0x77ac2ad2, 0x75b61edc, 0x7ae29b6a, 0x03dfd274, 0x487c71c6, + 0x2c9f97ef, 0x01fa9958, 0x7a78a7ad, 0x78519ebc, 0x1305f5c1, 0x31989bd0, 0x31fd37b1, + 0x38583a0a, 0x700df43a, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x789b76c2, 0x74933d40, 0x13350c4f, 0x01b1296a, 0x6d1d5a1c, 0x06587af5, 0x5565eff3, + 0x5b88a6cf, 0x0c430736, 0x7fb18ed3, 0x64c94d58, 0x318128fe, 0x392ef65e, 0x71b83429, + 0x0c0b405f, 0x44db668d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x01062150, 0x39f2226d, 0x589e7dec, 0x29f0d5d5, 0x39951315, 0x3eca8ffb, 0x1c4d5c50, + 0x2917a937, 0x0272222f, 0x548d46c3, 0x592ce973, 0x6e5cbc04, 0x697576d7, 0x51b9d66c, + 0x6ac07352, 0x2c4b55a0, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x27f6bea4, 0x0c967b2f, 0x4453e8ea, 0x568daace, 0x33fc6e77, 0x1ba012d4, 0x018a97e8, + 0x1a8c1d4a, 0x1e79576b, 0x62469fcf, 0x37b50300, 0x5ab7c661, 0x2a469759, 0x41682375, + 0x0b762fef, 0x0a7fc88c, + ]), + // Terminal full rounds (4) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x5c23bb9c, 0x5da64dbf, 0x7a2be1dd, 0x1d33a4d8, 0x484a3f8e, 0x007a706a, 0x57bd9767, + 0x7149341f, 0x2667ecb6, 0x2db9150f, 0x32004141, 0x45c0728f, 0x62934143, 0x32c19c19, + 0x29bd378d, 0x5b3d502e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x62cb8455, 0x2b147f51, 0x621d052b, 0x11ba7123, 0x59bb54be, 0x61452bf6, 0x30babf3a, + 0x215b97f7, 0x07700f00, 0x0dda07b1, 0x2ad97715, 0x2c78402d, 0x6096089e, 0x2465e76f, + 0x5b490daa, 0x27d6349d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x4e9d8c89, 0x7b36a67d, 0x41a27774, 0x71452a2a, 0x4d2f9d8d, 0x5c199518, 0x4c017e2c, + 0x344f57b3, 0x70afd1ad, 0x5141ba4f, 0x2fe06654, 0x745d98a8, 0x0311922c, 0x335e3407, + 0x5bfe6359, 0x74fb36b4, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x41a1e898, 0x5f17d56c, 0x30d1c4a2, 0x3380e1bb, 0x413b7490, 0x51ad85e6, 0x1a9760a3, + 0x3533477a, 0x42d9b6cb, 0x284a99fc, 0x04eb39f8, 0x2f2b33ae, 0x5b21e6b2, 0x4ab941a2, + 0x16ffcaa1, 0x3f02cbe3, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-32 Poseidon1 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=32, R_F=8, R_P=30 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon1/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 32`. +/// +/// Layout: [initial_full (4 rounds), partial (30 rounds), terminal_full (4 rounds)]. +#[rustfmt::skip] +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_RC_32: [[Mersenne31; 32]; 38] = [ + // Initial full rounds (4) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6710e381, 0x01ab3dad, 0x49bdc51f, 0x41c98c65, 0x23885d8a, 0x24ea7d7c, 0x6b65fc6d, 0x6106615a, + 0x084957f3, 0x157c3634, 0x4dada10f, 0x6cdfa46d, 0x1bf208be, 0x5bd22fac, 0x79da8fdb, 0x78ebc8ed, + 0x4c8bcbdf, 0x27f79490, 0x70495412, 0x2a41844e, 0x51bb69f1, 0x3215dc21, 0x67114819, 0x27aa6a09, + 0x5f4d3cad, 0x5fd6c724, 0x1b4c108d, 0x7ebd949d, 0x5799d04d, 0x568c212f, 0x680821db, 0x62073729, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x229ee780, 0x3b4f94c3, 0x17a3ac54, 0x6c388279, 0x4876fe55, 0x3170f20a, 0x33703e4e, 0x03980ab1, + 0x012fb0fa, 0x145ee8db, 0x49815b30, 0x46ad879c, 0x52bc503d, 0x586530d7, 0x5c36f9e5, 0x028e6503, + 0x08310368, 0x75546646, 0x732516f1, 0x33483e5a, 0x04a0842c, 0x1a3135d9, 0x537b2eb1, 0x5baf4f77, + 0x4b78cd6d, 0x5aed2c4a, 0x66c893e1, 0x3c5493a6, 0x46c62bfc, 0x564e591a, 0x52ded7a7, 0x00d1032d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2b30d801, 0x101dabf7, 0x2efb21cd, 0x4a361c39, 0x49eff572, 0x2e13caf4, 0x016e6799, 0x1b5cdb44, + 0x17ca2dc6, 0x0e500ee0, 0x0141ca9b, 0x279b2376, 0x6647c40b, 0x0dcaee3c, 0x16e7fcf9, 0x59e6d65c, + 0x1eb730c9, 0x7ebf0417, 0x28607848, 0x45727f9c, 0x4e543ffb, 0x03ee2550, 0x010cd54b, 0x7b1a1050, + 0x02dc4b76, 0x2b3a9a3c, 0x2eabb2d9, 0x06928553, 0x2d23b3f5, 0x6da322b1, 0x1527ec07, 0x0e450b7a, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x53961612, 0x20f16b10, 0x16f00c60, 0x4c39d50f, 0x41d59d76, 0x5253f822, 0x3b53d381, 0x1b7f470a, + 0x5e3d895c, 0x52658125, 0x012190d3, 0x65563b80, 0x1d0faa47, 0x3575b3c9, 0x4c0d9d20, 0x18cff09f, + 0x64a7da5c, 0x2f140b25, 0x139f9e31, 0x66e36bd5, 0x6442c811, 0x58879bce, 0x5fcc87c6, 0x6807ae0c, + 0x4111c657, 0x633c8929, 0x74962971, 0x3fc18eb8, 0x456cf288, 0x31f6c8d2, 0x6c3a31a8, 0x6d82df50, + ]), + // Partial rounds (30) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x3d432793, 0x4195a297, 0x7fcf576b, 0x6bce9b95, 0x3c822af0, 0x7629e5b3, 0x3dddd04e, 0x5a3d0558, + 0x763e6c75, 0x676f1d88, 0x77b82255, 0x25df8a51, 0x697c3b10, 0x03cf6edf, 0x12b54f78, 0x6633d534, + 0x426fbcb7, 0x554665dc, 0x5689bdb2, 0x12e747de, 0x60c28745, 0x11ca4ba5, 0x7c7c7b7a, 0x3f0f9583, + 0x7a3c8210, 0x56c7d993, 0x20f6875f, 0x69e597c8, 0x3c911573, 0x29c7f702, 0x7818a8d3, 0x1a58e115, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x29113198, 0x776b289f, 0x1e922ee2, 0x2165fbf0, 0x28ccaf78, 0x1983287d, 0x492b22e0, 0x77cc4657, + 0x39005c27, 0x48cd8089, 0x267cfcbb, 0x1c41ca85, 0x41b3943f, 0x20e7727a, 0x64ad78f3, 0x13dd4413, + 0x1042e3dc, 0x74adeb2c, 0x2dcdd3c7, 0x06006fbc, 0x35a609e9, 0x0daf273c, 0x3a4f694f, 0x7a992693, + 0x59fd101d, 0x27d2112b, 0x1937b69f, 0x2e8880bc, 0x40c12429, 0x067965a6, 0x6ea1b36d, 0x6e01476e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x29cd718a, 0x5406c693, 0x51de2e9a, 0x6ddc388a, 0x53763473, 0x7fbd6bda, 0x17a25cbf, 0x1f2982cd, + 0x7af8156c, 0x19ca5afd, 0x2d703c93, 0x0c2840e4, 0x2cda82cd, 0x5c7f51e0, 0x1db58806, 0x3cb62bd1, + 0x2b45461b, 0x6204ba50, 0x7bcdbe79, 0x6857f0bc, 0x4af2a368, 0x32c146f4, 0x1acfdd93, 0x2dc39570, + 0x0dbdeb4e, 0x50bef84d, 0x6f83a22c, 0x434c3741, 0x2060e160, 0x68f58f0b, 0x2529b2bd, 0x112c4768, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x70409ce2, 0x1b57460e, 0x21dc818c, 0x5f6b5330, 0x443f8fba, 0x211a90de, 0x591d4a30, 0x5b5a3e75, + 0x635c333a, 0x1efd6a70, 0x5d35445f, 0x5637cf22, 0x6e9ba8b1, 0x10b54e2c, 0x04291eb8, 0x2d4ea543, + 0x720a5c61, 0x1a5b6323, 0x68e176e7, 0x26149775, 0x58f30beb, 0x450402ab, 0x24928255, 0x32c59955, + 0x2b5b7261, 0x6279779f, 0x599b6a8e, 0x70d145d3, 0x3786c4d1, 0x11363460, 0x22ff2181, 0x4d06fc50, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x27a8a3df, 0x647df984, 0x3a748cc3, 0x4aa91ea2, 0x21ead2a1, 0x50cd5d8d, 0x06d6ffc6, 0x5bc51117, + 0x45f848bc, 0x12c3d5f1, 0x487f9065, 0x1617243c, 0x5c8774e4, 0x76bcd3ec, 0x783819d0, 0x349c8a4b, + 0x265d6a36, 0x39fc652e, 0x246831a8, 0x488058fc, 0x0a5c75d6, 0x760d4eed, 0x7acd5d5f, 0x2d2957ad, + 0x6188b6fe, 0x2084c575, 0x67c5ff60, 0x3d6d899b, 0x2759464a, 0x1e4319d2, 0x09fef836, 0x305660e4, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2437e398, 0x698e8bad, 0x51a1c08a, 0x6f6b42ea, 0x4e7a622c, 0x3359b875, 0x6fc9bf1d, 0x349ecd95, + 0x402affed, 0x0e7d1f4a, 0x7568ff95, 0x6d26f65b, 0x527b8ff5, 0x13e3a821, 0x76f0683c, 0x7c6b5a3e, + 0x1ba8baa6, 0x7bf0c2eb, 0x609df788, 0x512ac703, 0x64950065, 0x5e53895a, 0x74b59dea, 0x4a663191, + 0x1c09524b, 0x30b5b604, 0x13196a5f, 0x787c00d7, 0x3c56db18, 0x7ec1baf0, 0x7f760f44, 0x3a5a1de6, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1b91c3fa, 0x66f3100f, 0x4153c359, 0x0e098a72, 0x1f4abc43, 0x4c8f6c3d, 0x7eff304b, 0x15c1c8dd, + 0x0ac43795, 0x19e87ea1, 0x535bed09, 0x2466eef0, 0x2cce459b, 0x663b3da6, 0x7b6e46b3, 0x2daa3590, + 0x302394b0, 0x0de56e75, 0x6fa06cd4, 0x1e0712cc, 0x55801c2d, 0x05fa4531, 0x30746c53, 0x1363fc86, + 0x17019f68, 0x113e6a01, 0x7dc8674c, 0x713867f4, 0x46dc2aab, 0x073679be, 0x18b9ced4, 0x484bca9e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x39cf2be3, 0x66ae2f79, 0x10d0ae15, 0x6ff9de20, 0x64733e7b, 0x01d7c954, 0x3da5afe0, 0x1a324fbb, + 0x7ebb4f37, 0x513caeaf, 0x3fa2c6cd, 0x57355b17, 0x253fc4b3, 0x0ea82db4, 0x799d8d38, 0x29eb1235, + 0x1166db5e, 0x4702280e, 0x4c0a0516, 0x714d46a2, 0x79688b69, 0x143f324b, 0x6c0a36f7, 0x2938f208, + 0x3eb39324, 0x1f61a856, 0x0a6ed93e, 0x74ec34c6, 0x7266c396, 0x522e81d0, 0x43a932cf, 0x0f17d5b9, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7c31e8a0, 0x09cb4b9c, 0x700c3e5e, 0x249c8c16, 0x3c4fe8e0, 0x03b84f18, 0x4825fa59, 0x1659f2ad, + 0x031031e3, 0x746de944, 0x094ff5dd, 0x33c629fe, 0x05898337, 0x7c2592cc, 0x51d3f50c, 0x0e045cfc, + 0x04a0ddd9, 0x61390b16, 0x7fbce1da, 0x0c8e5510, 0x60487f1c, 0x335f280e, 0x61655c16, 0x45f42611, + 0x11f0c67c, 0x78ae4b41, 0x1714ff99, 0x165f7819, 0x31281c73, 0x38e87026, 0x3818fe79, 0x1d1ad24d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x3b679e6c, 0x3e51606e, 0x617db118, 0x566665cc, 0x2b5fb536, 0x4e9b1e00, 0x679bedc6, 0x5f6c74e5, + 0x778fd658, 0x40776c3b, 0x063c76d1, 0x2b7652e9, 0x25956cb9, 0x7aed481d, 0x11bda982, 0x37fdfbf7, + 0x5523be31, 0x56945dd1, 0x7c049305, 0x61c5c56c, 0x7f9ce07e, 0x0bd94fe4, 0x1689c147, 0x78b24a5a, + 0x23e0ca74, 0x573b0a62, 0x7feea8d4, 0x147e92c9, 0x10751066, 0x197b0dfd, 0x2d1e89b9, 0x19f7f255, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x338de8ae, 0x1d3950f5, 0x1cf58e86, 0x5aa7f39d, 0x4f6a8dc0, 0x1f010335, 0x27d6532f, 0x044135f2, + 0x5f7d6b6c, 0x0d43513e, 0x24e9f9e7, 0x2d6bcf03, 0x40a7458d, 0x58c90caa, 0x4d048865, 0x48b012ad, + 0x34df70f8, 0x7098ef21, 0x28ee8417, 0x0ea30375, 0x581889f7, 0x3bb682b1, 0x76c1a8c9, 0x34d53516, + 0x2918fe23, 0x109dfd0a, 0x4d248dab, 0x141fefad, 0x23c4167e, 0x2a51b6a3, 0x70539b59, 0x615b302d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x5ad7ed79, 0x38b26be2, 0x1c63eb82, 0x782caaf3, 0x544ce98f, 0x07ffa066, 0x1984bf64, 0x62809aa1, + 0x5cf6971c, 0x56cfc9f4, 0x79270e65, 0x6a5ac813, 0x68bb53c5, 0x566ca5b2, 0x1d5f9cdc, 0x4e42ac96, + 0x45dd828c, 0x02105779, 0x6191e207, 0x7a090906, 0x4f8da1de, 0x41177418, 0x4563c669, 0x70923cc9, + 0x1b044561, 0x6d1e6d7b, 0x64368db7, 0x1673b755, 0x356a84d9, 0x1b76e2c5, 0x2290c06f, 0x12dcd502, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x0426c307, 0x50c707b0, 0x686ed71d, 0x05cb5fcf, 0x2726ef9d, 0x73f04ff5, 0x40361170, 0x07472de8, + 0x3f23ab1e, 0x2f06b292, 0x620e742b, 0x1f562b80, 0x3bb8429c, 0x6287fca9, 0x77b5c517, 0x781ee01a, + 0x668916a4, 0x18a7dadf, 0x43d0b3db, 0x53c57452, 0x7f4eb257, 0x49323ba4, 0x0b7d4444, 0x3b00799d, + 0x268427ab, 0x2b07b82c, 0x00b960f7, 0x5ccb7e2e, 0x7d16c3c5, 0x0de8cca4, 0x491b67b5, 0x10e0c5bd, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x75776d6c, 0x45d9b10a, 0x332bc6d5, 0x0babcef1, 0x468dee74, 0x681a15e9, 0x3ef42ea4, 0x2268e7ff, + 0x7855c5e9, 0x5e2b56c8, 0x6b067779, 0x4f1f8bec, 0x14e98c2f, 0x53aa063c, 0x6c19052b, 0x13774678, + 0x15d4034e, 0x17315651, 0x1423dae4, 0x30458131, 0x766744c4, 0x5795b834, 0x4ea8993e, 0x276726e1, + 0x4a6b62d4, 0x07c5d4eb, 0x4ddbdafe, 0x08517a59, 0x7f5590a5, 0x7a5fdda5, 0x27adcd1c, 0x5784b2af, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x0b07b8fe, 0x49d4582a, 0x13ff9929, 0x412b9bde, 0x72c5ca57, 0x7db5b928, 0x30b546b0, 0x4eb59327, + 0x36adf136, 0x180388b9, 0x650c12f6, 0x746327b6, 0x48b21fcc, 0x6aabcae0, 0x281cf1f5, 0x5163bb4c, + 0x0cee7303, 0x6c7121ce, 0x63f366ef, 0x6032ce95, 0x64d890a4, 0x318f09eb, 0x394a57d0, 0x3a240162, + 0x66148f52, 0x16c22420, 0x66f8d4d0, 0x37b6cf3e, 0x7f1a683a, 0x65bfe7cb, 0x77ae875c, 0x1dd73c19, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x5b403d3d, 0x2ac45eb4, 0x410b9e9c, 0x75b939d2, 0x3968be22, 0x788f61e7, 0x64f46f51, 0x0cbcc05b, + 0x3f924163, 0x603fa063, 0x4ca1ee10, 0x4846f234, 0x023bd27b, 0x51c5869a, 0x19c8a2b7, 0x706b89e6, + 0x0ba00de3, 0x3192560b, 0x1aca76c3, 0x15850b0d, 0x7b8cbfb7, 0x6f0caeeb, 0x262ecc36, 0x35587a97, + 0x053bb4d4, 0x295608b0, 0x066c040f, 0x3aaad479, 0x783345e5, 0x16ec4e0d, 0x71dda99f, 0x5ea8008e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x53d2f000, 0x707758d5, 0x0132416e, 0x1e0c7554, 0x43015759, 0x326868f4, 0x57bee380, 0x3e6b4769, + 0x422daf4b, 0x0c5319e5, 0x1ccaea92, 0x7faa8be0, 0x3034ca78, 0x23317bf8, 0x4aca4df7, 0x18f89b82, + 0x363ab441, 0x5054bdf6, 0x7ff58a05, 0x315adbe8, 0x3a1a5a33, 0x3ac4c620, 0x68465616, 0x5a017a95, + 0x692b3096, 0x6b21450f, 0x1209df32, 0x50bc5af2, 0x590e511a, 0x215201a7, 0x68023bdb, 0x7cd7f4ea, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1469d882, 0x4d147a45, 0x5f404861, 0x2ab807ee, 0x6a5ce35c, 0x2d7bbeff, 0x661c8cda, 0x53b63633, + 0x414f678c, 0x38512dac, 0x5a32a63b, 0x425edcc1, 0x2a1765da, 0x77361c41, 0x4ab92cf0, 0x776cb3c5, + 0x066d77c1, 0x31045acb, 0x50ea7b39, 0x65146378, 0x53e53f97, 0x53eee68c, 0x4069c800, 0x5077d8c1, + 0x627dd5c6, 0x6710c5a7, 0x15911766, 0x095b2a41, 0x74a75545, 0x3075d136, 0x04348e00, 0x10512848, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x5bf194c5, 0x45e8863b, 0x00e6d125, 0x0c6da617, 0x1185e319, 0x6e47742a, 0x00e3bacc, 0x3af98cd5, + 0x03a748c8, 0x73e8429c, 0x3aede390, 0x2ba0b346, 0x3618a1e7, 0x25272815, 0x5413e8e0, 0x687e0305, + 0x0af5c2c5, 0x0a67556e, 0x39174412, 0x21277515, 0x00549eab, 0x57db34a9, 0x7102106f, 0x14e03ac4, + 0x32043d83, 0x252a816a, 0x13e53eba, 0x54ec815a, 0x23975136, 0x25db96ef, 0x6965a57c, 0x3acbf737, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1e6b4124, 0x027c2ccb, 0x220a4aea, 0x62267f92, 0x42fc4e53, 0x387d5173, 0x5606eb22, 0x0107ce12, + 0x1e10fb5c, 0x6c50f9cd, 0x3da3a387, 0x2864339a, 0x3afc062f, 0x0998f6e1, 0x07241691, 0x21fdaa31, + 0x750adbe8, 0x21974181, 0x796eecf4, 0x4ef280d4, 0x78896585, 0x17a8df5f, 0x6118460f, 0x7cbc0698, + 0x39ad3fd9, 0x12ea1a76, 0x2634308f, 0x434bd381, 0x2a7797a0, 0x63822326, 0x460c7a49, 0x39e45118, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x758ba6a4, 0x5009827a, 0x1aae5c46, 0x50921a89, 0x1520c0b1, 0x5db604f1, 0x2d79d774, 0x1037fba8, + 0x6b3706c2, 0x069cd371, 0x49c859d7, 0x7a263996, 0x2d04e0bd, 0x43ae8518, 0x28410013, 0x262ca742, + 0x7809a4c5, 0x6958252e, 0x605767e5, 0x55573da7, 0x079f0a5c, 0x20e7f477, 0x5b87f4f4, 0x34cdca96, + 0x5a22bb2a, 0x062588ef, 0x3a98fd6f, 0x4045258b, 0x0661fff9, 0x1466dd4b, 0x6f86bf51, 0x5c1c348f, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x07dbea9d, 0x54be56dd, 0x3d693a56, 0x7ca27d34, 0x3e96e54b, 0x32f55bff, 0x166a0ec1, 0x16bc9b21, + 0x1624acb9, 0x7d9f7ac4, 0x452337ef, 0x0371afe4, 0x66b6437c, 0x08fd16ef, 0x36e88e2a, 0x73244c56, + 0x31a87fbd, 0x647f1290, 0x514b4612, 0x592f4426, 0x074ba95f, 0x32ea4ba9, 0x6dbf08cd, 0x3f1de05a, + 0x5f837cd2, 0x3dbc2aa1, 0x313ebcf4, 0x25ef0210, 0x63a45cc2, 0x60ec908e, 0x4b07d045, 0x1a5b338e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7313eaea, 0x2a33061f, 0x5cc7ced8, 0x1c452ab9, 0x6ab7d100, 0x54c265c6, 0x4bbf6c2b, 0x37765cc3, + 0x7d2d9e33, 0x0eaf1fcf, 0x6981217f, 0x5b6ba0c2, 0x1e0d7873, 0x52363630, 0x6464a079, 0x10543a02, + 0x680285cf, 0x613fee88, 0x4275d4f8, 0x6279a362, 0x0ce381f2, 0x55a188eb, 0x7e0ab342, 0x76f9966e, + 0x3c8a2ec2, 0x7a270447, 0x58d7eb39, 0x671c51f6, 0x5e94fc22, 0x5c30fd8a, 0x2aa28958, 0x72f4bfb3, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x184bacd9, 0x3422813c, 0x57ac803a, 0x7e2fc74a, 0x783f8d00, 0x5a73e5b6, 0x2a965b52, 0x477dce48, + 0x0d0baee8, 0x3f442904, 0x24b21822, 0x238d9798, 0x04e2fa43, 0x1743983c, 0x28249bfc, 0x473f570a, + 0x155d7611, 0x4165e4b5, 0x6d76a047, 0x02a5202c, 0x5f63237f, 0x67f47b96, 0x1dd127d2, 0x0fc54fe2, + 0x5024ec37, 0x3aa5b9d6, 0x3ad5c930, 0x1ca8ebe8, 0x00b9b791, 0x56ceb219, 0x41943e11, 0x2332bf7b, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00739566, 0x122e9d8e, 0x25cc025e, 0x7e00d52c, 0x3cc12b91, 0x458520be, 0x564d5fbe, 0x6714969b, + 0x1c41b815, 0x497bba48, 0x592e3fbb, 0x5fcd5f32, 0x2311dfa1, 0x51d6122d, 0x1ddc0251, 0x0e62289f, + 0x57a52b96, 0x43f4b668, 0x52e162f7, 0x05cb6953, 0x7a9e17fe, 0x29f4ceaa, 0x398e4724, 0x089f08e2, + 0x20c34191, 0x0f08cb67, 0x1501ddbb, 0x50275cf2, 0x0aacbdaa, 0x58910cb8, 0x173b7582, 0x60f0d694, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6dcf278f, 0x362a9f79, 0x6e16b9b4, 0x57a29ea9, 0x0818e24c, 0x22ac6399, 0x74da2d53, 0x04ec6e36, + 0x7372dcfd, 0x3f37017a, 0x3562a2d3, 0x4276c6a1, 0x76e44a94, 0x18215b0b, 0x2cc40fec, 0x3f85ae8d, + 0x4dc6bcd1, 0x77c2f53f, 0x357d1298, 0x328f0f8c, 0x5088da1f, 0x4e987ab6, 0x23ce8328, 0x79713d75, + 0x05fb1dfb, 0x2a25494c, 0x2dee3415, 0x5edc149a, 0x1afeaa39, 0x3b4adf89, 0x6b9d2b0c, 0x772aa7ba, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x07d6df57, 0x14629768, 0x0dbb2361, 0x2e140207, 0x1f700b37, 0x48b86fe9, 0x73c79a7c, 0x75262867, + 0x047a564f, 0x45934f5e, 0x3a3d9d3a, 0x4b150069, 0x72c1b5fd, 0x6e8340c0, 0x3d6ccffa, 0x17cb0609, + 0x055a015e, 0x68f838e3, 0x4afb0948, 0x7544f4d9, 0x6f552958, 0x285b8658, 0x570861b9, 0x54b3abe1, + 0x211e03d4, 0x52d42cf2, 0x421caec7, 0x7356f24a, 0x4e20fd95, 0x4cd33660, 0x52639f70, 0x180c0e3e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6d366d77, 0x4d855863, 0x3e7875fd, 0x1193ca6a, 0x293d51be, 0x23249aed, 0x4969a773, 0x5047991d, + 0x7a75f545, 0x6f89e19c, 0x7f0c85cb, 0x1e008c9c, 0x12cf7516, 0x12f3cc0c, 0x6d21837e, 0x73363a53, + 0x57c27954, 0x47df2f6d, 0x520b20c2, 0x714bf286, 0x715f300d, 0x7f05b211, 0x41ef0f11, 0x66ec9d02, + 0x66514219, 0x1a5339dc, 0x24a41ddc, 0x7760518d, 0x78e20c07, 0x275e5ffc, 0x4474d20e, 0x0783ae0b, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x26d18a03, 0x6eddc8c6, 0x00687507, 0x1bf6e532, 0x2654e686, 0x002161d5, 0x6ea4736a, 0x5e7ca086, + 0x3364e46b, 0x46e8b9ef, 0x5edb347a, 0x7ba774b0, 0x32c86b0d, 0x74ecbe76, 0x07c3abf7, 0x5e025176, + 0x61b2fe7e, 0x1c1a1fff, 0x58684b00, 0x08cc0550, 0x3e76c197, 0x003a7cdb, 0x0ed98995, 0x7ca724b3, + 0x65f9e77e, 0x52123b0a, 0x1efff024, 0x61457b4f, 0x402be38f, 0x56e66878, 0x685e81a5, 0x50ae4132, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x51a721c8, 0x049fc8e2, 0x563563a7, 0x72de2637, 0x4d929ffa, 0x7a008564, 0x713d7e97, 0x7b876039, + 0x2aed4bd2, 0x59553042, 0x45b3f48c, 0x23cb4486, 0x4d5f14ea, 0x49b82d50, 0x54f5a5b6, 0x202e29ee, + 0x7aec360b, 0x23ab0e09, 0x584be113, 0x63354a5c, 0x16724b23, 0x345d3855, 0x79e473d1, 0x16c32e21, + 0x08e59413, 0x3a6f1f6a, 0x6cc113c7, 0x01e50dba, 0x626f45a2, 0x55417cec, 0x7ff3fdd4, 0x5d2ce42b, + ]), + // Terminal full rounds (4) + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1c89f089, 0x4bab0cf7, 0x63676f79, 0x6832f3cd, 0x3424bad7, 0x02176051, 0x78e9f924, 0x2c2042a7, + 0x2e5e5343, 0x7f13dd21, 0x211a2c1c, 0x61a0804c, 0x451f4763, 0x27d04cbb, 0x3ac9f6ce, 0x13553fd0, + 0x0d8cc4fe, 0x4df983ac, 0x71a83710, 0x5374c3b9, 0x6cb0d5b3, 0x13d607e6, 0x0c895cbf, 0x7711eae5, + 0x661a88b5, 0x3e972972, 0x58468904, 0x7bb3d1b4, 0x22ef7433, 0x74c8f38a, 0x627f37ae, 0x5a056999, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x09f3bfb7, 0x03734ed3, 0x53a6b381, 0x48d9d05d, 0x6bf9b614, 0x4a9f144f, 0x4bca8391, 0x3a1f1299, + 0x33a33a1f, 0x1ce0389b, 0x1690f939, 0x3d618bc4, 0x18660f42, 0x20e10ec3, 0x0639c084, 0x6c409e98, + 0x1bf13fb5, 0x3b1e8b8c, 0x086daac8, 0x66249317, 0x0937e002, 0x69810e64, 0x1b488058, 0x37b2667e, + 0x5974b1d1, 0x68b90b26, 0x762685f6, 0x16773c93, 0x37681a94, 0x226ec818, 0x712880c3, 0x6238a02f, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x4160e5f9, 0x2cabb507, 0x60f6ecf0, 0x20e2d0eb, 0x0581d33c, 0x2d898980, 0x5009f9fc, 0x5e80c8a0, + 0x336952ea, 0x22098481, 0x4d9adbe7, 0x0539e374, 0x713548df, 0x1f46dfb0, 0x0f676c2b, 0x2889ad8b, + 0x34b6148b, 0x51d868db, 0x7ae605ce, 0x4fdb0e34, 0x6fba849a, 0x4c1caa6c, 0x7631c902, 0x456f878e, + 0x7e292981, 0x5dfc70a7, 0x2eaba22a, 0x7698fc9b, 0x40233110, 0x1e3a43dd, 0x15d1ab25, 0x142e8c3f, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x433edc84, 0x48c6b434, 0x61533702, 0x2acdab18, 0x57807057, 0x1c95fec4, 0x111091cd, 0x2f9e6394, + 0x52fa8c7c, 0x1898cecb, 0x5fc06816, 0x4c2fd9f5, 0x21b7c60f, 0x0fac6f13, 0x76ed472a, 0x1563a976, + 0x5f055d85, 0x31864aff, 0x36915cce, 0x7c7b9275, 0x193594a8, 0x74f1d9ca, 0x13345a09, 0x55c49cbf, + 0x67974c88, 0x725a4445, 0x3513e148, 0x6cb1fcd6, 0x5859e67d, 0x778e0804, 0x3f9e57c5, 0x67ff1751, + ]), +]; + +/// Create the default width-16 Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31. +pub fn default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16() -> Poseidon1Mersenne31<16> { + Poseidon1::new(&Poseidon1Constants { + rounds_f: 2 * MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + rounds_p: MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_16, + mds_circ_col: first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_16_SML_ROW), + round_constants: MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_RC_16.to_vec(), + }) +} + +/// Create the default width-32 Poseidon1 permutation for Mersenne31. +pub fn default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32() -> Poseidon1Mersenne31<32> { + Poseidon1::new(&Poseidon1Constants { + rounds_f: 2 * MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + rounds_p: MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_32, + mds_circ_col: first_row_to_first_col(&MATRIX_CIRC_MDS_32_MERSENNE31_ROW), + round_constants: MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_RC_32.to_vec(), + }) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use rand::SeedableRng; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + + use super::*; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + /// Known-answer test for width 16 (sequential 0..15 input). + #[test] + fn test_poseidon1_mersenne31_width_16() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let mut input: [F; 16] = + F::new_array([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]); + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + + let expected: [F; 16] = F::new_array([ + 763678880, 1665665156, 138326798, 2029009038, 523315643, 1240724959, 799985579, + 1533764468, 1851415257, 580298256, 158301910, 1486286674, 1604442932, 919070942, + 791307160, 922090452, + ]); + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + /// Known-answer test for width 32 (sequential 0..31 input). + #[test] + fn test_poseidon1_mersenne31_width_32() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let mut input: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, + 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, + ]); + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + + let expected: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 493956664, 1487097341, 1986839634, 1423871566, 183460581, 827438159, 7996988, + 141241897, 1403482130, 847367286, 2077667889, 1108646476, 1352254530, 1822401306, + 809224972, 1606586582, 1039326136, 622010047, 1526365331, 1585000638, 1938294847, + 559133752, 570966981, 1111956911, 1758188893, 1919461707, 940683889, 1707731554, + 1949319314, 1540753789, 1964681567, 229242586, + ]); + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + /// Smoke test for width 16 with random constants. + #[test] + fn test_poseidon1_mersenne31_width_16_random() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let poseidon = Poseidon1Mersenne31Generic::<16>::new_from_rng( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_16, + &MdsMatrixMersenne31, + &mut rng, + ); + let input: [F; 16] = rand::RngExt::random(&mut rng); + let output = poseidon.permute(input); + assert_ne!(output, input); + } + + /// Smoke test for width 32 with random constants. + #[test] + fn test_poseidon1_mersenne31_width_32_random() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let poseidon = Poseidon1Mersenne31Generic::<32>::new_from_rng( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS, + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON1_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_32, + &MdsMatrixMersenne31, + &mut rng, + ); + let input: [F; 32] = rand::RngExt::random(&mut rng); + let output = poseidon.permute(input); + assert_ne!(output, input); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon2.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon2.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7479f9ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/poseidon2.rs @@ -0,0 +1,646 @@ +//! Implementation of Poseidon2, see: `` +//! +//! For the diffusion matrix, 1 + Diag(V), we perform a search to find an optimized +//! vector V composed of elements with efficient multiplication algorithms in AVX2/AVX512/NEON. +//! +//! This leads to using small values (e.g. 1, 2) where multiplication is implemented using addition +//! and powers of 2 where multiplication is implemented using shifts. +//! Additionally, for technical reasons, having the first entry be -2 is useful. +//! +//! Optimized Diagonal for Mersenne31 width 16: +//! [-2, 2^0, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 2^7, 2^8, 2^10, 2^12, 2^13, 2^14, 2^15, 2^16] +//! Optimized Diagonal for Mersenne31 width 24: +//! [-2, 2^0, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 2^7, 2^8, 2^9, 2^10, 2^11, 2^12, 2^13, 2^14, 2^15, 2^16, 2^17, 2^18, 2^19, 2^20, 2^21, 2^22] +//! See poseidon2\src\diffusion.rs for information on how to double check these matrices in Sage. + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_poseidon2::{ + ExternalLayer, ExternalLayerConstants, GenericPoseidon2LinearLayers, InternalLayer, MDSMat4, + Poseidon2, add_rc_and_sbox_generic, external_initial_permute_state, + external_terminal_permute_state, internal_permute_state, +}; + +use crate::{ + Mersenne31, Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31, Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31, from_u62, +}; + +/// S-box degree for Mersenne31 Poseidon2. +/// +/// Since `p - 1 = 2 × 3^2 × 7 × 11 × 31 × 151 × 331`, both 3 and 4 share factors +/// with `p - 1`. The smallest valid exponent satisfying `gcd(α, p - 1) = 1` is 5. +pub const MERSENNE31_S_BOX_DEGREE: u64 = 5; + +/// Number of full rounds per half for Mersenne31 Poseidon2 (`RF / 2`). +/// +/// The total number of full rounds is `RF = 8` (4 beginning + 4 ending). +/// Follows the Poseidon2 paper's security analysis with a +2 RF margin. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_HALF_FULL_ROUNDS: usize = 4; + +/// Number of partial rounds for Mersenne31 Poseidon2 (width 16). +/// +/// Derived from the Gröbner basis bound in the Poseidon2 paper (Eq. 1, R_GB term 3): +/// +/// R_GB ≥ t − 7 + log_α(2) · min{κ/(t+1), log_2(p)/2} +/// = 9 + 0.4307 · min{7.53, 15.5} = 12.243 +/// +/// With the +7.5% security margin: ⌈1.075 × 12.243⌉ = 14. +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_16: usize = 14; + +/// Number of partial rounds for Mersenne31 Poseidon2 (width 24). +/// +/// Same Gröbner basis bound as width 16: +/// +/// R_GB ≥ 17 + 0.4307 · min{5.12, 15.5} = 19.205 +/// +/// With the +7.5% security margin: ⌈1.075 × 19.205⌉ = 21. +/// +/// The official round number script yields R_P = 22 for this configuration +/// (matching the Grain LFSR parameters used to generate the round constants). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_24: usize = 22; + +/// Number of partial rounds for Mersenne31 Poseidon2 (width 32). +/// +/// The official round number script yields R_P = 30 for this configuration +/// (matching the Grain LFSR parameters used to generate the round constants below). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_PARTIAL_ROUNDS_32: usize = 30; + +/// An implementation of the Poseidon2 hash function specialised to run on the current architecture. +/// +/// It acts on arrays of the form either `[Mersenne31::Packing; WIDTH]` or `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]`. For speed purposes, +/// wherever possible, input arrays should of the form `[Mersenne31::Packing; WIDTH]`. +pub type Poseidon2Mersenne31 = Poseidon2< + Mersenne31, + Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31, + Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31, + WIDTH, + MERSENNE31_S_BOX_DEGREE, +>; + +/// Round constants for width-16 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=16, R_F=8, R_P=14 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 16`. +/// +/// Layout: external_initial (4 rounds × 16 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL: [[Mersenne31; 16]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x768bab52, 0x70e0ab7d, 0x3d266c8a, 0x6da42045, 0x600fef22, 0x41dace6b, 0x64f9bdd4, + 0x5d42d4fe, 0x76b1516d, 0x6fc9a717, 0x70ac4fb6, 0x00194ef6, 0x22b644e2, 0x1f7916d5, + 0x47581be2, 0x2710a123, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6284e867, 0x018d3afe, 0x5df99ef3, 0x4c1e467b, 0x566f6abc, 0x2994e427, 0x538a6d42, + 0x5d7bf2cf, 0x7fda2dab, 0x0fd854c4, 0x46922fca, 0x3d7763a1, 0x19fd05ca, 0x0a4bbb43, + 0x15075851, 0x3d903d76, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2d290ff7, 0x40809fa0, 0x59dac6ec, 0x127927a2, 0x6bbf0ea0, 0x0294140f, 0x24742976, + 0x6e84c081, 0x22484f4a, 0x354cae59, 0x0453ffe1, 0x3f47a3cc, 0x0088204e, 0x6066e109, + 0x3b7c4b80, 0x6b55665d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x3bc4b897, 0x735bf378, 0x508daf42, 0x1884fc2b, 0x7214f24c, 0x7498be0a, 0x1a60e640, + 0x3303f928, 0x29b46376, 0x5c96bb68, 0x65d097a5, 0x1d358e9f, 0x4a9a9017, 0x4724cf76, + 0x347af70f, 0x1e77e59a, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-16 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=16, R_F=8, R_P=14 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 16`. +/// +/// Layout: external_final (4 rounds × 16 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL: [[Mersenne31; 16]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x57090613, 0x1fa42108, 0x17bbef50, 0x1ff7e11c, 0x047b24ca, 0x4e140275, 0x4fa086f5, + 0x079b309c, 0x1159bd47, 0x6d37e4e5, 0x075d8dce, 0x12121ca0, 0x7f6a7c40, 0x68e182ba, + 0x5493201b, 0x0444a80e, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x0064f4c6, 0x6467abe6, 0x66975762, 0x2af68f9b, 0x345b33be, 0x1b70d47f, 0x053db717, + 0x381189cb, 0x43b915f8, 0x20df3694, 0x0f459d26, 0x77a0e97b, 0x2f73e739, 0x1876c2f9, + 0x65a0e29a, 0x4cabefbe, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x5abd1268, 0x4d34a760, 0x12771799, 0x69a0c9ac, 0x39091e55, 0x7f611cd0, 0x3af055da, + 0x7ac0bbdf, 0x6e0f3a24, 0x41e3b6f7, 0x49b3756d, 0x568bc538, 0x20c079d8, 0x1701c72c, + 0x7670dc6c, 0x5a439035, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7c93e00e, 0x561fbb4d, 0x1178907b, 0x02737406, 0x32fb24f1, 0x6323b60a, 0x6ab12418, + 0x42c99cea, 0x155a0b97, 0x53d1c6aa, 0x2bd20347, 0x279b3d73, 0x4f5f3c70, 0x0245af6c, + 0x238359d3, 0x49966a59, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-16 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=16, R_F=8, R_P=14 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 16`. +/// +/// Layout: internal (14 scalar constants). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL: [Mersenne31; 14] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7f7ec4bf, 0x0421926f, 0x5198e669, 0x34db3148, 0x4368bafd, 0x66685c7f, 0x78d3249a, 0x60187881, + 0x76dad67a, 0x0690b437, 0x1ea95311, 0x40e5369a, 0x38f103fc, 0x1d226a21, +]); + +/// Round constants for width-24 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=24, R_F=8, R_P=22 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 24`. +/// +/// Layout: external_initial (4 rounds × 24 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_EXTERNAL_INITIAL: [[Mersenne31; 24]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1feaba61, 0x53224454, 0x6bceb9e2, 0x5019f9b4, 0x48726592, 0x2b22d0a8, 0x6151bbf9, + 0x2f474b21, 0x2eb5f337, 0x3b645d87, 0x0942cef0, 0x65228c52, 0x78ffb30f, 0x4d2837c8, + 0x0e17ac4f, 0x05546686, 0x046c06cc, 0x0b51c3b6, 0x568db763, 0x38b334e4, 0x57f5acf0, + 0x19d32611, 0x77d02f4b, 0x6c82e9b8, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7148c1b6, 0x08067c75, 0x46d1e8c9, 0x30973b07, 0x20614f3b, 0x5c3ff851, 0x30503329, + 0x4972e7cc, 0x02d1d8bc, 0x09d5bfa6, 0x097104c0, 0x7ba49a34, 0x4a07c2fc, 0x24c1ee69, + 0x28a6ab41, 0x5d9108a0, 0x3a7851c7, 0x1dd495f9, 0x12b49ff4, 0x7bad5760, 0x5fed64c2, + 0x66f5c96c, 0x7eafbd02, 0x39b3593b, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x4a653b49, 0x75091dc1, 0x56e488e0, 0x1704a355, 0x745e4ff3, 0x392ef16e, 0x31e33fdf, + 0x02c28c66, 0x36c3083a, 0x3104d1fa, 0x5b03cda3, 0x6641e1af, 0x37754b56, 0x396f5af9, + 0x1a1a461a, 0x688e26f2, 0x6f829784, 0x1bb91d69, 0x5b788016, 0x704aa5c5, 0x0181869c, + 0x41211e56, 0x0ce803a0, 0x23bff3a0, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x17fb7064, 0x47317220, 0x76914b53, 0x219c1905, 0x16655528, 0x4df35544, 0x60808465, + 0x3350f833, 0x03bccdc7, 0x0a87180a, 0x017a99f5, 0x6e945726, 0x15445504, 0x780533b1, + 0x3b91bf38, 0x3fc77eb1, 0x4b4d960e, 0x3cd93d2e, 0x0ea4e976, 0x1d5306cc, 0x3a7ac284, + 0x0ec22934, 0x4d979713, 0x51a41c65, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-24 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=24, R_F=8, R_P=22 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 24`. +/// +/// Layout: external_final (4 rounds × 24 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_EXTERNAL_FINAL: [[Mersenne31; 24]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x1c662299, 0x057c955a, 0x7ab6c0f2, 0x25a6ad0a, 0x75850b58, 0x48fd3793, 0x0b4366b1, + 0x0fdd0d49, 0x7db419f9, 0x49b9cc0f, 0x48949716, 0x29c35890, 0x76445485, 0x1c27d30c, + 0x10aa7a3b, 0x30f34fb6, 0x6fe06435, 0x02135ecd, 0x6caaba96, 0x3eb290d0, 0x22fd8d3b, + 0x768b1525, 0x5be95814, 0x523d7fe9, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x55e94cec, 0x47c42e1f, 0x1aa53b5e, 0x2fd1fe7e, 0x59230e91, 0x7472da66, 0x6443f2df, + 0x2d9de19d, 0x6f7f6a84, 0x77800430, 0x0f014bc8, 0x7bf3d095, 0x26afd318, 0x582561f7, + 0x5ee3198c, 0x6acc0000, 0x2f315e26, 0x27cac040, 0x2595081e, 0x5963b7da, 0x7e073565, + 0x6cf3f5f1, 0x09f8a3a4, 0x0da8ccfe, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x60be2365, 0x7ed742f5, 0x668b8031, 0x4bb03494, 0x59019333, 0x700e2878, 0x1cc45856, + 0x1d1617f7, 0x7b988da6, 0x4eb4936c, 0x78c9f87e, 0x63ce3e94, 0x7178341b, 0x45bc2f86, + 0x05b775bc, 0x704b0244, 0x29eed278, 0x47f43032, 0x2127b2e5, 0x1997903f, 0x24b3ce03, + 0x0c32298c, 0x7d2b6f3a, 0x17fcaa81, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x72f37fef, 0x3028e7a9, 0x5edd4d96, 0x1f96583b, 0x4cd6918a, 0x14880f0e, 0x69170359, + 0x173cbd33, 0x0969e7f4, 0x6e7f23ab, 0x6182ea87, 0x4dcb1f5c, 0x585fa113, 0x729cb3b6, + 0x01b3a27a, 0x1ba173e7, 0x4b33bcea, 0x63d93bbb, 0x6b3fbf99, 0x6f17e9d1, 0x0c3dd8ba, + 0x0bc1f9a8, 0x64d3f370, 0x465a6a18, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-24 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=24, R_F=8, R_P=22 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 24`. +/// +/// Layout: internal (22 scalar constants). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_INTERNAL: [Mersenne31; 22] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x22776a11, 0x5fa34268, 0x1415528d, 0x563fbd14, 0x34f45244, 0x120ea1b6, 0x261368a5, 0x27665ec1, + 0x36be2805, 0x345c4784, 0x17efdcc1, 0x393e6530, 0x6da0b4b8, 0x31e5ded3, 0x675b27ac, 0x0ae88c30, + 0x577841cc, 0x5fe06dec, 0x56b0691a, 0x7242de1f, 0x3c377529, 0x339b7523, +]); + +/// Create a default width-16 Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +pub fn default_mersenne31_poseidon2_16() -> Poseidon2Mersenne31<16> { + Poseidon2::new( + ExternalLayerConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_INITIAL.to_vec(), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_EXTERNAL_FINAL.to_vec(), + ), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_16_INTERNAL.to_vec(), + ) +} + +/// Create a default width-24 Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +pub fn default_mersenne31_poseidon2_24() -> Poseidon2Mersenne31<24> { + Poseidon2::new( + ExternalLayerConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_EXTERNAL_INITIAL.to_vec(), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_EXTERNAL_FINAL.to_vec(), + ), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_24_INTERNAL.to_vec(), + ) +} + +/// Round constants for width-32 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=32, R_F=8, R_P=30 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 32`. +/// +/// Layout: external_initial (4 rounds × 32 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_EXTERNAL_INITIAL: [[Mersenne31; 32]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6710e381, 0x01ab3dad, 0x49bdc51f, 0x41c98c65, 0x23885d8a, 0x24ea7d7c, 0x6b65fc6d, + 0x6106615a, 0x084957f3, 0x157c3634, 0x4dada10f, 0x6cdfa46d, 0x1bf208be, 0x5bd22fac, + 0x79da8fdb, 0x78ebc8ed, 0x4c8bcbdf, 0x27f79490, 0x70495412, 0x2a41844e, 0x51bb69f1, + 0x3215dc21, 0x67114819, 0x27aa6a09, 0x5f4d3cad, 0x5fd6c724, 0x1b4c108d, 0x7ebd949d, + 0x5799d04d, 0x568c212f, 0x680821db, 0x62073729, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x229ee780, 0x3b4f94c3, 0x17a3ac54, 0x6c388279, 0x4876fe55, 0x3170f20a, 0x33703e4e, + 0x03980ab1, 0x012fb0fa, 0x145ee8db, 0x49815b30, 0x46ad879c, 0x52bc503d, 0x586530d7, + 0x5c36f9e5, 0x028e6503, 0x08310368, 0x75546646, 0x732516f1, 0x33483e5a, 0x04a0842c, + 0x1a3135d9, 0x537b2eb1, 0x5baf4f77, 0x4b78cd6d, 0x5aed2c4a, 0x66c893e1, 0x3c5493a6, + 0x46c62bfc, 0x564e591a, 0x52ded7a7, 0x00d1032d, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2b30d801, 0x101dabf7, 0x2efb21cd, 0x4a361c39, 0x49eff572, 0x2e13caf4, 0x016e6799, + 0x1b5cdb44, 0x17ca2dc6, 0x0e500ee0, 0x0141ca9b, 0x279b2376, 0x6647c40b, 0x0dcaee3c, + 0x16e7fcf9, 0x59e6d65c, 0x1eb730c9, 0x7ebf0417, 0x28607848, 0x45727f9c, 0x4e543ffb, + 0x03ee2550, 0x010cd54b, 0x7b1a1050, 0x02dc4b76, 0x2b3a9a3c, 0x2eabb2d9, 0x06928553, + 0x2d23b3f5, 0x6da322b1, 0x1527ec07, 0x0e450b7a, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x53961612, 0x20f16b10, 0x16f00c60, 0x4c39d50f, 0x41d59d76, 0x5253f822, 0x3b53d381, + 0x1b7f470a, 0x5e3d895c, 0x52658125, 0x012190d3, 0x65563b80, 0x1d0faa47, 0x3575b3c9, + 0x4c0d9d20, 0x18cff09f, 0x64a7da5c, 0x2f140b25, 0x139f9e31, 0x66e36bd5, 0x6442c811, + 0x58879bce, 0x5fcc87c6, 0x6807ae0c, 0x4111c657, 0x633c8929, 0x74962971, 0x3fc18eb8, + 0x456cf288, 0x31f6c8d2, 0x6c3a31a8, 0x6d82df50, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-32 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=32, R_F=8, R_P=30 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 32`. +/// +/// Layout: external_final (4 rounds × 32 elements). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_EXTERNAL_FINAL: [[Mersenne31; 32]; 4] = [ + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x7818a8d3, 0x1a58e115, 0x29113198, 0x776b289f, 0x1e922ee2, 0x2165fbf0, 0x28ccaf78, + 0x1983287d, 0x492b22e0, 0x77cc4657, 0x39005c27, 0x48cd8089, 0x267cfcbb, 0x1c41ca85, + 0x41b3943f, 0x20e7727a, 0x64ad78f3, 0x13dd4413, 0x1042e3dc, 0x74adeb2c, 0x2dcdd3c7, + 0x06006fbc, 0x35a609e9, 0x0daf273c, 0x3a4f694f, 0x7a992693, 0x59fd101d, 0x27d2112b, + 0x1937b69f, 0x2e8880bc, 0x40c12429, 0x067965a6, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x6ea1b36d, 0x6e01476e, 0x29cd718a, 0x5406c693, 0x51de2e9a, 0x6ddc388a, 0x53763473, + 0x7fbd6bda, 0x17a25cbf, 0x1f2982cd, 0x7af8156c, 0x19ca5afd, 0x2d703c93, 0x0c2840e4, + 0x2cda82cd, 0x5c7f51e0, 0x1db58806, 0x3cb62bd1, 0x2b45461b, 0x6204ba50, 0x7bcdbe79, + 0x6857f0bc, 0x4af2a368, 0x32c146f4, 0x1acfdd93, 0x2dc39570, 0x0dbdeb4e, 0x50bef84d, + 0x6f83a22c, 0x434c3741, 0x2060e160, 0x68f58f0b, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2529b2bd, 0x112c4768, 0x70409ce2, 0x1b57460e, 0x21dc818c, 0x5f6b5330, 0x443f8fba, + 0x211a90de, 0x591d4a30, 0x5b5a3e75, 0x635c333a, 0x1efd6a70, 0x5d35445f, 0x5637cf22, + 0x6e9ba8b1, 0x10b54e2c, 0x04291eb8, 0x2d4ea543, 0x720a5c61, 0x1a5b6323, 0x68e176e7, + 0x26149775, 0x58f30beb, 0x450402ab, 0x24928255, 0x32c59955, 0x2b5b7261, 0x6279779f, + 0x599b6a8e, 0x70d145d3, 0x3786c4d1, 0x11363460, + ]), + Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x22ff2181, 0x4d06fc50, 0x27a8a3df, 0x647df984, 0x3a748cc3, 0x4aa91ea2, 0x21ead2a1, + 0x50cd5d8d, 0x06d6ffc6, 0x5bc51117, 0x45f848bc, 0x12c3d5f1, 0x487f9065, 0x1617243c, + 0x5c8774e4, 0x76bcd3ec, 0x783819d0, 0x349c8a4b, 0x265d6a36, 0x39fc652e, 0x246831a8, + 0x488058fc, 0x0a5c75d6, 0x760d4eed, 0x7acd5d5f, 0x2d2957ad, 0x6188b6fe, 0x2084c575, + 0x67c5ff60, 0x3d6d899b, 0x2759464a, 0x1e4319d2, + ]), +]; + +/// Round constants for width-32 Poseidon2 on Mersenne31. +/// +/// Generated by the Grain LFSR with parameters: +/// field_type=1, alpha=5 (exp_flag=0), n=31, t=32, R_F=8, R_P=30 +/// +/// Generated by `poseidon2/generate_constants.py --field mersenne31 --width 32`. +/// +/// Layout: internal (30 scalar constants). +pub const MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_INTERNAL: [Mersenne31; 30] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x3d432793, 0x4195a297, 0x7fcf576b, 0x6bce9b95, 0x3c822af0, 0x7629e5b3, 0x3dddd04e, 0x5a3d0558, + 0x763e6c75, 0x676f1d88, 0x77b82255, 0x25df8a51, 0x697c3b10, 0x03cf6edf, 0x12b54f78, 0x6633d534, + 0x426fbcb7, 0x554665dc, 0x5689bdb2, 0x12e747de, 0x60c28745, 0x11ca4ba5, 0x7c7c7b7a, 0x3f0f9583, + 0x7a3c8210, 0x56c7d993, 0x20f6875f, 0x69e597c8, 0x3c911573, 0x29c7f702, +]); + +/// Create a default width-32 Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +pub fn default_mersenne31_poseidon2_32() -> Poseidon2Mersenne31<32> { + Poseidon2::new( + ExternalLayerConstants::new( + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_EXTERNAL_INITIAL.to_vec(), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_EXTERNAL_FINAL.to_vec(), + ), + MERSENNE31_POSEIDON2_RC_32_INTERNAL.to_vec(), + ) +} + +/// An implementation of the matrix multiplications in the internal and external layers of Poseidon2. +/// +/// This can act on `[A; WIDTH]` for any ring implementing `Algebra`. +/// If you have either `[Mersenne31::Packing; WIDTH]` or `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` it will be much faster +/// to use `Poseidon2Mersenne31` instead of building a Poseidon2 permutation using this. +pub struct GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31 {} + +const POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_16_SHIFTS: [u8; 15] = + [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]; + +const POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_24_SHIFTS: [u8; 23] = [ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, +]; + +const POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_32_SHIFTS: [u8; 31] = [ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, + 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, +]; + +/// Multiply state by the matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// +/// Here V is the vector [-2] + 1 << shifts. This used delayed reduction to be slightly faster. +fn permute_mut(state: &mut [Mersenne31; N], shifts: &[u8]) { + debug_assert_eq!(shifts.len() + 1, N); + let part_sum: u64 = state[1..].iter().map(|x| x.value as u64).sum(); + let full_sum = part_sum + (state[0].value as u64); + let s0 = part_sum + (-state[0]).value as u64; + state[0] = from_u62(s0); + for i in 1..N { + let si = full_sum + ((state[i].value as u64) << shifts[i - 1]); + state[i] = from_u62(si); + } +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; 16]) { + internal_permute_state( + state, + |x| permute_mut(x, &POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_16_SHIFTS), + &self.internal_constants, + ); + } +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; 24]) { + internal_permute_state( + state, + |x| permute_mut(x, &POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_24_SHIFTS), + &self.internal_constants, + ); + } +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; 32]) { + internal_permute_state( + state, + |x| permute_mut(x, &POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_32_SHIFTS), + &self.internal_constants, + ); + } +} + +impl ExternalLayer + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + /// Perform the initial external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + external_initial_permute_state( + state, + self.external_constants.get_initial_constants(), + add_rc_and_sbox_generic, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } + + /// Perform the terminal external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + external_terminal_permute_state( + state, + self.external_constants.get_terminal_constants(), + add_rc_and_sbox_generic, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } +} + +impl GenericPoseidon2LinearLayers<16> for GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31 { + fn internal_linear_layer(state: &mut [R; 16]) { + let part_sum: R = state[1..].iter().map(|r| r.dup()).sum(); + let full_sum = part_sum.dup() + state[0].dup(); + + // The first three diagonal elements are -2, 1, 2 so we do something custom. + state[0] = part_sum - state[0].dup(); + state[1] = full_sum.dup() + state[1].dup(); + state[2] = full_sum.dup() + state[2].double(); + + // For the remaining elements we use the mul_2exp_u64 method. + // We need state[1..] as POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_16_SHIFTS + // doesn't include the shift for the 0'th element as it is -2. + state[1..] + .iter_mut() + .zip(POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_16_SHIFTS) + .skip(2) + .for_each(|(val, diag_shift)| { + *val = full_sum.dup() + val.dup().mul_2exp_u64(diag_shift as u64); + }); + } +} + +impl GenericPoseidon2LinearLayers<24> for GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31 { + fn internal_linear_layer(state: &mut [R; 24]) { + let part_sum: R = state[1..].iter().map(|r| r.dup()).sum(); + let full_sum = part_sum.dup() + state[0].dup(); + + // The first three diagonal elements are -2, 1, 2 so we do something custom. + state[0] = part_sum - state[0].dup(); + state[1] = full_sum.dup() + state[1].dup(); + state[2] = full_sum.dup() + state[2].double(); + + // For the remaining elements we use the mul_2exp_u64 method. + // We need state[1..] as POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_24_SHIFTS + // doesn't include the shift for the 0'th element as it is -2. + state[1..] + .iter_mut() + .zip(POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_24_SHIFTS) + .skip(2) + .for_each(|(val, diag_shift)| { + *val = full_sum.dup() + val.dup().mul_2exp_u64(diag_shift as u64); + }); + } +} + +impl GenericPoseidon2LinearLayers<32> for GenericPoseidon2LinearLayersMersenne31 { + fn internal_linear_layer(state: &mut [R; 32]) { + let part_sum: R = state[1..].iter().map(|r| r.dup()).sum(); + let full_sum = part_sum.dup() + state[0].dup(); + + // The first three diagonal elements are -2, 1, 2 so we do something custom. + state[0] = part_sum - state[0].dup(); + state[1] = full_sum.dup() + state[1].dup(); + state[2] = full_sum.dup() + state[2].double(); + + // For the remaining elements we use the mul_2exp_u64 method. + state[1..] + .iter_mut() + .zip(POSEIDON2_INTERNAL_MATRIX_DIAG_32_SHIFTS) + .skip(2) + .for_each(|(val, diag_shift)| { + *val = full_sum.dup() + val.dup().mul_2exp_u64(diag_shift as u64); + }); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use rand::SeedableRng; + use rand_xoshiro::Xoroshiro128Plus; + + use super::*; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + // We need to make some round constants. We use Xoroshiro128Plus for this as we can easily match this PRNG in sage. + // See: https://github.com/0xPolygonZero/hash-constants for the sage code used to create all these tests. + + /// Test on a roughly random input. + /// This random input is generated by the following sage code: + /// set_random_seed(16) + /// vector([M31.random_element() for t in range(16)]). + #[test] + fn test_poseidon2_width_16_random() { + let mut input: [F; 16] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 894848333, 1437655012, 1200606629, 1690012884, 71131202, 1749206695, 1717947831, + 120589055, 19776022, 42382981, 1831865506, 724844064, 171220207, 1299207443, 227047920, + 1783754913, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 16] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1124552602, 2127602268, 1834113265, 1207687593, 1891161485, 245915620, 981277919, + 627265710, 1534924153, 1580826924, 887997842, 1526280482, 547791593, 1028672510, + 1803086471, 323071277, + ]); + + let mut rng = Xoroshiro128Plus::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Poseidon2Mersenne31::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + /// Test on a roughly random input. + /// This random input is generated by the following sage code: + /// set_random_seed(24) + /// vector([M31.random_element() for t in range(24)]). + #[test] + fn test_poseidon2_width_24_random() { + let mut input: [F; 24] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 886409618, 1327899896, 1902407911, 591953491, 648428576, 1844789031, 1198336108, + 355597330, 1799586834, 59617783, 790334801, 1968791836, 559272107, 31054313, + 1042221543, 474748436, 135686258, 263665994, 1962340735, 1741539604, 2026927696, + 449439011, 1131357108, 50869465, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 24] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 87189408, 212775836, 954807335, 1424761838, 1222521810, 1264950009, 1891204592, + 710452896, 957091834, 1776630156, 1091081383, 786687731, 1101902149, 1281649821, + 436070674, 313565599, 1961711763, 2002894460, 2040173120, 854107426, 25198245, + 1967213543, 604802266, 2086190331, + ]); + + let mut rng = Xoroshiro128Plus::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Poseidon2Mersenne31::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn test_default_mersenne31_poseidon2_width_16() { + let mut input: [F; 16] = + Mersenne31::new_array([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]); + + let expected: [F; 16] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x0b2c803a, 0x5b1ee4d1, 0x49c6b1e3, 0x2cdc280c, 0x310a60c8, 0x530a729e, 0x4e61bcb4, + 0x2e84d3c3, 0x58709c08, 0x7e82ac42, 0x2162bcef, 0x6d153ab6, 0x742cf0e3, 0x2f21632d, + 0x61adce1e, 0x1973d6f1, + ]); + + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon2_16(); + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn test_default_mersenne31_poseidon2_width_24() { + let mut input: [F; 24] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 24] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x2040f051, 0x7261dbfa, 0x4fbd519e, 0x2320ecaf, 0x039ef27c, 0x48d60ad5, 0x73ca17ff, + 0x6023111a, 0x6c5e31e7, 0x373cd90d, 0x75a3ae11, 0x00ecc878, 0x33a7c097, 0x244c2171, + 0x7552a38e, 0x58d20817, 0x00feecb7, 0x47c43c88, 0x30d3001c, 0x24d09ba6, 0x71f241d9, + 0x1c72ab2e, 0x4749f79d, 0x61ff7579, + ]); + + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon2_24(); + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn test_default_mersenne31_poseidon2_width_32() { + let mut input: [F; 32] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 886409618, 1327899896, 1902407911, 591953491, 648428576, 1844789031, 1198336108, + 355597330, 1799586834, 59617783, 790334801, 1968791836, 559272107, 31054313, + 1042221543, 474748436, 135686258, 263665994, 1962340735, 1741539604, 2026927696, + 449439011, 1131357108, 50869465, 894848333, 1437655012, 1200606629, 1690012884, + 71131202, 1749206695, 1717947831, 120589055, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 32] = Mersenne31::new_array([ + 1856060025, 1254059276, 2099136415, 1891507371, 202832695, 754761125, 1546769253, + 2039240755, 969633288, 117763588, 624654727, 1034887750, 898944818, 1818019588, + 1662865566, 1426397765, 102254187, 1541093348, 280956251, 1038202157, 1207554722, + 1615928492, 2099241528, 997904479, 621678012, 724483212, 1292553224, 1107946119, + 1584500975, 1889218820, 432786428, 1331980049, + ]); + + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon2_32(); + perm.permute_mut(&mut input); + + assert_eq!(input, expected); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/qm31.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/qm31.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4b86bd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/qm31.rs @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +//! The degree-4 extension of Mersenne31, built as the binomial extension by +//! `X² - (2 + i)` over the complex extension `Mersenne31[i]`, flattened to a +//! degree-4 vector space over `Mersenne31`. +//! +//! The tower type `BinomialExtensionField, 2>` only knows +//! it is an extension of `Complex`. This module supplies the +//! `Algebra`, `BasedVectorSpace` and +//! `ExtensionField` impls (plus the packed counterpart +//! [`PackedQM31`]) that let it serve as the challenge field of a STARK over +//! `Mersenne31`, with 4 · 31 = 124 bits of extension size. +//! +//! The flattened basis is `[1, i, u, iu]` (`u² = 2 + i`), i.e. the in-memory +//! order of the nested `[[Mersenne31; 2]; 2]` representation. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::iter::{Product, Sum}; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Mul, MulAssign, Neg, Sub, SubAssign}; +use core::slice; + +use p3_field::extension::{BinomialExtensionField, Complex}; +use p3_field::{ + Algebra, BasedVectorSpace, ExtensionField, Field, PackedFieldExtension, PackedValue, Powers, + PrimeCharacteristicRing, +}; +use p3_util::{as_base_slice, flatten_to_base, reconstitute_from_base}; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +/// The degree-4 extension of Mersenne31: `Mersenne31[i][u]` with `i² = -1` +/// and `u² = 2 + i`. +pub type QM31 = BinomialExtensionField, 2>; + +type CM31 = Complex; +type PackedM31 = ::Packing; +type PackedCM31 = >::ExtensionPacking; + +/// The two `CM31` coefficients of a `QM31` element. +#[inline(always)] +fn coeffs(x: &QM31) -> [CM31; 2] { + let s = BasedVectorSpace::::as_basis_coefficients_slice(x); + [s[0], s[1]] +} + +/// Multiply a packed complex coefficient by `W = 2 + i` using only additions: +/// `(a + bi)(2 + i) = (2a - b) + (a + 2b)i`. +#[inline(always)] +fn packed_mul_by_w(c: PackedCM31) -> PackedCM31 { + let s = BasedVectorSpace::::as_basis_coefficients_slice(&c); + let (re, im) = (s[0], s[1]); + PackedCM31::new([re + re - im, re + im + im]) +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Scalar flattening: QM31 as an algebra / vector space / extension over M31 +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +impl From for QM31 { + #[inline] + fn from(x: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self::new([CM31::from(x), CM31::ZERO]) + } +} + +impl Add for QM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Mersenne31) -> Self { + let [c0, c1] = coeffs(&self); + Self::new([c0 + rhs, c1]) + } +} + +impl AddAssign for QM31 { + #[inline] + fn add_assign(&mut self, rhs: Mersenne31) { + *self = *self + rhs; + } +} + +impl Sub for QM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Mersenne31) -> Self { + let [c0, c1] = coeffs(&self); + Self::new([c0 - rhs, c1]) + } +} + +impl SubAssign for QM31 { + #[inline] + fn sub_assign(&mut self, rhs: Mersenne31) { + *self = *self - rhs; + } +} + +impl Mul for QM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: Mersenne31) -> Self { + let [c0, c1] = coeffs(&self); + Self::new([c0 * rhs, c1 * rhs]) + } +} + +impl MulAssign for QM31 { + #[inline] + fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: Mersenne31) { + *self = *self * rhs; + } +} + +impl Algebra for QM31 {} + +impl BasedVectorSpace for QM31 { + const DIMENSION: usize = 4; + + #[inline] + fn as_basis_coefficients_slice(&self) -> &[Mersenne31] { + // SAFETY: `QM31` is `repr(transparent)` over `[CM31; 2]` and `CM31` + // over `[Mersenne31; 2]`, so `QM31` is layout-identical to + // `[Mersenne31; 4]`. + unsafe { as_base_slice(slice::from_ref(self)) } + } + + #[inline] + fn from_basis_coefficients_fn Mersenne31>(mut f: Fn) -> Self { + Self::new(core::array::from_fn(|i| { + CM31::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|j| f(2 * i + j)) + })) + } + + #[inline] + fn from_basis_coefficients_iter>( + mut iter: I, + ) -> Option { + (iter.len() == 4).then(|| Self::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|_| iter.next().unwrap())) + } + + #[inline] + fn flatten_to_base(vec: Vec) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: `QM31` is layout-identical to `[Mersenne31; 4]` (see + // `as_basis_coefficients_slice`) and has the same alignment as `Mersenne31`. + unsafe { flatten_to_base(vec) } + } + + #[inline] + fn reconstitute_from_base(vec: Vec) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: `QM31` is layout-identical to `[Mersenne31; 4]` (see + // `as_basis_coefficients_slice`) and has the same alignment as `Mersenne31`. + unsafe { reconstitute_from_base(vec) } + } +} + +impl ExtensionField for QM31 { + type ExtensionPacking = PackedQM31; + + #[inline] + fn is_in_basefield(&self) -> bool { + BasedVectorSpace::::as_basis_coefficients_slice(self)[1..] + .iter() + .all(Mersenne31::is_zero) + } + + #[inline] + fn as_base(&self) -> Option { + ExtensionField::::is_in_basefield(self) + .then(|| BasedVectorSpace::::as_basis_coefficients_slice(self)[0]) + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// PackedQM31: SIMD-lane-parallel QM31, two packed CM31 coefficients +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Packed representation of [`QM31`]: two packed `Complex` +/// coefficients, each holding `PackedM31::WIDTH` lanes. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[repr(transparent)] +pub struct PackedQM31(pub [PackedCM31; 2]); + +impl PrimeCharacteristicRing for PackedQM31 { + type PrimeSubfield = Mersenne31; + + const ZERO: Self = Self([PackedCM31::ZERO; 2]); + const ONE: Self = Self([PackedCM31::ONE, PackedCM31::ZERO]); + const TWO: Self = Self([PackedCM31::TWO, PackedCM31::ZERO]); + const NEG_ONE: Self = Self([PackedCM31::NEG_ONE, PackedCM31::ZERO]); + + #[inline] + fn from_prime_subfield(val: Self::PrimeSubfield) -> Self { + Self([PackedCM31::from_prime_subfield(val), PackedCM31::ZERO]) + } + + #[inline] + fn halve(&self) -> Self { + Self(self.0.map(|c| c.halve())) + } + + #[inline] + fn mul_2exp_u64(&self, exp: u64) -> Self { + Self(self.0.map(|c| c.mul_2exp_u64(exp))) + } + + #[inline] + fn div_2exp_u64(&self, exp: u64) -> Self { + Self(self.0.map(|c| c.div_2exp_u64(exp))) + } + + #[inline] + fn zero_vec(len: usize) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: `Self` is `repr(transparent)` over `[PackedCM31; 2]`. + unsafe { reconstitute_from_base(PackedCM31::zero_vec(len * 2)) } + } +} + +impl Neg for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn neg(self) -> Self { + Self(self.0.map(Neg::neg)) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + Self([self.0[0] + rhs.0[0], self.0[1] + rhs.0[1]]) + } +} + +impl AddAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn add_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { + *self = *self + rhs; + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + Self([self.0[0] - rhs.0[0], self.0[1] - rhs.0[1]]) + } +} + +impl SubAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn sub_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { + *self = *self - rhs; + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + // Karatsuba over CM31 with the cheap W = 2 + i correction: + // (a0 + a1 u)(b0 + b1 u) = a0 b0 + W a1 b1 + (a0 b1 + a1 b0) u + // with a0 b1 + a1 b0 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) - a0 b0 - a1 b1, + // for 3 full CM31 multiplications instead of 4. + let [a0, a1] = self.0; + let [b0, b1] = rhs.0; + let m0 = a0 * b0; + let m1 = a1 * b1; + let m2 = (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1); + Self([m0 + packed_mul_by_w(m1), m2 - m0 - m1]) + } +} + +impl MulAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { + *self = *self * rhs; + } +} + +impl core::ops::Div for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[allow(clippy::suspicious_arithmetic_impl)] + #[inline] + fn div(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + self * p3_field::invert_packed_extension::(rhs) + } +} + +impl core::ops::DivAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn div_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { + *self = *self / rhs; + } +} + +impl Sum for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn sum>(iter: I) -> Self { + iter.fold(Self::ZERO, |acc, x| acc + x) + } +} + +impl Product for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn product>(iter: I) -> Self { + iter.fold(Self::ONE, |acc, x| acc * x) + } +} + +// --- Algebra --- + +impl From for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn from(x: QM31) -> Self { + let [c0, c1] = coeffs(&x); + Self([c0.into(), c1.into()]) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: QM31) -> Self { + let [b0, b1] = coeffs(&rhs); + Self([self.0[0] + b0, self.0[1] + b1]) + } +} + +impl AddAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn add_assign(&mut self, rhs: QM31) { + *self = *self + rhs; + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: QM31) -> Self { + let [b0, b1] = coeffs(&rhs); + Self([self.0[0] - b0, self.0[1] - b1]) + } +} + +impl SubAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn sub_assign(&mut self, rhs: QM31) { + *self = *self - rhs; + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: QM31) -> Self { + let [a0, a1] = self.0; + let [b0, b1] = coeffs(&rhs); + let m0 = a0 * b0; + let m1 = a1 * b1; + let m2 = (a0 + a1) * (b0 + b1); + Self([m0 + packed_mul_by_w(m1), m2 - m0 - m1]) + } +} + +impl MulAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: QM31) { + *self = *self * rhs; + } +} + +impl Algebra for PackedQM31 {} + +// --- Algebra --- + +impl From for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn from(x: PackedM31) -> Self { + Self([x.into(), PackedCM31::ZERO]) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: PackedM31) -> Self { + Self([self.0[0] + rhs, self.0[1]]) + } +} + +impl AddAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn add_assign(&mut self, rhs: PackedM31) { + *self = *self + rhs; + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: PackedM31) -> Self { + Self([self.0[0] - rhs, self.0[1]]) + } +} + +impl SubAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn sub_assign(&mut self, rhs: PackedM31) { + *self = *self - rhs; + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedQM31 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: PackedM31) -> Self { + Self([self.0[0] * rhs, self.0[1] * rhs]) + } +} + +impl MulAssign for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: PackedM31) { + *self = *self * rhs; + } +} + +impl Algebra for PackedQM31 {} + +impl BasedVectorSpace for PackedQM31 { + const DIMENSION: usize = 4; + + #[inline] + fn as_basis_coefficients_slice(&self) -> &[PackedM31] { + // SAFETY: `PackedQM31` is `repr(transparent)` over `[PackedCM31; 2]` + // and `PackedCM31` over `[PackedM31; 2]`, so `PackedQM31` is + // layout-identical to `[PackedM31; 4]`. + unsafe { as_base_slice(slice::from_ref(self)) } + } + + #[inline] + fn from_basis_coefficients_fn PackedM31>(mut f: Fn) -> Self { + Self(core::array::from_fn(|i| { + PackedCM31::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|j| f(2 * i + j)) + })) + } + + #[inline] + fn from_basis_coefficients_iter>( + mut iter: I, + ) -> Option { + (iter.len() == 4).then(|| Self::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|_| iter.next().unwrap())) + } +} + +impl rand::distr::Distribution for rand::distr::StandardUniform { + #[inline] + fn sample(&self, rng: &mut R) -> PackedQM31 { + PackedQM31(core::array::from_fn(|_| { + >::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|_| { + self.sample(rng) + }) + })) + } +} + +impl PackedFieldExtension for PackedQM31 { + #[inline] + fn packed_ext_powers(base: QM31) -> Powers { + let width = PackedM31::WIDTH; + let powers = base.powers().collect_n(width + 1); + // Transpose the first WIDTH powers into the lanes. + let current = Self::from_ext_slice(&powers[..width]); + // Broadcast base^WIDTH as the per-step multiplier. + Powers { + base: powers[width].into(), + current, + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use num_bigint::BigUint; + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_field_testing::{test_extension_field, test_field, test_packed_extension_field}; + + use super::*; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type EF = QM31; + + const ZEROS: [EF; 1] = [EF::ZERO]; + const ONES: [EF; 1] = [EF::ONE]; + + // The prime factorization of P^4 - 1 (same multiplicative group as the + // quadratic-over-complex view tested in `extension.rs`). + fn multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() -> [(BigUint, u32); 11] { + [ + (BigUint::from(2u8), 33), + (BigUint::from(3u8), 2), + (BigUint::from(5u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(7u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(11u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(31u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(151u8), 1), + (BigUint::from(331u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(733u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(1709u16), 1), + (BigUint::from(368140581013u64), 1), + ] + } + + test_field!( + super::EF, + &super::ZEROS, + &super::ONES, + &super::multiplicative_group_prime_factorization() + ); + + test_extension_field!(super::F, super::EF); + + type Pef = PackedQM31; + const PACKED_ZEROS: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ZERO]; + const PACKED_ONES: [Pef; 1] = [Pef::ONE]; + test_packed_extension_field!( + super::F, + super::EF, + super::Pef, + &super::PACKED_ZEROS, + &super::PACKED_ONES + ); + + /// The flattened M31 basis order must match the nested CM31 layout. + #[test] + fn flattened_basis_order_matches_nested_layout() { + use p3_field::BasedVectorSpace; + + let x = QM31::new([ + Complex::new_complex(F::new(1), F::new(2)), + Complex::new_complex(F::new(3), F::new(4)), + ]); + let flat = BasedVectorSpace::::as_basis_coefficients_slice(&x); + assert_eq!(flat, &[F::new(1), F::new(2), F::new(3), F::new(4)]); + + let rebuilt = >::from_basis_coefficients_slice(flat).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(rebuilt, x); + } + + /// Packed multiplication must agree with scalar multiplication lane-wise. + #[test] + fn packed_mul_matches_scalar() { + use p3_field::PackedFieldExtension; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let width = ::WIDTH; + let xs: alloc::vec::Vec = (0..width).map(|_| rng.random()).collect(); + let ys: alloc::vec::Vec = (0..width).map(|_| rng.random()).collect(); + + let px = >::from_ext_slice(&xs); + let py = >::from_ext_slice(&ys); + let prod = px * py; + + for lane in 0..width { + assert_eq!( + >::extract(&prod, lane), + xs[lane] * ys[lane] + ); + } + } + + /// The zero-copy `flatten_to_base`/`reconstitute_from_base` overrides must match + /// the basis-coefficient view element by element and round-trip exactly. + #[test] + fn flatten_reconstitute_roundtrip() { + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(7); + let xs: Vec = (0..23).map(|_| rng.random()).collect(); + + let flat = >::flatten_to_base(xs.clone()); + let expected: Vec = xs + .iter() + .flat_map(|x| x.as_basis_coefficients_slice().to_vec()) + .collect(); + assert_eq!(flat, expected); + + let back = >::reconstitute_from_base(flat); + assert_eq!(back, xs); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/radix_2_dit.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/radix_2_dit.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..167468f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/radix_2_dit.rs @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +use p3_dft::TwoAdicSubgroupDft; +use p3_field::extension::Complex; +use p3_field::{PrimeCharacteristicRing, PrimeField64, TwoAdicField}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::{RowMajorMatrix, RowMajorMatrixViewMut}; +use p3_matrix::util::reverse_matrix_index_bits; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; + +use crate::Mersenne31; + +type F = Mersenne31; +type C = Complex; + +#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)] +pub struct Mersenne31ComplexRadix2Dit; + +impl TwoAdicSubgroupDft for Mersenne31ComplexRadix2Dit { + type Evaluations = RowMajorMatrix; + fn dft_batch(&self, mut mat: RowMajorMatrix) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let h = mat.height(); + let log_h = log2_strict_usize(h); + + let root = C::two_adic_generator(log_h); + let twiddles = root.powers().collect_n(h / 2); + + // DIT butterfly + reverse_matrix_index_bits(&mut mat); + for layer in 0..log_h { + dit_layer(&mut mat.as_view_mut(), layer, &twiddles); + } + mat + } +} + +// NB: Most of what follows is copypasta from `dft/src/radix_2_dit.rs`. +// This is ugly, but the alternative is finding another way to "inject" +// the specialisation of the butterfly evaluation to Mersenne31Complex +// (in `dit_butterfly_inner()` below) into the existing structure. + +/// One layer of a DIT butterfly network. +fn dit_layer(mat: &mut RowMajorMatrixViewMut<'_, C>, layer: usize, twiddles: &[C]) { + let h = mat.height(); + let log_h = log2_strict_usize(h); + let layer_rev = log_h - 1 - layer; + + let half_block_size = 1 << layer; + let block_size = half_block_size * 2; + + for j in (0..h).step_by(block_size) { + // Unroll i=0 case + let butterfly_hi = j; + let butterfly_lo = butterfly_hi + half_block_size; + twiddle_free_butterfly(mat, butterfly_hi, butterfly_lo); + + for i in 1..half_block_size { + let butterfly_hi = j + i; + let butterfly_lo = butterfly_hi + half_block_size; + let twiddle = twiddles[i << layer_rev]; + dit_butterfly(mat, butterfly_hi, butterfly_lo, twiddle); + } + } +} + +#[inline] +fn twiddle_free_butterfly(mat: &mut RowMajorMatrixViewMut<'_, C>, row_1: usize, row_2: usize) { + let ((shorts_1, suffix_1), (shorts_2, suffix_2)) = mat.packed_row_pair_mut(row_1, row_2); + + // TODO: There's no special packing for Mersenne31Complex at the + // time of writing; when there is we'll want to expand this out + // into three separate loops. + let row_1 = shorts_1.iter_mut().chain(suffix_1); + let row_2 = shorts_2.iter_mut().chain(suffix_2); + + for (x, y) in row_1.zip(row_2) { + let sum = *x + *y; + let diff = *x - *y; + *x = sum; + *y = diff; + } +} + +#[inline] +fn dit_butterfly(mat: &mut RowMajorMatrixViewMut<'_, C>, row_1: usize, row_2: usize, twiddle: C) { + let ((shorts_1, suffix_1), (shorts_2, suffix_2)) = mat.packed_row_pair_mut(row_1, row_2); + + // TODO: There's no special packing for Mersenne31Complex at the + // time of writing; when there is we'll want to expand this out + // into three separate loops. + let row_1 = shorts_1.iter_mut().chain(suffix_1); + let row_2 = shorts_2.iter_mut().chain(suffix_2); + + for (x, y) in row_1.zip(row_2) { + dit_butterfly_inner(x, y, twiddle); + } +} + +/// Given x, y, and twiddle, return the "butterfly values" +/// x' = x + y*twiddle and y' = x - y*twiddle. +/// +/// NB: At the time of writing, replacing the straight-forward +/// implementation +/// +/// let sum = *x + *y * twiddle; +/// let diff = *x - *y * twiddle; +/// *x = sum; +/// *y = diff; +/// +/// with the one below approximately halved the runtime of a DFT over +/// `Mersenne31Complex`. +#[inline] +fn dit_butterfly_inner(x: &mut C, y: &mut C, twiddle: C) { + // Adding any multiple of P doesn't change the result modulo P; + // we use this to ensure that the inputs to `from_u64` + // below are non-negative. + const P_SQR: i64 = (F::ORDER_U64 * F::ORDER_U64) as i64; + const TWO_P_SQR: i64 = 2 * P_SQR; + + // Unpack the inputs; + // x = x1 + i*x2 + // y = y1 + i*y2 + // twiddle = w1 + i*w2 + let unpack = |x: C| (x.to_array()[0].value as i64, x.to_array()[1].value as i64); + let (x1, x2) = unpack(*x); + let (y1, y2) = unpack(*y); + let (w1, w2) = unpack(twiddle); + + // x ± y*twiddle + // = (x1 + i*x2) ± (y1 + i*y2)*(w1 + i*w2) + // = (x1 ± (y1*w1 - y2*w2)) + i*(x2 ± (y2*w1 + y1*w2)) + // = (x1 ± z1) + i*(x2 ± z2) + // where z1 + i*z2 = y*twiddle + + // SAFE: multiplying `u64` values within the range of `Mersennes31` doesn't overflow: + // (2^31 - 1) * (2^31 - 1) = 2^62 - 2^32 + 1 < 2^64 - 1 + let z1 = y1 * w1 - y2 * w2; // -P^2 <= z1 <= P^2 + + // NB: 2*P^2 + P < 2^63 + + // -P^2 <= x1 + z1 <= P^2 + P + let a1 = F::from_u64((P_SQR + x1 + z1) as u64); + // -P^2 <= x1 - z1 <= P^2 + P + let b1 = F::from_u64((P_SQR + x1 - z1) as u64); + + // SAFE: multiplying `u64` values within the range of `Mersennes31` doesn't overflow: + // 2 * (2^31 - 1) * (2^31 - 1) = 2 * (2^62 - 2^32 + 1) < 2^64 - 1 + let z2 = y2 * w1 + y1 * w2; // 0 <= z2 <= 2*P^2 + + // 0 <= x2 + z2 <= 2*P^2 + P + let a2 = F::from_u64((x2 + z2) as u64); + // -2*P^2 <= x2 - z2 <= P + let b2 = F::from_u64((TWO_P_SQR + x2 - z2) as u64); + + *x = C::new_complex(a1, a2); + *y = C::new_complex(b1, b2); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mds.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mds.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54bd3b23 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mds.rs @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +//! Packed MDS permutation for Mersenne31 on x86_64 AVX2. +//! +//! Implements [`Permutation`] and [`MdsPermutation`] for +//! `[PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]` by applying the scalar circulant MDS +//! independently to each of the eight AVX2 lanes. +//! +//! Each [`PackedMersenne31AVX2`] element holds 8 `Mersenne31` values in a +//! `__m256i` register. The MDS is applied per-lane: unpack → scalar +//! MDS → repack, reusing the optimised Karatsuba convolution from +//! [`MdsMatrixMersenne31`]. + +use p3_mds::MdsPermutation; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + +/// Apply the scalar MDS to each AVX2 lane independently. +/// +/// Extracts one scalar state per lane, runs the circulant MDS +/// convolution, then writes the results back into the packed state. +#[inline] +fn mds_packed( + mds: &MdsMatrixMersenne31, + input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + for lane in 0..8 { + let mut scalar_state: [Mersenne31; WIDTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| input[i].0[lane]); + mds.permute_mut(&mut scalar_state); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + input[i].0[lane] = scalar_state[i]; + } + } +} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; 8]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 8]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; 12]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 12]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; 16]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 16]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; 32]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 32]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; 64]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 64]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + macro_rules! proptest_avx2_mds { + ($name:ident, $width:literal, $uniform:ident) => { + proptest! { + #[test] + fn $name(input in prop::array::$uniform(arb_f())) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let avx2_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected); + } + } + }; + } + + proptest_avx2_mds!(mds_avx2_matches_scalar_8, 8, uniform8); + proptest_avx2_mds!(mds_avx2_matches_scalar_12, 12, uniform12); + proptest_avx2_mds!(mds_avx2_matches_scalar_16, 16, uniform16); + proptest_avx2_mds!(mds_avx2_matches_scalar_32, 32, uniform32); + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn mds_avx2_matches_scalar_64( + a in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + b in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + ) { + let mut input = [F::ZERO; 64]; + input[..32].copy_from_slice(&a); + input[32..].copy_from_slice(&b); + + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let avx2_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa9b2696 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +mod mds; +mod packing; +mod poseidon1; +mod poseidon2; +mod utils; + +pub use packing::*; +pub use poseidon1::*; +pub use poseidon2::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/packing.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/packing.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c10c1b56 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/packing.rs @@ -0,0 +1,552 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m256i}; +use core::iter::{Product, Sum}; +use core::mem::transmute; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Div, DivAssign, Mul, MulAssign, Neg, Sub, SubAssign}; + +use p3_field::exponentiation::exp_1717986917; +use p3_field::interleave::{interleave_u32, interleave_u64, interleave_u128}; +use p3_field::op_assign_macros::{ + impl_add_assign, impl_add_base_field, impl_div_methods, impl_mul_base_field, impl_mul_methods, + impl_packed_field_div, impl_packed_value, impl_rng, impl_sub_assign, impl_sub_base_field, + impl_sum_prod_base_field, ring_sum, +}; +use p3_field::{ + Algebra, Field, InjectiveMonomial, PackedField, PackedFieldPow2, PackedValue, + PermutationMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing, impl_packed_field_pow_2, mm256_mod_add, + mm256_mod_sub, +}; +use p3_util::reconstitute_from_base; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand::{Rng, RngExt}; + +use crate::{Mersenne31, mul_2exp_i}; + +const WIDTH: usize = 8; +pub(crate) const P: __m256i = unsafe { transmute::<[u32; WIDTH], _>([0x7fffffff; WIDTH]) }; +/// The low 31 bits of each 64-bit lane, used to mask off the high half during folding. +const LOW31_64: __m256i = unsafe { transmute::<[u64; 4], _>([0x7fffffff; 4]) }; + +/// Vectorized AVX2 implementation of `Mersenne31` arithmetic. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[repr(transparent)] // Needed to make `transmute`s safe. +#[must_use] +pub struct PackedMersenne31AVX2(pub [Mersenne31; WIDTH]); + +impl PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + #[inline] + #[must_use] + /// Get an arch-specific vector representing the packed values. + pub(crate) fn to_vector(self) -> __m256i { + unsafe { + // Safety: `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to `u32`. It + // follows that `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` can be transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]`, which can be + // transmuted to `__m256i`, since arrays are guaranteed to be contiguous in memory. + // Finally `PackedMersenne31AVX2` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to + // `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]`. + transmute(self) + } + } + + #[inline] + /// Make a packed field vector from an arch-specific vector. + /// + /// SAFETY: The caller must ensure that each element of `vector` represents a valid + /// `Mersenne31`. In particular, each element of vector must be in `0..=P`. + pub(crate) unsafe fn from_vector(vector: __m256i) -> Self { + unsafe { + // Safety: It is up to the user to ensure that elements of `vector` represent valid + // `Mersenne31` values. We must only reason about memory representations. `__m256i` can be + // transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]` (since arrays elements are contiguous in memory), which can + // be transmuted to `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` (since `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)`), which + // in turn can be transmuted to `PackedMersenne31AVX2` (since `PackedMersenne31AVX2` is also + // `repr(transparent)`). + transmute(vector) + } + } + + /// Copy `value` to all positions in a packed vector. This is the same as + /// `From::from`, but `const`. + #[inline] + const fn broadcast(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self([value; WIDTH]) + } +} + +impl From for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + #[inline] + fn from(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self::broadcast(value) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mm256_mod_add(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mm256_mod_add` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mm256_mod_sub(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `sub` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Neg for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn neg(self) -> Self { + let val = self.to_vector(); + let res = neg(val); + unsafe { + // Safety: `neg` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mul(lhs, rhs); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mul` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl_add_assign!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); +impl_sub_assign!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); +impl_mul_methods!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); +ring_sum!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); +impl_rng!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); + +impl PrimeCharacteristicRing for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type PrimeSubfield = Mersenne31; + + const ZERO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ZERO); + const ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ONE); + const TWO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::TWO); + const NEG_ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::NEG_ONE); + + #[inline] + fn from_prime_subfield(f: Self::PrimeSubfield) -> Self { + f.into() + } + + #[inline] + fn halve(&self) -> Self { + // 2^{-1} = 2^30 mod P so we implement halve by multiplying by 2^30. + mul_2exp_i::<30, 1>(*self) + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn exp_const_u64(&self) -> Self { + // We provide specialised code for power 5 as this turns up regularly. + // The other powers could be specialised similarly but we ignore this for now. + // These ideas could also be used to speed up the more generic exp_u64. + match POWER { + 0 => Self::ONE, + 1 => *self, + 2 => self.square(), + 3 => self.cube(), + 4 => self.square().square(), + 5 => unsafe { + let val = self.to_vector(); + Self::from_vector(exp5(val)) + }, + 6 => self.square().cube(), + 7 => { + let x2 = self.square(); + let x3 = x2 * *self; + let x4 = x2.square(); + x3 * x4 + } + _ => self.exp_u64(POWER), + } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn zero_vec(len: usize) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: this is a repr(transparent) wrapper around an array. + unsafe { reconstitute_from_base(Mersenne31::zero_vec(len * WIDTH)) } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn dot_product(u: &[Self; N], v: &[Self; N]) -> Self { + dot_product::(u, v) + } +} + +// Degree of the smallest permutation polynomial for Mersenne31. +// +// As p - 1 = 2×3^2×7×11×... the smallest choice for a degree D satisfying gcd(p - 1, D) = 1 is 5. +impl InjectiveMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31AVX2 {} + +impl PermutationMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + /// In the field `Mersenne31`, `a^{1/5}` is equal to a^{1717986917}. + /// + /// This follows from the calculation `5 * 1717986917 = 4*(2^31 - 2) + 1 = 1 mod p - 1`. + fn injective_exp_root_n(&self) -> Self { + exp_1717986917(*self) + } +} + +impl_add_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31); +impl_sub_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31); +impl_mul_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31); +impl_div_methods!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31); +impl_packed_field_div!(PackedMersenne31AVX2); +impl_sum_prod_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31); + +impl Algebra for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + // Benchmarked on AVX2: chunk=32 ≈ 73ns, chunk=4 ≈ 74ns, chunk=8 ≈ 74ns. + const BATCHED_LC_CHUNK: usize = 32; + + #[inline(always)] + fn mixed_dot_product(a: &[Self; N], f: &[Mersenne31; N]) -> Self { + mixed_dot_product::(a, f) + } +} + +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn movehdup_epi32(x: __m256i) -> __m256i { + // The instruction is only available in the floating-point flavor; this distinction is only for + // historical reasons and no longer matters. We cast to floats, duplicate, and cast back. + unsafe { + x86_64::_mm256_castps_si256(x86_64::_mm256_movehdup_ps(x86_64::_mm256_castsi256_ps(x))) + } +} + +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn moveldup_epi32(x: __m256i) -> __m256i { + // This instruction is only available in the floating-point flavor; this distinction is only for + // historical reasons and no longer matters. We cast to floats, duplicate, and cast back. + unsafe { + x86_64::_mm256_castps_si256(x86_64::_mm256_moveldup_ps(x86_64::_mm256_castsi256_ps(x))) + } +} + +/// Multiply vectors of Mersenne-31 field elements represented as values in {0, ..., P}. +/// If the inputs do not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn mul(lhs: __m256i, rhs: __m256i) -> __m256i { + // We want this to compile to: + // vpsrlq lhs_odd_dbl, lhs, 31 + // vmovshdup rhs_odd, rhs + // vpmuludq prod_odd_dbl, lhs_odd_dbl, rhs_odd + // vpmuludq prod_evn, lhs, rhs + // vpsllq prod_odd_lo_dirty, prod_odd_dbl, 31 + // vpsrlq prod_evn_hi, prod_evn, 31 + // vpblendd prod_lo_dirty, prod_evn, prod_odd_lo_dirty, aah + // vpblendd prod_hi, prod_evn_hi, prod_odd_dbl, aah + // vpand prod_lo, prod_lo_dirty, P + // vpaddd t, prod_lo, prod_hi + // vpsubd u, t, P + // vpminud res, t, u + // throughput: 4 cyc/vec (2 els/cyc) + // latency: 13 cyc + unsafe { + // vpmuludq only reads the bottom 32 bits of every 64-bit quadword. + // The even indices are already in the bottom 32 bits of a quadword, so we can leave them. + let lhs_evn = lhs; + let rhs_evn = rhs; + // Right shift by 31 is equivalent to moving the high 32 bits down to the low 32, and then + // doubling it. So these are the odd indices in lhs, but doubled. + let lhs_odd_dbl = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi64::<31>(lhs); + // Copy the high 32 bits in each quadword of rhs down to the low 32. + let rhs_odd = movehdup_epi32(rhs); + + // Multiply odd indices; since lhs_odd_dbl is doubled, these products are also doubled. + // prod_odd_dbl.quadword[i] = 2 * lsh.doubleword[2 * i + 1] * rhs.doubleword[2 * i + 1] + let prod_odd_dbl = x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(rhs_odd, lhs_odd_dbl); + // Multiply even indices. + // prod_evn.quadword[i] = lsh.doubleword[2 * i] * rhs.doubleword[2 * i] + let prod_evn = x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(rhs_evn, lhs_evn); + + // We now need to extract the low 31 bits and the high 31 bits of each 62 bit product and + // prepare to add them. + // Put the low 31 bits of the product (recall that it is shifted left by 1) in an odd + // doubleword. (Notice that the high 31 bits are already in an odd doubleword in + // prod_odd_dbl.) We will still need to clear the sign bit, hence we mark it _dirty. + let prod_odd_lo_dirty = x86_64::_mm256_slli_epi64::<31>(prod_odd_dbl); + // Put the high 31 bits in an even doubleword, again noting that in prod_evn the even + // doublewords contain the low 31 bits (with a dirty sign bit). + let prod_evn_hi = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi64::<31>(prod_evn); + + // Put all the low halves of all the products into one vector. Take the even values from + // prod_evn and odd values from prod_odd_lo_dirty. Note that the sign bits still need + // clearing. + let prod_lo_dirty = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(prod_evn, prod_odd_lo_dirty); + // Now put all the high halves into one vector. The even values come from prod_evn_hi and + // the odd values come from prod_odd_dbl. + let prod_hi = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(prod_evn_hi, prod_odd_dbl); + // Clear the most significant bit. + let prod_lo = x86_64::_mm256_and_si256(prod_lo_dirty, P); + + // Standard addition of two 31-bit values. + mm256_mod_add(prod_lo, prod_hi, P) + } +} + +/// Negate a vector of Mersenne-31 field elements represented as values in {0, ..., P}. +/// If the input does not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn neg(val: __m256i) -> __m256i { + // We want this to compile to: + // vpxor res, val, P + // throughput: .33 cyc/vec (24 els/cyc) + // latency: 1 cyc + + // Since val is in {0, ..., P (= 2^31 - 1)}, res = val XOR P = P - val. Then res is in {0, + // ..., P}. + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + x86_64::_mm256_xor_si256(val, P) + } +} + +/// Reduce a representative in {0, ..., P^2} +/// to a representative in [-P, P]. If the input is greater than P^2, the output will +/// still correspond to the same class but will instead lie in [-P, 2^34]. +#[inline(always)] +fn partial_reduce_neg(x: __m256i) -> __m256i { + unsafe { + // Get the top bits shifted down. + let hi = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi64::<31>(x); + + const LOW31: __m256i = unsafe { transmute::<[u64; 4], _>([0x7fffffff; 4]) }; + // nand instead of and means this returns P - lo. + let neg_lo = x86_64::_mm256_andnot_si256(x, LOW31); + + // Compiling with sub_epi64 vs sub_epi32 both produce reasonable code so we use + // sub_epi64 for the slightly greater flexibility. + // See: https://godbolt.org/z/WPze9e3f3 + x86_64::_mm256_sub_epi64(hi, neg_lo) + } +} + +/// Compute the square of the Mersenne-31 field elements located in the even indices. +/// These field elements are represented as values in {-P, ..., P}. If the even inputs +/// do not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +/// Values in odd indices are ignored. +/// Output will contain 0's in odd indices. +#[inline(always)] +fn square_unred(x: __m256i) -> __m256i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let x2 = x86_64::_mm256_mul_epi32(x, x); + partial_reduce_neg(x2) + } +} + +/// Compute the permutation x -> x^5 on Mersenne-31 field elements +/// represented as values in {0, ..., P}. If the inputs do not conform +/// to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn exp5(x: __m256i) -> __m256i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let input_evn = x; + let input_odd = movehdup_epi32(x); + + let evn_sq = square_unred(input_evn); + let odd_sq = square_unred(input_odd); + + let evn_4 = square_unred(evn_sq); + let odd_4 = square_unred(odd_sq); + + let evn_5 = x86_64::_mm256_mul_epi32(evn_4, input_evn); + let odd_5 = x86_64::_mm256_mul_epi32(odd_4, input_odd); + + // Marked dirty as the top bit needs to be cleared. + let odd_5_lo_dirty = moveldup_epi32(odd_5); + let odd_5_hi = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64(odd_5, odd_5); + let evn_5_hi = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi64::<31>(evn_5); + + // Marked dirty as the top bit needs to be cleared. + let lo_dirty = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(evn_5, odd_5_lo_dirty); + let hi = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(evn_5_hi, odd_5_hi); + let lo = x86_64::_mm256_and_si256(lo_dirty, P); + let corr = x86_64::_mm256_sign_epi32(P, hi); + let t = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi32(hi, lo); + let u = x86_64::_mm256_sub_epi32(t, corr); + + x86_64::_mm256_min_epu32(t, u) + } +} + +/// Fold a vector of four 64-bit accumulators once: given `val`, return `res = val (mod P)` +/// with `res <= (val >> 31) + P` in the low 32 bits of each lane. +/// +/// Uses `2^31 = 1 (mod P)`: writing `val = hi * 2^31 + lo` with `lo <= P`, we have +/// `val = hi + lo (mod P)`. Applied twice, any `val < 2^64` is brought to `0..=2 P`. +#[inline(always)] +#[must_use] +fn fold_u64(val: __m256i) -> __m256i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let lo = x86_64::_mm256_and_si256(val, LOW31_64); + let hi = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi64::<31>(val); + x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64(lo, hi) + } +} + +/// Compute the dot product of `u` and `v` lanewise, deferring the Mersenne reduction. +/// +/// Each product fits in 62 bits, so the raw `32x32 -> 64`-bit products are accumulated in +/// 64-bit lanes (even and odd 32-bit indices kept apart, since `vpmuludq` reads only the +/// low half of each 64-bit lane). Inputs are in `0..=P`, so a product is at most `P^2`; +/// folding the accumulators below `2^33` every 3 iterations keeps `2^33 + 3 * P^2 < 2^64`, +/// so the lanes never overflow. +#[inline] +fn dot_product( + u: &[PackedMersenne31AVX2; N], + v: &[PackedMersenne31AVX2; N], +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let mut acc_evn = x86_64::_mm256_setzero_si256(); + let mut acc_odd = x86_64::_mm256_setzero_si256(); + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let lhs = u[i].to_vector(); + let rhs = v[i].to_vector(); + acc_evn = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64(acc_evn, x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(lhs, rhs)); + acc_odd = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64( + acc_odd, + x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(movehdup_epi32(lhs), movehdup_epi32(rhs)), + ); + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 { + unreduced = 0; + acc_evn = fold_u64(acc_evn); + acc_odd = fold_u64(acc_odd); + } + } + + // At most 2 unreduced products sit on top of a folded value: the lanes are below + // `2^33 + 2 * P^2 < 2^64`, so two folds bring them to `0..=2 P` in the low 32 bits. + let evn = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_evn)); + let odd = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_odd)); + + // The even results sit in the low 32 bits of each 64-bit lane (indices 0, 2, 4, 6); + // shift the odd results up into the high halves (indices 1, 3, 5, 7) and merge. + let odd_shifted = x86_64::_mm256_slli_epi64::<32>(odd); + let t = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(evn, odd_shifted); + + // Final reduction of values in `0..=2 P` to the canonical `0..=P`. + let t_sub_p = x86_64::_mm256_sub_epi32(t, P); + PackedMersenne31AVX2::from_vector(x86_64::_mm256_min_epu32(t, t_sub_p)) + } +} + +/// Compute the dot product of `u` (packed) and `v` (scalar coefficients), deferring the +/// Mersenne reduction. Each `v[i]` is broadcast across the packing lanes before +/// multiplying, so this follows the same overflow argument as `dot_product`. +/// +/// A broadcast vector already has every lane equal, so the odd/even shuffle used to +/// separate `dot_product`'s two operands is unnecessary on the broadcast side. +#[inline] +fn mixed_dot_product( + u: &[PackedMersenne31AVX2; N], + v: &[Mersenne31; N], +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let mut acc_evn = x86_64::_mm256_setzero_si256(); + let mut acc_odd = x86_64::_mm256_setzero_si256(); + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let lhs = u[i].to_vector(); + let rhs = x86_64::_mm256_set1_epi32(v[i].value as i32); + acc_evn = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64(acc_evn, x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(lhs, rhs)); + acc_odd = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi64( + acc_odd, + x86_64::_mm256_mul_epu32(movehdup_epi32(lhs), rhs), + ); + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 { + unreduced = 0; + acc_evn = fold_u64(acc_evn); + acc_odd = fold_u64(acc_odd); + } + } + + let evn = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_evn)); + let odd = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_odd)); + + let odd_shifted = x86_64::_mm256_slli_epi64::<32>(odd); + let t = x86_64::_mm256_blend_epi32::<0b10101010>(evn, odd_shifted); + + let t_sub_p = x86_64::_mm256_sub_epi32(t, P); + PackedMersenne31AVX2::from_vector(x86_64::_mm256_min_epu32(t, t_sub_p)) + } +} + +impl_packed_value!(PackedMersenne31AVX2, Mersenne31, WIDTH); + +unsafe impl PackedField for PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + type Scalar = Mersenne31; +} + +impl_packed_field_pow_2!( + PackedMersenne31AVX2; + [ + (1, interleave_u32), + (2, interleave_u64), + (4, interleave_u128) + ], + WIDTH +); + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field_testing::{test_packed_field, test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary}; + + use super::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + + /// Zero has a redundant representation, so let's test both. + const ZEROS: PackedMersenne31AVX2 = PackedMersenne31AVX2(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, + 0x7fffffff, + ])); + + const SPECIAL_VALS: PackedMersenne31AVX2 = PackedMersenne31AVX2(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000001, 0x7ffffffe, 0x00000002, 0x7ffffffd, 0x40000000, + 0x3fffffff, + ])); + + test_packed_field!( + crate::PackedMersenne31AVX2, + &[super::ZEROS], + &[crate::PackedMersenne31AVX2::ONE], + super::SPECIAL_VALS + ); + + test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary!(crate::PackedMersenne31AVX2); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon1.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon1.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d3325dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon1.rs @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +//! AVX2-optimized Poseidon1 permutation layers for Mersenne31. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::__m256i; + +use p3_field::InjectiveMonomial; +use p3_poseidon1::external::{ + FullRoundConstants, FullRoundLayer, FullRoundLayerConstructor, mds_multiply, +}; +use p3_poseidon1::internal::{ + PartialRoundConstants, PartialRoundLayer, PartialRoundLayerConstructor, cheap_matmul, + partial_permute_state, +}; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use super::utils::{add_rc_and_sbox, convert_to_vec_neg_form}; +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + +/// AVX2-optimized external (full-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Stores round constants in two forms: +/// - **Scalar** (`FullRoundConstants`) — used by the +/// scalar fallback path (`FullRoundLayer`). +/// - **Packed** (`Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]>`) — each constant broadcast to +/// all eight AVX2 lanes in negative form, enabling the fused [`add_rc_and_sbox`] path. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: FullRoundConstants, + packed_initial_constants: Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]>, + packed_terminal_constants: Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl FullRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: FullRoundConstants) -> Self { + let pack_rc = |rcs: &[[Mersenne31; WIDTH]]| -> Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]> { + rcs.iter() + .map(|rc| rc.map(|c| convert_to_vec_neg_form(c.value as i32))) + .collect() + }; + let packed_initial_constants = pack_rc(&constants.initial); + let packed_terminal_constants = pack_rc(&constants.terminal); + Self { + constants, + packed_initial_constants, + packed_terminal_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Apply a sequence of full rounds using AVX2-packed negative-form constants. +/// +/// For each round: fuse `add_rc + x^5` via [`add_rc_and_sbox`], then +/// apply the MDS via the permutation trait. +#[inline] +fn full_rounds_packed( + state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH], + packed_constants: &[[__m256i; WIDTH]], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]>, +{ + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for rc in packed_constants { + for (s, &c) in state.iter_mut().zip(rc.iter()) { + add_rc_and_sbox(s, c); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } +} + +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_initial_constants); + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_terminal_constants); + } +} + +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.initial { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.terminal { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } +} + +/// AVX2-optimized internal (partial-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Uses the sparse matrix decomposition from the Poseidon paper (Appendix B). +/// Constants are stored as scalar `Mersenne31` values; the `Algebra` +/// impl on `PackedMersenne31AVX2` handles broadcasting during multiplication. +/// +/// Each partial round applies the S-box only to `state[0]`, then performs +/// a cheap sparse matrix-vector product via [`cheap_matmul`]. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: PartialRoundConstants, +} + +impl PartialRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: PartialRoundConstants) -> Self { + Self { constants } + } +} + +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]) { + for (s, &rc) in state + .iter_mut() + .zip(self.constants.first_round_constants.iter()) + { + *s += rc; + } + + mds_multiply(state, &self.constants.m_i); + + let rounds_p = self.constants.sparse_first_row.len(); + + for r in 0..rounds_p - 1 { + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + state[0] += self.constants.round_constants[r]; + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[r], + &self.constants.v[r], + ); + } + + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[rounds_p - 1], + &self.constants.v[rounds_p - 1], + ); + } +} + +/// Scalar fallback: delegates to the generic partial-round implementation. +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + partial_permute_state::(state, &self.constants); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::poseidon1::{default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16, default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32}; + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + /// Known-answer test for width 16 through the AVX2 packed path. + #[test] + fn test_avx2_poseidon1_width_16() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let input: [F; 16] = F::new_array([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]); + + let expected: [F; 16] = F::new_array([ + 763678880, 1665665156, 138326798, 2029009038, 523315643, 1240724959, 799985579, + 1533764468, 1851415257, 580298256, 158301910, 1486286674, 1604442932, 919070942, + 791307160, 922090452, + ]); + + let mut avx2_input = input.map(Into::::into); + perm.permute_mut(&mut avx2_input); + + for lane in 0..avx2_input[0].0.len() { + let avx2_output = avx2_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + /// Known-answer test for width 32 through the AVX2 packed path. + #[test] + fn test_avx2_poseidon1_width_32() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let input: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, + 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 493956664, 1487097341, 1986839634, 1423871566, 183460581, 827438159, 7996988, + 141241897, 1403482130, 847367286, 2077667889, 1108646476, 1352254530, 1822401306, + 809224972, 1606586582, 1039326136, 622010047, 1526365331, 1585000638, 1938294847, + 559133752, 570966981, 1111956911, 1758188893, 1919461707, 940683889, 1707731554, + 1949319314, 1540753789, 1964681567, 229242586, + ]); + + let mut avx2_input = input.map(Into::::into); + perm.permute_mut(&mut avx2_input); + + for lane in 0..avx2_input[0].0.len() { + let avx2_output = avx2_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn poseidon1_avx2_matches_scalar_width_16( + input in prop::array::uniform16(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31AVX2::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + #[test] + fn poseidon1_avx2_matches_scalar_width_32( + input in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31AVX2::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon2.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon2.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01e925d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/poseidon2.rs @@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m256i}; +use core::mem::transmute; + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_poseidon2::{ + ExternalLayer, ExternalLayerConstants, ExternalLayerConstructor, InternalLayer, + InternalLayerConstructor, MDSMat4, external_initial_permute_state, + external_terminal_permute_state, +}; + +use super::utils::{add_rc_and_sbox, convert_to_vec_neg_form}; +use crate::{Mersenne31, P, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + +/// The internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// The packed constants are stored in negative form as this allows some optimizations. +/// This means given a constant `x`, we treat it as an `i32` and +/// pack 8 copies of `x - P` into the corresponding `__m256i` packed constant. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) internal_constants: Vec, + packed_internal_constants: Vec<__m256i>, +} + +impl InternalLayerConstructor for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// We save the round constants in the {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard + /// {0, ..., P} one. This saves several instructions later. + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + Self::new_from_constants(internal_constants) + } +} + +/// The external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// The packed constants are stored in negative form as this allows some optimizations. +/// This means given a constant `x`, we treat it as an `i32` and +/// pack 8 copies of `x - P` into the corresponding `__m256i` packed constant. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants, + packed_initial_external_constants: Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]>, + packed_terminal_external_constants: Vec<[__m256i; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl ExternalLayerConstructor + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + Self::new_from_constants(external_constants) + } +} + +impl Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Construct an instance of Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 from a vector containing + /// the constants for each round. Internally, the constants are transformed into the + /// {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard {0, ..., P} one. + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + let packed_internal_constants = internal_constants + .iter() + .map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32)) + .collect(); + Self { + internal_constants, + packed_internal_constants, + } + } +} + +impl Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Construct an instance of Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 from an array of + /// vectors containing the constants for each round. Internally, the constants + /// are transformed into the {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard {0, ..., P} one. + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + let packed_initial_external_constants = external_constants + .get_initial_constants() + .iter() + .map(|array| array.map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32))) + .collect(); + let packed_terminal_external_constants = external_constants + .get_terminal_constants() + .iter() + .map(|array| array.map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32))) + .collect(); + Self { + external_constants, + packed_initial_external_constants, + packed_terminal_external_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Compute the map `x -> 2^I x` on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// +/// `x` must be represented as a value in `[0, P]`. +/// This requires 2 generic parameters, `I` and `I_PRIME` satisfying `I + I_PRIME = 31`. +/// If the inputs do not conform to this representations, the result is undefined. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn mul_2exp_i( + val: PackedMersenne31AVX2, +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + /* + We want this to compile to: + vpslld hi_dirty, val, I + vpsrld lo, val, 31 - I + vpand hi, hi_dirty, P + vpor res, lo, hi + throughput: 1.33 cyc/vec + latency: 3 cyc + */ + const { + assert!(I + I_PRIME == 31); + } + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let input = val.to_vector(); + + // In M31, multiplication by 2^n corresponds to a cyclic rotation which + // is much faster than the naive multiplication method. + + // Shift the low bits up. This also shifts something unwanted into + // the sign bit so we mark it dirty. + let hi_bits_dirty = x86_64::_mm256_slli_epi32::(input); + + // Shift the high bits down. + let lo_bits = x86_64::_mm256_srli_epi32::(input); + + // Clear the sign bit. + let hi_bits = x86_64::_mm256_and_si256(hi_bits_dirty, P); + + // Combine the lo and high bits. + let output = x86_64::_mm256_or_si256(lo_bits, hi_bits); + PackedMersenne31AVX2::from_vector(output) + } +} + +/// Compute the map `x -> 2^15 x` on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// +/// `x` must be represented as a value in `[0, P]`. +/// If the input does not conform to this representations, the result is undefined. +/// This has higher throughput and higher latency than mul_2exp_i so should be used +/// in contexts where latency is less important. +#[inline(always)] +fn mul_2exp_15(val: PackedMersenne31AVX2) -> PackedMersenne31AVX2 { + /* + We want this to compile to: + vpmaddwd neg_madds, val, C + vpaddd dirty_neg_res, neg_madds, P + vpandn res, dirty_neg_res, P + throughput: 1 cyc/vec + latency: 7 cyc + + The following is a proof that this works: + Let our input be x which we can decompose as (x_lo + 2^{16}x_hi). + Additionally let x_n denote the n'th binary digit of x. + + Our goal is to output y = 2^15x = 2^15x_lo + 2^{31}x_hi = x_hi + 2^{15}x_lo + Note additionally that x_hi + 2^{15}x_lo < 2^31 as x_lo < 2^16 and x_hi < 2^15. + + On each 32 bit lane vpmaddwd signed multiplies matching 16 bit integers and adds the result. + Hence setting C = [[-2^{15}, -1]; 8], the first instruction outputs + + -x_hi - 2^{15}(x_lo - 2^{16}x_{16}) (The x_{16} appears as we interpret x_lo as a signed integer). + = -(x_hi + 2^{15}x_lo) + 2^{31}x_{16} + = -y + 2^{31}x_{16} + + Next, we add P = 2^31 - 1 to this, giving us: + -y + 2^{31}x_{16} + P = 2^31(1 + x_{16}) + (- y - 1) mod 2^32. + Note that -y-1 is exactly (NOT y) as y + (NOT y) = - 1 so we are left with: + + 2^31(1 + x_{16}) + (NOT y) + + As we know y < 2^31, we simply do a NOT followed by clearing the sign bit + this is exactly what vpandn accomplishes (with third argument equal to P.) + + */ + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let input = val.to_vector(); + + const C: __m256i = unsafe { transmute([[(-1_i16) << 15, -1_i16]; 8]) }; + + let neg_madds = x86_64::_mm256_madd_epi16(input, C); + let dirty_neg_output = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi32(neg_madds, P); + let output = x86_64::_mm256_andnot_si256(dirty_neg_output, P); + + PackedMersenne31AVX2::from_vector(output) + } +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 16 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] +/// i.e. The first entry is -2 and all other entries are powers of 2. +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 16]) { + // The first three entries involve multiplication by -2, 1, 2 which are simple: + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; // add is 3 instructions whereas shift is 4. + + // For the remaining entries we use our fast shift code. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_15(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[15]); +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 24 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] +/// i.e. The first entry is -2 and all other entries are powers of 2. +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 24]) { + // The first three entries involve multiplication by -2, 1, 2 which are simple: + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; // add is 3 instructions whereas shift is 4. + + // For the remaining entries we use our fast shift code. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_15(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 16. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 16], rc: __m256i) { + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX2::sum_array::<15>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_16(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 16]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_16(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 24. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 24], rc: __m256i) { + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX2::sum_array::<23>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_24(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 24]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_24(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 32 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 32]) { + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_15(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); + state[24] = mul_2exp_i::<23, 8>(state[24]); + state[25] = mul_2exp_i::<24, 7>(state[25]); + state[26] = mul_2exp_i::<25, 6>(state[26]); + state[27] = mul_2exp_i::<26, 5>(state[27]); + state[28] = mul_2exp_i::<27, 4>(state[28]); + state[29] = mul_2exp_i::<28, 3>(state[29]); + state[30] = mul_2exp_i::<29, 2>(state[30]); + state[31] = mul_2exp_i::<30, 1>(state[31]); +} + +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 32], rc: __m256i) { + add_rc_and_sbox(&mut state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX2::sum_array::<31>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_32(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; 32]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_32(state, rc)); + } +} + +impl ExternalLayer + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + /// Perform the initial external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]) { + external_initial_permute_state( + state, + &self.packed_initial_external_constants, + add_rc_and_sbox, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } + + /// Perform the terminal external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX2; WIDTH]) { + external_terminal_permute_state( + state, + &self.packed_terminal_external_constants, + add_rc_and_sbox, + &MDSMat4, + ); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::Poseidon2Mersenne31; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type Perm16 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<16>; + type Perm24 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<24>; + type Perm32 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<32>; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 16. + #[test] + fn test_avx2_poseidon2_width_16() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm16::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 16] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx2_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx2_input); + + let avx2_output = avx2_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected); + } + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 24. + #[test] + fn test_avx2_poseidon2_width_24() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm24::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 24] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx2_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx2_input); + + let avx2_output = avx2_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected); + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn prop_avx2_poseidon2_width_32(input in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f())) { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let poseidon2 = Perm32::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx2_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx2_input); + let avx2_output = avx2_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx2_output, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/utils.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/utils.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ae6cc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx2/utils.rs @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +//! Shared AVX2 utilities for Poseidon hash functions on Mersenne31. + +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m256i}; + +use p3_field::PrimeField32; + +use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2, exp5}; + +/// Convert a Mersenne31 element from standard form {0, ..., P} to negative form {-P, ..., 0}, +/// broadcast to all 8 AVX2 lanes. +#[inline(always)] +pub(super) fn convert_to_vec_neg_form(input: i32) -> __m256i { + let input_sub_p = input - (Mersenne31::ORDER_U32 as i32); + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + x86_64::_mm256_set1_epi32(input_sub_p) + } +} + +/// Compute the map x -> (x + rc)^5 on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// x must be represented as a value in {0..P}. +/// rc must be represented as a value in {-P, ..., 0}. +/// If the inputs do not conform to these representations, the result is undefined. +/// The output will be represented as a value in {0..P}. +#[inline(always)] +pub(super) fn add_rc_and_sbox(input: &mut PackedMersenne31AVX2, rc: __m256i) { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX2 intrinsics are available. + let input_vec = input.to_vector(); + let input_plus_rc = x86_64::_mm256_add_epi32(input_vec, rc); + + // Due to the representations of input and rc, input_plus_rc is in {-P, ..., P}. + // This is exactly the required bound to apply sbox. + let input_post_sbox = exp5(input_plus_rc); + *input = PackedMersenne31AVX2::from_vector(input_post_sbox); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::{InjectiveMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX2}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn add_rc_and_sbox_matches_scalar( + inputs in prop::array::uniform8(arb_f()), + rc in arb_f(), + ) { + let expected: [F; 8] = inputs.map(|x| (x + rc).injective_exp_n()); + + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31AVX2(inputs); + let rc_neg = super::convert_to_vec_neg_form(rc.value as i32); + super::add_rc_and_sbox(&mut packed, rc_neg); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed.0, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mds.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mds.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdde5855 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mds.rs @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +//! Packed MDS permutation for Mersenne31 on x86_64 AVX-512. +//! +//! Implements [`Permutation`] and [`MdsPermutation`] for +//! `[PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]` by applying the scalar circulant MDS +//! independently to each of the sixteen AVX-512 lanes. +//! +//! Each [`PackedMersenne31AVX512`] element holds 16 `Mersenne31` values in +//! a `__m512i` register. The MDS is applied per-lane: unpack → scalar +//! MDS → repack, reusing the optimised Karatsuba convolution from +//! [`MdsMatrixMersenne31`]. + +use p3_mds::MdsPermutation; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + +/// Apply the scalar MDS to each AVX-512 lane independently. +/// +/// Extracts one scalar state per lane, runs the circulant MDS +/// convolution, then writes the results back into the packed state. +#[inline] +fn mds_packed( + mds: &MdsMatrixMersenne31, + input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + for lane in 0..16 { + let mut scalar_state: [Mersenne31; WIDTH] = core::array::from_fn(|i| input[i].0[lane]); + mds.permute_mut(&mut scalar_state); + for i in 0..WIDTH { + input[i].0[lane] = scalar_state[i]; + } + } +} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; 8]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 8]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; 12]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 12]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; 16]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 16]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; 32]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 32]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +impl Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; 64]> for MdsMatrixMersenne31 { + fn permute_mut(&self, input: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 64]) { + mds_packed(self, input); + } +} +impl MdsPermutation for MdsMatrixMersenne31 {} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + macro_rules! proptest_avx512_mds { + ($name:ident, $width:literal, $uniform:ident) => { + proptest! { + #[test] + fn $name(input in prop::array::$uniform(arb_f())) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let avx512_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected); + } + } + }; + } + + proptest_avx512_mds!(mds_avx512_matches_scalar_8, 8, uniform8); + proptest_avx512_mds!(mds_avx512_matches_scalar_12, 12, uniform12); + proptest_avx512_mds!(mds_avx512_matches_scalar_16, 16, uniform16); + proptest_avx512_mds!(mds_avx512_matches_scalar_32, 32, uniform32); + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn mds_avx512_matches_scalar_64( + a in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + b in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()), + ) { + let mut input = [F::ZERO; 64]; + input[..32].copy_from_slice(&a); + input[32..].copy_from_slice(&b); + + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + let expected = mds.permute(input); + + let packed_input = input.map(Into::::into); + let packed_output = mds.permute(packed_input); + let avx512_output = packed_output.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d382418c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +mod mds; +mod packing; +mod poseidon1; +mod poseidon2; +mod utils; + +pub use packing::*; +pub use poseidon1::*; +pub(crate) use poseidon2::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/packing.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/packing.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..548776e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/packing.rs @@ -0,0 +1,574 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m512i, __mmask16}; +use core::iter::{Product, Sum}; +use core::mem::transmute; +use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign, Div, DivAssign, Mul, MulAssign, Neg, Sub, SubAssign}; + +use p3_field::exponentiation::exp_1717986917; +use p3_field::interleave::{interleave_u32, interleave_u64, interleave_u128, interleave_u256}; +use p3_field::op_assign_macros::{ + impl_add_assign, impl_add_base_field, impl_div_methods, impl_mul_base_field, impl_mul_methods, + impl_packed_field_div, impl_packed_value, impl_rng, impl_sub_assign, impl_sub_base_field, + impl_sum_prod_base_field, ring_sum, +}; +use p3_field::{ + Algebra, Field, InjectiveMonomial, PackedField, PackedFieldPow2, PackedValue, + PermutationMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing, impl_packed_field_pow_2, mm512_mod_add, + mm512_mod_sub, +}; +use p3_util::reconstitute_from_base; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand::{Rng, RngExt}; + +use crate::{Mersenne31, mul_2exp_i}; + +const WIDTH: usize = 16; +pub(crate) const P: __m512i = unsafe { transmute::<[u32; WIDTH], _>([0x7fffffff; WIDTH]) }; +const EVENS: __mmask16 = 0b0101010101010101; +const ODDS: __mmask16 = 0b1010101010101010; +/// The low 31 bits of each 64-bit lane, used to mask off the high half during folding. +const LOW31_64: __m512i = unsafe { transmute::<[u64; 8], _>([0x7fffffff; 8]) }; + +/// Vectorized AVX-512F implementation of `Mersenne31` arithmetic. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[repr(transparent)] // Needed to make `transmute`s safe. +#[must_use] +pub struct PackedMersenne31AVX512(pub [Mersenne31; WIDTH]); + +impl PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + #[inline] + #[must_use] + /// Get an arch-specific vector representing the packed values. + pub(crate) fn to_vector(self) -> __m512i { + unsafe { + // Safety: `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to `u32`. It + // follows that `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` can be transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]`, which can be + // transmuted to `__m512i`, since arrays are guaranteed to be contiguous in memory. + // Finally `PackedMersenne31AVX512` is `repr(transparent)` so it can be transmuted to + // `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]`. + transmute(self) + } + } + + #[inline] + /// Make a packed field vector from an arch-specific vector. + /// + /// SAFETY: The caller must ensure that each element of `vector` represents a valid + /// `Mersenne31`. In particular, each element of vector must be in `0..=P`. + pub(crate) unsafe fn from_vector(vector: __m512i) -> Self { + unsafe { + // Safety: It is up to the user to ensure that elements of `vector` represent valid + // `Mersenne31` values. We must only reason about memory representations. `__m512i` can be + // transmuted to `[u32; WIDTH]` (since arrays elements are contiguous in memory), which can + // be transmuted to `[Mersenne31; WIDTH]` (since `Mersenne31` is `repr(transparent)`), which + // in turn can be transmuted to `PackedMersenne31AVX512` (since `PackedMersenne31AVX512` is also + // `repr(transparent)`). + transmute(vector) + } + } + + /// Copy `value` to all positions in a packed vector. This is the same as + /// `From::from`, but `const`. + #[inline] + const fn broadcast(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self([value; WIDTH]) + } +} + +impl From for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + #[inline] + fn from(value: Mersenne31) -> Self { + Self::broadcast(value) + } +} + +impl Add for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn add(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mm512_mod_add(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mm512_mod_add` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Sub for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn sub(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mm512_mod_sub(lhs, rhs, P); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mm512_mod_sub` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Neg for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn neg(self) -> Self { + let val = self.to_vector(); + let res = neg(val); + unsafe { + // Safety: `neg` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl Mul for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type Output = Self; + #[inline] + fn mul(self, rhs: Self) -> Self { + let lhs = self.to_vector(); + let rhs = rhs.to_vector(); + let res = mul(lhs, rhs); + unsafe { + // Safety: `mul` returns values in canonical form when given values in canonical form. + Self::from_vector(res) + } + } +} + +impl_add_assign!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); +impl_sub_assign!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); +impl_mul_methods!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); +ring_sum!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); +impl_rng!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); + +impl PrimeCharacteristicRing for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type PrimeSubfield = Mersenne31; + + const ZERO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ZERO); + const ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::ONE); + const TWO: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::TWO); + const NEG_ONE: Self = Self::broadcast(Mersenne31::NEG_ONE); + + #[inline] + fn from_prime_subfield(f: Self::PrimeSubfield) -> Self { + f.into() + } + + #[inline] + fn halve(&self) -> Self { + // 2^{-1} = 2^30 mod P so we implement halve by multiplying by 2^30. + mul_2exp_i::<30, 1>(*self) + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn zero_vec(len: usize) -> Vec { + // SAFETY: this is a repr(transparent) wrapper around an array. + unsafe { reconstitute_from_base(Mersenne31::zero_vec(len * WIDTH)) } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn exp_const_u64(&self) -> Self { + // We provide specialised code for power 5 as this turns up regularly. + // The other powers could be specialised similarly but we ignore this for now. + // These ideas could also be used to speed up the more generic exp_u64. + match POWER { + 0 => Self::ONE, + 1 => *self, + 2 => self.square(), + 3 => self.cube(), + 4 => self.square().square(), + 5 => unsafe { + let val = self.to_vector(); + Self::from_vector(exp5(val)) + }, + 6 => self.square().cube(), + 7 => { + let x2 = self.square(); + let x3 = x2 * *self; + let x4 = x2.square(); + x3 * x4 + } + _ => self.exp_u64(POWER), + } + } + + #[inline(always)] + fn dot_product(u: &[Self; N], v: &[Self; N]) -> Self { + dot_product::(u, v) + } +} + +// Degree of the smallest permutation polynomial for Mersenne31. +// +// As p - 1 = 2×3^2×7×11×... the smallest choice for a degree D satisfying gcd(p - 1, D) = 1 is 5. +impl InjectiveMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31AVX512 {} + +impl PermutationMonomial<5> for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + /// In the field `Mersenne31`, `a^{1/5}` is equal to a^{1717986917}. + /// + /// This follows from the calculation `5 * 1717986917 = 4*(2^31 - 2) + 1 = 1 mod p - 1`. + fn injective_exp_root_n(&self) -> Self { + exp_1717986917(*self) + } +} + +impl_add_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31); +impl_sub_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31); +impl_mul_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31); +impl_div_methods!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31); +impl_packed_field_div!(PackedMersenne31AVX512); +impl_sum_prod_base_field!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31); + +impl Algebra for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + // Benchmarked on AVX-512: chunk=8 ≈ 77ns, chunk=2 ≈ 77ns, chunk=4 ≈ 78ns. + const BATCHED_LC_CHUNK: usize = 8; + + #[inline(always)] + fn mixed_dot_product(a: &[Self; N], f: &[Mersenne31; N]) -> Self { + mixed_dot_product::(a, f) + } +} + +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn movehdup_epi32(a: __m512i) -> __m512i { + // The instruction is only available in the floating-point flavor; this distinction is only for + // historical reasons and no longer matters. We cast to floats, do the thing, and cast back. + unsafe { + x86_64::_mm512_castps_si512(x86_64::_mm512_movehdup_ps(x86_64::_mm512_castsi512_ps(a))) + } +} + +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn mask_movehdup_epi32(src: __m512i, k: __mmask16, a: __m512i) -> __m512i { + // The instruction is only available in the floating-point flavor; this distinction is only for + // historical reasons and no longer matters. We cast to floats, do the thing, and cast back. + unsafe { + let src = x86_64::_mm512_castsi512_ps(src); + let a = x86_64::_mm512_castsi512_ps(a); + x86_64::_mm512_castps_si512(x86_64::_mm512_mask_movehdup_ps(src, k, a)) + } +} + +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn mask_moveldup_epi32(src: __m512i, k: __mmask16, a: __m512i) -> __m512i { + // The instruction is only available in the floating-point flavor; this distinction is only for + // historical reasons and no longer matters. We cast to floats, do the thing, and cast back. + unsafe { + let src = x86_64::_mm512_castsi512_ps(src); + let a = x86_64::_mm512_castsi512_ps(a); + x86_64::_mm512_castps_si512(x86_64::_mm512_mask_moveldup_ps(src, k, a)) + } +} + +/// Multiply vectors of Mersenne-31 field elements represented as values in {0, ..., P}. +/// If the inputs do not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn mul(lhs: __m512i, rhs: __m512i) -> __m512i { + // We want this to compile to: + // vpaddd lhs_evn_dbl, lhs, lhs + // vmovshdup rhs_odd, rhs + // vpsrlq lhs_odd_dbl, lhs, 31 + // vpmuludq prod_lo_dbl, lhs_evn_dbl, rhs + // vpmuludq prod_odd_dbl, lhs_odd_dbl, rhs_odd + // vmovdqa32 prod_hi, prod_odd_dbl + // vmovshdup prod_hi{EVENS}, prod_lo_dbl + // vmovsldup prod_lo_dbl{ODDS}, prod_odd_dbl + // vpsrld prod_lo, prod_lo_dbl, 1 + // vpaddd t, prod_lo, prod_hi + // vpsubd u, t, P + // vpminud res, t, u + // throughput: 5.5 cyc/vec (2.91 els/cyc) + // latency: (lhs->res) 15 cyc, (rhs->res) 14 cyc + unsafe { + // vpmuludq only reads the bottom 32 bits of every 64-bit quadword. + // The even indices are already in the bottom 32 bits of a quadword, so we can leave them. + let rhs_evn = rhs; + // Again, vpmuludq only reads the bottom 32 bits so we don't need to clear the top. But we + // do want to double the lhs. + let lhs_evn_dbl = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi32(lhs, lhs); + // Copy the high 32 bits in each quadword of rhs down to the low 32. + let rhs_odd = movehdup_epi32(rhs); + // Right shift by 31 is equivalent to moving the high 32 bits down to the low 32, and then + // doubling it. So these are the odd indices in lhs, but doubled. + let lhs_odd_dbl = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi64::<31>(lhs); + + // Multiply odd indices; since lhs_odd_dbl is doubled, these products are also doubled. + // prod_odd_dbl.quadword[i] = 2 * lhs.doubleword[2 * i + 1] * rhs.doubleword[2 * i + 1] + let prod_odd_dbl = x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(lhs_odd_dbl, rhs_odd); + // Multiply even indices; these are also doubled. + // prod_evn_dbl.quadword[i] = 2 * lhs.doubleword[2 * i] * rhs.doubleword[2 * i] + let prod_evn_dbl = x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(lhs_evn_dbl, rhs_evn); + + // Move the low halves of odd products into odd positions; keep the low halves of even + // products in even positions (where they already are). Note that the products are doubled, + // so the result is a vector of all the low halves, but doubled. + let prod_lo_dbl = mask_moveldup_epi32(prod_evn_dbl, ODDS, prod_odd_dbl); + // Move the high halves of even products into even positions, keeping the high halves of odd + // products where they are. The products are doubled, but we are looking at (prod >> 32), + // which cancels out the doubling, so this result is _not_ doubled. + let prod_hi = mask_movehdup_epi32(prod_odd_dbl, EVENS, prod_evn_dbl); + // Right shift to undo the doubling. + let prod_lo = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi32::<1>(prod_lo_dbl); + + // Standard addition of two 31-bit values. + mm512_mod_add(prod_lo, prod_hi, P) + } +} + +/// Negate a vector of Mersenne-31 field elements represented as values in {0, ..., P}. +/// If the input does not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline] +#[must_use] +fn neg(val: __m512i) -> __m512i { + // We want this to compile to: + // vpxord res, val, P + // throughput: .5 cyc/vec (32 els/cyc) + // latency: 1 cyc + + // Since val is in {0, ..., P (= 2^31 - 1)}, res = val XOR P = P - val. Then res is in {0, + // ..., P}. + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512F intrinsics are available. + x86_64::_mm512_xor_epi32(val, P) + } +} + +/// Reduce a representative in {0, ..., P^2} +/// to a representative in [-P, P]. If the input is greater than P^2, the output will +/// still correspond to the same class but will instead lie in [-P, 2^34]. +#[inline(always)] +fn partial_reduce_neg(x: __m512i) -> __m512i { + unsafe { + // Get the top bits shifted down. + let hi = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi64::<31>(x); + + const LOW31: __m512i = unsafe { transmute::<[u64; 8], _>([0x7fffffff; 8]) }; + + // nand instead of and means this returns P - lo. + let neg_lo = x86_64::_mm512_andnot_si512(x, LOW31); + + // we could also try: + // let neg_lo = x86_64::_mm512_maskz_andnot_epi32(EVENS, x, P); + // but this seems to get compiled badly and likes outputting vpternlogd. + // See: https://godbolt.org/z/WPze9e3f3 + + // Compiling with sub_epi64 vs sub_epi32 both produce reasonable code so we use + // sub_epi64 for the slightly greater flexibility. + x86_64::_mm512_sub_epi64(hi, neg_lo) + } +} + +/// Compute the square of the Mersenne-31 field elements located in the even indices. +/// These field elements are represented as values in {-P, ..., P}. If the even inputs +/// do not conform to this representation, the result is undefined. +/// The top half of each 64-bit lane is ignored. +/// The top half of each 64-bit lane in the result is 0. +#[inline(always)] +fn square_unred(x: __m512i) -> __m512i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512F intrinsics are available. + let x2 = x86_64::_mm512_mul_epi32(x, x); + partial_reduce_neg(x2) + } +} + +/// Compute the permutation x -> x^5 on Mersenne-31 field elements +/// represented as values in {0, ..., P}. If the inputs do not conform +/// to this representation, the result is undefined. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn exp5(x: __m512i) -> __m512i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512F intrinsics are available. + let input_evn = x; + let input_odd = movehdup_epi32(x); + + let evn_sq = square_unred(input_evn); + let odd_sq = square_unred(input_odd); + + let evn_4 = square_unred(evn_sq); + let odd_4 = square_unred(odd_sq); + + let evn_5 = x86_64::_mm512_mul_epi32(evn_4, input_evn); + let odd_5 = x86_64::_mm512_mul_epi32(odd_4, input_odd); + + // Marked dirty as the top bit needs to be cleared. + let lo_dirty = mask_moveldup_epi32(evn_5, ODDS, odd_5); + + // We could use 2 adds and mask_movehdup_epi32. + // instead of an add, a shift and a blend. + let odd_5_hi = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64(odd_5, odd_5); + let evn_5_hi = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi64::<31>(evn_5); + let hi = x86_64::_mm512_mask_blend_epi32(ODDS, evn_5_hi, odd_5_hi); + + let zero = x86_64::_mm512_setzero_si512(); + let signs = x86_64::_mm512_movepi32_mask(hi); + let corr = x86_64::_mm512_mask_sub_epi32(P, signs, zero, P); + + let lo = x86_64::_mm512_and_si512(lo_dirty, P); + + let t = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi32(hi, lo); + let u = x86_64::_mm512_sub_epi32(t, corr); + + x86_64::_mm512_min_epu32(t, u) + } +} + +/// Fold a vector of eight 64-bit accumulators once: given `val`, return `res = val (mod P)` +/// with `res <= (val >> 31) + P` in the low 32 bits of each lane. +/// +/// Uses `2^31 = 1 (mod P)`: writing `val = hi * 2^31 + lo` with `lo <= P`, we have +/// `val = hi + lo (mod P)`. Applied twice, any `val < 2^64` is brought to `0..=2 P`. +#[inline(always)] +#[must_use] +fn fold_u64(val: __m512i) -> __m512i { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512 intrinsics are available. + let lo = x86_64::_mm512_and_si512(val, LOW31_64); + let hi = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi64::<31>(val); + x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64(lo, hi) + } +} + +/// Compute the dot product of `u` and `v` lanewise, deferring the Mersenne reduction. +/// +/// Each product fits in 62 bits, so the raw `32x32 -> 64`-bit products are accumulated in +/// 64-bit lanes (even and odd 32-bit indices kept apart, since `vpmuludq` reads only the +/// low half of each 64-bit lane). Inputs are in `0..=P`, so a product is at most `P^2`; +/// folding the accumulators below `2^33` every 3 iterations keeps `2^33 + 3 * P^2 < 2^64`, +/// so the lanes never overflow. +#[inline] +fn dot_product( + u: &[PackedMersenne31AVX512; N], + v: &[PackedMersenne31AVX512; N], +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512 intrinsics are available. + let mut acc_evn = x86_64::_mm512_setzero_si512(); + let mut acc_odd = x86_64::_mm512_setzero_si512(); + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let lhs = u[i].to_vector(); + let rhs = v[i].to_vector(); + acc_evn = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64(acc_evn, x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(lhs, rhs)); + acc_odd = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64( + acc_odd, + x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(movehdup_epi32(lhs), movehdup_epi32(rhs)), + ); + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 { + unreduced = 0; + acc_evn = fold_u64(acc_evn); + acc_odd = fold_u64(acc_odd); + } + } + + // At most 2 unreduced products sit on top of a folded value: the lanes are below + // `2^33 + 2 * P^2 < 2^64`, so two folds bring them to `0..=2 P` in the low 32 bits. + let evn = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_evn)); + let odd = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_odd)); + + // The even results sit in the low 32 bits of each 64-bit lane (the even 32-bit + // indices); shift the odd results up into the high halves (the odd indices) and merge. + let odd_shifted = x86_64::_mm512_slli_epi64::<32>(odd); + let t = x86_64::_mm512_mask_blend_epi32(ODDS, evn, odd_shifted); + + // Final reduction of values in `0..=2 P` to the canonical `0..=P`. + let t_sub_p = x86_64::_mm512_sub_epi32(t, P); + PackedMersenne31AVX512::from_vector(x86_64::_mm512_min_epu32(t, t_sub_p)) + } +} + +/// Compute the dot product of `u` (packed) and `v` (scalar coefficients), deferring the +/// Mersenne reduction. Each `v[i]` is broadcast across the packing lanes before +/// multiplying, so this follows the same overflow argument as `dot_product`. +/// +/// A broadcast vector already has every lane equal, so the odd/even shuffle used to +/// separate `dot_product`'s two operands is unnecessary on the broadcast side. +#[inline] +fn mixed_dot_product( + u: &[PackedMersenne31AVX512; N], + v: &[Mersenne31; N], +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX-512 intrinsics are available. + let mut acc_evn = x86_64::_mm512_setzero_si512(); + let mut acc_odd = x86_64::_mm512_setzero_si512(); + let mut unreduced = 0; + for i in 0..N { + let lhs = u[i].to_vector(); + let rhs = x86_64::_mm512_set1_epi32(v[i].value as i32); + acc_evn = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64(acc_evn, x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(lhs, rhs)); + acc_odd = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi64( + acc_odd, + x86_64::_mm512_mul_epu32(movehdup_epi32(lhs), rhs), + ); + unreduced += 1; + if unreduced == 3 { + unreduced = 0; + acc_evn = fold_u64(acc_evn); + acc_odd = fold_u64(acc_odd); + } + } + + let evn = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_evn)); + let odd = fold_u64(fold_u64(acc_odd)); + + let odd_shifted = x86_64::_mm512_slli_epi64::<32>(odd); + let t = x86_64::_mm512_mask_blend_epi32(ODDS, evn, odd_shifted); + + let t_sub_p = x86_64::_mm512_sub_epi32(t, P); + PackedMersenne31AVX512::from_vector(x86_64::_mm512_min_epu32(t, t_sub_p)) + } +} + +impl_packed_value!(PackedMersenne31AVX512, Mersenne31, WIDTH); + +unsafe impl PackedField for PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + type Scalar = Mersenne31; +} + +impl_packed_field_pow_2!( + PackedMersenne31AVX512; + [ + (1, interleave_u32), + (2, interleave_u64), + (4, interleave_u128), + (8, interleave_u256) + ], + WIDTH +); + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field_testing::{test_packed_field, test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary}; + + use super::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + + /// Zero has a redundant representation, so let's test both. + const ZEROS: PackedMersenne31AVX512 = PackedMersenne31AVX512(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, + 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, + ])); + + const SPECIAL_VALS: PackedMersenne31AVX512 = PackedMersenne31AVX512(Mersenne31::new_array([ + 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000001, 0x7ffffffe, 0x00000002, 0x7ffffffd, 0x40000000, + 0x3fffffff, 0x00000000, 0x7fffffff, 0x00000001, 0x7ffffffe, 0x00000002, 0x7ffffffd, + 0x40000000, 0x3fffffff, + ])); + + test_packed_field!( + crate::PackedMersenne31AVX512, + &[super::ZEROS], + &[crate::PackedMersenne31AVX512::ONE], + super::SPECIAL_VALS + ); + + test_packed_field_dot_product_boundary!(crate::PackedMersenne31AVX512); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon1.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon1.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3120cacf --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon1.rs @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +//! AVX512-optimized Poseidon1 permutation layers for Mersenne31. + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::__m512i; + +use p3_field::InjectiveMonomial; +use p3_poseidon1::external::{ + FullRoundConstants, FullRoundLayer, FullRoundLayerConstructor, mds_multiply, +}; +use p3_poseidon1::internal::{ + PartialRoundConstants, PartialRoundLayer, PartialRoundLayerConstructor, cheap_matmul, + partial_permute_state, +}; +use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + +use super::utils::{add_rc_and_sbox, convert_to_vec_neg_form}; +use crate::{MdsMatrixMersenne31, Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + +/// AVX512-optimized external (full-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Stores round constants in two forms: +/// - **Scalar** (`FullRoundConstants`) — used by the +/// scalar fallback path (`FullRoundLayer`). +/// - **Packed** (`Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]>`) — each constant broadcast to +/// all sixteen AVX512 lanes in negative form, enabling the fused [`add_rc_and_sbox`] path. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: FullRoundConstants, + packed_initial_constants: Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]>, + packed_terminal_constants: Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl FullRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: FullRoundConstants) -> Self { + let pack_rc = |rcs: &[[Mersenne31; WIDTH]]| -> Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]> { + rcs.iter() + .map(|rc| rc.map(|c| convert_to_vec_neg_form(c.value as i32))) + .collect() + }; + let packed_initial_constants = pack_rc(&constants.initial); + let packed_terminal_constants = pack_rc(&constants.terminal); + Self { + constants, + packed_initial_constants, + packed_terminal_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Apply a sequence of full rounds using AVX512-packed negative-form constants. +/// +/// For each round: fuse `add_rc + x^5` via [`add_rc_and_sbox`], then +/// apply the MDS via the permutation trait. +#[inline] +fn full_rounds_packed( + state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH], + packed_constants: &[[__m512i; WIDTH]], +) where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]>, +{ + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for rc in packed_constants { + for (s, &c) in state.iter_mut().zip(rc.iter()) { + *s = add_rc_and_sbox(*s, c); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } +} + +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_initial_constants); + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]) { + full_rounds_packed(state, &self.packed_terminal_constants); + } +} + +impl FullRoundLayer + for Poseidon1ExternalLayerMersenne31 +where + MdsMatrixMersenne31: Permutation<[Mersenne31; WIDTH]>, +{ + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.initial { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } + + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + let mds = MdsMatrixMersenne31; + for round_constants in &self.constants.terminal { + for (s, &rc) in state.iter_mut().zip(round_constants.iter()) { + *s += rc; + } + for s in state.iter_mut() { + *s = s.injective_exp_n(); + } + mds.permute_mut(state); + } + } +} + +/// AVX512-optimized internal (partial-round) layer for Mersenne31 Poseidon1. +/// +/// Uses the sparse matrix decomposition from the Poseidon paper (Appendix B). +/// Constants are stored as scalar `Mersenne31` values; the `Algebra` +/// impl on `PackedMersenne31AVX512` handles broadcasting during multiplication. +/// +/// Each partial round applies the S-box only to `state[0]`, then performs +/// a cheap sparse matrix-vector product via [`cheap_matmul`]. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 { + constants: PartialRoundConstants, +} + +impl PartialRoundLayerConstructor + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(constants: PartialRoundConstants) -> Self { + Self { constants } + } +} + +/// Packed AVX512 path: S-box on `state[0]` only, sparse matmul via scalar constants. +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]) { + for (s, &rc) in state + .iter_mut() + .zip(self.constants.first_round_constants.iter()) + { + *s += rc; + } + + mds_multiply(state, &self.constants.m_i); + + let rounds_p = self.constants.sparse_first_row.len(); + + for r in 0..rounds_p - 1 { + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + state[0] += self.constants.round_constants[r]; + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[r], + &self.constants.v[r], + ); + } + + state[0] = state[0].injective_exp_n(); + cheap_matmul( + state, + &self.constants.sparse_first_row[rounds_p - 1], + &self.constants.v[rounds_p - 1], + ); + } +} + +impl PartialRoundLayer + for Poseidon1InternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [Mersenne31; WIDTH]) { + partial_permute_state::(state, &self.constants); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::poseidon1::{default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16, default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32}; + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + /// Known-answer test for width 16 through the AVX512 packed path. + #[test] + fn test_avx512_poseidon1_width_16() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let input: [F; 16] = F::new_array([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]); + + let expected: [F; 16] = F::new_array([ + 763678880, 1665665156, 138326798, 2029009038, 523315643, 1240724959, 799985579, + 1533764468, 1851415257, 580298256, 158301910, 1486286674, 1604442932, 919070942, + 791307160, 922090452, + ]); + + let mut avx512_input = input.map(Into::::into); + perm.permute_mut(&mut avx512_input); + + for lane in 0..avx512_input[0].0.len() { + let avx512_output = avx512_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + /// Known-answer test for width 32 through the AVX512 packed path. + #[test] + fn test_avx512_poseidon1_width_32() { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let input: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, + 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, + ]); + + let expected: [F; 32] = F::new_array([ + 493956664, 1487097341, 1986839634, 1423871566, 183460581, 827438159, 7996988, + 141241897, 1403482130, 847367286, 2077667889, 1108646476, 1352254530, 1822401306, + 809224972, 1606586582, 1039326136, 622010047, 1526365331, 1585000638, 1938294847, + 559133752, 570966981, 1111956911, 1758188893, 1919461707, 940683889, 1707731554, + 1949319314, 1540753789, 1964681567, 229242586, + ]); + + let mut avx512_input = input.map(Into::::into); + perm.permute_mut(&mut avx512_input); + + for lane in 0..avx512_input[0].0.len() { + let avx512_output = avx512_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn poseidon1_avx512_matches_scalar_width_16( + input in prop::array::uniform16(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_16(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31AVX512::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + + #[test] + fn poseidon1_avx512_matches_scalar_width_32( + input in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f()) + ) { + let perm = default_mersenne31_poseidon1_32(); + + let mut packed_input = core::array::from_fn(|i| { + let mut packed = PackedMersenne31AVX512::ZERO; + for lane in 0..packed.0.len() { + packed.0[lane] = input[i] + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32); + } + packed + }); + perm.permute_mut(&mut packed_input); + + for lane in 0..packed_input[0].0.len() { + let mut expected = input.map(|x| x + F::from_u32((lane + 1) as u32)); + perm.permute_mut(&mut expected); + let packed_output = packed_input.map(|x| x.0[lane]); + + prop_assert_eq!(packed_output, expected, "lane {} mismatch", lane); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon2.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon2.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64d23026 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/poseidon2.rs @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m512i}; + +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_poseidon2::{ + ExternalLayer, ExternalLayerConstants, ExternalLayerConstructor, InternalLayer, + InternalLayerConstructor, MDSMat4, mds_light_permutation, +}; + +use super::utils::{add_rc_and_sbox, convert_to_vec_neg_form}; +use crate::{Mersenne31, P, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + +/// The internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// The packed constants are stored in negative form as this allows some optimizations. +/// This means given a constant `x`, we treat it as an `i32` and +/// pack 16 copies of `x - P` into the corresponding `__m512i` packed constant. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) internal_constants: Vec, + packed_internal_constants: Vec<__m512i>, +} + +impl InternalLayerConstructor for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// We save the round constants in the {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard + /// {0, ..., P} one. This saves several instructions later. + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + Self::new_from_constants(internal_constants) + } +} + +/// The external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation for Mersenne31. +/// +/// The packed constants are stored in negative form as this allows some optimizations. +/// This means given a constant `x`, we treat it as an `i32` and +/// pack 16 copies of `x - P` into the corresponding `__m512i` packed constant. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + pub(crate) external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants, + packed_initial_external_constants: Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]>, + packed_terminal_external_constants: Vec<[__m512i; WIDTH]>, +} + +impl ExternalLayerConstructor + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + Self::new_from_constants(external_constants) + } +} + +impl Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Construct an instance of Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 from a vector containing + /// the constants for each round. Internally, the constants are transformed into the + /// {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard {0, ..., P} one. + fn new_from_constants(internal_constants: Vec) -> Self { + let packed_internal_constants = internal_constants + .iter() + .map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32)) + .collect(); + Self { + internal_constants, + packed_internal_constants, + } + } +} + +impl Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Construct an instance of Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 from an array of + /// vectors containing the constants for each round. Internally, the constants + /// are transformed into the {-P, ..., 0} representation instead of the standard {0, ..., P} one. + fn new_from_constants(external_constants: ExternalLayerConstants) -> Self { + let packed_initial_external_constants = external_constants + .get_initial_constants() + .iter() + .map(|array| array.map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32))) + .collect(); + let packed_terminal_external_constants = external_constants + .get_terminal_constants() + .iter() + .map(|array| array.map(|constant| convert_to_vec_neg_form(constant.value as i32))) + .collect(); + Self { + external_constants, + packed_initial_external_constants, + packed_terminal_external_constants, + } + } +} + +/// Compute the map x -> 2^I x on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// +/// x must be represented as a value in {0..P}. +/// This requires 2 generic parameters, I and I_PRIME satisfying I + I_PRIME = 31. +/// If the inputs do not conform to this representations, the result is undefined. +#[inline(always)] +pub(crate) fn mul_2exp_i( + val: PackedMersenne31AVX512, +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + const { + assert!(I + I_PRIME == 31); + } + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX512-F intrinsics are available. + let input = val.to_vector(); + + // In M31, multiplication by 2^n corresponds to a cyclic rotation which + // is much faster than the naive multiplication method. + + // Shift the low bits up. This also shifts something unwanted into + // the sign bit so we mark it dirty. + let hi_bits_dirty = x86_64::_mm512_slli_epi32::(input); + + // Shift the high bits down. + let lo_bits = x86_64::_mm512_srli_epi32::(input); + + // Clear the sign bit and combine the lo and high bits. + // The simplest description of the operation we want is lo OR (hi_dirty AND P) which has bit pattern: + // 111 => 1, 110 => 1, 101 => 1, 100 => 1, 011 => 1, 010 => 0, 001 => 0, 000 => 0 + // Note that the input patterns: 111, 110, 100 cannot occur so any constant of the form **1*1000 should work. + let output = x86_64::_mm512_ternarylogic_epi32::<0b11111000>(lo_bits, hi_bits_dirty, P); + PackedMersenne31AVX512::from_vector(output) + } +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 16 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] +/// i.e. The first entry is -2 and all other entries are powers of 2. +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 16]) { + // The first three entries involve multiplication by -2, 1, 2 which are simple: + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + + // We could use mul_2exp_i here as it is also 3 instructions but add should have better throughput as its instructions work on more ports. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; + + // For the remaining entries we use our fast shift code. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[15]); +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 24 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] +/// i.e. The first entry is -2 and all other entries a power of 2. +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 24]) { + // The first three entries involve multiplication by -2, 1, 2 which are simple: + // state[0] -> -2*state[0] is handled by the calling code. + + // We could use mul_2exp_i here as it is also 3 instructions but add should have better throughput as its instructions work on more ports. + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; + + // For the remaining entries we use our fast shift code. + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 16. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_16(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 16], rc: __m512i) { + state[0] = add_rc_and_sbox(state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX512::sum_array::<15>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_16(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 16]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_16(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// Compute a single Poseidon2 internal layer on a state of width 24. +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_24(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 24], rc: __m512i) { + state[0] = add_rc_and_sbox(state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX512::sum_array::<23>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_24(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + /// Perform the internal layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 24]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_24(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// We hard code multiplication by the diagonal minus 1 of our internal matrix (1 + Diag(V)) +/// In the Mersenne31, WIDTH = 32 case, the diagonal minus 1 is: +/// [-2] + 1 << [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] +#[inline(always)] +fn diagonal_mul_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 32]) { + state[2] = state[2] + state[2]; + state[3] = mul_2exp_i::<2, 29>(state[3]); + state[4] = mul_2exp_i::<3, 28>(state[4]); + state[5] = mul_2exp_i::<4, 27>(state[5]); + state[6] = mul_2exp_i::<5, 26>(state[6]); + state[7] = mul_2exp_i::<6, 25>(state[7]); + state[8] = mul_2exp_i::<7, 24>(state[8]); + state[9] = mul_2exp_i::<8, 23>(state[9]); + state[10] = mul_2exp_i::<9, 22>(state[10]); + state[11] = mul_2exp_i::<10, 21>(state[11]); + state[12] = mul_2exp_i::<11, 20>(state[12]); + state[13] = mul_2exp_i::<12, 19>(state[13]); + state[14] = mul_2exp_i::<13, 18>(state[14]); + state[15] = mul_2exp_i::<14, 17>(state[15]); + state[16] = mul_2exp_i::<15, 16>(state[16]); + state[17] = mul_2exp_i::<16, 15>(state[17]); + state[18] = mul_2exp_i::<17, 14>(state[18]); + state[19] = mul_2exp_i::<18, 13>(state[19]); + state[20] = mul_2exp_i::<19, 12>(state[20]); + state[21] = mul_2exp_i::<20, 11>(state[21]); + state[22] = mul_2exp_i::<21, 10>(state[22]); + state[23] = mul_2exp_i::<22, 9>(state[23]); + state[24] = mul_2exp_i::<23, 8>(state[24]); + state[25] = mul_2exp_i::<24, 7>(state[25]); + state[26] = mul_2exp_i::<25, 6>(state[26]); + state[27] = mul_2exp_i::<26, 5>(state[27]); + state[28] = mul_2exp_i::<27, 4>(state[28]); + state[29] = mul_2exp_i::<28, 3>(state[29]); + state[30] = mul_2exp_i::<29, 2>(state[30]); + state[31] = mul_2exp_i::<30, 1>(state[31]); +} + +#[inline(always)] +fn internal_32(state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 32], rc: __m512i) { + state[0] = add_rc_and_sbox(state[0], rc); + let sum_tail = PackedMersenne31AVX512::sum_array::<31>(&state[1..]); + let sum = sum_tail + state[0]; + state[0] = sum_tail - state[0]; + diagonal_mul_32(state); + state[1..].iter_mut().for_each(|x| *x += sum); +} + +impl InternalLayer for Poseidon2InternalLayerMersenne31 { + fn permute_state(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; 32]) { + self.packed_internal_constants + .iter() + .for_each(|&rc| internal_32(state, rc)); + } +} + +/// Compute a collection of Poseidon2 external layers. +/// One layer for every constant supplied. +#[inline] +fn external_rounds( + state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH], + packed_external_constants: &[[__m512i; WIDTH]], +) { + packed_external_constants.iter().for_each(|round_consts| { + state + .iter_mut() + .zip(round_consts.iter()) + .for_each(|(val, &rc)| *val = add_rc_and_sbox(*val, rc)); + mds_light_permutation(state, &MDSMat4); + }); +} + +impl ExternalLayer + for Poseidon2ExternalLayerMersenne31 +{ + /// Perform the initial external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_initial(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]) { + mds_light_permutation(state, &MDSMat4); + external_rounds(state, &self.packed_initial_external_constants); + } + + /// Perform the terminal external layers of the Poseidon2 permutation on the given state. + fn permute_state_terminal(&self, state: &mut [PackedMersenne31AVX512; WIDTH]) { + external_rounds(state, &self.packed_terminal_external_constants); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_symmetric::Permutation; + use proptest::prelude::*; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + use crate::Poseidon2Mersenne31; + + type F = Mersenne31; + type Perm16 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<16>; + type Perm24 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<24>; + type Perm32 = Poseidon2Mersenne31<32>; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 16. + #[test] + fn test_avx512_poseidon2_width_16() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm16::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 16] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx512_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx512_input); + + let avx512_output = avx512_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected); + } + + /// Test that the output is the same as the scalar version on a random input of length 24. + #[test] + fn test_avx512_poseidon2_width_24() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + + // Our Poseidon2 implementation. + let poseidon2 = Perm24::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let input: [F; 24] = rng.random(); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx512_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx512_input); + + let avx512_output = avx512_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected); + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn prop_avx512_poseidon2_width_32(input in prop::array::uniform32(arb_f())) { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let poseidon2 = Perm32::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + let mut expected = input; + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut expected); + + let mut avx512_input = input.map(Into::::into); + poseidon2.permute_mut(&mut avx512_input); + let avx512_output = avx512_input.map(|x| x.0[0]); + + prop_assert_eq!(avx512_output, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/utils.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/utils.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63ecaf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/x86_64_avx512/utils.rs @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +//! Shared AVX512 utilities for Poseidon hash functions on Mersenne31. + +use core::arch::x86_64::{self, __m512i}; + +use p3_field::PrimeField32; + +use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512, exp5}; + +/// Convert a Mersenne31 element from standard form {0, ..., P} to negative form {-P, ..., 0}, +/// broadcast to all 16 AVX512 lanes. +#[inline(always)] +pub(super) fn convert_to_vec_neg_form(input: i32) -> __m512i { + let input_sub_p = input - (Mersenne31::ORDER_U32 as i32); + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX512-F intrinsics are available. + x86_64::_mm512_set1_epi32(input_sub_p) + } +} + +/// Compute the map x -> (x + rc)^5 on Mersenne-31 field elements. +/// x must be represented as a value in {0..P}. +/// rc must be represented as a value in {-P, ..., 0}. +/// If the inputs do not conform to these representations, the result is undefined. +/// The output will be represented as a value in {0..P}. +#[inline(always)] +pub(super) fn add_rc_and_sbox( + input: PackedMersenne31AVX512, + rc: __m512i, +) -> PackedMersenne31AVX512 { + unsafe { + // Safety: If this code got compiled then AVX512-F intrinsics are available. + let input_vec = input.to_vector(); + let input_plus_rc = x86_64::_mm512_add_epi32(input_vec, rc); + + // Due to the representations of input and rc, input_plus_rc is in {-P, ..., P}. + // This is exactly the required bound to apply sbox. + let input_post_sbox = exp5(input_plus_rc); + PackedMersenne31AVX512::from_vector(input_post_sbox) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use p3_field::{InjectiveMonomial, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use crate::{Mersenne31, PackedMersenne31AVX512}; + + type F = Mersenne31; + + fn arb_f() -> impl Strategy { + prop::num::u32::ANY.prop_map(F::from_u32) + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn add_rc_and_sbox_matches_scalar( + inputs in prop::array::uniform16(arb_f()), + rc in arb_f(), + ) { + let expected: [F; 16] = inputs.map(|x| (x + rc).injective_exp_n()); + + let packed = PackedMersenne31AVX512(inputs); + let rc_neg = super::convert_to_vec_neg_form(rc.value as i32); + let result = super::add_rc_and_sbox(packed, rc_neg); + + prop_assert_eq!(result.0, expected); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo-ok b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo-ok new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8b7958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo-ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"v":1} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f8a45bf --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "git": { + "sha1": "11cc5849a1b57a2f520d6edc608b9e516517d841" + }, + "path_in_vcs": "uni-stark" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/CHANGELOG.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..332b4cc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +# Changelog + +All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. + +The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/), +and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). + +## [Unreleased] +## [0.6.2] - 2026-07-20 +## [0.6.1] - 2026-06-13 +### Merged PRs +- Perf(uni-stark): reuse per-thread buffers in quotient_values (#1815) + +## [0.6.0] - 2026-06-11 +### Merged PRs +- Uni-stark: richer verification errors (#1453) +- Fix(batch-stark): validate per-instance global lookup data count (#1458) +- Make batched_linear_combination chunk size per-impl tunable (#1451) +- Field: rm unused packed_linear_combination (#1460) +- Fix(verifier): tighten input shape validation (#1464) +- Uni stark: rm useless `check_constraints.rs` file (#1471) +- Feat: add support for Periodic Columns at runtime (#1462) +- Feat: add `assert_zeros_ext()` method to `ExtensionBuilder` (#1493) +- Uni stark: rely on default assert_zeros_ext for ProverConstraintFolder (#1498) +- Fix: periodic columns + zk (#1510) +- Refactor(fri): move FRI parameter constructors to associated methods (#1530) +- Guard verifier degree_bits (#1535) +- Harden verifier shape checks (#1469) +- Feat: bus-based cross-AIR interactions and lookup crate redesign (#1566) +- Refactor(air): merge PeriodicAirBuilder into AirBuilder (#1611) +- Field: expand packed-extension API; fix unsound PackedValue impls (#1620) +- Chore: use T::zero_vec(n) instead of vec![T::ZERO; n] (#1633) +- Fix(merkle-tree): make MerkleTreeHidingMmcs Sync (#1559) +- Feat: add security estimation (#1329) +- Verifier: add a couple strengthening checks (#1666) +- Ci: tighten doc/release/TOML checks (#1689) +- Refactor: remove duplication around AirBuilder `_named` methods (#1724) +- Fix: add PoW check in Circle STARK's commit phase (#1723) +- Feat(lookup): single-terminal LogUp aux trace (#1628) +- Fix(challenger): make duplex sponge absorbs length-binding (#1769) +- Fix(uni-stark): reject out-of-domain point inside the trace domain (#1760) +- Fix(uni-stark, batch-stark): reject malformed periodic column lengths (#1761) +- Fix(mersenne-31): make serde encoding canonical (#1773) +- Chore: update CHANGELOGs (#1785) +- Doc: add basic READMEs in main crates (#1786) + +## [0.5.3] - 2026-05-15 +## [0.5.2] - 2026-03-27 +### Merged PRs +- Make batched_linear_combination chunk size per-impl tunable (#1451) +- Uni stark: rm useless `check_constraints.rs` file (#1471) + +## [0.5.1] - 2026-03-16 +### Merged PRs +- Clarify selector semantics (#1412) + +## [0.5.0] - 2026-03-10 +### Merged PRs +- Refactor: integrate `Lookup` logic into the `Air` trait (#1239) +- Refactor: remove `PairBuilder` (#1250) +- Tests: add backward-compat proof fixtures for uni/batch verifiers (#1249) +- Fix: reduce logging noise in batch-stark with multiple AIRs (#1258) +- Update check_constraints.rs (#1296) +- [BREAKING] feat: Implement high-arity folding (#1277) +- Chore: revert #1296 (#1306) +- Deps: update rand and rand_xoshiro (#1314) +- Feat: add Merkle Caps (#1321) +- Feat: add Clone to StarkConfig and StarkGenericConfig (#1328) +- Fix: dead code removal and twiddle table race condition (#1318) +- Air: add `num_constraints` and `AirBuilderWithContext` (#1327) +- Air: unify `DebugConstraintBuilder` (#1330) +- Refactor(air): move SymbolicAirBuilder from uni-stark to air crate (#1334) +- Air: add max_constraint_degree in BaseAir (#1331) +- Air: add flag for next row of the main trace access (#1336) +- Air: merge `AirBuilderWithPublicValues` into `AirBuilder` (#1337) +- Air: rm num_public_values parameter when useless (#1339) +- Air: more granularity for next row (#1340) +- Feat: switch AirBuilder::Var back to Copy (#1368) +- Perf(uni-stark): only open preprocessed at zeta_next when needed (#1354) +- Refactor(air): split symbolic expressions into base and extension types (#1369) +- Chore: remove unused dependencies (#1374) +- Feat(air): add PeriodicAirBuilder extension trait and BaseEntry::Periodic (#1380) +- Air: change return type of preprocessed in air builder (#1387) +- Perf: vectorize constraint evaluations (#1388) +- Introduce AirLayout struct to bundle symbolic builder parameters (#1390) +- Air: rm `is_transition_window` and add `RowWindow` (#1357) +- Refactor(lookup): decouple lookup concerns from Air trait (#1392) +- Feat: add high-arity support in `MerkleTree` and `MMCS` (#1373) +- Refactor: split `AirBuilder::M` into `MainWindow` and `PreprocessedWindow` (#1405) + +## [0.4.2] - 2026-01-05 +### Merged PRs +- Refactor(field): Add packed field extraction helpers and FieldArray utilities (#1211) (Adrian Hamelink) +- Enable ZK for preprocessing and in batch-stark (#1178) (Linda Guiga) +- Avoid change of Pcs's `open` method signature (#1230) (Linda Guiga) + +### Authors +- Adrian Hamelink +- Linda Guiga + +## [0.4.1] - 2025-12-18 +### Authors + +## [0.4.0] - 2025-12-12 +### Merged PRs +- Field.rs: `Powers::packed_collect_n` (#888) (Adrian Hamelink) +- Uni stark: small touchups on the verifier (#910) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy wants us to put things inside of fmt now instead of just extra arguments... (#916) (AngusG) +- Chore: add descriptions to all sub-crate manifests (#906) (Himess) +- Fixed "attempt to subtract with overflow" issue in uni-stark (#934) (Gabriel Barreto) +- Replace `Copy` with `Clone` in `AirBuilder`'s `Var` (#930) (Linda Guiga) +- Docs: Add comprehensive documentation to constraint folder implementation (#856) (Ragnar) +- Shrink some test sizes (#524) (Daniel Lubarov) +- Fixing error on main (#939) (AngusG) +- Chore: various small changes (#944) (Thomas Coratger) +- Remove Nightly Features (#932) (AngusG) +- Small visibility changes for recursion (#1046) (Linda Guiga) +- Refactor: remove redundant clones in crypto modules (#1086) (Skylar Ray) +- Add modular lookups (local and global) with logup implementation (#1090) (Linda Guiga) +- Add multi-STARK prover and verifier (#1088) (Sai) +- Clippy: small step (#1102) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add nursery (#1103) (Thomas Coratger) +- Update symbolic_builder.rs (#1106) (AJoX) +- Clippy: add semicolon_if_nothing_returned (#1107) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add `needless_pass_by_value` (#1112) (Thomas Coratger) +- Refactor: Replace &Vec with &[T] in function parameters (#1111) (Merkel Tranjes) +- Add preprocessed/transparent columns to uni-stark (#1114) (o-k-d) +- Add Preprocessed trace setup and VKs (#1150) (Sai) +- Update lookup traits and add folders with lookups (#1160) (Linda Guiga) +- ExtensionBuilder for SymbolicAirBuilder (#1161) (Linda Guiga) +- Uni-stark: add unit tests for SymbolicExpression (#1169) (Thomas Coratger) +- Uni stark: small touchups (#1163) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clarify quotient degree vs quotient chunks naming (#1156) (Sai) +- Core: add error messages to error enums via thiserror (#1168) (Thomas Coratger) +- Feat: add `SubAirBuilder` module (#1172) (Robin Salen) +- Doc: add intra-doc links (#1174) (Robin Salen) +- Integrate lookups to prover and verifier (#1165) (Linda Guiga) +- Core: small touchups (#1186) (Thomas Coratger) +- Feat: add PoW phase 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"db97caf9d906fbde555dd62fa95ddba9eecfd14cb388e4f491a66d74cd5fb79a" + +[[package]] +name = "unicode-ident" +version = "1.0.24" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc9ed3f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +# THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED BY CARGO +# +# When uploading crates to the registry Cargo will automatically +# "normalize" Cargo.toml files for maximal compatibility +# with all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies +# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies. +# +# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml +# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable). +# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents. + +[package] +edition = "2024" +name = "p3-uni-stark" +version = "0.6.2" +build = false +autolib = false +autobins = false +autoexamples = false +autotests = false +autobenches = false +description = "A minimal univariate STARK framework providing core components for proof generation and verification." +homepage = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +readme = "README.md" +keywords = [ + "cryptography", + "SNARK", + "PLONK", + "FRI", + "plonky3", +] +categories = ["cryptography::cryptocurrencies"] +license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0" +repository = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +resolver = "2" + +[features] +cu-trace = [] +parallel = ["p3-maybe-rayon/parallel"] + +[lib] +name = "p3_uni_stark" +path = "src/lib.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "fib_air" +path = "tests/fib_air.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "mul_air" +path = "tests/mul_air.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "mul_fib_pair" +path = "tests/mul_fib_pair.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "no_next_row" +path = "tests/no_next_row.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "periodic_air" +path = "tests/periodic_air.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "periodic_column_shape" +path = "tests/periodic_column_shape.rs" + +[[test]] +name = "rc_sub_builder" +path = "tests/rc_sub_builder.rs" + +[dependencies.itertools] +version = "0.15.0" +features = ["use_alloc"] +default-features = false + +[dependencies.libm] +version = "0.2" + +[dependencies.p3-air] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-challenger] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-commit] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-field] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-fri] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-matrix] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-maybe-rayon] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.p3-util] +version = "0.6.2" + +[dependencies.serde] +version = "1.0" +features = [ + "derive", + "alloc", +] +default-features = false + +[dependencies.thiserror] +version = "2.0" +default-features = false + +[dependencies.tracing] +version = "0.1.44" +features = ["attributes"] +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.postcard] +version = "1.1.3" +features = ["alloc"] +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.rand] +version = "0.10.1" +default-features = false + +[lints.clippy] +cognitive_complexity = "allow" +match_bool = "warn" +needless_pass_by_value = "warn" +redundant_pub_crate = "allow" +semicolon_if_nothing_returned = "warn" +too_long_first_doc_paragraph = "allow" +transmute_undefined_repr = "allow" +tuple_array_conversions = "allow" +unused_peekable = "allow" + +[lints.clippy.all] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.clippy.nursery] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rust] +rust_2024_incompatible_pat = "warn" +unused_must_use = "deny" + +[lints.rust.rust_2018_idioms] +level = "deny" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rustdoc] +all = "warn" + +[target.'cfg(target_os = "solana")'.dependencies.solana-program] +version = "2" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml.orig b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml.orig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bd0d85a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/Cargo.toml.orig @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +[package] +name = "p3-uni-stark" +description = "A minimal univariate STARK framework providing core components for proof generation and verification." +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +homepage.workspace = true +keywords.workspace = true +categories.workspace = true + +[features] +parallel = ["p3-maybe-rayon/parallel"] + +[dependencies] +libm.workspace = true +p3-air.workspace = true +p3-challenger.workspace = true +p3-commit.workspace = true +p3-field.workspace = true +p3-fri.workspace = true +p3-matrix.workspace = true +p3-maybe-rayon.workspace = true +p3-util.workspace = true + +itertools.workspace = true +serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive", "alloc"] } +thiserror.workspace = true +tracing.workspace = true + +[dev-dependencies] +p3-baby-bear = { path = "../baby-bear" } +p3-challenger = { path = "../challenger" } +p3-circle = { path = "../circle" } +p3-commit = { path = "../commit", features = ["test-utils"] } +p3-dft = { path = "../dft" } +p3-keccak = { path = "../keccak" } +p3-matrix = { path = "../matrix" } +p3-merkle-tree = { path = "../merkle-tree" } +p3-mersenne-31 = { path = "../mersenne-31" } +p3-symmetric = { path = "../symmetric" } + +postcard = { workspace = true, features = ["alloc"] } +rand.workspace = true + +[lints] +workspace = true diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/PATCH.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/PATCH.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..533c1a00 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/PATCH.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# Why this vendored copy of `p3-uni-stark` 0.6.2 exists + +Same category as the sibling `p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/` and +`p3-mersenne-31-0.6.2-sbf-patch/`: a Solana-runtime-constraint workaround on +full upstream source (MIT OR Apache-2.0, `https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3`), +not a fork we intend to diverge on. One change, additive, in `src/verifier.rs`. + +## The problem, measured + +`verify_with_preprocessed` begins by symbolically re-evaluating the entire AIR +(`get_log_num_quotient_chunks` → `get_all_symbolic_constraints`) to derive a +single `usize`: the log of the quotient-chunk count. For a Poseidon2 AIR that +symbolic pass materializes a transient `SymbolicExpr` tree that peaks at +**~440 KB of live heap** (measured natively with a tracking allocator against +`riverrun-m31`'s `BindingAir`: 452,760 B peak live at 4 FRI queries, of which +the numeric verification itself accounts for ~38 KB). Solana caps a +transaction's heap at 256 KB (`MAX_HEAP_FRAME_BYTES`, a hard runtime ceiling), +so on-chain the verifier OOMs inside `verify()` before reaching any +cryptography — the exact failure `programs/riverrun-m31-verifier` documented +as an open question before this patch existed. + +The number that pass derives is a compile-time fact for a fixed AIR. An +on-chain verifier's AIR is fixed by definition. + +## The change + +`verify_with_preprocessed` is split, behavior-preserving: + +- `verify_with_preprocessed` (unchanged signature and semantics) computes + `log_num_quotient_chunks` via the symbolic pass exactly as before, then + delegates. +- **`verify_with_known_quotient_chunks`** (new, public) is the untouched + remainder of the verification body, taking `log_num_quotient_chunks` as a + parameter. Its `A` bound drops `Air>`, keeping only + the numeric `for<'a> Air>`. + +A caller with a fixed AIR pins the value as a constant (riverrun-m31: +`binding::LOG_NUM_QUOTIENT_CHUNKS`, guarded by a native test that recomputes +it through the symbolic pass and fails on drift) and calls the new entry +point. Native re-measurement after the switch: peak live heap 37,664 B at 4 +queries, 109,376 B at the production 40 queries — under the 256 KB ceiling +even with the on-chain LIFO-bump allocator's reclaim semantics (171,736 B +watermark at 40 queries). + +## Soundness + +A wrong `log_num_quotient_chunks` cannot weaken verification: the value fixes +the expected proof shape (`num_quotient_chunks`) and the quotient-domain +split, so a mismatch makes honest proofs fail shape validation or the final +quotient check — it rejects, it does not accept. The parameter is a program +constant on-chain, not attacker-controlled input. + +## Second, diagnostic-only addition: the `cu-trace` feature + +Three `sol_log_compute_units()` calls in `verify_with_known_quotient_chunks` +(before/after `pcs.verify`, before `verify_constraints`), gated behind +`#[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))]` — **off by default, +zero behavioral difference unless explicitly enabled**. They exist so the +on-chain CU cost can be attributed per phase reproducibly (measured 2026-07-29, +4 FRI queries, opt-level 3: pre-PCS ~220k CU, `pcs.verify` ~1.67M CU, +quotient recompose ~97k CU, `verify_constraints` ~398k CU, total 2,384,277 CU). +The `[target.'cfg(target_os = "solana")'.dependencies]` on `solana-program` +exists only for these calls. + +## Exit condition + +Remove this vendored copy when upstream Plonky3 exposes an equivalent entry +point that takes the quotient-degree (or the full symbolic summary) as a +precomputed input instead of recomputing it inside `verify`. diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/README.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aaa60b5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# p3-uni-stark + +A minimal univariate STARK framework: proving and verification of a single +AIR over a two-adic field, generic over the polynomial commitment scheme. + +Key items: + +- `prove` / `verify` (and `*_with_preprocessed` variants) — the prover and verifier entry points +- `StarkConfig` / `StarkGenericConfig` — ties together field, PCS and challenger +- `SymbolicAirBuilder` — symbolic constraint evaluation for degree inference +- `Proof`, `VerificationError` — proof object and typed verifier errors + +The verifier is designed to reject malformed proofs with a typed error, but +panics on adversarial inputs are not yet ruled out; see the repository +README's known-issues section. + +Part of [Plonky3](https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3), dual-licensed under MIT and Apache 2.0. diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/config.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/config.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f995a17d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/config.rs @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, CanSample, FieldChallenger}; +use p3_commit::{Pcs, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field}; + +pub type PcsError = <::Pcs as Pcs< + ::Challenge, + ::Challenger, +>>::Error; + +pub type Domain = <::Pcs as Pcs< + ::Challenge, + ::Challenger, +>>::Domain; + +pub type Val = as PolynomialSpace>::Val; + +pub type PackedVal = as Field>::Packing; + +pub type PackedChallenge = + <::Challenge as ExtensionField>>::ExtensionPacking; + +pub trait StarkGenericConfig: Clone { + /// The [`Pcs`] implementation used to commit to trace polynomials. + type Pcs: Pcs; + + /// The [`ExtensionField`] from which most random challenges are drawn. + type Challenge: ExtensionField>; + + /// The [`FieldChallenger`] (Fiat-Shamir) implementation used. + type Challenger: FieldChallenger> + + CanObserve<>::Commitment> + + CanSample; + + /// Get a reference to the [`Pcs`] used by this proof configuration. + fn pcs(&self) -> &Self::Pcs; + + /// Get an initialisation of the [`FieldChallenger`] used by this proof configuration. + fn initialise_challenger(&self) -> Self::Challenger; + + /// Returns 1 if the [`Pcs`] is zero-knowledge, 0 otherwise. + fn is_zk(&self) -> usize { + Self::Pcs::ZK as usize + } +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct StarkConfig { + /// The [`Pcs`] used to commit polynomials and produce opening proofs. + pcs: Pcs, + /// An initialised instance of the [`FieldChallenger`]. + challenger: Challenger, + _phantom: PhantomData, +} + +impl StarkConfig { + pub const fn new(pcs: Pcs, challenger: Challenger) -> Self { + Self { + pcs, + challenger, + _phantom: PhantomData, + } + } +} + +impl StarkGenericConfig for StarkConfig +where + Challenge: ExtensionField<::Val> + Clone, + Pcs: p3_commit::Pcs + Clone, + Challenger: FieldChallenger<::Val> + + CanObserve + + CanSample + + Clone, +{ + type Pcs = Pcs; + type Challenge = Challenge; + type Challenger = Challenger; + + fn pcs(&self) -> &Self::Pcs { + &self.pcs + } + + fn initialise_challenger(&self) -> Self::Challenger { + self.challenger.clone() + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/error.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/error.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d35c34f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/error.rs @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +//! Error types for STARK verification. + +use alloc::format; +use alloc::string::String; + +use thiserror::Error; + +/// Specific reasons why a proof's shape is invalid. +#[derive(Debug, Error)] +pub enum InvalidProofShapeError { + /// Instance arrays (airs, opened_values, public_values, degree_bits) have different lengths. + #[error("instance count mismatch")] + InstanceCountMismatch, + /// Trace local width doesn't match the AIR width. + #[error("air {air}: trace local width mismatch: expected {expected}, got {got}")] + TraceLocalWidthMismatch { + air: usize, + expected: usize, + got: usize, + }, + /// Trace next values have wrong width or are unexpectedly missing. + #[error("air {air}: trace next width mismatch or missing")] + TraceNextMismatch { air: usize }, + /// Trace next values present when AIR doesn't use next row. + #[error("air {air}: unexpected trace next values")] + UnexpectedTraceNext { air: usize }, + /// Quotient chunks count doesn't match expected. + #[error("air {air}: quotient chunks count mismatch: expected {expected}, got {got}")] + QuotientChunksCountMismatch { + air: usize, + expected: usize, + got: usize, + }, + /// Quotient chunk has wrong dimension. + #[error("air {air}: quotient chunk dimension mismatch")] + QuotientChunkDimensionMismatch { air: usize }, + /// Quotient opened values count doesn't match domain count. + #[error("air {air}: quotient domains count mismatch")] + QuotientDomainsCountMismatch { air: usize }, + /// Preprocessed trace opened values width doesn't match expected. + #[error( + "preprocessed trace width mismatch: expected local={expected_local}, next={expected_next}, got local={got_local}, next={got_next}" + )] + PreprocessedTraceWidthMismatch { + expected_local: usize, + expected_next: usize, + got_local: usize, + got_next: usize, + }, + /// Preprocessed verifier key is inconsistent with width. + #[error("preprocessed verifier key inconsistency")] + PreprocessedVerifierKeyInconsistency, + /// Preprocessed and main trace have different heights. + #[error( + "preprocessed degree mismatch: vk degree_bits={vk_degree_bits}, proof degree_bits={proof_degree_bits}" + )] + PreprocessedDegreeMismatch { + vk_degree_bits: usize, + proof_degree_bits: usize, + }, + /// Preprocessed width mismatch for a specific AIR. + #[error("air {air}: preprocessed width mismatch")] + PreprocessedWidthMismatch { air: usize }, + /// Preprocessed values present when preprocessed width is zero. + #[error("air {air}: unexpected preprocessed values")] + UnexpectedPreprocessedValues { air: usize }, + /// Proof degree bits are too small for the PCS ZK setting. + #[error( + "{}degree_bits too small for zk setting: expected at least {minimum}, got {got}", + air.map_or_else(String::new, |air| format!("air {air}: ")) + )] + DegreeBitsTooSmall { + air: Option, + minimum: usize, + got: usize, + }, + /// Proof degree bits are too large to safely construct verifier domains. + #[error( + "{}degree_bits too large for domain construction: expected at most {maximum}, got {got}", + air.map_or_else(String::new, |air| format!("air {air}: ")) + )] + DegreeBitsTooLarge { + air: Option, + maximum: usize, + got: usize, + }, + /// The quotient domain log-size overflows after adding degree bits and quotient chunk bits. + #[error( + "{}quotient domain too large: log-size {got} exceeds maximum {maximum}", + air.map_or_else(String::new, |air| format!("air {air}: ")) + )] + QuotientDomainTooLarge { + air: Option, + maximum: usize, + got: usize, + }, + /// Missing preprocessed local or next values. + #[error("air {air}: missing preprocessed values")] + MissingPreprocessedValues { air: usize }, + /// Preprocessed metadata missing or mismatched. + #[error("air {air}: preprocessed metadata mismatch")] + PreprocessedMetadataMismatch { air: usize }, + /// Public values length doesn't match what the AIR expects. + #[error("public values length mismatch: expected {expected}, got {got}")] + PublicValuesLengthMismatch { expected: usize, got: usize }, + /// Opened values (trace, quotient, random) don't match expected dimensions. + #[error("opened values do not match expected dimensions")] + OpenedValuesDimensionMismatch, +} + +/// Reasons a periodic column cannot be evaluated. +/// +/// - Periodic columns are AIR definition, not proof data. +/// - A malformed one is an AIR bug, surfaced here instead of a panic. +#[derive(Debug, Error)] +pub enum PeriodicColumnError { + /// A periodic column length is not a power of two. + #[error("periodic column length must be a power of two, got {got}")] + LengthNotPowerOfTwo { got: usize }, + /// A periodic column is longer than the trace it repeats over. + #[error("periodic column length too large: expected at most {maximum}, got {got}")] + LengthTooLarge { maximum: usize, got: usize }, +} + +/// Top-level verification error. +#[derive(Debug, Error)] +pub enum VerificationError +where + PcsErr: core::fmt::Debug, +{ + /// The proof shape is invalid. + #[error(transparent)] + InvalidProofShape(#[from] InvalidProofShapeError), + /// A periodic column declared by the AIR cannot be evaluated. + #[error(transparent)] + PeriodicColumn(#[from] PeriodicColumnError), + /// An error occurred while verifying the claimed openings. + #[error("invalid opening argument: {0:?}")] + InvalidOpeningArgument(PcsErr), + /// Out-of-domain evaluation mismatch, i.e. `constraints(zeta)` did not match + /// `quotient(zeta) Z_H(zeta)`. + #[error("out-of-domain evaluation mismatch{}", .index.map(|i| format!(" at index {}", i)).unwrap_or_default())] + OodEvaluationMismatch { index: Option }, + /// The FRI batch randomization does not correspond to the ZK setting. + #[error("randomization error: FRI batch randomization does not match ZK setting")] + RandomizationError, + /// The domain does not support computing the next point algebraically. + #[error( + "next point unavailable: domain does not support computing the next point algebraically" + )] + NextPointUnavailable, + /// The out-of-domain point coincides with a trace-domain point. + /// + /// Selector inversion is undefined there. + #[error("out-of-domain point lies inside the trace domain")] + OodPointInDomain, +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/folder.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/folder.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a83157e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/folder.rs @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_air::{AirBuilder, ExtensionBuilder, RowWindow}; +use p3_field::{Algebra, BasedVectorSpace}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrixView; +use p3_matrix::stack::ViewPair; + +use crate::{PackedChallenge, PackedVal, StarkGenericConfig, Val}; + +/// Packed constraint folder for SIMD-optimized prover evaluation. +/// +/// Uses packed types to evaluate constraints on multiple domain points simultaneously. +/// +/// Collects constraints during `air.eval()` into separate base/ext vectors, then +/// combines them in [`Self::finalize_constraints`] using decomposed alpha powers and +/// `batched_linear_combination` for efficient SIMD accumulation. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct ProverConstraintFolder<'a, SC: StarkGenericConfig> { + /// The [`RowMajorMatrixView`] containing rows on which the constraint polynomial is evaluated. + pub main: RowMajorMatrixView<'a, PackedVal>, + /// The preprocessed columns as a [`RowMajorMatrixView`]. + /// Zero-width when the AIR has no preprocessed trace. + pub preprocessed: RowMajorMatrixView<'a, PackedVal>, + /// Pre-built window over the preprocessed columns. + pub preprocessed_window: RowWindow<'a, PackedVal>, + /// Periodic column values at the current row(s), one packed value per column. + pub periodic_values: &'a [PackedVal], + /// Public inputs to the [AIR](`p3_air::Air`) implementation. + pub public_values: &'a [Val], + /// Evaluations of the first-row selector polynomial. + /// Non-zero only on the first trace row. + pub is_first_row: PackedVal, + /// Evaluations of the last-row selector polynomial. + /// Non-zero only on the last trace row. + pub is_last_row: PackedVal, + /// Evaluations of the transition selector polynomial. + /// Zero only on the last trace row. + pub is_transition: PackedVal, + /// Base-field alpha powers, reordered to match base constraint emission order. + /// `base_alpha_powers[d][j]` = d-th basis coefficient of alpha power for j-th base constraint. + pub base_alpha_powers: &'a [Vec>], + /// Extension-field alpha powers, reordered to match ext constraint emission order. + pub ext_alpha_powers: &'a [SC::Challenge], + /// Collected base-field constraints for this row + pub base_constraints: Vec>, + /// Collected extension-field constraints for this row + pub ext_constraints: Vec>, + /// Current constraint index being processed (debug-only bookkeeping) + pub constraint_index: usize, + /// Total number of constraints in the AIR (debug-only bookkeeping) + pub constraint_count: usize, +} + +/// Handles constraint verification for the verifier in a STARK system. +/// +/// Similar to [`ProverConstraintFolder`] but operates on committed values rather than the full trace, +/// using a more efficient accumulation method for verification. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct VerifierConstraintFolder<'a, SC: StarkGenericConfig> { + /// Pair of consecutive rows from the committed polynomial evaluations as a [`ViewPair`]. + pub main: ViewPair<'a, SC::Challenge>, + /// The preprocessed columns as a [`ViewPair`]. + /// Zero-width when the AIR has no preprocessed trace. + pub preprocessed: ViewPair<'a, SC::Challenge>, + /// Pre-built window over the preprocessed columns. + pub preprocessed_window: RowWindow<'a, SC::Challenge>, + /// Periodic column values at the opened point. + pub periodic_values: &'a [SC::Challenge], + /// Public values that are inputs to the computation + pub public_values: &'a [Val], + /// Evaluations of the first-row selector polynomial. + /// Non-zero only on the first trace row. + pub is_first_row: SC::Challenge, + /// Evaluations of the last-row selector polynomial. + /// Non-zero only on the last trace row. + pub is_last_row: SC::Challenge, + /// Evaluations of the transition selector polynomial. + /// Zero only on the last trace row. + pub is_transition: SC::Challenge, + /// Single challenge value used for constraint combination + pub alpha: SC::Challenge, + /// Running accumulator for all constraints + pub accumulator: SC::Challenge, +} + +impl ProverConstraintFolder<'_, SC> { + /// Combine all collected constraints with their pre-computed alpha powers. + /// + /// Base constraints use [`Algebra::batched_linear_combination`] per basis dimension, + /// decomposing the extension-field multiply into D base-field SIMD dot products. + /// Extension constraints use the same method with scalar EF coefficients. + /// + /// We keep base and extension constraints separate because the base constraints can + /// stay in the base field and use packed SIMD arithmetic. Decomposing EF powers of + /// `alpha` into base-field coordinates turns the base-field fold into a small number + /// of packed dot-products, avoiding repeated cross-field promotions. + #[inline] + pub fn finalize_constraints(&self) -> PackedChallenge { + debug_assert_eq!(self.constraint_index, self.constraint_count); + + let base = &self.base_constraints; + let base_powers = self.base_alpha_powers; + let acc = PackedChallenge::::from_basis_coefficients_fn(|d| { + PackedVal::::batched_linear_combination(base, &base_powers[d]) + }); + acc + PackedChallenge::::batched_linear_combination( + &self.ext_constraints, + self.ext_alpha_powers, + ) + } +} + +impl<'a, SC: StarkGenericConfig> AirBuilder for ProverConstraintFolder<'a, SC> { + type F = Val; + type Expr = PackedVal; + type Var = PackedVal; + type PreprocessedWindow = RowWindow<'a, PackedVal>; + type MainWindow = RowWindow<'a, PackedVal>; + type PublicVar = Val; + type PeriodicVar = PackedVal; + + #[inline] + fn main(&self) -> Self::MainWindow { + RowWindow::from_view(&self.main) + } + + fn preprocessed(&self) -> &Self::PreprocessedWindow { + &self.preprocessed_window + } + + #[inline] + fn is_first_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_first_row + } + + #[inline] + fn is_last_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_last_row + } + + #[inline] + fn is_transition(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_transition + } + + #[inline] + fn assert_zero>(&mut self, x: I) { + self.base_constraints.push(x.into()); + self.constraint_index += 1; + } + + #[inline] + fn assert_zeros>(&mut self, array: [I; N]) { + let expr_array = array.map(Into::into); + self.base_constraints.extend(expr_array); + self.constraint_index += N; + } + + #[inline] + fn public_values(&self) -> &[Self::PublicVar] { + self.public_values + } + + #[inline] + fn periodic_values(&self) -> &[Self::PeriodicVar] { + self.periodic_values + } +} + +impl ExtensionBuilder for ProverConstraintFolder<'_, SC> { + type EF = SC::Challenge; + type ExprEF = PackedChallenge; + type VarEF = PackedChallenge; + + fn assert_zero_ext(&mut self, x: I) + where + I: Into, + { + self.ext_constraints.push(x.into()); + self.constraint_index += 1; + } +} + +impl<'a, SC: StarkGenericConfig> AirBuilder for VerifierConstraintFolder<'a, SC> { + type F = Val; + type Expr = SC::Challenge; + type Var = SC::Challenge; + type PreprocessedWindow = RowWindow<'a, SC::Challenge>; + type MainWindow = RowWindow<'a, SC::Challenge>; + type PublicVar = Val; + type PeriodicVar = SC::Challenge; + + fn main(&self) -> Self::MainWindow { + RowWindow::from_two_rows(self.main.top.values, self.main.bottom.values) + } + + fn preprocessed(&self) -> &Self::PreprocessedWindow { + &self.preprocessed_window + } + + fn is_first_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_first_row + } + + fn is_last_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_last_row + } + + fn is_transition(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.is_transition + } + + fn assert_zero>(&mut self, x: I) { + self.accumulator *= self.alpha; + self.accumulator += x.into(); + } + + fn public_values(&self) -> &[Self::PublicVar] { + self.public_values + } + + #[inline] + fn periodic_values(&self) -> &[Self::PeriodicVar] { + self.periodic_values + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aac4b737 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")] +#![no_std] + +extern crate alloc; + +mod config; +mod error; +mod folder; +mod preprocessed; +mod proof; +mod prover; +mod security; +mod sub_builder; +mod symbolic; +mod verifier; + +pub use config::*; +pub use error::*; +pub use folder::*; +pub use p3_air::symbolic::*; +pub use preprocessed::*; +pub use proof::*; +pub use prover::*; +pub use security::*; +pub use sub_builder::*; +pub use symbolic::*; +pub use verifier::*; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/preprocessed.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/preprocessed.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a71c3fc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/preprocessed.rs @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +use p3_air::Air; +use p3_air::symbolic::SymbolicAirBuilder; +use p3_commit::Pcs; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use tracing::debug_span; + +use crate::{ProverConstraintFolder, StarkGenericConfig, Val}; + +/// Prover-side reusable data for preprocessed columns. +/// +/// This allows committing to the preprocessed trace once per [`Air`]/degree and reusing +/// the commitment and [`Pcs`] prover data across many proofs. +pub struct PreprocessedProverData { + /// The width (number of columns) of the preprocessed trace. + pub width: usize, + /// The log2 of the degree of the domain over which the preprocessed trace is committed. + /// + /// In the current uni-stark implementation this matches `degree_bits` in [`Proof`](crate::Proof), + /// i.e. the (extended) trace degree. + pub degree_bits: usize, + /// [`Pcs`] commitment to the preprocessed trace. + pub commitment: >::Commitment, + /// [`Pcs`] prover data for the preprocessed trace. + pub prover_data: >::ProverData, +} + +/// Verifier-side reusable data for preprocessed columns. +/// +/// This allows committing to the preprocessed trace once per [`Air`]/degree and reusing +/// the commitment across many verifications. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct PreprocessedVerifierKey { + /// The width (number of columns) of the preprocessed trace. + pub width: usize, + /// The log2 of the degree of the domain over which the preprocessed trace is committed. + /// + /// This should match `degree_bits` in [`Proof`](crate::Proof), i.e. the (extended) trace degree. + pub degree_bits: usize, + /// [`Pcs`] commitment to the preprocessed trace. + pub commitment: >::Commitment, +} + +/// Set up and commit the preprocessed trace for a given [`Air`] and degree. +/// +/// This can be called once per [`Air`]/degree configuration to obtain reusable +/// prover data for preprocessed columns. Returns `None` if the [`Air`] does not +/// define any preprocessed columns. +pub fn setup_preprocessed( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + degree_bits: usize, +) -> Option<(PreprocessedProverData, PreprocessedVerifierKey)> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, +{ + let pcs = config.pcs(); + let is_zk = config.is_zk(); + + let init_degree = 1 << degree_bits; + let degree = 1 << (degree_bits + is_zk); + + let preprocessed = air.preprocessed_trace()?; + + let width = preprocessed.width(); + if width == 0 { + return None; + } + + assert_eq!( + preprocessed.height(), + init_degree, + "preprocessed trace height must equal trace degree" + ); + + let trace_domain = pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(degree); + let (commitment, prover_data) = debug_span!("commit to preprocessed trace") + .in_scope(|| pcs.commit_preprocessing([(trace_domain, preprocessed)])); + + let degree_bits = degree_bits + is_zk; + let prover_data = PreprocessedProverData { + width, + degree_bits, + commitment: commitment.clone(), + prover_data, + }; + let vk = PreprocessedVerifierKey { + width, + degree_bits, + commitment, + }; + Some((prover_data, vk)) +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/proof.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/proof.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57fb60cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/proof.rs @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use p3_commit::Pcs; +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +use crate::StarkGenericConfig; +use crate::security::{ConjecturedSecurity, ProvenSecurity, StarkSecurityParams}; + +type Com = <::Pcs as Pcs< + ::Challenge, + ::Challenger, +>>::Commitment; +type PcsProof = <::Pcs as Pcs< + ::Challenge, + ::Challenger, +>>::Proof; + +#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)] +#[serde(bound = "")] +pub struct Proof { + pub commitments: Commitments>, + pub opened_values: OpenedValues, + pub opening_proof: PcsProof, + pub degree_bits: usize, +} + +impl Proof { + /// Conjectured security level (in bits). + /// + /// This is a parameter-space property and does not depend on `self`; the method + /// is exposed on [`Proof`] for parity with [`Self::proven_security`]. + /// + /// See [`ConjecturedSecurity`]. + pub fn conjectured_security(params: &StarkSecurityParams) -> ConjecturedSecurity { + ConjecturedSecurity::compute_from_params(params) + } + + /// Proven security level (in bits). + /// + /// See [`ProvenSecurity`]. + pub fn proven_security(&self, params: &StarkSecurityParams) -> ProvenSecurity { + ProvenSecurity::compute_from_proof(self.degree_bits, params) + } +} + +#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub struct Commitments { + pub trace: Com, + pub quotient_chunks: Com, + pub random: Option, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub struct OpenedValues { + pub trace_local: Vec, + /// Main trace evaluated at `g * zeta`. + /// + /// `None` when the AIR has no transition constraints and does not access the next row. + pub trace_next: Option>, + pub preprocessed_local: Option>, + pub preprocessed_next: Option>, // may not always be necessary + pub quotient_chunks: Vec>, + pub random: Option>, +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/prover.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/prover.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa564797 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/prover.rs @@ -0,0 +1,555 @@ +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::Itertools; +use p3_air::symbolic::{AirLayout, SymbolicAirBuilder, get_symbolic_constraints}; +use p3_air::{Air, RowWindow}; +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger}; +use p3_commit::{Pcs, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::{PackedFieldExtension, PackedValue, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_matrix::Matrix; +use p3_matrix::dense::{RowMajorMatrix, RowMajorMatrixView}; +use p3_maybe_rayon::prelude::*; +use p3_util::log2_strict_usize; +use tracing::{debug_span, info_span, instrument}; + +use crate::{ + Commitments, Domain, OpenedValues, PackedChallenge, PackedVal, PreprocessedProverData, Proof, + ProverConstraintFolder, StarkGenericConfig, Val, get_constraint_layout, + get_log_num_quotient_chunks, +}; + +#[instrument(skip_all)] +#[allow(clippy::multiple_bound_locations, clippy::type_repetition_in_bounds)] // cfg not supported in where clauses? +pub fn prove_with_preprocessed< + SC, + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] A: for<'a> Air>>, + #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))] A, +>( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + trace: RowMajorMatrix>, + public_values: &[Val], + preprocessed: Option<&PreprocessedProverData>, +) -> Proof +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, +{ + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + p3_air::check_constraints(air, &trace, public_values); + + // Compute the height `N = 2^n` and `log_2(height)`, `n`, of the trace. + let degree = trace.height(); + let log_degree = log2_strict_usize(degree); + let log_ext_degree = log_degree + config.is_zk(); + + // Get preprocessed width for symbolic constraint evaluation. + // + // - If reusable preprocessed prover data is provided, trust its width and degree_bits + // (and enforce consistency). + // - Otherwise, if the AIR defines preprocessed columns, we treat it as an error: + // callers must use `setup_preprocessed` and pass the resulting data in. + let preprocessed_width = preprocessed.map_or_else( + || { + let width = air.preprocessed_width(); + if width > 0 { + panic!( + "AIR defines preprocessed columns (width = {width}), \ + but no PreprocessedProverData was provided. \ + Call `setup_preprocessed` and pass it to `prove_with_preprocessed`." + ); + } + 0 + }, + |pp| { + assert_eq!( + pp.degree_bits, log_ext_degree, + "PreprocessedProverData degree_bits does not match trace degree_bits" + ); + pp.width + }, + ); + + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width, + main_width: air.width(), + num_public_values: air.num_public_values(), + num_periodic_columns: air.num_periodic_columns(), + ..Default::default() + }; + + // In debug builds, cross-check the static hint against symbolic evaluation. + debug_assert!( + air.num_constraints() + .is_none_or(|n| { n == get_symbolic_constraints(air, layout).len() }), + "num_constraints() = {} but symbolic evaluation found {} constraints", + air.num_constraints().unwrap(), + get_symbolic_constraints(air, layout).len(), + ); + + // Each constraint polynomial looks like `C_j(X_1, ..., X_w, Y_1, ..., Y_w, Z_1, ..., Z_j)`. + // When evaluated on a given row, the X_i's will be the `i`'th element of the that row, the + // Y_i's will be the `i`'th element of the next row and the Z_i's will be evaluations of + // selector polynomials on the given row index. + // + // When we convert to working with polynomials, the `X_i`'s and `Y_i`'s will be replaced by the + // degree `N - 1` polynomials `T_i(x)` and `T_i(hx)` respectively. The selector polynomials are + // a little more complicated, however. + // + // In our case, the selector polynomials are `S_1(x) = is_first_row`, `S_2(x) = is_last_row` + // and `S_3(x) = is_transition`. Both `S_1(x)` and `S_2(x)` are polynomials of degree `N - 1` + // as they must be non-zero only at a single location in the initial domain. However, + // `is_transition` is a polynomial of degree `1` as it simply needs to be `0` on the last row. + // + // The constraint degree (`deg(C)`) is the linear factor of `N` in the constraint polynomial. In other + // words, it is roughly the total degree of `C`; however, we treat `Z_3` as a constant term which does + // not contribute to the degree. + // + // E.g. `C_j = Z_1 * (X_1^3 - X_2 * X_3 * X_4)` would have degree `4`. + // `C_j = Z_3 * (X_1^3 - X_2 * X_3 * X_4)` would have degree `3`. + // + // The point of all this is that, defining: + // C(x) = C(T_1(x), ..., T_w(x), T_1(hx), ... T_w(hx), S_1(x), S_2(x), S_3(x)) + // We get the constraint bound: + // deg(C(x)) <= deg(C) * (N - 1) + 1 + // The `+1` is due to the `is_transition` selector which is not accounted for in `deg(C)`. Note + // that S_i^2 should never appear in a constraint as it should just be replaced by `S_i`. + // + // For now in comments we assume that `deg(C) = 3` meaning `deg(C(x)) <= 3N - 2` + + // From the degree of the constraint polynomial, compute the number + // of quotient polynomials we will split Q(x) into. This is chosen to + // always be a power of 2. + let log_num_quotient_chunks = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::, A>(air, layout, config.is_zk()); + + let num_quotient_chunks = 1 << (log_num_quotient_chunks + config.is_zk()); + + // Initialize the PCS and the Challenger. + let pcs = config.pcs(); + let mut challenger = config.initialise_challenger(); + + // Get the subgroup `H` of size `N`. We treat each column `T_i` of + // the trace as an evaluation vector of polynomials `T_i(x)` over `H`. + // (In the Circle STARK case `H` is instead a standard position twin coset of size `N`) + let trace_domain = pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(degree); + + // When ZK is enabled, we need to use an extended domain of size `2N` as we will + // add random values to the trace. + let ext_trace_domain = pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(degree * (config.is_zk() + 1)); + + // Let `g` denote a generator of the multiplicative group of `F` and `H'` the unique + // subgroup of `F` of size `N << (pcs.config.log_blowup + config.is_zk())`. + // If `zk` is enabled, we double the trace length by adding random values. + // + // For each trace column `T_i`, we compute the evaluation vector of `T_i(x)` over `H'`. This + // new extended trace `ET` is hashed into a Merkle tree with its rows bit-reversed. + // trace_commit contains the root of the tree + // trace_data contains the entire tree. + // - trace_data.leaves is the matrix containing `ET`. + let (trace_commit, trace_data) = + info_span!("commit to trace data").in_scope(|| pcs.commit([(ext_trace_domain, trace)])); + + // Preprocessed commitment and prover data (if any). + let (preprocessed_commit, preprocessed_data_ref) = preprocessed + .map(|pp| (pp.commitment.clone(), &pp.prover_data)) + .unzip(); + + // Observe the instance. + // degree < 2^255 so we can safely cast log_degree to a u8. + challenger.observe(Val::::from_u8(log_ext_degree as u8)); + challenger.observe(Val::::from_u8(log_degree as u8)); + challenger.observe(Val::::from_usize(preprocessed_width)); + // TODO: Might be best practice to include other instance data here; see verifier comment. + + // Observe the Merkle root of the trace commitment. + challenger.observe(trace_commit.clone()); + if preprocessed_width > 0 { + challenger.observe(preprocessed_commit.as_ref().unwrap().clone()); + } + + // Observe the public input values. + challenger.observe_slice(public_values); + + // Get the first Fiat Shamir challenge which will be used to combine all constraint polynomials + // into a single polynomial. + // + // Soundness Error: + // If a prover is malicious, we can find a row `i` such that some of the constraints + // C_0, ..., C_n are non 0 on this row. The malicious prover "wins" if the random challenge + // alpha is such that: + // (1): C_0(i) + alpha * C_1(i) + ... + alpha^n * C_n(i) = 0 + // This is a polynomial of degree n, so it has at most n roots. Thus the probability of this + // occurring for a given trace and set of constraints is n/|EF|. + // + // Currently, we do not observe data about the constraint polynomials directly. In particular + // a prover could take a trace and fiddle around with the AIR it claims to satisfy without + // changing this sample alpha. + // + // In particular this means that a malicious prover could create a custom AIR for a given trace + // such that equation (1) holds. However, such AIRs would need to be very specific and + // so such tampering should be obvious to spot. The verifier needs to check the AIR anyway to + // confirm that satisfying it indeed proves what the prover claims. Hence this should not be + // a soundness issue. + let alpha: SC::Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + // A domain large enough to uniquely identify the quotient polynomial. + // This domain must be contained in the domain over which `trace_data` is defined. + // Explicitly it should be equal to `gK` for some subgroup `K` contained in `H'`. + let quotient_domain = + ext_trace_domain.create_disjoint_domain(1 << (log_ext_degree + log_num_quotient_chunks)); + + // Return a the subset of the extended trace `ET` corresponding to the rows giving evaluations + // over the quotient domain. + // + // This only works if the trace domain is `gH'` and the quotient domain is `gK` for some subgroup `K` contained in `H'`. + // TODO: Make this explicit in `get_evaluations_on_domain` or otherwise fix this. + let trace_on_quotient_domain = pcs.get_evaluations_on_domain(&trace_data, 0, quotient_domain); + let preprocessed_on_quotient_domain = preprocessed_data_ref + .map(|data| pcs.get_evaluations_on_domain_no_random(data, 0, quotient_domain)); + + // Compute the quotient polynomial `Q(x)` by evaluating + // `C(T_1(x), ..., T_w(x), T_1(hx), ..., T_w(hx), selectors(x)) / Z_H(x)` + // at every point in the quotient domain. The degree of `Q(x)` is `<= deg(C(x)) - N = 2N - 2` in the case + // where `deg(C) = 3`. (See the discussion above constraint_degree for more details.) + let quotient_values = quotient_values( + pcs, + air, + public_values, + layout, + trace_domain, + quotient_domain, + &trace_on_quotient_domain, + preprocessed_on_quotient_domain.as_ref(), + alpha, + ); + + // Due to `alpha`, evaluations of `Q` all lie in the extension field `E`. + // We flatten this into a matrix of `F` values by treating `E` as an `F` + // vector space and so separating each element of `E` into `e + 1 = [E: F]` elements of `F`. + // + // This is valid to do because our domain lies in the base field `F`. Hence we can split + // `Q(x)` into `e + 1` polynomials `Q_0(x), ... , Q_e(x)` each contained in `F`. + // such that `Q(x) = [Q_0(x), ... ,Q_e(x)]` holds for all `x` in `F`. + let quotient_flat = RowMajorMatrix::new_col(quotient_values).flatten_to_base(); + + // Currently each polynomial `Q_i(x)` is of degree `<= 2(N - 1)` and + // we have it's evaluations over a the coset `gK of size `2N`. Let `k` be the chosen + // generator of `K` which satisfies `k^2 = h`. + // + // We can split this coset into the sub-cosets `gH` and `gkH` each of size `N`. + // Define: L_g(x) = (x^N - (gk)^N)/(g^N - (gk)^N) = (x^N + g^N)/2g^N + // L_{gk}(x) = (x^N - g^N)/(g^N - (gk)^N) = -(x^N - g^N)/2g^N. + // Then `L_g` is equal to `1` on `gH` and `0` on `gkH` and `L_{gk}` is equal to `1` on `gkH` and `0` on `gH`. + // + // Thus we can decompose `Q_i(x) = L_{g}(x)q_{i0}(x) + L_{gk}(x)q_{i1}(x)` (Or an randomized version of this in the zk case) + // where `q_{i0}(x)` and `q_{i1}(x)` are polynomials of degree `<= N - 1`. + // Moreover the evaluations of `q_{i0}(x), q_{i1}(x)` on `gH` and `gkH` respectively are + // exactly the evaluations of `Q_i(x)` on `gH` and `gkH`. + // For each polynomial `q_{ij}`, compute the evaluation vector of `q_{ij}(x)` over `gH'`. We bit + // reverse the rows and hash the resulting matrix into a merkle tree. + // quotient_commit contains the root of the tree + // quotient_data contains the entire tree. + // - quotient_data.leaves is a pair of matrices containing the `q_i0(x)` and `q_i1(x)`. + let (quotient_commit, quotient_data) = info_span!("commit to quotient poly chunks") + .in_scope(|| pcs.commit_quotient(quotient_domain, quotient_flat, num_quotient_chunks)); + challenger.observe(quotient_commit.clone()); + + // If zk is enabled, we generate random extension field values of the size of the randomized trace. If `n` is the degree of the initial trace, + // then the randomized trace has degree `2n`. To randomize the FRI batch polynomial, we then need an extension field random polynomial of degree `2n -1`. + // So we can generate a random polynomial of degree `2n`, and provide it to `open` as is. + // Then the method will add `(R(X) - R(z)) / (X - z)` (which is of the desired degree `2n - 1`), to the batch of polynomials. + // Since we need a random polynomial defined over the extension field, and the `commit` method is over the base field, + // we actually need to commit to `SC::Challenge::D` base field random polynomials. + // This is similar to what is done for the quotient polynomials. + // TODO: This approach is only statistically zk. To make it perfectly zk, `R` would have to truly be an extension field polynomial. + let (opt_r_commit, opt_r_data) = if SC::Pcs::ZK { + let (r_commit, r_data) = pcs + .get_opt_randomization_poly_commitment(core::iter::once(ext_trace_domain)) + .expect("ZK is enabled, so we should have randomization commitments"); + (Some(r_commit), Some(r_data)) + } else { + (None, None) + }; + + // Combine our commitments to the trace and quotient polynomials into a single object which + // will be passed to the verifier. + let commitments = Commitments { + trace: trace_commit, + quotient_chunks: quotient_commit, + random: opt_r_commit.clone(), + }; + + if let Some(r_commit) = opt_r_commit { + challenger.observe(r_commit); + } + + // Get an out-of-domain point to open our values at. + // + // Soundness Error: + // This sample will be used to check the equality: `C(X) = ZH(X)Q(X)`. If a prover is malicious + // and this equality is false, the probability that it is true at the point `zeta` will be + // deg(C(X))/|EF| = dN/|EF| where `N` is the trace length and our constraints have degree `d`. + // + // Completeness Error: + // If zeta happens to lie in the domain `gK`, then when opening at zeta we will run into division + // by zero errors. This doesn't lead to a soundness issue as the verifier will just reject in those + // cases but it is a completeness issue and contributes a completeness error of |gK| = 2N/|EF|. + let zeta: SC::Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + let zeta_next = trace_domain + .next_point(zeta) + .expect("domain should support next_point operation"); + + let is_random = opt_r_data.is_some(); + let main_next = !air.main_next_row_columns().is_empty(); + let pre_next = !air.preprocessed_next_row_columns().is_empty(); + let (opened_values, opening_proof) = info_span!("open").in_scope(|| { + let round0 = opt_r_data.as_ref().map(|r_data| (r_data, vec![vec![zeta]])); + let round1_points = if main_next { + vec![zeta, zeta_next] + } else { + vec![zeta] + }; + let round1 = (&trace_data, vec![round1_points]); + let round2 = ("ient_data, vec![vec![zeta]; num_quotient_chunks]); // open every chunk at zeta + let round3 = preprocessed_data_ref.map(|data| { + let pre_points = if pre_next { + vec![zeta, zeta_next] + } else { + vec![zeta] + }; + (data, vec![pre_points]) + }); + + let rounds = round0 + .into_iter() + .chain([round1, round2]) + .chain(round3) + .collect(); + + pcs.open_with_preprocessing(rounds, &mut challenger, preprocessed_data_ref.is_some()) + }); + let trace_idx = SC::Pcs::TRACE_IDX; + let quotient_idx = SC::Pcs::QUOTIENT_IDX; + let trace_local = opened_values[trace_idx][0][0].clone(); + let trace_next = if main_next { + Some(opened_values[trace_idx][0][1].clone()) + } else { + None + }; + let quotient_chunks = opened_values[quotient_idx] + .iter() + .map(|v| v[0].clone()) + .collect_vec(); + let random = if is_random { + Some(opened_values[0][0][0].clone()) + } else { + None + }; + let (preprocessed_local, preprocessed_next) = if preprocessed_width > 0 { + let local = Some(opened_values[SC::Pcs::PREPROCESSED_TRACE_IDX][0][0].clone()); + let next = if pre_next { + Some(opened_values[SC::Pcs::PREPROCESSED_TRACE_IDX][0][1].clone()) + } else { + None + }; + (local, next) + } else { + (None, None) + }; + let opened_values = OpenedValues { + trace_local, + trace_next, + preprocessed_local, + preprocessed_next, + quotient_chunks, + random, + }; + Proof { + commitments, + opened_values, + opening_proof, + degree_bits: log_ext_degree, + } +} + +#[instrument(skip_all)] +#[allow(clippy::multiple_bound_locations, clippy::type_repetition_in_bounds)] // cfg not supported in where clauses? +pub fn prove< + SC, + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] A: for<'a> Air>>, + #[cfg(not(debug_assertions))] A, +>( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + trace: RowMajorMatrix>, + public_values: &[Val], +) -> Proof +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, +{ + prove_with_preprocessed::(config, air, trace, public_values, None) +} + +#[instrument(skip_all, level = "debug")] +// TODO: Group some arguments to remove the `allow`? +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +pub fn quotient_values( + pcs: &SC::Pcs, + air: &A, + public_values: &[Val], + layout: AirLayout, + trace_domain: Domain, + quotient_domain: Domain, + trace_on_quotient_domain: &Mat, + preprocessed_on_quotient_domain: Option<&Mat>, + alpha: SC::Challenge, +) -> Vec +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, + Mat: Matrix> + Sync, +{ + let quotient_size = quotient_domain.size(); + let width = trace_on_quotient_domain.width(); + let mut sels = debug_span!("Compute Selectors") + .in_scope(|| trace_domain.selectors_on_coset(quotient_domain)); + + let qdb = log2_strict_usize(quotient_domain.size()) - log2_strict_usize(trace_domain.size()); + let next_step = 1 << qdb; + + // We take PackedVal::::WIDTH worth of values at a time from a quotient_size slice, so we need to + // pad with default values in the case where quotient_size is smaller than PackedVal::::WIDTH. + for _ in quotient_size..PackedVal::::WIDTH { + sels.is_first_row.push(Val::::default()); + sels.is_last_row.push(Val::::default()); + sels.is_transition.push(Val::::default()); + sels.inv_vanishing.push(Val::::default()); + } + + let constraint_layout = get_constraint_layout(air, layout); + let (base_alpha_powers, ext_alpha_powers) = constraint_layout.decompose_alpha(alpha); + let periodic_cols = air.periodic_columns(); + let periodic_table = + pcs.build_periodic_lde_table(&periodic_cols, trace_domain, quotient_domain); + + let pack_width = PackedVal::::WIDTH; + let periodic_packed: Vec>> = if periodic_table.is_empty() { + Vec::new() + } else { + let ncols = periodic_table.width(); + (0..quotient_size) + .step_by(pack_width) + .map(|i_start| { + (0..ncols) + .map(|col_idx| { + PackedVal::::from_fn(|offset| { + *periodic_table.get(i_start + offset, col_idx) + }) + }) + .collect() + }) + .collect() + }; + + // Buffers reused across row-groups on each worker thread: allocating the + // packed row pairs and constraint accumulators fresh per group costs + // ~20% of this function's runtime on wide traces. + struct GroupBuffers { + main: Vec>, + preprocessed: Vec>, + base_constraints: Vec>, + ext_constraints: Vec>, + } + + let mut quotient_values = SC::Challenge::zero_vec(quotient_size); + quotient_values + .par_chunks_mut(PackedVal::::WIDTH) + .enumerate() + .for_each_init( + || GroupBuffers:: { + main: Vec::with_capacity(2 * width), + preprocessed: Vec::with_capacity( + 2 * preprocessed_on_quotient_domain.map_or(0, |p| p.width()), + ), + base_constraints: Vec::with_capacity(constraint_layout.base_indices.len()), + ext_constraints: Vec::with_capacity(constraint_layout.ext_indices.len()), + }, + |bufs, (group, quotient_chunk)| { + let i_start = group * PackedVal::::WIDTH; + let i_range = i_start..i_start + PackedVal::::WIDTH; + + let is_first_row = + *PackedVal::::from_slice(&sels.is_first_row[i_range.clone()]); + let is_last_row = *PackedVal::::from_slice(&sels.is_last_row[i_range.clone()]); + let is_transition = + *PackedVal::::from_slice(&sels.is_transition[i_range.clone()]); + let inv_vanishing = *PackedVal::::from_slice(&sels.inv_vanishing[i_range]); + + bufs.main.clear(); + bufs.main.extend( + trace_on_quotient_domain.vertically_packed_row::>(i_start), + ); + bufs.main.extend( + trace_on_quotient_domain + .vertically_packed_row::>(i_start + next_step), + ); + let main = RowMajorMatrixView::new(&bufs.main, width); + + let preprocessed_view = match preprocessed_on_quotient_domain { + Some(preprocessed) => { + bufs.preprocessed.clear(); + bufs.preprocessed + .extend(preprocessed.vertically_packed_row::>(i_start)); + bufs.preprocessed.extend( + preprocessed + .vertically_packed_row::>(i_start + next_step), + ); + RowMajorMatrixView::new(&bufs.preprocessed, preprocessed.width()) + } + None => RowMajorMatrixView::new(&[], 0), + }; + let periodic_values: &[PackedVal] = if periodic_packed.is_empty() { + &[] + } else { + &periodic_packed[i_start / pack_width] + }; + let mut folder = ProverConstraintFolder { + main, + preprocessed: preprocessed_view, + preprocessed_window: RowWindow::from_view(&preprocessed_view), + periodic_values, + public_values, + is_first_row, + is_last_row, + is_transition, + base_alpha_powers: &base_alpha_powers, + ext_alpha_powers: &ext_alpha_powers, + base_constraints: core::mem::take(&mut bufs.base_constraints), + ext_constraints: core::mem::take(&mut bufs.ext_constraints), + constraint_index: 0, + constraint_count: constraint_layout.total_constraints(), + }; + air.eval(&mut folder); + + // quotient(x) = constraints(x) / Z_H(x) + let quotient = folder.finalize_constraints() * inv_vanishing; + + // The contents were folded into `quotient` above; reclaim the Vecs and + // `clear` them (`len = 0`, capacity kept) so the next row group reuses + // the allocations. + bufs.base_constraints = folder.base_constraints; + bufs.base_constraints.clear(); + bufs.ext_constraints = folder.ext_constraints; + bufs.ext_constraints.clear(); + + // "Transpose" D packed base coefficients into WIDTH scalar extension coefficients. + for (idx_in_packing, q) in quotient_chunk.iter_mut().enumerate() { + *q = quotient.extract(idx_in_packing); + } + }, + ); + quotient_values +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/security.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/security.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e525e2f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/security.rs @@ -0,0 +1,647 @@ +//! STARK proof security level computation. +//! +//! Provides conjectured and proven security level estimates in bits. +//! +//! # References +//! - ethSTARK ([2021/582](https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/582)) +//! - Proximity Gaps for Reed-Solomon Codes ([2020/654](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/654)) +//! - On the Security of STARKs with FRI ([2024/1553](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1553)) +//! - On the Distribution of the Distances of Random Words ([2025/2010](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2010)) +//! - BCHKS25 — Improved LDR proximity gaps ([2025/2055](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2055)) +//! +//! [2025/2010] recommends proven bounds in deployment. If a deployer prefers +//! conjectured bounds, it advises staying above the random-words cutoff +//! ([2025/2010] §1.5, formula (5)). +//! +//! The proven analysis is patterned on Theorems 2 & 3 of [2024/1553] (round-by-round +//! soundness; UDR and LDR), with the improved LDR FRI commit-phase bound from +//! [2025/2055] Theorem 4.2. Concrete formulas are cross-checked against Ethereum's +//! reference [`soundcalc`](https://github.com/ethereum/soundcalc) calculator. + +#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] + +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::cmp::{max, min}; + +use libm::{ceil, log2, pow, sqrt}; +use p3_air::Air; +use p3_air::symbolic::{AirLayout, SymbolicAirBuilder, get_all_symbolic_constraints}; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field}; +use p3_fri::FriParameters; +use p3_util::log2_floor_usize; + +/// Parameters required to compute STARK proof security level. +/// +/// FRI-related fields are read from [`FriParameters`]; the AIR-shape fields +/// (`num_constraints`, `air_max_constraint_degree`, `max_combo`) describe the +/// AIR being proved and are used in the DEEP-ALI bounds. Use +/// [`StarkSecurityParams::from_air`] to derive them automatically when an AIR +/// is available. +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +pub struct StarkSecurityParams { + /// log2(blowup factor); the FRI rate is ρ = 2^{-log_blowup}. + pub fri_log_blowup: usize, + /// log2(final FRI polynomial length) — controls when FRI stops folding. + pub fri_log_final_poly_len: usize, + /// log2(maximum FRI folding arity). + pub fri_max_log_arity: usize, + /// Number of FRI queries. + pub fri_num_queries: usize, + /// Bits of grinding ground at every FRI commit-phase round. + pub fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits: usize, + /// Bits of grinding ground once before sampling FRI queries. + pub fri_query_proof_of_work_bits: usize, + /// Bit-length of the field where FRI operates (typically the extension field). + pub num_modulus_bits: usize, + /// Collision resistance of the commitment hash, in bits. + pub collision_resistance: usize, + /// Total number of AIR constraints batched in ALI (base + extension). + pub num_constraints: usize, + /// Maximum AIR constraint degree. The Plonky3 prover requires this to be at most + /// `blowup + 1` for the quotient to fit in the LDE. + pub air_max_constraint_degree: usize, + /// Maximum number of out-of-domain points referenced per AIR column + /// (DEEP-ALI's `max_combo`). For a uni-STARK using `local`/`next` rotations this + /// is `2`; `1` if no transition constraint is present. + pub max_combo: usize, +} + +impl StarkSecurityParams { + /// Build security parameters explicitly from FRI parameters and the AIR shape. + /// + /// Use [`from_air`](Self::from_air) when an AIR is available — it derives + /// `num_constraints` and `air_max_constraint_degree` from symbolic evaluation. + pub const fn new( + fri_params: &FriParameters, + num_modulus_bits: usize, + collision_resistance: usize, + num_constraints: usize, + air_max_constraint_degree: usize, + max_combo: usize, + ) -> Self { + Self { + fri_log_blowup: fri_params.log_blowup, + fri_log_final_poly_len: fri_params.log_final_poly_len, + fri_max_log_arity: fri_params.max_log_arity, + fri_num_queries: fri_params.num_queries, + fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits: fri_params.commit_proof_of_work_bits, + fri_query_proof_of_work_bits: fri_params.query_proof_of_work_bits, + num_modulus_bits, + collision_resistance, + num_constraints, + air_max_constraint_degree, + max_combo, + } + } + + /// Build security parameters by inspecting the AIR's symbolic constraints to derive + /// `num_constraints` and `air_max_constraint_degree`. The caller supplies `max_combo` + /// (typically `2` for a uni-STARK that uses `local`/`next`, `1` if no transition). + /// + /// `layout` must reflect any permutation/lookup columns: a base-only layout (e.g. + /// `AirLayout::from_air`, which fills only the `BaseAir` widths) leaves the + /// permutation fields at `0`, so permutation-argument constraints are not counted + /// and security is overstated. + pub fn from_air( + fri_params: &FriParameters, + air: &A, + layout: AirLayout, + num_modulus_bits: usize, + collision_resistance: usize, + max_combo: usize, + ) -> Self + where + F: Field, + EF: ExtensionField, + A: Air>, + { + let (base, ext) = get_all_symbolic_constraints::(air, layout); + let num_constraints = base.len() + ext.len(); + // Clamp to 1 so log2(·) stays finite when the AIR has no constraints. + let base_deg = base.iter().map(|c| c.degree_multiple()).max().unwrap_or(0); + let ext_deg = ext.iter().map(|c| c.degree_multiple()).max().unwrap_or(0); + let air_max_constraint_degree = base_deg.max(ext_deg).max(1); + Self::new( + fri_params, + num_modulus_bits, + collision_resistance, + num_constraints, + air_max_constraint_degree, + max_combo, + ) + } +} + +/// Conjectured security level (in bits) using the "random words" regime +/// of [2025/2010](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2010) §1.5. +/// +/// The cited paper recommends proven bounds for deployment; users staying with +/// conjectured bounds should remain above the cutoff. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ConjecturedSecurity { + pub security_bits: usize, +} + +impl ConjecturedSecurity { + /// Conjectured security from FRI parameters using the random-words formula + /// ([2025/2010] §1.5). Requires `num_modulus_bits` (log2 of field size) for the η cutoff. + pub fn compute( + log_blowup: usize, + num_queries: usize, + query_proof_of_work_bits: usize, + collision_resistance: usize, + num_modulus_bits: usize, + ) -> Self { + let fri_bits = conjectured_fri_bits_random_words(log_blowup, num_queries, num_modulus_bits) + + query_proof_of_work_bits; + let mut bits = min(fri_bits, collision_resistance); + bits = min(bits, num_modulus_bits); + + Self { + security_bits: bits, + } + } + + /// Compute conjectured security from a parameter bundle. + pub fn compute_from_params(params: &StarkSecurityParams) -> Self { + Self::compute( + params.fri_log_blowup, + params.fri_num_queries, + params.fri_query_proof_of_work_bits, + params.collision_resistance, + params.num_modulus_bits, + ) + } +} + +/// Computes conjectured FRI security bits from the random-words formula in +/// [2025/2010](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2010) §1.5: +/// +/// `b = num_queries . (−log2(ρ + η))`, with `η ≈ (log2(e/ρ) . ρ) / log2(q)`, +/// +/// where `b` is the achieved security in bits, `ρ` is the FRI rate, and `q` is the field size. +fn conjectured_fri_bits_random_words( + log_blowup: usize, + num_queries: usize, + num_modulus_bits: usize, +) -> usize { + if log_blowup == 0 || num_modulus_bits == 0 { + return 0; + } + let log_blowup_f = log_blowup as f64; + let rho = pow(2.0, -log_blowup_f); + let log2_e_over_rho = core::f64::consts::LOG2_E + log_blowup_f; + let eta = (log2_e_over_rho * rho) / num_modulus_bits as f64; + let effective = rho + eta; + if effective <= 0.0 || effective >= 1.0 { + return 0; + } + let bits_per_query = -log2(effective); + (num_queries as f64 * bits_per_query) as usize +} + +/// Proven security level (in bits) of a STARK configuration. +/// +/// Follows Theorems 2 and 3 of [2024/1553](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1553) +/// (round-by-round soundness; unique-decoding and list-decoding regimes), with the +/// improved LDR FRI commit-phase bound from [2025/2055](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2055) +/// Theorem 4.2. Cross-checked against [`soundcalc`](https://github.com/ethereum/soundcalc). +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ProvenSecurity { + pub unique_decoding_bits: usize, + pub list_decoding_bits: usize, +} + +impl ProvenSecurity { + /// Best of the two regimes (unique-decoding and list-decoding). + /// + /// Each regime is an independent valid lower bound on round-by-round soundness, so + /// their maximum is itself a valid (and tighter) lower bound on the proven security. + #[inline] + pub fn security_bits(&self) -> usize { + max(self.unique_decoding_bits, self.list_decoding_bits) + } + + /// Compute proven security from protocol parameters and the trace length. + pub fn compute(params: &StarkSecurityParams, trace_length: usize) -> Self { + // ρ = 1 (no blowup) makes the proven bounds vacuous. + if params.fri_log_blowup == 0 || trace_length == 0 || params.num_modulus_bits == 0 { + return Self { + unique_decoding_bits: 0, + list_decoding_bits: 0, + }; + } + + let extension_field_bits = params.num_modulus_bits as f64; + let blowup_factor = 1usize << params.fri_log_blowup; + let lde_domain_size = trace_length * blowup_factor; + let trace_domain_size = trace_length as f64; + let lde_domain_size_f = lde_domain_size as f64; + let num_fri_queries = params.fri_num_queries as f64; + let query_grinding = params.fri_query_proof_of_work_bits as f64; + let commit_grinding = params.fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits as f64; + let air_max_deg = params.air_max_constraint_degree.max(1) as f64; + debug_assert!( + params.air_max_constraint_degree <= blowup_factor + 1, + "AIR max constraint degree {} exceeds blowup+1 ({}); the prover cannot commit a quotient", + params.air_max_constraint_degree, + blowup_factor + 1 + ); + let max_combo = params.max_combo as f64; + let num_constraints = params.num_constraints.max(1) as f64; + let folding_factor = (1usize << params.fri_max_log_arity) as f64; + + let unique_decoding = min( + proven_security_unique_decoding( + extension_field_bits, + num_fri_queries, + query_grinding, + commit_grinding, + trace_domain_size, + lde_domain_size, + lde_domain_size_f, + air_max_deg, + max_combo, + num_constraints, + params.fri_log_final_poly_len, + folding_factor, + ), + params.collision_resistance as u64, + ) as usize; + + // Theorem 4.2 of [2025/2055] requires η > 0; bracket m and search for the optimum. + let m_min: usize = 3; + let m_max = min(compute_upper_m(trace_length), LDR_M_CAP); + let list_decoding = if m_max < m_min { + // No valid m in range (e.g. trivially small traces); LDR is vacuous. + 0 + } else { + let m_optimal = (m_min..=m_max) + .max_by_key(|&m| { + proven_security_list_decoding_m( + extension_field_bits, + blowup_factor, + num_fri_queries, + query_grinding, + commit_grinding, + trace_domain_size, + lde_domain_size_f, + air_max_deg, + max_combo, + num_constraints, + folding_factor, + m, + ) + }) + .expect("non-empty range"); + + min( + proven_security_list_decoding_m( + extension_field_bits, + blowup_factor, + num_fri_queries, + query_grinding, + commit_grinding, + trace_domain_size, + lde_domain_size_f, + air_max_deg, + max_combo, + num_constraints, + folding_factor, + m_optimal, + ), + params.collision_resistance as u64, + ) as usize + }; + + Self { + unique_decoding_bits: unique_decoding, + list_decoding_bits: list_decoding, + } + } + + /// Compute proven security using a parameter bundle and the proof's degree bits. + /// + /// `degree_bits` already reflects the committed-polynomial size (post-zk padding, + /// when applicable), so the trace-domain size used for security analysis is `2^degree_bits`. + pub fn compute_from_proof(degree_bits: usize, params: &StarkSecurityParams) -> Self { + let trace_length = 1usize << degree_bits; + Self::compute(params, trace_length) + } +} + +/// Performance bound on the searched proximity parameter `m`. +const LDR_M_CAP: usize = 1000; + +/// Computes the largest proximity parameter `m` such that the η > 0 precondition of +/// the proof of Theorem 1 in [2021/582](https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/582) holds. +/// See also Theorem 2 and its proof in [2024/1553](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1553). +/// +/// Returns the raw theorem-derived bound; the caller applies [`LDR_M_CAP`]. +fn compute_upper_m(trace_domain_size: usize) -> usize { + if trace_domain_size == 0 { + return 0; + } + let h = trace_domain_size as f64; + let ratio = (h + 2.0) / h; + let m_max = ceil(1.0 / (2.0 * (sqrt(ratio) - 1.0))) as usize; + + assert!( + (m_max as f64) >= h / 2.0, + "compute_upper_m: m_max = {} < h/2 = {} (closed-form drifted from theorem)", + m_max, + h / 2.0, + ); + m_max +} + +/// Round-by-round soundness in the unique-decoding regime (Theorem 3 of [2024/1553]). +/// +/// RbR soundness is bounded by `max_i ε_i`, so we report `min_i (-log2 ε_i)`. A strict +/// union bound would be tighter by ~`log2(num_components)` (≈ 2–3 bits); we keep `min` +/// to match `soundcalc/circuits/deep_ali.py:89`. +fn proven_security_unique_decoding( + extension_field_bits: f64, + num_fri_queries: f64, + query_grinding: f64, + commit_grinding: f64, + trace_domain_size: f64, + lde_domain_size: usize, + lde_domain_size_f: f64, + air_max_deg: f64, + max_combo: f64, + num_constraints: f64, + log_final_poly_len: usize, + folding_factor: f64, +) -> u64 { + // UDR agreement parameter α = (1 + ρ⁺)/2; ρ⁺ accounts for trace-side expansion + // from out-of-domain openings. + let rho_plus = (trace_domain_size + max_combo) / lde_domain_size_f; + let alpha = (1.0 + rho_plus) * 0.5; + + // Multi-point quotient soundness precondition from [2020/654] §4.1.3, written + // against the UDR agreement parameter α used below (i.e. θ = 1 − α) rather than + // the raw rate `soundcalc` uses; both hold for any blowup ≥ 2. + if trace_domain_size + max_combo >= alpha * lde_domain_size_f { + return 0; + } + + let mut epsilons_bits_neg = Vec::new(); + + // ALI: ε_ALI = L⁺ · num_constraints / |F|; in UDR, L⁺ = 1. + epsilons_bits_neg.push(extension_field_bits - log2(num_constraints)); + + // DEEP: ε_DEEP = (max_deg · (k + max_combo - 1) + (k - 1)) / |F|. + // (`soundcalc` divides by `|F| - k - D` — negligibly different in practice.) + let deep_factor = + air_max_deg * (trace_domain_size + max_combo - 1.0) + (trace_domain_size - 1.0); + epsilons_bits_neg.push(extension_field_bits - log2(deep_factor.max(1.0))); + + // FRI commit phase: per round, ε ≤ (folding_factor − 1)·(n + 1)/|F|. Each layer + // yields the same bound, so push once when at least one fold occurs. We use the + // plain `(n + 1)`; `soundcalc` uses the tighter `(γn + 1)` with γ = (1 − ρ)/2 ≤ 1, + // so this is a conservative simplification (~1–2 bits). + let num_fri_layers = log2_floor_usize(lde_domain_size).saturating_sub(log_final_poly_len); + if num_fri_layers > 0 { + let folding_minus_one = (folding_factor - 1.0).max(1.0); + epsilons_bits_neg.push( + extension_field_bits - log2(folding_minus_one * (lde_domain_size_f + 1.0)) + + commit_grinding, + ); + } + + // FRI query phase: ε ≤ αᵏ. + let epsilon_k = query_grinding - log2(pow(alpha, num_fri_queries)); + epsilons_bits_neg.push(epsilon_k); + + let min_bits = epsilons_bits_neg + .into_iter() + .fold(f64::INFINITY, |a, b| if b < a { b } else { a }); + min_bits.max(0.0) as u64 +} + +/// Round-by-round soundness in the list-decoding regime (Theorem 2 of [2024/1553] +/// with BCHKS25 [2025/2055] Theorem 4.2 commit-phase bound). +/// +/// `m` is the explicit Johnson-bound multiplicity controlling the proximity gap η. +fn proven_security_list_decoding_m( + extension_field_bits: f64, + blowup_factor: usize, + num_fri_queries: f64, + query_grinding: f64, + commit_grinding: f64, + trace_domain_size: f64, + lde_domain_size: f64, + air_max_deg: f64, + max_combo: f64, + num_constraints: f64, + folding_factor: f64, + m: usize, +) -> u64 { + let rho = 1.0 / blowup_factor as f64; + let sqrt_rho = sqrt(rho); + let m_f = m as f64; + let m_shifted = m_f + 0.5; + // BCHKS25 explicit-m proximity parameter γ = 1 − √ρ − η, with η = √ρ/(2m). + let pp = 1.0 - sqrt_rho * (1.0 + 0.5 / m_f); + if pp <= 0.0 { + return 0; + } + let alpha = (1.0 + 0.5 / m_f) * sqrt_rho; + + // BCHKS25 list size L⁺ = (m + 0.5) / √ρ (matches `soundcalc/proxgaps/johnson_bound.py` + // `get_max_list_size` explicit_m branch). + let l = m_shifted / sqrt_rho; + if !l.is_finite() || l <= 0.0 { + return 0; + } + + // Multi-point quotient soundness precondition from [2020/654] §4.1.3 with θ = γ. + if trace_domain_size + max_combo >= (1.0 - pp) * lde_domain_size { + return 0; + } + + let mut epsilons_bits_neg = Vec::new(); + + // ALI: ε_ALI = L⁺ · num_constraints / |F|. + epsilons_bits_neg.push(-log2(l) - log2(num_constraints) + extension_field_bits); + + // DEEP: ε_DEEP = L⁺ · (max_deg · (k + max_combo - 1) + (k - 1)) / |F|. + // Linear in L⁺, matching `soundcalc/circuits/deep_ali.py:170`. + let deep_factor = + air_max_deg * (trace_domain_size + max_combo - 1.0) + (trace_domain_size - 1.0); + epsilons_bits_neg.push(-log2(l) - log2(deep_factor.max(1.0)) + extension_field_bits); + + // FRI commit phase, per round (BCHKS25 Theorem 4.2 / `error_powers`): + // ε_lin = ((2·m'⁵ + 3·m'·γρ)·n / (3·ρ^{3/2}) + m'/√ρ) / |F| + // ε_round = ε_lin · (folding_factor − 1) + // We use the round-0 LDE size `n = lde_domain_size` for every round. `soundcalc` + // shrinks `n` per round, but RbR soundness is the max over rounds and the worst + // round is round 0 (largest `n`), so this is exact for RbR — not a loosening. + let n = lde_domain_size; + let num = (2.0 * pow(m_shifted, 5.0) + 3.0 * m_shifted * pp * rho) * n; + let den = 3.0 * rho * sqrt_rho; + let epsilon_linear = num / den + m_shifted / sqrt_rho; + let folding_minus_one = (folding_factor - 1.0).max(1.0); + let epsilon_powers = epsilon_linear * folding_minus_one; + let epsilon_3_bits_neg = extension_field_bits - log2(epsilon_powers.max(1.0)) + commit_grinding; + + // [2024/1553] also gives an n/q-style bound per round; report the smaller-bits of + // the two. Factors `folding_factor` (vs `folding_factor − 1`) and `(2m + 1)` (vs + // `m + 0.5`) here are slightly conservative. + let term_from_n_over_q = extension_field_bits + - log2(folding_factor) + - log2(lde_domain_size + 1.0) + - log2(2.0 * m_f + 1.0) + + 0.5 * log2(rho) + + commit_grinding; + epsilons_bits_neg.push(epsilon_3_bits_neg.min(term_from_n_over_q)); + + // FRI query phase: ε ≤ αᵏ. + if alpha >= 1.0 { + return 0; + } + let epsilon_k = query_grinding - log2(pow(alpha, num_fri_queries)); + epsilons_bits_neg.push(epsilon_k); + + let min_bits = epsilons_bits_neg + .into_iter() + .fold(f64::INFINITY, |a, b| if b < a { b } else { a }); + min_bits.max(0.0) as u64 +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + const TEST_NUM_CONSTRAINTS: usize = 1; + const TEST_AIR_MAX_DEG: usize = 2; + const TEST_MAX_COMBO: usize = 2; + + #[test] + fn conjectured_security_bounded_by_collision_resistance() { + let s = ConjecturedSecurity::compute(8, 32, 0, 128, 128); + assert_eq!(s.security_bits, 128); + } + + #[test] + fn conjectured_security_random_words_formula() { + let s = ConjecturedSecurity::compute(4, 20, 8, 256, 128); + assert!(s.security_bits > 0 && s.security_bits <= 256); + } + + #[test] + fn conjectured_security_log_blowup_zero_returns_zero_fri_bits() { + let s = ConjecturedSecurity::compute(0, 100, 16, 128, 256); + assert_eq!(s.security_bits, 16); + } + + #[test] + fn conjectured_fri_100_queries_benchmark_below_100_bits() { + let fri_bits = conjectured_fri_bits_random_words(1, 100, 256); + assert!( + fri_bits < 100, + "100 queries at ρ=1/2 (log_blowup=1) should give <100 bits per random-words formula, got {}", + fri_bits + ); + } + + fn benchmark_high_arity_params(num_modulus_bits: usize) -> StarkSecurityParams { + // Mirrors `FriParameters::new_benchmark_high_arity`. + StarkSecurityParams { + fri_log_blowup: 1, + fri_log_final_poly_len: 0, + fri_max_log_arity: 3, + fri_num_queries: 100, + fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + fri_query_proof_of_work_bits: 16, + num_modulus_bits, + collision_resistance: 128, + num_constraints: TEST_NUM_CONSTRAINTS, + air_max_constraint_degree: TEST_AIR_MAX_DEG, + max_combo: TEST_MAX_COMBO, + } + } + + #[test] + fn proven_security_lower_than_conjectured_for_same_params() { + let c = ConjecturedSecurity::compute(8, 32, 8, 256, 252); + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.fri_log_blowup = 8; + params.fri_num_queries = 32; + params.fri_query_proof_of_work_bits = 8; + let p = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 16); + assert!(p.security_bits() <= c.security_bits); + } + + #[test] + fn proven_security_log_blowup_zero_returns_zero() { + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.fri_log_blowup = 0; + let p = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 16); + assert_eq!(p.unique_decoding_bits, 0); + assert_eq!(p.list_decoding_bits, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn proven_security_tiny_trace_returns_zero_ldr() { + let params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + let p = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1); + assert_eq!(p.list_decoding_bits, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn commit_pow_increases_or_holds_security() { + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits = 0; + let p0 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + params.fri_commit_proof_of_work_bits = 16; + let p16 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + assert!(p16.unique_decoding_bits >= p0.unique_decoding_bits); + assert!(p16.list_decoding_bits >= p0.list_decoding_bits); + } + + #[test] + fn more_constraints_decreases_or_holds_security() { + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.num_constraints = 1; + let p1 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + params.num_constraints = 1024; + let p1024 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + assert!(p1024.unique_decoding_bits <= p1.unique_decoding_bits); + assert!(p1024.list_decoding_bits <= p1.list_decoding_bits); + } + + #[test] + fn more_max_combo_decreases_or_holds_security() { + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.max_combo = 1; + let p1 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + params.max_combo = 8; + let p8 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + assert!(p8.unique_decoding_bits <= p1.unique_decoding_bits); + assert!(p8.list_decoding_bits <= p1.list_decoding_bits); + } + + #[test] + fn higher_arity_decreases_or_holds_security() { + let mut params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + params.fri_max_log_arity = 1; + let p_a2 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + params.fri_max_log_arity = 3; + let p_a8 = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + assert!(p_a8.list_decoding_bits <= p_a2.list_decoding_bits); + assert!(p_a8.unique_decoding_bits <= p_a2.unique_decoding_bits); + } + + // Regression vector pinning the proven-security output for a fixed configuration: + // log_blowup=1, num_queries=100, query_pow=16, commit_pow=0, max_log_arity=3, + // |F|=252 bits, trace 2^20, num_constraints=1, max_deg=2, max_combo=2. + #[test] + fn proven_security_regression_benchmark_high_arity() { + let params = benchmark_high_arity_params(252); + let p = ProvenSecurity::compute(¶ms, 1 << 20); + assert_eq!(p.unique_decoding_bits, 57); + assert_eq!(p.list_decoding_bits, 65); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/sub_builder.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/sub_builder.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16eddcb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/sub_builder.rs @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +//! Helpers for restricting a builder to a subset of trace columns. +//! +//! The uni-STARK builders often need to enforce constraints that refer to only a slice of the main +//! trace. [`SubSliced`] offers a cheap view over a subset of columns, and [`SubAirBuilder`] wires +//! that view into any [`AirBuilder`] implementation so a sub-air can be evaluated independently +//! without copying trace data. + +// Code inspired by SP1 with additional modifications: +// https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/blob/main/crates/stark/src/air/sub_builder.rs + +use core::marker::PhantomData; +use core::ops::Range; + +use p3_air::{AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; + +/// A column-restricted view over a trace window. +/// +/// Wraps an inner window and exposes only the columns within +/// the given range. Lets a sub-AIR see a contiguous subset +/// of the parent trace without copying data. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct SubSliced { + window: W, + range: Range, + _marker: PhantomData, +} + +impl, T> WindowAccess for SubSliced { + #[inline] + fn current_slice(&self) -> &[T] { + &self.window.current_slice()[self.range.clone()] + } + + #[inline] + fn next_slice(&self) -> &[T] { + &self.window.next_slice()[self.range.clone()] + } +} + +/// Evaluates a sub-AIR against a restricted slice of the parent trace. +/// +/// This is useful whenever a standalone component AIR is embedded in a larger system but only owns +/// a few columns. `SubAirBuilder` reuses the parent builder for bookkeeping so witness generation +/// and constraint enforcement stay in sync. +pub struct SubAirBuilder<'a, AB: AirBuilder, SubAir: BaseAir, T> { + /// Mutable reference to the parent builder. + inner: &'a mut AB, + + /// Column range (in the parent trace) that the sub-AIR is allowed to see. + column_range: Range, + + /// Marker for the sub-AIR and witness type. + _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData<(SubAir, T)>, +} + +impl<'a, AB: AirBuilder, SubAir: BaseAir, T> SubAirBuilder<'a, AB, SubAir, T> { + /// Create a new [`SubAirBuilder`] exposing only `column_range` to the sub-AIR. + /// + /// The range must lie entirely inside the parent trace width. + #[must_use] + pub const fn new(inner: &'a mut AB, column_range: Range) -> Self { + Self { + inner, + column_range, + _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData, + } + } +} + +/// Implements `AirBuilder` for `SubAirBuilder`. +impl, F> AirBuilder for SubAirBuilder<'_, AB, SubAir, F> { + type F = AB::F; + type Expr = AB::Expr; + type Var = AB::Var; + type PreprocessedWindow = AB::PreprocessedWindow; + type MainWindow = SubSliced; + type PublicVar = AB::PublicVar; + type PeriodicVar = AB::PeriodicVar; + + fn main(&self) -> Self::MainWindow { + SubSliced { + window: self.inner.main(), + range: self.column_range.clone(), + _marker: PhantomData, + } + } + + fn preprocessed(&self) -> &Self::PreprocessedWindow { + self.inner.preprocessed() + } + + fn is_first_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.inner.is_first_row() + } + + fn is_last_row(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.inner.is_last_row() + } + + fn is_transition(&self) -> Self::Expr { + self.inner.is_transition() + } + + fn assert_zero>(&mut self, x: I) { + self.inner.assert_zero(x.into()); + } + + fn public_values(&self) -> &[Self::PublicVar] { + self.inner.public_values() + } + + fn periodic_values(&self) -> &[Self::PeriodicVar] { + self.inner.periodic_values() + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/symbolic.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/symbolic.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbc10dad --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/symbolic.rs @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +//! STARK-specific quotient polynomial degree calculations. + +use p3_air::Air; +use p3_air::symbolic::{AirLayout, SymbolicAirBuilder, get_max_constraint_degree_extension}; +use p3_field::{ExtensionField, Field}; +use p3_util::log2_ceil_usize; +use tracing::instrument; + +#[instrument(skip_all, level = "debug")] +pub fn get_log_num_quotient_chunks(air: &A, layout: AirLayout, is_zk: usize) -> usize +where + F: Field, + A: Air>, +{ + assert!(is_zk <= 1, "is_zk must be either 0 or 1"); + + if let Some(degree_hint) = air.max_constraint_degree() { + let constraint_degree = (degree_hint + is_zk).max(2); + let result = log2_ceil_usize(constraint_degree - 1); + + // This check remains at the `debug` level, as the AIR is known by both + // prover and verifier, i.e. a malicious prover cannot feed the verifier + // a different hint than the verifier computes for itself. + debug_assert!( + { + let symbolic = get_log_quotient_degree_extension::(air, layout, is_zk); + result >= symbolic + }, + "max_constraint_degree() hint {} is too small; actual log quotient degree is larger", + degree_hint + ); + + return result; + } + + get_log_quotient_degree_extension(air, layout, is_zk) +} + +#[instrument( + name = "infer log of base and extension constraint degree", + skip_all, + level = "debug" +)] +pub fn get_log_quotient_degree_extension( + air: &A, + layout: AirLayout, + is_zk: usize, +) -> usize +where + F: Field, + EF: ExtensionField, + A: Air>, +{ + assert!(is_zk <= 1, "is_zk must be either 0 or 1"); + + if let Some(degree_hint) = air.max_constraint_degree() { + let constraint_degree = (degree_hint + is_zk).max(2); + let result = log2_ceil_usize(constraint_degree - 1); + + debug_assert!( + { + let actual = get_max_constraint_degree_extension::(air, layout); + degree_hint >= actual + }, + "max_constraint_degree() hint {} is too small; symbolic evaluation found a larger degree", + degree_hint + ); + + return result; + } + + // We pad to at least degree 2, since a quotient argument doesn't make sense with smaller degrees. + let constraint_degree = + (get_max_constraint_degree_extension::(air, layout) + is_zk).max(2); + + // We bound the degree of the quotient polynomial by constraint_degree - 1, + // then choose the number of quotient chunks as the smallest power of two + // >= (constraint_degree - 1). This function returns log2(#chunks). + log2_ceil_usize(constraint_degree - 1) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use p3_air::symbolic::{AirLayout, SymbolicAirBuilder, SymbolicVariable}; + use p3_air::{AirBuilder, BaseAir, BaseEntry}; + use p3_baby_bear::BabyBear; + + use super::*; + + #[derive(Debug)] + struct MockAir { + constraints: Vec>, + width: usize, + } + + impl BaseAir for MockAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + self.width + } + } + + impl Air> for MockAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut SymbolicAirBuilder) { + for constraint in &self.constraints { + builder.assert_zero(*constraint); + } + } + } + + fn air_layout(air: &impl BaseAir, preprocessed_width: usize) -> AirLayout { + AirLayout { + preprocessed_width, + main_width: air.width(), + num_public_values: air.num_public_values(), + ..Default::default() + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_get_log_num_quotient_chunks_no_constraints() { + let air = MockAir { + constraints: vec![], + width: 4, + }; + let log_degree = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 3), 0); + assert_eq!(log_degree, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn test_get_log_num_quotient_chunks_single_constraint() { + let air = MockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + }; + let log_degree = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 3), 0); + assert_eq!(log_degree, log2_ceil_usize(1)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_get_log_num_quotient_chunks_multiple_constraints() { + let air = MockAir { + constraints: vec![ + SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0), + SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 1 }, 1), + SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 2 }, 2), + ], + width: 4, + }; + let log_degree = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 3), 0); + assert_eq!(log_degree, log2_ceil_usize(1)); + } + + /// A mock AIR with a configurable `max_constraint_degree` hint. + #[derive(Debug)] + struct HintedMockAir { + constraints: Vec>, + width: usize, + degree_hint: Option, + } + + impl BaseAir for HintedMockAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + self.width + } + + fn max_constraint_degree(&self) -> Option { + self.degree_hint + } + } + + impl Air> for HintedMockAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut SymbolicAirBuilder) { + for constraint in &self.constraints { + builder.assert_zero(*constraint); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_max_constraint_degree_hint_is_used() { + // Actual degree is 1 (single variable), hint says 3. + // The hint should be used, giving log2_ceil(max(3, 2) - 1) = log2_ceil(2) = 1. + let air = HintedMockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + degree_hint: Some(3), + }; + let log_chunks = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 0), 0); + assert_eq!(log_chunks, log2_ceil_usize(2)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_max_constraint_degree_hint_none_falls_back() { + // No hint provided — should fall back to symbolic evaluation. + // Actual degree is 1, so log2_ceil(max(1, 2) - 1) = log2_ceil(1) = 0. + let air = HintedMockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + degree_hint: None, + }; + let log_chunks = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 0), 0); + assert_eq!(log_chunks, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn test_max_constraint_degree_hint_exact_match() { + // Hint matches actual degree exactly. + let air = HintedMockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + degree_hint: Some(1), + }; + let with_hint = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 0), 0); + + let air_no_hint = HintedMockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + degree_hint: None, + }; + let without_hint = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air_no_hint, air_layout(&air_no_hint, 0), 0); + + assert_eq!(with_hint, without_hint); + } + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "max_constraint_degree() hint")] + fn test_max_constraint_degree_hint_too_small_panics() { + // Actual degree is 1, hint says 0 — debug_assert should fire. + let air = HintedMockAir { + constraints: vec![SymbolicVariable::new(BaseEntry::Main { offset: 0 }, 0)], + width: 4, + degree_hint: Some(0), + }; + let _ = get_log_num_quotient_chunks(&air, air_layout(&air, 0), 0); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/verifier.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/verifier.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3df56155 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/src/verifier.rs @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +//! See [`crate::prover`] for an overview of the protocol and a more detailed soundness analysis. + +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use itertools::Itertools; +use p3_air::symbolic::SymbolicAirBuilder; +use p3_air::{Air, RowWindow}; +use p3_challenger::{CanObserve, FieldChallenger}; +use p3_commit::{Pcs, PolynomialSpace}; +use p3_field::{BasedVectorSpace, ExtensionField, Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrixView; +use p3_matrix::stack::VerticalPair; +use p3_util::zip_eq::zip_eq; +use p3_util::{checked_log_size_sum, checked_pow2}; +use tracing::instrument; + +use crate::error::{InvalidProofShapeError, PeriodicColumnError, VerificationError}; +use crate::symbolic::get_log_num_quotient_chunks; +use crate::{ + AirLayout, Domain, PcsError, PreprocessedVerifierKey, Proof, StarkGenericConfig, Val, + VerifierConstraintFolder, +}; + +/// Reject periodic columns the verifier cannot evaluate over the trace domain. +/// +/// - Evaluation samples a subdomain whose size is the column length. +/// - Both verifiers call this before evaluating. +/// - A malformed AIR therefore errors instead of panicking. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// - `periodic_columns` — the periodic columns declared by the AIR. +/// - `trace_length` — the number of rows the columns repeat over. +/// +/// # Errors +/// +/// - A length that is not a power of two has no evaluation subdomain. +/// - A length larger than the trace cannot sit inside the trace domain. +pub fn check_periodic_column_lengths( + periodic_columns: &[Vec], + trace_length: usize, +) -> Result<(), PeriodicColumnError> { + for col in periodic_columns { + let period = col.len(); + + // A subdomain of size `period` exists only for powers of two. + if !period.is_power_of_two() { + return Err(PeriodicColumnError::LengthNotPowerOfTwo { got: period }); + } + + // That subdomain must sit inside the trace domain. + if period > trace_length { + return Err(PeriodicColumnError::LengthTooLarge { + maximum: trace_length, + got: period, + }); + } + } + + Ok(()) +} + +pub fn validate_degree_bits( + air: Option, + degree_bits: usize, + is_zk: usize, + max_log_degree: usize, +) -> Result<(usize, usize), InvalidProofShapeError> { + if degree_bits < is_zk { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::DegreeBitsTooSmall { + air, + minimum: is_zk, + got: degree_bits, + }); + } + + if degree_bits > max_log_degree { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::DegreeBitsTooLarge { + air, + maximum: max_log_degree, + got: degree_bits, + }); + } + + let degree = checked_pow2(degree_bits).ok_or(InvalidProofShapeError::DegreeBitsTooLarge { + air, + maximum: usize::BITS as usize - 1, + got: degree_bits, + })?; + Ok((degree_bits - is_zk, degree)) +} + +/// Recomposes the quotient polynomial from its chunks evaluated at a point. +/// +/// Given quotient chunks and their domains, this computes the Lagrange +/// interpolation coefficients (zps) and reconstructs quotient(zeta). +pub fn recompose_quotient_from_chunks( + quotient_chunks_domains: &[Domain], + quotient_chunks: &[Vec], + zeta: SC::Challenge, +) -> SC::Challenge +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, +{ + let zps = quotient_chunks_domains + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, domain)| { + quotient_chunks_domains + .iter() + .enumerate() + .filter(|(j, _)| *j != i) + .map(|(_, other_domain)| { + other_domain.vanishing_poly_at_point(zeta) + * other_domain + .vanishing_poly_at_point(domain.first_point()) + .inverse() + }) + .product::() + }) + .collect_vec(); + + // valid_shape checks each ch has length >>::DIMENSION, + // so from_ext_basis_coefficients won't return None. + quotient_chunks + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(ch_i, ch)| { + zps[ch_i] + * SC::Challenge::from_ext_basis_coefficients(ch) + .expect("quotient chunk length checked in valid_shape") + }) + .sum::() +} + +/// Verifies that the folded constraints match the quotient polynomial at zeta. +/// +/// This evaluates the [`Air`] constraints at the out-of-domain point and checks +/// that constraints(zeta) / Z_H(zeta) = quotient(zeta). +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +pub fn verify_constraints( + air: &A, + trace_local: &[SC::Challenge], + trace_next: &[SC::Challenge], + preprocessed_local: Option<&[SC::Challenge]>, + preprocessed_next: Option<&[SC::Challenge]>, + periodic_values: &[SC::Challenge], + public_values: &[Val], + trace_domain: Domain, + zeta: SC::Challenge, + alpha: SC::Challenge, + quotient: SC::Challenge, +) -> Result<(), VerificationError> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: for<'a> Air>, + PcsErr: core::fmt::Debug, +{ + let sels = trace_domain.selectors_at_point(zeta); + + let main = VerticalPair::new( + RowMajorMatrixView::new_row(trace_local), + RowMajorMatrixView::new_row(trace_next), + ); + + let preprocessed = match (preprocessed_local, preprocessed_next) { + (Some(local), Some(next)) => VerticalPair::new( + RowMajorMatrixView::new_row(local), + RowMajorMatrixView::new_row(next), + ), + _ => VerticalPair::new( + RowMajorMatrixView::new(&[], 0), + RowMajorMatrixView::new(&[], 0), + ), + }; + + let preprocessed_window = + RowWindow::from_two_rows(preprocessed.top.values, preprocessed.bottom.values); + let mut folder = VerifierConstraintFolder { + main, + preprocessed, + preprocessed_window, + periodic_values, + public_values, + is_first_row: sels.is_first_row, + is_last_row: sels.is_last_row, + is_transition: sels.is_transition, + alpha, + accumulator: SC::Challenge::ZERO, + }; + air.eval(&mut folder); + let folded_constraints = folder.accumulator; + + // Check that constraints(zeta) / Z_H(zeta) = quotient(zeta) + if folded_constraints * sels.inv_vanishing != quotient { + return Err(VerificationError::OodEvaluationMismatch { index: None }); + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// Validates and commits the preprocessed trace if present. +/// Returns the preprocessed width and its commitment hash (available iff width > 0). +#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)] +fn process_preprocessed_trace( + air: &A, + opened_values: &crate::proof::OpenedValues, + preprocessed_vk: Option<&PreprocessedVerifierKey>, +) -> Result< + ( + usize, + Option<>::Commitment>, + ), + VerificationError>, +> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: for<'a> Air>, +{ + // Determine expected preprocessed width. + // - If a verifier key is provided, trust its width. + // - Otherwise, derive width from the AIR's preprocessed trace (if any). + let preprocessed_width = preprocessed_vk + .map(|vk| vk.width) + .unwrap_or_else(|| air.preprocessed_width()); + + // Check that the proof's opened preprocessed values match the expected width. + let preprocessed_local_len = opened_values + .preprocessed_local + .as_ref() + .map_or(0, |v| v.len()); + let preprocessed_next_len = opened_values + .preprocessed_next + .as_ref() + .map_or(0, |v| v.len()); + let expected_next_len = if !air.preprocessed_next_row_columns().is_empty() { + preprocessed_width + } else { + 0 + }; + if preprocessed_width != preprocessed_local_len || expected_next_len != preprocessed_next_len { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::PreprocessedTraceWidthMismatch { + expected_local: preprocessed_width, + expected_next: expected_next_len, + got_local: preprocessed_local_len, + got_next: preprocessed_next_len, + } + .into()); + } + + // Validate consistency between width, verifier key, and zk settings. + match (preprocessed_width, preprocessed_vk) { + // Case: No preprocessed columns. + // + // Valid only if no verifier key is provided. + (0, None) => Ok((0, None)), + + // Case: Preprocessed columns exist. + // + // Valid only if VK exists, widths match, and we are NOT in zk mode. + (w, Some(vk)) if w == vk.width => Ok((w, Some(vk.commitment.clone()))), + + // Catch-all for invalid states, such as: + // - Width is 0 but VK is provided. + // - Width > 0 but VK is missing. + // - Width > 0 but VK width mismatches the expected width. + _ => Err(InvalidProofShapeError::PreprocessedVerifierKeyInconsistency.into()), + } +} + +#[instrument(skip_all)] +pub fn verify( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + proof: &Proof, + public_values: &[Val], +) -> Result<(), VerificationError>> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, +{ + verify_with_preprocessed(config, air, proof, public_values, None) +} + +#[instrument(skip_all)] +pub fn verify_with_preprocessed( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + proof: &Proof, + public_values: &[Val], + preprocessed_vk: Option<&PreprocessedVerifierKey>, +) -> Result<(), VerificationError>> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: Air>> + for<'a> Air>, +{ + // [heap-patch] Behavior-preserving split: compute the quotient-chunk count + // via the symbolic pass exactly as before, then run the untouched + // verification body. The split exists so a caller with a fixed AIR can + // supply this value as a compile-time constant and skip the symbolic + // re-evaluation of the whole AIR, whose transient expression tree is what + // does not fit Solana's 256 KB heap ceiling. See PATCH.md. + let layout = AirLayout { + preprocessed_width: preprocessed_vk + .map(|vk| vk.width) + .unwrap_or_else(|| air.preprocessed_width()), + main_width: air.width(), + num_public_values: air.num_public_values(), + num_periodic_columns: air.num_periodic_columns(), + ..Default::default() + }; + let log_num_quotient_chunks = + get_log_num_quotient_chunks::, A>(air, layout, config.is_zk()); + verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + config, + air, + proof, + public_values, + preprocessed_vk, + log_num_quotient_chunks, + ) +} + +/// [heap-patch] `verify_with_preprocessed` minus the symbolic-builder pass: +/// `log_num_quotient_chunks` (the only thing that pass produced) arrives as a +/// parameter. A wrong value does not weaken soundness: it changes the expected +/// proof shape and domain split, so an honest proof simply fails to verify. +#[instrument(skip_all)] +pub fn verify_with_known_quotient_chunks( + config: &SC, + air: &A, + proof: &Proof, + public_values: &[Val], + preprocessed_vk: Option<&PreprocessedVerifierKey>, + log_num_quotient_chunks: usize, +) -> Result<(), VerificationError>> +where + SC: StarkGenericConfig, + A: for<'a> Air>, +{ + let Proof { + commitments, + opened_values, + opening_proof, + degree_bits, + } = proof; + let degree_bits = *degree_bits; + + let pcs = config.pcs(); + let (base_degree_bits, degree) = + validate_degree_bits(None, degree_bits, config.is_zk(), pcs.log_max_lde_height())?; + let trace_domain = pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(degree); + // TODO: allow moving preprocessed commitment to preprocess time, if known in advance + let (preprocessed_width, preprocessed_commit) = + process_preprocessed_trace::(air, opened_values, preprocessed_vk)?; + + // Ensure the preprocessed trace and main trace have the same height. + if let Some(vk) = preprocessed_vk + && preprocessed_width > 0 + && vk.degree_bits != degree_bits + { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::PreprocessedDegreeMismatch { + vk_degree_bits: vk.degree_bits, + proof_degree_bits: degree_bits, + } + .into()); + } + + // [heap-patch] the symbolic AirLayout/get_log_num_quotient_chunks + // computation that stood here moved to `verify_with_preprocessed`; + // `log_num_quotient_chunks` is this function's parameter. + let (_, num_quotient_chunks) = checked_log_size_sum(log_num_quotient_chunks, config.is_zk()) + .ok_or_else(|| InvalidProofShapeError::QuotientDomainTooLarge { + air: None, + maximum: usize::BITS as usize - 1, + got: log_num_quotient_chunks.saturating_add(config.is_zk()), + })?; + let mut challenger = config.initialise_challenger(); + let init_trace_domain = pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(degree >> config.is_zk()); + + let (_, quotient_domain_size) = checked_log_size_sum(degree_bits, log_num_quotient_chunks) + .ok_or_else(|| InvalidProofShapeError::QuotientDomainTooLarge { + air: None, + maximum: usize::BITS as usize - 1, + got: degree_bits.saturating_add(log_num_quotient_chunks), + })?; + let quotient_domain = trace_domain.create_disjoint_domain(quotient_domain_size); + let quotient_chunks_domains = quotient_domain.split_domains(num_quotient_chunks); + + let randomized_quotient_chunks_domains = quotient_chunks_domains + .iter() + .map(|domain| pcs.natural_domain_for_degree(domain.size() << (config.is_zk()))) + .collect_vec(); + // Check that the random commitments are/are not present depending on the ZK setting. + // - If ZK is enabled, the prover should have random commitments. + // - If ZK is not enabled, the prover should not have random commitments. + if (opened_values.random.is_some() != SC::Pcs::ZK) + || (commitments.random.is_some() != SC::Pcs::ZK) + { + return Err(VerificationError::RandomizationError); + } + + let air_width = A::width(air); + let expected_public_values_len = air.num_public_values(); + if public_values.len() != expected_public_values_len { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::PublicValuesLengthMismatch { + expected: expected_public_values_len, + got: public_values.len(), + } + .into()); + } + + let main_next = !air.main_next_row_columns().is_empty(); + let pre_next = !air.preprocessed_next_row_columns().is_empty(); + let trace_next_ok = if main_next { + opened_values + .trace_next + .as_ref() + .is_some_and(|v| v.len() == air_width) + } else { + opened_values.trace_next.is_none() + }; + let valid_shape = opened_values.trace_local.len() == air_width + && trace_next_ok + && opened_values.quotient_chunks.len() == num_quotient_chunks + && opened_values + .quotient_chunks + .iter() + .all(|qc| qc.len() == SC::Challenge::DIMENSION) + // We've already checked that opened_values.random is present if and only if ZK is enabled. + && opened_values.random.as_ref().is_none_or(|r_comm| r_comm.len() == SC::Challenge::DIMENSION); + if !valid_shape { + return Err(InvalidProofShapeError::OpenedValuesDimensionMismatch.into()); + } + + // Observe the instance. + challenger.observe(Val::::from_usize(degree_bits)); + challenger.observe(Val::::from_usize(base_degree_bits)); + challenger.observe(Val::::from_usize(preprocessed_width)); + // TODO: Might be best practice to include other instance data here in the transcript, like some + // encoding of the AIR. This protects against transcript collisions between distinct instances. + // Practically speaking though, the only related known attack is from failing to include public + // values. It's not clear if failing to include other instance data could enable a transcript + // collision, since most such changes would completely change the set of satisfying witnesses. + challenger.observe(commitments.trace.clone()); + if preprocessed_width > 0 { + challenger.observe(preprocessed_commit.as_ref().unwrap().clone()); + } + challenger.observe_slice(public_values); + + // Get the first Fiat Shamir challenge which will be used to combine all constraint polynomials + // into a single polynomial. + // + // Soundness Error: n/|EF| where n is the number of constraints. + let alpha = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + challenger.observe(commitments.quotient_chunks.clone()); + + // We've already checked that commitments.random is present if and only if ZK is enabled. + // Observe the random commitment if it is present. + if let Some(r_commit) = commitments.random.clone() { + challenger.observe(r_commit); + } + + // Get an out-of-domain point to open our values at. + // + // Soundness Error: dN/|EF| where `N` is the trace length and our constraint polynomial has degree `d`. + let zeta: SC::Challenge = challenger.sample_algebra_element(); + + // The opening at zeta divides by the vanishing polynomial of the trace domain. + // Reject any zeta on the domain, where that polynomial is zero and the inverse panics. + // Honest Fiat-Shamir sampling reaches this only with probability |H| / |EF|. + if init_trace_domain.vanishing_poly_at_point(zeta).is_zero() { + return Err(VerificationError::OodPointInDomain); + } + + // Periodic columns are AIR logic; a malformed one must error, not panic. + let periodic_columns = air.periodic_columns(); + check_periodic_column_lengths(&periodic_columns, init_trace_domain.size())?; + + let periodic_values: Vec = periodic_columns + .iter() + .map(|periodic_col| init_trace_domain.evaluate_periodic_column_at(periodic_col, zeta)) + .collect(); + + let zeta_next = init_trace_domain + .next_point(zeta) + .ok_or(VerificationError::NextPointUnavailable)?; + + // We've already checked that commitments.random and opened_values.random are present if and only if ZK is enabled. + let mut coms_to_verify = if let Some(random_commit) = &commitments.random { + let random_values = opened_values + .random + .as_ref() + .ok_or(VerificationError::RandomizationError)?; + vec![( + random_commit.clone(), + vec![(trace_domain, vec![(zeta, random_values.clone())])], + )] + } else { + vec![] + }; + let trace_round = { + let mut trace_points = vec![(zeta, opened_values.trace_local.clone())]; + if main_next { + trace_points.push(( + zeta_next, + opened_values + .trace_next + .clone() + .expect("checked in shape validation"), + )); + } + ( + commitments.trace.clone(), + vec![(trace_domain, trace_points)], + ) + }; + coms_to_verify.extend(vec![ + trace_round, + ( + commitments.quotient_chunks.clone(), + // Check the commitment on the randomized domains. + zip_eq( + randomized_quotient_chunks_domains.iter(), + &opened_values.quotient_chunks, + VerificationError::from(InvalidProofShapeError::QuotientDomainsCountMismatch { + air: 0, + }), + )? + .map(|(domain, values)| (*domain, vec![(zeta, values.clone())])) + .collect_vec(), + ), + ]); + + // Add preprocessed commitment verification if present + if preprocessed_width > 0 { + let mut pre_points = vec![(zeta, opened_values.preprocessed_local.clone().unwrap())]; + if pre_next { + pre_points.push((zeta_next, opened_values.preprocessed_next.clone().unwrap())); + } + coms_to_verify.push(( + preprocessed_commit.unwrap(), + vec![(trace_domain, pre_points)], + )); + } + + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] before pcs.verify + pcs.verify(coms_to_verify, opening_proof, &mut challenger) + .map_err(VerificationError::InvalidOpeningArgument)?; + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] after pcs.verify + + let quotient = recompose_quotient_from_chunks::( + "ient_chunks_domains, + &opened_values.quotient_chunks, + zeta, + ); + + let zeros; + let trace_next_slice = match &opened_values.trace_next { + Some(v) => v.as_slice(), + None => { + zeros = SC::Challenge::zero_vec(air_width); + &zeros + } + }; + let pre_next_zeros; + let preprocessed_next_for_verify = match &opened_values.preprocessed_next { + Some(v) => Some(v.as_slice()), + None if preprocessed_width > 0 => { + pre_next_zeros = SC::Challenge::zero_vec(preprocessed_width); + Some(pre_next_zeros.as_slice()) + } + None => None, + }; + #[cfg(all(target_os = "solana", feature = "cu-trace"))] + solana_program::log::sol_log_compute_units(); // [cu-trace] before verify_constraints + verify_constraints::>( + air, + &opened_values.trace_local, + trace_next_slice, + opened_values.preprocessed_local.as_deref(), + preprocessed_next_for_verify, + &periodic_values, + public_values, + init_trace_domain, + zeta, + alpha, + quotient, + )?; + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fib_air.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fib_air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..256f0191 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fib_air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,478 @@ +use core::borrow::Borrow; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::{DuplexChallenger, HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing, PrimeField64, TwoAdicField}; +use p3_fri::{FriParameters, HidingFriPcs, TwoAdicFriPcs}; +use p3_keccak::{Keccak256Hash, KeccakF}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::{MerkleTreeHidingMmcs, MerkleTreeMmcs}; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_symmetric::{ + CompressionFunctionFromHasher, PaddingFreeSponge, SerializingHasher, TruncatedPermutation, +}; +use p3_uni_stark::{InvalidProofShapeError, StarkConfig, prove, verify}; +use p3_util::assert_sync; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +/// For testing the public values feature +pub struct FibonacciAir {} + +impl BaseAir for FibonacciAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + NUM_FIBONACCI_COLS + } + + fn num_public_values(&self) -> usize { + 3 + } + + fn max_constraint_degree(&self) -> Option { + // All constraints are guarded by is_first_row / is_transition / is_last_row + // (degree 1) applied to degree-1 expressions (trace vars minus public values), + // giving a max constraint degree of 2. + Some(2) + } +} + +impl Air for FibonacciAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + + let pis = builder.public_values(); + + let a = pis[0]; + let b = pis[1]; + let x = pis[2]; + + let local: &FibonacciRow = main.current_slice().borrow(); + let next: &FibonacciRow = main.next_slice().borrow(); + + let mut when_first_row = builder.when_first_row(); + + when_first_row.assert_eq(local.left, a); + when_first_row.assert_eq(local.right, b); + + let mut when_transition = builder.when_transition(); + + // a' <- b + when_transition.assert_eq(local.right, next.left); + + // b' <- a + b + when_transition.assert_eq(local.left + local.right, next.right); + + builder.when_last_row().assert_eq(local.right, x); + } +} + +pub fn generate_trace_rows(a: u64, b: u64, n: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!(n.is_power_of_two()); + + let mut trace = RowMajorMatrix::new(F::zero_vec(n * NUM_FIBONACCI_COLS), NUM_FIBONACCI_COLS); + + let (prefix, rows, suffix) = unsafe { trace.values.align_to_mut::>() }; + assert!(prefix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + assert!(suffix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + assert_eq!(rows.len(), n); + + rows[0] = FibonacciRow::new(F::from_u64(a), F::from_u64(b)); + + for i in 1..n { + rows[i].left = rows[i - 1].right; + rows[i].right = rows[i - 1].left + rows[i - 1].right; + } + + trace +} + +const NUM_FIBONACCI_COLS: usize = 2; + +pub struct FibonacciRow { + pub left: F, + pub right: F, +} + +impl FibonacciRow { + const fn new(left: F, right: F) -> Self { + Self { left, right } + } +} + +impl Borrow> for [F] { + fn borrow(&self) -> &FibonacciRow { + debug_assert_eq!(self.len(), NUM_FIBONACCI_COLS); + let (prefix, shorts, suffix) = unsafe { self.align_to::>() }; + debug_assert!(prefix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert!(suffix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert_eq!(shorts.len(), 1); + &shorts[0] + } +} + +type Val = BabyBear; +type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; +type MyHash = PaddingFreeSponge; +type MyCompress = TruncatedPermutation; +type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, MyHash, MyCompress, 2, 8>; +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; +type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; +type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; +type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + +const TWO_ADIC_FIXTURE: &str = "tests/fixtures/uni_stark_two_adic_v1.postcard"; +const CIRCLE_FIXTURE: &str = "tests/fixtures/uni_stark_circle_v1.postcard"; + +fn make_two_adic_config(log_final_poly_len: usize) -> MyConfig { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup: 2, + log_final_poly_len, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 2, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 1, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 1, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +type ZkByteHash = Keccak256Hash; +type ZkU64Hash = PaddingFreeSponge; +type ZkFieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type ZkCompress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type ZkValHidingMmcs = MerkleTreeHidingMmcs< + [Val; p3_keccak::VECTOR_LEN], + [u64; p3_keccak::VECTOR_LEN], + ZkFieldHash, + ZkCompress, + SmallRng, + 2, + 4, + 4, +>; +type ZkChallenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type ZkChallengeHidingMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type ZkHidingPcs = HidingFriPcs; +type ZkConfig = StarkConfig; + +fn make_zk_config() -> ZkConfig { + assert_sync::(); + assert_sync::(); + assert_sync::(); + + let byte_hash = ZkByteHash {}; + let u64_hash = ZkU64Hash::new(KeccakF {}); + let field_hash = ZkFieldHash::new(u64_hash); + let compress = ZkCompress::new(u64_hash); + let val_mmcs = ZkValHidingMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0, SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1)); + let challenge_mmcs = ZkChallengeHidingMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 2); + let pcs = ZkHidingPcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params, 4, SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1)); + let challenger = ZkChallenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + ZkConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn two_adic_compat_case() -> (MyConfig, FibonacciAir, Vec, RowMajorMatrix) { + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + let config = make_two_adic_config(2); + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(21)]; + (config, FibonacciAir {}, pis, trace) +} + +type CircleVal = Mersenne31; +type CircleChallenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type CircleByteHash = Keccak256Hash; +type CircleFieldHash = SerializingHasher; +type CircleCompress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; +type CircleValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; +type CircleChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type CircleChallenger = SerializingChallenger32>; +type CirclePcsType = CirclePcs; +type CircleConfig = StarkConfig; + +fn make_circle_config() -> CircleConfig { + let byte_hash = CircleByteHash {}; + let field_hash = CircleFieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = CircleCompress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = CircleValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = CircleChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = CirclePcsType { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: core::marker::PhantomData, + }; + let challenger = CircleChallenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + CircleConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn circle_compat_case() -> ( + CircleConfig, + FibonacciAir, + Vec, + RowMajorMatrix, +) { + let config = make_circle_config(); + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + let pis = vec![ + CircleVal::from_u64(0), + CircleVal::from_u64(1), + CircleVal::from_u64(21), + ]; + (config, FibonacciAir {}, pis, trace) +} + +fn write_fixture(path: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> { + let full_path = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join(path); + if let Some(parent) = full_path.parent() { + std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?; + } + std::fs::write(full_path, bytes) +} + +fn read_fixture(path: &str) -> std::io::Result> { + let full_path = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join(path); + std::fs::read(full_path) +} + +/// n-th Fibonacci number expected to be x +fn test_public_value_impl(n: usize, x: u64, log_final_poly_len: usize) { + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, n); + let config = make_two_adic_config(log_final_poly_len); + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(x)]; + + let proof = prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); + verify(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, &proof, &pis).expect("verification failed"); +} + +#[test] +fn test_zk() { + let n = 1 << 3; + let x = 21; + + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, n); + let config = make_zk_config(); + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(x)]; + let proof = prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); + verify(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, &proof, &pis).expect("verification failed"); +} + +#[test] +fn test_one_row_trace() { + // Need to set log_final_poly_len to ensure log_min_height > params.log_final_poly_len + params.log_blowup + test_public_value_impl(1, 1, 0); +} + +#[test] +fn test_public_value() { + test_public_value_impl(1 << 3, 21, 2); +} + +#[test] +fn test_short_public_values_rejected() { + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + let config = make_two_adic_config(2); + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(21)]; + + let proof = prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); + let short_pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE]; + let err = verify(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, &proof, &short_pis) + .expect_err("verification should reject short public values"); + match err { + p3_uni_stark::VerificationError::InvalidProofShape( + InvalidProofShapeError::PublicValuesLengthMismatch { expected, got }, + ) => { + assert_eq!(expected, 3); + assert_eq!(got, 2); + } + _ => panic!("unexpected error: {err:?}"), + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_degree_bits_too_large_rejected() { + // The uni-stark verifier builds an evaluation domain via `1 << degree_bits`. + // A malicious proof can set degree_bits >= usize::BITS (e.g. 64 on a 64-bit + // platform), causing a shift overflow. The verifier must reject this with a + // structured error before any domain construction. + + // Generate a valid 2^3 = 8-row Fibonacci trace: fib(0) = 0, fib(1) = 1. + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + + // Non-ZK config with log_final_poly_len = 2 (FRI stops at degree 4). + // The overflow check is independent of the ZK setting. + let config = make_two_adic_config(2); + + // Public inputs: [fib(0), fib(1), fib(7)] = [0, 1, 21]. + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(21)]; + + // Produce a legitimate proof, then tamper with the degree_bits field. + let mut proof = prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); + + // Mutation: set degree_bits to exactly the bit width of usize, the + // smallest value that overflows: + // + // degree_bits = 64 (on 64-bit) + // 1_usize << 64 → shift overflow → must be caught + proof.degree_bits = usize::BITS as usize; + + // Verification must fail deterministically, not panic. + let err = verify(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, &proof, &pis) + .expect_err("verification should reject oversized degree_bits"); + + // Verify the error carries the correct diagnostic fields. + // Unlike batch-stark, uni-stark has a single AIR so `air` is None. + // + // - air: None — uni-stark doesn't index by AIR + // - maximum: TWO_ADICITY — largest degree supported by the PCS + // - got: BITS — the tampered value we injected (64) + match err { + p3_uni_stark::VerificationError::InvalidProofShape( + InvalidProofShapeError::DegreeBitsTooLarge { air, maximum, got }, + ) => { + assert_eq!(air, None); + assert_eq!(maximum, BabyBear::TWO_ADICITY); + assert_eq!(got, usize::BITS as usize); + } + _ => panic!("unexpected error: {err:?}"), + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_degree_bits_too_small_for_zk_rejected() { + // In ZK mode the prover extends the trace by one bit (is_zk = 1), so the + // verifier computes `base_degree_bits = degree_bits - is_zk`. If a + // malicious proof sets degree_bits = 0 while is_zk = 1, that subtraction + // underflows. The verifier must reject this before any arithmetic. + + // Generate a valid 2^3 = 8-row Fibonacci trace. + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + + // ZK-enabled config — is_zk = 1, meaning degree_bits must be >= 1. + let config = make_zk_config(); + + // Public inputs: [fib(0), fib(1), fib(7)] = [0, 1, 21]. + let pis = vec![BabyBear::ZERO, BabyBear::ONE, BabyBear::from_u64(21)]; + + // Produce a legitimate ZK proof, then tamper with degree_bits. + let mut proof = prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); + + // Mutation: set degree_bits to 0, below the ZK minimum. + // + // is_zk = 1 + // degree_bits = 0 + // base_degree_bits = 0 - 1 → underflow → must be caught + proof.degree_bits = 0; + + // Verification must fail with a structured error. + let err = verify(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, &proof, &pis) + .expect_err("verification should reject too-small degree_bits in zk mode"); + + // Verify the error carries the correct diagnostic fields: + // + // - air: None — uni-stark doesn't index by AIR + // - minimum: 1 — is_zk, the smallest acceptable degree_bits + // - got: 0 — the tampered value we injected + match err { + p3_uni_stark::VerificationError::InvalidProofShape( + InvalidProofShapeError::DegreeBitsTooSmall { air, minimum, got }, + ) => { + assert_eq!(air, None); + assert_eq!(minimum, 1); + assert_eq!(got, 0); + } + _ => panic!("unexpected error: {err:?}"), + } +} + +#[test] +fn verify_two_adic_compat_fixture() -> Result<(), Box> { + let (config, air, pis, _) = two_adic_compat_case(); + let proof_bytes = read_fixture(TWO_ADIC_FIXTURE) + .expect("Missing fixture. Run: cargo test -p p3-uni-stark --test fib_air -- --ignored"); + let proof: p3_uni_stark::Proof = postcard::from_bytes(&proof_bytes)?; + verify(&config, &air, &proof, &pis)?; + Ok(()) +} + +#[test] +fn verify_circle_compat_fixture() -> Result<(), Box> { + let (config, air, pis, _) = circle_compat_case(); + let proof_bytes = read_fixture(CIRCLE_FIXTURE) + .expect("Missing fixture. Run: cargo test -p p3-uni-stark --test fib_air -- --ignored"); + let proof: p3_uni_stark::Proof = postcard::from_bytes(&proof_bytes)?; + verify(&config, &air, &proof, &pis)?; + Ok(()) +} + +#[test] +#[ignore] +fn generate_two_adic_fixture() -> Result<(), Box> { + // Regen: cargo test -p p3-uni-stark --test fib_air -- --ignored + let (config, air, pis, trace) = two_adic_compat_case(); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + let bytes = postcard::to_allocvec(&proof)?; + write_fixture(TWO_ADIC_FIXTURE, &bytes)?; + Ok(()) +} + +#[test] +#[ignore] +fn generate_circle_fixture() -> Result<(), Box> { + // Regen: cargo test -p p3-uni-stark --test fib_air -- --ignored + let (config, air, pis, trace) = circle_compat_case(); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &pis); + let bytes = postcard::to_allocvec(&proof)?; + write_fixture(CIRCLE_FIXTURE, &bytes)?; + Ok(()) +} + +#[cfg(debug_assertions)] +#[test] +#[should_panic(expected = "constraints not satisfied on row")] +fn test_incorrect_public_value() { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 1); + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(0, 1, 1 << 3); + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + let config = MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger); + let pis = vec![ + BabyBear::ZERO, + BabyBear::ONE, + BabyBear::from_u32(123_123), // incorrect result + ]; + prove(&config, &FibonacciAir {}, trace, &pis); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_circle_v1.postcard b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_circle_v1.postcard new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19051e7b Binary files /dev/null and b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_circle_v1.postcard differ diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_two_adic_v1.postcard b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_two_adic_v1.postcard new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ddccc95 Binary files /dev/null and b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/fixtures/uni_stark_two_adic_v1.postcard differ diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_air.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5aae694d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +use core::fmt::Debug; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use itertools::Itertools; +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::{DuplexChallenger, HashChallenger, SerializingChallenger32}; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_commit::testing::TrivialPcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_fri::{FriParameters, HidingFriPcs, TwoAdicFriPcs}; +use p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::{MerkleTreeHidingMmcs, MerkleTreeMmcs}; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_symmetric::{ + CompressionFunctionFromHasher, PaddingFreeSponge, SerializingHasher, TruncatedPermutation, +}; +use p3_uni_stark::{StarkConfig, StarkGenericConfig, Val, prove, verify}; +use rand::distr::{Distribution, StandardUniform}; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; +use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + +/// How many `a * b = c` operations to do per row in the AIR. +const REPETITIONS: usize = 20; // This should be < 255 so it can fit into a u8. +const TRACE_WIDTH: usize = REPETITIONS * 3; + +/* +In its basic form, asserts a^(self.degree-1) * b = c +(so that the total constraint degree is self.degree) + + +If `uses_transition_constraints`, checks that on transition rows, the first a = row number +*/ +pub struct MulAir { + degree: u64, + uses_boundary_constraints: bool, + uses_transition_constraints: bool, +} + +impl Default for MulAir { + fn default() -> Self { + Self { + degree: 3, + uses_boundary_constraints: true, + uses_transition_constraints: true, + } + } +} + +impl MulAir { + pub fn random_valid_trace(&self, rows: usize, valid: bool) -> RowMajorMatrix + where + StandardUniform: Distribution, + { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let mut trace_values = F::zero_vec(rows * TRACE_WIDTH); + for (i, (a, b, c)) in trace_values.iter_mut().tuples().enumerate() { + let row = i / REPETITIONS; + *a = if self.uses_transition_constraints { + F::from_usize(i) + } else { + rng.random() + }; + *b = if self.uses_boundary_constraints && row == 0 { + a.square() + F::ONE + } else { + rng.random() + }; + *c = a.exp_u64(self.degree - 1) * *b; + + if !valid { + // make it invalid + *c *= F::TWO; + } + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(trace_values, TRACE_WIDTH) + } +} + +impl BaseAir for MulAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + TRACE_WIDTH + } +} + +impl Air for MulAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + let main_local = main.current_slice(); + let main_next = main.next_slice(); + + for i in 0..REPETITIONS { + let start = i * 3; + let a = main_local[start]; + let b = main_local[start + 1]; + let c = main_local[start + 2]; + builder.assert_zero(a.into().exp_u64(self.degree - 1) * b - c); + if self.uses_boundary_constraints { + builder.when_first_row().assert_eq(a * a + AB::Expr::ONE, b); + } + if self.uses_transition_constraints { + let next_a = main_next[start]; + builder + .when_transition() + .assert_eq(a + AB::Expr::from_u8(REPETITIONS as u8), next_a); + } + } + } +} + +#[allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)] +fn do_test( + config: SC, + air: MulAir, + log_height: usize, +) -> Result<(), impl Debug> +where + SC::Challenger: Clone, + StandardUniform: Distribution>, +{ + let trace = air.random_valid_trace(log_height, true); + + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &[]); + + let serialized_proof = postcard::to_allocvec(&proof).expect("unable to serialize proof"); + tracing::debug!("serialized_proof len: {} bytes", serialized_proof.len()); + + let deserialized_proof = + postcard::from_bytes(&serialized_proof).expect("unable to deserialize proof"); + + verify(&config, &air, &deserialized_proof, &[]) +} + +fn do_test_bb_trivial(degree: u64, log_n: usize) -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + let dft = Dft::default(); + + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + + type Pcs = TrivialPcs>; + let pcs = TrivialPcs { + dft, + log_n, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + + type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + let config = MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = MulAir { + degree, + ..Default::default() + }; + + do_test(config, air, 1 << log_n) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_trivial_deg2() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_trivial(2, 8) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_trivial_deg3() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_trivial(3, 8) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_trivial_deg4() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_trivial(4, 8) +} + +fn do_test_bb_twoadic(log_blowup: usize, degree: u64, log_n: usize) -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + type MyHash = PaddingFreeSponge; + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + + type MyCompress = TruncatedPermutation; + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + + type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, MyHash, MyCompress, 2, 8>; + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + let dft = Dft::default(); + + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup, + log_final_poly_len: 3, + max_log_arity: 2, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + + type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + let config = MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = MulAir { + degree, + ..Default::default() + }; + + do_test(config, air, 1 << log_n) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_twoadic_deg2() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_twoadic(1, 2, 5) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_twoadic_deg2_zk() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + + type MyHash = PaddingFreeSponge; + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + + type MyCompress = TruncatedPermutation; + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + + type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeHidingMmcs< + ::Packing, + ::Packing, + MyHash, + MyCompress, + SmallRng, + 2, + 8, + 4, + >; + + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0, rng); + + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + let dft = Dft::default(); + + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing_zk(challenge_mmcs); + type HidingPcs = HidingFriPcs; + let pcs = HidingPcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params, 4, SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1)); + type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + let config = MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = MulAir { + degree: 3, + ..Default::default() + }; + do_test(config, air, 1 << 8) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_twoadic_deg3() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_twoadic(1, 3, 5) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_twoadic_deg4() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_twoadic(2, 4, 4) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_bb_twoadic_deg5() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_bb_twoadic(2, 5, 4) +} + +fn do_test_m31_circle(log_blowup: usize, degree: u64, log_n: usize) -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = Mersenne31; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + + type ByteHash = Keccak256Hash; + type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + + type MyCompress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; + let compress = MyCompress::new(byte_hash); + + type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + + type Challenger = SerializingChallenger32>; + + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + + type Pcs = CirclePcs; + let pcs = Pcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + let challenger = Challenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + + type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + let config = MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = MulAir { + degree, + uses_boundary_constraints: true, + uses_transition_constraints: true, + }; + + do_test(config, air, 1 << log_n) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_m31_circle_deg2() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_m31_circle(1, 2, 6) +} + +#[test] +fn prove_m31_circle_deg3() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + do_test_m31_circle(1, 3, 7) +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_fib_pair.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_fib_pair.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7f601fb --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/mul_fib_pair.rs @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +use core::borrow::Borrow; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::DuplexChallenger; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeField64}; +use p3_fri::{FriParameters, HidingFriPcs, TwoAdicFriPcs}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::{MerkleTreeHidingMmcs, MerkleTreeMmcs}; +use p3_symmetric::{PaddingFreeSponge, TruncatedPermutation}; +use p3_uni_stark::{ + StarkConfig, prove_with_preprocessed, setup_preprocessed, verify_with_preprocessed, +}; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +pub struct MulFibPAir { + num_rows: usize, + /// Index to tamper with in preprocessed trace (None = no tampering) + tamper_index: Option, +} + +impl MulFibPAir { + pub const fn new(num_rows: usize) -> Self { + Self { + num_rows, + tamper_index: None, + } + } + + pub const fn with_tampered_preprocessed(num_rows: usize, tamper_index: usize) -> Self { + Self { + num_rows, + tamper_index: Some(tamper_index), + } + } +} + +impl BaseAir for MulFibPAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + NUM_COLS + } + fn preprocessed_trace(&self) -> Option> { + Some(generate_preprocessed_trace::( + self.num_rows, + self.tamper_index, + )) + } + fn preprocessed_width(&self) -> usize { + NUM_PREPROCESSED_COLS + } +} + +impl Air for MulFibPAir +where + AB::F: PrimeField64, +{ + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + let local: &MulFibPairRow = main.current_slice().borrow(); + let next: &MulFibPairRow = main.next_slice().borrow(); + + // Copy the preprocessed values we need so the immutable borrow on + // `builder` is released before the mutable `when_transition` call. + let prep: &PreprocessedRow = builder.preprocessed().current_slice().borrow(); + let (prod_coeff, sum_coeff) = (prep.prod_coeff, prep.sum_coeff); + + let mut when_transition = builder.when_transition(); + + // a' <- b + when_transition.assert_eq(local.b, next.a); + + // b' <- prod_coeff * a * b + sum_coeff * (a + b) + let prod_term = prod_coeff * local.a * local.b; + let sum_term = sum_coeff * (local.a + local.b); + when_transition.assert_eq(prod_term + sum_term, next.b); + } +} + +pub fn generate_trace_rows(a: u64, b: u64, n: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!(n.is_power_of_two()); + + let mut trace = RowMajorMatrix::new(F::zero_vec(n * NUM_COLS), NUM_COLS); + let preprocessed = generate_preprocessed_trace::(n, None); + + let (_, rows, _) = unsafe { trace.values.align_to_mut::>() }; + let (_, prep_rows, _) = unsafe { preprocessed.values.align_to::>() }; + assert_eq!(rows.len(), n); + + rows[0] = MulFibPairRow::new(F::from_u64(a), F::from_u64(b)); + + for i in 1..n { + rows[i].a = rows[i - 1].b; + rows[i].b = prep_rows[i - 1].prod_coeff * rows[i - 1].a * rows[i - 1].b + + prep_rows[i - 1].sum_coeff * (rows[i - 1].a + rows[i - 1].b); + } + + trace +} + +pub fn generate_preprocessed_trace( + n: usize, + tamper_index: Option, +) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!(n.is_power_of_two()); + + let mut preprocessed = RowMajorMatrix::new( + F::zero_vec(n * NUM_PREPROCESSED_COLS), + NUM_PREPROCESSED_COLS, + ); + + let (_, rows, _) = unsafe { preprocessed.values.align_to_mut::>() }; + assert_eq!(rows.len(), n); + + rows.iter_mut().enumerate().for_each(|(i, row)| { + row.prod_coeff = F::from_u64((i % 2) as u64); + row.sum_coeff = F::from_u64(((i + 1) % 6) as u64); + }); + + if let Some(idx) = tamper_index.filter(|&i| i < n) { + rows[idx].prod_coeff += F::ONE; + } + + preprocessed +} + +const NUM_COLS: usize = 2; +const NUM_PREPROCESSED_COLS: usize = 2; + +pub struct MulFibPairRow { + pub a: F, + pub b: F, +} + +impl MulFibPairRow { + const fn new(a: F, b: F) -> Self { + Self { a, b } + } +} + +impl Borrow> for [F] { + fn borrow(&self) -> &MulFibPairRow { + debug_assert_eq!(self.len(), NUM_COLS); + let (prefix, shorts, suffix) = unsafe { self.align_to::>() }; + debug_assert!(prefix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert!(suffix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert_eq!(shorts.len(), 1); + &shorts[0] + } +} + +pub struct PreprocessedRow { + pub prod_coeff: F, + pub sum_coeff: F, +} + +impl Borrow> for [F] { + fn borrow(&self) -> &PreprocessedRow { + debug_assert_eq!(self.len(), NUM_PREPROCESSED_COLS); + let (prefix, shorts, suffix) = unsafe { self.align_to::>() }; + debug_assert!(prefix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert!(suffix.is_empty(), "Alignment should match"); + debug_assert_eq!(shorts.len(), 1); + &shorts[0] + } +} + +type Val = BabyBear; +type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; +type MyHash = PaddingFreeSponge; +type MyCompress = TruncatedPermutation; +type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, MyHash, MyCompress, 2, 8>; +type HidingValMmcs = MerkleTreeHidingMmcs< + ::Packing, + ::Packing, + MyHash, + MyCompress, + SmallRng, + 2, + 8, + 4, +>; +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type HidingChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; +type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; +type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; +type HidingPcs = HidingFriPcs; +type MyConfig = StarkConfig; +type MyHidingConfig = StarkConfig; + +fn setup_test_config() -> MyConfig { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 2); + let pcs = Pcs::new(Dft::default(), val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +fn setup_zk_test_config() -> MyHidingConfig { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = HidingValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0, rng.clone()); + let challenge_mmcs = HidingChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing(challenge_mmcs, 2); + let pcs = HidingPcs::new(Dft::default(), val_mmcs, fri_params, 4, rng); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + MyHidingConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +#[test] +fn test_mul_fib_pair() { + let num_rows = 1024; + let config = setup_test_config(); + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(1, 1, num_rows); + + let air = MulFibPAir::new(num_rows); + let degree_bits = 10; // log2(1024) + let (preprocessed_prover_data, preprocessed_vk) = + setup_preprocessed::(&config, &air, degree_bits).unwrap(); + + let proof = prove_with_preprocessed(&config, &air, trace, &[], Some(&preprocessed_prover_data)); + + verify_with_preprocessed(&config, &air, &proof, &[], Some(&preprocessed_vk)) + .expect("verification failed"); +} + +#[test] +fn test_mul_fib_pair_zk() { + let num_rows = 1024; + let config = setup_zk_test_config(); + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(1, 1, num_rows); + + let air = MulFibPAir::new(num_rows); + let degree_bits = 10; // log2(1024) + let (preprocessed_prover_data, preprocessed_vk) = + setup_preprocessed::(&config, &air, degree_bits).unwrap(); + + let proof = prove_with_preprocessed(&config, &air, trace, &[], Some(&preprocessed_prover_data)); + + verify_with_preprocessed(&config, &air, &proof, &[], Some(&preprocessed_vk)) + .expect("verification failed"); +} + +#[test] +fn test_tampered_preprocessed_fails() { + let num_rows = 1024; + let config = setup_test_config(); + let trace = generate_trace_rows::(1, 1, num_rows); + let air = MulFibPAir::new(num_rows); + let degree_bits = 10; // log2(1024) + + // Prover uses the correct AIR for preprocessed setup. + let (preprocessed_prover_data, _) = + setup_preprocessed::(&config, &air, degree_bits).unwrap(); + let proof = prove_with_preprocessed(&config, &air, trace, &[], Some(&preprocessed_prover_data)); + + // Verifier uses a *tampered* AIR to derive the preprocessed commitment, which should + // not match the one used in the proof. + let tampered_air = MulFibPAir::with_tampered_preprocessed(num_rows, 3); + let (_, tampered_preprocessed_vk) = + setup_preprocessed::(&config, &tampered_air, degree_bits).unwrap(); + + let result = verify_with_preprocessed( + &config, + &tampered_air, + &proof, + &[], + Some(&tampered_preprocessed_vk), + ); + + assert!( + result.is_err(), + "Verification should fail with tampered preprocessed columns" + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/no_next_row.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/no_next_row.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9f339d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/no_next_row.rs @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::DuplexChallenger; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing, PrimeField64}; +use p3_fri::TwoAdicFriPcs; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_symmetric::{PaddingFreeSponge, TruncatedPermutation}; +use p3_uni_stark::{StarkConfig, prove, verify}; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +/// A minimal single-row AIR: enforces `a * a == b` per row, never reads the next row. +struct SquareAir; + +impl BaseAir for SquareAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + 2 + } + + fn main_next_row_columns(&self) -> Vec { + vec![] + } +} + +impl Air for SquareAir { + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + let a = main.current(0).unwrap(); + let b = main.current(1).unwrap(); + builder.assert_eq(a * a, b); + } +} + +fn generate_square_trace(n: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!(n.is_power_of_two()); + let mut values = F::zero_vec(n * 2); + for i in 0..n { + let a = F::from_u64((i + 1) as u64); + values[i * 2] = a; + values[i * 2 + 1] = a * a; + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, 2) +} + +type Val = BabyBear; +type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; +type MyHash = PaddingFreeSponge; +type MyCompress = TruncatedPermutation; +type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, MyHash, MyCompress, 2, 8>; +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; +type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; +type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; +type MyConfig = StarkConfig; + +fn make_config() -> MyConfig { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(42); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = MyHash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = MyCompress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = p3_fri::FriParameters { + log_blowup: 2, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 2, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 1, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 1, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + MyConfig::new(pcs, challenger) +} + +#[test] +fn test_no_next_row_air() { + let config = make_config(); + let trace = generate_square_trace::(1 << 3); + let proof = prove(&config, &SquareAir, trace, &[]); + + // trace_next should be None + assert!( + proof.opened_values.trace_next.is_none(), + "trace_next should be None for an AIR that does not use the next row" + ); + + verify(&config, &SquareAir, &proof, &[]).expect("verification should succeed"); +} + +#[test] +fn test_no_next_row_rejects_present_trace_next() { + let config = make_config(); + let trace = generate_square_trace::(1 << 3); + let proof = prove(&config, &SquareAir, trace, &[]); + + // Tamper: set trace_next to Some(zeros) — verifier should reject + let mut tampered = proof; + let air_width = >::width(&SquareAir); + tampered.opened_values.trace_next = Some(Challenge::zero_vec(air_width)); + + let result = verify(&config, &SquareAir, &tampered, &[]); + assert!( + result.is_err(), + "verifier should reject proof with trace_next present when AIR does not use next row" + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_air.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eaa50f5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +use core::fmt::Debug; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::DuplexChallenger; +use p3_circle::CirclePcs; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_fri::{FriParameters, HidingFriPcs, TwoAdicFriPcs}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::{MerkleTreeHidingMmcs, MerkleTreeMmcs}; +use p3_mersenne_31::Mersenne31; +use p3_symmetric::{ + CompressionFunctionFromHasher, PaddingFreeSponge, SerializingHasher, TruncatedPermutation, +}; +use p3_uni_stark::{StarkConfig, prove, verify}; +use p3_util::assert_sync; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +#[derive(Clone)] +struct PeriodicAir { + periodic: Vec>, +} + +impl PeriodicAir { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { + periodic: vec![ + vec![ + F::from_u64(1), + F::from_u64(2), + F::from_u64(3), + F::from_u64(4), + ], + vec![F::from_u64(10), F::from_u64(20)], + ], + } + } + + fn valid_trace(&self, rows: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let mut values = F::zero_vec(rows * 2); + for (i, row) in values.chunks_exact_mut(2).enumerate() { + row[0] = self.periodic[0][i % self.periodic[0].len()]; + row[1] = self.periodic[1][i % self.periodic[1].len()]; + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, 2) + } +} + +impl BaseAir for PeriodicAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + 2 + } + + fn num_periodic_columns(&self) -> usize { + self.periodic.len() + } + + fn periodic_columns(&self) -> Vec> { + self.periodic.clone() + } +} + +impl Air for PeriodicAir +where + AB::F: Field, +{ + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + let local = main.current_slice(); + let p0 = builder.periodic_values()[0].into(); + let p1 = builder.periodic_values()[1].into(); + builder.assert_eq(local[0], p0); + builder.assert_eq(local[1], p1); + } +} + +#[test] +fn periodic_air_two_adic_prove_verify() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + type Hash = PaddingFreeSponge; + type Compress = TruncatedPermutation; + type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, Hash, Compress, 2, 8>; + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + type Config = StarkConfig; + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = Hash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = Compress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup: 2, + log_final_poly_len: 3, + max_log_arity: 2, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + let config = Config::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = PeriodicAir::::new(); + let trace = air.valid_trace(1 << 6); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &[]); + verify(&config, &air, &proof, &[]) +} + +#[test] +fn periodic_air_two_adic_zk_prove_verify() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + type Hash = PaddingFreeSponge; + type Compress = TruncatedPermutation; + type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeHidingMmcs< + ::Packing, + ::Packing, + Hash, + Compress, + SmallRng, + 2, + 8, + 4, + >; + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + type Pcs = HidingFriPcs; + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + type Config = StarkConfig; + + assert_sync::(); + assert_sync::(); + assert_sync::(); + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = Hash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = Compress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0, rng); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let dft = Dft::default(); + let fri_params = FriParameters::new_testing_zk(challenge_mmcs); + let pcs = Pcs::new(dft, val_mmcs, fri_params, 4, SmallRng::seed_from_u64(2)); + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + let config = Config::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = PeriodicAir::::new(); + let trace = air.valid_trace(1 << 6); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &[]); + verify(&config, &air, &proof, &[]) +} + +#[test] +fn periodic_air_circle_prove_verify() -> Result<(), impl Debug> { + type Val = Mersenne31; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + type ByteHash = p3_keccak::Keccak256Hash; + type FieldHash = SerializingHasher; + type Compress = CompressionFunctionFromHasher; + type ValMmcs = MerkleTreeMmcs; + type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; + type Challenger = p3_challenger::SerializingChallenger32< + Val, + p3_challenger::HashChallenger, + >; + type Pcs = CirclePcs; + type Config = StarkConfig; + + let byte_hash = ByteHash {}; + let field_hash = FieldHash::new(byte_hash); + let compress = Compress::new(byte_hash); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(field_hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup: 1, + log_final_poly_len: 0, + max_log_arity: 1, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs { + mmcs: val_mmcs, + fri_params, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + let challenger = Challenger::from_hasher(vec![], byte_hash); + let config = Config::new(pcs, challenger); + + let air = PeriodicAir::::new(); + let trace = air.valid_trace(1 << 5); + let proof = prove(&config, &air, trace, &[]); + verify(&config, &air, &proof, &[]) +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_column_shape.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_column_shape.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fab81e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/periodic_column_shape.rs @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::DuplexChallenger; +use p3_commit::ExtensionMmcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_field::{Field, PrimeCharacteristicRing}; +use p3_fri::{FriParameters, TwoAdicFriPcs}; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_merkle_tree::MerkleTreeMmcs; +use p3_symmetric::{PaddingFreeSponge, TruncatedPermutation}; +use p3_uni_stark::{PcsError, PeriodicColumnError, StarkConfig, VerificationError, prove, verify}; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +type Val = BabyBear; +type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; +type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; +type Hash = PaddingFreeSponge; +type Compress = TruncatedPermutation; +type ValMmcs = + MerkleTreeMmcs<::Packing, ::Packing, Hash, Compress, 2, 8>; +type ChallengeMmcs = ExtensionMmcs; +type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; +type Pcs = TwoAdicFriPcs; +type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; +type Config = StarkConfig; + +/// One-column AIR with a single periodic column of the given period. +/// +/// The constraint pins each trace cell to the periodic value at that row. +/// Two instances with different periods share the same symbolic shape: +/// both report one periodic column of degree one and one width-one trace. +#[derive(Clone)] +struct SinglePeriodicAir { + period: usize, +} + +impl BaseAir for SinglePeriodicAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + 1 + } + + fn num_periodic_columns(&self) -> usize { + 1 + } + + fn periodic_columns(&self) -> Vec> { + // A single column holding 0, 1, ..., period - 1. + // A period of zero yields one empty column, which has no valid subdomain. + vec![(0..self.period as u64).map(F::from_u64).collect()] + } +} + +impl Air for SinglePeriodicAir +where + AB::F: Field, +{ + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + // Pin the single trace column to the periodic value at the current row. + let main = builder.main(); + let local = main.current_slice(); + let p0 = builder.periodic_values()[0].into(); + builder.assert_eq(local[0], p0); + } +} + +/// Number of trace rows used by the fixtures, so the trace length is 2^6 = 64. +const LOG_TRACE_ROWS: usize = 6; +const TRACE_LENGTH: usize = 1 << LOG_TRACE_ROWS; + +/// Build a trace whose only column repeats 0, 1, ..., period - 1. +fn periodic_trace(period: usize, rows: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + let column: Vec = (0..period as u64).map(Val::from_u64).collect(); + let values: Vec = (0..rows).map(|i| column[i % period]).collect(); + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, 1) +} + +fn config() -> Config { + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let hash = Hash::new(perm.clone()); + let compress = Compress::new(perm.clone()); + let val_mmcs = ValMmcs::new(hash, compress, 0); + let challenge_mmcs = ChallengeMmcs::new(val_mmcs.clone()); + let fri_params = FriParameters { + log_blowup: 2, + log_final_poly_len: 3, + max_log_arity: 2, + num_queries: 40, + commit_proof_of_work_bits: 0, + query_proof_of_work_bits: 8, + mmcs: challenge_mmcs, + }; + let pcs = Pcs::new(Dft::default(), val_mmcs, fri_params); + StarkConfig::new(pcs, Challenger::new(perm)) +} + +/// Verify a valid proof against an AIR whose single periodic column has the given length. +/// +/// - The proof comes from a well-formed period-two AIR. +/// - The verifying AIR shares the same symbolic shape: one width-one trace and one degree-one periodic column. +/// - The quotient layout therefore matches. +/// - Verification then reaches the periodic-length check. +fn verify_with_period(bad_period: usize) -> Result<(), VerificationError>> { + let config = config(); + + // Prover side: period 2 column [0, 1], trace column [0, 1, 0, 1, ...]. + let good_air = SinglePeriodicAir { period: 2 }; + let proof = prove(&config, &good_air, periodic_trace(2, TRACE_LENGTH), &[]); + + // Verifier side: same shape, but a malformed period the verifier cannot evaluate. + let bad_air = SinglePeriodicAir { period: bad_period }; + verify(&config, &bad_air, &proof, &[]) +} + +#[test] +fn empty_periodic_column_is_rejected() { + // Period 0 yields one empty column [[]]; zero is not a power of two. + // Without the check this panics taking log2 of zero. + let result = verify_with_period(0); + assert!( + matches!( + result, + Err(VerificationError::PeriodicColumn( + PeriodicColumnError::LengthNotPowerOfTwo { got: 0 } + )) + ), + "expected LengthNotPowerOfTwo {{ got: 0 }}, got {result:?}" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn non_power_of_two_periodic_column_is_rejected() { + // Period 3 lies inside 1..=64 but is not a power of two, so it has no subdomain. + // The error names the power-of-two requirement, not the range bound. + let result = verify_with_period(3); + assert!( + matches!( + result, + Err(VerificationError::PeriodicColumn( + PeriodicColumnError::LengthNotPowerOfTwo { got: 3 } + )) + ), + "expected LengthNotPowerOfTwo {{ got: 3 }}, got {result:?}" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn oversized_periodic_column_is_rejected() { + // Period 128 is a power of two but exceeds the 64-row trace length. + // The error names the range bound and the offending period. + let oversized = 2 * TRACE_LENGTH; + let result = verify_with_period(oversized); + assert!( + matches!( + result, + Err(VerificationError::PeriodicColumn( + PeriodicColumnError::LengthTooLarge { maximum, got } + )) if maximum == TRACE_LENGTH && got == oversized + ), + "expected LengthTooLarge {{ maximum: {TRACE_LENGTH}, got: {oversized} }}, got {result:?}" + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/rc_sub_builder.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/rc_sub_builder.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65662ca0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-uni-stark-0.6.2-heap-patch/tests/rc_sub_builder.rs @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +//! Minimal range-check example that reuses a bit-decomposition gadget via [`SubAirBuilder`]. +//! +//! Column layout: +//! - `c[0]`: running sum owned by the parent AIR. +//! - `c[1]`: value that must stay in `[0, 2^NUM_RANGE_BITS)`. +//! - `c[2..]`: boolean limbs proving the decomposition of `c[1]`. +//! +//! The sub-AIR enforces the decomposition + booleanity over columns `1..`, while the parent AIR +//! never touches the bit columns and only reasons about the accumulated sum. + +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use p3_air::symbolic::{AirLayout, SymbolicAirBuilder}; +use p3_air::{Air, AirBuilder, BaseAir, WindowAccess}; +use p3_baby_bear::{BabyBear, Poseidon2BabyBear}; +use p3_challenger::DuplexChallenger; +use p3_commit::testing::TrivialPcs; +use p3_dft::Radix2DitParallel; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_field::extension::BinomialExtensionField; +use p3_matrix::dense::RowMajorMatrix; +use p3_uni_stark::{StarkConfig, SubAirBuilder, prove, verify}; +use rand::SeedableRng; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + +const NUM_RANGE_BITS: usize = 4; +const TRACE_WIDTH: usize = 2 + NUM_RANGE_BITS; + +/// Range-check gadget: proves a value equals the sum of weighted boolean limbs. +#[derive(Copy, Clone)] +struct RangeDecompAir; + +impl BaseAir for RangeDecompAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + 1 + NUM_RANGE_BITS + } +} + +impl Air for RangeDecompAir +where + AB: AirBuilder, +{ + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + let main = builder.main(); + + let value = main.current(0).unwrap(); + let bits = &main.current_slice()[1..]; + + let mut recomposed = AB::Expr::ZERO; + for (i, bit) in bits.iter().enumerate() { + let weight = BabyBear::from_u32(1 << i); + recomposed += *bit * weight; + builder.assert_zero(*bit * (*bit - AB::F::ONE)); + } + + builder.assert_zero(value - recomposed); + } +} + +/// Parent AIR that reuses the range gadget but only reasons about the running sum. +#[derive(Copy, Clone)] +struct RangeCheckAir; + +impl BaseAir for RangeCheckAir { + fn width(&self) -> usize { + TRACE_WIDTH + } +} + +impl Air for RangeCheckAir +where + AB: AirBuilder, +{ + fn eval(&self, builder: &mut AB) { + // Declare the sub-AIR and evaluate it via `SubAirBuilder` + let sub_air = RangeDecompAir; + { + let mut sub_builder = + SubAirBuilder::::new(builder, 1..TRACE_WIDTH); + sub_air.eval(&mut sub_builder); + } + + // Evaluate the parent AIR + let main = builder.main(); + + let accumulator = main.current(0).unwrap(); + let range_value = main.current(1).unwrap(); + let next_accumulator = main.next(0).unwrap(); + + builder.when_first_row().assert_zero(accumulator); + builder + .when_transition() + .assert_eq(next_accumulator, accumulator + range_value); + } +} + +impl RangeCheckAir { + fn generate_trace(&self, rows: usize) -> RowMajorMatrix { + assert!( + rows.is_power_of_two(), + "trace height must be a power of two" + ); + let mut values = BabyBear::zero_vec(rows * TRACE_WIDTH); + let mut accumulator = BabyBear::ZERO; + for row in 0..rows { + let base = row * TRACE_WIDTH; + let raw_value = (row * 7) % (1 << NUM_RANGE_BITS); + values[base] = accumulator; + values[base + 1] = BabyBear::from_u32(raw_value as u32); + let mut tmp = raw_value; + for bit in 0..NUM_RANGE_BITS { + values[base + 2 + bit] = BabyBear::from_u32((tmp & 1) as u32); + tmp >>= 1; + } + accumulator += BabyBear::from_u32(raw_value as u32); + } + RowMajorMatrix::new(values, TRACE_WIDTH) + } +} + +// Ensures the range-check gadget stays scoped to its columns and the whole AIR proves. +#[test] +fn range_checked_sub_builder() { + let air = RangeCheckAir; + let mut builder = SymbolicAirBuilder::::new(AirLayout { + main_width: TRACE_WIDTH, + ..Default::default() + }); + air.eval(&mut builder); + + let constraints = builder.base_constraints(); + assert!( + !constraints.is_empty(), + "Range-check AIR should emit constraints" + ); + + prove_bb_trivial_deg4(&air, 3); +} + +/// Tests the whole AIR on a trivial trace. +fn prove_bb_trivial_deg4(air: &RangeCheckAir, log_n: usize) { + type Val = BabyBear; + type Challenge = BinomialExtensionField; + type Perm = Poseidon2BabyBear<16>; + type Dft = Radix2DitParallel; + type Challenger = DuplexChallenger; + type Pcs = TrivialPcs; + type Config = StarkConfig; + + let rows = 1 << log_n; + let trace = air.generate_trace(rows); + + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + let perm = Perm::new_from_rng_128(&mut rng); + let dft = Dft::default(); + + let pcs = Pcs { + dft, + log_n, + _phantom: PhantomData, + }; + let challenger = Challenger::new(perm); + let config = Config::new(pcs, challenger); + + let proof = prove(&config, air, trace, &[]); + verify(&config, air, &proof, &[]).expect("verification failed"); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f8b7958 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo-ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"v":1} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc6ee31b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/.cargo_vcs_info.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "git": { + "sha1": "11cc5849a1b57a2f520d6edc608b9e516517d841" + }, + "path_in_vcs": "util" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..336e4319 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# Changelog + +All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file. + +The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/), +and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). + +## [Unreleased] +## [0.6.2] - 2026-07-20 +### Merged PRs +- Refactor(util): replace `transpose` crate with portable engine (#1874) +- Refactor: use p3-maybe-rayon instead of rayon for p3-util (#1880) +- Perf(util): stripe parallel transpose along the longer dimension (#1888) +- Perf(util): stripe the 8-byte parallel transpose along the longer dimension (#1889) +- Perf(mersenne-31,circle): defer M31 mixed_dot_product reduction; truncate circle LDE interpolation (#1903) +- Fix: doc and light tweaks (#1920) +- Revert "refactor: use p3-maybe-rayon instead of rayon for p3-util (#1880)" + +## [0.6.1] - 2026-06-13 +## [0.6.0] - 2026-06-11 +### Merged PRs +- Utils: add `log3_strict_usize` (#1444) +- Guard verifier degree_bits (#1535) +- Chore: use T::zero_vec(n) instead of vec![T::ZERO; n] (#1633) +- Chore: remove needless_range_loop allows across the workspace (#1632) +- Fix(merkle-tree): make MerkleTreeHidingMmcs Sync (#1559) +- Fix: local refs for dev-deps (#1663) +- Feat: add security estimation (#1329) +- Couple fixes (#1688) +- Ci: tighten doc/release/TOML checks (#1689) +- Isolate bit_reverse benchmark from clone overhead (#1703) +- Refactor: move DisjointMutPtr to p3-util (#1720) +- Couple miscellaneous tweaks (#1731) +- Fix(util): guard reverse_bits_len against oversized bit_len (#1752) +- Chore: update CHANGELOGs (#1785) + +## [0.5.3] - 2026-05-15 +## [0.5.2] - 2026-03-27 +## [0.5.1] - 2026-03-16 +## [0.5.0] - 2026-03-10 +### Merged PRs +- Util: better rect transpose with NEON for 32 bits fields (#1192) +- Update square.rs (#1261) +- Fix: deduplicate key lookup logic in LinearMap (#1291) +- Deps: update rand and rand_xoshiro (#1314) +- Util: faster rectangular transposition 64-bit fields (#1332) + +## [0.4.2] - 2026-01-05 +### Merged PRs +- Refactor: add public const `new` and `new_array` for all fields (#1222) (Adrian Hamelink) + +### Authors +- Adrian Hamelink + +## [0.4.1] - 2025-12-18 +### Authors + +## [0.4.0] - 2025-12-12 +### Merged PRs +- Clippy wants us to put things inside of fmt now instead of just extra arguments... (#916) (AngusG) +- Chore: add descriptions to all sub-crate manifests (#906) (Himess) +- GCD based inversion for 31 bit fields (#921) (AngusG) +- Fast GCD Inverse for Goldilocks (#925) (AngusG) +- More Clippy Complaints (#931) (AngusG) +- Chore: remove useless bench_reverse_bits benchmark (#933) (Galoretka) +- Packed Goldilocks Small Refactor (#946) (AngusG) +- Make Assume unsafe and add a doc comment (#1005) (AngusG) +- Compile Time asserts (#1015) (AngusG) +- Clippy: small step (#1102) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add nursery (#1103) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add semicolon_if_nothing_returned (#1107) (Thomas Coratger) +- Clippy: add match_bool (#1126) (Thomas Coratger) + +### Authors +- AngusG +- Galoretka +- Himess +- Thomas Coratger + diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.lock b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc299e70 --- /dev/null +++ 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crates.io) dependencies. +# +# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml +# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable). +# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents. + +[package] +edition = "2024" +name = "p3-util" +version = "0.6.2" +build = false +autolib = false +autobins = false +autoexamples = false +autotests = false +autobenches = false +description = "A collection of utility functions and tools for low-level operations, such as bit manipulation and array transformations." +homepage = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +readme = false +keywords = [ + "cryptography", + "SNARK", + "PLONK", + "FRI", + "plonky3", +] +categories = ["cryptography::cryptocurrencies"] +license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0" +repository = "https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3" +resolver = "2" + +[features] +parallel = ["rayon"] + +[lib] +name = "p3_util" +path = "src/lib.rs" + +[[bench]] +name = "bit_reverse" +path = "benches/bit_reverse.rs" +harness = false + +[[bench]] +name = "transpose" +path = "benches/transpose.rs" +harness = false + +[dependencies.rayon] +version = "1.12.0" +optional = true + +[dependencies.serde] +version = "1.0" +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.criterion] +version = "0.8" + +[dev-dependencies.proptest] +version = "1.11" +features = ["std"] +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.rand] +version = "0.10.1" +default-features = false + +[dev-dependencies.serde_json] +version = "1.0.150" + +[lints.clippy] +cognitive_complexity = "allow" +match_bool = "warn" +needless_pass_by_value = "warn" +redundant_pub_crate = "allow" +semicolon_if_nothing_returned = "warn" +too_long_first_doc_paragraph = "allow" +transmute_undefined_repr = "allow" +tuple_array_conversions = "allow" +unused_peekable = "allow" + +[lints.clippy.all] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.clippy.nursery] +level = "warn" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rust] +rust_2024_incompatible_pat = "warn" +unused_must_use = "deny" + +[lints.rust.rust_2018_idioms] +level = "deny" +priority = -1 + +[lints.rustdoc] +all = "warn" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60e60f73 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/Cargo.toml.orig @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +[package] +name = "p3-util" +description = "A collection of utility functions and tools for low-level operations, such as bit manipulation and array transformations." +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +homepage.workspace = true +keywords.workspace = true +categories.workspace = true + +[features] +parallel = ["rayon"] + +[dependencies] +rayon = { workspace = true, optional = true } +serde.workspace = true + +[dev-dependencies] +p3-baby-bear = { path = "../baby-bear" } +p3-field = { path = "../field" } +p3-goldilocks = { path = "../goldilocks" } + +criterion.workspace = true +proptest.workspace = true +rand.workspace = true +serde_json.workspace = true + +[[bench]] +name = "bit_reverse" +harness = false + +[[bench]] +name = "transpose" +harness = false + +[lints] +workspace = true diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b5d1a7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/PATCH.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# Why this vendored copy of `p3-util` 0.6.2 exists + +This is a full copy of the upstream `p3-util` 0.6.2 source +(MIT OR Apache-2.0, `https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3`), patched in exactly +one place, to work around a Solana toolchain limitation, not to change any +behavior or claim any originality over upstream's work. + +## The problem + +`riverrun-m31` compiles cleanly for `sbpf-solana-solana` (Solana's on-chain +program target) with every dependency except this one. `p3-util::apply_to_chunks` +calls `[MaybeUninit]::assume_init_ref()`, which is the unstable Rust library +feature `maybe_uninit_slice` (tracking issue rust-lang/rust#63569). It compiles +fine on a recent stable host toolchain (this machine: rustc 1.97.0, where the +feature has since stabilized), but Solana's SBF target is pinned to a specific, +older compiler bundled with `platform-tools`: **rustc 1.89.0** as of +`platform-tools v1.54` (2026-03-06, the newest release available as of this +patch, checked via the `anza-xyz/platform-tools` GitHub releases API before +patching anything). On 1.89.0 that API is still unstable, and +`RUSTC_BOOTSTRAP=1` does not help, because `p3-util`'s own source never +declares `#![feature(maybe_uninit_slice)]`; it simply assumes the API is +already stable, which is only true on a newer compiler than Solana currently +ships. + +## The fix + +One function, `apply_to_chunks` in `src/lib.rs`, rewritten to produce the exact +same `&[u8]` from the exact same initialized bytes, using only stable APIs +(`core::slice::from_raw_parts` over a raw pointer cast) instead of the unstable +trait method. Same safety invariant, same behavior, zero functional change: +`iter_next_chunk_erased` (unchanged, already stable) guarantees the first `n` +elements of `buf` are initialized before this function ever runs; the patch +only changes how that already-established fact is turned into a `&[u8]`. + +## Everything else + +Untouched, byte-for-byte upstream 0.6.2. This is not a fork we intend to +diverge on, add features to, or maintain independently: it exists to be +deleted the moment either (a) Solana's platform-tools ships a newer pinned +rustc where `maybe_uninit_slice` is stable, or (b) upstream Plonky3 ships a +release that avoids the unstable API itself. Check for either before assuming +this patch is still needed. diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bit_reverse.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bit_reverse.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46f78c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/bit_reverse.rs @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +use core::hint::black_box; + +use criterion::{BenchmarkId, Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main}; +use p3_util::reverse_slice_index_bits; +use rand::rngs::SmallRng; +use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + +fn bench_reverse_slice_index_bits(c: &mut Criterion) { + let mut group = c.benchmark_group("reverse_slice_index_bits"); + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for log_size in [1, 3, 5, 8, 16, 24, 26] { + let size = 1 << log_size; + group.bench_with_input(BenchmarkId::from_parameter(size), &size, |b, &size| { + let mut data: Vec = (0..size).map(|_| rng.random()).collect(); + b.iter(|| { + reverse_slice_index_bits(black_box(&mut data)); + }); + }); + } + group.finish(); +} + +criterion_group!(benches, bench_reverse_slice_index_bits); +criterion_main!(benches); diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/transpose.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/transpose.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81611a85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/benches/transpose.rs @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +use core::hint::black_box; + +use criterion::{BenchmarkId, Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main}; +use p3_baby_bear::BabyBear; +use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; +use p3_goldilocks::Goldilocks; +use p3_util::transpose::transpose; + +/// Benchmark matrix sizes for BabyBear field elements (4 bytes each): +const BENCHMARK_SIZES: &[(usize, usize, &str)] = &[ + (128, 128, "small_square_128x128"), + (1024, 1024, "medium_square_1024x1024"), + (4096, 2048, "large_wide_4096x2048"), + (2048, 4096, "large_tall_2048x4096"), +]; + +fn bench_transpose_babybear(c: &mut Criterion) { + let mut group = c.benchmark_group("transpose_babybear"); + + for &(width, height, name) in BENCHMARK_SIZES { + let size = width * height; + + let input: Vec<_> = (0..size as u64).map(BabyBear::from_u64).collect(); + let mut output = BabyBear::zero_vec(size); + + group.bench_with_input(BenchmarkId::new("transpose_util", name), &size, |b, _| { + b.iter(|| { + transpose(black_box(&input), &mut output, width, height); + black_box(output[0]) + }); + }); + } + + group.finish(); +} + +fn bench_transpose_goldilocks(c: &mut Criterion) { + let mut group = c.benchmark_group("transpose_goldilocks"); + + for &(width, height, name) in BENCHMARK_SIZES { + let size = width * height; + + let input: Vec<_> = (0..size as u64).map(Goldilocks::from_u64).collect(); + let mut output = Goldilocks::zero_vec(size); + + group.bench_with_input(BenchmarkId::new("transpose_util", name), &size, |b, _| { + b.iter(|| { + transpose(black_box(&input), &mut output, width, height); + black_box(output[0]) + }); + }); + } + + group.finish(); +} + +criterion_group!( + benches, + bench_transpose_babybear, + bench_transpose_goldilocks +); + +criterion_main!(benches); diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/array_serialization.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/array_serialization.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f2c1de1e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/array_serialization.rs @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::marker::PhantomData; + +use serde::de::{SeqAccess, Visitor}; +use serde::ser::SerializeTuple; +use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer}; + +pub fn serialize( + data: &[T; N], + ser: S, +) -> Result { + let mut s = ser.serialize_tuple(N)?; + for item in data { + s.serialize_element(item)?; + } + s.end() +} + +struct ArrayVisitor(PhantomData); + +impl<'de, T, const N: usize> Visitor<'de> for ArrayVisitor +where + T: Deserialize<'de>, +{ + type Value = [T; N]; + + fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result { + formatter.write_fmt(format_args!("an array of length {N}")) + } + + #[inline] + fn visit_seq(self, mut seq: A) -> Result + where + A: SeqAccess<'de>, + { + let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(N); + for _ in 0..N { + match seq.next_element()? { + Some(val) => data.push(val), + None => return Err(serde::de::Error::invalid_length(data.len(), &self)), + } + } + data.try_into().map_or_else(|_| unreachable!(), Ok) + } +} +pub fn deserialize<'de, D, T, const N: usize>(deserializer: D) -> Result<[T; N], D::Error> +where + D: Deserializer<'de>, + T: Deserialize<'de>, +{ + deserializer.deserialize_tuple(N, ArrayVisitor::(PhantomData)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + use serde_json; + + use super::*; + + /// A helper wrapper struct to use serialize/deserialize hooks on arrays. + #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, PartialEq)] + #[serde(bound(serialize = "", deserialize = ""))] + struct Wrapper { + #[serde(serialize_with = "serialize", deserialize_with = "deserialize")] + arr: [u32; N], + } + + #[test] + fn test_array_serde_roundtrip() { + let original = Wrapper::<3> { arr: [10, 20, 30] }; + + let json = serde_json::to_string(&original).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json, r#"{"arr":[10,20,30]}"#); + + let deserialized: Wrapper<3> = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(deserialized, original); + + let parsed: Wrapper<3> = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"arr":[10,20,30]}"#).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(parsed.arr, [10, 20, 30]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_deserialize_wrong_length() { + let json = r#"{"arr":[1,2]}"#; + + let result: Result, _> = serde_json::from_str(json); + assert!(result.is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_empty_array() { + let data = Wrapper::<0> { arr: [] }; + + let json = serde_json::to_string(&data).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(json, r#"{"arr":[]}"#); + + let parsed: Wrapper<0> = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(parsed, data); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59d22023 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1365 @@ +//! Various simple utilities. + +#![no_std] + +extern crate alloc; + +use alloc::slice; +use alloc::string::String; +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::any::type_name; +use core::hint::unreachable_unchecked; +use core::mem::{ManuallyDrop, MaybeUninit}; +use core::{iter, mem}; + +use crate::transpose::transpose_in_place_square; + +pub mod array_serialization; +pub mod linear_map; +pub mod transpose; +pub mod zip_eq; + +/// Computes `ceil(log_2(n))`. +#[must_use] +pub const fn log2_ceil_usize(n: usize) -> usize { + (usize::BITS - n.saturating_sub(1).leading_zeros()) as usize +} + +/// Computes `floor(log_2(n))`. +/// +/// Returns `0` for `n == 0` (matching `log2_ceil_usize(0) == 0`); `floor(log2(0))` +/// is undefined mathematically and the saturating behaviour is the convention used +/// elsewhere in the workspace. +#[must_use] +pub const fn log2_floor_usize(n: usize) -> usize { + if n == 0 { + return 0; + } + (usize::BITS - 1 - n.leading_zeros()) as usize +} + +#[must_use] +pub const fn log2_ceil_u64(n: u64) -> u64 { + (u64::BITS - n.saturating_sub(1).leading_zeros()) as u64 +} + +/// Returns `2^log_degree` if it can be represented by `usize`. +#[must_use] +pub const fn checked_pow2(log_degree: usize) -> Option { + if log_degree < usize::BITS as usize { + Some(1usize << log_degree) + } else { + None + } +} + +/// Adds two log-sizes and computes the resulting power of two. +/// +/// Returns: +/// - `(a + b, 2^(a + b))` when the sum fits in a `usize` shift, +/// - `None` if the addition overflows or the resulting power exceeds the representable range. +#[must_use] +pub const fn checked_log_size_sum(a: usize, b: usize) -> Option<(usize, usize)> { + match a.checked_add(b) { + Some(sum) => match checked_pow2(sum) { + Some(size) => Some((sum, size)), + None => None, + }, + None => None, + } +} + +/// Computes `log_2(n)` +/// +/// # Panics +/// Panics if `n` is not a power of two. +#[must_use] +#[inline] +pub const fn log2_strict_usize(n: usize) -> usize { + let res = n.trailing_zeros(); + assert!(n.wrapping_shr(res) == 1, "Not a power of two"); + // Tell the optimizer about the semantics of `log2_strict`. i.e. it can replace `n` with + // `1 << res` and vice versa. + unsafe { + assume(n == 1 << res); + } + res as usize +} + +/// Precomputed table of all powers of 3 that fit in a `u64`. +/// +/// The maximum power is `3^40 = 12_157_665_459_056_928_801`. +/// +/// We use `u64` instead of `usize` so the table compiles safely on 32-bit targets, +/// where `3^40` would overflow a 32-bit `usize`. +const POWERS_OF_3: [u64; 41] = { + // Start with 3^0 = 1. + let mut table = [0u64; 41]; + table[0] = 1; + + // Fill iteratively: each entry is 3 times the previous one. + let mut i = 1; + while i < 41 { + table[i] = table[i - 1] * 3; + i += 1; + } + table +}; + +/// Maps a bit-position (i.e. `floor(log2(n))`) to the corresponding base-3 exponent. +/// +/// Because `3^k` grows faster than `2^k`, every power of 3 has a unique highest set +/// bit position. This lets us use `leading_zeros()` to jump straight to the answer +/// in O(1) without any loop or binary search. +/// +/// Entries that don't correspond to any power of 3 are unused (left as 0). +const LOG2_TO_EXP: [u8; 64] = { + // Initialize every slot to 0. + let mut table = [0u8; 64]; + + // For each power of 3, record which log2 bucket it falls into. + let mut i = 0; + while i < 41 { + // Compute floor(log2(3^i)) via the highest set bit. + let log2 = (u64::BITS - 1 - POWERS_OF_3[i].leading_zeros()) as usize; + + // Store the exponent i at the corresponding bit-position. + table[log2] = i as u8; + i += 1; + } + table +}; + +/// Computes the strict base-3 logarithm of `n`. +/// +/// Returns `k` such that `3^k == n`. Panics if `n` is not a power of 3. +/// +/// This is the base-3 analogue of [`log2_strict_usize`]. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// * `n` - A positive integer that must be a power of 3 (i.e., 1, 3, 9, 27, 81, ...). +/// +/// # Returns +/// +/// The exponent `k` where `3^k == n`. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// Panics if: +/// - `n` is zero +/// - `n` is not a power of 3 +#[must_use] +#[inline] +pub const fn log3_strict_usize(n: usize) -> usize { + // Zero has no logarithm - check explicitly for a clear error message. + assert!(n != 0, "log3_strict_usize: input must be non-zero"); + + // Instantly find the candidate exponent via the highest set bit. + // + // Because every power of 3 occupies a unique log2 bucket, this single + // lookup gives us the answer in O(1) with zero branches. + let log2 = (usize::BITS - 1 - n.leading_zeros()) as usize; + let res = LOG2_TO_EXP[log2] as usize; + + // Verify the result: catches non-powers of 3 in a single O(1) check. + assert!( + POWERS_OF_3[res] as usize == n, + "log3_strict_usize: input is not a power of 3" + ); + + res +} + +/// Returns `[0, ..., N - 1]`. +#[must_use] +pub const fn indices_arr() -> [usize; N] { + let mut indices_arr = [0; N]; + let mut i = 0; + while i < N { + indices_arr[i] = i; + i += 1; + } + indices_arr +} + +/// Statically asserts that `T` implements [`Clone`]. +pub const fn assert_clone() {} + +/// Statically asserts that `T` implements [`Send`]. +pub const fn assert_send() {} + +/// Statically asserts that `T` implements [`Sync`]. +pub const fn assert_sync() {} + +#[inline] +pub const fn reverse_bits(x: usize, n: usize) -> usize { + // Assert that n is a power of 2 + debug_assert!(n.is_power_of_two()); + reverse_bits_len(x, n.trailing_zeros() as usize) +} + +#[inline] +pub const fn reverse_bits_len(x: usize, bit_len: usize) -> usize { + // A `bit_len` wider than the word would underflow the shift below. + // That yields a wrong, non-panicking permutation in release, so reject it up front. + debug_assert!(bit_len <= usize::BITS as usize); + // NB: The only reason we need overflowing_shr() here as opposed + // to plain '>>' is to accommodate the case n == num_bits == 0, + // which would become `0 >> 64`. Rust thinks that any shift of 64 + // bits causes overflow, even when the argument is zero. + x.reverse_bits() + .overflowing_shr(usize::BITS - bit_len as u32) + .0 +} + +// Lookup table of 6-bit reverses. +// NB: 2^6=64 bytes is a cache line. A smaller table wastes cache space. +#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))] +#[rustfmt::skip] +const BIT_REVERSE_6BIT: &[u8] = &[ + 0o00, 0o40, 0o20, 0o60, 0o10, 0o50, 0o30, 0o70, + 0o04, 0o44, 0o24, 0o64, 0o14, 0o54, 0o34, 0o74, + 0o02, 0o42, 0o22, 0o62, 0o12, 0o52, 0o32, 0o72, + 0o06, 0o46, 0o26, 0o66, 0o16, 0o56, 0o36, 0o76, + 0o01, 0o41, 0o21, 0o61, 0o11, 0o51, 0o31, 0o71, + 0o05, 0o45, 0o25, 0o65, 0o15, 0o55, 0o35, 0o75, + 0o03, 0o43, 0o23, 0o63, 0o13, 0o53, 0o33, 0o73, + 0o07, 0o47, 0o27, 0o67, 0o17, 0o57, 0o37, 0o77, +]; + +const BIG_T_SIZE: usize = 1 << 14; +const SMALL_ARR_SIZE: usize = 1 << 16; +const _: () = assert!(SMALL_ARR_SIZE >= 4 * BIG_T_SIZE); + +/// Permutes `arr` such that each index is mapped to its reverse in binary. +/// +/// If the whole array fits in fast cache, then the trivial algorithm is cache friendly. Also, if +/// `T` is really big, then the trivial algorithm is cache-friendly, no matter the size of the array. +pub fn reverse_slice_index_bits(vals: &mut [F]) +where + F: Copy + Send + Sync, +{ + let n = vals.len(); + if n == 0 { + return; + } + let log_n = log2_strict_usize(n); + + // If the whole array fits in fast cache, then the trivial algorithm is cache friendly. Also, if + // `T` is really big, then the trivial algorithm is cache-friendly, no matter the size of the array. + if core::mem::size_of::() << log_n <= SMALL_ARR_SIZE + || core::mem::size_of::() >= BIG_T_SIZE + { + reverse_slice_index_bits_small(vals, log_n); + } else { + debug_assert!(n >= 4); // By our choice of `BIG_T_SIZE` and `SMALL_ARR_SIZE`. + + // Algorithm: + // + // Treat `arr` as a `sqrt(n)` by `sqrt(n)` row-major matrix. (Assume for now that `lb_n` is + // even, i.e., `n` is a square number.) To perform bit-order reversal we: + // 1. Bit-reverse the order of the rows. (They are contiguous in memory, so this is + // basically a series of large `memcpy`s.) + // 2. Transpose the matrix. + // 3. Bit-reverse the order of the rows. + // + // This is equivalent to, for every index `0 <= i < n`: + // 1. bit-reversing `i[lb_n / 2..lb_n]`, + // 2. swapping `i[0..lb_n / 2]` and `i[lb_n / 2..lb_n]`, + // 3. bit-reversing `i[lb_n / 2..lb_n]`. + // + // If `lb_n` is odd, i.e., `n` is not a square number, then the above procedure requires + // slight modification. At steps 1 and 3 we bit-reverse bits `ceil(lb_n / 2)..lb_n`, of the + // index (shuffling `floor(lb_n / 2)` chunks of length `ceil(lb_n / 2)`). At step 2, we + // perform _two_ transposes. We treat `arr` as two matrices, one where the middle bit of the + // index is `0` and another, where the middle bit is `1`; we transpose each individually. + + let lb_num_chunks = log_n >> 1; + let lb_chunk_size = log_n - lb_num_chunks; + unsafe { + reverse_slice_index_bits_chunks(vals, lb_num_chunks, lb_chunk_size); + transpose_in_place_square(vals, lb_chunk_size, lb_num_chunks, 0); + if lb_num_chunks != lb_chunk_size { + // `arr` cannot be interpreted as a square matrix. We instead interpret it as a + // `1 << lb_num_chunks` by `2` by `1 << lb_num_chunks` tensor, in row-major order. + // The above transpose acted on `tensor[..., 0, ...]` (all indices with middle bit + // `0`). We still need to transpose `tensor[..., 1, ...]`. To do so, we advance + // arr by `1 << lb_num_chunks` effectively, adding that to every index. + let vals_with_offset = &mut vals[1 << lb_num_chunks..]; + transpose_in_place_square(vals_with_offset, lb_chunk_size, lb_num_chunks, 0); + } + reverse_slice_index_bits_chunks(vals, lb_num_chunks, lb_chunk_size); + } + } +} + +// Both functions below are semantically equivalent to: +// for i in 0..n { +// result.push(arr[reverse_bits(i, n_power)]); +// } +// where reverse_bits(i, n_power) computes the n_power-bit reverse. The complications are there +// to guide the compiler to generate optimal assembly. + +#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))] +fn reverse_slice_index_bits_small(vals: &mut [F], lb_n: usize) { + if lb_n <= 6 { + // BIT_REVERSE_6BIT holds 6-bit reverses. This shift makes them lb_n-bit reverses. + let dst_shr_amt = 6 - lb_n as u32; + for (src, &br) in BIT_REVERSE_6BIT.iter().enumerate().take(vals.len()) { + let dst = (br as usize).wrapping_shr(dst_shr_amt); + if src < dst { + vals.swap(src, dst); + } + } + } else { + // LLVM does not know that it does not need to reverse src at each iteration (which is + // expensive on x86). We take advantage of the fact that the low bits of dst change rarely and the high + // bits of dst are dependent only on the low bits of src. + let dst_lo_shr_amt = usize::BITS - (lb_n - 6) as u32; + let dst_hi_shl_amt = lb_n - 6; + for src_chunk in 0..(vals.len() >> 6) { + let src_hi = src_chunk << 6; + let dst_lo = src_chunk.reverse_bits().wrapping_shr(dst_lo_shr_amt); + for (src_lo, &br) in BIT_REVERSE_6BIT.iter().enumerate() { + let dst_hi = (br as usize) << dst_hi_shl_amt; + let src = src_hi + src_lo; + let dst = dst_hi + dst_lo; + if src < dst { + vals.swap(src, dst); + } + } + } + } +} + +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +const fn reverse_slice_index_bits_small(vals: &mut [F], lb_n: usize) { + // Aarch64 can reverse bits in one instruction, so the trivial version works best. + // use manual `while` loop to enable `const` + let mut src = 0; + while src < vals.len() { + let dst = src.reverse_bits().wrapping_shr(usize::BITS - lb_n as u32); + if src < dst { + vals.swap(src, dst); + } + + src += 1; + } +} + +/// Split `arr` chunks and bit-reverse the order of the chunks. There are `1 << lb_num_chunks` +/// chunks, each of length `1 << lb_chunk_size`. +/// SAFETY: ensure that `arr.len() == 1 << lb_num_chunks + lb_chunk_size`. +unsafe fn reverse_slice_index_bits_chunks( + vals: &mut [F], + lb_num_chunks: usize, + lb_chunk_size: usize, +) { + for i in 0..1usize << lb_num_chunks { + // `wrapping_shr` handles the silly case when `lb_num_chunks == 0`. + let j = i + .reverse_bits() + .wrapping_shr(usize::BITS - lb_num_chunks as u32); + if i < j { + unsafe { + core::ptr::swap_nonoverlapping( + vals.get_unchecked_mut(i << lb_chunk_size), + vals.get_unchecked_mut(j << lb_chunk_size), + 1 << lb_chunk_size, + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Allow the compiler to assume that the given predicate `p` is always `true`. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Callers must ensure that `p` is true. If this is not the case, the behavior is undefined. +#[inline(always)] +pub const unsafe fn assume(p: bool) { + debug_assert!(p); + if !p { + unsafe { + unreachable_unchecked(); + } + } +} + +/// Try to force Rust to emit a branch. Example: +/// +/// ```no_run +/// let x = 100; +/// if x > 20 { +/// println!("x is big!"); +/// p3_util::branch_hint(); +/// } else { +/// println!("x is small!"); +/// } +/// ``` +/// +/// This function has no semantics. It is a hint only. +#[inline(always)] +pub fn branch_hint() { + // NOTE: These are the currently supported assembly architectures. See the + // [nightly reference](https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/reference/inline-assembly.html) for + // the most up-to-date list. + #[cfg(any( + target_arch = "aarch64", + target_arch = "arm", + target_arch = "riscv32", + target_arch = "riscv64", + target_arch = "x86", + target_arch = "x86_64", + ))] + unsafe { + core::arch::asm!("", options(nomem, nostack, preserves_flags)); + } +} + +/// Return a String containing the name of T but with all the crate +/// and module prefixes removed. +pub fn pretty_name() -> String { + let name = type_name::(); + let mut result = String::new(); + for qual in name.split_inclusive(&['<', '>', ',']) { + result.push_str(qual.split("::").last().unwrap()); + } + result +} + +/// A C-style buffered input reader, similar to +/// `core::iter::Iterator::next_chunk()` from nightly. +/// +/// Returns an array of `MaybeUninit` and the number of items in the +/// array which have been correctly initialized. +#[inline] +fn iter_next_chunk_erased( + iter: &mut I, +) -> ([MaybeUninit; BUFLEN], usize) +where + I::Item: Copy, +{ + let mut buf = [const { MaybeUninit::::uninit() }; BUFLEN]; + let mut i = 0; + + while i < BUFLEN { + if let Some(c) = iter.next() { + // Copy the next Item into `buf`. + unsafe { + buf.get_unchecked_mut(i).write(c); + i = i.unchecked_add(1); + } + } else { + // No more items in the iterator. + break; + } + } + (buf, i) +} + +/// Split an iterator into small arrays and apply `func` to each. +/// +/// Repeatedly read `BUFLEN` elements from `input` into an array and +/// pass the array to `func` as a slice. If less than `BUFLEN` +/// elements are remaining, that smaller slice is passed to `func` (if +/// it is non-empty) and the function returns. +#[inline] +pub fn apply_to_chunks(input: I, mut func: H) +where + I: IntoIterator, + H: FnMut(&[u8]), +{ + let mut iter = input.into_iter(); + loop { + let (buf, n) = iter_next_chunk_erased::(&mut iter); + if n == 0 { + break; + } + // riverrun SBF-compat patch (see PATCH.md in this vendor dir): the + // original used `[MaybeUninit]::assume_init_ref`, unstable on + // Solana's pinned SBF rustc (1.89.0). Same safety invariant + // (the first `n` elements of `buf` are initialized, guaranteed by + // `iter_next_chunk_erased` above), expressed with only stable APIs. + let init: &[u8] = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(buf.as_ptr().cast::(), n) }; + func(init); + } +} + +/// Pulls `N` items from `iter` and returns them as an array. If the iterator +/// yields fewer than `N` items (but more than `0`), pads by the given default value. +/// +/// Since the iterator is passed as a mutable reference and this function calls +/// `next` at most `N` times, the iterator can still be used afterwards to +/// retrieve the remaining items. +/// +/// If `iter.next()` panics, all items already yielded by the iterator are +/// dropped. +#[inline] +fn iter_next_chunk_padded( + iter: &mut impl Iterator, + default: T, // Needed due to [T; M] not always implementing Default. Can probably be dropped if const generics stabilize. +) -> Option<[T; N]> { + let (mut arr, n) = iter_next_chunk_erased::(iter); + (n != 0).then(|| { + // Fill the rest of the array with default values. + arr[n..].fill(MaybeUninit::new(default)); + unsafe { mem::transmute_copy::<_, [T; N]>(&arr) } + }) +} + +/// Returns an iterator over `N` elements of the iterator at a time. +/// +/// The chunks do not overlap. If `N` does not divide the length of the +/// iterator, then the last chunk is padded with up to `N-1` copies of the given default value. +/// +/// This is essentially a copy pasted version of the nightly `array_chunks` function. +/// +/// Once that is stabilized this and the functions above it should be removed. +#[inline] +pub fn iter_array_chunks_padded( + iter: impl IntoIterator, + default: T, // Needed due to [T; M] not always implementing Default. Can probably be dropped if const generics stabilize. +) -> impl Iterator { + let mut iter = iter.into_iter(); + iter::from_fn(move || iter_next_chunk_padded(&mut iter, default)) +} + +/// Reinterpret a slice of `BaseArray` elements as a slice of `Base` elements +/// +/// This is useful to convert `&[F; N]` to `&[F]` or `&[A]` to `&[F]` where +/// `A` has the same size, alignment and memory layout as `[F; N]` for some `N`. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// This is assumes that `BaseArray` has the same alignment and memory layout as `[Base; N]`. +/// As Rust guarantees that arrays elements are contiguous in memory and the alignment of +/// the array is the same as the alignment of its elements, this means that `BaseArray` +/// must have the same alignment as `Base`. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// This panics if the size of `BaseArray` is not a multiple of the size of `Base`. +#[inline] +pub const unsafe fn as_base_slice(buf: &[BaseArray]) -> &[Base] { + const { + assert!(align_of::() == align_of::()); + assert!(size_of::().is_multiple_of(size_of::())); + } + + let d = size_of::() / size_of::(); + + let buf_ptr = buf.as_ptr().cast::(); + let n = buf.len() * d; + unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(buf_ptr, n) } +} + +/// Reinterpret a mutable slice of `BaseArray` elements as a slice of `Base` elements +/// +/// This is useful to convert `&[F; N]` to `&[F]` or `&[A]` to `&[F]` where +/// `A` has the same size, alignment and memory layout as `[F; N]` for some `N`. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// This is assumes that `BaseArray` has the same alignment and memory layout as `[Base; N]`. +/// As Rust guarantees that arrays elements are contiguous in memory and the alignment of +/// the array is the same as the alignment of its elements, this means that `BaseArray` +/// must have the same alignment as `Base`. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// This panics if the size of `BaseArray` is not a multiple of the size of `Base`. +#[inline] +pub const unsafe fn as_base_slice_mut(buf: &mut [BaseArray]) -> &mut [Base] { + const { + assert!(align_of::() == align_of::()); + assert!(size_of::().is_multiple_of(size_of::())); + } + + let d = size_of::() / size_of::(); + + let buf_ptr = buf.as_mut_ptr().cast::(); + let n = buf.len() * d; + unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts_mut(buf_ptr, n) } +} + +/// Convert a vector of `BaseArray` elements to a vector of `Base` elements without any +/// reallocations. +/// +/// This is useful to convert `Vec<[F; N]>` to `Vec` or `Vec` to `Vec` where +/// `A` has the same size, alignment and memory layout as `[F; N]` for some `N`. It can also, +/// be used to safely convert `Vec` to `Vec` if `F` is a `32` bit field +/// or `Vec` to `Vec` if `F` is a `64` bit field. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// This is assumes that `BaseArray` has the same alignment and memory layout as `[Base; N]`. +/// As Rust guarantees that arrays elements are contiguous in memory and the alignment of +/// the array is the same as the alignment of its elements, this means that `BaseArray` +/// must have the same alignment as `Base`. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// This panics if the size of `BaseArray` is not a multiple of the size of `Base`. +#[inline] +pub unsafe fn flatten_to_base(vec: Vec) -> Vec { + const { + assert!(align_of::() == align_of::()); + assert!(size_of::().is_multiple_of(size_of::())); + } + + let d = size_of::() / size_of::(); + // Prevent running `vec`'s destructor so we are in complete control + // of the allocation. + let mut values = ManuallyDrop::new(vec); + + // Each `Self` is an array of `d` elements, so the length and capacity of + // the new vector will be multiplied by `d`. + let new_len = values.len() * d; + let new_cap = values.capacity() * d; + + // Safe as BaseArray and Base have the same alignment. + let ptr = values.as_mut_ptr() as *mut Base; + + unsafe { + // Safety: + // - BaseArray and Base have the same alignment. + // - As size_of::() == size_of::() * d: + // -- The capacity of the new vector is equal to the capacity of the old vector. + // -- The first new_len elements of the new vector correspond to the first + // len elements of the old vector and so are properly initialized. + Vec::from_raw_parts(ptr, new_len, new_cap) + } +} + +/// Convert a vector of `Base` elements to a vector of `BaseArray` elements ideally without any +/// reallocations. +/// +/// This is an inverse of `flatten_to_base`. Unfortunately, unlike `flatten_to_base`, it may not be +/// possible to avoid allocations. This issue is that there is not way to guarantee that the capacity +/// of the vector is a multiple of `d`. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// This is assumes that `BaseArray` has the same alignment and memory layout as `[Base; N]`. +/// As Rust guarantees that arrays elements are contiguous in memory and the alignment of +/// the array is the same as the alignment of its elements, this means that `BaseArray` +/// must have the same alignment as `Base`. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// This panics if the size of `BaseArray` is not a multiple of the size of `Base`. +/// This panics if the length of the vector is not a multiple of the ratio of the sizes. +#[inline] +pub unsafe fn reconstitute_from_base(mut vec: Vec) -> Vec { + const { + assert!(align_of::() == align_of::()); + assert!(size_of::().is_multiple_of(size_of::())); + } + + let d = size_of::() / size_of::(); + + assert!( + vec.len().is_multiple_of(d), + "Vector length (got {}) must be a multiple of the extension field dimension ({}).", + vec.len(), + d + ); + + let new_len = vec.len() / d; + + // We could call vec.shrink_to_fit() here to try and increase the probability that + // the capacity is a multiple of d. That might cause a reallocation though which + // would defeat the whole purpose. + let cap = vec.capacity(); + + // The assumption is that basically all callers of `reconstitute_from_base_vec` will be calling it + // with a vector constructed from `flatten_to_base` and so the capacity should be a multiple of `d`. + // But capacities can do strange things so we need to support both possibilities. + // Note that the `else` branch would also work if the capacity is a multiple of `d` but it is slower. + if cap.is_multiple_of(d) { + // Prevent running `vec`'s destructor so we are in complete control + // of the allocation. + let mut values = ManuallyDrop::new(vec); + + // If we are on this branch then the capacity is a multiple of `d`. + let new_cap = cap / d; + + // Safe as BaseArray and Base have the same alignment. + let ptr = values.as_mut_ptr() as *mut BaseArray; + + unsafe { + // Safety: + // - BaseArray and Base have the same alignment. + // - As size_of::() == size_of::() / d: + // -- If we have reached this point, the length and capacity are both divisible by `d`. + // -- The capacity of the new vector is equal to the capacity of the old vector. + // -- The first new_len elements of the new vector correspond to the first + // len elements of the old vector and so are properly initialized. + Vec::from_raw_parts(ptr, new_len, new_cap) + } + } else { + // If the capacity is not a multiple of `D`, we go via slices. + + let buf_ptr = vec.as_mut_ptr().cast::(); + let slice = unsafe { + // Safety: + // - BaseArray and Base have the same alignment. + // - As size_of::() == size_of::() / D: + // -- If we have reached this point, the length is divisible by `D`. + // -- The first new_len elements of the slice correspond to the first + // len elements of the old slice and so are properly initialized. + slice::from_raw_parts(buf_ptr, new_len) + }; + + // Ideally the compiler could optimize this away to avoid the copy but it appears not to. + slice.to_vec() + } +} + +#[inline(always)] +pub const fn relatively_prime_u64(mut u: u64, mut v: u64) -> bool { + // Check that neither input is 0. + if u == 0 || v == 0 { + return false; + } + + // Check divisibility by 2. + if (u | v) & 1 == 0 { + return false; + } + + // Remove factors of 2 from `u` and `v` + u >>= u.trailing_zeros(); + if u == 1 { + return true; + } + + while v != 0 { + v >>= v.trailing_zeros(); + if v == 1 { + return true; + } + + // Ensure u <= v + if u > v { + core::mem::swap(&mut u, &mut v); + } + + // This looks inefficient for v >> u but thanks to the fact that we remove + // trailing_zeros of v in every iteration, it ends up much more performative + // than first glance implies. + v -= u; + } + // If we made it through the loop, at no point is u or v equal to 1 and so the gcd + // must be greater than 1. + false +} + +/// Inner loop of the deferred GCD algorithm. +/// +/// See: for more information. +/// +/// This is basically a mini GCD algorithm which builds up a transformation to apply to the larger +/// numbers in the main loop. The key point is that this small loop only uses u64s, subtractions and +/// bit shifts, which are very fast operations. +/// +/// The bottom `NUM_ROUNDS` bits of `a` and `b` should match the bottom `NUM_ROUNDS` bits of +/// the corresponding big-ints and the top `NUM_ROUNDS + 2` should match the top bits including +/// zeroes if the original numbers have different sizes. +#[inline] +pub const fn gcd_inner(a: &mut u64, b: &mut u64) -> (i64, i64, i64, i64) { + // Initialise update factors. + // At the start of round 0: -1 < f0, g0, f1, g1 <= 1 + let (mut f0, mut g0, mut f1, mut g1) = (1, 0, 0, 1); + + // If at the start of a round: -2^i < f0, g0, f1, g1 <= 2^i + // Then, at the end of the round: -2^{i + 1} < f0, g0, f1, g1 <= 2^{i + 1} + // use manual `while` loop to enable `const` + let mut round = 0; + while round < NUM_ROUNDS { + if *a & 1 == 0 { + *a >>= 1; + } else { + if *a < *b { + core::mem::swap(a, b); + (f0, f1) = (f1, f0); + (g0, g1) = (g1, g0); + } + *a -= *b; + *a >>= 1; + f0 -= f1; + g0 -= g1; + } + f1 <<= 1; + g1 <<= 1; + + round += 1; + } + + // -2^NUM_ROUNDS < f0, g0, f1, g1 <= 2^NUM_ROUNDS + // Hence provided NUM_ROUNDS <= 62, we will not get any overflow. + // Additionally, if NUM_ROUNDS <= 63, then the only source of overflow will be + // if a variable is meant to equal 2^{63} in which case it will overflow to -2^{63}. + (f0, g0, f1, g1) +} + +/// Inverts elements inside the prime field `F_P` with `P < 2^FIELD_BITS`. +/// +/// Arguments: +/// - a: The value we want to invert. It must be < P. +/// - b: The value of the prime `P > 2`. +/// +/// Output: +/// - A `64-bit` signed integer `v` equal to `2^{2 * FIELD_BITS - 2} a^{-1} mod P` with +/// size `|v| < 2^{2 * FIELD_BITS - 2}`. +/// +/// It is up to the user to ensure that `b` is an odd prime with at most `FIELD_BITS` bits and +/// `a < b`. If either of these assumptions break, the output is undefined. +#[inline] +pub const fn gcd_inversion_prime_field_32(mut a: u32, mut b: u32) -> i64 { + const { + assert!(FIELD_BITS <= 32); + } + debug_assert!(((1_u64 << FIELD_BITS) - 1) >= b as u64); + + // Initialise u, v. Note that |u|, |v| <= 2^0 + let (mut u, mut v) = (1_i64, 0_i64); + + // Let a0 and P denote the initial values of a and b. Observe: + // `a = u * a0 mod P` + // `b = v * a0 mod P` + // `len(a) + len(b) <= 2 * len(P) <= 2 * FIELD_BITS` + + // use manual `while` loop to enable `const` + let mut i = 0; + while i < 2 * FIELD_BITS - 2 { + // Assume at the start of the loop i: + // (1) `|u|, |v| <= 2^{i}` + // (2) `2^i * a = u * a0 mod P` + // (3) `2^i * b = v * a0 mod P` + // (4) `gcd(a, b) = 1` + // (5) `b` is odd. + // (6) `len(a) + len(b) <= max(n - i, 1)` + + if a & 1 != 0 { + if a < b { + (a, b) = (b, a); + (u, v) = (v, u); + } + // As b < a, this subtraction cannot increase `len(a) + len(b)` + a -= b; + // Observe |u'| = |u - v| <= |u| + |v| <= 2^{i + 1} + u -= v; + + // As (1) and (2) hold, we have + // `2^i a' = 2^i * (a - b) = (u - v) * a0 mod P = u' * a0 mod P` + } + // As b is odd, a must now be even. + // This reduces `len(a) + len(b)` by 1 (unless `a = 0` in which case `b = 1` and the sum of the lengths is always 1) + a >>= 1; + + // Observe |v'| = 2|v| <= 2^{i + 1} + v <<= 1; + + // Thus as the end of loop i: + // (1) `|u|, |v| <= 2^{i + 1}` + // (2) `2^{i + 1} * a = u * a0 mod P` (As we have halved a) + // (3) `2^{i + 1} * b = v * a0 mod P` (As we have doubled v) + // (4) `gcd(a, b) = 1` + // (5) `b` is odd. + // (6) `len(a) + len(b) <= max(n - i - 1, 1)` + + i += 1; + } + + // After the loops, we see that: + // |u|, |v| <= 2^{2 * FIELD_BITS - 2}: Hence for FIELD_BITS <= 32 we will not overflow an i64. + // `2^{2 * FIELD_BITS - 2} * b = v * a0 mod P` + // `len(a) + len(b) <= 2` with `gcd(a, b) = 1` and `b` odd. + // This implies that `b` must be `1` and so `v = 2^{2 * FIELD_BITS - 2} a0^{-1} mod P` as desired. + v +} + +/// A raw mutable pointer wrapper that implements [`Send`] and [`Sync`]. +/// +/// Used to enable parallel writes to disjoint slices of a pre-allocated buffer +/// from within closures that require `Send + Sync` (e.g. `rayon::ParallelIterator::for_each_init`). +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// The caller must ensure that concurrent accesses through this pointer always +/// target **non-overlapping** memory regions. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub struct DisjointMutPtr(*mut T); + +// SAFETY: The contract of DisjointMutPtr guarantees that each thread writes to +// a disjoint region, so sharing the pointer across threads is safe. +unsafe impl Send for DisjointMutPtr {} +unsafe impl Sync for DisjointMutPtr {} + +impl DisjointMutPtr { + /// Create a new `DisjointMutPtr` from a mutable slice. + #[inline] + pub const fn new(slice: &mut [T]) -> Self { + Self(slice.as_mut_ptr()) + } + + /// Get a mutable slice starting at `offset` with `len` elements. + /// + /// # Safety + /// + /// The caller must ensure the range `[offset, offset+len)` is within bounds + /// and does not overlap with any other concurrent access. + #[inline] + pub const unsafe fn slice_mut(self, offset: usize, len: usize) -> &'static mut [T] { + unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(self.0.add(offset), len) } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use proptest::prelude::*; + use rand::rngs::SmallRng; + use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng}; + + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn test_reverse_bits_len() { + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(0b0000000000, 10), 0b0000000000); + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(0b0000000001, 10), 0b1000000000); + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(0b1000000000, 10), 0b0000000001); + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(0b00000, 5), 0b00000); + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(0b01011, 5), 0b11010); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reverse_bits_len_full_width() { + // A full-width reversal is the largest valid bit length and must reverse every bit. + let bits = usize::BITS as usize; + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(1, bits), 1 << (bits - 1)); + assert_eq!(reverse_bits_len(1 << (bits - 1), bits), 1); + } + + #[test] + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[should_panic(expected = "bit_len <= usize::BITS")] + fn test_reverse_bits_len_rejects_oversized_bit_len() { + // One bit past the word width: the shift would underflow into a wrong permutation. + // The expected message pins the guard, not the incidental subtraction-overflow panic. + let _ = reverse_bits_len(0, usize::BITS as usize + 1); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reverse_index_bits() { + let mut arg = vec![10, 20, 30, 40]; + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut arg); + assert_eq!(arg, vec![10, 30, 20, 40]); + + let mut input256: Vec = (0..256).collect(); + #[rustfmt::skip] + let output256: Vec = vec![ + 0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0, 0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0, + 0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8, 0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8, + 0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4, 0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4, + 0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec, 0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc, + 0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2, 0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2, + 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa, + 0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6, 0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6, + 0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe, + 0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1, 0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1, + 0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9, 0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9, + 0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5, 0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5, + 0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed, 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd, + 0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3, 0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3, + 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb, + 0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7, 0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7, + 0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef, 0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff, + ]; + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut input256[..]); + assert_eq!(input256, output256); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_exact_fit() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 4; + let input: Vec = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]; + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert_eq!(results, vec![vec![1, 2, 3, 4], vec![5, 6, 7, 8]]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_with_remainder() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 3; + let input: Vec = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]; + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert_eq!(results, vec![vec![1, 2, 3], vec![4, 5, 6], vec![7]]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_empty_input() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 4; + let input: Vec = vec![]; + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert!(results.is_empty()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_single_chunk() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 10; + let input: Vec = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5]; + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert_eq!(results, vec![vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5]]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_large_chunk_size() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 100; + let input: Vec = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]; + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert_eq!(results, vec![vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_apply_to_chunks_large_input() { + const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 5; + let input: Vec = (1..=20).collect(); + let mut results: Vec> = Vec::new(); + + apply_to_chunks::(input, |chunk| { + results.push(chunk.to_vec()); + }); + + assert_eq!( + results, + vec![ + vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5], + vec![6, 7, 8, 9, 10], + vec![11, 12, 13, 14, 15], + vec![16, 17, 18, 19, 20] + ] + ); + } + + #[test] + fn test_reverse_slice_index_bits_random() { + let lengths = [32, 128, 1 << 16]; + let mut rng = SmallRng::seed_from_u64(1); + for _ in 0..32 { + for &length in &lengths { + let mut rand_list: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(length); + rand_list.resize_with(length, || rng.random()); + let expect = reverse_index_bits_naive(&rand_list); + + let mut actual = rand_list.clone(); + reverse_slice_index_bits(&mut actual); + + assert_eq!(actual, expect); + } + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_log2_strict_usize_edge_cases() { + assert_eq!(log2_strict_usize(1), 0); + assert_eq!(log2_strict_usize(2), 1); + assert_eq!(log2_strict_usize(1 << 18), 18); + assert_eq!(log2_strict_usize(1 << 31), 31); + assert_eq!( + log2_strict_usize(1 << (usize::BITS - 1)), + usize::BITS as usize - 1 + ); + } + + #[test] + fn test_checked_pow2() { + // 2^0 = 1, the smallest valid exponent. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(0), Some(1)); + + // 2^1 = 2. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(1), Some(2)); + + // 2^5 = 32, a typical small power. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(5), Some(32)); + + // 2^10 = 1024, commonly used as a domain size in FRI. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(10), Some(1024)); + + // 2^20 = 1_048_576, a realistic large trace length. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(20), Some(1_048_576)); + + // Largest representable power: 2^(BITS - 1). + // On a 64-bit platform this is 2^63 = 0x8000_0000_0000_0000. + let max_exp = usize::BITS as usize - 1; + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(max_exp), Some(1usize << max_exp)); + + // Exponent equal to the bit width would shift 1 out of range. + // + // 1_usize << 64 (on 64-bit) → overflow + // + // Must return `None`. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(usize::BITS as usize), None); + + // One past the maximum: also out of range. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(usize::BITS as usize + 1), None); + + // Extreme exponent: usize::MAX is astronomically beyond + // representable range — must return `None`. + assert_eq!(checked_pow2(usize::MAX), None); + } + + #[test] + fn test_checked_log_size_sum() { + // Both zero: 0 + 0 = 0, 2^0 = 1. + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(0, 0), Some((0, 1))); + + // Identity cases: adding zero to either side is a no-op. + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(5, 0), Some((5, 32))); + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(0, 10), Some((10, 1024))); + + // Typical FRI scenario: degree_bits=10, log_quotient_chunks=2. + // + // 10 + 2 = 12, 2^12 = 4096 + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(10, 2), Some((12, 4096))); + + // Commutativity: order of operands must not matter. + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(2, 10), Some((12, 4096))); + + // Large realistic case: degree_bits=20, log_chunks=3. + // + // 20 + 3 = 23, 2^23 = 8_388_608 + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(20, 3), Some((23, 8_388_608))); + + // Largest representable sum: (BITS - 2) + 1 = BITS - 1. + let almost_max = usize::BITS as usize - 2; + let max_exp = usize::BITS as usize - 1; + assert_eq!( + checked_log_size_sum(almost_max, 1), + Some((max_exp, 1usize << max_exp)) + ); + + // Sum exactly at the bit width: overflows the shift. + // + // (BITS - 1) + 1 = BITS → 2^BITS is unrepresentable → None + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(max_exp, 1), None); + + // Both operands large but sum still within range. + // + // 32 + 31 = 63 (on 64-bit) → 2^63 is representable + let half = usize::BITS as usize / 2; + let other_half = max_exp - half; + assert_eq!( + checked_log_size_sum(half, other_half), + Some((max_exp, 1usize << max_exp)) + ); + + // Addition itself overflows usize, not just the shift. + // + // usize::MAX + 1 → checked_add returns None → None + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(usize::MAX, 1), None); + + // Both operands at usize::MAX: addition doubly overflows. + assert_eq!(checked_log_size_sum(usize::MAX, usize::MAX), None); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic] + fn test_log2_strict_usize_zero() { + let _ = log2_strict_usize(0); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic] + fn test_log2_strict_usize_nonpower_2() { + let _ = log2_strict_usize(0x78c341c65ae6d262); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic] + fn test_log2_strict_usize_max() { + let _ = log2_strict_usize(usize::MAX); + } + + #[test] + fn test_log3_strict_powers_of_3() { + // Test all powers of 3 up to 3^12 = 531441. + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(1), 0); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(3), 1); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(9), 2); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(27), 3); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(81), 4); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(243), 5); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(729), 6); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(2187), 7); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(6561), 8); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(19683), 9); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(59049), 10); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(177_147), 11); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(531_441), 12); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "input must be non-zero")] + fn test_log3_strict_panics_on_zero() { + let _ = log3_strict_usize(0); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "is not a power of 3")] + fn test_log3_strict_panics_on_non_power_of_3() { + // 2 is not a power of 3. + let _ = log3_strict_usize(2); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "is not a power of 3")] + fn test_log3_strict_panics_on_power_of_2() { + // 8 = 2^3 is not a power of 3. + let _ = log3_strict_usize(8); + } + + #[test] + #[should_panic(expected = "is not a power of 3")] + fn test_log3_strict_panics_on_product_with_other_primes() { + // 6 = 2 * 3 is not a power of 3. + let _ = log3_strict_usize(6); + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn test_log3_strict_roundtrip(k in 0u32..25u32) { + // Roundtrip: 3^k -> log3_strict_usize -> k + let n = 3usize.pow(k); + assert_eq!(log3_strict_usize(n), k as usize); + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_log2_ceil_usize_comprehensive() { + // Powers of 2 + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(0), 0); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(1), 0); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(2), 1); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(1 << 18), 18); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(1 << 31), 31); + assert_eq!( + log2_ceil_usize(1 << (usize::BITS - 1)), + usize::BITS as usize - 1 + ); + + // Nonpowers; want to round up + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(3), 2); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(0x14fe901b), 29); + assert_eq!( + log2_ceil_usize((1 << (usize::BITS - 1)) + 1), + usize::BITS as usize + ); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(usize::MAX - 1), usize::BITS as usize); + assert_eq!(log2_ceil_usize(usize::MAX), usize::BITS as usize); + } + + fn reverse_index_bits_naive(arr: &[T]) -> Vec { + let n = arr.len(); + let n_power = log2_strict_usize(n); + + let mut out = vec![None; n]; + for (i, v) in arr.iter().enumerate() { + let dst = i.reverse_bits() >> (usize::BITS - n_power as u32); + out[dst] = Some(*v); + } + + out.into_iter().map(|x| x.unwrap()).collect() + } + + #[test] + fn test_relatively_prime_u64() { + // Zero cases (should always return false) + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(0, 0)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(10, 0)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(0, 10)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(0, 123456789)); + + // Number with itself (if greater than 1, not relatively prime) + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(1, 1)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(10, 10)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(99999, 99999)); + + // Powers of 2 (always false since they share factor 2) + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(2, 4)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(16, 32)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(64, 128)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(1024, 4096)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(u64::MAX, u64::MAX)); + + // One number is a multiple of the other (always false) + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(5, 10)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(12, 36)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(15, 45)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(100, 500)); + + // Co-prime numbers (should be true) + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(17, 31)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(97, 43)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(7919, 65537)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(15485863, 32452843)); + + // Small prime numbers (should be true) + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(13, 17)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(101, 103)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(1009, 1013)); + + // Large numbers (some cases where they are relatively prime or not) + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64( + 190266297176832000, + 10430732356495263744 + )); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64( + 2040134905096275968, + 5701159354248194048 + )); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64( + 16611311494648745984, + 7514969329383038976 + )); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64( + 14863931409971066880, + 7911906750992527360 + )); + + // Max values + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(u64::MAX, 1)); + assert!(relatively_prime_u64(u64::MAX, u64::MAX - 1)); + assert!(!relatively_prime_u64(u64::MAX, u64::MAX)); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/linear_map.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/linear_map.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dc32a0c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/linear_map.rs @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +use alloc::vec::Vec; +use core::mem; +use core::ops::Index; + +/// A linear key-value map backed by a `Vec`. +/// +/// This map performs **O(n)** lookups and inserts. +/// It is suitable only for **small** sets of keys which +/// must implement `Eq`. +/// +/// Internally stores key-value pairs in insertion order. +/// Duplicate key inserts overwrite the previous value. +/// +/// # Performance +/// Avoid using this for more than a few keys. All core operations are linear. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct LinearMap( + /// The underlying storage for key-value pairs. + Vec<(K, V)>, +); + +impl Default for LinearMap { + fn default() -> Self { + Self(Default::default()) + } +} + +impl LinearMap { + #[inline] + fn index_of(&self, k: &K) -> Option { + self.0.iter().position(|(kk, _)| kk == k) + } + + /// Creates a new empty `LinearMap`. + pub fn new() -> Self { + Default::default() + } + + /// Creates a new empty `LinearMap` with a pre-allocated capacity. + pub fn with_capacity(capacity: usize) -> Self { + Self(Vec::with_capacity(capacity)) + } + + /// Gets a reference to the value associated with the key, if it exists. + /// + /// Returns `Some(&V)` if found, or `None` if not present. + /// + /// This is an **O(n)** operation. + pub fn get(&self, k: &K) -> Option<&V> { + self.index_of(k).map(|idx| &self.0[idx].1) + } + + /// Gets a mutable reference to the value associated with the key, if it exists. + /// + /// Returns `Some(&mut V)` if found, or `None` otherwise. + /// + /// This is an **O(n)** operation. + pub fn get_mut(&mut self, k: &K) -> Option<&mut V> { + self.index_of(k).map(|idx| &mut self.0[idx].1) + } + + /// Inserts a key-value pair into the map. + /// + /// If the key exists, swaps the old value with the new one and returns the old value. + /// Otherwise, appends the new pair and returns `None`. + /// + /// This is an **O(n)** operation due to the linear search. + pub fn insert(&mut self, k: K, mut v: V) -> Option { + if let Some(vv) = self.get_mut(&k) { + mem::swap(&mut v, vv); + Some(v) + } else { + self.0.push((k, v)); + None + } + } + + /// Returns a mutable reference to the value for the given key. + /// + /// If the key exists, returns a mutable reference to the value. + /// Otherwise, inserts a new value created by the provided closure and returns a reference to it. + /// + /// This is an **O(n)** operation due to the key search. + pub fn get_or_insert_with(&mut self, k: K, f: impl FnOnce() -> V) -> &mut V { + if let Some(idx) = self.index_of(&k) { + &mut self.0[idx].1 + } else { + self.0.push((k, f())); + &mut self.0.last_mut().unwrap().1 + } + } + + /// Returns an iterator over the values in the map. + /// + /// Values are yielded in insertion order. + pub fn values(&self) -> impl Iterator { + self.0.iter().map(|(_, v)| v) + } + + /// Returns an iterator over the keys in the map. + /// + /// Keys are yielded in insertion order. + pub fn keys(&self) -> impl Iterator { + self.0.iter().map(|(k, _)| k) + } + + /// Returns an iterator over all key-value pairs in the map. + /// + /// Items are yielded in insertion order. + pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator { + self.0.iter() + } +} + +impl FromIterator<(K, V)> for LinearMap { + /// Builds a `LinearMap` from an iterator of key-value pairs. + /// + /// Later duplicates overwrite earlier entries. + /// + /// This calls `insert` in a loop, so is O(n^2)!! + fn from_iter>(iter: T) -> Self { + let mut me = Self::default(); + for (k, v) in iter { + me.insert(k, v); + } + me + } +} + +impl IntoIterator for LinearMap { + type Item = (K, V); + type IntoIter = as IntoIterator>::IntoIter; + + fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter { + self.0.into_iter() + } +} + +impl Index<&K> for LinearMap { + type Output = V; + + fn index(&self, index: &K) -> &Self::Output { + self.get(index).unwrap() + } +} + +impl<'a, K, V> IntoIterator for &'a LinearMap { + type Item = &'a (K, V); + type IntoIter = <&'a Vec<(K, V)> as IntoIterator>::IntoIter; + + fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter { + self.0.iter() + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn test_index_of() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + assert_eq!(map.index_of(&1), None); + + map.insert(1, "a"); + map.insert(2, "b"); + + assert_eq!(map.index_of(&1), Some(0)); + assert_eq!(map.index_of(&2), Some(1)); + assert_eq!(map.index_of(&3), None); + } + + #[test] + fn test_index_of_after_overwrite() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert(1, "a"); + map.insert(2, "b"); + + // Overwriting an existing key should not change its position. + assert_eq!(map.insert(1, "c"), Some("a")); + assert_eq!(map.index_of(&1), Some(0)); + assert_eq!(map.get(&1), Some(&"c")); + } + + #[test] + fn test_insert_and_get() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + + // Insert key=1, value="a" → should return None (new insert) + assert_eq!(map.insert(1, "a"), None); + + // Get key=1 → should return Some("a") + assert_eq!(map.get(&1), Some(&"a")); + + // Insert same key with new value → should return old value + assert_eq!(map.insert(1, "b"), Some("a")); + + // After update, get should return updated value + assert_eq!(map.get(&1), Some(&"b")); + + // Non-existent key → should return None + assert_eq!(map.get(&2), None); + } + + #[test] + fn test_get_mut() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert(42, 100); + + // Mutably get the value for key=42 + if let Some(val) = map.get_mut(&42) { + *val += 1; + } + + // Value should now be 101 + assert_eq!(map.get(&42), Some(&101)); + + // get_mut on missing key should return None + assert_eq!(map.get_mut(&999), None); + } + + #[test] + fn test_get_or_insert_with() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + + // First call should insert 10 with value computed as 123 + let val = map.get_or_insert_with(10, || 123); + assert_eq!(*val, 123); + + // Second call should not invoke the closure, just return existing + let val2 = map.get_or_insert_with(10, || panic!("should not be called")); + assert_eq!(*val2, 123); + + // Insert another value with a different key + let val3 = map.get_or_insert_with(20, || 777); + assert_eq!(*val3, 777); + } + + #[test] + fn test_values_iterator() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert("a", 1); + map.insert("b", 2); + map.insert("c", 3); + + // Collect all values into a vector + let values: Vec<_> = map.values().copied().collect(); + assert_eq!(values, vec![1, 2, 3]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_keys_iterator() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert("a", 1); + map.insert("b", 2); + map.insert("c", 3); + + // Collect all values into a vector + let values: Vec<_> = map.keys().copied().collect(); + assert_eq!(values, vec!["a", "b", "c"]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_index() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert("a", 1); + map.insert("b", 2); + map.insert("c", 3); + + assert_eq!(map[&"a"], 1); + assert_eq!(map[&"b"], 2); + assert_eq!(map[&"c"], 3); + } + + #[test] + fn test_from_iterator_behavior() { + // Use .collect() from an iterator of key-value pairs + let map: LinearMap<_, _> = vec![(1, "a"), (2, "b"), (1, "c")].into_iter().collect(); + + // Should insert (1, "a"), (2, "b"), then replace (1, "a") with (1, "c") + assert_eq!(map.get(&1), Some(&"c")); + assert_eq!(map.get(&2), Some(&"b")); + } + + #[test] + fn test_into_iterator() { + let mut map = LinearMap::new(); + map.insert("x", 10); + map.insert("z", 30); + map.insert("y", 20); + + // Collect items yielded by `iter()` + let iter_ref = map.iter().copied().collect::>(); + // Consume the LinearMap into an iterator + let iter = map.into_iter().collect::>(); + + // Since it's just a Vec internally, order is preserved + assert_eq!(iter_ref, vec![("x", 10), ("z", 30), ("y", 20)]); + // Ensure both iter and into_iter yield the same elements + assert_eq!(iter, iter_ref); + } + + #[test] + fn test_empty_map_behavior() { + let map: LinearMap = LinearMap::new(); + + // Getting any key from an empty map should return None + assert_eq!(map.get(&0), None); + assert_eq!(map.get(&999), None); + + // values() iterator should be empty + assert_eq!(map.values().count(), 0); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1048371c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +//! Matrix transpose operations. +//! +//! This module provides high-performance transpose implementations + +mod portable; +mod rectangular; +mod square; + +pub use rectangular::transpose; +pub(crate) use square::transpose_in_place_square; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/portable.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/portable.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50212bee --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/portable.rs @@ -0,0 +1,661 @@ +//! Portable cache-oblivious matrix transpose, the fallback when no SIMD kernel applies. +//! +//! Maps `input[y * width + x]` to `output[x * height + y]` for any `Copy` type. + +/// Largest element count handled by the plain scalar copy. +/// +/// A matrix this small fits in L1, so tiling would only add loop-setup overhead. +const SMALL_LEN: usize = 255; + +/// Largest element count handled by single-level tiling before recursing. +/// +/// - Below this, the working set still tiles well against L2/L3. +/// - Past it, recursive subdivision keeps each leaf cache-resident at any size. +const MEDIUM_LEN: usize = 1 << 20; + +/// Side length, in elements, of one transpose tile. +/// +/// - A tile is transposed as a unit, so it stays cache-hot for the whole tile. +/// - For 4-byte elements each output run is one 64-byte cache line. +const TILE: usize = 16; + +/// Number of horizontal passes a full tile is split into for large matrices. +/// +/// - Each pass touches fewer source rows, shrinking the active read footprint. +/// - That keeps reads inside the TLB and L1 working set when rows are far apart. +/// - The tile side must be a multiple of this value. +const NBR_SEGMENTS: usize = 4; + +/// Source-row count covered by one tile segment. +const SEGMENT: usize = TILE / NBR_SEGMENTS; + +/// Side length at which recursion stops and switches to tiling. +/// +/// At this size a leaf sub-matrix fits in L2, so further splitting only adds overhead. +const RECURSIVE_LIMIT: usize = 128; + +/// Minimum element count before the parallel column-band path is used. +/// +/// Smaller matrices are dominated by thread fan-out and cache-coherency traffic. +#[cfg(feature = "parallel")] +const PARALLEL_THRESHOLD: usize = 4 << 20; + +/// Transpose a row-major matrix from `input` into `output`. +/// +/// - `input` is read as `height` rows of `width` columns. +/// - `output` receives the transpose as `width` rows of `height` columns. +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// Panics if either slice length differs from `width * height`. +#[inline] +pub(crate) fn transpose( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + width: usize, + height: usize, +) { + // Both buffers must describe the same `height x width` matrix. + assert_eq!( + input.len(), + width * height, + "input length {} != width*height {}", + input.len(), + width * height + ); + assert_eq!( + output.len(), + width * height, + "output length {} != width*height {}", + output.len(), + width * height + ); + + // A zero-size matrix has nothing to move. + if width == 0 || height == 0 { + return; + } + + let len = width * height; + + // Large matrices: hand off to the parallel column-band split. + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + if len >= PARALLEL_THRESHOLD { + transpose_parallel(input, output, width, height); + return; + } + + // Tiny matrices: the scalar copy beats any tiling setup. + if len <= SMALL_LEN { + transpose_small(input, output, width, height); + return; + } + + // SAFETY: + // - Both slices hold exactly `width * height` elements (asserted above). + // - The whole matrix is one region with output base column 0, + // so every index the kernels form stays in `[0, width * height)`. + unsafe { + if len <= MEDIUM_LEN { + // Medium: tile the whole matrix once, no recursion overhead. + transpose_region::(input, output, 0, height, 0, width, width, height, 0); + } else { + // Large: recurse down to cache-resident leaves, then tile. + transpose_recursive(input, output, 0, height, 0, width, width, height, 0); + } + } +} + +/// Element-by-element transpose for matrices that fit in L1. +/// +/// - Iterating the source row index innermost keeps the writes contiguous. +/// - The strided reads are cheap while the whole matrix is L1-resident. +#[inline] +fn transpose_small(input: &[T], output: &mut [T], width: usize, height: usize) { + // Walk output rows (source columns) one at a time. + for x in 0..width { + // Walk down this output row, filling the contiguous run `[x*height ..][..height]`. + for y in 0..height { + // SAFETY: `x < width` and `y < height`, so both indices are `< width*height`. + unsafe { + // Source element (row y, col x) -> output element (row x, col y). + *output.get_unchecked_mut(x * height + y) = *input.get_unchecked(x + y * width); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose an arbitrary block with contiguous writes, for a region's edges. +/// +/// - Slices (not pointers) let the compiler assume no aliasing and pipeline reads. +/// - A parallel column-band renumbers output rows from zero; otherwise they match the source column. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// - `input` holds `total_cols * total_rows` elements. +/// - The largest source index read is `(start_x + block_width - 1) + (start_y + block_height - 1) * total_cols`. +/// - The largest output index written is `(out_col_start + block_width - 1) * total_rows + start_y + block_height - 1`. +/// - Callers keep both within their respective slice lengths. +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_block( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, + start_x: usize, + start_y: usize, + out_col_start: usize, + block_width: usize, + block_height: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Each source column becomes one contiguous output run. + for inner_x in 0..block_width { + // Absolute source column. + let x = start_x + inner_x; + // Start of the matching contiguous output run. + let out_base = (out_col_start + inner_x) * total_rows + start_y; + // Stream down the column: contiguous stores, strided loads. + for inner_y in 0..block_height { + *output.get_unchecked_mut(out_base + inner_y) = + *input.get_unchecked(x + (start_y + inner_y) * total_cols); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a full `TILE x TILE` block with compile-time-constant bounds. +/// +/// The constant trip count lets the compiler unroll and vectorize the inner loop. +/// Fast kernel for the cache-resident medium path. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// As the generic block kernel, with both block dimensions equal to the tile side. +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_plain( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, + start_x: usize, + start_y: usize, + out_col_start: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // One contiguous output run per source column; bounds are the `TILE` constant. + for inner_x in 0..TILE { + let x = start_x + inner_x; + let out_base = (out_col_start + inner_x) * total_rows + start_y; + for inner_y in 0..TILE { + *output.get_unchecked_mut(out_base + inner_y) = + *input.get_unchecked(x + (start_y + inner_y) * total_cols); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a full `TILE x TILE` block in several horizontal passes. +/// +/// Same result as the plain tile kernel, but each pass covers fewer source rows. +/// Used for the recursive large-matrix leaves, where rows are far apart and TLB/L1 pressure dominates. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// As the plain tile kernel. +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_segmented( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, + start_x: usize, + start_y: usize, + out_col_start: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Sweep the tile top-to-bottom in `NBR_SEGMENTS` short bands. + for segment in 0..NBR_SEGMENTS { + // First source row of this band. + let seg_y = start_y + segment * SEGMENT; + for inner_x in 0..TILE { + let x = start_x + inner_x; + let out_base = (out_col_start + inner_x) * total_rows + seg_y; + for inner_y in 0..SEGMENT { + *output.get_unchecked_mut(out_base + inner_y) = + *input.get_unchecked(x + (seg_y + inner_y) * total_cols); + } + } + } + } +} + +/// Tiled transpose of the sub-region `[row_start, row_end) x [col_start, col_end)`. +/// +/// Whole `TILE x TILE` tiles use a constant-bound kernel. +/// Partial tiles at the right and bottom edges use the generic block kernel. +/// +/// `SEGMENTED` selects the whole-tile kernel: +/// - `false` (medium path): plain tiles stream best while the matrix is cache-resident. +/// - `true` (recursive leaves): segmented passes cut TLB/L1 pressure on large matrices. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// - `total_cols`: input row stride (the full matrix width). +/// - `total_rows`: output row stride (the full matrix height). +/// - `col_out_base`: absolute source column mapped to output row 0 (0 for the whole matrix). +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// - `input.len() == total_cols * total_rows`. +/// - `row_end <= total_rows` and `col_end <= total_cols`. +/// - `output` covers output rows `[col_start - col_out_base, col_end - col_out_base)`. +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_region( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, + col_out_base: usize, +) { + // Split the region into whole tiles plus the leftover edge widths. + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + let x_tiles = nbr_cols / TILE; + let y_tiles = nbr_rows / TILE; + let remainder_x = nbr_cols - x_tiles * TILE; + let remainder_y = nbr_rows - y_tiles * TILE; + + // Output row index of this region's first source column. + let out_col_start = col_start - col_out_base; + + unsafe { + // Whole tiles: tight hot loop, no per-tile bookkeeping. + // `SEGMENTED` is const, so the branch is resolved at compile time. + for y_tile in 0..y_tiles { + let row = row_start + y_tile * TILE; + for x_tile in 0..x_tiles { + // Source column and matching output row for this tile. + let col = col_start + x_tile * TILE; + let out_col = out_col_start + x_tile * TILE; + if SEGMENTED { + transpose_tile_segmented( + input, output, total_cols, total_rows, col, row, out_col, + ); + } else { + transpose_tile_plain(input, output, total_cols, total_rows, col, row, out_col); + } + } + + // Right edge: partial-width tiles for this band of rows. + if remainder_x > 0 { + transpose_block( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tiles * TILE, + row, + out_col_start + x_tiles * TILE, + remainder_x, + TILE, + ); + } + } + + // Bottom edge: partial-height tiles below the last whole tile row. + if remainder_y > 0 { + let row = row_start + y_tiles * TILE; + for x_tile in 0..x_tiles { + transpose_block( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile * TILE, + row, + out_col_start + x_tile * TILE, + TILE, + remainder_y, + ); + } + + // Bottom-right corner: partial in both dimensions. + if remainder_x > 0 { + transpose_block( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tiles * TILE, + row, + out_col_start + x_tiles * TILE, + remainder_x, + remainder_y, + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Cache-oblivious recursive transpose of a rectangular region. +/// +/// Splits along the longer side until both sides fit in cache, then tiles each leaf. +/// Halving the longer side keeps leaves near-square, so the working set stays bounded. +/// +/// ```text +/// rows >= cols cols > rows +/// split horizontally split vertically +/// +-----------+ +-----+-----+ +/// | top | | | | +/// +-----------+ |left |right| +/// | bottom | | | | +/// +-----------+ +-----+-----+ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Same contract as the tiled-region kernel. +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_recursive( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, + col_out_base: usize, +) { + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + + unsafe { + // Base case: a leaf that fits in cache, or a side too thin to split. + if (nbr_rows <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT && nbr_cols <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT) + || nbr_rows <= 2 + || nbr_cols <= 2 + { + transpose_region::( + input, + output, + row_start, + row_end, + col_start, + col_end, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_out_base, + ); + return; + } + + if nbr_rows >= nbr_cols { + // Taller than wide: cut the row range in half. + let mid = row_start + nbr_rows / 2; + transpose_recursive( + input, + output, + row_start, + mid, + col_start, + col_end, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_out_base, + ); + transpose_recursive( + input, + output, + mid, + row_end, + col_start, + col_end, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_out_base, + ); + } else { + // Wider than tall: cut the column range in half. + let mid = col_start + nbr_cols / 2; + transpose_recursive( + input, + output, + row_start, + row_end, + col_start, + mid, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_out_base, + ); + transpose_recursive( + input, + output, + row_start, + row_end, + mid, + col_end, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_out_base, + ); + } + } +} + +/// Parallel transpose: one rayon task per disjoint output column-band. +/// +/// Output rows are cut into contiguous bands of whole source columns. +/// Band `k` holds the transpose of source columns starting at `k * cols_per_task`. +/// Bands never overlap, so each task gets an exclusive slice — no shared pointers. +/// +/// ```text +/// source columns -> output rows (one contiguous band) +/// [0, c) -> output[0 .. c*height) +/// [c, 2c) -> output[c*height .. 2c*height) +/// ... +/// ``` +#[cfg(feature = "parallel")] +fn transpose_parallel( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + width: usize, + height: usize, +) { + use rayon::prelude::*; + + // One band per worker; round up so the final band is the only short one. + let num_threads = rayon::current_num_threads(); + let cols_per_task = width.div_ceil(num_threads).max(1); + + // Each band is `cols_per_task` output rows of `height` columns. + output + .par_chunks_mut(cols_per_task * height) + .enumerate() + .for_each(|(task, band)| { + // Absolute source columns this band owns. + let col_start = task * cols_per_task; + let col_end = (col_start + cols_per_task).min(width); + + // SAFETY: + // - `band` is exactly `(col_end - col_start) * height` long (only the last is shorter). + // - The engine writes output rows `[0, col_end - col_start)`, all inside `band`. + // - Reads address the shared `input`, valid for `width * height` elements. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive( + input, band, 0, height, col_start, col_end, width, height, col_start, + ); + } + }); +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + extern crate alloc; + + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use super::*; + + /// Independent textbook transpose used as the source of truth. + fn reference(input: &[T], width: usize, height: usize, zero: T) -> Vec { + let mut out = vec![zero; width * height]; + for y in 0..height { + for x in 0..width { + out[x * height + y] = input[y * width + x]; + } + } + out + } + + /// Build a `width x height`, transpose it, and compare. + fn check(width: usize, height: usize, zero: T, make: impl Fn(usize) -> T) + where + T: Copy + PartialEq + core::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync, + { + // Distinct value per cell. + let input: Vec = (0..width * height).map(&make).collect(); + // Engine under test. + let mut output = vec![zero; width * height]; + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + // Independent oracle. + let expected = reference(&input, width, height, zero); + // Every position must agree. + assert_eq!(output, expected, "mismatch for {width}x{height}"); + } + + /// Dimensions covering every code path the engine can take. + /// + /// One `prop_oneof` branch per regime, so fuzzing samples them all: + /// + /// ```text + /// degenerate : empty / single element / single row / single column + /// scalar : len <= SMALL_LEN + /// tiled : around one tile, several tiles, both-edge remainders + /// recursive : just past MEDIUM_LEN, varied aspect ratios + remainders + /// ``` + /// + /// Recursive shapes are fixed (not ranges) to keep allocations bounded while + /// still exercising column splits, row splits, and edge remainders. + fn dims() -> impl Strategy { + prop_oneof![ + // Degenerate: empty, single element, single row, single column. + Just((0, 0)), + Just((1, 1)), + (1..=200_usize).prop_map(|w| (w, 1)), + (1..=200_usize).prop_map(|h| (1, h)), + // Scalar path: total length below the small threshold. + (1..=15_usize, 1..=15_usize), + // Tile boundaries: just below, at, and just above one tile. + ((TILE - 1)..=(TILE + 1), (TILE - 1)..=(TILE + 1)), + // Several whole tiles, no remainder. + Just((TILE * 4, TILE * 4)), + // Tiled path with remainders on both edges. + ((TILE + 1)..=(TILE * 6), (TILE + 1)..=(TILE * 6)), + // Around the recursion-leaf side length. + (120..=140_usize, 120..=140_usize), + // Rectangular tiled shapes (wide and tall). + (40..=300_usize, 10..=60_usize), + (10..=60_usize, 40..=300_usize), + // Exactly MEDIUM_LEN: last shape on the single-level tiled path. + Just((1024, 1024)), + // Recursive path: just past MEDIUM_LEN with assorted aspect ratios. + Just((1025, 1024)), // remainder columns + Just((1024, 1025)), // remainder rows + Just((1100, 1000)), // remainders on both edges + Just((2003, 757)), // wide, prime-ish sides + Just((757, 2003)), // tall, prime-ish sides + ] + } + + proptest! { + // 4-byte elements: the common 32-bit field width; fuzz every regime. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_u32((width, height) in dims()) { + check(width, height, 0u32, |i| i as u32); + } + + // 8-byte elements: 64-bit fields like Goldilocks; fuzz every regime. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_u64((width, height) in dims()) { + check(width, height, 0u64, |i| i as u64); + } + } + + /// Dimension strategy for the wider element types. + /// + /// Covers the same regimes as the main strategy, with only one recursive shape. + /// Capping the large shapes keeps the bigger element types cheap to allocate. + fn dims_small() -> impl Strategy { + prop_oneof![ + Just((0, 0)), + Just((1, 1)), + (1..=200_usize).prop_map(|w| (w, 1)), + (1..=200_usize).prop_map(|h| (1, h)), + (1..=15_usize, 1..=15_usize), + ((TILE - 1)..=(TILE + 1), (TILE - 1)..=(TILE + 1)), + ((TILE + 1)..=(TILE * 6), (TILE + 1)..=(TILE * 6)), + (40..=300_usize, 10..=60_usize), + (10..=60_usize, 40..=300_usize), + // One recursive shape, so generic indexing is checked past MEDIUM_LEN too. + Just((1025, 1024)), + ] + } + + proptest! { + // 1-byte elements: smallest stride, stresses the index arithmetic. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_u8((width, height) in dims_small()) { + // Values wrap at 256, but the reference wraps identically, so a swap is still caught. + check(width, height, 0u8, |i| i as u8); + } + + // 16-byte elements: degree-2 / degree-4 extension fields. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_u128((width, height) in dims_small()) { + check(width, height, 0u128, |i| i as u128); + } + + // 3-byte element: a non-power-of-two size, pins generic stride handling. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_3byte((width, height) in dims_small()) { + check(width, height, [0u8; 3], |i| [i as u8, (i >> 8) as u8, (i >> 16) as u8]); + } + + // 32-byte element: a wide extension-field-sized type. + #[test] + fn portable_matches_reference_32byte((width, height) in dims_small()) { + check(width, height, [0u64; 4], |i| [i as u64, 0, 0, i as u64]); + } + } + + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + #[test] + fn portable_parallel_path() { + // Invariant: a column-band split must agree with the sequential transpose. + // + // Each shape has >= PARALLEL_THRESHOLD elements, so the parallel path runs. + // The renumbered output columns are the part unique to this path. + // + // shape : exercises + // 2050 x 2050 : square, uneven band split + // 4097 x 1025 : wide, remainder columns + // 1025 x 4097 : tall + // 3 x 1.4e6 : narrower than the worker count -> one column per band + for &(w, h) in &[(2050, 2050), (4097, 1025), (1025, 4097), (3, 1_400_001)] { + check(w, h, 0u32, |i| i as u32); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/rectangular.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/rectangular.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90020357 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/rectangular.rs @@ -0,0 +1,2167 @@ +//! High-performance matrix transpose for generic `Copy` types. +//! +//! This module provides an optimized **out-of-place** matrix transpose. +//! +//! # Overview +//! +//! Matrix transposition converts a row-major matrix into its column-major equivalent. +//! For a matrix `A` with dimensions `height × width`: +//! +//! ```text +//! A[i][j] → A^T[j][i] +//! ``` +//! +//! In memory (row-major layout), element at position `(row, col)` is stored at: +//! - **Input**: `input[row * width + col]` +//! - **Output**: `output[col * height + row]` +//! +//! # Architecture-Specific Optimizations +//! +//! On **ARM64** (aarch64), this module uses NEON SIMD intrinsics for: +//! - **4-byte elements** (typical for 32-bit field elements like `MontyField31`, `BabyBear`) +//! using a 2-stage butterfly (`vtrn1q_u32`/`vtrn2q_u32` then `vtrn1q_u64`/`vtrn2q_u64`). +//! - **8-byte elements** (typical for 64-bit field elements like `Goldilocks`) +//! using a simpler 1-stage butterfly (`vtrn1q_u64`/`vtrn2q_u64`) on pairs of registers. +//! +//! On other architectures, or for other element sizes, it falls back to the portable engine. +//! +//! # Key Optimizations +//! +//! ## NEON SIMD Registers (128-bit) +//! +//! ARM64 NEON provides 32 vector registers, each holding 128 bits. +//! - For 32-bit (4-byte) elements, each register holds exactly **`BLOCK_SIZE` elements**. +//! - A `BLOCK_SIZE`×`BLOCK_SIZE` block (`BLOCK_SIZE`^2 elements) fits perfectly in **`BLOCK_SIZE` registers**. +//! +//! ```text +//! ┌─────────────────────────────────┐ +//! │ q0 = [ a00, a01, a02, a03 ] │ ← 128 bits = 4 × 32-bit +//! │ q1 = [ a10, a11, a12, a13 ] │ +//! │ q2 = [ a20, a21, a22, a23 ] │ +//! │ q3 = [ a30, a31, a32, a33 ] │ +//! └─────────────────────────────────┘ +//! ``` +//! +//! ## In-Register Transpose (Butterfly Network) +//! +//! We transpose a `BLOCK_SIZE`×`BLOCK_SIZE` block entirely in registers using a 2-stage butterfly: +//! +//! **Stage 1**: Swap pairs of 32-bit elements using `TRN1`/`TRN2` +//! **Stage 2**: Swap pairs of 64-bit elements using `TRN1`/`TRN2` on reinterpreted u64 +//! +//! ```text +//! Input: After Stage 1: After Stage 2 (Output): +//! ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ +//! │ a b │ c d │ │ a e │ c g │ │ a e │ i m │ +//! │ e f │ g h │ │ b f │ d h │ │ b f │ j n │ +//! │─────┼───────│ │─────┼───────│ │─────┼───────│ +//! │ i j │ k l │ │ i m │ k o │ │ c g │ k o │ +//! │ m n │ o p │ │ j n │ l p │ │ d h │ l p │ +//! └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ +//! ``` +//! +//! ## Multi-Level Tiling Strategy +//! +//! Different strategies for different matrix sizes: +//! - **Small (<`SMALL_LEN` elements)**: Scalar transpose - fits in L1, no overhead +//! - **Medium (<`MEDIUM_LEN` elements)**: `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` Tiled - L2-friendly tiles +//! - **Large (≥`MEDIUM_LEN` elements)**: Recursive + Tiled - Cache-oblivious + +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +use core::arch::aarch64::*; +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +use core::mem::MaybeUninit; +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", feature = "parallel"))] +use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; + +/// Software prefetch for write (PRFM PSTL1KEEP). +/// +/// Brings the cache line containing `ptr` into the L1 data cache in exclusive +/// state, preparing for a subsequent store. This avoids Read-For-Ownership +/// (RFO) stalls when writing to memory not already in L1. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline(always)] +unsafe fn prefetch_write(ptr: *const u8) { + // PRFM PSTL1KEEP: Prefetch for Store, L1 cache, temporal (keep in cache). + unsafe { + core::arch::asm!( + "prfm pstl1keep, [{ptr}]", + ptr = in(reg) ptr, + options(readonly, nostack, preserves_flags), + ); + } +} + +/// Maximum number of elements for the simple scalar transpose. +/// +/// For matrices with fewer than `SMALL_LEN` elements (~1KB for 4-byte elements), +/// the overhead of tiling isn't worth it. +/// +/// Direct element-by-element copy is faster because: +/// - The entire matrix fits in L1 cache (32-64KB on most CPUs) +/// - No tile boundary calculations needed +/// - Branch prediction works well for small loops +#[cfg(any(target_arch = "aarch64", test))] +const SMALL_LEN: usize = 255; + +/// Maximum number of elements for the single-level tiled transpose. +/// +/// For matrices up to `MEDIUM_LEN` elements (~4MB for 4-byte elements), we use +/// a simple tiled approach with `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles. +/// +/// This fits comfortably within L2 cache (256KB-512KB) with good spatial locality. +/// +/// Beyond this threshold, we switch to recursive subdivision to ensure +/// cache-oblivious behavior for very large matrices. +#[cfg(any(target_arch = "aarch64", test))] +const MEDIUM_LEN: usize = 1024 * 1024; + +/// Side length of a tile in elements. +/// +/// We use `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles because: +/// - `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` × 4 bytes = 1KB per tile, fitting in L1 cache +/// - `TILE_SIZE` is divisible by `BLOCK_SIZE`, allowing exactly (`TILE_SIZE`/`BLOCK_SIZE`)^2 NEON blocks per tile +/// - Good balance between tile overhead and cache utilization +#[cfg(any(target_arch = "aarch64", test))] +const TILE_SIZE: usize = 16; + +/// Maximum dimension for recursive base case. +/// +/// When recursively subdividing large matrices, we stop when both +/// dimensions are ≤ `RECURSIVE_LIMIT` elements. +/// +/// At this point, the sub-matrix (up to `RECURSIVE_LIMIT`×`RECURSIVE_LIMIT` elements) +/// fits in L2 cache, so we switch to tiled transpose. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +const RECURSIVE_LIMIT: usize = 128; + +/// Minimum number of elements before enabling parallel processing. +/// +/// Parallel transpose only pays off for large matrices because: +/// - Thread spawn/join overhead (~1-10μs) +/// - Cache coherency traffic between cores +/// - Memory bandwidth becomes the bottleneck, not compute +/// +/// At `PARALLEL_THRESHOLD` elements, the work per thread is large enough that +/// parallelism overhead is amortized. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", feature = "parallel"))] +const PARALLEL_THRESHOLD: usize = 4 * 1024 * 1024; + +/// Transpose a matrix from row-major `input` to row-major `output`. +/// +/// Given an input matrix with `height` rows and `width` columns, produces +/// an output matrix with `width` rows and `height` columns. +/// +/// # Memory Layout +/// +/// Both input and output are stored in **row-major order**. +/// +/// ```text +/// Input (height=2, width=3): Output (height=3, width=2): +/// +/// Row 0: [ a, b, c ] Row 0: [ a, d ] +/// Row 1: [ d, e, f ] Row 1: [ b, e ] +/// Row 2: [ c, f ] +/// +/// Memory: [a, b, c, d, e, f] Memory: [a, d, b, e, c, f] +/// ``` +/// +/// # Index Transformation +/// +/// - Initial element at `input[row * width + col]`, +/// - Transposed position is `output[col * height + row]`. +/// +/// # Arguments +/// +/// * `input` - Source matrix in row-major order +/// * `output` - Destination buffer in row-major order +/// * `width` - Number of columns in the input matrix +/// * `height` - Number of rows in the input matrix +/// +/// # Panics +/// +/// Panics if: +/// - `input.len() != width * height` +/// - `output.len() != width * height` +#[inline] +pub fn transpose( + input: &[T], + output: &mut [T], + width: usize, + height: usize, +) { + // Input validation + assert_eq!( + input.len(), + width * height, + "Input length {} doesn't match width*height = {}", + input.len(), + width * height + ); + assert_eq!( + output.len(), + width * height, + "Output length {} doesn't match width*height = {}", + output.len(), + width * height + ); + + // Handle empty matrices + if width == 0 || height == 0 { + return; + } + + // Architecture dispatch + #[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] + { + // Use NEON-optimized path for 4-byte elements. + // + // This covers common field types like MontyField31. + // + // The alignment check matters as much as the size check: a type like + // `Complex` is 8 bytes but only 4-byte aligned, so it must + // not take the 8-byte path below, which assumes u64 alignment. + if core::mem::size_of::() == 4 && core::mem::align_of::() == 4 { + // SAFETY: + // - input/output lengths verified above + // - T is 4 bytes and 4-byte aligned, matching u32 size and alignment + // - Pointers derived from valid slices + unsafe { + transpose_neon_4b( + input.as_ptr().cast::(), + output.as_mut_ptr().cast::(), + width, + height, + ); + } + return; + } + + // Use NEON-optimized path for 8-byte elements. + // + // This covers 64-bit field types like Goldilocks. + // A 128-bit NEON register holds 2 u64 elements, so we use + // pairs of registers per row and a 1-stage butterfly. + if core::mem::size_of::() == 8 && core::mem::align_of::() == 8 { + // SAFETY: + // - input/output lengths verified above + // - T is 8 bytes and 8-byte aligned, matching u64 size and alignment + // - Pointers derived from valid slices + unsafe { + transpose_neon_8b( + input.as_ptr().cast::(), + output.as_mut_ptr().cast::(), + width, + height, + ); + } + return; + } + } + + // Fallback for non-ARM64 or unsupported element sizes. + super::portable::transpose(input, output, width, height); +} + +/// Top-level NEON transpose dispatcher for 4-byte elements. +/// +/// Selects the appropriate strategy based on matrix size: +/// +/// ```text +/// ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +/// │ transpose_neon_4b │ +/// │ │ │ +/// │ ┌────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┐ │ +/// │ ▼ ▼ ▼ │ +/// │ len < SMALL_LEN SMALL_LEN ≤ len < MEDIUM_LEN len ≥ MEDIUM_LEN │ +/// │ │ │ │ │ +/// │ ▼ ▼ ▼ │ +/// │ scalar tiled TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE recursive │ +/// │ │ (→ tiled at │ +/// │ │ leaves) │ +/// │ │ │ │ +/// │ └───────────────┬───────────────┘ │ +/// │ ▼ │ +/// │ parallel (if ≥ PARALLEL_THRESHOLD │ +/// │ and feature enabled) │ +/// └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure `input` and `output` point to valid memory regions +/// of at least `width * height` elements each. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_neon_4b(input: *const u32, output: *mut u32, width: usize, height: usize) { + // Total number of elements in the matrix. + let len = width * height; + + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + { + // Parallel path (if enabled and matrix is large enough) + if len >= PARALLEL_THRESHOLD { + // SAFETY: Caller guarantees valid pointers. + unsafe { + transpose_neon_4b_parallel(input, output, width, height); + } + return; + } + } + + // Sequential path - choose strategy based on size + if len <= SMALL_LEN { + // Small matrix: simple scalar transpose. + // + // SAFETY: Caller guarantees valid pointers. + unsafe { + transpose_small_4b(input, output, width, height); + } + } else if len <= MEDIUM_LEN { + // Medium matrix: single-level `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiling. + // + // SAFETY: Caller guarantees valid pointers. + unsafe { + transpose_tiled_4b(input, output, width, height); + } + } else { + // Large matrix: recursive subdivision then tiling. + // + // This is the cache-oblivious approach. + // SAFETY: Caller guarantees valid pointers. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_4b(input, output, 0, height, 0, width, width, height); + } + } +} + +/// Parallel transpose for very large matrices (at least `PARALLEL_THRESHOLD` elements). +/// +/// The work is split into stripes, one per thread, along the longer input dimension. +/// +/// # Stripe Division +/// +/// The output holds the transpose in row-major order. +/// Input element `(r, c)` lands at output index `c * height + r`. +/// +/// A wide input (more columns than rows) is split by columns. +/// - Each thread owns a column band over every row. +/// - Its writes form one contiguous block of output rows. +/// +/// A tall or square input is split by rows. +/// - Each thread owns a row band over every column. +/// - Its input reads stay contiguous, one full row at a time. +/// +/// ```text +/// wide input: split by columns tall input: split by rows +/// ┌──────┬──────┬──────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ +/// │ t0 │ t1 │ t2 │ │ t0 │ +/// │ cols │ cols │ cols │ ├────────────────────┤ +/// └──────┴──────┴──────┘ │ t1 │ +/// ├────────────────────┤ +/// │ t2 │ +/// └────────────────────┘ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Why the longer dimension +/// +/// Splitting a wide input by rows would scatter each thread's writes: +/// - Each thread gets a thin column band, written down the tall output +/// with stride `height`. +/// - Scattered stores stall on read-for-ownership and TLB traffic. +/// +/// Splitting by columns keeps each thread's writes in one contiguous block. +/// +/// # Data Race Safety +/// +/// Each thread writes a disjoint output region, so no synchronization is needed. +/// - A column band maps to a contiguous run of output rows, unique per thread. +/// - A row band maps to a unique set of output columns. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", feature = "parallel"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_neon_4b_parallel( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + width: usize, + height: usize, +) { + use rayon::prelude::*; + + // Number of available threads in the rayon thread pool. + let num_threads = rayon::current_num_threads(); + + // We use `AtomicUsize` to pass pointer addresses to threads. + // + // This is safe because: + // 1. We only read the addresses (Relaxed ordering is fine) + // 2. Each thread writes to a disjoint output region + let inp = AtomicUsize::new(input as usize); + let out = AtomicUsize::new(output as usize); + + // Split the longer input dimension so each thread's output stays contiguous. + // + // A wide input is split by columns, a tall or square input by rows. + let split_cols = width > height; + + // Length of the dimension being split. + let stripe_len = if split_cols { width } else { height }; + + // Share handed to each thread. + // + // The ceiling keeps the final thread from getting an oversized chunk. + let stripe_per_thread = stripe_len.div_ceil(num_threads); + + (0..num_threads).into_par_iter().for_each(|thread_idx| { + // Half-open stripe `[start, end)` of the split dimension owned here. + let start = thread_idx * stripe_per_thread; + let end = (start + stripe_per_thread).min(stripe_len); + + // Empty when there are more threads than stripe units. + if start < end { + // Recover the pointers from their atomic addresses. + let input_ptr = inp.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as *const u32; + let output_ptr = out.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as *mut u32; + + // Map the stripe to an input region. + // + // A column stripe spans every row. + // A row stripe spans every column. + let (row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end) = if split_cols { + (0, height, start, end) + } else { + (start, end, 0, width) + }; + + // SAFETY: + // - Pointers are valid for `width * height` elements (from caller). + // - Stripes partition one dimension, so the per-thread output + // regions are disjoint and never aliased. + unsafe { + transpose_region_tiled_4b( + input_ptr, output_ptr, row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end, width, height, + ); + } + } + }); +} + +/// Simple element-by-element transpose for small matrices. +/// +/// For matrices with <= `SMALL_LEN` elements, the overhead of tiling isn't justified. +/// Direct copying with good cache behavior is faster. +/// +/// # Algorithm +/// +/// For each position `(x, y)`: +/// - Read from `input[y * width + x]` +/// - Write to `output[x * height + y]` +/// +/// # Loop Order +/// +/// We iterate `x` in the outer loop to improve **output locality**. +/// +/// This means consecutive writes go to consecutive memory addresses, +/// which is better for the write-combining buffers. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_small_4b(input: *const u32, output: *mut u32, width: usize, height: usize) { + // Outer loop over columns (output rows). + for x in 0..width { + // Inner loop over rows (output columns). + for y in 0..height { + // Input index: row-major position of element (y, x). + let input_index = x + y * width; + + // Output index: row-major position of element (x, y). + let output_index = y + x * height; + + // SAFETY: Indices are within bounds by loop construction. + unsafe { + *output.add(output_index) = *input.add(input_index); + } + } + } +} + +/// Tiled transpose using `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles composed of `BLOCK_SIZE`×`BLOCK_SIZE` NEON blocks. +/// +/// This is important for medium-sized matrices (`SMALL_LEN` to `MEDIUM_LEN` elements). +/// +/// # Tiling Strategy +/// +/// - The matrix is divided into `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles. +/// - Each tile is further divided into (`TILE_SIZE`/`BLOCK_SIZE`)^2 blocks that are transposed using NEON SIMD. +/// +/// ```text +/// Matrix (e.g., 64×48): +/// ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +/// │ Tile(0,0) │ Tile(1,0) │ Tile(2,0) │ Tile(3,0) │rem_x │ +/// │ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×.. │ │ +/// ├────────────────────┼────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───────────────┼──────┤ +/// │ Tile(0,1) │ Tile(1,1) │ Tile(2,1) │ Tile(3,1) │rem_x │ +/// │ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×.. │ │ +/// ├────────────────────┼────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───────────────┼──────┤ +/// │ Tile(0,2) │ Tile(1,2) │ Tile(2,2) │ Tile(3,2) │rem_x │ +/// │ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE│ TILE_SIZE×.. │ │ +/// └────────────────────┴────────────────────┴────────────────────┴───────────────┴──────┘ +/// rem_y +/// ``` +/// +/// Remainders (`rem_x`, `rem_y`) are handled with scalar transpose. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tiled_4b(input: *const u32, output: *mut u32, width: usize, height: usize) { + // Compute tile counts and remainders + + // Number of complete `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles in each dimension. + let x_tile_count = width / TILE_SIZE; + let y_tile_count = height / TILE_SIZE; + + // Leftover elements that don't fit in complete tiles. + let remainder_x = width - x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + let remainder_y = height - y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + + // Process complete `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles + + // Iterate over tile rows. + for y_tile in 0..y_tile_count { + // Iterate over tile columns. + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + // Top-left corner of this tile. + let x_start = x_tile * TILE_SIZE; + let y_start = y_tile * TILE_SIZE; + + // Transpose this `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tile + // + // SAFETY: Tile coordinates are within bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_tile_16x16_neon(input, output, width, height, x_start, y_start); + } + } + + // Handle partial column tiles (right edge) + + // Elements in columns [x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, width) don't form a complete tile. + // Use scalar transpose for these. + if remainder_x > 0 { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + y_tile * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + remainder_x, // block_width + TILE_SIZE, // block_height + ); + } + } + } + + // Handle partial row tiles (bottom edge) + + // Elements in rows [y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, height) don't form complete tiles. + if remainder_y > 0 { + // Process bottom edge tiles (except corner). + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + TILE_SIZE, // block_width + remainder_y, // block_height + ); + } + } + + // Handle corner block (bottom-right) + + // The corner block is the intersection of right and bottom remainders. + if remainder_x > 0 { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + remainder_x, // block_width + remainder_y, // block_height + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Recursive cache-oblivious transpose for large matrices. +/// +/// This algorithm recursively subdivides the matrix until sub-blocks fit +/// in cache, then uses tiled transpose on the leaves. +/// +/// # Cache-Oblivious Design +/// +/// The key insight is that we don't need to know cache sizes explicitly. +/// +/// By recursively halving the problem, we eventually reach a size that +/// fits in any level of cache (L1, L2, or L3). +/// +/// # Recursion Pattern +/// +/// At each level, we split along the **longer dimension**: +/// +/// ```text +/// Wide matrix (cols > rows): Tall matrix (rows ≥ cols): +/// Split vertically Split horizontally +/// +/// ┌─────────┬─────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ +/// │ │ │ │ │ +/// │ Left │ Right │ │ Top │ +/// │ │ │ │ │ +/// │ │ │ ├───────────────────┤ +/// │ │ │ │ │ +/// └─────────┴─────────┘ │ Bottom │ +/// │ │ +/// └───────────────────┘ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Base Case +/// +/// We stop recursing when both dimensions are ≤ `RECURSIVE_LIMIT` elements (or ≤ 2, +/// which is a degenerate case). At this point, the sub-matrix fits in +/// L2 cache (~64KB for `RECURSIVE_LIMIT`×`RECURSIVE_LIMIT`×4 bytes), so we use tiled transpose. +/// +/// # Parameters +/// +/// The function uses coordinate ranges rather than creating sub-arrays: +/// - `row_start..row_end`: Row range in the original matrix +/// - `col_start..col_end`: Column range in the original matrix +/// - `total_cols`, `total_rows`: Original matrix dimensions (for stride calculations) +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers and that coordinate ranges are within bounds. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_recursive_4b( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, +) { + // Compute sub-matrix dimensions + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + + // Base case: small enough to use tiled transpose + + // Stop recursing when: + // 1. Both dimensions ≤ RECURSIVE_LIMIT (fits in cache), OR + // 2. Either dimension ≤ 2 (degenerate case, no benefit from recursion) + if (nbr_rows <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT && nbr_cols <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT) + || nbr_rows <= 2 + || nbr_cols <= 2 + { + // SAFETY: Caller ensures valid pointers and bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_region_tiled_4b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + return; + } + + // Recursive case: split along the longer dimension + if nbr_rows >= nbr_cols { + // Split horizontally (by rows) + + // Midpoint of the row range. + let mid = row_start + (nbr_rows / 2); + + // Recurse on top half. + // SAFETY: mid is within [row_start, row_end]. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_4b( + input, output, row_start, mid, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + + // Recurse on bottom half. + // SAFETY: mid is within [row_start, row_end]. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_4b( + input, output, mid, row_end, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + } else { + // Split vertically (by columns) + + // Midpoint of the column range. + let mid = col_start + (nbr_cols / 2); + + // Recurse on left half. + // SAFETY: mid is within [col_start, col_end]. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_4b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, col_start, mid, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + + // Recurse on right half. + // SAFETY: mid is within [col_start, col_end]. + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_4b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, mid, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + } +} + +/// Tiled transpose for a rectangular region within a larger matrix. +/// +/// It operates on a sub-region defined by coordinate ranges. +/// +/// Used as the base case of recursive transpose and for parallel stripe processing. +/// +/// # Coordinate System +/// +/// ```text +/// Original matrix (total_cols × total_rows): +/// ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ +/// │ │ +/// │ (col_start, row_start) │ +/// │ ┌─────────────────────┐ │ +/// │ │ │ │ +/// │ │ Region to │ │ +/// │ │ transpose │ │ +/// │ │ │ │ +/// │ └─────────────────────┘ │ +/// │ (col_end, row_end) │ +/// │ │ +/// └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for `total_cols * total_rows` elements +/// - `row_start < row_end <= total_rows` +/// - `col_start < col_end <= total_cols` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_region_tiled_4b( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, +) { + // Compute region dimensions and tile counts + + // Dimensions of the region to transpose. + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + + // Number of complete `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles in each dimension. + let x_tile_count = nbr_cols / TILE_SIZE; + let y_tile_count = nbr_rows / TILE_SIZE; + + // Leftover elements that don't fit in complete tiles. + let remainder_x = nbr_cols - x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + let remainder_y = nbr_rows - y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + + // Process complete `TILE_SIZE`×`TILE_SIZE` tiles + for y_tile in 0..y_tile_count { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + // Coordinates of this tile's top-left corner in the original matrix. + let col = col_start + x_tile * TILE_SIZE; + let row = row_start + y_tile * TILE_SIZE; + + // SAFETY: Tile coordinates are within the region bounds. + // Uses the buffered tile function: for large matrices the output + // is likely in L3/RAM, so L1 buffering + write prefetching avoids + // RFO stalls on scattered output writes. + unsafe { + transpose_tile_16x16_neon_buffered(input, output, total_cols, total_rows, col, row); + } + } + + // Handle partial column tiles (right edge of region) + if remainder_x > 0 { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within region bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + row_start + y_tile * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + remainder_x, // block_width + TILE_SIZE, // block_height + ); + } + } + } + + // Handle partial row tiles (bottom edge of region) + if remainder_y > 0 { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within region bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + row_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + TILE_SIZE, // block_width + remainder_y, // block_height + ); + } + } + + // Handle corner block (bottom-right of region) + if remainder_x > 0 { + // SAFETY: Coordinates are within region bounds. + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // x_start + row_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, // y_start + remainder_x, // block_width + remainder_y, // block_height + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a complete 16×16 tile using NEON SIMD (direct-to-output). +/// +/// A 16×16 tile is processed as a 4×4 grid of 4×4 NEON blocks. +/// This function is fully unrolled for maximum performance. +/// +/// Used by the **medium tiled path** where the output likely fits in L2 cache +/// and the overhead of L1 buffering isn't justified. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +/// - `y_start + 16 <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_16x16_neon( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Block Row 0 (input rows y_start..y_start+4) + let inp = input.add(y_start * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 1 (input rows y_start+4..y_start+8) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 4) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 4); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 2 (input rows y_start+8..y_start+12) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 8) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 8); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 3 (input rows y_start+12..y_start+16) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 12) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 12); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + } +} + +/// Transpose a complete 16×16 tile using NEON SIMD with L1 buffering. +/// +/// Same grid of 4×4 NEON blocks, but transposed into a stack-allocated buffer +/// first, then flushed to the output with write prefetching (`PRFM PSTL1KEEP`). +/// +/// Used by the **recursive/parallel path** for large matrices (≥ `MEDIUM_LEN`) +/// where the output is in L3/RAM and direct scattered writes would stall on +/// Read-For-Ownership (RFO) cache line fetches. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +/// - `x_start + 16 <= width` +/// - `y_start + 16 <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_16x16_neon_buffered( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, +) { + // Stack buffer for L1-hot transpose (1 KB for u32). + // MaybeUninit avoids unnecessary zero-initialization; every element + // is written by the NEON blocks before the copy reads it. + let mut buffer = MaybeUninit::<[u32; TILE_SIZE * TILE_SIZE]>::uninit(); + let buf = buffer.as_mut_ptr().cast::(); + + unsafe { + // Transpose 4×4 grid of NEON blocks into the buffer. + // Buffer layout: buf[col * TILE_SIZE + row] = transposed element. + // Buffer write stride is TILE_SIZE (contiguous in L1) vs. `height` (scattered). + + // Block Row 0 (input rows y_start..y_start+4) + let inp = input.add(y_start * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, buf, width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 1 (input rows y_start+4..y_start+8) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 4) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, buf.add(4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 2 (input rows y_start+8..y_start+12) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 8) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, buf.add(8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 3 (input rows y_start+12..y_start+16) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 12) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp, buf.add(12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Flush buffer to output with write prefetching. + // Each iteration copies TILE_SIZE u32s (64 bytes = 1 cache line) from the + // L1-hot buffer to one output row. Prefetch brings the next output cache + // line into exclusive state, avoiding RFO stalls. + prefetch_write(output.add(x_start * height + y_start) as *const u8); + for c in 0..TILE_SIZE { + if c + 1 < TILE_SIZE { + prefetch_write(output.add((x_start + c + 1) * height + y_start) as *const u8); + } + core::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping( + buf.add(c * TILE_SIZE), + output.add((x_start + c) * height + y_start), + TILE_SIZE, + ); + } + } +} + +/// Scalar transpose for an arbitrary rectangular block. +/// +/// Used for handling edge cases where dimensions don't align to tile boundaries. +/// Falls back to simple element-by-element copying. +/// +/// # When Used +/// +/// - Right edge: `block_width < TILE_SIZE` +/// - Bottom edge: `block_height < TILE_SIZE` +/// - Bottom-right corner: both dimensions < `TILE_SIZE` +/// +/// # Safety +/// +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +/// - `x_start + block_width <= width` +/// - `y_start + block_height <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_block_scalar( + input: *const u32, + output: *mut u32, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, + block_width: usize, + block_height: usize, +) { + // Iterate over block columns (becomes output rows). + for inner_x in 0..block_width { + // Iterate over block rows (becomes output columns). + for inner_y in 0..block_height { + // Absolute coordinates in the original matrix. + let x = x_start + inner_x; + let y = y_start + inner_y; + + // Input index: row-major position of (y, x). + let input_index = x + y * width; + + // Output index: row-major position of (x, y) in transposed matrix. + let output_index = y + x * height; + + // SAFETY: Indices are within bounds by construction. + unsafe { + *output.add(output_index) = *input.add(input_index); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a 4×4 block of 32-bit elements using NEON SIMD. +/// +/// This is the fundamental building block of the entire transpose algorithm. +/// +/// It transposes a 4×4 block entirely within NEON registers +/// using a two-stage butterfly network. +/// +/// # Memory Layout +/// +/// Input (4 rows, stride = `src_stride`): +/// ```text +/// src + 0*stride: [ a00, a01, a02, a03 ] → q0 +/// src + 1*stride: [ a10, a11, a12, a13 ] → q1 +/// src + 2*stride: [ a20, a21, a22, a23 ] → q2 +/// src + 3*stride: [ a30, a31, a32, a33 ] → q3 +/// ``` +/// +/// Output (4 rows, stride = `dst_stride`): +/// ```text +/// dst + 0*stride: [ a00, a10, a20, a30 ] ← r0 +/// dst + 1*stride: [ a01, a11, a21, a31 ] ← r1 +/// dst + 2*stride: [ a02, a12, a22, a32 ] ← r2 +/// dst + 3*stride: [ a03, a13, a23, a33 ] ← r3 +/// ``` +/// +/// # Butterfly Network Algorithm +/// +/// The transpose is performed in two stages using `TRN1`/`TRN2` instructions: +/// +/// ## Stage 1: 32-bit Transpose +/// +/// - `TRN1` takes **even-indexed** elements, +/// - `TRN2` takes **odd-indexed** elements. +/// +/// ```text +/// TRN1(q0, q1) = [ a00, a10, a02, a12 ] (even indices: 0, 2) +/// TRN2(q0, q1) = [ a01, a11, a03, a13 ] (odd indices: 1, 3) +/// TRN1(q2, q3) = [ a20, a30, a22, a32 ] +/// TRN2(q2, q3) = [ a21, a31, a23, a33 ] +/// ``` +/// +/// ## Stage 2: 64-bit Transpose +/// +/// Reinterpret as 64-bit elements and transpose again: +/// +/// ```text +/// TRN1_64(t0, t2) = [ a00, a10 | a20, a30 ] → r0 +/// TRN2_64(t0, t2) = [ a02, a12 | a22, a32 ] → r2 +/// TRN1_64(t1, t3) = [ a01, a11 | a21, a31 ] → r1 +/// TRN2_64(t1, t3) = [ a03, a13 | a23, a33 ] → r3 +/// ``` +/// +/// # Explanations +/// +/// The butterfly network swaps elements at progressively larger distances: +/// - Stage 1: Swaps elements 1 apart (within 64-bit pairs) +/// - Stage 2: Swaps elements 2 apart (between 64-bit halves) +/// +/// This is analogous to the bit-reversal pattern in FFT algorithms. +/// +/// # Performance +/// +/// - **4 loads** (vld1q_u32): 4 cycles +/// - **8 permutes** (vtrn): ~8 cycles (pipelined) +/// - **4 stores** (vst1q_u32): 4 cycles +/// - **Total**: ~16 cycles for 16 elements = **1 cycle/element** +/// +/// # Safety +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - `src` is valid for reading 4 rows of `src_stride` elements each +/// - `dst` is valid for writing 4 rows of `dst_stride` elements each +/// - The first 4 elements of each row are accessible +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline(always)] +unsafe fn transpose_4x4_neon(src: *const u32, dst: *mut u32, src_stride: usize, dst_stride: usize) { + unsafe { + // Phase 1: Load 4 rows into NEON registers + // + // Each vld1q_u32 loads 4 consecutive u32s (16 bytes = 128 bits). + // Total: 64 bytes = one cache line on most ARM64 CPUs. + + // Row 0: [a00, a01, a02, a03] + let q0 = vld1q_u32(src); + // Row 1: [a10, a11, a12, a13] + let q1 = vld1q_u32(src.add(src_stride)); + // Row 2: [a20, a21, a22, a23] + let q2 = vld1q_u32(src.add(2 * src_stride)); + // Row 3: [a30, a31, a32, a33] + let q3 = vld1q_u32(src.add(3 * src_stride)); + + // Phase 2: Stage 1 - Transpose 2×2 blocks of 32-bit elements + // + // vtrn1q_u32(a, b): Takes elements at even indices from a and b + // - Result: [a[0], b[0], a[2], b[2]] + // + // vtrn2q_u32(a, b): Takes elements at odd indices from a and b + // - Result: [a[1], b[1], a[3], b[3]] + + let t0_0 = vtrn1q_u32(q0, q1); // [a00, a10, a02, a12] + let t0_1 = vtrn2q_u32(q0, q1); // [a01, a11, a03, a13] + let t0_2 = vtrn1q_u32(q2, q3); // [a20, a30, a22, a32] + let t0_3 = vtrn2q_u32(q2, q3); // [a21, a31, a23, a33] + + // Phase 3: Stage 2 - Transpose 2×2 blocks of 64-bit elements + // + // Reinterpret u32x4 as u64x2, then transpose. + // This swaps the 64-bit halves of the vectors. + // + // vtrn1q_u64(a, b): [a.lo, b.lo] + // vtrn2q_u64(a, b): [a.hi, b.hi] + + // r0 = [a00, a10, a20, a30] (column 0 of input → row 0 of output) + let r0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u64(vtrn1q_u64( + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_0), + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_2), + )); + + // r2 = [a02, a12, a22, a32] (column 2 of input → row 2 of output) + let r2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u64(vtrn2q_u64( + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_0), + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_2), + )); + + // r1 = [a01, a11, a21, a31] (column 1 of input → row 1 of output) + let r1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u64(vtrn1q_u64( + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_1), + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_3), + )); + + // r3 = [a03, a13, a23, a33] (column 3 of input → row 3 of output) + let r3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u64(vtrn2q_u64( + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_1), + vreinterpretq_u64_u32(t0_3), + )); + + // Phase 4: Store 4 transposed rows + // + // Store row 0 of output + vst1q_u32(dst, r0); + // Store row 1 of output + vst1q_u32(dst.add(dst_stride), r1); + // Store row 2 of output + vst1q_u32(dst.add(2 * dst_stride), r2); + // Store row 3 of output + vst1q_u32(dst.add(3 * dst_stride), r3); + } +} + +// ============================================================================ +// 8-byte (u64) NEON transpose functions +// +// These are analogous to the 4-byte functions above, but operate on u64 +// elements. Since a 128-bit NEON register holds 2 u64 elements, each row +// of a 4×4 block requires 2 registers (8 total for a block). The transpose +// uses a single-stage butterfly with vtrn1q_u64/vtrn2q_u64 on four 2×2 +// sub-blocks. +// ============================================================================ + +/// Top-level NEON transpose dispatcher for 8-byte elements. +/// +/// Selects the appropriate strategy based on matrix size, mirroring +/// `transpose_neon_4b` but for u64 elements. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure `input` and `output` point to valid memory regions +/// of at least `width * height` elements each. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_neon_8b(input: *const u64, output: *mut u64, width: usize, height: usize) { + let len = width * height; + + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + { + if len >= PARALLEL_THRESHOLD { + unsafe { + transpose_neon_8b_parallel(input, output, width, height); + } + return; + } + } + + if len <= SMALL_LEN { + unsafe { + transpose_small_8b(input, output, width, height); + } + } else if len <= MEDIUM_LEN { + unsafe { + transpose_tiled_8b(input, output, width, height); + } + } else { + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_8b(input, output, 0, height, 0, width, width, height); + } + } +} + +/// Parallel transpose for very large matrices of 8-byte elements. +/// +/// The work is split into stripes, one per thread, along the longer input dimension. +/// +/// # Stripe Division +/// +/// The output holds the transpose in row-major order. +/// Input element `(r, c)` lands at output index `c * height + r`. +/// +/// A wide input (more columns than rows) is split by columns. +/// - Each thread owns a column band over every row. +/// - Its writes form one contiguous block of output rows. +/// +/// A tall or square input is split by rows. +/// - Each thread owns a row band over every column. +/// - Its input reads stay contiguous, one full row at a time. +/// +/// ```text +/// wide input: split by columns tall input: split by rows +/// ┌──────┬──────┬──────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ +/// │ t0 │ t1 │ t2 │ │ t0 │ +/// │ cols │ cols │ cols │ ├────────────────────┤ +/// └──────┴──────┴──────┘ │ t1 │ +/// ├────────────────────┤ +/// │ t2 │ +/// └────────────────────┘ +/// ``` +/// +/// # Why the longer dimension +/// +/// Splitting a wide input by rows would scatter each thread's writes: +/// - Each thread gets a thin column band, written down the tall output +/// with stride `height`. +/// - Scattered stores stall on read-for-ownership and TLB traffic. +/// +/// Splitting by columns keeps each thread's writes in one contiguous block. +/// +/// # Data Race Safety +/// +/// Each thread writes a disjoint output region, so no synchronization is needed. +/// - A column band maps to a contiguous run of output rows, unique per thread. +/// - A row band maps to a unique set of output columns. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", feature = "parallel"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_neon_8b_parallel( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + width: usize, + height: usize, +) { + use rayon::prelude::*; + + // Number of available threads in the rayon thread pool. + let num_threads = rayon::current_num_threads(); + + // We use `AtomicUsize` to pass pointer addresses to threads. + // + // This is safe because: + // 1. We only read the addresses (Relaxed ordering is fine) + // 2. Each thread writes to a disjoint output region + let inp = AtomicUsize::new(input as usize); + let out = AtomicUsize::new(output as usize); + + // Split the longer input dimension so each thread's output stays contiguous. + // + // A wide input is split by columns, a tall or square input by rows. + let split_cols = width > height; + + // Length of the dimension being split. + let stripe_len = if split_cols { width } else { height }; + + // Share handed to each thread. + // + // The ceiling keeps the final thread from getting an oversized chunk. + let stripe_per_thread = stripe_len.div_ceil(num_threads); + + (0..num_threads).into_par_iter().for_each(|thread_idx| { + // Half-open stripe `[start, end)` of the split dimension owned here. + let start = thread_idx * stripe_per_thread; + let end = (start + stripe_per_thread).min(stripe_len); + + // Empty when there are more threads than stripe units. + if start < end { + // Recover the pointers from their atomic addresses. + let input_ptr = inp.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as *const u64; + let output_ptr = out.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as *mut u64; + + // Map the stripe to an input region. + // + // A column stripe spans every row. + // A row stripe spans every column. + let (row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end) = if split_cols { + (0, height, start, end) + } else { + (start, end, 0, width) + }; + + // SAFETY: + // - Pointers are valid for `width * height` elements (from caller). + // - Stripes partition one dimension, so the per-thread output + // regions are disjoint and never aliased. + unsafe { + transpose_region_tiled_8b( + input_ptr, output_ptr, row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end, width, height, + ); + } + } + }); +} + +/// Simple element-by-element transpose for small matrices of 8-byte elements. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_small_8b(input: *const u64, output: *mut u64, width: usize, height: usize) { + for x in 0..width { + for y in 0..height { + let input_index = x + y * width; + let output_index = y + x * height; + + unsafe { + *output.add(output_index) = *input.add(input_index); + } + } + } +} + +/// Tiled transpose using 16×16 tiles for 8-byte elements. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers for `width * height` elements. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tiled_8b(input: *const u64, output: *mut u64, width: usize, height: usize) { + let x_tile_count = width / TILE_SIZE; + let y_tile_count = height / TILE_SIZE; + + let remainder_x = width - x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + let remainder_y = height - y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + + // Process complete tiles + for y_tile in 0..y_tile_count { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + let x_start = x_tile * TILE_SIZE; + let y_start = y_tile * TILE_SIZE; + + unsafe { + transpose_tile_16x16_neon_8b(input, output, width, height, x_start, y_start); + } + } + + // Right edge remainder + if remainder_x > 0 { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + y_tile * TILE_SIZE, + remainder_x, + TILE_SIZE, + ); + } + } + } + + // Bottom edge remainder + if remainder_y > 0 { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile * TILE_SIZE, + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + TILE_SIZE, + remainder_y, + ); + } + } + + // Bottom-right corner + if remainder_x > 0 { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + width, + height, + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + remainder_x, + remainder_y, + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Recursive cache-oblivious transpose for large matrices of 8-byte elements. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure valid pointers and that coordinate ranges are within bounds. +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_recursive_8b( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, +) { + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + + if (nbr_rows <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT && nbr_cols <= RECURSIVE_LIMIT) + || nbr_rows <= 2 + || nbr_cols <= 2 + { + unsafe { + transpose_region_tiled_8b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + return; + } + + if nbr_rows >= nbr_cols { + let mid = row_start + (nbr_rows / 2); + + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_8b( + input, output, row_start, mid, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_8b( + input, output, mid, row_end, col_start, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + } else { + let mid = col_start + (nbr_cols / 2); + + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_8b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, col_start, mid, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + + unsafe { + transpose_recursive_8b( + input, output, row_start, row_end, mid, col_end, total_cols, total_rows, + ); + } + } +} + +/// Tiled transpose for a rectangular region of 8-byte elements. +/// +/// Used as the base case of recursive transpose and for parallel stripe processing. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for `total_cols * total_rows` elements +/// - `row_start < row_end <= total_rows` +/// - `col_start < col_end <= total_cols` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_region_tiled_8b( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + row_start: usize, + row_end: usize, + col_start: usize, + col_end: usize, + total_cols: usize, + total_rows: usize, +) { + let nbr_cols = col_end - col_start; + let nbr_rows = row_end - row_start; + + let x_tile_count = nbr_cols / TILE_SIZE; + let y_tile_count = nbr_rows / TILE_SIZE; + + let remainder_x = nbr_cols - x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + let remainder_y = nbr_rows - y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE; + + // Process complete tiles + for y_tile in 0..y_tile_count { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + let col = col_start + x_tile * TILE_SIZE; + let row = row_start + y_tile * TILE_SIZE; + + // Uses the buffered tile function: for large matrices the output + // is likely in L3/RAM, so L1 buffering + write prefetching avoids + // RFO stalls on scattered output writes. + unsafe { + transpose_tile_16x16_neon_8b_buffered( + input, output, total_cols, total_rows, col, row, + ); + } + } + + // Right edge remainder + if remainder_x > 0 { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + row_start + y_tile * TILE_SIZE, + remainder_x, + TILE_SIZE, + ); + } + } + } + + // Bottom edge remainder + if remainder_y > 0 { + for x_tile in 0..x_tile_count { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile * TILE_SIZE, + row_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + TILE_SIZE, + remainder_y, + ); + } + } + + // Bottom-right corner + if remainder_x > 0 { + unsafe { + transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input, + output, + total_cols, + total_rows, + col_start + x_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + row_start + y_tile_count * TILE_SIZE, + remainder_x, + remainder_y, + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a complete 16×16 tile of 8-byte elements using NEON SIMD (direct-to-output). +/// +/// Used by the **medium tiled path** where the output likely fits in L2 cache. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +/// - `x_start + 16 <= width` +/// - `y_start + 16 <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_16x16_neon_8b( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Block Row 0 (input rows y_start..y_start+4) + let inp = input.add(y_start * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 1 (input rows y_start+4..y_start+8) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 4) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 4); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 2 (input rows y_start+8..y_start+12) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 8) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 8); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + + // Block Row 3 (input rows y_start+12..y_start+16) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 12) * width + x_start); + let out = output.add(x_start * height + y_start + 12); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, out, width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), out.add(4 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), out.add(8 * height), width, height); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), out.add(12 * height), width, height); + } +} + +/// Transpose a complete 16×16 tile of 8-byte elements with L1 buffering. +/// +/// Used by the **recursive/parallel path** for large matrices where the output +/// is in L3/RAM. L1 buffering + write prefetching avoids RFO stalls. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +/// - `x_start + 16 <= width` +/// - `y_start + 16 <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +unsafe fn transpose_tile_16x16_neon_8b_buffered( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, +) { + // Stack buffer for L1-hot transpose (2 KB for u64). + let mut buffer = MaybeUninit::<[u64; TILE_SIZE * TILE_SIZE]>::uninit(); + let buf = buffer.as_mut_ptr().cast::(); + + unsafe { + // Transpose 4×4 grid of NEON blocks into the buffer. + + // Block Row 0 (input rows y_start..y_start+4) + let inp = input.add(y_start * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, buf, width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 1 (input rows y_start+4..y_start+8) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 4) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, buf.add(4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 4), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 2 (input rows y_start+8..y_start+12) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 8) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, buf.add(8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 8), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Block Row 3 (input rows y_start+12..y_start+16) + let inp = input.add((y_start + 12) * width + x_start); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp, buf.add(12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(4), buf.add(4 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(8), buf.add(8 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + transpose_4x4_neon_8b(inp.add(12), buf.add(12 * TILE_SIZE + 12), width, TILE_SIZE); + + // Flush buffer to output with write prefetching. + prefetch_write(output.add(x_start * height + y_start) as *const u8); + for c in 0..TILE_SIZE { + if c + 1 < TILE_SIZE { + prefetch_write(output.add((x_start + c + 1) * height + y_start) as *const u8); + } + core::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping( + buf.add(c * TILE_SIZE), + output.add((x_start + c) * height + y_start), + TILE_SIZE, + ); + } + } +} + +/// Scalar transpose for an arbitrary rectangular block of 8-byte elements. +/// +/// Used for handling edge cases where dimensions don't align to tile boundaries. +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - Valid pointers for the full matrix +/// - `x_start + block_width <= width` +/// - `y_start + block_height <= height` +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline] +#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] +unsafe fn transpose_block_scalar_8b( + input: *const u64, + output: *mut u64, + width: usize, + height: usize, + x_start: usize, + y_start: usize, + block_width: usize, + block_height: usize, +) { + for inner_x in 0..block_width { + for inner_y in 0..block_height { + let x = x_start + inner_x; + let y = y_start + inner_y; + + let input_index = x + y * width; + let output_index = y + x * height; + + unsafe { + *output.add(output_index) = *input.add(input_index); + } + } + } +} + +/// Transpose a 4×4 block of 64-bit elements using NEON SIMD. +/// +/// This is the fundamental building block for 8-byte element transpose. +/// +/// Since a 128-bit NEON register holds only 2 u64 elements, each row of 4 +/// elements requires 2 registers. A 4×4 block uses 8 registers for input +/// and 8 for output (16 total, well within NEON's 32 registers). +/// +/// # Algorithm +/// +/// The transpose uses a single-stage butterfly on four independent 2×2 +/// sub-blocks: +/// +/// ```text +/// Load: q0_lo=[a00,a01] q0_hi=[a02,a03] (row 0) +/// q1_lo=[a10,a11] q1_hi=[a12,a13] (row 1) +/// q2_lo=[a20,a21] q2_hi=[a22,a23] (row 2) +/// q3_lo=[a30,a31] q3_hi=[a32,a33] (row 3) +/// +/// Transpose 2×2 sub-blocks: +/// Top-left: trn1(q0_lo,q1_lo)=[a00,a10] trn2(q0_lo,q1_lo)=[a01,a11] +/// Top-right: trn1(q0_hi,q1_hi)=[a02,a12] trn2(q0_hi,q1_hi)=[a03,a13] +/// Bottom-left: trn1(q2_lo,q3_lo)=[a20,a30] trn2(q2_lo,q3_lo)=[a21,a31] +/// Bottom-right: trn1(q2_hi,q3_hi)=[a22,a32] trn2(q2_hi,q3_hi)=[a23,a33] +/// +/// Store: row0=[a00,a10,a20,a30] row1=[a01,a11,a21,a31] +/// row2=[a02,a12,a22,a32] row3=[a03,a13,a23,a33] +/// ``` +/// +/// # Safety +/// +/// Caller must ensure: +/// - `src` is valid for reading 4 rows of `src_stride` elements each +/// - `dst` is valid for writing 4 rows of `dst_stride` elements each +/// - The first 4 elements of each row are accessible +#[cfg(all(target_arch = "aarch64", target_feature = "neon"))] +#[inline(always)] +unsafe fn transpose_4x4_neon_8b( + src: *const u64, + dst: *mut u64, + src_stride: usize, + dst_stride: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Load 4 rows, 2 registers per row (4 u64 = 2 × 128-bit) + + // Row 0: [a00, a01] [a02, a03] + let q0_lo = vld1q_u64(src); + let q0_hi = vld1q_u64(src.add(2)); + // Row 1: [a10, a11] [a12, a13] + let q1_lo = vld1q_u64(src.add(src_stride)); + let q1_hi = vld1q_u64(src.add(src_stride + 2)); + // Row 2: [a20, a21] [a22, a23] + let q2_lo = vld1q_u64(src.add(2 * src_stride)); + let q2_hi = vld1q_u64(src.add(2 * src_stride + 2)); + // Row 3: [a30, a31] [a32, a33] + let q3_lo = vld1q_u64(src.add(3 * src_stride)); + let q3_hi = vld1q_u64(src.add(3 * src_stride + 2)); + + // Transpose four 2×2 sub-blocks using vtrn1q_u64/vtrn2q_u64 + + // Top-left: rows 0,1 × columns 0,1 + let r0_lo = vtrn1q_u64(q0_lo, q1_lo); // [a00, a10] + let r1_lo = vtrn2q_u64(q0_lo, q1_lo); // [a01, a11] + // Top-right: rows 0,1 × columns 2,3 + let r2_lo = vtrn1q_u64(q0_hi, q1_hi); // [a02, a12] + let r3_lo = vtrn2q_u64(q0_hi, q1_hi); // [a03, a13] + // Bottom-left: rows 2,3 × columns 0,1 + let r0_hi = vtrn1q_u64(q2_lo, q3_lo); // [a20, a30] + let r1_hi = vtrn2q_u64(q2_lo, q3_lo); // [a21, a31] + // Bottom-right: rows 2,3 × columns 2,3 + let r2_hi = vtrn1q_u64(q2_hi, q3_hi); // [a22, a32] + let r3_hi = vtrn2q_u64(q2_hi, q3_hi); // [a23, a33] + + // Store 4 transposed rows, 2 registers per row + + // Row 0: [a00, a10, a20, a30] + vst1q_u64(dst, r0_lo); + vst1q_u64(dst.add(2), r0_hi); + // Row 1: [a01, a11, a21, a31] + vst1q_u64(dst.add(dst_stride), r1_lo); + vst1q_u64(dst.add(dst_stride + 2), r1_hi); + // Row 2: [a02, a12, a22, a32] + vst1q_u64(dst.add(2 * dst_stride), r2_lo); + vst1q_u64(dst.add(2 * dst_stride + 2), r2_hi); + // Row 3: [a03, a13, a23, a33] + vst1q_u64(dst.add(3 * dst_stride), r3_lo); + vst1q_u64(dst.add(3 * dst_stride + 2), r3_hi); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use p3_baby_bear::BabyBear; + use p3_field::PrimeCharacteristicRing; + use p3_goldilocks::Goldilocks; + use proptest::prelude::*; + + use super::*; + + /// A type with the same size/alignment mismatch as `Complex`: + /// 8 bytes, but only 4-byte aligned. Must not be routed through the 8-byte + /// NEON path, which assumes `u64` alignment. + #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] + #[repr(C, align(4))] + struct Size8Align4([u8; 8]); + + /// Naive reference implementation for correctness testing. + fn transpose_reference(input: &[T], width: usize, height: usize) -> Vec { + // Allocate output buffer with same size as input. + let mut output = vec![T::default(); width * height]; + + // For each position (x, y) in the input matrix: + // - Input index: y * width + x (row-major) + // - Output index: x * height + y (transposed row-major) + for y in 0..height { + for x in 0..width { + output[x * height + y] = input[y * width + x]; + } + } + + output + } + + /// Strategy for generating matrix dimensions. + fn dimension_strategy() -> impl Strategy { + // Compute boundary dimensions from constants. + // `small_side` is the largest square that stays in the small (scalar) path. + let small_side = (SMALL_LEN as f64).sqrt() as usize; + // `medium_side` is the largest square that stays in the medium (tiled) path. + let medium_side = (MEDIUM_LEN as f64).sqrt() as usize; + // `large_side` is the side length that triggers the large (recursive) path. + let large_side = medium_side + 1; + + prop_oneof![ + // Edge cases: empty and degenerate matrices + // + // Empty matrix (0×0) + Just((0, 0)), + // Single row (1×n) - tests degenerate case + (1..=100_usize).prop_map(|w| (w, 1)), + // Single column (n×1) - tests degenerate case + (1..=100_usize).prop_map(|h| (1, h)), + // Small path: len < SMALL_LEN (scalar transpose) + // + // These dimensions exercise the scalar transpose path. + + // Tiny matrices (various shapes within small threshold) + (1..=small_side, 1..=small_side), + // Medium path: SMALL_LEN ≤ len < MEDIUM_LEN (tiled TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE) + // + // These dimensions exercise the tiled TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE path. + + // Exactly 4×4 (single NEON block) + Just((4, 4)), + // Exactly TILE_SIZE×TILE_SIZE (single tile) + Just((TILE_SIZE, TILE_SIZE)), + // Multiple complete tiles (2× and 4× TILE_SIZE) + Just((TILE_SIZE * 2, TILE_SIZE * 2)), + Just((TILE_SIZE * 4, TILE_SIZE * 4)), + // Non-aligned: has remainders in both dimensions + // Range from just above TILE_SIZE to below 4×TILE_SIZE. + // These test the scalar fallback for tile edges. + ( + (TILE_SIZE + 1)..=(TILE_SIZE * 4 - 1), + (TILE_SIZE + 1)..=(TILE_SIZE * 4 - 1) + ), + // Wide rectangle with remainders (medium path) + (50..=200_usize, 10..=50_usize), + // Tall rectangle with remainders (medium path) + (10..=50_usize, 50..=200_usize), + // Large path: MEDIUM_LEN ≤ len < PARALLEL_THRESHOLD (recursive) + // + // These exercise the cache-oblivious recursive subdivision. + + // Square matrices triggering recursion (just above medium threshold) + Just((large_side, large_side)), + // Slightly larger square + Just((large_side + 100, large_side + 100)), + // Wide rectangle triggering recursion + Just((large_side * 2, large_side / 2)), + // Tall rectangle triggering recursion + Just((large_side / 2, large_side * 2)), + // Non-power-of-2 dimensions in large range + Just((large_side + 50, large_side + 75)), + ] + } + + proptest! { + #[test] + fn proptest_transpose_babybear((width, height) in dimension_strategy()) { + // Skip empty matrices (they're trivially correct). + if width == 0 || height == 0 { + // Just verify it doesn't panic. + let input: [BabyBear; 0] = []; + let mut output: [BabyBear; 0] = []; + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + return Ok(()); + } + + // Create input matrix with unique values at each position. + let input: Vec = (0..width * height) + .map(|i| BabyBear::from_u64(i as u64)) + .collect(); + + // Allocate output buffer. + let mut output = BabyBear::zero_vec(width * height); + + // Run optimized transpose. + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + + // Run reference transpose. + let expected = transpose_reference(&input, width, height); + + // Verify results match. + prop_assert_eq!( + output, + expected, + "Transpose mismatch for {}×{} matrix", + width, + height + ); + } + + #[test] + fn proptest_transpose_u64((width, height) in dimension_strategy()) { + // Skip empty and very large matrices for u64 (memory intensive). + if width == 0 || height == 0 || width * height > 100_000 { + return Ok(()); + } + + // Create input with unique values. + let input: Vec = (0..width * height).map(|i| i as u64).collect(); + + // Allocate output. + let mut output = vec![0u64; width * height]; + + // Run transpose. + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + + // Verify against reference. + let expected = transpose_reference(&input, width, height); + prop_assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn proptest_transpose_u8((width, height) in dimension_strategy()) { + // Skip empty and very large matrices. + if width == 0 || height == 0 || width * height > 100_000 { + return Ok(()); + } + + // Create input with unique values (wrapping for u8). + let input: Vec = (0..width * height).map(|i| i as u8).collect(); + + // Allocate output. + let mut output = vec![0u8; width * height]; + + // Run transpose. + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + + // Verify against reference. + let expected = transpose_reference(&input, width, height); + prop_assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn proptest_transpose_size8_align4((width, height) in dimension_strategy()) { + // Skip empty and very large matrices. + if width == 0 || height == 0 || width * height > 100_000 { + return Ok(()); + } + + // Create input with unique values. + let input: Vec = (0..width * height) + .map(|i| Size8Align4((i as u64).to_le_bytes())) + .collect(); + + // Allocate output. + let mut output = vec![Size8Align4::default(); width * height]; + + // Run transpose. + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + + // Verify against reference. + let expected = transpose_reference(&input, width, height); + prop_assert_eq!(output, expected); + } + + #[test] + fn proptest_transpose_goldilocks((width, height) in dimension_strategy()) { + // Skip empty matrices. + if width == 0 || height == 0 { + let input: [Goldilocks; 0] = []; + let mut output: [Goldilocks; 0] = []; + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + return Ok(()); + } + + // Create input matrix with unique values at each position. + let input: Vec = (0..width * height) + .map(|i| Goldilocks::from_u64(i as u64)) + .collect(); + + // Allocate output buffer. + let mut output = Goldilocks::zero_vec(width * height); + + // Run optimized transpose. + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + + // Run reference transpose. + let expected = transpose_reference(&input, width, height); + + // Verify results match. + prop_assert_eq!( + output, + expected, + "Transpose mismatch for {}×{} matrix", + width, + height + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn transpose_parallel_paths_match_reference() { + // The longer-dimension striping runs only past the parallel threshold, + // and only on aarch64 with the `parallel` feature. + // + // The proptest dimensions stay below that threshold, so these shapes + // cross it on purpose to cover both stripings. + let shapes = [ + (1 << 13, 640), // wide, tile-aligned + (640, 1 << 13), // tall, tile-aligned + (8191, 641), // wide, off both tile and thread boundaries + (641, 8191), // tall, off both tile and thread boundaries + (1 << 22, 2), // degenerate wide: a two-row input + ]; + for (width, height) in shapes { + // Distinct values 0..size, so a misplaced element is caught. + let size = width * height; + + // 4-byte path. + let input: Vec = (0..size as u32).collect(); + let mut output = vec![0u32; size]; + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + assert_eq!( + output, + transpose_reference(&input, width, height), + "4-byte parallel transpose mismatch for {width}×{height}" + ); + + // 8-byte path. + let input: Vec = (0..size as u64).collect(); + let mut output = vec![0u64; size]; + transpose(&input, &mut output, width, height); + assert_eq!( + output, + transpose_reference(&input, width, height), + "8-byte parallel transpose mismatch for {width}×{height}" + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/square.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/square.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98312e0f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/transpose/square.rs @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@ +use core::ptr::{swap, swap_nonoverlapping}; +#[cfg(feature = "parallel")] +use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicPtr, Ordering}; + +/// Log2 of the matrix dimension below which we use the base-case direct swap loop. +/// e.g. BASE_CASE_LOG = 3 means base case is used for ≤ 8×8 submatrices +const BASE_CASE_LOG: usize = 3; + +/// Absolute size threshold (in elements) below which recursive swap stops +const BASE_CASE_ELEMENT_THRESHOLD: usize = 1 << (2 * BASE_CASE_LOG); + +#[cfg(feature = "parallel")] +/// Threshold (in number of elements) beyond which we enable parallel recursion +const PARALLEL_RECURSION_THRESHOLD: usize = 1 << 10; + +/// Transpose a small square matrix in-place using element-wise swaps. +/// +/// # Parameters +/// - `ptr`: Pointer to the base of a 1D array representing a larger row-major matrix. +/// - `log_stride`: Log2 of the stride between rows in the array. +/// - `log_size`: Log2 of the dimension of the square matrix to transpose. +/// - `x`: Offset (in rows and columns) from the top-left corner of the full array. +/// +/// The matrix occupies a logical square region starting at `(x, x)` and of size `1 << log_size`. +/// +/// ## SAFETY +/// - `ptr` must be valid for reads and writes of every offset this call touches. +/// - `log_size <= log_stride` must hold to prevent overlapping indices during swaps. +unsafe fn transpose_in_place_square_small( + ptr: *mut T, + log_stride: usize, + log_size: usize, + x: usize, +) { + unsafe { + // Loop over upper triangle (excluding diagonal) + for i in (x + 1)..(x + (1 << log_size)) { + for j in x..i { + // Compute memory offsets and swap M[i, j] <-> M[j, i] + swap( + ptr.add(i + (j << log_stride)), + ptr.add((i << log_stride) + j), + ); + } + } + } +} + +/// Recursively swaps two submatrices across the main diagonal as part of a larger transposition. +/// +/// Given: +/// - Submatrix `A` of shape `(rows × cols)` +/// - Submatrix `B` of shape `(cols × rows)` +/// +/// This function swaps element `A[i, j]` with `B[j, i]`, effectively transposing them +/// relative to each other. +/// +/// `A` is assumed to be row-major, starting at pointer `a`, where `A[i,j] = a[i * width_outer_mat + j]`. +/// `B` is assumed to be row-major, starting at pointer `b`, where `B[j,i] = b[j * width_outer_mat + i]`. +/// +/// The recursion always splits along the longer dimension to balance cache and workload. +/// +/// # Safety +/// - `a` and `b` must be valid for `rows * cols` reads and writes. +/// - The regions pointed to by `a` and `b` must be disjoint. +/// - `width_outer_mat` must be large enough to avoid overlapping accesses during index calculations. +pub(super) unsafe fn transpose_swap( + a: *mut T, + b: *mut T, + width_outer_mat: usize, + (rows, cols): (usize, usize), +) { + let size = rows * cols; + + // Base case: directly swap A[i,j] with B[j,i] using pointer offsets + if size < BASE_CASE_ELEMENT_THRESHOLD { + for i in 0..rows { + for j in 0..cols { + let ai = i * width_outer_mat + j; + let bi = j * width_outer_mat + i; + unsafe { + swap_nonoverlapping(a.add(ai), b.add(bi), 1); + } + } + } + return; + } + + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + { + // If large enough, split work recursively in parallel + if size > PARALLEL_RECURSION_THRESHOLD { + let a = AtomicPtr::new(a); + let b = AtomicPtr::new(b); + + // Prefer splitting the longer dimension for better balance and locality + if rows > cols { + let top = rows / 2; + let bottom = rows - top; + rayon::join( + || { + let a = a.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let b = b.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + unsafe { + transpose_swap(a, b, width_outer_mat, (top, cols)); + } + }, + || { + let a = a.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let b = b.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + unsafe { + transpose_swap( + a.add(top * width_outer_mat), + b.add(top), + width_outer_mat, + (bottom, cols), + ); + } + }, + ); + } else { + let left = cols / 2; + let right = cols - left; + rayon::join( + || { + let a = a.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let b = b.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + unsafe { + transpose_swap(a, b, width_outer_mat, (rows, left)); + } + }, + || { + let a = a.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let b = b.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + unsafe { + transpose_swap( + a.add(left), + b.add(left * width_outer_mat), + width_outer_mat, + (rows, right), + ); + } + }, + ); + } + return; + } + } + + // Sequential case: same recursive logic without threading + if rows > cols { + let top = rows / 2; + let bottom = rows - top; + unsafe { + transpose_swap(a, b, width_outer_mat, (top, cols)); + transpose_swap( + a.add(top * width_outer_mat), + b.add(top), + width_outer_mat, + (bottom, cols), + ); + } + } else { + let left = cols / 2; + let right = cols - left; + unsafe { + transpose_swap(a, b, width_outer_mat, (rows, left)); + transpose_swap( + a.add(left), + b.add(left * width_outer_mat), + width_outer_mat, + (rows, right), + ); + } + } +} + +/// In-place recursive transposition of a square matrix of size `2^log_size × 2^log_size`, +/// embedded inside a larger row-major array at offset `(x, x)`. +/// +/// Each matrix element `M[i,j]` is stored at: +/// ```text +/// \begin{equation} +/// \text{index}(i,j) = ((i + x) << log_stride) + (j + x) +/// \end{equation} +/// ``` +/// +/// The matrix is recursively split into four quadrants: +/// ```text +/// +----+----+ +/// | TL | TR | +/// +----+----+ +/// | BL | BR | +/// +----+----+ +/// ``` +/// Transposition proceeds by: +/// 1. Recursively transposing `TL` +/// 2. Swapping `TR` and `BL` across the diagonal +/// 3. Recursively transposing `BR` +/// +/// # Safety +/// - Assumes all accesses via `((i + x) << log_stride) + (j + x)` are in-bounds. +/// - Requires `log_size <= log_stride` to avoid index overlap. +pub(crate) unsafe fn transpose_in_place_square( + arr: &mut [T], + log_stride: usize, + log_size: usize, + x: usize, +) where + T: Copy + Send + Sync, +{ + // SAFETY: `arr.as_mut_ptr()` is valid for the accesses the recursion + // below performs, per this function's own safety contract. + unsafe { + transpose_in_place_square_ptr(arr.as_mut_ptr(), log_stride, log_size, x); + } +} + +/// Raw-pointer core of [`transpose_in_place_square`]. +/// +/// Operating on a raw pointer throughout (rather than reconstructing a +/// `&mut [T]` slice at each recursive call) avoids ever having two live +/// mutable references over the same backing array: the parallel branch below +/// recurses into disjoint quadrants concurrently, and two `&mut [T]` slices +/// spanning the same memory are UB regardless of whether the accesses they +/// perform actually overlap. +/// +/// # Safety +/// - `ptr` must be valid for reads and writes of every offset this call +/// (and its recursive descendants) touches. +/// - `log_size <= log_stride` must hold to prevent overlapping indices during swaps. +unsafe fn transpose_in_place_square_ptr( + ptr: *mut T, + log_stride: usize, + log_size: usize, + x: usize, +) where + T: Copy + Send + Sync, +{ + // If small, switch to base case + if log_size <= BASE_CASE_LOG { + unsafe { + transpose_in_place_square_small(ptr, log_stride, log_size, x); + } + return; + } + + // Shared derived values for both sequential and parallel paths. + // `log_size > BASE_CASE_LOG >= 1`, so `log_size - 1` cannot underflow. + let log_half_size = log_size - 1; + let half = 1 << log_half_size; + let stride = 1 << log_stride; + + #[cfg(feature = "parallel")] + { + // Total number of elements in the full square matrix + let elements = 1 << (2 * log_size); + + if elements >= PARALLEL_RECURSION_THRESHOLD { + // Shared base pointer for parallel recursion + let base = AtomicPtr::new(ptr); + + // Coordinate each quadrant via `rayon::join`: + // - TL and BR are recursive calls + // - TR and BL are swapped directly + rayon::join( + || unsafe { + transpose_in_place_square_ptr( + base.load(Ordering::Relaxed), + log_stride, + log_half_size, + x, + ); + }, + || { + rayon::join( + // TR: starts at (x, x + half) + // BL: starts at (x + half, x) + || unsafe { + let ptr = base.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + transpose_swap( + ptr.add((x << log_stride) + (x + half)), + ptr.add(((x + half) << log_stride) + x), + stride, + (half, half), + ); + }, + || unsafe { + transpose_in_place_square_ptr( + base.load(Ordering::Relaxed), + log_stride, + log_half_size, + x + half, + ); + }, + ) + }, + ); + return; + } + } + + // Sequential version of above logic + unsafe { + // Transpose TL quadrant (top-left) + transpose_in_place_square_ptr(ptr, log_stride, log_half_size, x); + // Swap TR (top-right) with BL (bottom-left) + transpose_swap( + ptr.add((x << log_stride) + (x + half)), + ptr.add(((x + half) << log_stride) + x), + stride, + (half, half), + ); + // Transpose BR quadrant (bottom-right) + transpose_in_place_square_ptr(ptr, log_stride, log_half_size, x + half); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + extern crate alloc; + + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use super::*; + + /// Helper to create a square matrix of size `2^log_size` with elements `0..n^2` + fn generate_matrix(log_size: usize) -> Vec { + let size = 1 << log_size; + (0..size * size).collect() + } + + /// Reference transpose that returns a new vector (row-major layout) + fn transpose_reference(input: &[u32], log_size: usize) -> Vec { + let size = 1 << log_size; + let mut transposed = vec![0; size * size]; + for i in 0..size { + for j in 0..size { + transposed[j * size + i] = input[i * size + j]; + } + } + transposed + } + + #[test] + fn transpose_square() { + // Loop over matrix sizes: + // Each size is of the form 2^log_size × 2^log_size + for log_size in 1..=10 { + // Compute the actual dimension: size = 2^log_size + let size = 1 << log_size; + + // Generate a flat matrix of size×size elements + let mut mat = generate_matrix(log_size); + + // Compute the reference result using a naive transpose implementation + let expected = transpose_reference(&mat, log_size); + + // Perform the in-place transpose on `mat`. + unsafe { + transpose_in_place_square(&mut mat, log_size, log_size, 0); + } + + // Compare the transposed matrix against the reference. + assert_eq!(mat, expected, "Transpose failed for {size}x{size} matrix"); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/zip_eq.rs b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/zip_eq.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6ae6d4da --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-m31/vendor/p3-util-0.6.2-sbf-patch/src/zip_eq.rs @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +/// An iterator which iterates two other iterators of the same length simultaneously. +/// +/// Equality of the lengths of `a` and `b` is checked at construction time. +#[must_use = "iterator adaptors are lazy and do nothing unless consumed"] +pub struct ZipEq { + a: A, + b: B, +} + +/// Zips two iterators but **panics** if they are not of the same length. +/// +/// Similar to `itertools::zip_eq`, but we check the lengths at construction time. +pub fn zip_eq( + a: A, + b: B, + err: Error, +) -> Result, Error> +where + A: IntoIterator, + AIter: ExactSizeIterator, + B: IntoIterator, + BIter: ExactSizeIterator, +{ + let a_iter = a.into_iter(); + let b_iter = b.into_iter(); + if a_iter.len() == b_iter.len() { + Ok(ZipEq { + a: a_iter, + b: b_iter, + }) + } else { + Err(err) + } +} + +impl Iterator for ZipEq +where + A: ExactSizeIterator, // We need to use ExactSizeIterator here otherwise the size_hint() methods could differ. + B: ExactSizeIterator, +{ + type Item = (A::Item, B::Item); + + fn next(&mut self) -> Option { + match (self.a.next(), self.b.next()) { + (Some(a), Some(b)) => Some((a, b)), + (None, None) => None, + _ => unreachable!("The iterators must have the same length."), + } + } + + fn size_hint(&self) -> (usize, Option) { + // self.a.size_hint() = self.b.size_hint() as a and b are ExactSizeIterators + // and we checked that they are the same length at construction time. + debug_assert_eq!(self.a.size_hint(), self.b.size_hint()); + self.a.size_hint() + } +} + +impl ExactSizeIterator for ZipEq +where + A: ExactSizeIterator, + B: ExactSizeIterator, +{ +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use alloc::vec; + use alloc::vec::Vec; + + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn test_zip_eq_success() { + let a = [1, 2, 3]; + let b = ['a', 'b', 'c']; + + // Expect zip_eq to succeed since both slices are length 3. + let zipped = zip_eq(a, b, "length mismatch").unwrap(); + + let result: Vec<_> = zipped.collect(); + + // Expect tuples zipped together positionally. + assert_eq!(result, vec![(1, 'a'), (2, 'b'), (3, 'c')]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_zip_eq_length_mismatch() { + let a = [1, 2]; + let b = ['x', 'y', 'z']; + + // Use pattern matching instead of .unwrap_err() + match zip_eq(a, b, "oops") { + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e, "oops"), + Ok(_) => panic!("expected error due to mismatched lengths"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_zip_eq_empty_iterators() { + let a: [i32; 0] = []; + let b: [char; 0] = []; + + // Zipping two empty iterators should succeed and produce an empty iterator. + let mut zipped = zip_eq(a, b, "mismatch").unwrap(); + + // The result should be an empty vector. + assert!(zipped.next().is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_zip_eq_size_hint() { + let a = [10, 20]; + let b = [100, 200]; + + let zipped = zip_eq(a, b, "bad").unwrap(); + + // Size hint should reflect the number of items remaining. + assert_eq!(zipped.size_hint(), (2, Some(2))); + } + + #[test] + fn test_zip_eq_unreachable_case() { + let a = [1, 2]; + let b = [3, 4]; + + let mut zipped = zip_eq(a, b, "fail").unwrap(); + + // Manually advance 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Excluded from the default workspace (pulls Winterfell +# via riverrun-stark); builds/tests standalone: +# cargo test --manifest-path crates/riverrun-pool-zk/Cargo.toml +[package] +name = "riverrun-pool-zk" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +license = "MIT" +description = "ZK-backed behavioral pool for riverrun: execution carries an opaque post-quantum STARK membership proof, not the secret." + +[dependencies] +riverrun-stark = { path = "../riverrun-stark" } +# OS CSPRNG for minting member secrets (two f128 field elements, ~256 bits). +getrandom = "0.2" diff --git a/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/examples/behavior_pool.rs b/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/examples/behavior_pool.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..955566d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/examples/behavior_pool.rs @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +//! End-to-end demo of the behavioral pool: **Tornado Cash for actions, not funds.** +//! +//! Four members commit the *same* action, then all execute it in one synchronized +//! round. The public transcript is printed — identical actions, distinct +//! nullifiers, one root — and the point is what is *absent*: any way to map an +//! executed action back to the member who committed it. Then two guards fire, and +//! both are enforced by the post-quantum STARK rather than by a field comparison: +//! a double execution, and an execution that swaps in an action the member never +//! committed. +//! +//! Run: `cargo run --manifest-path crates/riverrun-pool-zk/Cargo.toml --example behavior_pool` + +use riverrun_pool_zk::{Action, Secret, ZkPool}; +use riverrun_stark::{BaseElement, Hash}; + +fn main() { + // A public action. Amount/target are NOT hidden — the *author* is. + // (In practice this is the hash of e.g. "withdraw 1 SOL from protocol P".) + let action: Action = [BaseElement::new(0x5749_5448_4452_4157), BaseElement::new(1)]; + let round: u64 = 2026_07_23; + + let mut pool = ZkPool::new(); + + // --- Commit phase ("deposits") --------------------------------------- + // Four distinct members each commit the identical action. + let members: Vec<(Secret, usize)> = (1u128..=4) + .map(|i| { + let secret: Secret = [BaseElement::new(0xA11CE * i), BaseElement::new(0xB0B * i)]; + let idx = pool.commit(secret, action); + (secret, idx) + }) + .collect(); + + println!("riverrun — Tornado for behavior (not funds)\n"); + println!("committed members : {}", pool.len()); + println!("set root : {}\n", hex8(&pool.root().unwrap())); + + // --- Execute + settle phase ("withdrawals" / saques) ----------------- + println!("synchronized round — public transcript the observer sees:"); + println!("{:<4} {:<20} {:<18} {}", "#", "action (public)", "nullifier", "proof"); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(66)); + for (n, (secret, idx)) in members.iter().enumerate() { + let exec = pool.prove_execution(*secret, *idx, round, action); + let bytes = exec.proof.len(); + pool.settle(&exec).expect("settles"); + println!( + "{:<4} {:<20} {:<18} {} B", + n + 1, + hex8(&Hash::new(action[0], action[1])), + hex8(&exec.nullifier), + bytes + ); + } + + println!( + "\nEvery row is the SAME action with a DISTINCT nullifier, all under one\n\ + root. The nullifier is Rescue(secret‖round), unlinkable to any commitment,\n\ + and the proof carries no witness — settle never sees a secret.\n\ + An observer's chance of mapping any execution to its author is 1/{}.\n", + members.len() + ); + + // --- Guards ---------------------------------------------------------- + // 1. A member cannot execute twice in the same round (anti-replay). + let (secret0, idx0) = &members[0]; + let replay = pool.prove_execution(*secret0, *idx0, round, action); + println!("double execution, same round -> {:?}", pool.settle(&replay).unwrap_err()); + + // 2. An action the member never committed. The leaf is Rescue(secret, action), + // and the action is a public input of the same proof, so this is caught by + // the proof failing to verify — not by comparing a field. + let mut swapped = pool.prove_execution(members[1].0, members[1].1, round + 1, action); + swapped.action = [BaseElement::new(0xDEAD), BaseElement::new(0xBEEF)]; + println!("action the member never committed -> {:?}", pool.settle(&swapped).unwrap_err()); +} + +/// First 8 bytes of a digest as hex, for compact display. +fn hex8(h: &Hash) -> String { + h.to_bytes()[..8].iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect::() + "…" +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc342b56 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-pool-zk/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +//! # riverrun-pool-zk +//! +//! The behavioral pool with the STARK **wired into the flow** — the honest fix +//! for audit-critical #1's confidentiality half. Unlike `riverrun-core`'s +//! reference-proof pool (which serializes the secret into the `Execution`), here +//! an [`Execution`] carries only **public data plus an opaque post-quantum STARK +//! membership proof**. The member's secret never leaves the prover. +//! +//! Flow: +//! - **commit**: publish `leaf = Rescue(secret, action)` into the set — the member +//! registers *which intent* they may later execute. +//! - **execute**: produce an opaque STARK proof that *some* committed leaf is +//! yours, that it commits to *this* action, and that the revealed round +//! nullifier came from that same secret — none of which transmits the secret. +//! - **settle**: verify the opaque proof against the public root, round and +//! nullifier, then spend the nullifier. No witness required. +//! +//! ## Honest scope (what this does and does NOT close) +//! +//! - Closes: the secret is no longer on the wire (confidentiality of +//! audit-critical #1). Verified by a test asserting the `Execution` carries no +//! witness. +//! - Closes: the nullifier is **bound inside the STARK** (audit-critical #1c). +//! The proof's public inputs are `{root, nullifier, round, action}`, and the AIR +//! witnesses every part from one secret, so pairing a valid membership proof +//! with a nullifier of one's choosing no longer verifies — "one action per +//! member per round" is cryptographically enforced here. +//! - Closes: the **action is bound too**. The leaf is `Rescue(secret, action)`, so +//! a member can execute the intent they registered and not another. Without +//! this, membership alone would let anyone in the set execute anything. +//! - Still open: the AIR is hand-rolled and **unaudited**. Passing negative tests +//! are necessary, not sufficient, for soundness. +//! - Still open: verification is off-chain (the chosen trusted-relayer, +//! post-quantum model). The on-chain `execute` still verifies no membership — +//! audit-critical #2. +//! - The proof keeps the witness off the wire but Winterfell 0.13 has no witness +//! randomization, so this is not a formal zero-knowledge guarantee. + +use std::collections::HashSet; + +use riverrun_stark::{leaf_of, nullifier, verify_bound, BaseElement, Hash, MembershipSet}; + +/// A member's secret witness: the two field-element preimage of their leaf. +pub type Secret = [BaseElement; 2]; + +/// The public action a member commits to and later executes, as two field +/// elements (a 32-byte action hash). +pub type Action = [BaseElement; 2]; + +/// Mint a fresh member secret from the operating system's CSPRNG. +/// +/// The secret is two independent `f128` field elements — ~256 bits of entropy. +/// Every hiding property of the pool (the leaf `Rescue(secret, action)` and the +/// per-round `nullifier(secret, round)`) rests on this secret being unguessable: +/// a 256-bit secret costs a quantum adversary ~2^128 work under Grover, the +/// standard post-quantum level. Leaving secret generation to the caller is a +/// footgun (a weak secret is breakable regardless of the hash), so the pool +/// ships the generator. +pub fn random_secret() -> Secret { + [random_field_element(), random_field_element()] +} + +/// Draw one near-uniform `f128` element from 128 bits of OS entropy. The modular +/// reduction bias is negligible: the f128 modulus is within a tiny factor of +/// 2^128, so a uniform `u128` maps to a statistically uniform field element. +fn random_field_element() -> BaseElement { + let mut bytes = [0u8; 16]; + getrandom::getrandom(&mut bytes) + .expect("OS CSPRNG must be available to mint a member secret"); + BaseElement::new(u128::from_le_bytes(bytes)) +} + +/// Everything an execution publishes. Note the absence of any witness field — +/// only the public root, round, revealed nullifier, and the opaque proof. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct Execution { + pub root: Hash, + pub round: u64, + pub nullifier: Hash, + /// The action being executed. Public, and witnessed by the proof. + pub action: Action, + /// Opaque post-quantum STARK membership proof. Carries no secret. + pub proof: Vec, +} + +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum ZkPoolError { + EmptyPool, + StaleRoot, + BadProof, + NullifierSpent, +} + +/// The ZK-backed behavioral pool. +#[derive(Default)] +pub struct ZkPool { + leaves: Vec, + spent: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, +} + +impl ZkPool { + pub fn new() -> Self { + Self::default() + } + + /// Commit a member's intent: publish `Rescue(secret, action)` as a leaf. + /// Returns the member's private leaf index. + pub fn commit(&mut self, secret: Secret, action: Action) -> usize { + self.leaves.push(leaf_of(secret, action)); + self.leaves.len() - 1 + } + + pub fn len(&self) -> usize { + self.leaves.len() + } + + pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { + self.leaves.is_empty() + } + + /// Valid Merkle widths for the STARK: the bound trace spends one cycle on the + /// nullifier and one per Merkle level, so its length is `(depth+2)·8`, a power + /// of two (required for the FFT) only when `depth+2` is — i.e. tree sizes 4, 64 + /// and 16384 (depths 2, 6, 14). + const VALID_WIDTHS: [usize; 3] = [4, 64, 16384]; + + /// Leaves padded up to the smallest valid width that fits the members, with a + /// fixed empty leaf appended after the real members so real indices stay stable. + fn padded_leaves(&self) -> Vec { + let n = self.leaves.len().max(1); + let width = Self::VALID_WIDTHS + .into_iter() + .find(|&w| n <= w) + .expect("pool exceeds the largest fixed STARK tree size (16384)"); + let mut v = self.leaves.clone(); + let empty = Hash::new(BaseElement::new(0), BaseElement::new(0)); + v.resize(width, empty); + v + } + + fn set(&self) -> MembershipSet { + MembershipSet::new(self.padded_leaves()) + } + + /// The public set root, or `None` if empty. + pub fn root(&self) -> Option { + if self.leaves.is_empty() { + None + } else { + Some(self.set().root()) + } + } + + /// The per-round nullifier for a secret: `Rescue(secret[0], secret[1], round)`. + /// The membership proof witnesses this same derivation, so a nullifier that + /// does not come from the proving member's secret makes the proof fail. + fn nullifier(secret: &Secret, round: u64) -> Hash { + nullifier(*secret, Self::round_element(round)) + } + + fn round_element(round: u64) -> BaseElement { + BaseElement::new(round as u128) + } + + /// Produce an execution: an opaque STARK membership proof plus the round + /// nullifier. The secret stays here; it is not part of the returned value. + pub fn prove_execution( + &self, + secret: Secret, + index: usize, + round: u64, + action: Action, + ) -> Execution { + let set = self.set(); + Execution { + root: set.root(), + round, + nullifier: Self::nullifier(&secret, round), + action, + proof: set.prove_bound(secret, index, Self::round_element(round), action), + } + } + + /// Verify an execution against the current root and spend its nullifier. + /// Requires no witness — only the public statement and the opaque proof. + pub fn settle(&mut self, exec: &Execution) -> Result<(), ZkPoolError> { + let current = self.root().ok_or(ZkPoolError::EmptyPool)?; + if current.to_bytes() != exec.root.to_bytes() { + return Err(ZkPoolError::StaleRoot); + } + if !verify_bound( + exec.root, + exec.nullifier, + Self::round_element(exec.round), + exec.action, + &exec.proof, + ) { + return Err(ZkPoolError::BadProof); + } + let n = exec.nullifier.to_bytes(); + if self.spent.contains(&n) { + return Err(ZkPoolError::NullifierSpent); + } + self.spent.insert(n); + Ok(()) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn secret(a: u128, b: u128) -> Secret { + [BaseElement::new(a), BaseElement::new(b)] + } + + fn action(tag: u128) -> Action { + [BaseElement::new(0xAC01 + tag), BaseElement::new(0xAC02 + tag)] + } + + /// Fill the pool to `n` members, returning their (secret, index) handles. + fn pool_with(n: u128) -> (ZkPool, Vec<(Secret, usize)>) { + let mut pool = ZkPool::new(); + let members: Vec<(Secret, usize)> = (0..n) + .map(|i| { + let s = secret(1000 + i, 2000 + i); + let idx = pool.commit(s, action(0)); + (s, idx) + }) + .collect(); + (pool, members) + } + + #[test] + fn commit_execute_settle_round_trip() { + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(5); + let (s, idx) = members[2]; + let exec = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 0, action(0)); + assert!(pool.settle(&exec).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn settle_needs_no_secret() { + // The whole point of 1b: settle takes only &Execution — the public root, + // round, revealed nullifier, and the opaque proof. It never receives the + // secret. We drop the secret before settling to make that explicit; the + // opaque proof still verifies from public data alone. (That the secret is + // also absent from the proof *bytes* is proven in riverrun-stark's + // `transmitted_proof_does_not_carry_the_secret_verbatim`.) + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(5); + let (s, idx) = members[1]; + let exec = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 7, action(0)); + drop(s); + assert!(pool.settle(&exec).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn double_execution_same_round_is_rejected() { + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(4); + let (s, idx) = members[0]; + let e1 = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 0, action(0)); + let e2 = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 0, action(0)); + assert!(pool.settle(&e1).is_ok()); + assert_eq!(pool.settle(&e2).unwrap_err(), ZkPoolError::NullifierSpent); + } + + #[test] + fn same_member_acts_once_per_new_round() { + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(4); + let (s, idx) = members[0]; + assert!(pool.settle(&pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 1, action(0))).is_ok()); + assert!(pool.settle(&pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 2, action(0))).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn an_execution_carrying_someone_elses_nullifier_is_rejected() { + // Audit-critical #1c at the pool level. Before the nullifier was bound + // inside the AIR, the proof only said "a member is here" and the nullifier + // beside it was unchecked — a member could act, then act again in the same + // round under a nullifier of their choosing. + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(3); + let (s_a, idx_a) = members[0]; + let (s_b, _) = members[1]; + + let mut exec = pool.prove_execution(s_a, idx_a, 4, action(0)); + exec.nullifier = ZkPool::nullifier(&s_b, 4); + + assert_eq!(pool.settle(&exec).unwrap_err(), ZkPoolError::BadProof); + } + + #[test] + fn executing_an_action_the_member_did_not_commit_is_rejected() { + // The thesis: a member registers an intent and later executes *that* + // intent unlinkably. Without the action inside the proof, membership + // alone would let anyone in the set execute anything. + let mut pool = ZkPool::new(); + let s = secret(1000, 2000); + let committed = action(1); + let idx = pool.commit(s, committed); + + let mut exec = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 5, committed); + exec.action = action(2); + + assert_eq!(pool.settle(&exec).unwrap_err(), ZkPoolError::BadProof); + } + + #[test] + fn tampered_proof_is_rejected() { + let (mut pool, members) = pool_with(4); + let (s, idx) = members[3]; + let mut exec = pool.prove_execution(s, idx, 0, action(0)); + // Corrupt the opaque proof. + if let Some(b) = exec.proof.get_mut(16) { + *b ^= 0xFF; + } + assert_eq!(pool.settle(&exec).unwrap_err(), ZkPoolError::BadProof); + } + + #[test] + fn random_secret_is_unique_and_usable() { + // Two minted secrets must differ (a constant generator would collide), + // and a random secret must drive a full commit -> execute -> settle, + // proving the OS-generated witness is a valid pool secret, not just bytes. + let a = random_secret(); + let b = random_secret(); + assert_ne!(a, b, "two OS-random secrets collided"); + + // Same size as the passing round-trip test (5 members), with the random + // member placed among constant-secret padding. + let mut pool = ZkPool::new(); + pool.commit(secret(1, 2), action(0)); + pool.commit(secret(3, 4), action(0)); + let idx = pool.commit(a, action(7)); + pool.commit(secret(5, 6), action(0)); + pool.commit(secret(7, 8), action(0)); + let exec = pool.prove_execution(a, idx, 0, action(7)); + assert!(pool.settle(&exec).is_ok(), "random secret failed to settle"); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-sdk/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-sdk/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c1e51bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-sdk/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +[package] +name = "riverrun-sdk" +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +description = "The act() flow a fund integrates: one secret, one call, one unlinkable and measured action on Solana." + +[dependencies] +riverrun-core = { path = "../riverrun-core" } diff --git a/crates/riverrun-sdk/examples/position_bot.rs b/crates/riverrun-sdk/examples/position_bot.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bba845e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-sdk/examples/position_bot.rs @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +//! Phase E: a fund enters and exits a position unlinkably. +//! +//! The fund-facing proof that the primitive is real. One secret, two `act()` calls +//! in two different contexts: enter the position, and later exit it. An observer of +//! the chain sees two unrelated settlements. The fund knows they are the same +//! position, opened and closed, each with a measured anonymity floor. Nobody can +//! link the entry to the exit, or either to the fund. +//! +//! Run: `cargo run -p riverrun-sdk --example position_bot` +//! +//! This runs against an in-memory backend so it is deterministic and offline. The +//! same `act()` calls run on-chain through the devnet backend +//! (`programs/mirror-pool/examples/act_devnet.rs`, Phase D), which settles for real. + +use riverrun_core::act as core_act; +use riverrun_core::commitment::{Commitment, Secret}; +use riverrun_core::nullifier::Nullifier; +use riverrun_sdk::{act, ActRequest, Backend, Policy, Proof, Prover, Receipt, RoundInfo}; + +fn hex8(bytes: &[u8]) -> String { + bytes.iter().take(8).map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect() +} + +/// An in-memory backend: a healthy round, and a deterministic settlement signature +/// derived from the nullifier so the demo is reproducible. +struct SimBackend { + round: Vec, + advertised_k: usize, + effective_k: f64, +} +impl Backend for SimBackend { + fn commit(&mut self, _commitment: &Commitment) -> Result<(), String> { + Ok(()) + } + fn await_round(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(RoundInfo { + round: self.round.clone(), + advertised_k: self.advertised_k, + effective_k: self.effective_k, + }) + } + fn settle( + &mut self, + _round: &RoundInfo, + nullifier: &Nullifier, + _action: &[u8], + _recipient: &[u8; 32], + _amount: u64, + _proof: &Proof, + ) -> Result { + Ok(format!("sim-{}", hex8(nullifier.as_bytes()))) + } +} + +struct SimProver; +impl Prover for SimProver { + fn prove(&self, _s: &Secret, _c: &[u8], _a: &[u8], _r: &RoundInfo) -> Result { + Ok(Vec::new()) + } +} + +fn print_leg(name: &str, ctx: &[u8], receipt: &Receipt) { + println!(" {name}"); + println!(" context : {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(ctx)); + println!(" settlement : {}", receipt.signature); + println!(" advertised k: {} effective k (measured): {:.1}", receipt.advertised_k, receipt.effective_k); + println!(" nullifier : {}… (spent once)", hex8(receipt.nullifier.as_bytes())); +} + +fn main() { + // The fund holds one secret. Everything below is derived from it. + let fund = Secret::from_bytes([0x5a; 32]); + let recipient = [0x11; 32]; + let floor = Policy { min_effective_k: 8.0 }; + + println!("A fund opens and closes a position, unlinkably. One secret, two acts.\n"); + + // 1. ENTER the position in its own context. + let entry_ctx: &[u8] = b"position-alpha/entry"; + let mut entry_be = SimBackend { round: b"epoch-100".to_vec(), advertised_k: 24, effective_k: 11.5 }; + let entry = act( + &fund, + &ActRequest { context: entry_ctx, action: b"buy 5000 SOL of X", recipient, amount: 1_000_000 }, + &SimProver, + &mut entry_be, + &floor, + ) + .expect("entry meets the floor"); + + // 2. Later, EXIT the position in a different context and round. + let exit_ctx: &[u8] = b"position-alpha/exit"; + let mut exit_be = SimBackend { round: b"epoch-137".to_vec(), advertised_k: 19, effective_k: 9.2 }; + let exit = act( + &fund, + &ActRequest { context: exit_ctx, action: b"sell 5000 SOL of X", recipient, amount: 1_000_000 }, + &SimProver, + &mut exit_be, + &floor, + ) + .expect("exit meets the floor"); + + println!("what the fund did (it knows both are the same position):"); + print_leg("ENTER", entry_ctx, &entry); + print_leg("EXIT ", exit_ctx, &exit); + + // 3. What an observer of the chain sees: two unrelated actions. + println!("\nwhat an observer of the chain sees:"); + println!(" two settlements, {} and {}, with unrelated nullifiers,", entry.signature, exit.signature); + println!(" different identities, in different rounds. No edge links them,"); + println!(" and nothing links either back to the fund."); + + // 4. The proof, not a claim: the two legs are independent PRF outputs. + let entry_id = core_act::identity(&fund, entry_ctx); + let exit_id = core_act::identity(&fund, exit_ctx); + assert_ne!(entry_id, exit_id, "entry and exit identities must be unlinkable"); + assert_ne!(entry.nullifier, exit.nullifier, "entry and exit nullifiers must be unlinkable"); + + println!("\nproof (independent PRF outputs from one secret):"); + println!(" entry identity : {}…", hex8(&entry_id)); + println!(" exit identity : {}…", hex8(&exit_id)); + println!(" unlinkable: the same secret produced both, but nobody else can tell."); + + println!("\nThe position was opened and closed, each leg above the fund's anonymity"); + println!("floor, and the strategy left no linkable trail on-chain. That is the point."); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-sdk/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-sdk/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54186d2a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-sdk/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +//! riverrun-sdk: the `act()` flow a fund, market maker, or agent integrates. +//! +//! One call, one unlinkable, *measured* action. `act()` derives everything from a +//! single secret (see `riverrun_core::act`, Phase B), commits the leaf to join a +//! round, waits for the crowd to form, **refuses to settle if the round's measured +//! anonymity is below the caller's floor**, proves membership+nullifier+action, +//! settles through a relayer, and returns a receipt with the anonymity you actually +//! got, not the advertised member count. +//! +//! The on-chain side and the prover are behind traits, so the flow is testable +//! without a live cluster and the real Solana backend plugs in later +//! (`docs/RIVERRUN_ACT_DESIGN.md`, Phase D). The floor check is the point: a fund +//! will not act into a crowd that does not hide it, and the SDK enforces that in +//! code, not in a promise. + +use riverrun_core::act; +use riverrun_core::commitment::{Commitment, Secret}; +use riverrun_core::nullifier::Nullifier; + +/// What a caller wants to do, unlinkably. +pub struct ActRequest<'a> { + /// The venue or app the action belongs to (unlinkable across contexts). + pub context: &'a [u8], + /// The public action to perform. + pub action: &'a [u8], + /// Where the fixed-denomination payout goes. + pub recipient: [u8; 32], + /// The payout amount (a pool's fixed denomination). + pub amount: u64, +} + +/// A round the backend formed, with its measured anonymity. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct RoundInfo { + /// The round identifier the nullifier and proof are bound to. + pub round: Vec, + /// Members in the round (the advertised count). + pub advertised_k: usize, + /// The anonymity the ruler measured for this round (the number that matters). + pub effective_k: f64, +} + +/// An opaque membership+nullifier+action proof. +pub type Proof = Vec; + +/// What `act()` returns: the settlement plus the anonymity you actually got. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct Receipt { + /// The settlement transaction signature. + pub signature: String, + /// The round the action settled in. + pub round: Vec, + /// The nullifier spent (one action per member per round). + pub nullifier: Nullifier, + /// The advertised member count of the round. + pub advertised_k: usize, + /// The measured effective-k, the anonymity actually delivered. + pub effective_k: f64, +} + +/// Why an `act()` did not settle. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum ActError { + /// The round's measured anonymity was below the policy floor, so `act()` + /// refused to settle rather than act into a crowd that would not hide you. + BelowFloor { effective_k: f64, floor: f64 }, + /// The on-chain backend failed (commit, round formation, or settlement). + Backend(String), + /// The prover failed to produce a proof. + Prover(String), +} + +/// The on-chain side: publish a commitment, wait for the round, settle with a +/// proof. The real implementation talks to the Solana program; a test uses a mock. +pub trait Backend { + /// Publish the commitment leaf to join the next round. + fn commit(&mut self, commitment: &Commitment) -> Result<(), String>; + /// Wait for the round to form and return it with its measured anonymity. + fn await_round(&mut self) -> Result; + /// Settle the action through a relayer; no member key signs. Returns the + /// settlement signature. + fn settle( + &mut self, + round: &RoundInfo, + nullifier: &Nullifier, + action: &[u8], + recipient: &[u8; 32], + amount: u64, + proof: &Proof, + ) -> Result; +} + +/// Builds the membership+nullifier+action proof for one settlement. The real +/// implementation drives the STARK; a test uses a mock. +pub trait Prover { + fn prove( + &self, + secret: &Secret, + context: &[u8], + action: &[u8], + round: &RoundInfo, + ) -> Result; +} + +/// The caller's anonymity policy. +pub struct Policy { + /// `act()` refuses to settle if the round's effective-k is below this. Set it + /// to the anonymity you actually require; the flow enforces it. + pub min_effective_k: f64, +} + +/// The single flow: derive from one secret, commit, wait for the crowd, refuse if +/// it is too small, prove, settle, and return a receipt with the measured +/// anonymity. Identity, membership, and nullifier all come from `secret`. +pub fn act( + secret: &Secret, + req: &ActRequest, + prover: &dyn Prover, + backend: &mut dyn Backend, + policy: &Policy, +) -> Result { + // 1. The leaf has no round dependency, so publish it to join the next round. + let commitment = act::commitment(secret, req.context, req.action); + backend.commit(&commitment).map_err(ActError::Backend)?; + + // 2. The crowd forms. + let round = backend.await_round().map_err(ActError::Backend)?; + + // 3. The anonymity floor: measure, do not hope. Refuse to act into a crowd + // that would not hide you, before anything is spent. + if round.effective_k < policy.min_effective_k { + return Err(ActError::BelowFloor { + effective_k: round.effective_k, + floor: policy.min_effective_k, + }); + } + + // 4. The round is fixed now, so the nullifier is known: prove, then settle + // through the relayer. No member key signs the settlement. + let nullifier = act::nullifier(secret, req.context, &round.round); + let proof = prover + .prove(secret, req.context, req.action, &round) + .map_err(ActError::Prover)?; + let signature = backend + .settle(&round, &nullifier, req.action, &req.recipient, req.amount, &proof) + .map_err(ActError::Backend)?; + + // 5. The receipt reports the anonymity actually delivered, not the count. + Ok(Receipt { + signature, + round: round.round, + nullifier, + advertised_k: round.advertised_k, + effective_k: round.effective_k, + }) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + struct MockBackend { + round: RoundInfo, + fail_commit: bool, + committed: Option, + settled_nullifier: Option, + settled_recipient: Option<[u8; 32]>, + } + impl MockBackend { + fn with_effective_k(ek: f64) -> Self { + Self { + round: RoundInfo { round: b"round-7".to_vec(), advertised_k: 30, effective_k: ek }, + fail_commit: false, + committed: None, + settled_nullifier: None, + settled_recipient: None, + } + } + } + impl Backend for MockBackend { + fn commit(&mut self, c: &Commitment) -> Result<(), String> { + if self.fail_commit { + return Err("rpc unreachable".into()); + } + self.committed = Some(*c); + Ok(()) + } + fn await_round(&mut self) -> Result { + Ok(self.round.clone()) + } + fn settle( + &mut self, + _round: &RoundInfo, + nullifier: &Nullifier, + _action: &[u8], + recipient: &[u8; 32], + _amount: u64, + _proof: &Proof, + ) -> Result { + self.settled_nullifier = Some(*nullifier); + self.settled_recipient = Some(*recipient); + Ok("SIG_OK".into()) + } + } + + struct MockProver; + impl Prover for MockProver { + fn prove(&self, _s: &Secret, _c: &[u8], _a: &[u8], _r: &RoundInfo) -> Result { + Ok(vec![0xAB; 8]) + } + } + + fn secret() -> Secret { + Secret::from_bytes([7; 32]) + } + fn request() -> ActRequest<'static> { + ActRequest { context: b"amm", action: b"buy", recipient: [9; 32], amount: 1_000_000 } + } + fn policy(floor: f64) -> Policy { + Policy { min_effective_k: floor } + } + + #[test] + fn act_settles_and_reports_measured_anonymity_not_the_advertised_count() { + let mut be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + let r = act(&secret(), &request(), &MockProver, &mut be, &policy(6.0)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(r.signature, "SIG_OK"); + assert_eq!(r.effective_k, 12.0, "the receipt reports the measured effective-k"); + assert_eq!(r.advertised_k, 30); + assert_ne!(r.effective_k, r.advertised_k as f64, "measured is not the advertised count"); + } + + #[test] + fn act_commits_the_leaf_derived_from_the_secret() { + let mut be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + act(&secret(), &request(), &MockProver, &mut be, &policy(6.0)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + be.committed.unwrap(), + act::commitment(&secret(), b"amm", b"buy"), + "the committed leaf is exactly the one derived from the secret + context + action" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn act_settles_the_nullifier_derived_from_the_secret_and_round() { + let mut be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + act(&secret(), &request(), &MockProver, &mut be, &policy(6.0)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!( + be.settled_nullifier.unwrap(), + act::nullifier(&secret(), b"amm", b"round-7"), + "the settled nullifier is exactly the one derived from the secret + context + round" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn act_refuses_to_settle_below_the_anonymity_floor() { + // The round's measured anonymity is 3, below the fund's floor of 6. + let mut be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(3.0); + let err = act(&secret(), &request(), &MockProver, &mut be, &policy(6.0)).unwrap_err(); + assert_eq!(err, ActError::BelowFloor { effective_k: 3.0, floor: 6.0 }); + assert!(be.settled_nullifier.is_none(), "it must not settle when below the floor"); + } + + #[test] + fn act_propagates_a_backend_failure_without_settling() { + let mut be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + be.fail_commit = true; + let err = act(&secret(), &request(), &MockProver, &mut be, &policy(6.0)).unwrap_err(); + assert!(matches!(err, ActError::Backend(_))); + assert!(be.settled_nullifier.is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn entering_and_exiting_a_position_leaves_no_linkable_trail() { + // The Phase E guarantee: a fund enters a position and later exits it, each + // through act() in a different context. An observer sees two settlements + // with unrelated nullifiers, and the two identities are independent, so the + // entry cannot be linked to the exit, nor either to the fund. + let fund = Secret::from_bytes([3; 32]); + + let mut enter_be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + let enter = act( + &fund, + &ActRequest { context: b"position-alpha/entry", action: b"buy", recipient: [1; 32], amount: 1 }, + &MockProver, + &mut enter_be, + &policy(6.0), + ) + .unwrap(); + + let mut exit_be = MockBackend::with_effective_k(12.0); + let exit = act( + &fund, + &ActRequest { context: b"position-alpha/exit", action: b"sell", recipient: [1; 32], amount: 1 }, + &MockProver, + &mut exit_be, + &policy(6.0), + ) + .unwrap(); + + assert_ne!(enter.nullifier, exit.nullifier, "entry and exit nullifiers must be unlinkable"); + assert_ne!( + act::identity(&fund, b"position-alpha/entry"), + act::identity(&fund, b"position-alpha/exit"), + "entry and exit identities must be independent" + ); + // and both settled with a real anonymity floor met + assert!(enter.effective_k >= 6.0 && exit.effective_k >= 6.0); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/Cargo.lock b/crates/riverrun-stark/Cargo.lock new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f178cf21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/Cargo.lock @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +# This file is automatically @generated by Cargo. +# It is not intended for manual editing. +version = 4 + +[[package]] +name = "arrayref" +version = "0.3.9" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "76a2e8124351fda1ef8aaaa3bbd7ebbcb486bbcd4225aca0aa0d84bb2db8fecb" + +[[package]] +name = "arrayvec" +version = "0.7.8" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "d3fb67a6e08acf24fdeccbac2cb6ac4305825bd1f117462e0e6f2f193345ad56" + +[[package]] +name = "blake3" +version = "1.8.5" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = 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crates/riverrun-stark/Cargo.toml +# +# The Rescue-Prime Merkle-path AIR is adapted from the Winterfell v0.13 `merkle` +# example (MIT, Facebook/Meta) — see src/air.rs, src/prover.rs, src/utils/. +[package] +name = "riverrun-stark" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" +license = "MIT" +description = "Post-quantum, transparent STARK proof of anonymous set membership for riverrun (Rescue-Prime Merkle path, no trusted setup)." + +[dependencies] +winterfell = "0.13" +core-utils = { package = "winter-utils", version = "0.13" } diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/examples/bench.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/examples/bench.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f66e1bf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/examples/bench.rs @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +//! What one execution costs, measured. +//! +//! The number that matters for this bounty's audience — agents, market makers, +//! ordinary users proving before every action — is not proof size, it is what the +//! *client* has to spend and distribute. A pairing-based system needs a proving +//! key produced by a ceremony and shipped to every prover; for a Merkle circuit +//! that is tens of megabytes of setup that must exist before anyone proves +//! anything. riverrun needs none: the prover is the code. +//! +//! Run: `cargo run --release --example bench` + +use riverrun_stark::*; +use std::time::Instant; + +fn main() { + let action = [BaseElement::new(0xAC01), BaseElement::new(0xAC02)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(3); + + println!("riverrun — cost of one execution\n"); + println!( + "{:>9} {:>10} {:>12} {:>12} {:>10}", + "set size", "proof", "prove", "verify", "setup" + ); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(62)); + + for n in [4u128, 64, 16384] { + let v = [BaseElement::new(7), BaseElement::new(9)]; + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..n) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(900 + 2 * i), BaseElement::new(901 + 2 * i))) + .collect(); + leaves[1] = leaf_of(v, action); + let set = MembershipSet::new(leaves); + let root = set.root(); + let nf = nullifier(v, round); + + // warm the allocator so the first row is not the odd one out + let _ = set.prove_bound(v, 1, round, action); + + let t = Instant::now(); + let proof = set.prove_bound(v, 1, round, action); + let prove_ms = t.elapsed().as_secs_f64() * 1000.0; + + let t = Instant::now(); + let ok = verify_bound(root, nf, round, action, &proof); + let verify_ms = t.elapsed().as_secs_f64() * 1000.0; + assert!(ok); + + println!( + "{n:>9} {:>8} B {prove_ms:>9.1} ms {verify_ms:>9.2} ms {:>10}", + proof.len(), + "0 bytes" + ); + } + + // --- one round, one proof ------------------------------------------- + println!("\n\nriverrun — a whole synchronized round, batched into one proof\n"); + println!( + "{:>9} {:>12} {:>13} {:>8} {:>10}", + "members", "one proof", "one per member", "saving", "prove" + ); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(62)); + + for k in [4usize, 64] { + let secrets: Vec<[BaseElement; 2]> = (0..k as u128) + .map(|i| [BaseElement::new(1000 + i), BaseElement::new(2000 + i)]) + .collect(); + let set = MembershipSet::new(secrets.iter().map(|s| leaf_of(*s, action)).collect()); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + secrets.iter().copied().enumerate().collect(); + + let t = Instant::now(); + let batched = prove_round(&set, &members, round, action); + let prove_ms = t.elapsed().as_secs_f64() * 1000.0; + + let claim = RoundClaim { + root: set.root(), + round, + action, + nullifiers: secrets.iter().map(|s| nullifier(*s, round)).collect(), + }; + assert!(verify_round(&claim, &batched)); + + let separate: usize = members + .iter() + .map(|(i, s)| set.prove_bound(*s, *i, round, action).len()) + .sum(); + + println!( + "{k:>9} {:>10} B {:>11} B {:>7.1}x {prove_ms:>7.1} ms", + batched.len(), + separate, + separate as f64 / batched.len() as f64 + ); + } + + println!( + "\nOne round is one proof and one verification. A per-member scheme pays\n\ + for k of each; on-chain, that is k verifications of ~250k CU for a\n\ + pairing-based verifier. riverrun's synchronized round is exactly the\n\ + structure that batches, so this costs nothing conceptually — the k\n\ + sub-traces are laid end to end in one trace.\n" + ); + + println!( + "\nProof size grows logarithmically: 4096x the members costs 1.6x the proof.\n\ + Proving is single-digit milliseconds and needs no proving key, no circuit\n\ + artifact and no ceremony output — there is nothing to distribute to clients\n\ + and nothing to trust. That is the trade riverrun makes: a large proof in\n\ + exchange for a prover that is the code, and no setup that can be corrupted.\n\ + \n\ + Honest other side of it: 12-19 KB does not fit in Solana's 1232-byte\n\ + transaction, which is why this proof is verified off-chain today. See the\n\ + README's Security status." + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/air.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24df92d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates. +// +// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the +// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + +use winterfell::{ + math::ToElements, Air, AirContext, Assertion, EvaluationFrame, ProofOptions, TraceInfo, + TransitionConstraintDegree, +}; + +use crate::{rescue, BaseElement, FieldElement, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, HASH_STATE_WIDTH, TRACE_WIDTH}; +use crate::utils::{are_equal, is_binary, is_zero, not, EvaluationResult}; + +// MERKLE PATH VERIFICATION AIR +// ================================================================================================ + +pub struct PublicInputs { + pub tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], +} + +impl ToElements for PublicInputs { + fn to_elements(&self) -> Vec { + self.tree_root.to_vec() + } +} + +pub struct MerkleAir { + context: AirContext, + tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], +} + +impl Air for MerkleAir { + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type PublicInputs = PublicInputs; + + // CONSTRUCTOR + // -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + fn new(trace_info: TraceInfo, pub_inputs: PublicInputs, options: ProofOptions) -> Self { + let degrees = vec![ + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::new(2), + ]; + assert_eq!(TRACE_WIDTH, trace_info.width()); + MerkleAir { + context: AirContext::new(trace_info, degrees, 4, options), + tree_root: pub_inputs.tree_root, + } + } + + fn context(&self) -> &AirContext { + &self.context + } + + fn evaluate_transition>( + &self, + frame: &EvaluationFrame, + periodic_values: &[E], + result: &mut [E], + ) { + let current = frame.current(); + let next = frame.next(); + // expected state width is 4 field elements + debug_assert_eq!(TRACE_WIDTH, current.len()); + debug_assert_eq!(TRACE_WIDTH, next.len()); + + // split periodic values into masks and Rescue round constants + let hash_flag = periodic_values[0]; + let ark = &periodic_values[1..]; + + // when hash_flag = 1, constraints for Rescue round are enforced + rescue::enforce_round( + result, + ¤t[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + &next[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + ark, + hash_flag, + ); + + // when hash_flag = 0, make sure accumulated hash is placed in the right place in the hash + // state for the next round of hashing. Specifically: when index bit = 0 accumulated hash + // must go into registers [0, 1], and when index bit = 0, it must go into registers [2, 3] + let hash_init_flag = not(hash_flag); + let bit = next[6]; + let not_bit = not(bit); + result.agg_constraint(0, hash_init_flag, not_bit * are_equal(current[0], next[0])); + result.agg_constraint(1, hash_init_flag, not_bit * are_equal(current[1], next[1])); + result.agg_constraint(2, hash_init_flag, bit * are_equal(current[0], next[2])); + result.agg_constraint(3, hash_init_flag, bit * are_equal(current[1], next[3])); + + // make sure capacity registers of the hash state are reset to zeros + result.agg_constraint(4, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[4])); + result.agg_constraint(5, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[5])); + + // finally, we always enforce that values in the bit register must be binary + result[6] = is_binary(current[6]); + } + + fn get_assertions(&self) -> Vec> { + // assert that Merkle path resolves to the tree root, and that hash capacity + // registers (registers 4 and 5) are reset to ZERO every 8 steps + let last_step = self.trace_length() - 1; + vec![ + Assertion::single(0, last_step, self.tree_root[0]), + Assertion::single(1, last_step, self.tree_root[1]), + Assertion::periodic(4, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO), + Assertion::periodic(5, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO), + ] + } + + fn get_periodic_column_values(&self) -> Vec> { + let mut result = vec![HASH_CYCLE_MASK.to_vec()]; + result.append(&mut rescue::get_round_constants()); + result + } +} + +// MASKS +// ================================================================================================ +const HASH_CYCLE_MASK: [BaseElement; HASH_CYCLE_LEN] = [ + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ZERO, +]; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_air.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0e3e42d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +//! The **nullifier-binding** membership AIR (audit-critical #1c). +//! +//! Extends the Merkle-path AIR (`air.rs`, adapted from the Winterfell v0.13 +//! `merkle` example, MIT) with one extra hash cycle that computes the per-round +//! nullifier `n = Rescue(v0, v1, round)` from the *same* secret `v` whose leaf +//! `Rescue(v0, v1, a0, a1)` the Merkle path then resolves to the public root. +//! +//! The leaf commits to the **action** as well as the secret, which is what makes +//! this "Tornado for behaviour" rather than an anonymous nullifier set: a member +//! commits an intent and can later execute *that* intent, not any intent. The +//! action is public, so the AIR pins it directly as a constant when the Merkle +//! leaf preimage is loaded. +//! +//! Public inputs: `{root, nullifier, round, action}`. Private: `v`, leaf index, +//! path. +//! +//! Layout (trace width 9, cycles of 8 steps, `d` = tree depth): +//! +//! | col | meaning | +//! |---|---| +//! | 0..5 | Rescue state (rate `[0..3]`, capacity `[4,5]`) | +//! | 6 | Merkle index bit | +//! | 7, 8 | carry: `v0, v1`, held only across cycle 0, then zeroed | +//! +//! The carry is deliberately **not** constant for the whole trace. A column that +//! is constant has a constant low-degree extension, so every FRI query opening +//! would hand the verifier the secret verbatim — measured, before this was fixed, +//! at 20 leaks out of 20 proofs. Confining the carry to the eight rows where it is +//! load-bearing keeps the column non-constant (0 out of 20). This is "the witness +//! is not verbatim on the wire", not a formal zero-knowledge guarantee: Winterfell +//! 0.13 has no witness randomization. +//! +//! - cycle 0 (rows 0..7): `[v0, v1, round, 0, 0, 0]` → 7 Rescue rounds → row 7 +//! holds `n` in `[0,1]`. The row-7 transition then loads the Merkle leaf +//! preimage: `next[0,1] = cur[7,8]` (the carried secret) and +//! `next[2,3] = action` (public), `next[4,5] = 0`. +//! - cycles 1..d+1: the existing Merkle logic (leaf hash, then path merges). +//! +//! The soundness crux is the *start-tie*: at row 0, `cur[0] == cur[7]` and +//! `cur[1] == cur[8]`. Without it a prover could hash secret A into the nullifier +//! while carrying member B into the Merkle path — proving membership under one +//! secret and acting under another's nullifier. See +//! `docs/1c-nullifier-binding-design.md`. + +use winterfell::{ + math::ToElements, Air, AirContext, Assertion, EvaluationFrame, ProofOptions, TraceInfo, + TransitionConstraintDegree, +}; + +use crate::utils::{are_equal, is_binary, is_zero, not, EvaluationResult}; +use crate::{ + rescue, BaseElement, FieldElement, BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, CARRY_0, CARRY_1, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, + HASH_STATE_WIDTH, NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, +}; + +/// Row at which the nullifier digest is readable in columns `[0, 1]` — after the +/// seven Rescue rounds of cycle 0, before the row-7 transition overwrites them. +pub const NULLIFIER_STEP: usize = NUM_HASH_ROUNDS; + +pub struct BoundPublicInputs { + pub tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], + pub nullifier: [BaseElement; 2], + pub round: BaseElement, + pub action: [BaseElement; 2], +} + +impl ToElements for BoundPublicInputs { + fn to_elements(&self) -> Vec { + vec![ + self.tree_root[0], + self.tree_root[1], + self.nullifier[0], + self.nullifier[1], + self.round, + self.action[0], + self.action[1], + ] + } +} + +pub struct BoundMerkleAir { + context: AirContext, + tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], + nullifier: [BaseElement; 2], + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], +} + +impl Air for BoundMerkleAir { + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type PublicInputs = BoundPublicInputs; + + fn new(trace_info: TraceInfo, pub_inputs: BoundPublicInputs, options: ProofOptions) -> Self { + let trace_len = trace_info.length(); + // Columns 0..5 aggregate three families of terms: the Rescue rounds + // (degree 5, cycle 8), the Merkle insertion (degree 2, cycles 8 and + // trace_len) and the cycle-0 load (degree 1, cycle trace_len). The Rescue + // family dominates, so its degree bounds the slot. + let degrees = vec![ + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + // index bit is binary + TransitionConstraintDegree::new(2), + // carry columns: held across cycle 0 (degree 1) plus the start-tie, + // both masked by columns whose period is the whole trace length. + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(1, vec![trace_len]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(1, vec![trace_len]), + ]; + assert_eq!(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, trace_info.width()); + BoundMerkleAir { + context: AirContext::new(trace_info, degrees, 8, options), + tree_root: pub_inputs.tree_root, + nullifier: pub_inputs.nullifier, + round: pub_inputs.round, + action: pub_inputs.action, + } + } + + fn context(&self) -> &AirContext { + &self.context + } + + fn evaluate_transition>( + &self, + frame: &EvaluationFrame, + periodic_values: &[E], + result: &mut [E], + ) { + let current = frame.current(); + let next = frame.next(); + debug_assert_eq!(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, current.len()); + debug_assert_eq!(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, next.len()); + + let hash_flag = periodic_values[0]; + let start = periodic_values[1]; + let null_ins = periodic_values[2]; + let carry_hold = periodic_values[3]; + let ark = &periodic_values[4..]; + + // when hash_flag = 1, constraints for a Rescue round are enforced + rescue::enforce_round( + result, + ¤t[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + &next[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + ark, + hash_flag, + ); + + let hash_init_flag = not(hash_flag); + // cycle boundaries split in two: row 7 loads the Merkle leaf preimage from + // the carry (the nullifier cycle just ended), every later boundary inserts + // the next path node. + let merkle_ins = hash_init_flag * not(null_ins); + + // Merkle insertion: when the index bit is 0 the accumulated hash stays in + // registers [0, 1] and the sibling goes into [2, 3]; when it is 1 they swap. + let bit = next[6]; + let not_bit = not(bit); + result.agg_constraint(0, merkle_ins, not_bit * are_equal(current[0], next[0])); + result.agg_constraint(1, merkle_ins, not_bit * are_equal(current[1], next[1])); + result.agg_constraint(2, merkle_ins, bit * are_equal(current[0], next[2])); + result.agg_constraint(3, merkle_ins, bit * are_equal(current[1], next[3])); + + // cycle-0 load: the leaf preimage is the carried secret followed by the + // public action, so the leaf the Merkle path resolves commits to both. + result.agg_constraint(0, null_ins, are_equal(next[0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(1, null_ins, are_equal(next[1], current[CARRY_1])); + result.agg_constraint(2, null_ins, are_equal(next[2], E::from(self.action[0]))); + result.agg_constraint(3, null_ins, are_equal(next[3], E::from(self.action[1]))); + + // capacity registers are reset to zero at every cycle boundary, of either kind + result.agg_constraint(4, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[4])); + result.agg_constraint(5, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[5])); + + // the index bit register must be binary + result[6] = is_binary(current[6]); + + // the carry holds the secret unchanged across cycle 0, which is exactly as + // long as it is needed: row 0 ties it to the nullifier input, row 7 loads it + // into the Merkle path. Past that it is free (and the prover zeroes it, so + // the column is not constant — see the module note on FRI openings). + result.agg_constraint(7, carry_hold, are_equal(next[CARRY_0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(8, carry_hold, are_equal(next[CARRY_1], current[CARRY_1])); + // ...and at row 0 it is tied to the input of the nullifier hash. This is + // what makes one secret serve both halves of the statement. + result.agg_constraint(7, start, are_equal(current[0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(8, start, are_equal(current[1], current[CARRY_1])); + } + + fn get_assertions(&self) -> Vec> { + let last_step = self.trace_length() - 1; + vec![ + // the Merkle path resolves to the public root + Assertion::single(0, last_step, self.tree_root[0]), + Assertion::single(1, last_step, self.tree_root[1]), + // cycle 0 produced the public nullifier + Assertion::single(0, NULLIFIER_STEP, self.nullifier[0]), + Assertion::single(1, NULLIFIER_STEP, self.nullifier[1]), + // ...from the public round, absorbed as the third rate element + Assertion::single(2, 0, self.round), + Assertion::single(3, 0, BaseElement::ZERO), + // hash capacity registers are zero at every cycle start + Assertion::periodic(4, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO), + Assertion::periodic(5, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO), + ] + } + + fn get_periodic_column_values(&self) -> Vec> { + let trace_len = self.trace_length(); + + // one-shot masks: they fire exactly once, so their period is the whole trace + let mut start_mask = vec![BaseElement::ZERO; trace_len]; + start_mask[0] = BaseElement::ONE; + let mut null_ins_mask = vec![BaseElement::ZERO; trace_len]; + null_ins_mask[NULLIFIER_STEP] = BaseElement::ONE; + + // holds the carry constant across cycle 0 only: transitions out of rows + // 0..NULLIFIER_STEP-1, so rows 1..NULLIFIER_STEP equal row 0 + let mut carry_hold_mask = vec![BaseElement::ZERO; trace_len]; + carry_hold_mask[..NULLIFIER_STEP].fill(BaseElement::ONE); + + let mut result = + vec![HASH_CYCLE_MASK.to_vec(), start_mask, null_ins_mask, carry_hold_mask]; + result.append(&mut rescue::get_round_constants()); + result + } +} + +// MASKS +// ================================================================================================ +const HASH_CYCLE_MASK: [BaseElement; HASH_CYCLE_LEN] = [ + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ZERO, +]; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_prover.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_prover.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..db9c81d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/bound_prover.rs @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +//! Prover for the nullifier-binding AIR (see `bound_air.rs`). +//! +//! Adapted from the Winterfell v0.13 `merkle` example prover (MIT), with the +//! nullifier cycle prepended and the two carry columns added. + +use winterfell::{ + crypto::MerkleTree, matrix::ColMatrix, AuxRandElements, CompositionPoly, CompositionPolyTrace, + ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, DefaultConstraintCommitment, DefaultConstraintEvaluator, + DefaultTraceLde, PartitionOptions, StarkDomain, Trace, TraceInfo, TracePolyTable, TraceTable, +}; + +use crate::bound_air::NULLIFIER_STEP; +use crate::{ + rescue, BaseElement, BoundMerkleAir, BoundPublicInputs, DefaultRandomCoin, ElementHasher, + FieldElement, PhantomData, ProofOptions, Prover, BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, CARRY_0, CARRY_1, + HASH_CYCLE_LEN, HASH_STATE_WIDTH, NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, +}; + +pub struct BoundMerkleProver { + options: ProofOptions, + /// Overrides the action published with the proof, instead of reading it back + /// out of the trace. Only the soundness tests set this: it is how a dishonest + /// prover would hash one action into their leaf and announce another. + declared_action: Option<[BaseElement; 2]>, + _hasher: PhantomData, +} + +impl BoundMerkleProver { + pub fn new(options: ProofOptions) -> Self { + Self { options, declared_action: None, _hasher: PhantomData } + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn declaring_action(options: ProofOptions, action: [BaseElement; 2]) -> Self { + Self { options, declared_action: Some(action), _hasher: PhantomData } + } + + /// Build the execution trace for `value` at `index` under `branch` (the leaf + /// digest followed by the sibling path), binding the nullifier for `round`. + pub fn build_trace( + &self, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + branch: &[rescue::Hash], + index: usize, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + ) -> TraceTable { + self.build_trace_with_carry(value, value, branch, index, round, action) + } + + /// The same trace, but with the value that feeds the **nullifier hash** + /// (`hashed`) separated from the one that feeds the **Merkle path** (`carried`). + /// + /// An honest prover always passes the same secret for both; the separation + /// exists so the soundness tests can attempt the attack the start-tie is meant + /// to stop — proving membership of one member while presenting another's + /// nullifier — and observe that no accepted proof comes out. + pub(crate) fn build_trace_with_carry( + &self, + hashed: [BaseElement; 2], + carried: [BaseElement; 2], + branch: &[rescue::Hash], + index: usize, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + ) -> TraceTable { + // one cycle for the nullifier hash, one for the leaf hash, one per path node + let trace_length = (branch.len() + 1) * HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + assert!( + trace_length.is_power_of_two(), + "the bound scheme spends an extra hash cycle, so the anonymity set must have \ + 4, 64 or 16384 leaves (tree depth 2, 6 or 14); this branch implies a trace \ + length of {trace_length}, which is not a power of two" + ); + let mut trace = TraceTable::new(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, trace_length); + + // skip the first node of the branch: the leaf is computed in the trace as hash(value) + let branch = &branch[1..]; + + trace.fill( + |state| { + // cycle 0 absorbs (v0, v1, round) — exactly what `nullifier()` hashes + state[0] = hashed[0]; + state[1] = hashed[1]; + state[2] = round; + state[3..].fill(BaseElement::ZERO); + state[CARRY_0] = carried[0]; + state[CARRY_1] = carried[1]; + }, + |step, state| { + let cycle_num = step / HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let cycle_pos = step % HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + + if cycle_pos < NUM_HASH_ROUNDS { + rescue::apply_round(&mut state[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], step); + } else if cycle_num == 0 { + // the nullifier is now in [0, 1] (read as a boundary assertion at + // step NULLIFIER_STEP); reload the state with the carried secret + // so the Merkle path hashes the same value + state[0] = state[CARRY_0]; + state[1] = state[CARRY_1]; + // the leaf commits to the action too: Rescue(v0, v1, a0, a1) + state[2] = action[0]; + state[3] = action[1]; + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + // the carry has done its job; clear it so the column is not + // constant (a constant column has a constant low-degree + // extension, which would put the secret in every FRI opening) + state[CARRY_0] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[CARRY_1] = BaseElement::ZERO; + } else { + // insert the next branch node in the position given by the index bit + let branch_node = branch[cycle_num - 1].to_elements(); + let index_bit = BaseElement::new(((index >> (cycle_num - 1)) & 1) as u128); + if index_bit == BaseElement::ZERO { + state[2] = branch_node[0]; + state[3] = branch_node[1]; + } else { + state[2] = state[0]; + state[3] = state[1]; + state[0] = branch_node[0]; + state[1] = branch_node[1]; + } + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[6] = index_bit; + } + }, + ); + + // same degree stabilizer as the unbound AIR: keep the index bit register + // free of repeating patterns (real bits only enter after step 7) + trace.set(6, 1, FieldElement::ONE); + + trace + } +} + +impl Prover for BoundMerkleProver +where + H: ElementHasher + Sync, +{ + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type Air = BoundMerkleAir; + type Trace = TraceTable; + type HashFn = H; + type VC = MerkleTree; + type RandomCoin = DefaultRandomCoin; + type TraceLde> = + DefaultTraceLde; + type ConstraintCommitment> = + DefaultConstraintCommitment; + type ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E: FieldElement> = + DefaultConstraintEvaluator<'a, Self::Air, E>; + + fn get_pub_inputs(&self, trace: &Self::Trace) -> BoundPublicInputs { + let last_step = trace.length() - 1; + BoundPublicInputs { + tree_root: [trace.get(0, last_step), trace.get(1, last_step)], + nullifier: [trace.get(0, NULLIFIER_STEP), trace.get(1, NULLIFIER_STEP)], + round: trace.get(2, 0), + action: self + .declared_action + .unwrap_or([trace.get(2, HASH_CYCLE_LEN), trace.get(3, HASH_CYCLE_LEN)]), + } + } + + fn options(&self) -> &ProofOptions { + &self.options + } + + fn new_trace_lde>( + &self, + trace_info: &TraceInfo, + main_trace: &ColMatrix, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_option: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::TraceLde, TracePolyTable) { + DefaultTraceLde::new(trace_info, main_trace, domain, partition_option) + } + + fn new_evaluator<'a, E: FieldElement>( + &self, + air: &'a Self::Air, + aux_rand_elements: Option>, + composition_coefficients: ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, + ) -> Self::ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E> { + DefaultConstraintEvaluator::new(air, aux_rand_elements, composition_coefficients) + } + + fn build_constraint_commitment>( + &self, + composition_poly_trace: CompositionPolyTrace, + num_constraint_composition_columns: usize, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_options: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::ConstraintCommitment, CompositionPoly) { + DefaultConstraintCommitment::new( + composition_poly_trace, + num_constraint_composition_columns, + domain, + partition_options, + ) + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..934f18e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +//! # riverrun-stark +//! +//! A **transparent, post-quantum STARK proof of anonymous set membership**: +//! prove knowledge of a leaf preimage whose Rescue-Prime hash sits under a public +//! Merkle root — *without revealing which leaf*. Hash-based (Rescue-Prime over the +//! 128-bit field) and FRI-based, so post-quantum; no trusted setup, no ceremony. +//! +//! This is the succinct post-quantum membership seam of riverrun. The +//! Rescue-Prime Merkle-path AIR (`air.rs`, `prover.rs`, `utils/`) is adapted from +//! the Winterfell v0.13 `merkle` example (MIT, Facebook/Meta); the public API and +//! tests here wrap it as a clean membership prover/verifier. +//! +//! **Not formally zero-knowledge.** Winterfell is a transparent STARK for +//! post-quantum *soundness/succinctness*, not a zk-STARK — it has no witness +//! randomization in any release (verified against `main`), so a deterministic +//! proof is a function of the witness and provably carries information about it. +//! What this seam *does* guarantee is weaker and stated honestly: the secret is +//! never transmitted verbatim, the leaf index is not a public input, and the +//! proof is verified off-chain so it never enters the permanent on-chain record +//! (only the nullifier does). Formal witness-hiding requires a different proof +//! system (a genuinely zero-knowledge, post-quantum one — e.g. a Circle STARK +//! over M31 with ZK). See the README's "Security status" section. +//! +//! Two provers live here. `prove_membership` proves set membership alone. The +//! **bound** prover (`bound_air.rs`, `bound_prover.rs`) proves the whole riverrun +//! relation in one STARK: public inputs `{root, nullifier, round, action}`, and a +//! single private secret that must simultaneously sit under the root as +//! `Rescue(secret, action)` and produce the revealed `Rescue(secret, round)`. That +//! is what makes an execution *the* committed intent of *a* member, rather than +//! either half on its own. + +// Used only by this module's public API. +use winterfell::crypto::hashers::Blake3_256; +use winterfell::crypto::MerkleTree; +use winterfell::{AcceptableOptions, BatchingMethod, FieldExtension, Proof, VerifierError}; + +mod air; +mod bound_air; +mod bound_prover; +mod prover; +mod round_air; +mod round_prover; +mod utils; + +// Crate-root re-exports so the ported `air.rs` / `prover.rs` resolve their +// `crate::{...}` imports (they were `super::{...}` in the Winterfell example), +// and so this module can name them too. +pub(crate) use air::{MerkleAir, PublicInputs}; +pub(crate) use bound_air::{BoundMerkleAir, BoundPublicInputs}; +pub(crate) use bound_prover::BoundMerkleProver; +pub(crate) use core::marker::PhantomData; +pub(crate) use prover::MerkleProver; +pub(crate) use round_air::{RoundAir, RoundPublicInputs}; +pub(crate) use round_prover::{MemberWitness, RoundProver}; +pub(crate) use rescue::{ + CYCLE_LENGTH as HASH_CYCLE_LEN, NUM_ROUNDS as NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, STATE_WIDTH as HASH_STATE_WIDTH, +}; +pub(crate) use utils::rescue; +pub(crate) use winterfell::crypto::{DefaultRandomCoin, ElementHasher}; +pub(crate) use winterfell::math::FieldElement; +pub(crate) use winterfell::{ProofOptions, Prover}; + +/// The field over which the in-circuit Rescue hash and leaf preimages live. +pub use winterfell::math::fields::f128::BaseElement; + +pub(crate) const TRACE_WIDTH: usize = 7; + +/// Trace width of the nullifier-binding AIR: the seven columns above plus the two +/// carry columns that hold the secret constant across the whole trace. +pub(crate) const BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH: usize = 9; +pub(crate) const CARRY_0: usize = 7; +pub(crate) const CARRY_1: usize = 8; + +/// The in-circuit Merkle hash is Rescue-Prime; re-exported for building trees. +pub use rescue::{Hash, Rescue128}; + +/// The STARK's own commitment / Fiat-Shamir hash (distinct from the in-circuit +/// Rescue). Any collision-resistant hash works; BLAKE3 keeps the whole stack +/// hash-based and post-quantum. +type StarkHash = Blake3_256; + +/// Proof options tuned for post-quantum strength: **43 queries** at blow-up +/// factor 8 with **16 bits of grinding** → ~**145 bits** of conjectured security +/// (43 × log2(8) + 16 = 129 + 16), comfortably above the 128-bit post-quantum +/// target. FRI/query soundness is no longer the weak link. +/// +/// Remaining hardening (tracked, NOT closed here): the in-circuit Rescue-Prime +/// uses the demo round count; a full-round parameter set is required before this +/// is audited-production. Raising FRI queries does not substitute for that — it +/// closes the proof-system soundness margin, not the hash's round security. +fn proof_options() -> ProofOptions { + ProofOptions::new( + 43, + 8, + 16, + FieldExtension::None, + 8, + 31, + BatchingMethod::Linear, + BatchingMethod::Linear, + ) +} + +/// Proof options with a chosen query count and blow-up, for measuring how far the +/// on-chain verification cost can be pushed down. Fewer queries = lower security +/// and lower CU. Used only by the on-chain verifier's cost study; the shipped +/// path uses [`proof_options`]. +pub fn proof_options_tuned(queries: usize, blowup: usize) -> ProofOptions { + ProofOptions::new( + queries, + blowup, + 0, + FieldExtension::None, + 8, + 31, + BatchingMethod::Linear, + BatchingMethod::Linear, + ) +} + +/// Prove a bound membership with explicit proof options — for the on-chain cost +/// measurement only. +pub fn prove_bound_tuned( + set: &MembershipSet, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + index: usize, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + options: ProofOptions, +) -> Vec { + let (leaf, path) = set.tree.prove(index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + let prover = BoundMerkleProver::::new(options); + prover.prove(prover.build_trace(value, &branch, index, round, action)).unwrap().to_bytes() +} + +/// Build a Rescue-Prime Merkle tree (the anonymity set) from its leaves. +pub fn build_tree(leaves: Vec) -> MerkleTree { + MerkleTree::new(leaves).expect("power-of-two leaf count") +} + +/// Prove that `value` is the preimage of the leaf at `index` of `tree` — i.e. +/// that a member with this leaf is in the set with `tree`'s root. The proof's +/// public inputs are the root alone; `value` and `index` are not public inputs +/// and the secret is not transmitted verbatim. This is **not** a formal +/// zero-knowledge guarantee (Winterfell has no witness randomization); see the +/// crate-level note. +pub fn prove_membership( + tree: &MerkleTree, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + index: usize, +) -> Proof { + let (leaf, path) = tree.prove(index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + let prover = MerkleProver::::new(proof_options()); + let trace = prover.build_trace(value, &branch, index); + prover.prove(trace).expect("prove membership") +} + +/// Verify a membership proof against the public set root. Accepts iff the proof +/// witnesses some leaf preimage resolving to `root` — without learning which. +pub fn verify_membership(root: Hash, proof: Proof) -> Result<(), VerifierError> { + let pub_inputs = PublicInputs { tree_root: root.to_elements() }; + let acceptable = AcceptableOptions::OptionSet(vec![proof.options().clone()]); + winterfell::verify::, MerkleTree>( + proof, + pub_inputs, + &acceptable, + ) +} + +// --- High-level API: the transmitted proof carries no witness ---------------- + +/// An anonymity set backed by the Rescue-Prime Merkle tree, hiding the winterfell +/// types so a consumer (e.g. the pool) never touches them. +pub struct MembershipSet { + tree: MerkleTree, +} + +impl MembershipSet { + /// Build the set from its leaves (each a Rescue digest — see [`leaf_of`]). + pub fn new(leaves: Vec) -> Self { + Self { tree: build_tree(leaves) } + } + + /// The public set root. + pub fn root(&self) -> Hash { + *self.tree.root() + } + + /// Whether `leaf` really is the leaf at `index` of this set. Used by the + /// in-the-clear relation checks; a proof never gets to look. + pub fn contains(&self, leaf: Hash, index: usize) -> bool { + match self.tree.prove(index) { + Ok((l, _)) => l.to_bytes() == leaf.to_bytes(), + Err(_) => false, + } + } + + /// Prove membership of the leaf whose preimage is `value` at `index`, and + /// return the proof **as opaque bytes**. Unlike a witness-carrying proof, the + /// secret `value` and the leaf `index` are not serialized into these bytes. + pub fn prove(&self, value: [BaseElement; 2], index: usize) -> Vec { + prove_membership(&self.tree, value, index).to_bytes() + } + + /// Prove membership of the leaf whose preimage is `value` **and** that the + /// per-round nullifier `Rescue(value, round)` comes from that same preimage — + /// in one proof. Public inputs are `{root, nullifier, round}`; `value` and + /// `index` stay private. See [`verify_bound`]. + pub fn prove_bound( + &self, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + index: usize, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + ) -> Vec { + prove_bound_membership(&self.tree, value, index, round, action).to_bytes() + } +} + +/// Prove membership *and* the per-round nullifier in a single STARK. The verifier +/// learns only `{root, nullifier, round}`; which member acted stays hidden. +pub fn prove_bound_membership( + tree: &MerkleTree, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + index: usize, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], +) -> Proof { + let (leaf, path) = tree.prove(index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + let prover = BoundMerkleProver::::new(proof_options()); + let trace = prover.build_trace(value, &branch, index, round, action); + prover.prove(trace).expect("prove bound membership") +} + +/// Verify a bound proof: accepts iff the proof witnesses a secret that is both a +/// member under `root` and the preimage of `nullifier` for this `round`. +pub fn verify_bound( + root: Hash, + nullifier: Hash, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + proof_bytes: &[u8], +) -> bool { + let proof = match Proof::from_bytes(proof_bytes) { + Ok(proof) => proof, + Err(_) => return false, + }; + let pub_inputs = BoundPublicInputs { + tree_root: root.to_elements(), + nullifier: nullifier.to_elements(), + round, + action, + }; + let acceptable = AcceptableOptions::OptionSet(vec![proof.options().clone()]); + winterfell::verify::< + BoundMerkleAir, + StarkHash, + DefaultRandomCoin, + MerkleTree, + >(proof, pub_inputs, &acceptable) + .is_ok() +} + +/// The leaf a member commits: `Rescue(secret, action)`. Binding the action into +/// the leaf is what lets one proof witness *which intent* the member registered, +/// rather than only that they are in the set. +pub fn leaf_of(value: [BaseElement; 2], action: [BaseElement; 2]) -> Hash { + Rescue128::digest(&[value[0], value[1], action[0], action[1]]) +} + +/// The per-round nullifier for a secret: `Rescue(v0, v1, round)`. This is the +/// value that binding-into-the-AIR (audit-critical #1c, see +/// `docs/1c-nullifier-binding-design.md`) must reproduce in-circuit and expose as +/// a public output, so that one proof witnesses membership *and* this nullifier +/// from the same secret. Provided and tested here so the AIR has a reference to +/// match. +pub fn nullifier(secret: [BaseElement; 2], round: BaseElement) -> Hash { + Rescue128::digest(&[secret[0], secret[1], round]) +} + +// --- The ricorso: the set is reborn each cycle ------------------------------ +// +// Finnegans Wake runs on Vico's cycle, and its fourth age is the *ricorso*, the +// return that begins it again. riverrun already borrows the book's circularity +// for the funding graph. This is the other half, and it closes a leak the repo +// had not named: a member's leaf is fixed forever, so per-round nullifiers unlink +// one execution from another while the leaf itself links the member across every +// round, and a set that only grows is a public record of who joined when. +// +// Under the ricorso the member holds a different leaf each cycle and proves the +// new one descends from some leaf under the previous root, without revealing +// which. History stops accumulating. +// +// Status: the relation is implemented and tested **in the clear** here, the way +// `riverrun-core::membership::check_relation` specifies the execution relation. +// The STARK that proves it without the witness is specified in +// `docs/RICORSO.md` and is not built. That is the same order 1c was done in, and +// the same honesty: a relation you can check is not a proof you can publish. + +/// Domain tag separating the per-cycle secret from every other use of Rescue. +const DOM_CYCLE: BaseElement = BaseElement::new(0x0052_4943_4F52_534F); +/// Domain tag for the migration nullifier. It must differ from [`DOM_CYCLE`]: +/// sharing one would make publishing a migration nullifier hand out the next +/// cycle's secret, and with it the member's next leaf. +const DOM_MIGRATE: BaseElement = BaseElement::new(0x004D_4947_5241_5445); + +/// The member's secret for cycle `c`: `Rescue(v0, v1, c, DOM_CYCLE)`. +/// +/// Deriving per-cycle secrets from one master secret is what lets a member hold +/// an unlinkable leaf each cycle while still being able to prove, cycle after +/// cycle, that they are the same member. +pub fn cycle_secret(secret: [BaseElement; 2], cycle: BaseElement) -> Hash { + Rescue128::digest(&[secret[0], secret[1], cycle, DOM_CYCLE]) +} + +/// The member's leaf in cycle `c`: `Rescue(cycle_secret(v, c), action)`. +pub fn cycle_leaf( + secret: [BaseElement; 2], + cycle: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], +) -> Hash { + let s = cycle_secret(secret, cycle).to_elements(); + leaf_of(s, action) +} + +/// Spent once per member per cycle, so one seat cannot become many at a rebirth. +pub fn migration_nullifier(secret: [BaseElement; 2], cycle: BaseElement) -> Hash { + Rescue128::digest(&[secret[0], secret[1], cycle, DOM_MIGRATE]) +} + +/// Everything a migration publishes. The witness — the secret and the leaf index +/// — is not in here; it is what the STARK would hide. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct Migration { + pub old_root: Hash, + pub new_leaf: Hash, + pub nullifier: Hash, + pub old_cycle: BaseElement, + pub new_cycle: BaseElement, + pub action: [BaseElement; 2], +} + +/// Evaluate the migration relation in the clear. +/// +/// True iff, for this witness: the member's leaf for `old_cycle` sits under +/// `old_root`, the announced `new_leaf` is their leaf for `new_cycle`, and the +/// announced `nullifier` is their migration nullifier for `new_cycle` — all from +/// the same secret, which is what stops a member migrating under one identity +/// and spending another's nullifier. +/// +/// This takes the witness as input, so it is emphatically **not** a proof +/// system. It is the specification the AIR has to enforce. +pub fn check_migration( + m: &Migration, + secret: [BaseElement; 2], + index: usize, + old_set: &MembershipSet, +) -> bool { + if m.new_cycle == m.old_cycle { + return false; // a rebirth has to move the cycle forward + } + if old_set.root().to_bytes() != m.old_root.to_bytes() { + return false; + } + if cycle_leaf(secret, m.new_cycle, m.action).to_bytes() != m.new_leaf.to_bytes() { + return false; + } + if migration_nullifier(secret, m.new_cycle).to_bytes() != m.nullifier.to_bytes() { + return false; + } + // membership of the *old* leaf, checked against the set the root came from + old_set.contains(cycle_leaf(secret, m.old_cycle, m.action), index) +} + +// --- One round, one proof --------------------------------------------------- + +/// Everything a settled round publishes: the set it was proven against, the +/// round and action it settles, and one nullifier per member. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct RoundClaim { + pub root: Hash, + pub round: BaseElement, + pub action: [BaseElement; 2], + pub nullifiers: Vec, +} + +/// Prove a whole synchronized round in one STARK: every `(index, secret)` in +/// `members` is a committed member of `set` acting on `action` in `round`. +/// +/// This is the shape riverrun's thesis already has — k members doing the same +/// thing at the same time — so batching costs nothing conceptually and saves a +/// proof and a verification per member. +pub fn prove_round( + set: &MembershipSet, + members: &[(usize, [BaseElement; 2])], + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], +) -> Vec { + let witnesses: Vec = members + .iter() + .map(|(index, secret)| { + let (leaf, path) = set.tree.prove(*index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + MemberWitness { secret: *secret, index: *index, branch } + }) + .collect(); + + let prover = + RoundProver::::new(proof_options(), round, action, witnesses.len()); + let trace = prover.build_trace(&witnesses); + prover.prove(trace).expect("prove round").to_bytes() +} + +/// Verify a whole round against its public claim. +pub fn verify_round(claim: &RoundClaim, proof_bytes: &[u8]) -> bool { + let proof = match Proof::from_bytes(proof_bytes) { + Ok(p) => p, + Err(_) => return false, + }; + let pub_inputs = RoundPublicInputs { + tree_root: claim.root.to_elements(), + round: claim.round, + action: claim.action, + nullifiers: claim.nullifiers.iter().map(|n| n.to_elements()).collect(), + }; + let acceptable = AcceptableOptions::OptionSet(vec![proof.options().clone()]); + winterfell::verify::, MerkleTree>( + proof, + pub_inputs, + &acceptable, + ) + .is_ok() +} + +/// Verify an opaque membership-proof byte string against a public `root`. +pub fn verify_bytes(root: Hash, proof_bytes: &[u8]) -> bool { + match Proof::from_bytes(proof_bytes) { + Ok(proof) => verify_membership(root, proof).is_ok(), + Err(_) => false, + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use winterfell::math::StarkField; + + fn contains(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool { + haystack.windows(needle.len()).any(|w| w == needle) + } + + /// Build an 8-leaf set with `value`'s digest planted at `index`. + fn set_with(value: [BaseElement; 2], index: usize) -> MerkleTree { + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..8u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = Rescue128::digest(&value); + build_tree(leaves) + } + + #[test] + fn membership_proves_and_verifies() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let index = 5; + let tree = set_with(value, index); + let root = *tree.root(); + let proof = prove_membership(&tree, value, index); + assert!(verify_membership(root, proof).is_ok(), "valid member must verify"); + } + + #[test] + fn proof_against_wrong_root_is_rejected() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let index = 3; + let tree = set_with(value, index); + let proof = prove_membership(&tree, value, index); + // A different (swapped) root must not accept the proof. + let real = tree.root().to_elements(); + let wrong = Hash::new(real[1], real[0]); + assert!(verify_membership(wrong, proof).is_err(), "a wrong root must be rejected"); + } + + /// The start-tie, attacked directly. + /// + /// The public-input tests in `tests/bound_nullifier.rs` would pass even with no + /// tie at all — they only vary what the verifier is told. This one builds the + /// trace an attacker would want: hash secret A into the nullifier cycle, but + /// carry member B into the Merkle path, so the proof would show membership of B + /// under A's nullifier. That is the "act under someone else's nullifier" break, + /// and only constraint (3) of the design doc stops it. + #[test] + fn a_trace_that_hashes_one_secret_and_carries_another_yields_no_accepted_proof() { + let a = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let b = [BaseElement::new(99), BaseElement::new(100)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let b_index = 0; + + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..4u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + let act = [BaseElement::new(0xAC01), BaseElement::new(0xAC02)]; + leaves[b_index] = leaf_of(b, act); + leaves[3] = leaf_of(a, act); + let tree = build_tree(leaves); + let root = *tree.root(); + + let (leaf, path) = tree.prove(b_index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + + let prover = BoundMerkleProver::::new(proof_options()); + // hashed = A (whose nullifier the attacker wants), carried = B (the member) + let forged = prover.build_trace_with_carry(a, b, &branch, b_index, round, act); + + // In a debug build the prover panics on an unsatisfied constraint; in a + // release build it emits a proof that must not verify. Both are a rejection. + let attempt = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + prover.prove(forged).map(|p| p.to_bytes()) + })); + + if let Ok(Ok(proof)) = attempt { + assert!( + !verify_bound(root, nullifier(a, round), round, act, &proof), + "a forged trace must not yield a proof of B's membership under A's nullifier" + ); + } + } + + /// The action binding, attacked directly. + /// + /// Announcing a different action in the public inputs is not enough to test + /// this: the action feeds the Fiat-Shamir transcript, so the proof fails for + /// that reason alone even with no constraint at all (checked by deleting the + /// constraint — those tests stayed green). The real attack is to hash the + /// action you *did* commit into the leaf, so the Merkle path still resolves, + /// while announcing the action you want to execute. Only the AIR pinning + /// column 2 and 3 at the load row to the public action stops that. + #[test] + fn a_trace_whose_leaf_commits_one_action_cannot_announce_another() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let committed = [BaseElement::new(0xAC01), BaseElement::new(0xAC02)]; + let wanted = [BaseElement::new(0xBD01), BaseElement::new(0xBD02)]; + let index = 1; + + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..4u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = leaf_of(value, committed); + let tree = build_tree(leaves); + let root = *tree.root(); + + let (leaf, path) = tree.prove(index).expect("valid index"); + let mut branch = vec![leaf]; + branch.extend_from_slice(&path); + + // the leaf hashes `committed` (so the path resolves), the proof announces `wanted` + let prover = BoundMerkleProver::::declaring_action(proof_options(), wanted); + let trace = prover.build_trace(value, &branch, index, round, committed); + + let attempt = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + prover.prove(trace).map(|p| p.to_bytes()) + })); + + if let Ok(Ok(proof)) = attempt { + assert!( + !verify_bound(root, nullifier(value, round), round, wanted, &proof), + "a member who committed one action must not be able to execute another" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn nullifier_is_deterministic_and_round_dependent() { + let v = [BaseElement::new(11), BaseElement::new(22)]; + let r1 = BaseElement::new(1); + let r2 = BaseElement::new(2); + // deterministic per (secret, round) + assert_eq!(nullifier(v, r1).to_bytes(), nullifier(v, r1).to_bytes()); + // different round → different nullifier (cross-round unlinkability) + assert_ne!(nullifier(v, r1).to_bytes(), nullifier(v, r2).to_bytes()); + // different secret → different nullifier + let w = [BaseElement::new(33), BaseElement::new(22)]; + assert_ne!(nullifier(v, r1).to_bytes(), nullifier(w, r1).to_bytes()); + // and it is distinct from the leaf commitment of the same secret + assert_ne!(nullifier(v, r1).to_bytes(), leaf_of(v, [r1, r2]).to_bytes()); + } + + #[test] + fn transmitted_proof_does_not_carry_the_secret_verbatim() { + // The whole point vs the reference proof: the opaque proof bytes must not + // contain the secret preimage verbatim (the reference proof serialized + // exactly that). This is a smoke test for "witness not on the wire", not + // a formal zero-knowledge guarantee. + let value = [BaseElement::new(0xDEAD_BEEF_1234), BaseElement::new(0x00C0_FFEE_5678)]; + let index = 2; + let mut leaves: Vec = (100..108u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = Rescue128::digest(&value); + let set = MembershipSet::new(leaves); + let root = set.root(); + + let proof = set.prove(value, index); + assert!(verify_bytes(root, &proof), "opaque proof must verify against the root"); + + // The 32 raw bytes of the secret preimage (two f128 elements, LE). + let secret_bytes: Vec = + value.iter().flat_map(|e| e.as_int().to_le_bytes()).collect(); + assert!( + !contains(&proof, &secret_bytes), + "the secret preimage must not appear verbatim in the transmitted proof" + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/prover.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/prover.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3e87307a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/prover.rs @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates. +// +// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the +// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + +use winterfell::{ + crypto::MerkleTree, matrix::ColMatrix, AuxRandElements, CompositionPoly, CompositionPolyTrace, + ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, DefaultConstraintCommitment, DefaultConstraintEvaluator, + DefaultTraceLde, PartitionOptions, StarkDomain, Trace, TraceInfo, TracePolyTable, TraceTable, +}; + +use crate::{ + rescue, BaseElement, DefaultRandomCoin, ElementHasher, FieldElement, MerkleAir, PhantomData, + ProofOptions, Prover, PublicInputs, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, HASH_STATE_WIDTH, NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, + TRACE_WIDTH, +}; + +// MERKLE PROVER +// ================================================================================================ + +pub struct MerkleProver { + options: ProofOptions, + _hasher: PhantomData, +} + +impl MerkleProver { + pub fn new(options: ProofOptions) -> Self { + Self { options, _hasher: PhantomData } + } + + pub fn build_trace( + &self, + value: [BaseElement; 2], + branch: &[rescue::Hash], + index: usize, + ) -> TraceTable { + // allocate memory to hold the trace table + let trace_length = branch.len() * HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let mut trace = TraceTable::new(TRACE_WIDTH, trace_length); + + // skip the first node of the branch because it will be computed in the trace as hash(value) + let branch = &branch[1..]; + + trace.fill( + |state| { + // initialize first state of the computation + state[0] = value[0]; + state[1] = value[1]; + state[2..].fill(BaseElement::ZERO); + }, + |step, state| { + // execute the transition function for all steps + // + // For the first 7 steps of each 8-step cycle, compute a single round of Rescue + // hash in registers [0..6]. On the 8th step, insert the next branch node into the + // trace in the positions defined by the next bit of the leaf index. If the bit is + // ZERO, the next node goes into registers [2, 3], if it is ONE, the node goes into + // registers [0, 1]. + + let cycle_num = step / HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let cycle_pos = step % HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + + if cycle_pos < NUM_HASH_ROUNDS { + rescue::apply_round(&mut state[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], step); + } else { + let branch_node = branch[cycle_num].to_elements(); + let index_bit = BaseElement::new(((index >> cycle_num) & 1) as u128); + if index_bit == BaseElement::ZERO { + // if index bit is zero, new branch node goes into registers [2, 3]; values + // in registers [0, 1] (the accumulated hash) remain unchanged + state[2] = branch_node[0]; + state[3] = branch_node[1]; + } else { + // if index bit is one, accumulated hash goes into registers [2, 3], + // and new branch nodes goes into registers [0, 1] + state[2] = state[0]; + state[3] = state[1]; + state[0] = branch_node[0]; + state[1] = branch_node[1]; + } + // reset the capacity registers of the state to ZERO + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + + state[6] = index_bit; + } + }, + ); + + // set index bit at the second step to one; this still results in a valid execution trace + // because actual index bits are inserted into the trace after step 7, but it ensures + // that there are no repeating patterns in the index bit register, and thus the degree + // of the index bit constraint is stable. + trace.set(6, 1, FieldElement::ONE); + + trace + } +} + +impl Prover for MerkleProver +where + H: ElementHasher + Sync, +{ + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type Air = MerkleAir; + type Trace = TraceTable; + type HashFn = H; + type VC = MerkleTree; + type RandomCoin = DefaultRandomCoin; + type TraceLde> = + DefaultTraceLde; + type ConstraintCommitment> = + DefaultConstraintCommitment; + type ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E: FieldElement> = + DefaultConstraintEvaluator<'a, Self::Air, E>; + + fn get_pub_inputs(&self, trace: &Self::Trace) -> PublicInputs { + let last_step = trace.length() - 1; + PublicInputs { + tree_root: [trace.get(0, last_step), trace.get(1, last_step)], + } + } + + fn options(&self) -> &ProofOptions { + &self.options + } + + fn new_trace_lde>( + &self, + trace_info: &TraceInfo, + main_trace: &ColMatrix, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_option: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::TraceLde, TracePolyTable) { + DefaultTraceLde::new(trace_info, main_trace, domain, partition_option) + } + + fn new_evaluator<'a, E: FieldElement>( + &self, + air: &'a Self::Air, + aux_rand_elements: Option>, + composition_coefficients: ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, + ) -> Self::ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E> { + DefaultConstraintEvaluator::new(air, aux_rand_elements, composition_coefficients) + } + + fn build_constraint_commitment>( + &self, + composition_poly_trace: CompositionPolyTrace, + num_constraint_composition_columns: usize, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_options: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::ConstraintCommitment, CompositionPoly) { + DefaultConstraintCommitment::new( + composition_poly_trace, + num_constraint_composition_columns, + domain, + partition_options, + ) + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_air.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_air.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..721ac9b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_air.rs @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +//! One round, one proof: the batched membership AIR. +//! +//! riverrun's thesis is a *synchronized round* — k members performing the same +//! action at the same time — and that is exactly the structure that batches. +//! Proving each member separately costs k proofs and k verifications. Laying the +//! k sub-traces end to end in one trace costs one of each. +//! +//! Each sub-trace is the bound AIR from `bound_air.rs`, unchanged: a nullifier +//! cycle, then the Merkle path to the root, with the action pinned at the load +//! row. Three things generalise: +//! +//! 1. **The one-shot masks become periodic.** `start`, `null_ins` and +//! `carry_hold` had the trace length as their period; here their period is the +//! sub-trace length `L`, so they fire once per member instead of once. +//! 2. **A seam mask.** Row `L-1` of a sub-trace sits at `hash_flag = 0`, so +//! without gating, the Merkle-insertion constraint would try to carry the last +//! row of one member into the first row of the next. `seam` switches it off at +//! exactly those rows. +//! 3. **Assertions repeat per member.** Each sub-trace asserts its own nullifier +//! at its row 7 and the shared root at its last row. +//! +//! ## Who can use this, and who cannot +//! +//! A batched proof is produced by **one prover that holds every member's +//! secret**. For a crowd of independent users that is not privacy, it is a +//! custodian, and batching there needs distributed proving. For an operator who +//! controls k identities — an agent fleet, a market maker running many wallets, +//! exactly the audience the brief names — it is one prover and a 24.6x saving at +//! k=64. +//! +//! It is also *slower* to prove: 2.57 s for 64 members against 339 ms for 64 +//! separate proofs, because the trace is 64x longer and the FFT is n log n. The +//! trade is prover time for proof size and verification count. +//! +//! This module deliberately mirrors `bound_air.rs` rather than abstracting over +//! it. The single-member path is shipped, tested and wired into the pool; the +//! honest move four days from a deadline is to leave it alone and duplicate, +//! with unification noted rather than attempted. + +use winterfell::{ + math::ToElements, Air, AirContext, Assertion, EvaluationFrame, ProofOptions, TraceInfo, + TransitionConstraintDegree, +}; + +use crate::utils::{are_equal, is_binary, is_zero, not, EvaluationResult}; +use crate::{ + rescue, BaseElement, FieldElement, BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, CARRY_0, CARRY_1, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, + HASH_STATE_WIDTH, NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, +}; + +/// Everything a settled round publishes. +pub struct RoundPublicInputs { + pub tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], + pub round: BaseElement, + pub action: [BaseElement; 2], + /// One per member, in sub-trace order. + pub nullifiers: Vec<[BaseElement; 2]>, +} + +impl ToElements for RoundPublicInputs { + fn to_elements(&self) -> Vec { + let mut v = vec![ + self.tree_root[0], + self.tree_root[1], + self.round, + self.action[0], + self.action[1], + ]; + for n in &self.nullifiers { + v.push(n[0]); + v.push(n[1]); + } + v + } +} + +pub struct RoundAir { + context: AirContext, + tree_root: [BaseElement; 2], + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + nullifiers: Vec<[BaseElement; 2]>, + /// Rows per member. + sub_len: usize, +} + +impl Air for RoundAir { + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type PublicInputs = RoundPublicInputs; + + fn new(trace_info: TraceInfo, pub_inputs: RoundPublicInputs, options: ProofOptions) -> Self { + let members = pub_inputs.nullifiers.len(); + assert!(members > 0, "a round needs at least one member"); + assert_eq!( + trace_info.length() % members, + 0, + "the trace must divide evenly into one sub-trace per member" + ); + let sub_len = trace_info.length() / members; + + let degrees = vec![ + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(5, vec![HASH_CYCLE_LEN]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::new(2), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(1, vec![sub_len]), + TransitionConstraintDegree::with_cycles(1, vec![sub_len]), + ]; + assert_eq!(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, trace_info.width()); + + // 6 per member (nullifier x2, root x2, round, padding) + 2 periodic + let num_assertions = members * 6 + 2; + RoundAir { + context: AirContext::new(trace_info, degrees, num_assertions, options), + tree_root: pub_inputs.tree_root, + round: pub_inputs.round, + action: pub_inputs.action, + nullifiers: pub_inputs.nullifiers, + sub_len, + } + } + + fn context(&self) -> &AirContext { + &self.context + } + + fn evaluate_transition>( + &self, + frame: &EvaluationFrame, + periodic_values: &[E], + result: &mut [E], + ) { + let current = frame.current(); + let next = frame.next(); + + let hash_flag = periodic_values[0]; + let start = periodic_values[1]; + let null_ins = periodic_values[2]; + let carry_hold = periodic_values[3]; + let seam = periodic_values[4]; + let ark = &periodic_values[5..]; + + rescue::enforce_round( + result, + ¤t[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + &next[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], + ark, + hash_flag, + ); + + let hash_init_flag = not(hash_flag); + // A cycle boundary is one of three things: the row-7 load, a Merkle + // insertion, or the seam between two members — where nothing carries over. + let merkle_ins = hash_init_flag * not(null_ins) * not(seam); + + let bit = next[6]; + let not_bit = not(bit); + result.agg_constraint(0, merkle_ins, not_bit * are_equal(current[0], next[0])); + result.agg_constraint(1, merkle_ins, not_bit * are_equal(current[1], next[1])); + result.agg_constraint(2, merkle_ins, bit * are_equal(current[0], next[2])); + result.agg_constraint(3, merkle_ins, bit * are_equal(current[1], next[3])); + + let load = null_ins * not(seam); + result.agg_constraint(0, load, are_equal(next[0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(1, load, are_equal(next[1], current[CARRY_1])); + result.agg_constraint(2, load, are_equal(next[2], E::from(self.action[0]))); + result.agg_constraint(3, load, are_equal(next[3], E::from(self.action[1]))); + + // Capacity is zero at every cycle start, including the first row of each + // sub-trace, so this needs no seam gating. + result.agg_constraint(4, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[4])); + result.agg_constraint(5, hash_init_flag, is_zero(next[5])); + + result[6] = is_binary(current[6]); + + result.agg_constraint(7, carry_hold, are_equal(next[CARRY_0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(8, carry_hold, are_equal(next[CARRY_1], current[CARRY_1])); + result.agg_constraint(7, start, are_equal(current[0], current[CARRY_0])); + result.agg_constraint(8, start, are_equal(current[1], current[CARRY_1])); + } + + fn get_assertions(&self) -> Vec> { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.nullifiers.len() * 6 + 2); + for (i, n) in self.nullifiers.iter().enumerate() { + let base = i * self.sub_len; + // this member's nullifier, read before the load row overwrites it + out.push(Assertion::single(0, base + NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, n[0])); + out.push(Assertion::single(1, base + NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, n[1])); + // ...and this member's Merkle path resolving to the shared root + let last = base + self.sub_len - 1; + out.push(Assertion::single(0, last, self.tree_root[0])); + out.push(Assertion::single(1, last, self.tree_root[1])); + // the round absorbed by the nullifier hash, and its padding + out.push(Assertion::single(2, base, self.round)); + out.push(Assertion::single(3, base, BaseElement::ZERO)); + } + out.push(Assertion::periodic(4, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO)); + out.push(Assertion::periodic(5, 0, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, BaseElement::ZERO)); + out + } + + fn get_periodic_column_values(&self) -> Vec> { + let l = self.sub_len; + let one_at = |idx: &[usize]| { + let mut v = vec![BaseElement::ZERO; l]; + for &i in idx { + v[i] = BaseElement::ONE; + } + v + }; + let start = one_at(&[0]); + let null_ins = one_at(&[NUM_HASH_ROUNDS]); + let carry_hold = one_at(&(0..NUM_HASH_ROUNDS).collect::>()); + let seam = one_at(&[l - 1]); + + let mut result = vec![ + HASH_CYCLE_MASK.to_vec(), + start, + null_ins, + carry_hold, + seam, + ]; + result.append(&mut rescue::get_round_constants()); + result + } +} + +const HASH_CYCLE_MASK: [BaseElement; HASH_CYCLE_LEN] = [ + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ONE, + BaseElement::ZERO, +]; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_prover.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_prover.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a6b91de --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/round_prover.rs @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +//! Prover for the batched round AIR (see `round_air.rs`). +//! +//! Fills one sub-trace per member, back to back. The only thing the step +//! function does differently from the single-member prover is re-initialise the +//! state at each seam, which is what makes the sub-traces independent. + +use winterfell::{ + crypto::MerkleTree, matrix::ColMatrix, AuxRandElements, CompositionPoly, CompositionPolyTrace, + ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, DefaultConstraintCommitment, DefaultConstraintEvaluator, + DefaultTraceLde, PartitionOptions, StarkDomain, Trace, TraceInfo, TracePolyTable, TraceTable, +}; + +use crate::{ + rescue, BaseElement, DefaultRandomCoin, ElementHasher, FieldElement, PhantomData, ProofOptions, + Prover, RoundAir, RoundPublicInputs, BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, CARRY_0, CARRY_1, HASH_CYCLE_LEN, + HASH_STATE_WIDTH, NUM_HASH_ROUNDS, +}; + +/// One member's witness for the round. +pub struct MemberWitness { + pub secret: [BaseElement; 2], + pub index: usize, + /// Leaf digest followed by the sibling path. + pub branch: Vec, +} + +pub struct RoundProver { + options: ProofOptions, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + members: usize, + _hasher: PhantomData, +} + +impl RoundProver { + pub fn new( + options: ProofOptions, + round: BaseElement, + action: [BaseElement; 2], + members: usize, + ) -> Self { + Self { options, round, action, members, _hasher: PhantomData } + } + + pub fn build_trace(&self, members: &[MemberWitness]) -> TraceTable { + assert!(!members.is_empty(), "a round needs at least one member"); + let sub_len = (members[0].branch.len() + 1) * HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let trace_length = sub_len * members.len(); + assert!( + trace_length.is_power_of_two(), + "sub-trace length {sub_len} times {} members gives {trace_length} rows, \ + which is not a power of two", + members.len() + ); + let mut trace = TraceTable::new(BOUND_TRACE_WIDTH, trace_length); + + let round = self.round; + let action = self.action; + + // Initialise state for member `m`: the nullifier hash absorbs + // (secret, round), and the carry holds the secret for the load row. + let init_member = |state: &mut [BaseElement], m: &MemberWitness| { + state[0] = m.secret[0]; + state[1] = m.secret[1]; + state[2] = round; + state[3] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[6] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[CARRY_0] = m.secret[0]; + state[CARRY_1] = m.secret[1]; + }; + + trace.fill( + |state| init_member(state, &members[0]), + |step, state| { + let next_row = step + 1; + // seam: the next row starts a new member + if next_row % sub_len == 0 { + let m = next_row / sub_len; + if m < members.len() { + init_member(state, &members[m]); + } + return; + } + + let within = step % sub_len; + let cycle_num = within / HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let cycle_pos = within % HASH_CYCLE_LEN; + let member = &members[step / sub_len]; + + if cycle_pos < NUM_HASH_ROUNDS { + rescue::apply_round(&mut state[..HASH_STATE_WIDTH], within); + } else if cycle_num == 0 { + // the nullifier is readable at row 7; reload with the carried + // secret and the public action to form the Merkle leaf + state[0] = state[CARRY_0]; + state[1] = state[CARRY_1]; + state[2] = action[0]; + state[3] = action[1]; + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[CARRY_0] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[CARRY_1] = BaseElement::ZERO; + } else { + let branch = &member.branch[1..]; + let node = branch[cycle_num - 1].to_elements(); + let bit = BaseElement::new(((member.index >> (cycle_num - 1)) & 1) as u128); + if bit == BaseElement::ZERO { + state[2] = node[0]; + state[3] = node[1]; + } else { + state[2] = state[0]; + state[3] = state[1]; + state[0] = node[0]; + state[1] = node[1]; + } + state[4] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[5] = BaseElement::ZERO; + state[6] = bit; + } + }, + ); + + // the same degree stabiliser as the single-member prover, once per member + for m in 0..members.len() { + trace.set(6, m * sub_len + 1, FieldElement::ONE); + } + + trace + } +} + +impl Prover for RoundProver +where + H: ElementHasher + Sync, +{ + type BaseField = BaseElement; + type Air = RoundAir; + type Trace = TraceTable; + type HashFn = H; + type VC = MerkleTree; + type RandomCoin = DefaultRandomCoin; + type TraceLde> = + DefaultTraceLde; + type ConstraintCommitment> = + DefaultConstraintCommitment; + type ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E: FieldElement> = + DefaultConstraintEvaluator<'a, Self::Air, E>; + + fn get_pub_inputs(&self, trace: &Self::Trace) -> RoundPublicInputs { + let last = trace.length() - 1; + let members = self.members; + let sub_len = trace.length() / members; + let nullifiers = (0..members) + .map(|i| { + let at = i * sub_len + NUM_HASH_ROUNDS; + [trace.get(0, at), trace.get(1, at)] + }) + .collect(); + RoundPublicInputs { + tree_root: [trace.get(0, last), trace.get(1, last)], + round: trace.get(2, 0), + action: self.action, + nullifiers, + } + } + + fn options(&self) -> &ProofOptions { + &self.options + } + + fn new_trace_lde>( + &self, + trace_info: &TraceInfo, + main_trace: &ColMatrix, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_option: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::TraceLde, TracePolyTable) { + DefaultTraceLde::new(trace_info, main_trace, domain, partition_option) + } + + fn new_evaluator<'a, E: FieldElement>( + &self, + air: &'a Self::Air, + aux_rand_elements: Option>, + composition_coefficients: ConstraintCompositionCoefficients, + ) -> Self::ConstraintEvaluator<'a, E> { + DefaultConstraintEvaluator::new(air, aux_rand_elements, composition_coefficients) + } + + fn build_constraint_commitment>( + &self, + composition_poly_trace: CompositionPolyTrace, + num_constraint_composition_columns: usize, + domain: &StarkDomain, + partition_options: PartitionOptions, + ) -> (Self::ConstraintCommitment, CompositionPoly) { + DefaultConstraintCommitment::new( + composition_poly_trace, + num_constraint_composition_columns, + domain, + partition_options, + ) + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/mod.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..658d8795 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates. +// +// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the +// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + +use core::ops::Range; + +use winterfell::{ + math::{FieldElement, StarkField}, + Trace, TraceTable, +}; + +pub mod rescue; + +// CONSTRAINT EVALUATION HELPERS +// ================================================================================================ + +/// Returns zero only when a == b. +pub fn are_equal(a: E, b: E) -> E { + a - b +} + +/// Returns zero only when a == zero. +pub fn is_zero(a: E) -> E { + a +} + +/// Returns zero only when a = zero || a == one. +pub fn is_binary(a: E) -> E { + a * a - a +} + +/// Return zero when a == one, and one when a == zero; +/// assumes that a is a binary value. +pub fn not(a: E) -> E { + E::ONE - a +} + +// TRAIT TO SIMPLIFY CONSTRAINT AGGREGATION +// ================================================================================================ + +pub trait EvaluationResult { + fn agg_constraint(&mut self, index: usize, flag: E, value: E); +} + +impl EvaluationResult for [E] { + fn agg_constraint(&mut self, index: usize, flag: E, value: E) { + self[index] += flag * value; + } +} + +impl EvaluationResult for Vec { + fn agg_constraint(&mut self, index: usize, flag: E, value: E) { + self[index] += flag * value; + } +} + +// OTHER FUNCTIONS +// ================================================================================================ + +/// Prints out an execution trace. +#[allow(dead_code)] +pub fn print_trace( + trace: &TraceTable, + multiples_of: usize, + offset: usize, + range: Range, +) { + let trace_width = trace.width(); + + let mut state = vec![E::ZERO; trace_width]; + for i in 0..trace.length() { + if !(i.wrapping_sub(offset)).is_multiple_of(multiples_of) { + continue; + } + trace.read_row_into(i, &mut state); + println!( + "{}\t{:?}", + i, + state[range.clone()] + .iter() + .map(|v| v.as_int()) + .collect::>() + ); + } +} + +#[allow(dead_code)] +pub fn print_trace_step(trace: &[Vec], step: usize) { + let trace_width = trace.len(); + let mut state = vec![E::ZERO; trace_width]; + for i in 0..trace_width { + state[i] = trace[i][step]; + } + println!( + "{}\t{:?}", + step, + state.iter().map(|v| v.as_int()).collect::>() + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/rescue.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/rescue.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c16c969 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/src/utils/rescue.rs @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates. +// +// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the +// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + +use core::slice; + +use core_utils::{ByteReader, ByteWriter, Deserializable, DeserializationError, Serializable}; +use winterfell::{ + crypto::{Digest, Hasher}, + math::{fields::f128::BaseElement, FieldElement}, +}; + +use crate::utils::{are_equal, EvaluationResult}; + +/// Function state is set to 6 field elements or 96 bytes; 4 elements are reserved for rate +/// and 2 elements are reserved for capacity. +pub const STATE_WIDTH: usize = 6; +pub const RATE_WIDTH: usize = 4; + +/// Two elements (32-bytes) are returned as digest. +const DIGEST_SIZE: usize = 2; + +/// Number of rounds in a single permutation of the hash function. +/// +/// The number of rounds is set to 7 to provide 128-bit security level with 40% security margin; +/// computed using algorithm 7 from +/// security margin here differs from Rescue Prime specification which suggests 50% security +/// margin (and would require 8 rounds) primarily to make AIR a bit simpler. +pub const NUM_ROUNDS: usize = 7; + +/// Minimum cycle length required to describe Rescue permutation. +pub const CYCLE_LENGTH: usize = 8; + +// TYPES AND INTERFACES +// ================================================================================================ + +pub struct Rescue128 { + state: [BaseElement; STATE_WIDTH], + idx: usize, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Default)] +pub struct Hash([BaseElement; DIGEST_SIZE]); + +// RESCUE128 IMPLEMENTATION +// ================================================================================================ + +impl Rescue128 { + /// Returns a new hasher with the state initialized to all zeros. + #[allow(clippy::new_without_default)] + pub fn new() -> Self { + Rescue128 { + state: [BaseElement::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH], + idx: 0, + } + } + + /// Absorbs data into the hasher state. + pub fn update(&mut self, data: &[BaseElement]) { + for &element in data { + self.state[self.idx] += element; + self.idx += 1; + if self.idx.is_multiple_of(RATE_WIDTH) { + apply_permutation(&mut self.state); + self.idx = 0; + } + } + } + + /// Returns hash of the data absorbed into the hasher. + pub fn finalize(mut self) -> Hash { + if self.idx > 0 { + // TODO: apply proper padding + apply_permutation(&mut self.state); + } + Hash([self.state[0], self.state[1]]) + } + + /// Returns hash of the provided data. + pub fn digest(data: &[BaseElement]) -> Hash { + // initialize state to all zeros + let mut state = [BaseElement::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + + let mut i = 0; + for &element in data.iter() { + state[i] += element; + i += 1; + if i.is_multiple_of(RATE_WIDTH) { + apply_permutation(&mut state); + i = 0; + } + } + + if i > 0 { + // TODO: apply proper padding + apply_permutation(&mut state); + } + + Hash([state[0], state[1]]) + } +} + +// HASHER IMPLEMENTATION +// ================================================================================================ + +impl Hasher for Rescue128 { + type Digest = Hash; + + const COLLISION_RESISTANCE: u32 = 64; + + fn hash(_bytes: &[u8]) -> Self::Digest { + unimplemented!("not implemented") + } + + fn merge(values: &[Self::Digest; 2]) -> Self::Digest { + Self::digest(Hash::hashes_as_elements(values)) + } + + fn merge_many(_values: &[Self::Digest]) -> Self::Digest { + unimplemented!("not implemented") + } + + fn merge_with_int(_seed: Self::Digest, _value: u64) -> Self::Digest { + unimplemented!("not implemented") + } +} + +// HASH IMPLEMENTATION +// ================================================================================================ + +impl Hash { + pub fn new(v1: BaseElement, v2: BaseElement) -> Self { + Hash([v1, v2]) + } + + #[allow(dead_code)] + #[allow(clippy::wrong_self_convention)] + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut bytes = [0; 32]; + bytes[..16].copy_from_slice(&self.0[0].to_bytes()); + bytes[16..].copy_from_slice(&self.0[1].to_bytes()); + bytes + } + + #[allow(clippy::wrong_self_convention)] + pub fn to_elements(&self) -> [BaseElement; DIGEST_SIZE] { + self.0 + } + + pub fn hashes_as_elements(hashes: &[Hash]) -> &[BaseElement] { + let p = hashes.as_ptr(); + let len = hashes.len() * DIGEST_SIZE; + unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(p as *const BaseElement, len) } + } +} + +impl Digest for Hash { + fn as_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { + let bytes = BaseElement::elements_as_bytes(&self.0); + let mut result = [0; 32]; + result[..bytes.len()].copy_from_slice(bytes); + result + } +} + +impl Serializable for Hash { + fn write_into(&self, target: &mut W) { + target.write(self.0[0]); + target.write(self.0[1]); + } +} + +impl Deserializable for Hash { + fn read_from(source: &mut R) -> Result { + let v1 = BaseElement::read_from(source)?; + let v2 = BaseElement::read_from(source)?; + Ok(Self([v1, v2])) + } +} + +// RESCUE PERMUTATION +// ================================================================================================ + +/// Applies Rescue-XLIX permutation to the provided state. +pub fn apply_permutation(state: &mut [BaseElement; STATE_WIDTH]) { + // apply round function 7 times; this provides 128-bit security with 40% security margin + for i in 0..NUM_ROUNDS { + apply_round(state, i); + } +} + +/// Rescue-XLIX round function; +/// implementation based on algorithm 3 from +#[inline(always)] +pub fn apply_round(state: &mut [BaseElement], step: usize) { + // determine which round constants to use + let ark = ARK[step % CYCLE_LENGTH]; + + // apply first half of Rescue round + apply_sbox(state); + apply_mds(state); + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + state[i] += ark[i]; + } + + // apply second half of Rescue round + apply_inv_sbox(state); + apply_mds(state); + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + state[i] += ark[STATE_WIDTH + i]; + } +} + +// CONSTRAINTS +// ================================================================================================ + +/// when flag = 1, enforces constraints for a single round of Rescue hash functions +pub fn enforce_round>( + result: &mut [E], + current: &[E], + next: &[E], + ark: &[E], + flag: E, +) { + // compute the state that should result from applying the first half of Rescue round + // to the current state of the computation + let mut step1 = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + step1.copy_from_slice(current); + apply_sbox(&mut step1); + apply_mds(&mut step1); + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + step1[i] += ark[i]; + } + + // compute the state that should result from applying the inverse for the second + // half for Rescue round to the next step of the computation + let mut step2 = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + step2.copy_from_slice(next); + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + step2[i] -= ark[STATE_WIDTH + i]; + } + apply_inv_mds(&mut step2); + apply_sbox(&mut step2); + + // make sure that the results are equal + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + result.agg_constraint(i, flag, are_equal(step2[i], step1[i])); + } +} + +// ROUND CONSTANTS +// ================================================================================================ + +/// Returns Rescue round constants arranged in column-major form. +pub fn get_round_constants() -> Vec> { + let mut constants = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..(STATE_WIDTH * 2) { + constants.push(vec![BaseElement::ZERO; CYCLE_LENGTH]); + } + + #[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)] + for i in 0..CYCLE_LENGTH { + for j in 0..(STATE_WIDTH * 2) { + constants[j][i] = ARK[i][j]; + } + } + + constants +} + +// HELPER FUNCTIONS +// ================================================================================================ + +#[inline(always)] +#[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)] +fn apply_sbox(state: &mut [E]) { + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + state[i] = state[i].exp(ALPHA.into()); + } +} + +#[inline(always)] +#[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)] +fn apply_inv_sbox(state: &mut [BaseElement]) { + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + state[i] = state[i].exp(INV_ALPHA); + } +} + +#[inline(always)] +#[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)] +fn apply_mds>(state: &mut [E]) { + let mut result = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + let mut temp = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + for j in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + temp[j] = E::from(MDS[i * STATE_WIDTH + j]) * state[j]; + } + + for j in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + result[i] += temp[j]; + } + } + state.copy_from_slice(&result); +} + +#[inline(always)] +#[allow(clippy::needless_range_loop)] +fn apply_inv_mds>(state: &mut [E]) { + let mut result = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + let mut temp = [E::ZERO; STATE_WIDTH]; + for i in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + for j in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + temp[j] = E::from(INV_MDS[i * STATE_WIDTH + j]) * state[j]; + } + + for j in 0..STATE_WIDTH { + result[i] += temp[j]; + } + } + state.copy_from_slice(&result); +} + +// CONSTANTS +// ================================================================================================ + +/// S-Box and Inverse S-Box powers; +/// computed using algorithm 6 from +const ALPHA: u32 = 5; +const INV_ALPHA: u128 = 272225893536750770770699646362995969229; + +/// Rescue MDS matrix +/// Computed using algorithm 4 from +const MDS: [BaseElement; STATE_WIDTH * STATE_WIDTH] = [ + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557953730612630), + BaseElement::new(21493836), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557953736934518), + BaseElement::new(914760), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557953744928504), + BaseElement::new(364), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557948521959389), + BaseElement::new(7809407397), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557950844620457), + BaseElement::new(324945621), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557953733852285), + BaseElement::new(99463), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374556526559624596), + BaseElement::new(2132618407920), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557163162978137), + BaseElement::new(88084432800), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557950784345879), + BaseElement::new(25095280), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374197863906102577), + BaseElement::new(537966647357139), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374358646073999137), + BaseElement::new(22165576349400), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374557212857010097), + BaseElement::new(6174066262), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463285966851139685903), + BaseElement::new(132344277849702072), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463325536573199985698), + BaseElement::new(5448481182864720), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463374376171390478291), + BaseElement::new(1506472167928), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463441758328918057706841), + BaseElement::new(32291274613403616174), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463451414421516665416977), + BaseElement::new(1329039099788841441), + BaseElement::new(340282366920938463463330243139804660633), + BaseElement::new(366573514642546), +]; + +const INV_MDS: [BaseElement; STATE_WIDTH * STATE_WIDTH] = [ + BaseElement::new(133202720344903784697302507504318451498), + BaseElement::new(9109562341901685402869515497167051415), + BaseElement::new(187114562320006661061623258692072377978), + BaseElement::new(217977550980311337650875125151512141987), + BaseElement::new(274535269264332978809051716514493438195), + BaseElement::new(198907435511358942768401550501671423539), + BaseElement::new(107211340690419935719675873160429442610), + BaseElement::new(93035459208639798096019355873148696692), + BaseElement::new(34612840942819361370119536876515785819), + BaseElement::new(28124271099756519590702162721340502811), + BaseElement::new(220883180661145883341796932300840696133), + BaseElement::new(196697641239095428808435254975214799010), + BaseElement::new(48198755643822249649260269442324041679), + BaseElement::new(64419499747985404280993270855996080557), + BaseElement::new(280207800449835933431237404716657540948), + BaseElement::new(61755931245950637038951462642746253929), + BaseElement::new(206737575380416523686108693210925354496), + BaseElement::new(19245171373866178840198015038840651466), + BaseElement::new(133290479635000282395391929030461304726), + BaseElement::new(256035933367497105928763702353648605000), + BaseElement::new(97077987470620839632334052346344687963), + BaseElement::new(144638736603246051821344039641662500876), + BaseElement::new(323753713558453221824969500168839490204), + BaseElement::new(66050250127997888787320450320278295843), + BaseElement::new(107416947271017171483976049725783774207), + BaseElement::new(29799978553141132526384006297614595309), + BaseElement::new(112991183841517485419461727429810868869), + BaseElement::new(27096959906733835564333321118624482460), + BaseElement::new(197262955506413467422574209301409294301), + BaseElement::new(205996708763053834510019802034246907929), + BaseElement::new(114827794598835201662537916675749328586), + BaseElement::new(22232541983454090535685600849896663137), + BaseElement::new(84718265936029339288536427868493390350), + BaseElement::new(176534200716138685131361645691447579493), + BaseElement::new(304590074876810806644622682832255680729), + BaseElement::new(317944222651547267127379399943392242317), +]; + +/// Rescue round constants; +/// computed using algorithm 5 from +pub const ARK: [[BaseElement; STATE_WIDTH * 2]; CYCLE_LENGTH] = [ + [ + BaseElement::new(232350694689151131917165570858777669544), + BaseElement::new(297138716840883070166239111380460167036), + BaseElement::new(262280230220923724082396709497064092149), + BaseElement::new(172158049344191113832187131208632037738), + BaseElement::new(49064466045797039562408393043269857959), + BaseElement::new(310779117230843293557874990285120450495), + BaseElement::new(256706820970445617734149759518940865107), + BaseElement::new(79123538858040670180278455836284339197), + BaseElement::new(78750303544367952484014721485273250812), + BaseElement::new(288861383492149579433903883762711410179), + BaseElement::new(59801749333456280387477464033868461625), + BaseElement::new(21443300235508431203706748477819269958), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(58568963110264836729315799795504150465), + BaseElement::new(330748576252425315826992430477036516321), + BaseElement::new(186265990460580587588657915966473647991), + BaseElement::new(33474186560709631768594728335471560699), + BaseElement::new(158848462530608412921046130349797355353), + BaseElement::new(103951280788776493556470655637893338265), + BaseElement::new(143328281743837680325887693977200434046), + BaseElement::new(84141533915622931968833899936597847300), + BaseElement::new(8289043147167319381038668861607412243), + BaseElement::new(182690551456641207603161012621368395791), + BaseElement::new(189966993584382842241685332212477020587), + BaseElement::new(32137923394454105763485467845755642950), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(37831789571282423629213813309051107559), + BaseElement::new(128553631204082467137622394929811125529), + BaseElement::new(267986778741944677472811189878493395927), + BaseElement::new(16604948458564067211433039503683613987), + BaseElement::new(336102510949899388907937615764984494068), + BaseElement::new(269515689098362827313089599343791905108), + BaseElement::new(299424679105391259942771484229152481303), + BaseElement::new(204910193356347483970850685012209050540), + BaseElement::new(297547986861132400067173315704469727918), + BaseElement::new(90994669428470088728996184833134573519), + BaseElement::new(194832530917116381832912394976136685925), + BaseElement::new(3544879195102182108390682435201981399), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(339480205126523778084089852053600037139), + BaseElement::new(7584482258985997923597941079175892345), + BaseElement::new(293411952222390873312400094181647328549), + BaseElement::new(199529004542042321671242096609546451065), + BaseElement::new(67129123347758775813781826519244753478), + BaseElement::new(262358775581253675478636059962684988488), + BaseElement::new(214578730175648891816936630380713062555), + BaseElement::new(298888476681892954783673663609236117055), + BaseElement::new(28713802418311531156758766332916445632), + BaseElement::new(1440134829402109711440873134882900954), + BaseElement::new(136568912729847804743104940208565395935), + BaseElement::new(282333114631262903665175684297593586626), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(179980515973143677823617972256218090691), + BaseElement::new(262324617228293661450608983002445445851), + BaseElement::new(101457408539557988072857167265007764003), + BaseElement::new(135015365700146217343913438445165565670), + BaseElement::new(160037359781136723784361845515476884821), + BaseElement::new(182530253870899012049936279038476084254), + BaseElement::new(135879876810809726132885131537021449499), + BaseElement::new(232021530889024386996643355214152586646), + BaseElement::new(145764181560102807472161589832442506602), + BaseElement::new(30096323905520593555387863391076216460), + BaseElement::new(26964230850883304384940372063347292502), + BaseElement::new(248723932438838238159920468579438468564), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(294269904099379916907622037481357861347), + BaseElement::new(68547751515194812125080398554316505804), + BaseElement::new(206967528806115588933607920597265054243), + BaseElement::new(218563991130423186053843420486943196637), + BaseElement::new(271753381570791699387473121354016967661), + BaseElement::new(280821616954361601859332610476339898658), + BaseElement::new(10004341245328361103806488533574675264), + BaseElement::new(102737972201824925757345477497905200949), + BaseElement::new(181579715086871199454198713448655357907), + BaseElement::new(334443686013848360201749831728546200670), + BaseElement::new(43930702221243327593116820380585481596), + BaseElement::new(16744004758332429127464852702179311517), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(310201738135125726809998762242791360596), + BaseElement::new(155126893730515639579436939964032992002), + BaseElement::new(61238650483248463229462616021804212788), + BaseElement::new(6693212157784826508674787451860949238), + BaseElement::new(197651057967963974372308220503477603713), + BaseElement::new(174221476673212934077040088950046690415), + BaseElement::new(287511813733819668564695051918836002922), + BaseElement::new(304531189544765525159398110881793396421), + BaseElement::new(276777415462914862553995344360435589651), + BaseElement::new(241036817921529641113885285343669990717), + BaseElement::new(320958231309550951576801366383624382828), + BaseElement::new(242260690344880997681123448650535822378), + ], + [ + BaseElement::new(201589105262974747061391276271612166799), + BaseElement::new(21009766855942890883171267876432289297), + BaseElement::new(303226336248222109074995022589884483065), + BaseElement::new(105515432862530091605210357969101266504), + BaseElement::new(235097661610089805414814372959229370626), + BaseElement::new(210361497167001742816223425802317150493), + BaseElement::new(218546747003262668455051521918398855294), + BaseElement::new(280724473534270362895764829061545243190), + BaseElement::new(179926408118748249708833901850481685351), + BaseElement::new(168859451670725335987760025077648496937), + BaseElement::new(127174659756870191527945451601624140498), + BaseElement::new(290826558340641225374953827677533570165), + ], +]; diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/bound_nullifier.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/bound_nullifier.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..04c4e7f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/bound_nullifier.rs @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +//! Audit-critical #1c: the membership proof must *bind* the nullifier. +//! +//! One proof, three public inputs `{root, nullifier, round}`, one private secret. +//! The gate for calling 1c done is not the happy path — it is the negative tests +//! below: a proof must not verify against a nullifier it does not witness. +//! +//! See `docs/1c-nullifier-binding-design.md`. + +use riverrun_stark::{leaf_of, nullifier, BaseElement, Hash, MembershipSet}; + +/// The public action a member commits to and later executes. +fn action(tag: u128) -> [BaseElement; 2] { + [BaseElement::new(0xAC0001 + tag), BaseElement::new(0xAC0002 + tag)] +} + +/// A set of `n` leaves with `value`'s leaf planted at `index`. +/// +/// The bound scheme spends one extra hash cycle on the nullifier, so the trace +/// length is `(depth + 2) * 8` and must stay a power of two: only depths 2, 6 and +/// 14 (4, 64 and 16384 leaves) are valid. +fn set_with(value: [BaseElement; 2], act: [BaseElement; 2], index: usize, n: u128) -> MembershipSet { + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..n) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = leaf_of(value, act); + MembershipSet::new(leaves) +} + +#[test] +fn bound_membership_proves_and_verifies() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 2; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + let n = nullifier(value, round); + + assert!( + riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), n, round, action(0), &proof), + "a valid member must verify against the nullifier the proof witnesses" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn bound_membership_works_on_a_64_leaf_set() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(1234), BaseElement::new(5678)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(3); + let index = 41; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 64); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + assert!(riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), nullifier(value, round), round, action(0), &proof)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrong_nullifier_is_rejected() { + // THE binding test. Without this failing for a wrong `n`, the nullifier is + // decoration and a member could act twice per round under two nullifiers. + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 1; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + let real = nullifier(value, round).to_elements(); + let forged = Hash::new(real[1], real[0]); + + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), forged, round, action(0), &proof), + "a proof must not verify against a nullifier it does not witness" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn nullifier_of_another_member_is_rejected() { + // Member A proves membership but presents member B's nullifier: rejected. + // This is the "act under someone else's nullifier" attack. + let a = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let b = [BaseElement::new(99), BaseElement::new(100)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 3; + + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..4u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = leaf_of(a, action(0)); + leaves[0] = leaf_of(b, action(0)); + let set = MembershipSet::new(leaves); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(a, index, round, action(0)); + + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), nullifier(b, round), round, action(0), &proof), + "A's proof must not verify against B's nullifier" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn wrong_round_is_rejected() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 2; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + let other = BaseElement::new(8); + + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), nullifier(value, round), other, action(0), &proof), + "the round is public and bound: a proof for round 7 must not pass as round 8" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn wrong_root_is_rejected() { + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 2; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + let real = set.root().to_elements(); + let wrong = Hash::new(real[1], real[0]); + + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(wrong, nullifier(value, round), round, action(0), &proof), + "membership is still bound to the public set root" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn the_bound_proof_does_not_carry_the_secret() { + use winterfell::math::StarkField; + + // Over many secrets, not one: a single sample gave false comfort here. The + // first version of this AIR held the carry constant for the whole trace, and a + // constant column has a constant low-degree extension — the secret landed in + // every FRI opening, 20 proofs out of 20. One lucky sample would have hidden + // that. This is a "not verbatim on the wire" check, not a formal + // zero-knowledge guarantee (Winterfell 0.13 has no witness randomization). + let round = BaseElement::new(11); + for k in 0..20u128 { + let value = [BaseElement::new(0xDEAD_BEEF_0000 + k), BaseElement::new(0x00C0_FFEE_0000 + k)]; + let index = (k % 4) as usize; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(0)); + let secret_bytes: Vec = value.iter().flat_map(|e| e.as_int().to_le_bytes()).collect(); + + assert!( + !proof.windows(secret_bytes.len()).any(|w| w == secret_bytes), + "secret {k} appears verbatim in the transmitted proof" + ); + } +} + +#[test] +fn a_proof_does_not_verify_for_a_different_public_action() { + // The thesis of riverrun is that a member commits an *intent* and later + // executes that intent unlinkably. If the action is not bound, the proof only + // says "a member is here" and the member could execute anything. + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 2; + let committed = action(0); + let set = set_with(value, committed, index, 4); + + let proof = set.prove_bound(value, index, round, committed); + + assert!( + riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), nullifier(value, round), round, committed, &proof), + "the committed action must verify" + ); + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(set.root(), nullifier(value, round), round, action(1), &proof), + "a proof for one committed action must not settle a different action" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_member_cannot_prove_an_action_they_did_not_commit() { + // Prover side: the member is genuinely in the set, but for action 0. Building + // a proof that claims action 1 must not yield anything a verifier accepts — + // the leaf under the root is Rescue(secret, action 0), so no consistent trace + // exists for action 1. + let value = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let index = 1; + let set = set_with(value, action(0), index, 4); + let root = set.root(); + + let attempt = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + set.prove_bound(value, index, round, action(1)) + })); + + if let Ok(proof) = attempt { + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(root, nullifier(value, round), round, action(1), &proof), + "a member committed to action 0 must not be able to execute action 1" + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/ricorso.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/ricorso.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e058c445 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/ricorso.rs @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +//! The **ricorso**: the anonymity set is reborn each cycle. +//! +//! Finnegans Wake is built on Vico's cycle — three ages and a *ricorso*, the +//! return that starts it over. riverrun already borrows the book's circularity +//! for the funding graph. This is the other half of the same idea, and it closes +//! a leak the repo had not named. +//! +//! A member's leaf is `Rescue(secret, action)` and it never changes. Per-round +//! nullifiers unlink one *execution* from another, but the leaf itself persists, +//! so anyone who ever learns it links that member across every round, forever, +//! and a set that only grows is itself a timeline of who joined when. +//! +//! Under the ricorso the member holds a fresh leaf each cycle, +//! `Rescue(Rescue(secret, cycle), action)`, and proves the new one descends from +//! *some* leaf under the previous root without revealing which. History stops +//! accumulating. + +use riverrun_stark::{ + check_migration, cycle_leaf, cycle_secret, leaf_of, migration_nullifier, BaseElement, Hash, + MembershipSet, Migration, +}; + +fn action() -> [BaseElement; 2] { + [BaseElement::new(0xAC01), BaseElement::new(0xAC02)] +} + +/// A 4-leaf set with `value`'s cycle-`c` leaf planted at `index`. +fn set_at_cycle(value: [BaseElement; 2], c: BaseElement, index: usize) -> MembershipSet { + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..4u128) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(2 * i + 1), BaseElement::new(2 * i + 2))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = cycle_leaf(value, c, action()); + MembershipSet::new(leaves) +} + +#[test] +fn a_member_migrates_into_the_next_cycle() { + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let (c0, c1) = (BaseElement::new(0), BaseElement::new(1)); + let index = 2; + let set = set_at_cycle(v, c0, index); + + let m = Migration { + old_root: set.root(), + new_leaf: cycle_leaf(v, c1, action()), + nullifier: migration_nullifier(v, c1), + old_cycle: c0, + new_cycle: c1, + action: action(), + }; + + assert!( + check_migration(&m, v, index, &set), + "a member of the previous cycle's set may carry a fresh leaf into the next" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn the_cycle_secret_is_domain_separated_from_the_nullifier() { + // Both are Rescue over (secret, cycle). If they shared a domain, publishing a + // migration nullifier would hand out the next cycle's secret, and with it the + // member's next leaf — the rebirth would be public. + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let c = BaseElement::new(3); + assert_ne!( + cycle_secret(v, c).to_bytes(), + migration_nullifier(v, c).to_bytes(), + "the cycle secret must not equal the migration nullifier" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn the_new_leaf_is_unlinkable_to_the_old_one() { + // The whole point: without the secret, nothing connects the two leaves. + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let old = cycle_leaf(v, BaseElement::new(0), action()); + let new = cycle_leaf(v, BaseElement::new(1), action()); + assert_ne!(old.to_bytes(), new.to_bytes()); + + // and neither is the plain, cycle-free leaf + assert_ne!(old.to_bytes(), leaf_of(v, action()).to_bytes()); +} + +#[test] +fn a_non_member_cannot_migrate_in() { + // Set inflation through the back door: if migration did not check membership + // under the old root, anyone could mint themselves a seat every cycle. + let member = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let outsider = [BaseElement::new(7), BaseElement::new(9)]; + let (c0, c1) = (BaseElement::new(0), BaseElement::new(1)); + let set = set_at_cycle(member, c0, 1); + let root = set.root(); + + let m = Migration { + old_root: root, + new_leaf: cycle_leaf(outsider, c1, action()), + nullifier: migration_nullifier(outsider, c1), + old_cycle: c0, + new_cycle: c1, + action: action(), + }; + assert!( + !check_migration(&m, outsider, 1, &set), + "an outsider must not be able to migrate into the set" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_migration_proof_does_not_verify_for_another_leaf() { + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let (c0, c1) = (BaseElement::new(0), BaseElement::new(1)); + let set = set_at_cycle(v, c0, 0); + + let real = cycle_leaf(v, c1, action()).to_elements(); + let forged = Hash::new(real[1], real[0]); + let m = Migration { + old_root: set.root(), + new_leaf: forged, + nullifier: migration_nullifier(v, c1), + old_cycle: c0, + new_cycle: c1, + action: action(), + }; + + assert!( + !check_migration(&m, v, 0, &set), + "the relation must bind the new leaf the member announces" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn one_member_cannot_migrate_into_two_seats() { + // The migration nullifier is what stops a member turning one seat into many + // at each rebirth: it is derived from the secret and the cycle, so a second + // migration in the same cycle reuses it. + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let c1 = BaseElement::new(1); + assert_eq!( + migration_nullifier(v, c1).to_bytes(), + migration_nullifier(v, c1).to_bytes(), + "deterministic per (secret, cycle), so the pool can spend it" + ); + assert_ne!( + migration_nullifier(v, c1).to_bytes(), + migration_nullifier(v, BaseElement::new(2)).to_bytes(), + "a new cycle grants exactly one new migration" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_migration_announcing_someone_elses_nullifier_is_rejected() { + // Without this the nullifier is decoration: a member could migrate under + // their own leaf while spending a nullifier that is not theirs, which both + // burns another member's rebirth and leaves their own unspent — one seat + // becomes two at the next cycle. Found by deleting the check and watching + // every test stay green. + let a = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let b = [BaseElement::new(99), BaseElement::new(100)]; + let (c0, c1) = (BaseElement::new(0), BaseElement::new(1)); + let set = set_at_cycle(a, c0, 2); + + let m = Migration { + old_root: set.root(), + new_leaf: cycle_leaf(a, c1, action()), + nullifier: migration_nullifier(b, c1), // B's, not A's + old_cycle: c0, + new_cycle: c1, + action: action(), + }; + + assert!(!check_migration(&m, a, 2, &set), "the nullifier must come from the migrating secret"); +} + +#[test] +fn a_rebirth_has_to_move_the_cycle_forward() { + // Re-migrating into the same cycle would mint a second leaf for one member + // with a nullifier they have already spent. + let v = [BaseElement::new(42), BaseElement::new(43)]; + let c = BaseElement::new(4); + let set = set_at_cycle(v, c, 1); + + let m = Migration { + old_root: set.root(), + new_leaf: cycle_leaf(v, c, action()), + nullifier: migration_nullifier(v, c), + old_cycle: c, + new_cycle: c, + action: action(), + }; + + assert!(!check_migration(&m, v, 1, &set), "a cycle cannot be its own successor"); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/rotation.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/rotation.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e6b8e56 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/rotation.rs @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +//! Proving a *rotation* in zero knowledge — the turn of a rotatable piece. +//! +//! A piece (a secret) that appeared as a shape under the previous angle's set root +//! rotates to the next angle, revealing only its migration tag. The proof reveals +//! `{prev_root, turn_tag, angle}` and nothing else: which piece rotated, and its +//! shape, stay hidden. This is `riverrun_core::rotatable::check_turn` enforced in +//! zero knowledge, and it reuses the bound-membership STARK verbatim: the turn is +//! *structurally* a membership proof (the shape is in the previous set) bound to a +//! nullifier (the turn tag) from the same secret. The angle plays the role of the +//! round and the shape's action. + +use riverrun_stark::{leaf_of, nullifier, BaseElement, Hash, MembershipSet}; + +/// An angle, encoded as the shape's action `[θ, 0]`. +fn angle(theta: u128) -> [BaseElement; 2] { + [BaseElement::new(theta), BaseElement::new(0)] +} +/// The same angle as the round element the turn tag is derived against. +fn round_of(theta: u128) -> BaseElement { + BaseElement::new(theta) +} + +/// The previous angle's set: `n` shapes, with our piece's shape planted at `index`. +/// A shape at angle θ is `leaf_of(piece, angle(θ))` = Rescue(piece ‖ θ). Valid sizes +/// for the bound trace are 4, 64, 16384. +fn set_at_angle(piece: [BaseElement; 2], theta: u128, index: usize, n: u128) -> MembershipSet { + let mut leaves: Vec = (0..n) + .map(|i| Hash::new(BaseElement::new(7 * i + 3), BaseElement::new(7 * i + 5))) + .collect(); + leaves[index] = leaf_of(piece, angle(theta)); + MembershipSet::new(leaves) +} + +#[test] +fn a_rotation_is_provable_in_zero_knowledge() { + let piece = [BaseElement::new(0xB0FF), BaseElement::new(0xCAFE)]; + let theta = 4u128; + let index = 2; + let prev_set = set_at_angle(piece, theta, index, 4); + + // Prove: this piece's shape is under prev_root, and the revealed turn tag comes + // from the same piece. The piece itself never appears in the proof. + let proof = prev_set.prove_bound(piece, index, round_of(theta), angle(theta)); + let turn_tag = nullifier(piece, round_of(theta)); + + assert!( + riverrun_stark::verify_bound(prev_set.root(), turn_tag, round_of(theta), angle(theta), &proof), + "a genuine rotation must verify in zero knowledge" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_forged_turn_tag_does_not_verify() { + // The binding: a proof of one piece's rotation must not verify against a turn + // tag it does not witness (someone else's tag, or a made-up one). + let piece = [BaseElement::new(0xB0FF), BaseElement::new(0xCAFE)]; + let theta = 4u128; + let index = 2; + let prev_set = set_at_angle(piece, theta, index, 4); + let proof = prev_set.prove_bound(piece, index, round_of(theta), angle(theta)); + + let other_piece = [BaseElement::new(1), BaseElement::new(2)]; + let forged = nullifier(other_piece, round_of(theta)); + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(prev_set.root(), forged, round_of(theta), angle(theta), &proof), + "a turn tag not witnessed by the proof must be rejected" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_tag_from_a_different_angle_does_not_verify() { + // No replay across angles: the turn tag for angle θ must not settle angle θ'. + let piece = [BaseElement::new(0xB0FF), BaseElement::new(0xCAFE)]; + let theta = 4u128; + let index = 2; + let prev_set = set_at_angle(piece, theta, index, 4); + let proof = prev_set.prove_bound(piece, index, round_of(theta), angle(theta)); + + // the same piece's tag, but for a different angle + let wrong_angle_tag = nullifier(piece, round_of(9)); + assert!( + !riverrun_stark::verify_bound(prev_set.root(), wrong_angle_tag, round_of(theta), angle(theta), &proof), + "a turn tag from another angle must be rejected" + ); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/round_batch.rs b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/round_batch.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c0f7ac5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-stark/tests/round_batch.rs @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +//! One round, one proof. +//! +//! riverrun's whole thesis is a *synchronized round*: k members perform the same +//! action at the same time. That is precisely the structure that batches. Proving +//! each member separately costs k proofs and k verifications — 64 members is +//! 1.09 MB of proof. Laying the k sub-traces into one trace costs one proof and +//! one verification. +//! +//! A pairing-based system batches only through recursion, which is a different +//! and much harder project than making a trace longer. + +use riverrun_stark::{ + leaf_of, nullifier, prove_round, verify_round, BaseElement, Hash, MembershipSet, RoundClaim, +}; + +fn action(tag: u128) -> [BaseElement; 2] { + [BaseElement::new(0xAC01 + tag), BaseElement::new(0xAC02 + tag)] +} + +fn secret(i: u128) -> [BaseElement; 2] { + [BaseElement::new(1000 + i), BaseElement::new(2000 + i)] +} + +/// A 4-member set where every member committed the same action. +fn round_set(act: [BaseElement; 2]) -> MembershipSet { + MembershipSet::new((0..4u128).map(|i| leaf_of(secret(i), act)).collect()) +} + +#[test] +fn a_whole_round_settles_with_one_proof() { + let act = action(0); + let set = round_set(act); + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + (0..4).map(|i| (i, secret(i as u128))).collect(); + + let proof = prove_round(&set, &members, round, act); + + let claim = RoundClaim { + root: set.root(), + round, + action: act, + nullifiers: (0..4).map(|i| nullifier(secret(i as u128), round)).collect(), + }; + assert!(verify_round(&claim, &proof), "the whole round verifies at once"); +} + +#[test] +fn one_proof_is_far_smaller_than_one_proof_per_member() { + let act = action(0); + let set = round_set(act); + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + (0..4).map(|i| (i, secret(i as u128))).collect(); + + let batched = prove_round(&set, &members, round, act).len(); + let separate: usize = members + .iter() + .map(|(i, s)| set.prove_bound(*s, *i, round, act).len()) + .sum(); + + println!("BATCH 4 members: batched {batched} B vs separate {separate} B"); + assert!( + batched < separate, + "batching must win: {batched} vs {separate}" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_sixteen_member_round_settles_in_one_post_quantum_proof() { + // The scale exhibit: a full round of 16 members, all committing the same + // action, settles with a single hash-based proof and a single verification. + // A curve-based pool can put many recipients in one transaction, but each + // membership is its own proof or a recursion step; here 16 memberships are + // one longer trace. The round size is a power of two because the trace is + // (depth + 2) * 8 rows per member; a coordinator pads a short round with + // cover members to the next power of two. + let act = action(0); + let k = 16usize; + // A 64-leaf set (tree depth 6, a valid bound-scheme depth); the first k + // leaves are the round's members, each with a distinct secret. + let set = MembershipSet::new((0..64u128).map(|i| leaf_of(secret(i), act)).collect()); + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + (0..k).map(|i| (i, secret(i as u128))).collect(); + + let proof = prove_round(&set, &members, round, act); + + let claim = RoundClaim { + root: set.root(), + round, + action: act, + nullifiers: (0..k).map(|i| nullifier(secret(i as u128), round)).collect(), + }; + assert!(verify_round(&claim, &proof), "a 16-member round verifies at once"); + + let separate: usize = members + .iter() + .map(|(i, s)| set.prove_bound(*s, *i, round, act).len()) + .sum(); + println!( + "ROUND k=16: one proof {} B vs {} separate proofs {} B ({:.1}x)", + proof.len(), + k, + separate, + separate as f64 / proof.len() as f64 + ); + assert!( + proof.len() < separate, + "batching a 16-member round must beat 16 separate proofs: {} vs {}", + proof.len(), + separate + ); +} + +#[test] +fn a_round_claiming_a_nullifier_no_member_produced_is_rejected() { + // The soundness gate. If the batched proof did not bind each sub-trace to its + // own announced nullifier, a round could smuggle in an extra actor. + let act = action(0); + let set = round_set(act); + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + (0..4).map(|i| (i, secret(i as u128))).collect(); + + let proof = prove_round(&set, &members, round, act); + + let mut nullifiers: Vec = + (0..4).map(|i| nullifier(secret(i as u128), round)).collect(); + nullifiers[2] = nullifier(secret(99), round); // nobody in the set + + let claim = RoundClaim { root: set.root(), round, action: act, nullifiers }; + assert!(!verify_round(&claim, &proof), "a foreign nullifier must break the round"); +} + +#[test] +fn a_round_for_a_different_action_is_rejected() { + let act = action(0); + let set = round_set(act); + let round = BaseElement::new(7); + let members: Vec<(usize, [BaseElement; 2])> = + (0..4).map(|i| (i, secret(i as u128))).collect(); + + let proof = prove_round(&set, &members, round, act); + let claim = RoundClaim { + root: set.root(), + round, + action: action(1), + nullifiers: (0..4).map(|i| nullifier(secret(i as u128), round)).collect(), + }; + assert!(!verify_round(&claim, &proof), "the round is bound to its action"); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/Cargo.toml b/crates/riverrun-trace/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..749645da --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +[package] +name = "riverrun-trace" +version.workspace = true +edition.workspace = true +license.workspace = true +repository.workspace = true +description = "The provenance-tracer: an adversarial on-chain de-anonymizer that measures how far a target's funding graph traces back to a labeled root — the axis every noise-based privacy tool leaves open." + +[[bin]] +name = "riverrun" +path = "src/bin/riverrun.rs" +required-features = ["onchain"] + +[features] +onchain = ["ureq", "serde_json"] + +[dependencies] +blake3 = { workspace = true } +riverrun-core = { path = "../riverrun-core" } +ureq = { version = "2", features = ["json"], optional = true } +serde_json = { version = "1", optional = true } diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/examples/coordinator.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/examples/coordinator.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb8bde25 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/examples/coordinator.rs @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +//! The provenance-aware coordinator, as an agent loop. +//! +//! An autonomous agent watches members arrive wanting to act. Each tick it runs +//! the round policy: it fires a synchronized round for the members whose funding +//! origin is well-populated, and it holds back the ones who would be exposed, +//! telling each exactly what to do. This is the coordination layer the mirror-pool +//! brief asks for --- and the agent can run it only because riverrun can *measure* +//! a crowd's anonymity, so "form a good round" becomes an objective, not a guess. +//! +//! The scene is deterministic and offline: no network, no keys. Provenance classes +//! are synthetic labels; on live data they come from `riverrun trace`. +//! +//! Run: `cargo run --release --example coordinator` + +use riverrun_trace::cert::{verify, PrivacyCertificate}; +use riverrun_trace::coordinator::{coordinate, naive_effective_k, PendingIntent}; + +fn main() { + const K_MIN: usize = 3; + + println!("riverrun coordinator --- an agent that forms private crowds\n"); + println!( + "policy: admit a member only if >= {K_MIN} pending members share their funding\n\ + origin, so no admitted member is alone in their provenance class. Defer the\n\ + rest with a remedy. Fire a round when a crowd is ready.\n" + ); + + // Intents arrive over five ticks. Each is (member, funding origin). + let ticks: Vec> = vec![ + vec![("alice", "coinbase"), ("bob", "coinbase"), ("carol", "kraken")], + vec![("dave", "coinbase"), ("erin", "kraken"), ("frank", "self-mined")], + vec![("grace", "kraken"), ("heidi", "coinbase")], + vec![("ivan", "kraken"), ("judy", "binance")], + vec![("mallory", "kraken")], + ]; + + // The agent's waiting room: members who have arrived but not yet acted. + let mut pending: Vec = Vec::new(); + + for (t, arrivals) in ticks.iter().enumerate() { + for (m, origin) in arrivals { + pending.push(PendingIntent::new(*m, *origin)); + } + let arrived: Vec<&str> = arrivals.iter().map(|(m, _)| *m).collect(); + println!("── tick {} ─ arrived: {}", t + 1, arrived.join(", ")); + + let plan = coordinate(&pending, K_MIN); + + if plan.admitted.is_empty() { + println!(" no crowd ready yet ({} waiting)\n", pending.len()); + continue; + } + + let naive = naive_effective_k(&pending); + println!( + " FIRE ROUND: {} members | effective-k {:.1} (worst member {})", + plan.advertised_k(), + plan.effective_k, + plan.worst_personal_k + ); + println!( + " admitted: {}", + plan.admitted.join(", ") + ); + + // AXL-style proof-carrying certificate: the agent issues it, and an + // admitted member verifies it independently before joining --- recomputing + // the effective-k from the carried evidence, trusting nothing the agent + // said. (Design credit: AXL, Proof-Carrying Certificates for Bounded + // Autonomy.) + let cert = plan.certificate(); + match verify(&cert, &plan.admitted) { + Ok(v) => { + let commit8 = if let PrivacyCertificate::Issued { round_commit, .. } = &cert { + hex8(round_commit) + } else { + String::new() + }; + println!( + " certificate: floor k_min={} met, effective-k {:.1} re-verified by a member [round {commit8}]", + v.k_min, v.effective_k + ); + } + Err(e) => println!(" certificate FAILED verification: {e:?}"), + } + println!( + " vs batching all {} waiting: effective-k {:.1} -- the smaller round is more private", + pending.len(), + naive + ); + for d in &plan.deferred { + println!(" hold {} ({}): {}", d.member, d.class, short(&d.reason)); + } + println!(); + + // members who acted leave the waiting room; deferred members stay. + let acted: std::collections::HashSet = plan.admitted.into_iter().collect(); + pending.retain(|p| !acted.contains(&p.member)); + } + + if !pending.is_empty() { + let names: Vec<&str> = pending.iter().map(|p| p.member.as_str()).collect(); + println!("── still waiting for a same-origin crowd: {}", names.join(", ")); + println!( + " These members each have a rare funding origin. The agent will not put\n\ + them in a round that would expose them; it waits, or they re-fund from a\n\ + common origin. Refusing to act is the privacy-preserving choice." + ); + } +} + +/// Trim the remedy to one clause for the compact per-line display. +fn short(reason: &str) -> String { + reason.split(';').next().unwrap_or(reason).trim().to_string() +} + +/// First four bytes of a commitment as hex, for a compact round tag. +fn hex8(b: &[u8; 32]) -> String { + b[..4].iter().map(|x| format!("{x:02x}")).collect() +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/bin/riverrun.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/bin/riverrun.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9af2252c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/bin/riverrun.rs @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +//! The `riverrun` CLI — one binary, four verbs. See `riverrun_trace::cli`. +fn main() { + riverrun_trace::cli::main(); +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cert.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cert.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9ca2b77e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cert.rs @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +//! Proof-carrying **privacy certificates** for a coordinated round. +//! +//! This applies the AXL certificate pattern (Galmanus, *AXL: Proof-Carrying +//! Certificates for Bounded Autonomy*) to a privacy bound. It is a native +//! implementation, not a dependency on the AXL compiler, and the design credit is +//! AXL's. +//! +//! ## The trust gap it closes +//! +//! The coordinator ([`crate::coordinator`]) forms a round and claims a privacy +//! floor for it: *"effective-k is at least this, and every admitted member's +//! provenance class has at least `k_min` members, so no one is exposed."* On its +//! own that is the agent's word. A member about to join has to trust that the +//! coordinator computed honestly and was not buggy or adversarial. +//! +//! A certificate replaces trust with a check. When the agent fires a round it +//! emits a small artifact carrying the *evidence*---the provenance-class +//! histogram---and its two claims. Anyone can verify it, following AXL's three +//! properties: +//! +//! - **inescapable.** [`verify`] recomputes the effective-k from the carried +//! histogram and asserts it equals the claim, and checks the floor directly. A +//! coordinator cannot certify a floor the histogram does not support, because +//! verification redoes the arithmetic. +//! - **portable.** The certificate is a small, serializable object a third +//! party---a member, an auditor, a settling program---verifies without trusting +//! the coordinator and without re-tracing the funding graph. +//! - **bound to the round.** A blake3 commitment ties the certificate to the exact +//! admitted set, so it cannot be replayed onto a different round. +//! +//! ## Honest scope +//! +//! AXL's original bound (a sliding-window spending limit) needs an SMT solver +//! because the property is non-trivial. This bound does not: the two claims are a +//! closed-form function of the class-size multiset---$\keff = 2^{\sum (n_c/n)\log_2 +//! n_c}$ and $\min_c n_c \geq k_{\min}$---so verification is cheap arithmetic, no +//! solver. This is the AXL *certificate pattern*, not its SMT machinery, and that +//! the bound is simple enough to check directly is a feature: the certificate is +//! trivially and independently verifiable, and the integer floor +//! ($\min_c n_c \geq k_{\min}$) is exactly what an on-chain settling program could +//! enforce without any floating point. +//! +//! The certificate carries only the class-size histogram, never member +//! identities, so it proves the crowd meets the floor without revealing who is in +//! which class: the certificate is itself privacy-preserving. + +use crate::effective_k; + +/// A privacy certificate for one coordinated round: either an issued bound with +/// its evidence, or a fail-closed refusal. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum PrivacyCertificate { + /// The round meets the floor. Carries the evidence needed to re-check it. + Issued { + /// The floor cleared: every admitted member's provenance class has at + /// least this many members. + k_min: usize, + /// The number of admitted members (the advertised crowd size). + crowd: usize, + /// The round's effective anonymity-set size, as claimed. Verification + /// recomputes this from `class_sizes` and rejects any mismatch. + effective_k: f64, + /// The provenance-class histogram of the admitted set: the load-bearing + /// evidence. No member identity appears here. + class_sizes: Vec, + /// blake3 commitment binding this certificate to the exact admitted set. + round_commit: [u8; 32], + }, + /// No round meeting the floor could be formed. Fail-closed, like AXL. + Refused { reason: String }, +} + +/// A verified certificate reduces to these load-bearing facts. Metadata (the +/// float `effective_k`) is recomputed, not trusted. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Verified { + pub crowd: usize, + pub k_min: usize, + pub effective_k: f64, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum VerifyError { + /// The certificate refuses: no safe round. + Refused(String), + /// The carried histogram does not sum to the admitted crowd. + HistogramMismatch, + /// A provenance class is below the claimed floor: a member would be exposed. + FloorBreached { smallest: usize, k_min: usize }, + /// The recomputed effective-k does not match the claim (tampering or drift). + EffectiveKDrift { claimed: f64, recomputed: f64 }, + /// The certificate is not bound to this admitted set. + WrongRound, +} + +/// Commit to an admitted set: blake3 over the sorted member ids and the sorted +/// class-size histogram. Deterministic and order-independent. +fn commit(admitted: &[String], class_sizes: &[usize]) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut ids: Vec<&str> = admitted.iter().map(String::as_str).collect(); + ids.sort_unstable(); + let mut sizes = class_sizes.to_vec(); + sizes.sort_unstable(); + + let mut h = blake3::Hasher::new(); + h.update(b"riverrun-privacy-cert-v1"); + h.update(&(ids.len() as u64).to_le_bytes()); + for id in ids { + h.update(&(id.len() as u64).to_le_bytes()); + h.update(id.as_bytes()); + } + h.update(&(sizes.len() as u64).to_le_bytes()); + for n in sizes { + h.update(&(n as u64).to_le_bytes()); + } + *h.finalize().as_bytes() +} + +/// Issue a certificate for a round of `admitted` members whose provenance classes +/// have sizes `class_sizes`, against the floor `k_min`. Fail-closed: if the crowd +/// is empty or any class is below the floor, [`PrivacyCertificate::Refused`]. +pub fn certify(admitted: &[String], class_sizes: &[usize], k_min: usize) -> PrivacyCertificate { + let k_min = k_min.max(1); + let crowd: usize = class_sizes.iter().sum(); + + if crowd == 0 { + return PrivacyCertificate::Refused { + reason: "no members could be admitted into a safe round".into(), + }; + } + if crowd != admitted.len() { + return PrivacyCertificate::Refused { + reason: "the admitted set and its class histogram disagree".into(), + }; + } + let smallest = class_sizes.iter().copied().min().unwrap_or(0); + if smallest < k_min { + return PrivacyCertificate::Refused { + reason: format!( + "a provenance class of {smallest} is below the floor of {k_min}: \ + admitting it would expose a member" + ), + }; + } + + PrivacyCertificate::Issued { + k_min, + crowd, + effective_k: effective_k(class_sizes).effective, + class_sizes: class_sizes.to_vec(), + round_commit: commit(admitted, class_sizes), + } +} + +/// Independently verify a certificate against the admitted set a member is about +/// to join. Recomputes everything; trusts nothing in the certificate but its +/// structure. +pub fn verify(cert: &PrivacyCertificate, admitted: &[String]) -> Result { + let (k_min, crowd, claimed_k, class_sizes, round_commit) = match cert { + PrivacyCertificate::Refused { reason } => { + return Err(VerifyError::Refused(reason.clone())) + } + PrivacyCertificate::Issued { k_min, crowd, effective_k, class_sizes, round_commit } => { + (*k_min, *crowd, *effective_k, class_sizes, round_commit) + } + }; + + // 1. the histogram must account for exactly the admitted crowd + let sum: usize = class_sizes.iter().sum(); + if sum != crowd || sum != admitted.len() { + return Err(VerifyError::HistogramMismatch); + } + // 2. the floor: no class below k_min, so no member is exposed + let smallest = class_sizes.iter().copied().min().unwrap_or(0); + if smallest < k_min { + return Err(VerifyError::FloorBreached { smallest, k_min }); + } + // 3. inescapable: recompute effective-k and reject drift + let recomputed = effective_k(class_sizes).effective; + if (recomputed - claimed_k).abs() > 1e-9 { + return Err(VerifyError::EffectiveKDrift { claimed: claimed_k, recomputed }); + } + // 4. bound to this exact round + if commit(admitted, class_sizes) != *round_commit { + return Err(VerifyError::WrongRound); + } + + Ok(Verified { crowd, k_min, effective_k: recomputed }) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn members(n: usize) -> Vec { + (0..n).map(|i| format!("m{i}")).collect() + } + + #[test] + fn a_safe_round_certifies_and_verifies() { + let admitted = members(8); + let sizes = vec![5, 3]; + let cert = certify(&admitted, &sizes, 2); + let v = verify(&cert, &admitted).expect("a floor-clearing round must verify"); + assert_eq!(v.crowd, 8); + assert_eq!(v.k_min, 2); + assert!(v.effective_k > 4.0); + } + + #[test] + fn an_exposed_round_is_refused_not_issued() { + // a singleton class breaches the floor + let admitted = members(6); + let sizes = vec![5, 1]; + let cert = certify(&admitted, &sizes, 2); + assert!(matches!(cert, PrivacyCertificate::Refused { .. })); + assert_eq!( + verify(&cert, &admitted), + Err(VerifyError::Refused( + "a provenance class of 1 is below the floor of 2: admitting it would expose a member".into() + )) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_tampered_effective_k_is_caught_by_recomputation() { + // This is the inescapable property: forge a higher effective-k and it dies. + let admitted = members(8); + let sizes = vec![5, 3]; + let mut cert = certify(&admitted, &sizes, 2); + if let PrivacyCertificate::Issued { effective_k, .. } = &mut cert { + *effective_k = 8.0; // claim more anonymity than the histogram supports + } + assert!(matches!( + verify(&cert, &admitted), + Err(VerifyError::EffectiveKDrift { .. }) + )); + } + + #[test] + fn a_tampered_histogram_is_caught() { + // Inflate a class in the evidence without changing the crowd: the sum no + // longer matches, or (if kept summing) the commitment breaks. + let admitted = members(8); + let sizes = vec![5, 3]; + let mut cert = certify(&admitted, &sizes, 2); + if let PrivacyCertificate::Issued { class_sizes, .. } = &mut cert { + *class_sizes = vec![6, 3]; // sums to 9, not 8 + } + assert_eq!(verify(&cert, &admitted), Err(VerifyError::HistogramMismatch)); + } + + #[test] + fn a_certificate_cannot_be_replayed_onto_another_round() { + let admitted_a = members(8); + let sizes = vec![5, 3]; + let cert = certify(&admitted_a, &sizes, 2); + + // a different crowd of the same shape must not accept A's certificate + let admitted_b: Vec = (100..108).map(|i| format!("m{i}")).collect(); + assert_eq!(verify(&cert, &admitted_b), Err(VerifyError::WrongRound)); + } + + #[test] + fn the_certificate_carries_no_identities() { + // The evidence is a histogram, not a membership list: privacy-preserving. + let admitted = members(8); + let cert = certify(&admitted, &[5, 3], 2); + if let PrivacyCertificate::Issued { class_sizes, .. } = &cert { + assert_eq!(class_sizes, &vec![5, 3]); + } else { + panic!("should have issued"); + } + // (there is no field on Issued that could hold a member id) + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cli.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cli.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19d20d0d --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/cli.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1690 @@ +//! The `riverrun` command line — one entry point, four verbs. +//! +//! Everything the measurement side of this repo does, behind a single binary with +//! sensible defaults, so a first run is `riverrun preflight ` and not a +//! hunt through six programs each with its own arguments. +//! +//! ```text +//! riverrun preflight [pool] [n] your anonymity before you act +//! riverrun audit [n] a live pool's true anonymity +//! riverrun trace one wallet's funding provenance +//! riverrun exhibit the metric on riverrun's own designs +//! ``` + +use std::collections::HashSet; + +use crate::rpc::{fee_payer, provenance_class, system_transfers, Rpc, HUB_THRESHOLD}; +use crate::rng::SplitMix64; +use crate::runs::PRIVACY_CASH_N30; +use crate::uncertainty::{ + effective_k_interval, Bracket, Census, Gate, Interval, MemberOutcome, UnresolvedReason, + DEFAULT_REPLICATES, DEFAULT_SEED, +}; +use crate::{ + effective_k, evaluate, exposure_rank, preflight, scenario, valid_pubkey, EffectiveK, + SchemeStats, Verdict, +}; + +/// Privacy Cash — a live Tornado-style SOL pool, the default when none is given. +const DEFAULT_POOL: &str = "9fhQBbumKEFuXtMBDw8AaQyAjCorLGJQiS3skWZdQyQD"; + +// bounded-trace parameters, shared by every command +const DEPTH: usize = 3; +const NODES: usize = 14; +const FUNDERS: usize = 4; +const SCAN_TX: usize = 6; +const POOL_SIG_SCAN: usize = 300; +const MIN_DEPOSIT: u64 = 10_000_000; // 0.01 SOL + +// ---- color: TTY-aware, NO_COLOR-respecting, off for --json and pipes ---- +use std::io::IsTerminal; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + +static USE_COLOR: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false); + +fn paint(code: &str, s: &str) -> String { + if USE_COLOR.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { + format!("\x1b[{code}m{s}\x1b[0m") + } else { + s.to_string() + } +} +fn red(s: &str) -> String { paint("1;31", s) } +fn green(s: &str) -> String { paint("1;32", s) } +fn yellow(s: &str) -> String { paint("1;33", s) } +fn cyan(s: &str) -> String { paint("36", s) } +fn dim(s: &str) -> String { paint("2", s) } + +/// A severity or verdict word, uppercased and colored by risk: red for danger, +/// yellow for weak, green for safe. Color with intention (clig.dev). +fn paint_risk(word: &str) -> String { + let up = word.to_uppercase(); + match word.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() { + "critical" | "high" | "exposed" => red(&up), + "medium" | "weak" => yellow(&up), + "low" | "ok" | "indistinguishable" => green(&up), + _ => up, + } +} + +fn bold(s: &str) -> String { paint("1", s) } + +/// Color an arbitrary string (a number, a phrase) by a severity level. +fn paint_by_sev(sev: &str, s: &str) -> String { + match sev { + "critical" | "high" => red(s), + "medium" => yellow(s), + _ => green(s), + } +} + +// ---- interactive, guided mode: anyone can use it, no commands, no hashes ---- + +/// Print a prompt and read one line from the user. +fn ask(prompt: &str) -> String { + use std::io::Write; + print!("{prompt}"); + std::io::stdout().flush().ok(); + let mut s = String::new(); + std::io::stdin().read_line(&mut s).ok(); + s.trim().to_string() +} + +/// The default experience when you just run `riverrun`: a plain-language menu that +/// guides you, so you never need to know a command or paste a hash. +fn guide() { + banner(); + status_rows(); + loop { + println!(" {}", bold("What would you like to do?")); + println!(); + println!(" {} {} {}", cyan("1"), bold("Become anonymous "), dim("the step-by-step to disappear on Solana")); + println!(" {} {} {}", cyan("2"), bold("Am I exposed? "), dim("check your anonymity right now")); + println!(" {} {} {}", cyan("3"), bold("Create an identity"), dim("one secret, a different face in every app")); + println!(" {} {} {}", cyan("4"), bold("Measure a pool "), dim("its real anonymity vs what it advertises")); + println!(); + println!(" {} {} {}", dim("c"), dim("connect / disconnect"), dim("activate or clear your identity")); + println!(" {} {}", dim("q"), dim("quit")); + println!(); + match ask(&format!(" {} ", cyan("›"))).as_str() { + "1" => guided_anonymize(), + "2" => guided_preflight(), + "3" => guided_identity(), + "4" => guided_audit(), + "c" | "connect" => cmd_connect(), + "d" | "disconnect" => cmd_disconnect(), + "s" | "status" => cmd_status(), + "q" | "quit" | "exit" | "" => { + println!(" stay private."); + break; + } + _ => println!(" {} type 1, 2, 3, 4, c, or q.", yellow("?")), + } + println!(); + } +} + +/// The product: walk a person through actually becoming anonymous on Solana. The +/// mechanism is real and needs no unaudited pool: act from a fresh wallet funded from an +/// origin many others share, so the link from you to the action is broken and you are one +/// of a large crowd. riverrun measures where you start, picks the move, and verifies you +/// arrived. It never touches your keys and never moves your funds. +fn guided_anonymize() { + println!(); + println!(" {}", bold("Become anonymous on Solana")); + println!(" {}", dim("Break the link between you and what you do. Not hiding the transaction,")); + println!(" {}", dim("hiding WHO did it. Four steps. riverrun never touches your keys.")); + println!(); + + println!(" {} {}", cyan("1"), bold("Where are you now?")); + let w = ask(&format!(" {} the wallet you use today (or Enter to skip) › ", cyan("›"))); + if !w.is_empty() { + cmd_preflight(std::slice::from_ref(&w), false); + } + println!(); + + println!(" {} {}", cyan("2"), bold("Use a fresh wallet for the sensitive action")); + println!(" {}", dim("A new wallet with no history that ties it to you.")); + println!(" {} {}", cyan("solana-keygen new -o fresh.json"), dim("(riverrun never sees your keys)")); + println!(); + + println!(" {} {}", cyan("3"), bold("Fund it into a crowd")); + println!(" {}", dim("Fund the fresh wallet from an origin many people share, so you blend in.")); + println!(" {} {}", green("do "), dim("withdraw to it from a major exchange: thousands share that origin")); + println!(" {} {}", red("avoid"), dim("funding it from your current wallet, that re-links you at once")); + println!(); + + println!(" {} {}", cyan("4"), bold("Act, then verify you disappeared")); + println!(" {}", dim("Do your action from the fresh wallet, then check your anonymity:")); + let f = ask(&format!(" {} the fresh wallet, to verify (or Enter to skip) › ", cyan("›"))); + if !f.is_empty() { + cmd_preflight(std::slice::from_ref(&f), false); + } + println!(); + println!(" {} {}", green("✓"), dim("riverrun keeps watching and warns you if your crowd shrinks.")); + println!(); +} + +/// A tiny xorshift so the scramble varies per value, with no rand dependency. +fn xorshift(s: &mut u64) -> u64 { + *s ^= *s << 13; + *s ^= *s >> 7; + *s ^= *s << 17; + *s +} + +/// Watch a hash lock in: the bytes scramble and resolve left to right into the real +/// value. Honest, it resolves to the actual derived hash. Only animates on a terminal; +/// piped output just prints the result. +fn hash_anim(label: &str, target_hex: &str) { + use std::io::Write; + let show = 32.min(target_hex.len()); + let tgt = &target_hex[..show]; + if !USE_COLOR.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { + println!(" {} {}", label, tgt); + return; + } + let hexc = b"0123456789abcdef"; + let mut s = 0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15u64 ^ target_hex.bytes().fold(0u64, |a, b| a.rotate_left(5) ^ b as u64); + let frames = 16u32; + for f in 0..=frames { + let locked = (show as u32 * f / frames) as usize; + let mut line = String::with_capacity(show); + for (i, ch) in tgt.chars().enumerate() { + if i < locked { + line.push(ch); + } else { + line.push(hexc[(xorshift(&mut s) % 16) as usize] as char); + } + } + let (lock, scr) = line.split_at(locked); + print!("\r {} {}{} {}", dim(label), cyan(lock), dim(scr), dim("hashing")); + std::io::stdout().flush().ok(); + std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(55)); + } + println!("\r {} {} {} ", dim(label), bold(tgt), green("✓")); +} + +/// Watch a 256-bit secret be generated: entropy fills in. +fn mint_anim(hex: &str) { + use std::io::Write; + if !USE_COLOR.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { + return; + } + let hexc = b"0123456789abcdef"; + let mut s = 0xD1B5_4A32_D192_ED03u64 ^ hex.bytes().fold(0u64, |a, b| a.rotate_left(7) ^ b as u64); + let show = 48.min(hex.len()); + let frames = 14u32; + for f in 0..=frames { + let locked = (show as u32 * f / frames) as usize; + let mut line = String::with_capacity(show); + for (i, ch) in hex[..show].chars().enumerate() { + if i < locked { + line.push(ch); + } else { + line.push(hexc[(xorshift(&mut s) % 16) as usize] as char); + } + } + let (lock, scr) = line.split_at(locked); + print!("\r {} {}{}", dim("entropy"), green(lock), dim(scr)); + std::io::stdout().flush().ok(); + std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)); + } + print!("\r{}\r", " ".repeat(70)); + std::io::stdout().flush().ok(); +} + +/// Guided: create a private identity, and see two contexts come out unlinkable. +fn guided_identity() { + println!(); + println!(" {}", bold("Let's create your private identity.")); + println!(" {}", dim("One secret becomes a different, unlinkable identity in every app you use.")); + println!(); + let secret = riverrun_core::commitment::Secret::random(); + let hex = hex_encode(secret.as_bytes()); + println!(" {} {}", cyan("◈"), dim("generating a 256-bit post-quantum secret…")); + mint_anim(&hex); + println!(" {} your secret (write it down, it is your whole identity):", green("✓")); + println!(" {}", bold(&hex)); + println!(); + let mut count = 0; + loop { + let prompt = if count == 0 { + format!(" {} which app or place? (e.g. dao-vote, airdrop) › ", cyan("›")) + } else { + format!(" {} another one? (or press Enter to finish) › ", cyan("›")) + }; + let ctx = ask(&prompt); + if ctx.is_empty() { + break; + } + let angle = context_angle(&ctx); + let piece = secret.piece(); + let shape = hex_encode(&piece.shape(angle)); + let fit = hex_encode(&piece.fit(angle)); + println!(); + println!(" {} deriving your identity for {} …", cyan("◈"), cyan(&ctx)); + hash_anim("who you are (shape)", &shape); + hash_anim("one action (fit) ", &fit); + println!(" {}", dim("nobody can link these to you, or to your other apps.")); + count += 1; + if count == 2 { + println!(); + println!(" {} your two identities are completely different.", yellow("→")); + println!(" {}", dim("that is the whole point: one secret, and no one can connect them to you.")); + } + } + println!(); +} + +/// Guided: check your anonymity in a pool before you act. +fn guided_preflight() { + println!(); + println!(" {}", dim("Paste your wallet and I'll check the anonymity you would actually get.")); + let w = ask(&format!(" {} wallet › ", cyan("›"))); + if w.is_empty() { + return; + } + println!(); + cmd_preflight(&[w], false); +} + +// ---- session + protection panel (Tor-panel feel, honest about what it is) ---- + +fn session_path() -> Option { + let home = std::env::var_os("HOME")?; + Some(std::path::Path::new(&home).join(".riverrun").join("session")) +} + +/// The active identity secret, if one is connected on this machine. +fn load_session() -> Option { + let p = session_path()?; + std::fs::read_to_string(p) + .ok() + .map(|s| s.trim().to_string()) + .filter(|s| s.len() == 64) +} + +fn save_session(secret_hex: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> { + let p = session_path() + .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound, "no HOME"))?; + if let Some(dir) = p.parent() { + std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?; + } + std::fs::write(&p, secret_hex)?; + #[cfg(unix)] + { + use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt; + let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&p, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)); + } + // Windows has no chmod-equivalent bit; the file was otherwise saved with + // whatever the parent directory's inherited ACL grants (other accounts on + // a shared machine, by default), unlike Unix's 0600 above. Best-effort + // lock it to the current user only via icacls (ships with every Windows + // install, no extra dependency): strip inherited ACEs and grant Full + // Control to $USERNAME alone. Failure here (e.g. icacls missing on some + // non-standard Windows install) is not fatal; the session still saves, + // just without this hardening, same as if this block did not exist. + #[cfg(windows)] + { + if let Ok(user) = std::env::var("USERNAME") { + let _ = std::process::Command::new("icacls") + .arg(&p) + .arg("/inheritance:r") + .arg("/grant:r") + .arg(format!("{user}:F")) + .output(); + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn clear_session() { + if let Some(p) = session_path() { + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(p); + } +} + +/// The status panel: your privacy state at a glance, like a VPN or Tor panel, but +/// honest about what riverrun does. It does not tunnel your traffic. It makes your +/// actions unlinkable and measures how hidden you really are. +/// A dim, fixed-width label so the value columns line up. Padding is applied to the +/// plain text before coloring, so the alignment survives the ANSI codes. +fn label(s: &str) -> String { + dim(&format!("{s:<13}")) +} + +/// An elegant framed wordmark, top and bottom rules only, so it never misaligns. +fn header() { + println!(); + println!(" {}", cyan("▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁")); + println!(" {} {}", bold(&cyan("riverrun")), dim("anonymity on Solana, post-quantum")); + println!(" {}", cyan("▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔▔")); +} + +/// The opening screen: a full teal wordmark, for `riverrun` with no arguments. +fn banner() { + let art = [ + r" ██", + r" ▀▀", + r" ██▄████ ████ ██▄ ▄██ ▄████▄ ██▄████ ██▄████ ██ ██ ██▄████▄", + r" ██▀ ██ ██ ██ ██▄▄▄▄██ ██▀ ██▀ ██ ██ ██▀ ██", + r" ██ ██ ▀█▄▄█▀ ██▀▀▀▀▀▀ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██", + r" ██ ▄▄▄██▄▄▄ ████ ▀██▄▄▄▄█ ██ ██ ██▄▄▄███ ██ ██", + r" ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀ ▀▀", + ]; + println!(); + for line in art { + println!(" {}", cyan(line)); + } + println!(); + println!(" {}", dim("anonymity on Solana · post-quantum · you can measure it")); + println!(" {}", dim("──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────")); +} + +/// The status rows: connection, post-quantum, identity, and how to measure. +fn status_rows() { + let active = load_session(); + println!(); + match &active { + Some(hex) => println!( + " {} {} {} {}", + green("●"), + label("status"), + green("connected"), + dim(&format!("· {}…", &hex[..6])) + ), + None => println!( + " {} {} {} {}", + dim("○"), + label("status"), + dim("not connected"), + dim(&format!("· run {}", cyan("riverrun connect"))) + ), + } + println!( + " {} {} {} {}", + green("●"), + label("post-quantum"), + "on, everlasting", + dim(&format!("· {}", cyan("riverrun pq"))) + ); + println!(" {} {} {}", cyan("●"), label("identity"), dim("a different, unlinkable face in every app")); + println!(); + println!(" {} {}", label("measure yours"), cyan("riverrun preflight ")); + println!(); +} + +fn cmd_status() { + header(); + status_rows(); +} + +/// connect: activate a working identity on this machine. +fn cmd_connect() { + if let Some(hex) = load_session() { + println!(); + println!(" {} already connected ({}…). run `riverrun disconnect` to clear it.", green("●"), &hex[..8]); + cmd_status(); + return; + } + let secret = riverrun_core::commitment::Secret::random(); + let hex = hex_encode(secret.as_bytes()); + match save_session(&hex) { + Ok(()) => { + println!(); + println!(" {} connected. a fresh identity is active on this machine.", green("●")); + cmd_status(); + } + Err(e) => { + eprintln!(" {} could not save session: {e}", red("error")); + std::process::exit(1); + } + } +} + +/// disconnect: clear the active identity. +fn cmd_disconnect() { + let had = load_session().is_some(); + clear_session(); + println!(); + if had { + println!(" {} disconnected. the identity was cleared from this machine.", dim("○")); + } else { + println!(" {} nothing to disconnect. no identity was active.", dim("○")); + } + println!(); +} + +/// Guided: measure a pool's real anonymity. +fn guided_audit() { + println!(); + let p = ask(&format!(" {} pool address (or Enter for the default) › ", cyan("›"))); + println!(); + if p.is_empty() { + cmd_audit(&[], false); + } else { + cmd_audit(&[p], false); + } +} + +pub fn main() { + let mut args: Vec = std::env::args().skip(1).collect(); + let json = take_flag(&mut args, "--json"); + let no_color = take_flag(&mut args, "--no-color"); + USE_COLOR.store( + !json + && !no_color + && std::env::var_os("NO_COLOR").is_none() + && (std::env::var_os("CLICOLOR_FORCE").is_some() || std::io::stdout().is_terminal()), + Ordering::Relaxed, + ); + if args.is_empty() { + if std::io::stdout().is_terminal() && std::io::stdin().is_terminal() { + guide(); + } else { + help(); + } + return; + } + let cmd = args[0].clone(); + let rest: &[String] = &args[1..]; + match cmd.as_str() { + "guide" | "start" | "menu" => guide(), + "status" => cmd_status(), + "connect" => cmd_connect(), + "disconnect" => cmd_disconnect(), + "preflight" => cmd_preflight(rest, json), + "audit" => cmd_audit(rest, json), + "scan" => cmd_scan(rest, json), + "watch" => cmd_watch(rest, json), + "trace" => cmd_trace(rest, json), + "exhibit" => cmd_exhibit(json), + "runs" => cmd_runs(json), + "id" => cmd_id(rest, json), + "pq" | "quantum" => cmd_pq(rest), + "floor" | "selffill" => cmd_floor(rest, json), + "explain" | "learn" => cmd_explain(rest), + "help" | "-h" | "--help" => help(), + "version" | "-V" | "--version" => version(), + other => { + eprintln!("riverrun: unknown command '{other}'\n"); + help(); + std::process::exit(2); + } + } +} + +/// Remove a `--flag` from the argument list wherever it appears, returning +/// whether it was present. Keeps positional parsing simple and order-free. +fn take_flag(args: &mut Vec, flag: &str) -> bool { + if let Some(pos) = args.iter().position(|a| a == flag) { + args.remove(pos); + true + } else { + false + } +} + +fn version() { + println!("riverrun {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")); +} + +// --- pq: post-quantum posture + Mosca inequality ---------------------------- + +/// Expert-survey midpoint for a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer, in +/// years from now. An estimate, not a fact (Mosca's own framing): used only to +/// make the inequality concrete. Overridable as the second argument. +const QUANTUM_ETA_YEARS: u32 = 10; +/// Years to migrate a deployed system to quantum-safe crypto (the `Y` in Mosca). +const MIGRATION_YEARS: u32 = 2; + +/// Mosca's inequality: you are safe iff the secret's required lifetime plus the +/// migration time fits inside the window before a quantum computer arrives. +/// `X + Y <= Z`. For a permanent ledger `X` is effectively infinite, so no +/// curve-based scheme can satisfy it. +fn mosca_safe(x_years: u32, y_years: u32, z_years: u32) -> bool { + x_years.saturating_add(y_years) <= z_years +} + +fn cmd_pq(args: &[String]) { + // Optional: `riverrun pq [Z]`, X = years your secret must stay secret, + // Z = years until a quantum computer. Default X models a permanent ledger. + let x_arg = args.first().and_then(|s| s.parse::().ok()); + let z = args.get(1).and_then(|s| s.parse::().ok()).unwrap_or(QUANTUM_ETA_YEARS); + let y = MIGRATION_YEARS; + + println!("{}\n", cyan("riverrun: post-quantum posture")); + println!(" {:<18}{:<22}{}", "primitive", "riverrun", "curve-based tools"); + println!(" {}", dim(&"-".repeat(58))); + // pad the plain text to width first, then colorize, so ANSI codes do not + // count toward the column width and the table stays aligned. + let row = |k: &str, a: &str, b: &str| + println!(" {:<18}{}{}", k, green(&format!("{a:<22}")), red(b)); + row("commitment", "BLAKE3 hash", "curve point"); + row("membership proof", "Rescue / FRI STARK", "Groth16 / BN254"); + row("trusted setup", "none", "ceremony (toxic waste)"); + row("under Shor", "nothing to break", "keys recovered"); + row("under Grover", "halved, absorbed", "n/a"); + + println!("\n {} X + Y > Z => you have already lost", yellow("Mosca's inequality:")); + println!(" X = years your secret must stay secret"); + println!(" Y = years to migrate to quantum-safe crypto (~{y})"); + println!(" Z = years until a quantum computer breaks today's curves (~{z})"); + + match x_arg { + Some(x) => { + let curve_safe = mosca_safe(x, y, z); + println!( + "\n a curve-based tool, secret needed {x}y: {}", + if curve_safe { green("within the window") } else { red("EXPOSED (X+Y>Z)") } + ); + } + None => { + println!( + "\n On a {}, X is effectively infinite: the chain is copied", + yellow("permanent ledger") + ); + println!(" forever, so any curve-based scheme fails the inequality."); + } + } + println!( + "\n riverrun is hash-based: there is no curve for Shor to attack.\n verdict: {} what you hide today stays hidden after quantum.", + green("POST-QUANTUM") + ); +} + +// --- floor: the self-fill degradation ruler --------------------------------- + +fn cmd_floor(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let k: usize = args.first().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(30); + if k == 0 { + eprintln!("usage: riverrun floor [adversary_owned]"); + std::process::exit(2); + } + // If an adversary is named, report that one point; else print the curve. + if let Some(a) = args.get(1).and_then(|s| s.parse::().ok()) { + let h = k.saturating_sub(a); + let ek = if h == 0 { 0.0 } else { effective_k(&[h]).effective }; + if json { + println!( + "{{\"advertised_k\":{k},\"adversary_owned\":{a},\"honest\":{h},\"effective_k\":{ek:.4}}}" + ); + } else { + println!( + "advertised k {k}, adversary self-fills {a} -> honest {h}, effective-k {}", + paint_by_sev(severity(ek, k, h), &format!("{ek:.1}")) + ); + } + return; + } + + println!("{}\n", cyan("riverrun: the self-fill floor")); + println!(" Advertised k is a ceiling, not a guarantee. If an adversary self-fills"); + println!(" `a` of the slots (a Sybil, or a whale funding many notes), the honest"); + println!(" set is k - a, and effective-k falls with it.\n"); + println!(" {:>14} {:>12} {:>12}", "adversary owns", "honest slots", "effective-k"); + println!(" {}", dim(&"-".repeat(44))); + let picks: Vec = { + let mut v: Vec = (0..k).filter(|a| a % (k / 5).max(1) == 0).collect(); + if *v.last().unwrap_or(&0) != k - 1 { v.push(k - 1); } + v + }; + for a in picks { + let h = k - a; + let ek = effective_k(&[h]).effective; + let sev = severity(ek, k, h); + println!( + " {:>14} {:>12} {}", + a, + h, + paint_by_sev(sev, &format!("{:>12}", format!("{ek:.1}"))) + ); + } + println!( + "\n Owning all but one leaves you {}. The defense is a per-participant\n deposit cap and the funding-graph ruler, not a larger headline k.", + red("alone") + ); +} + +// --- explain: plain-language, because knowledge should be accessible -------- + +fn cmd_explain(args: &[String]) { + let topic = args.first().map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase()).unwrap_or_default(); + let body = match topic.as_str() { + "effective-k" | "effective_k" | "k" => + "effective-k is your REAL anonymity, not the advertised crowd. A pool says\n\ + you are hidden among 30. But everyone's funding source is public, so an\n\ + adversary sorts the 30 by where their money came from. If your source is\n\ + yours alone, your real crowd is 1. effective-k = 2^(entropy of that\n\ + sorting): the size of the uniform crowd that would give the same doubt.", + "self-fill" | "selffill" | "floor" => + "self-fill is how a whale or a Sybil shrinks your crowd. They submit their\n\ + own members into your round, and every slot they own is one they can\n\ + subtract, because they know it is theirs. Advertised k = 17 with 16\n\ + adversary slots is a crowd of 1. riverrun measures this floor. Try:\n\ + riverrun floor 30", + "post-quantum" | "pq" | "quantum" => + "post-quantum means your privacy survives a quantum computer. Curve-based\n\ + tools (Groth16, ElGamal) are broken by Shor's algorithm, and a permanent\n\ + ledger lets an attacker copy your data today and crack it later. riverrun\n\ + stores only hashes, which Shor cannot break. Try: riverrun pq", + "nullifier" => + "a nullifier is a one-time tag that lets you act exactly once without\n\ + revealing who you are. It is a hash of your secret and the round, so it\n\ + is unlinkable to you but unique, one vote or one claim per round, no\n\ + double-spend, no identity.", + "provenance" | "trace" => + "provenance is where your money came from, traced backward on the public\n\ + chain. It is the quasi-identifier that survives a mixer: fresh wallet,\n\ + same funding source, same you. riverrun traces it so you can see your\n\ + exposure before you act. Try: riverrun trace ", + "riverrun-id" | "id" | "identity" => + "riverrun ID is one secret that becomes a different, unlinkable identity in\n\ + every context. One vote at the DAO, one claim at the airdrop, and nobody\n\ + can piece them back into you. It is Solana's missing Semaphore, and it is\n\ + post-quantum. Try: riverrun id new", + _ => { + println!("{}\n", cyan("riverrun explain: plain answers")); + println!(" usage: riverrun explain \n\n topics:"); + for t in ["effective-k", "self-fill", "post-quantum", "nullifier", "provenance", "riverrun-id"] { + println!(" {}", green(t)); + } + return; + } + }; + println!("{}\n", cyan(&format!("riverrun explain: {topic}"))); + for line in body.lines() { + println!(" {line}"); + } +} + +/// Reject a malformed address before spending any RPC calls: a typo would +/// otherwise come back empty and be misread as "rootless" / "no crowd". +fn require_pubkey(kind: &str, s: &str) { + if !valid_pubkey(s) { + eprintln!("riverrun: '{s}' is not a valid Solana {kind} (base58, 32 bytes)."); + std::process::exit(2); + } +} + +/// Map an anonymity result to a scanner-style severity, so `audit` reads like a +/// finding and not just a metric. `critical` when any member is alone in their +/// provenance class (fully de-anonymized), then by how far effective k has fallen +/// below the advertised set. +fn severity(effective: f64, advertised: usize, worst_case: usize) -> &'static str { + if advertised == 0 { + return "unknown"; + } + if worst_case <= 1 { + return "critical"; + } + match effective / advertised as f64 { + r if r < 0.5 => "high", + r if r < 0.8 => "medium", + _ => "low", + } +} + +/// One pool's measured funding-graph exposure. The unit `audit`, `scan`, and +/// `watch` all share — a measurement, never an inference. +struct PoolMeasurement { + depositors_sampled: usize, + reach_origin: usize, + ek: EffectiveK, + severity: &'static str, + /// Every member accounted for: resolved, unresolved, or lost to our own RPC. + census: Census, + /// The two readings of the unresolved members. `ek` above is its upper end. + bracket: Bracket, + /// The spread of the upper reading over the draw of depositors. + interval: Option, + /// Whether this sample supports quoting a single number at all. + gate: Gate, +} + +/// Measure a pool once: sample depositors, trace each one's provenance, and +/// reduce to effective k. `None` when no depositor crowd was recovered (so the +/// caller can tell "nothing to measure" from a real result). `verbose` prints the +/// per-depositor progress that `audit` wants and `scan`/`watch` do not. +fn measure_pool( + rpc: &mut Rpc, + pool: &str, + n: usize, + budget: &mut usize, + verbose: bool, +) -> Option { + let depositors = pool_depositors(rpc, pool, n, budget); + if depositors.is_empty() { + return None; + } + if verbose { + eprintln!("tracing each one's funding graph..."); + } + // Per-member outcomes, not just labels. A member whose trace hit an RPC + // failure is recorded as ours and leaves the population: a throttled call + // that returns nothing must never read as "this wallet has no funder", which + // is exactly the bucket that inflates an anonymity figure. + let mut outcomes: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(depositors.len()); + let mut classes: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(depositors.len()); + for (i, d) in depositors.iter().enumerate() { + let failures_before = rpc.failures; + let budget_before = *budget; + let c = provenance_class(rpc, d, budget, DEPTH, NODES, FUNDERS, SCAN_TX); + if verbose { + eprintln!(" [{:>2}/{}] {}", i + 1, depositors.len(), short_class(&c)); + } + let failed = rpc.failures > failures_before; + let starved = budget_before > 0 && *budget == 0; + let outcome = if c != "rootless" { + MemberOutcome::Resolved { class: c.clone() } + } else if failed { + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure } + } else if starved { + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason::TraceBudgetExhausted } + } else { + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason::NoOriginWithinBound } + }; + outcomes.push(outcome); + classes.push(c); + } + + let mut seen: Vec<(&String, usize)> = Vec::new(); + for c in &classes { + if let Some(e) = seen.iter_mut().find(|(k, _)| *k == c) { + e.1 += 1; + } else { + seen.push((c, 1)); + } + } + let reach_origin = classes.iter().filter(|c| *c != "rootless").count(); + let sizes: Vec = seen.iter().map(|(_, n)| *n).collect(); + let ek = effective_k(&sizes); + let severity = severity(ek.effective, classes.len(), ek.worst_case); + + let census = Census::of(&outcomes); + let bracket = Bracket::from_outcomes(&outcomes)?; + let gate = bracket.gate(&census); + // The interval is around the reading actually reported — the one where the + // unresolved share a class — and it holds n fixed, so it is a statement about + // this sample size only. + let interval = effective_k_interval(&classes, DEFAULT_REPLICATES, DEFAULT_SEED); + + Some(PoolMeasurement { + depositors_sampled: classes.len(), + reach_origin, + ek, + severity, + census, + bracket, + interval, + gate, + }) +} + +/// Exit cleanly when a live command recovered no data, distinguishing a genuine +/// empty result from an RPC that could not be reached — because for a privacy +/// tool a network failure must never be reported as "private". +fn no_data_exit(rpc: &Rpc, empty_reason: &str) -> ! { + if rpc.failures > 0 { + eprintln!( + "\ncould not reach the RPC at {} ({} failed call(s)). Not reporting a\n\ + result: a network failure must never read as 'private'. Point $SOLANA_RPC\n\ + at a reliable endpoint and retry.", + rpc.endpoint(), + rpc.failures + ); + } else { + eprintln!("\n{empty_reason}"); + } + std::process::exit(1); +} + +fn help() { + println!( + "riverrun — measure and defend behavioural anonymity on Solana\n\ + \n\ + USAGE\n\ + \x20 riverrun [args]\n\ + \n\ + COMMANDS\n\ + \x20 preflight [pool] [n] the anonymity YOU would get in a pool,\n\ + \x20 before you deposit — the one to run first\n\ + \x20 audit [n] a live pool's effective k vs its advertised k\n\ + \x20 scan [pool...] measure many pools, ranked by exposure (worst first)\n\ + \x20 watch [pool...] [--interval s] scan on a loop — the always-on screening agent\n\ + \x20 trace one wallet's funding provenance, one hop at a time\n\ + \x20 exhibit the effective-k metric on riverrun's own\n\ + \x20 constructions (offline, no RPC)\n\ + \x20 runs this repo's published measurements, with their\n\ + \x20 bracket, interval and gate (offline, no RPC)\n\ + \x20 id riverrun ID: one secret, a different\n\ + \x20 unlinkable identity per context, offline\n\ + \x20 pq [X] [Z] post-quantum posture + Mosca inequality\n\ + \x20 floor [adversary] the self-fill floor: advertised k vs real\n\ + \x20 explain plain answers (effective-k, post-quantum, ...)\n\ + \x20 version print the version and exit\n\ + \n\ + OPTIONS\n\ + \x20 --json emit a machine-readable JSON result on stdout\n\ + \x20 (progress stays on stderr; pipe with `| jq`)\n\ + \x20 --no-color disable color (also off when piped or NO_COLOR set)\n\ + \n\ + EXAMPLES\n\ + \x20 riverrun preflight am I exposed in the default pool?\n\ + \x20 riverrun audit 30 a pool's real anonymity, 30 samples\n\ + \x20 riverrun id new mint an identity secret\n\ + \x20 riverrun id show dao-vote your unlinkable identity in one context\n\ + \x20 riverrun id erosion how a persistent identity erodes, when to rotate\n\ + \x20 riverrun audit --json | jq machine-readable, for scripts and CI\n\ + \n\ + DEFAULTS\n\ + \x20 pool {DEFAULT_POOL} (Privacy Cash)\n\ + \x20 n 15 depositors sampled\n\ + \x20 RPC $SOLANA_RPC, else mainnet-beta\n\ + \n\ + Every result from live data is a floor: bounded trace, SOL flows only.\n\ + 'safe' means 'no cheap attribution found', never 'anonymous'.\n\ + Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 no data (RPC / empty pool), 2 usage." + ); +} + +// --- preflight -------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn cmd_preflight(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let Some(wallet) = args.first() else { + eprintln!("usage: riverrun preflight [pool] [n]"); + std::process::exit(2); + }; + let pool = args.get(1).map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(DEFAULT_POOL); + let n: usize = args.get(2).and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(15); + require_pubkey("wallet", wallet); + require_pubkey("pool", pool); + + let mut rpc = Rpc::new(); + let mut budget = 3000; + + eprintln!("wallet : {wallet}\npool : {pool}\n\ntracing your funding graph backward..."); + let user_class = provenance_class(&mut rpc, wallet, &mut budget, DEPTH, NODES, FUNDERS, SCAN_TX); + eprintln!(" your provenance class: {}", describe(&user_class)); + + eprintln!("\nsampling the pool's current depositors..."); + let depositors = pool_depositors(&mut rpc, pool, n, &mut budget); + if depositors.is_empty() { + no_data_exit(&rpc, "no recent SOL deposits found for this pool (inactive, or not a SOL pool)."); + } + let population: Vec = depositors + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, d)| { + let c = provenance_class(&mut rpc, d, &mut budget, DEPTH, NODES, FUNDERS, SCAN_TX); + eprintln!(" depositor {:>2}: {}", i + 1, short_class(&c)); + c + }) + .collect(); + + let p = preflight(&user_class, &population); + + if json { + let verdict = match p.verdict { + Verdict::Exposed => "exposed", + Verdict::Weak => "weak", + Verdict::Ok => "ok", + }; + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "preflight", + "endpoint": rpc.endpoint(), + "pool": pool, + "wallet": wallet, + "advertised_k": p.advertised_k, + "pool_effective_k": p.pool_effective_k, + "personal_k": p.personal_k, + "verdict": verdict, + "is_floor": true, + "reliable": rpc.failures == 0, + "rpc_calls": rpc.calls, + "rpc_failures": rpc.failures, + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + println!("\n=== pre-flight anonymity check ==="); + println!("pool : {pool}"); + println!("advertised anonymity : 1 in {}", p.advertised_k); + println!("pool effective k (now) : {:.1}", p.pool_effective_k); + println!("YOUR crowd here : {} of {} share your provenance class", p.personal_k, p.advertised_k); + print!("VERDICT : "); + match p.verdict { + Verdict::Exposed => println!( + "{}\n\nYou would be alone in your provenance class. The pool's size is\n\ + irrelevant to you: an adversary reading the funding graph attributes your\n\ + action at once. Fund a fresh wallet from a source other depositors also use\n\ + (a major exchange withdrawal is the usual one), or wait for a same-origin\n\ + crowd. Anonymity is a crowd of people who look like you, not a large crowd.", + red("EXPOSED") + ), + Verdict::Weak => println!( + "{}\n\nOnly {} of {} depositors share your provenance class, so your real\n\ + anonymity here is far below the advertised {}. Consider funding through a\n\ + more common origin, or waiting for a larger same-class crowd.", + yellow("WEAK"), p.personal_k, p.advertised_k, p.advertised_k + ), + Verdict::Ok => println!( + "{}\n\n{} of {} depositors share your provenance class,\n\ + a healthy fraction, so the crowd is genuinely yours. This is a floor: a deeper\n\ + trace can only shrink your class, so 'OK' means 'no cheap attribution found'.", + green("OK (within the trace bound)"), p.personal_k, p.advertised_k + ), + } + println!("\n(RPC calls: {})", rpc.calls); +} + +// --- audit ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +fn cmd_audit(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let pool = args.first().map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(DEFAULT_POOL); + let n: usize = args.get(1).and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(15); + require_pubkey("pool", pool); + + let mut rpc = Rpc::new(); + let mut budget = 4000; + + eprintln!("pool : {pool}\n\nenumerating depositors..."); + let Some(m) = measure_pool(&mut rpc, pool, n, &mut budget, true) else { + no_data_exit(&rpc, "no depositors recovered: no recent SOL deposits (inactive, or not a SOL pool)."); + }; + let PoolMeasurement { + depositors_sampled, + reach_origin: rooted, + ek, + severity: sev, + census, + bracket, + interval, + gate, + } = m; + let classes_len = depositors_sampled; + let refusal = match &gate { + Gate::Publish => None, + Gate::Refuse { reason } => Some(reason.clone()), + }; + + if json { + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "audit", + "endpoint": rpc.endpoint(), + "pool": pool, + "severity": sev, + "depositors_sampled": classes_len, + "reach_origin": rooted, + "reach_origin_pct": (100.0 * rooted as f64 / classes_len as f64), + "provenance_classes": ek.classes, + "advertised_k": classes_len, + "effective_k": ek.effective, + "worst_case": ek.worst_case, + "residual_bits": ek.residual_bits, + // the two readings of the members that reached no origin + "effective_k_bracket": { + "unresolved_merged": bracket.upper.effective, + "unresolved_split": bracket.lower.effective, + "resolved": bracket.resolved, + "unresolved": bracket.unresolved, + "resolved_fraction": bracket.resolved_fraction(), + }, + "census": { + "attempted": census.attempted(), + "resolved": census.resolved, + "no_origin_within_bound": census.no_origin_within_bound, + "trace_budget_exhausted": census.trace_budget_exhausted, + "rpc_failure": census.rpc_failure, + "failure_rate": census.failure_rate(), + }, + "sampling_interval": interval.map(|i| serde_json::json!({ + "statistic": "effective_k, unresolved merged", + "point": i.point, + "lo": i.lo, + "hi": i.hi, + "resampling_bias": i.resampling_bias(), + "replicates": i.replicates, + "seed": format!("{:#018x}", i.seed), + })), + "publishable": refusal.is_none(), + "refusal": refusal, + "is_floor": true, + "reliable": rpc.failures == 0, + "rpc_calls": rpc.calls, + "rpc_failures": rpc.failures, + "note": "floor: bounded trace, SOL-only; see docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md", + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + println!("\n=== funding-graph exposure of a live anonymity set ==="); + println!("pool : {pool}"); + println!("severity : {}", paint_risk(sev)); + println!("depositors sampled : {classes_len}"); + println!("reach an origin : {rooted}/{classes_len} ({:.0}%)", 100.0 * rooted as f64 / classes_len as f64); + println!("provenance classes : {}", ek.classes); + println!( + "advertised k : {} -> effective k : {} (worst case {})", + classes_len, + paint_by_sev(sev, &format!("{:.1}", ek.effective)), + ek.worst_case + ); + println!( + "unresolved bracket : {:.1} … {:.1} ({} of {} reached an origin)", + bracket.lower.effective, + bracket.upper.effective, + bracket.resolved, + bracket.measured() + ); + if let Some(i) = interval { + println!( + "95% resampling range : {:.1} … {:.1} (bias {:+.1}, {} replicates, seed {:#018x})", + i.lo, i.hi, i.resampling_bias(), i.replicates, i.seed + ); + } + println!("census : {}", census.summary()); + match &refusal { + Some(reason) => println!( + "{}: {reason}\n\ + The effective k above is the favourable end of that bracket, not a result.", + red("REFUSED") + ), + None => println!("gate : {}", green("PUBLISHABLE")), + } + println!( + "\nAdvertised anonymity counts members. Effective k is what those members are\n\ + worth once an adversary sorts them by funding provenance — and members whose\n\ + bounded walk found no origin are a gap, not a class, which is what the bracket\n\ + spans. A floor: bounded trace, SOL only. See docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md." + ); + if rpc.failures > 0 { + println!("{}: {} RPC call(s) failed, this is a partial floor, not the full picture.", yellow("WARNING"), rpc.failures); + } + println!("(RPC calls: {}, failures: {})", rpc.calls, rpc.failures); + // anticipate the next action (gh primer): send the reader to the personal check. + println!("\n{}", dim(&format!("next: riverrun preflight {pool} (the anonymity YOU would get, before you deposit)"))); +} + +// --- scan / watch (the autonomous screening agent) -------------------------- + +/// Depositors sampled per pool in a multi-pool sweep — smaller than a single +/// `audit`, because breadth over many pools matters more than depth on one. +const SCAN_N: usize = 12; + +/// Positional pool addresses from args, ignoring flags and the value that +/// follows `--interval`. Defaults to the built-in pool when none are given. +fn pools_from_args(args: &[String]) -> Vec { + let mut pools = Vec::new(); + let mut skip_next = false; + for a in args { + if skip_next { + skip_next = false; + continue; + } + if a == "--interval" { + skip_next = true; + continue; + } + if a.starts_with("--") { + continue; + } + pools.push(a.clone()); + } + if pools.is_empty() { + vec![DEFAULT_POOL.to_string()] + } else { + pools + } +} + +fn arg_value(args: &[String], flag: &str) -> Option { + args.iter().position(|a| a == flag).and_then(|i| args.get(i + 1)).cloned() +} + +/// Measure every pool, rank by exposure (worst first), and report. Unmeasured +/// pools are listed but never counted as private — a pool we could not reach or +/// that has no crowd is not a safe pool, it is an unknown one. +fn run_scan(pools: &[String], json: bool) { + let mut rpc = Rpc::new(); + let mut ranked: Vec<(String, PoolMeasurement, usize)> = Vec::new(); + let mut unmeasured: Vec<(String, usize)> = Vec::new(); + for p in pools { + eprintln!("scanning {p} ..."); + let f0 = rpc.failures; + let mut budget = 2500; + match measure_pool(&mut rpc, p, SCAN_N, &mut budget, false) { + Some(m) => ranked.push((p.clone(), m, rpc.failures - f0)), + None => unmeasured.push((p.clone(), rpc.failures - f0)), + } + } + ranked.sort_by(|a, b| { + exposure_rank(a.1.severity, a.1.ek.effective) + .partial_cmp(&exposure_rank(b.1.severity, b.1.ek.effective)) + .unwrap() + }); + + if json { + let rows: Vec = ranked + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, (p, m, f))| { + serde_json::json!({ + "rank": i + 1, + "pool": p, + "severity": m.severity, + "advertised_k": m.depositors_sampled, + "effective_k": m.ek.effective, + "worst_case": m.ek.worst_case, + "reach_origin": m.reach_origin, + "effective_k_bracket": [m.bracket.lower.effective, m.bracket.upper.effective], + "publishable": m.gate.publishes(), + "reliable": *f == 0, + "rpc_failures": f, + }) + }) + .collect(); + let un: Vec = unmeasured + .iter() + .map(|(p, f)| { + serde_json::json!({ + "pool": p, + "measured": false, + "reason": if *f > 0 { "rpc_unreachable" } else { "no_deposit_crowd" }, + "rpc_failures": f, + }) + }) + .collect(); + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "scan", + "endpoint": rpc.endpoint(), + "pools_scanned": pools.len(), + "ranked": rows, + "unmeasured": un, + "is_floor": true, + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + println!("\n=== exposure ranking — most exposed first ==="); + println!("{:>2} {:<8} {:>7} {:>5} {:>5} pool", "#", "severity", "eff-k", "adv-k", "worst"); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(74)); + for (i, (p, m, f)) in ranked.iter().enumerate() { + let flag = if *f > 0 { " (partial)" } else { "" }; + println!( + "{:>2} {:<8} {:>7.1} {:>5} {:>5} {}{}", + i + 1, m.severity, m.ek.effective, m.depositors_sampled, m.ek.worst_case, p, flag + ); + } + for (p, f) in &unmeasured { + let why = if *f > 0 { "RPC unreachable — NOT counted as private" } else { "no deposit crowd to measure" }; + println!(" - {:<8} {:>7} {:>5} {:>5} {} [{}]", "unknown", "-", "-", "-", p, why); + } + println!( + "\nA floor: bounded, SOL-only traces. 'critical' = at least one member alone in its\n\ + provenance class. Unmeasured pools are unknown, never private." + ); +} + +fn cmd_scan(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let pools = pools_from_args(args); + for p in &pools { + require_pubkey("pool", p); + } + run_scan(&pools, json); +} + +fn cmd_watch(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let pools = pools_from_args(args); + for p in &pools { + require_pubkey("pool", p); + } + let interval: u64 = arg_value(args, "--interval").and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(300); + eprintln!( + "riverrun watch — screening {} pool(s) every {interval}s. Every pass is a fresh\n\ + measurement, never a cached inference. Ctrl-C to stop.", + pools.len() + ); + let mut pass = 1u64; + loop { + eprintln!("\n════ pass {pass} ════"); + run_scan(&pools, json); + pass += 1; + std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(interval)); + } +} + +// --- trace ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +fn cmd_trace(args: &[String], json: bool) { + let Some(wallet) = args.first() else { + eprintln!("usage: riverrun trace "); + std::process::exit(2); + }; + require_pubkey("wallet", wallet); + let mut rpc = Rpc::new(); + let mut budget = 1500; + + eprintln!("wallet : {wallet}\n\ntracing backward funding graph over mainnet..."); + let class = provenance_class(&mut rpc, wallet, &mut budget, DEPTH, NODES, FUNDERS, SCAN_TX); + + if json { + let rootless = class == "rootless"; + let hubs: Vec = if rootless { + Vec::new() + } else { + class.split('+').map(String::from).collect() + }; + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "trace", + "endpoint": rpc.endpoint(), + "wallet": wallet, + "attributable_origin": !rootless, + "hubs": hubs, + "trace_depth": DEPTH, + "is_floor": true, + "reliable": rpc.failures == 0, + "rpc_calls": rpc.calls, + "rpc_failures": rpc.failures, + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + println!("\n=== provenance report ==="); + println!("wallet : {wallet}"); + if class == "rootless" { + println!("attributable origin: none within depth {DEPTH} (shallow, SOL-only trace)"); + println!( + "\nAbsence here is the shallow bound, not proof of rootlessness — a deeper\n\ + trace or SPL-flow following may still reach an origin." + ); + } else { + println!("attributable origin: YES"); + for hub in class.split('+') { + println!(" reaches hub {hub}"); + } + println!( + "\nThe funding graph leaks: a shallow, SOL-only backward walk already names\n\ + an attributable origin. This is the axis noise tools leave open." + ); + } + println!("(RPC calls: {})", rpc.calls); +} + +// --- exhibit (offline) ------------------------------------------------------ + +// ---- id subcommand helpers ---- + +fn hex_encode(bytes: &[u8]) -> String { + let mut s = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2); + for b in bytes { + s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}")); + } + s +} + +fn hex_decode_32(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { + let s = s.trim(); + if s.len() != 64 { + return None; + } + let mut out = [0u8; 32]; + for i in 0..32 { + out[i] = u8::from_str_radix(&s[2 * i..2 * i + 2], 16).ok()?; + } + Some(out) +} + +/// A context string becomes an angle by hashing, so a user names contexts by words +/// ("dao-vote", "airdrop") rather than numbers. +fn context_angle(context: &str) -> u64 { + let h = blake3::hash(context.as_bytes()); + let mut b = [0u8; 8]; + b.copy_from_slice(&h.as_bytes()[..8]); + u64::from_le_bytes(b) +} + +/// riverrun ID from the command line: one secret, a different unlinkable identity per +/// context, and the erosion ruler that says when to rotate. +fn cmd_id(args: &[String], json: bool) { + match args.first().map(|s| s.as_str()).unwrap_or("help") { + "new" => { + let secret = riverrun_core::commitment::Secret::random(); + let hex = hex_encode(secret.as_bytes()); + if json { + println!("{{\"tool\":\"riverrun\",\"command\":\"id new\",\"secret\":\"{hex}\"}}"); + return; + } + println!("your riverrun ID secret (keep it safe, it is your whole identity):"); + println!(" {hex}"); + println!(); + println!("one secret becomes a different, unlinkable identity in every context."); + println!("try: riverrun id show {} dao-vote", &hex[..16]); + } + "show" => { + let (Some(sec_hex), Some(context)) = (args.get(1), args.get(2)) else { + eprintln!("usage: riverrun id show "); + std::process::exit(2); + }; + let Some(bytes) = hex_decode_32(sec_hex) else { + eprintln!("secret must be 64 hex chars (32 bytes). mint one with: riverrun id new"); + std::process::exit(2); + }; + let secret = riverrun_core::commitment::Secret::from_bytes(bytes); + let angle = context_angle(context); + let piece = secret.piece(); + let shape = hex_encode(&piece.shape(angle)); + let fit = hex_encode(&piece.fit(angle)); + let turn = hex_encode(&piece.turn(angle)); + if json { + println!("{{\"tool\":\"riverrun\",\"command\":\"id show\",\"context\":\"{context}\",\"angle\":{angle},\"shape\":\"{shape}\",\"fit\":\"{fit}\",\"turn\":\"{turn}\"}}"); + return; + } + println!("context: {}", cyan(context)); + println!(" {} : {shape}", dim("shape (your identity here)")); + println!(" {} : {fit}", dim("fit (your one action) ")); + println!(" {} : {turn}", dim("turn (continuity tag, ZK)")); + println!(); + println!("the same secret in another context gives a different, unlinkable shape."); + } + "erosion" => { + use crate::repeated::{repeated_use_effective_k, Use}; + // one persistent identity across three contexts; its crowd intersects down + // 6 -> 3 -> 1 against a floor of 4. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..6), Use::new(2, 0..3), Use::new(3, [0u32])]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + if json { + let keff: Vec = e.k_eff.iter().map(|k| format!("{k}")).collect(); + let rot = e + .rotate_before + .map(|i| (i + 1).to_string()) + .unwrap_or_else(|| "null".into()); + println!("{{\"tool\":\"riverrun\",\"command\":\"id erosion\",\"k_min\":4,\"k_eff\":[{}],\"rotate_before_use\":{rot}}}", keff.join(",")); + return; + } + println!("repeated-use erosion of one persistent identity (floor k_min = 4):"); + println!(); + for (i, k) in e.k_eff.iter().enumerate() { + let below = *k < 4.0; + let num = format!("{:>4.1}", k); + let num = if below { red(&num) } else { green(&num) }; + let flag = if below { red(" <- below the floor") } else { String::new() }; + println!(" after use {}: effective anonymity = {}{}", i + 1, num, flag); + } + println!(); + match e.rotate_before { + Some(i) => println!("{} before use {}: acting again under this secret drops you below the floor.", yellow("rotate (turn)"), i + 1), + None => println!("{}: the identity stays above the floor across every use.", green("safe")), + } + println!("turn resets the secret; re-fund from a common origin to reset provenance too."); + } + _ => { + println!("riverrun id — one secret, a different unlinkable identity per context\n"); + println!("USAGE"); + println!(" riverrun id new mint a fresh secret"); + println!(" riverrun id show your shape/fit/turn in a context"); + println!(" riverrun id erosion how a persistent identity erodes, when to rotate"); + } + } +} + +/// The runs this repository has published, re-measured offline with their +/// uncertainty attached. No RPC: it recomputes from the committed histogram, so +/// a reader gets the same bytes we did. +fn cmd_runs(json: bool) { + let run = PRIVACY_CASH_N30; + let b = run.bracket(); + let i = run.interval(); + let c = run.census(); + let refusal = match b.gate(&c) { + Gate::Publish => None, + Gate::Refuse { reason } => Some(reason), + }; + + if json { + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "runs", + "offline": true, + "runs": [{ + "source": run.source, + "pool": run.pool, + "sampled": run.sampled, + "resolved": b.resolved, + "unresolved": b.unresolved, + "effective_k_bracket": { + "unresolved_merged": b.upper.effective, + "unresolved_split": b.lower.effective, + }, + "sampling_interval": { + "statistic": "effective_k, unresolved merged", + "point": i.point, + "lo": i.lo, + "hi": i.hi, + "resampling_bias": i.resampling_bias(), + "replicates": i.replicates, + "seed": format!("{:#018x}", i.seed), + }, + "publishable": refusal.is_none(), + "refusal": refusal, + "raw_sample_committed": false, + }], + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + println!("{}\n", cyan("riverrun: the published runs, with what they do not know")); + println!(" {} {}\n", dim("source:"), run.source); + for line in run.report().lines() { + println!(" {line}"); + } + println!(); + for line in [ + "The class histogram is committed; the per-member addresses and funding edges", + "were not recorded, so this recomputes the arithmetic, not the tracing.", + ] { + println!(" {}", dim(line)); + } +} + +fn cmd_exhibit(json: bool) { + const SEED: u64 = 0x000C_0FFE_ED15_EA5E; + const N: usize = 2000; + + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(SEED); + let rows: [(&str, &str, SchemeStats); 3] = [ + ("rooted_decoy", "rooted decoy (the field)", evaluate(&scenario::rooted_decoy(&mut rng, N, 4))), + ("cyclic_ambiguous", "cyclic, ambiguous root", evaluate(&scenario::cyclic_ambiguous(&mut rng, N, 60, 8))), + ("cyclic_rootless", "cyclic, rootless", evaluate(&scenario::cyclic_rootless(&mut rng, N, 60))), + ]; + + if json { + let constructions: Vec = rows + .iter() + .map(|(id, _, s)| { + serde_json::json!({ + "construction": id, + "members": s.targets, + "root_hit_rate": s.root_hit_rate, + "mean_nearest_depth": if s.mean_nearest_depth.is_nan() { serde_json::Value::Null } else { serde_json::json!(s.mean_nearest_depth) }, + "mean_attribution_bits": s.mean_attribution_bits, + "cyclic_rate": s.cyclic_rate, + "effective_k": s.effective_k.effective, + }) + }) + .collect(); + let obj = serde_json::json!({ + "tool": "riverrun", + "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), + "command": "exhibit", + "offline": true, + "members_per_row": N, + "seed": format!("{SEED:#018x}"), + "constructions": constructions, + }); + println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&obj).unwrap()); + return; + } + + let print_row = |name: &str, s: &SchemeStats| { + let depth = if s.mean_nearest_depth.is_nan() { + " n/a".to_string() + } else { + format!("{:5.1}", s.mean_nearest_depth) + }; + println!( + "{:<26} {:>11.1}% {:>9} {:>13.2} {:>9.1}% {:>11.0}", + name, s.root_hit_rate * 100.0, depth, s.mean_attribution_bits, s.cyclic_rate * 100.0, s.effective_k.effective + ); + }; + + println!("the funding-graph leak every noise tool leaves open\n"); + println!( + "{:<26} {:>12} {:>9} {:>13} {:>10} {:>11}", + "construction", "root-hit", "depth", "attrib.(bits)", "in-cycle", "effective k" + ); + println!("{}", "-".repeat(92)); + for (_, label, s) in &rows { + print_row(label, s); + } + println!( + "\nSame {N} members each row. The field's decoys still trace to one origin\n\ + (root-hit ~100%, 0 bits of doubt); circularity dissolves it — a root that\n\ + could be any of many, or none at all — worth the full set instead of a\n\ + fraction. 'rootless' holds only while funding sources are unattributable." + ); +} + +// --- shared helpers --------------------------------------------------------- + +fn describe(class: &str) -> String { + if class == "rootless" { + "rootless (no attributable origin found within the trace bound)".to_string() + } else { + format!("reaches {}", short_class(class)) + } +} + +fn short_class(c: &str) -> String { + if c == "rootless" { + return "rootless".to_string(); + } + c.split('+').map(|a| format!("{}…", &a[..8.min(a.len())])).collect::>().join("+") +} + +/// Distinct non-hub fee payers who moved SOL into the pool recently. +fn pool_depositors(rpc: &mut Rpc, pool: &str, want: usize, budget: &mut usize) -> Vec { + pool_depositors_min(rpc, pool, want, budget, MIN_DEPOSIT) +} + +/// Like `pool_depositors`, but with an explicit deposit floor instead of the +/// default `MIN_DEPOSIT`. Pools have different entry-fee denominations (a live +/// mixer's SOL floor is not a fresh test pool's much smaller entry fee), so a +/// caller measuring a specific pool's own commitment size passes it here rather +/// than tuning the shared `MIN_DEPOSIT` constant, which stays as the general +/// noise floor for `audit`/`preflight`/`scan`/`watch` against pools of unknown +/// denomination. +fn pool_depositors_min( + rpc: &mut Rpc, + pool: &str, + want: usize, + budget: &mut usize, + min_deposit: u64, +) -> Vec { + let mut seen: HashSet = HashSet::new(); + let mut out = Vec::new(); + for sig in rpc.signatures(pool, POOL_SIG_SCAN) { + if out.len() >= want || *budget == 0 { + break; + } + *budget -= 1; + let Some(tx) = rpc.transaction(&sig) else { continue }; + let Some(payer) = fee_payer(&tx) else { continue }; + if seen.contains(&payer) { + continue; + } + let deposits = system_transfers(&tx) + .into_iter() + .any(|(src, dst, l)| src == payer && dst != payer && l >= min_deposit); + if !deposits { + continue; + } + seen.insert(payer.clone()); + if rpc.sig_count(&payer) >= HUB_THRESHOLD { + continue; // relayer / exchange, not a user + } + out.push(payer); + } + out +} + +/// Measure a pool's real effective-k, for a caller (like the `act()` SDK +/// backend) that knows the pool's own deposit denomination rather than relying +/// on the general-purpose `MIN_DEPOSIT` noise floor. `None` when no depositors +/// were recovered (empty pool, wrong denomination, or the RPC could not be +/// reached). The caller must not treat that as "anonymous", only as +/// "unmeasured". +pub fn measure_pool_ruler( + rpc: &mut Rpc, + pool: &str, + n: usize, + budget: &mut usize, + min_deposit: u64, +) -> Option { + let depositors = pool_depositors_min(rpc, pool, n, budget, min_deposit); + if depositors.is_empty() { + return None; + } + let classes: Vec = depositors + .iter() + .map(|d| provenance_class(rpc, d, budget, DEPTH, NODES, FUNDERS, SCAN_TX)) + .collect(); + let mut seen: Vec<(&String, usize)> = Vec::new(); + for c in &classes { + if let Some(e) = seen.iter_mut().find(|(k, _)| *k == c) { + e.1 += 1; + } else { + seen.push((c, 1)); + } + } + let sizes: Vec = seen.iter().map(|(_, n)| *n).collect(); + Some(effective_k(&sizes)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod cli_tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn mosca_safe_only_when_lifetime_plus_migration_fits_before_quantum() { + assert!(mosca_safe(3, 2, 10), "3+2=5 <= 10 is safe"); + assert!(mosca_safe(8, 2, 10), "8+2=10 <= 10 is exactly safe"); + assert!(!mosca_safe(9, 2, 10), "9+2=11 > 10 is exposed"); + // a permanent ledger: X is effectively infinite, so never safe for a + // scheme that has to migrate. This is why hash-based must be the default. + assert!(!mosca_safe(u32::MAX, 2, 10)); + } + + #[test] + fn the_self_fill_floor_collapses_to_one_and_tops_out_at_the_crowd() { + // one honest slot left is effective-k 1 (fully exposed) + assert!((effective_k(&[1]).effective - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9); + // the full untouched crowd is worth its size + assert!((effective_k(&[30]).effective - 30.0).abs() < 1e-9); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/coordinator.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/coordinator.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6a57e02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/coordinator.rs @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +//! The provenance-aware round coordinator. +//! +//! riverrun's privacy rests on a *synchronized round*: a crowd of members acting +//! together. But a crowd is not privacy just because it is large. Anonymity is +//! measured by the effective set size ([`crate::effective_k`]), and that number +//! is decided by **funding provenance**: a member alone in their provenance class +//! is exposed no matter how big the round, because an adversary who reads the +//! funding graph narrows the actor to that class. +//! +//! So forming a good round is an optimization, and riverrun is the only system +//! that can run it, because it is the only one that can *measure* a round's +//! anonymity. This module is the policy an agent uses: given the members who want +//! to act, it admits the ones whose provenance class is well-populated and defers +//! the ones who would be exposed, telling each deferred member what to do. The +//! result is a round that maximizes effective-k under a hard floor: **every +//! admitted member shares their class with at least `k_min - 1` others.** +//! +//! The counter-intuitive consequence, which the demo shows: a *smaller* round, +//! chosen well, gives *more* anonymity than batching everyone, because batching +//! everyone drags in the singletons who fragment the provenance distribution and +//! collapse the effective set size. + +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +use crate::effective_k; + +/// A member who wants to act this round, tagged with their funding-provenance +/// class (as produced by [`crate::rpc::provenance_class`], or a synthetic label +/// in tests and demos). +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct PendingIntent { + pub member: String, + pub class: String, +} + +impl PendingIntent { + pub fn new(member: impl Into, class: impl Into) -> Self { + Self { member: member.into(), class: class.into() } + } +} + +/// A member held back from this round, with the reason and a concrete remedy. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Deferral { + pub member: String, + pub class: String, + pub reason: String, +} + +/// The plan an agent commits to for one round. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct RoundPlan { + /// Members admitted to the synchronized round (this is exactly the set that + /// would be fed to the batched proof). + pub admitted: Vec, + /// Members deferred, each with a remedy. + pub deferred: Vec, + /// The formed round's effective anonymity-set size. + pub effective_k: f64, + /// The smallest provenance class among the admitted members: the anonymity of + /// the least-protected member in the round. + pub worst_personal_k: usize, + /// The provenance-class histogram of the admitted set. The evidence a + /// certificate carries; no member identity. + pub admitted_class_sizes: Vec, + /// The floor this round was formed against. + pub k_min: usize, +} + +impl RoundPlan { + pub fn advertised_k(&self) -> usize { + self.admitted.len() + } + + /// A proof-carrying privacy certificate for this round (see [`crate::cert`]). + /// The agent hands this to admitted members, who verify it independently + /// rather than trusting that the round is private. + pub fn certificate(&self) -> crate::cert::PrivacyCertificate { + crate::cert::certify(&self.admitted, &self.admitted_class_sizes, self.k_min) + } +} + +/// Plan a round from `pending`, admitting a member only if at least `k_min` +/// pending members share their provenance class. +/// +/// This greedy floor is not a heuristic that merely tends to help: it is a +/// guarantee. Every admitted member ends up in a class of size $\geq$ `k_min`, so +/// no admitted member is exposed, and among rounds with that property this one is +/// the largest (it admits every safe member). Because it drops exactly the +/// singleton and thin classes that fragment the distribution, it also lifts the +/// round's effective-k above the naive "admit everyone" round --- see +/// [`naive_effective_k`] and the tests. +pub fn coordinate(pending: &[PendingIntent], k_min: usize) -> RoundPlan { + let k_min = k_min.max(1); + + // group members by provenance class, preserving arrival order within a class + let mut by_class: BTreeMap<&str, Vec<&str>> = BTreeMap::new(); + for p in pending { + by_class.entry(&p.class).or_default().push(&p.member); + } + + let mut admitted = Vec::new(); + let mut deferred = Vec::new(); + let mut admitted_sizes = Vec::new(); + + for (class, members) in &by_class { + if members.len() >= k_min { + admitted_sizes.push(members.len()); + for m in members { + admitted.push((*m).to_string()); + } + } else { + let need = k_min - members.len(); + for m in members { + deferred.push(Deferral { + member: (*m).to_string(), + class: (*class).to_string(), + reason: format!( + "only {} pending member(s) share your provenance origin; a round \ + now would leave you in a crowd of {}. Wait for {} more same-origin \ + member(s), or fund a fresh wallet from an origin the round already \ + has.", + members.len(), + members.len(), + need + ), + }); + } + } + } + + let effective_k = effective_k(&admitted_sizes).effective; + let worst_personal_k = admitted_sizes.iter().copied().min().unwrap_or(0); + + RoundPlan { + admitted, + deferred, + effective_k, + worst_personal_k, + admitted_class_sizes: admitted_sizes, + k_min, + } +} + +/// The effective-k of the round you would get by naively admitting *everyone* in +/// `pending`. Provided so the coordinator's gain can be stated as a number rather +/// than asserted. +pub fn naive_effective_k(pending: &[PendingIntent]) -> f64 { + let mut by_class: BTreeMap<&str, usize> = BTreeMap::new(); + for p in pending { + *by_class.entry(&p.class).or_default() += 1; + } + let sizes: Vec = by_class.values().copied().collect(); + effective_k(&sizes).effective +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn intents(spec: &[(&str, usize)]) -> Vec { + // spec: (class, count) -> that many members in that class + let mut out = Vec::new(); + for (class, n) in spec { + for i in 0..*n { + out.push(PendingIntent::new(format!("{class}-{i}"), *class)); + } + } + out + } + + #[test] + fn a_same_origin_crowd_is_admitted_whole() { + // Ten members, all funded from the same origin: no one is exposed, the + // whole crowd is one class, effective-k is the full size. + let p = intents(&[("A", 10)]); + let plan = coordinate(&p, 2); + assert_eq!(plan.admitted.len(), 10); + assert!(plan.deferred.is_empty()); + assert!((plan.effective_k - 10.0).abs() < 1e-9, "got {}", plan.effective_k); + assert_eq!(plan.worst_personal_k, 10); + } + + #[test] + fn singletons_are_deferred_with_a_remedy() { + // Two big classes and two lone members. The lone members would each be a + // crowd of one; defer them. + let p = intents(&[("A", 5), ("B", 3), ("C", 1), ("D", 1)]); + let plan = coordinate(&p, 2); + assert_eq!(plan.admitted.len(), 8, "A and B admitted"); + assert_eq!(plan.deferred.len(), 2, "C and D deferred"); + for d in &plan.deferred { + assert!(d.reason.contains("origin"), "remedy should be actionable"); + } + assert!(plan.worst_personal_k >= 2, "no admitted member is alone"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_smaller_coordinated_round_beats_batching_everyone() { + // The core claim: choosing well gives MORE anonymity than admitting all. + let p = intents(&[("A", 5), ("B", 3), ("C", 1), ("D", 1)]); + let coordinated = coordinate(&p, 2).effective_k; + let naive = naive_effective_k(&p); + assert!( + coordinated > naive, + "coordinated {coordinated} must beat naive {naive}" + ); + // for these numbers: coordinated ~4.1 (round of 8), naive ~3.1 (round of 10) + assert!(coordinated > 4.0 && naive < 3.5, "coordinated {coordinated}, naive {naive}"); + } + + #[test] + fn an_all_singleton_set_forms_no_safe_round() { + // If everyone has a unique origin, there is no crowd to hide in. The + // honest answer is an empty round, not a fake one. + let p = intents(&[("A", 1), ("B", 1), ("C", 1), ("D", 1)]); + let plan = coordinate(&p, 2); + assert!(plan.admitted.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(plan.deferred.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(plan.effective_k, 0.0); + } + + #[test] + fn a_fired_round_hands_out_a_verifiable_certificate() { + use crate::cert::{verify, PrivacyCertificate}; + let p = intents(&[("A", 5), ("B", 3), ("C", 1)]); + let plan = coordinate(&p, 2); + let cert = plan.certificate(); + assert!(matches!(cert, PrivacyCertificate::Issued { .. })); + // a member re-checks the coordinator's claim against the admitted set, + // trusting nothing the coordinator said + let v = verify(&cert, &plan.admitted).expect("the round's certificate must verify"); + assert!(v.effective_k > 4.0); + assert_eq!(v.crowd, plan.admitted.len()); + } + + #[test] + fn k_min_is_respected() { + // With a floor of 4, the class of 3 is now too thin and is deferred. + let p = intents(&[("A", 5), ("B", 3)]); + let plan = coordinate(&p, 4); + assert_eq!(plan.admitted.len(), 5, "only A clears a floor of 4"); + assert_eq!(plan.deferred.len(), 3, "B is deferred"); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/graph.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/graph.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..736422f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/graph.rs @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +//! The provenance graph. +//! +//! Nodes are accounts. A directed edge `u -> v` means **`u` funded `v`** (value +//! flowed from `u` to `v`). Provenance analysis walks these edges *backward*: +//! the funders of `v` are its predecessors. Some nodes carry a [`RootLabel`] — +//! they are *attributable origins* the analyst already knows (a CEX deposit +//! address, a sanctioned wallet, a doxxed funder). The whole game of +//! de-anonymization is: starting from a target, does the backward walk reach a +//! labeled root, and if so, which one and how certainly? +//! +//! Because value flows forward in time, the *literal* funding graph is always a +//! rooted DAG — every chain of funding bottoms out at some source. The interesting +//! structure (and the defense) lives in whether that source is **labeled** and +//! whether the target sits inside a **cycle** in the inferred ownership relation, +//! which — unlike the time-ordered ledger — may be cyclic. + +/// A human-known origin label (exchange name, sanctioned tag, etc.). +pub type RootLabel = u32; + +/// Directed funding graph with optional root labels on nodes. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)] +pub struct ProvenanceGraph { + /// `succ[u]` = nodes `u` funded (out-edges `u -> v`). + succ: Vec>, + /// `preds[v]` = nodes that funded `v` (in-edges), kept in sync for backward + /// walks — the tracer's primary direction. + preds: Vec>, + /// `root[v] = Some(label)` iff `v` is an attributable origin. + root: Vec>, +} + +impl ProvenanceGraph { + pub fn new() -> Self { + Self::default() + } + + /// Add a node, returning its id. `label = Some(_)` marks it an attributable root. + pub fn add_node(&mut self, label: Option) -> usize { + let id = self.root.len(); + self.succ.push(Vec::new()); + self.preds.push(Vec::new()); + self.root.push(label); + id + } + + /// Record that `from` funded `to`. + pub fn add_funding(&mut self, from: usize, to: usize) { + // Ignore accidental self-loops on a single node; a 1-node "cycle" is not + // a meaningful anonymity structure. + if from == to { + return; + } + if !self.succ[from].contains(&to) { + self.succ[from].push(to); + self.preds[to].push(from); + } + } + + pub fn len(&self) -> usize { + self.root.len() + } + + pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { + self.root.is_empty() + } + + /// The funders of `v` (backward neighbors). + pub fn predecessors(&self, v: usize) -> &[usize] { + &self.preds[v] + } + + /// The nodes `u` funded (forward neighbors) — used by Tarjan for SCCs. + pub fn successors(&self, u: usize) -> &[usize] { + &self.succ[u] + } + + /// The root label of `v`, if any. + pub fn root_label(&self, v: usize) -> Option { + self.root[v] + } + + pub fn is_root(&self, v: usize) -> bool { + self.root[v].is_some() + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/lib.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d4f88d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +//! # riverrun-trace +//! +//! The **provenance-tracer**: an adversarial on-chain de-anonymizer, and the +//! measuring stick it implies. +//! +//! Every noise-based privacy tool in this space measures itself against a +//! *self-made* attacker and reports an attribution AUC. But they all leave one +//! leak open — several admit it in their own writeups — the **funding / +//! common-funder graph**: trace a target's money backward and you reach an +//! attributable origin (a CEX, a doxxed funder). That backward walk is the whole +//! ballgame, and it is a *graph* property no AUC captures. +//! +//! `riverrun-trace` makes it a first-class, measured axis. The tracer (see +//! [`tracer::Tracer`]) walks the funding graph backward and reports, per target: +//! does it reach a labeled root (**provenance**), and if so how many and how +//! concentrated (**attribution**), and does it sit in a cycle (**structural +//! rootlessness**). Run over a population it yields the numbers below. +//! +//! The design is deliberately dual-use in the honest sense: the same tool that +//! scores a *defense* is, on its own, the strongest open de-anonymizer of the +//! funding graph — the sorohunter pattern (build the attacker; the defense falls +//! out as its dual). + +pub mod cert; +pub mod coordinator; +pub mod repeated; +pub mod graph; +pub mod rng; +#[cfg(feature = "onchain")] +pub mod cli; +#[cfg(feature = "onchain")] +pub mod rpc; +pub mod runs; +pub mod scenario; +pub mod tracer; +pub mod uncertainty; + +use scenario::Scheme; +use tracer::Tracer; + +/// Population-level provenance statistics for one construction. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct SchemeStats { + pub targets: usize, + /// Fraction of targets for which the tracer finds *any* attributable origin. + /// This is the leak the field leaves open — lower is more private. + pub root_hit_rate: f64, + /// Mean depth to the nearest reachable root (over targets that have one). + pub mean_nearest_depth: f64, + /// Mean attribution ambiguity in bits — how undecidable "which origin" is, + /// even when one exists. Higher is more private. + pub mean_attribution_bits: f64, + /// Fraction of targets sitting inside a cycle (non-trivial SCC). + pub cyclic_rate: f64, + /// Anonymity that survives an adversary who partitions the set by provenance. + pub effective_k: EffectiveK, +} + +/// What a `k`-member anonymity set is actually worth against an adversary who +/// can tell which **provenance class** the acting member belongs to. +/// +/// Pools advertise `1/k`: k members, so a one-in-k guess. That counts members. +/// If the adversary can sort those members into classes by where their funding +/// came from — and the funding graph is public — then learning the actor's class +/// leaves only that class to guess within. +/// +/// The residual uncertainty is the class size, averaged over which class the +/// actor came from: +/// +/// ```text +/// H_residual = Σ_c (n_c / n) · log2(n_c) effective k = 2^H_residual +/// ``` +/// +/// One class holding everyone returns `log2(n)` — nothing was partitioned, the +/// set is worth its advertised size. All-singleton classes return 0 bits, an +/// effective k of 1: every member is individually identified. +/// +/// Note the direction. It is tempting to measure how *concentrated* the classes +/// are (min-entropy over the class distribution), but that reports catastrophe +/// exactly when the measurement found nothing to partition on. Residual +/// anonymity is the quantity the member cares about. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct EffectiveK { + pub advertised: usize, + pub classes: usize, + pub residual_bits: f64, + /// `2^residual_bits` — the anonymity set the member actually gets. + pub effective: f64, + /// The smallest class: what the least lucky member gets. + pub worst_case: usize, +} + +/// Compute [`EffectiveK`] from the sizes of the provenance classes. +pub fn effective_k(class_sizes: &[usize]) -> EffectiveK { + let n: usize = class_sizes.iter().sum(); + if n == 0 { + return EffectiveK { + advertised: 0, + classes: 0, + residual_bits: 0.0, + effective: 0.0, + worst_case: 0, + }; + } + let residual_bits: f64 = class_sizes + .iter() + .map(|&c| (c as f64 / n as f64) * (c as f64).log2()) + .sum(); + EffectiveK { + advertised: n, + classes: class_sizes.len(), + residual_bits, + effective: residual_bits.exp2(), + worst_case: class_sizes.iter().copied().min().unwrap_or(0), + } +} + +/// Sort key for ranking pools by exposure, worst first: a severity bucket, then +/// lower effective k. An ascending sort on this tuple puts the most-exposed pool +/// at the top of a `scan`. Pure, so the scanner's ordering is testable offline. +pub fn exposure_rank(severity: &str, effective_k: f64) -> (u8, f64) { + let bucket = match severity { + "critical" => 0, + "high" => 1, + "medium" => 2, + "low" => 3, + _ => 4, + }; + (bucket, effective_k) +} + +/// Whether `s` is a syntactically valid Solana address: base58 that decodes to +/// exactly 32 bytes. Dependency-free so the pure library keeps no crates, and +/// used by the CLI to reject typos *before* spending RPC calls that would come +/// back empty and be mistaken for "rootless". +pub fn valid_pubkey(s: &str) -> bool { + base58_decode(s).map(|b| b.len() == 32).unwrap_or(false) +} + +/// Minimal base58 (Bitcoin alphabet) decode. Returns `None` on any character +/// outside the alphabet. Not constant-time and not for cryptographic use — it +/// exists only to length-check addresses. +fn base58_decode(s: &str) -> Option> { + const ALPHABET: &[u8; 58] = b"123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + if s.is_empty() { + return None; + } + let mut bytes: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(s.len()); + for c in s.bytes() { + let mut carry = ALPHABET.iter().position(|&a| a == c)? as u32; + for b in bytes.iter_mut() { + carry += (*b as u32) * 58; + *b = (carry & 0xff) as u8; + carry >>= 8; + } + while carry > 0 { + bytes.push((carry & 0xff) as u8); + carry >>= 8; + } + } + // each leading '1' is one leading zero byte + for c in s.bytes() { + if c == b'1' { + bytes.push(0); + } else { + break; + } + } + bytes.reverse(); + Some(bytes) +} + +/// A pre-flight anonymity assessment for **one wallet about to act**. +/// +/// The tracer and `effective_k` audit a pool *after the fact*. This is the +/// defensive dual: before a user deposits into any pool, it tells them what +/// anonymity they personally will get there, given their own funding history and +/// the pool's current depositors — because the pool's advertised k is not it. +/// +/// Protocol-agnostic: it takes the user's provenance class and the classes of the +/// pool's current depositors, nothing about how the pool works. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Preflight { + /// How many of the pool's current depositors share the user's provenance + /// class — the crowd the user would actually be hidden in, *including* + /// themselves once they join. + pub personal_k: usize, + /// The advertised size: the pool's current depositor count plus the user. + pub advertised_k: usize, + /// The pool's effective k as it stands, before the user joins. + pub pool_effective_k: f64, + pub verdict: Verdict, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Verdict { + /// The user would be alone or nearly alone in their provenance class: the + /// pool gives them essentially no anonymity, whatever it advertises. + Exposed, + /// The user's class is much smaller than the advertised set. + Weak, + /// The user's class is a healthy fraction of the set. + Ok, +} + +/// Assess what anonymity `user_class` gets among depositors whose provenance +/// classes are `population`. A class is any hashable key (e.g. the sorted set of +/// attributable origins a wallet reaches, or a sentinel for "rootless"). +pub fn preflight(user_class: &K, population: &[K]) -> Preflight { + let advertised_k = population.len() + 1; + // the user joins their own class; personal_k counts everyone in it, self too + let shared = population.iter().filter(|c| *c == user_class).count(); + let personal_k = shared + 1; + + // pool effective k over the existing population's class distribution + let mut sizes: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut seen: Vec<(&K, usize)> = Vec::new(); + for c in population { + if let Some(e) = seen.iter_mut().find(|(k, _)| *k == c) { + e.1 += 1; + } else { + seen.push((c, 1)); + } + } + for (_, n) in &seen { + sizes.push(*n); + } + let pool_effective_k = effective_k(&sizes).effective; + + // verdict on the user's personal crowd relative to the whole set + let frac = personal_k as f64 / advertised_k as f64; + let verdict = if personal_k <= 1 { + Verdict::Exposed + } else if frac < 0.25 { + Verdict::Weak + } else { + Verdict::Ok + }; + + Preflight { personal_k, advertised_k, pool_effective_k, verdict } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod exposure_rank_tests { + use super::exposure_rank; + + #[test] + fn critical_outranks_high_even_with_larger_k() { + // worst-first: a critical pool sorts ahead of a high one no matter the k. + assert!(exposure_rank("critical", 9.0) < exposure_rank("high", 1.0)); + } + + #[test] + fn within_a_bucket_lower_effective_k_is_more_exposed() { + assert!(exposure_rank("high", 2.0) < exposure_rank("high", 8.0)); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod pubkey_tests { + use super::valid_pubkey; + + #[test] + fn accepts_real_solana_addresses() { + // the system program: 32 base58 '1's, decodes to 32 zero bytes + assert!(valid_pubkey("11111111111111111111111111111111")); + // a live pool address and a real wallet, both canonical 32-byte keys + assert!(valid_pubkey("9fhQBbumKEFuXtMBDw8AaQyAjCorLGJQiS3skWZdQyQD")); + assert!(valid_pubkey("F9neSDGmb6tyPtuSFp4we2zvFA5WAaQYuFjBbagzmvTK")); + } + + #[test] + fn rejects_non_addresses() { + assert!(!valid_pubkey(""), "empty"); + assert!(!valid_pubkey("hello"), "too short to be 32 bytes"); + // contains characters outside the base58 alphabet (0, O, I, l) + assert!(!valid_pubkey("0OIl0OIl0OIl0OIl0OIl0OIl0OIl0OIl"), "bad alphabet"); + // valid base58 but decodes to far more than 32 bytes + assert!( + !valid_pubkey("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"), + "too long" + ); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod preflight_tests { + use super::{preflight, Verdict}; + + #[test] + fn a_user_alone_in_their_class_is_exposed() { + // Everyone in the pool traces to hub A; the user traces to hub B alone. + let pop = vec!["A", "A", "A", "A"]; + let p = preflight(&"B", &pop); + assert_eq!(p.personal_k, 1); + assert_eq!(p.advertised_k, 5); + assert_eq!(p.verdict, Verdict::Exposed); + } + + #[test] + fn a_user_in_the_dominant_class_is_ok() { + let pop = vec!["A", "A", "A", "A"]; + let p = preflight(&"A", &pop); + assert_eq!(p.personal_k, 5, "the four plus the user"); + assert_eq!(p.verdict, Verdict::Ok); + } + + #[test] + fn a_small_minority_class_is_weak() { + // user shares a class with one other, among a set of 8 + let pop = vec!["A", "A", "A", "A", "A", "A", "A", "B"]; + let p = preflight(&"B", &pop); + assert_eq!(p.personal_k, 2); + assert_eq!(p.advertised_k, 9); + assert_eq!(p.verdict, Verdict::Weak, "2 of 9 is under a quarter"); + } + + #[test] + fn rootless_users_pool_together() { + // "rootless" is itself a class: unattributable wallets hide in each other. + let pop = vec!["rootless", "rootless", "rootless", "A"]; + let p = preflight(&"rootless", &pop); + assert_eq!(p.personal_k, 4); + assert_eq!(p.verdict, Verdict::Ok); + } +} + +/// Run the tracer over every target of a scheme and aggregate. +pub fn evaluate(scheme: &Scheme) -> SchemeStats { + let tracer = Tracer::new(&scheme.graph); + let n = scheme.targets.len(); + + let mut hits = 0usize; + let mut depth_sum = 0.0; + let mut depth_count = 0usize; + let mut bits_sum = 0.0; + let mut cyclic = 0usize; + // provenance class = the set of attributable origins a target reaches + let mut classes: std::collections::BTreeMap, usize> = std::collections::BTreeMap::new(); + + for &t in &scheme.targets { + let r = tracer.trace(t); + let mut key: Vec = r.reachable_roots.iter().map(|(l, _)| *l).collect(); + key.sort_unstable(); + key.dedup(); + *classes.entry(key).or_insert(0) += 1; + if r.has_attributable_root() { + hits += 1; + if let Some(d) = r.nearest_depth { + depth_sum += d as f64; + depth_count += 1; + } + } + bits_sum += r.attribution_entropy_bits; + if r.in_cycle { + cyclic += 1; + } + } + + SchemeStats { + targets: n, + root_hit_rate: hits as f64 / n as f64, + mean_nearest_depth: if depth_count > 0 { + depth_sum / depth_count as f64 + } else { + f64::NAN + }, + mean_attribution_bits: bits_sum / n as f64, + cyclic_rate: cyclic as f64 / n as f64, + effective_k: effective_k(&classes.values().copied().collect::>()), + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod effective_k_tests { + use super::effective_k; + + #[test] + fn one_class_holding_everyone_keeps_the_full_set() { + // Nothing was partitioned: the members are worth their advertised count. + let k = effective_k(&[64]); + assert_eq!(k.advertised, 64); + assert_eq!(k.classes, 1); + assert!((k.effective - 64.0).abs() < 1e-9, "got {}", k.effective); + assert_eq!(k.worst_case, 64); + } + + #[test] + fn singleton_classes_destroy_the_set() { + let k = effective_k(&[1, 1, 1, 1]); + assert!((k.residual_bits - 0.0).abs() < 1e-9); + assert!((k.effective - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9, "got {}", k.effective); + assert_eq!(k.worst_case, 1); + } + + #[test] + fn equal_classes_give_back_the_class_size() { + // Eight members in two provenance classes are worth four, not eight. + let k = effective_k(&[4, 4]); + assert_eq!(k.advertised, 8); + assert!((k.effective - 4.0).abs() < 1e-9, "got {}", k.effective); + } + + #[test] + fn the_unlucky_member_is_reported_separately() { + // The average hides them: one member alone in their class gets nothing, + // while the mean still looks respectable. + let k = effective_k(&[15, 1]); + assert_eq!(k.worst_case, 1, "one member is alone in their class"); + // (15/16)·log2(15) ≈ 3.66 bits ≈ 12.7 members: the average still reads as + // a healthy set while one member has none at all. + assert!( + (12.0..13.0).contains(&k.effective), + "the mean hides them: {}", + k.effective + ); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/repeated.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/repeated.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47df65d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/repeated.rs @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +//! The repeated-use bound: how a *persistent* identity erodes across its uses. +//! +//! The [`effective_k`](crate::effective_k) ruler scores a **single** action. A +//! riverrun-ID identity is one secret used **repeatedly** — `shape` across contexts, +//! `turn` across cycles. Its pseudonyms are cryptographically unlinkable, but a +//! persistent *quasi-identifier* rides underneath every use: the funding-provenance +//! origin, which recurs and is public. An adversary links a user's actions across +//! contexts by that origin (not the pseudonym) and **intersects** the candidate sets — +//! the classic intersection / statistical-disclosure attack. +//! +//! This module measures that erosion. It is deterministic and offline, and it reduces +//! to the single-shot ruler at `n = 1`. Design and proofs: +//! `docs/REPEATED_USE_ANONYMITY.md`. + +use std::collections::HashSet; + +/// One use of a persistent identity: the set of population members whose observable +/// features are consistent with the actor in this context (the true holder is always +/// among them). Its size is the single-shot candidate count for this use. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub struct Use { + /// The context `θ` this use happened in (a dApp, a round) — for labelling only. + pub context: u64, + /// Population member ids consistent with the observation in this context. + pub candidates: Vec, +} + +impl Use { + pub fn new(context: u64, candidates: impl IntoIterator) -> Self { + Use { context, candidates: candidates.into_iter().collect() } + } +} + +/// The erosion curve of a persistent identity across its uses. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Erosion { + /// `k_eff^(1..n)`: the identity's anonymity after each use — the size of the + /// running intersection of candidate sets. Monotone non-increasing. + pub k_eff: Vec, + /// Cumulative leak `Σε = log2(|U|) − log2(k_eff^(i))` after each use, in bits. + pub spent_bits: Vec, + /// The budget `log2(|U| / k_min)`: the identity is spent once `spent_bits` crosses it. + pub budget_bits: f64, + /// The first use index (0-based) whose `k_eff` drops below `k_min` — you should + /// `turn` (and re-provenance) *before* performing it. `None` if the floor holds + /// across every use. + pub rotate_before: Option, +} + +/// Measure how a persistent identity erodes across `uses`, against a `population` of +/// size `|U|`, holding an anonymity floor `k_min`. +/// +/// `k_eff^(i)` is the size of the running intersection `S_i = ∩_{j≤i} candidates_j`: +/// the number of population members still indistinguishable from the holder after `i` +/// uses. Because the holder is in every candidate set, the intersection never empties +/// under a consistent transcript; a contradictory transcript (disjoint sets) reports +/// `k_eff = 0`, i.e. fully identified. +pub fn repeated_use_effective_k(population: usize, uses: &[Use], k_min: f64) -> Erosion { + let budget_bits = if population as f64 > k_min && k_min > 0.0 { + (population as f64 / k_min).log2() + } else { + 0.0 + }; + + let mut k_eff = Vec::with_capacity(uses.len()); + let mut spent_bits = Vec::with_capacity(uses.len()); + let mut rotate_before = None; + + let mut surviving: Option> = None; + for (i, u) in uses.iter().enumerate() { + let this: HashSet = u.candidates.iter().copied().collect(); + surviving = Some(match surviving.take() { + None => this, + Some(prev) => prev.intersection(&this).copied().collect(), + }); + let k = surviving.as_ref().map(|s| s.len()).unwrap_or(0) as f64; + k_eff.push(k); + + // Σε = log2(|U|) − log2(k): the leak accumulated from full population to here. + let spent = if k >= 1.0 && population > 0 { + (population as f64).log2() - k.log2() + } else { + (population.max(1) as f64).log2() + }; + spent_bits.push(spent); + + if rotate_before.is_none() && k < k_min { + rotate_before = Some(i); + } + } + + Erosion { k_eff, spent_bits, budget_bits, rotate_before } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn reduces_to_the_single_shot_ruler_at_one_use() { + // A single use of a 6-member class in a pool of 30: the identity's anonymity + // is exactly its class size, matching the single-shot per-actor count. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..6)]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + assert_eq!(e.k_eff, vec![6.0]); + assert_eq!(e.rotate_before, None, "6 >= 4, safe for one use"); + } + + #[test] + fn intersection_is_monotone_non_increasing() { + // Nested candidate sets that all contain the holder (id 0): 6 -> 3 -> 1. + let uses = [ + Use::new(1, 0..6), // {0,1,2,3,4,5} + Use::new(2, 0..3), // {0,1,2} + Use::new(3, [0u32]), // {0} + ]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + assert_eq!(e.k_eff, vec![6.0, 3.0, 1.0], "erosion never increases"); + } + + #[test] + fn the_worked_example_fires_rotation_before_the_breaching_use() { + // The doc's worked example: floor 4, budget = log2(30/4) ~= 2.907 bits. + // k_eff = 6 (ok), 3 (< 4 -> breach at use index 1), 1. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..6), Use::new(2, 0..3), Use::new(3, [0u32])]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + assert!((e.budget_bits - (30.0f64 / 4.0).log2()).abs() < 1e-9); + assert_eq!(e.rotate_before, Some(1), "turn before the second use, which breaches the floor"); + // the leak crosses the budget exactly when k_eff falls under the floor + assert!(e.spent_bits[1] > e.budget_bits, "budget blown at use 1 (0-based)"); + assert!(e.spent_bits[0] < e.budget_bits, "still within budget after the first use"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_wide_identity_never_triggers_rotation() { + // Every use leaves a large crowd: the identity is safe indefinitely. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..20), Use::new(2, 0..18), Use::new(3, 0..16)]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + assert_eq!(e.rotate_before, None); + assert!(e.k_eff.iter().all(|&k| k >= 4.0)); + } + + #[test] + fn cumulative_leak_matches_the_closed_form() { + // spent_bits[i] == log2(|U|) - log2(k_eff[i]) for every i. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..6), Use::new(2, 0..3)]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + for i in 0..uses.len() { + let expected = 30.0f64.log2() - e.k_eff[i].log2(); + assert!((e.spent_bits[i] - expected).abs() < 1e-9, "use {i}"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_contradictory_transcript_reads_as_identified() { + // A wide first use (6 >= floor 4), then a disjoint set: the intersection empties, + // so the identity reads as fully identified at the second use. + let uses = [Use::new(1, 0..6), Use::new(2, [7u32, 8, 9])]; + let e = repeated_use_effective_k(30, &uses, 4.0); + assert_eq!(e.k_eff, vec![6.0, 0.0]); + assert_eq!(e.rotate_before, Some(1)); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rng.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rng.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2aaadd24 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rng.rs @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +//! Small deterministic PRNG (`splitmix64`) so scenarios and the exhibit are +//! reproducible from a fixed seed. Self-contained on purpose — the tracer must +//! regenerate identical graphs run to run. Not cryptographic; it only shapes the +//! synthetic funding graphs. + +pub struct SplitMix64 { + state: u64, +} + +impl SplitMix64 { + pub fn new(seed: u64) -> Self { + Self { state: seed } + } + + pub fn next_u64(&mut self) -> u64 { + self.state = self.state.wrapping_add(0x9E37_79B9_7F4A_7C15); + let mut z = self.state; + z = (z ^ (z >> 30)).wrapping_mul(0xBF58_476D_1CE4_E5B9); + z = (z ^ (z >> 27)).wrapping_mul(0x94D0_49BB_1331_11EB); + z ^ (z >> 31) + } + + /// Uniform integer in `[0, n)`. + pub fn below(&mut self, n: usize) -> usize { + (self.next_u64() % n as u64) as usize + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rpc.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rpc.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fca8a5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/rpc.rs @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +//! Shared Solana JSON-RPC plumbing for the on-chain tracers. +//! +//! Only compiled with the `onchain` feature, so the pure library stays +//! dependency-free and testable offline. +//! +//! Everything here is deliberately bounded — depth, fan-out, transactions +//! fetched — because the point is to establish a *lower bound* on the funding +//! graph leak using nothing but a public RPC endpoint. A real analyst goes +//! deeper, follows SPL flows, and pays for a tag database. Whatever these tools +//! find, the truth is worse. + +use std::time::Duration; + +use serde_json::{json, Value}; + +pub const SYSTEM_PROGRAM: &str = "11111111111111111111111111111111"; +/// `getSignaturesForAddress` hard cap. +pub const SIG_LIMIT: usize = 1000; +/// Only a *cap-hitting* address counts as an exchange-like hub root. +pub const HUB_THRESHOLD: usize = 1000; + +pub struct Rpc { + agent: ureq::Agent, + url: String, + /// Total RPC requests issued. + pub calls: usize, + /// Requests that failed at the transport layer or returned a JSON-RPC error. + /// A caller that gets an empty result *and* sees failures here must not read + /// the emptiness as "nothing to find" — it may be "could not look". + pub failures: usize, +} + +impl Rpc { + pub fn new() -> Self { + let url = std::env::var("SOLANA_RPC") + .unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com".to_string()); + let agent = ureq::AgentBuilder::new() + .timeout(Duration::from_secs(20)) + .build(); + Self { agent, url, calls: 0, failures: 0 } + } + + /// The RPC endpoint in use (`$SOLANA_RPC`, else mainnet-beta). Surfaced so the + /// CLI can name it in an error instead of failing opaquely. + pub fn endpoint(&self) -> &str { + &self.url + } + + pub fn call(&mut self, method: &str, params: Value) -> Option { + self.calls += 1; + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(130)); // be polite to public RPC + let body = json!({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":method,"params":params}); + for attempt in 0..3 { + match self.agent.post(&self.url).send_json(body.clone()) { + Ok(resp) => match resp.into_json::() { + Ok(v) => { + if let Some(err) = v.get("error") { + let msg = err + .get("message") + .and_then(|m| m.as_str()) + .unwrap_or("unknown JSON-RPC error"); + eprintln!(" rpc: {method} -> error: {msg}"); + self.failures += 1; + return None; + } + return v.get("result").cloned(); + } + Err(_) => { + eprintln!(" rpc: {method} -> unparseable response"); + self.failures += 1; + return None; + } + }, + Err(ureq::Error::Status(429, _)) if attempt < 2 => { + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(900 * (attempt as u64 + 1))); + } + Err(ureq::Error::Status(code, _)) => { + eprintln!(" rpc: {method} -> HTTP {code} from {}", self.url); + self.failures += 1; + return None; + } + Err(e) => { + eprintln!(" rpc: {method} -> transport error: {e}"); + self.failures += 1; + return None; + } + } + } + None + } + + /// Recent signature count for an address (bounded by our sampling cap). + pub fn sig_count(&mut self, addr: &str) -> usize { + self.call( + "getSignaturesForAddress", + json!([addr, {"limit": SIG_LIMIT}]), + ) + .and_then(|v| v.as_array().map(|a| a.len())) + .unwrap_or(0) + } + + pub fn signatures(&mut self, addr: &str, limit: usize) -> Vec { + self.call( + "getSignaturesForAddress", + json!([addr, {"limit": limit}]), + ) + .and_then(|v| v.as_array().cloned()) + .unwrap_or_default() + .iter() + .filter_map(|s| s.get("signature").and_then(|x| x.as_str()).map(String::from)) + .collect() + } + + pub fn transaction(&mut self, sig: &str) -> Option { + self.call( + "getTransaction", + json!([sig, {"encoding":"jsonParsed","maxSupportedTransactionVersion":0}]), + ) + } +} + +impl Default for Rpc { + fn default() -> Self { + Self::new() + } +} + +/// Parsed system-program transfers of a transaction, as +/// `(source, destination, lamports)` — **including inner instructions**. +/// +/// Reading only top-level instructions misses almost everything that matters: +/// a pool deposit is a CPI from the pool program, so it appears in +/// `meta.innerInstructions`, not in the message. An analyst who skips those sees +/// an empty graph and concludes, wrongly, that there is nothing to trace. +pub fn system_transfers(tx: &Value) -> Vec<(String, String, u64)> { + let mut instrs: Vec<&Value> = tx + .pointer("/transaction/message/instructions") + .and_then(|v| v.as_array()) + .map(|a| a.iter().collect()) + .unwrap_or_default(); + if let Some(groups) = tx.pointer("/meta/innerInstructions").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) { + for g in groups { + if let Some(inner) = g.get("instructions").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) { + instrs.extend(inner.iter()); + } + } + } + + let mut out = Vec::new(); + for ix in instrs { + let is_transfer = ix.pointer("/parsed/type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("transfer") + && ix.get("program").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("system"); + if !is_transfer { + continue; + } + let info = ix.pointer("/parsed/info"); + let src = info.and_then(|i| i.get("source")).and_then(|v| v.as_str()); + let dst = info + .and_then(|i| i.get("destination")) + .and_then(|v| v.as_str()); + let lamports = info + .and_then(|i| i.get("lamports")) + .and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) + .unwrap_or(0); + if let (Some(s), Some(d)) = (src, dst) { + out.push((s.to_string(), d.to_string(), lamports)); + } + } + out +} + +/// The fee payer of a transaction — `accountKeys[0]`. +pub fn fee_payer(tx: &Value) -> Option { + tx.pointer("/transaction/message/accountKeys/0/pubkey") + .and_then(|v| v.as_str()) + .map(String::from) + .or_else(|| { + tx.pointer("/transaction/message/accountKeys/0") + .and_then(|v| v.as_str()) + .map(String::from) + }) +} + +/// Incoming SOL funders of `addr` (sources of system transfers whose destination +/// is `addr`), plus whether `addr` looks like a high-activity hub. +/// +/// Hubs are terminal: an exchange-like address is treated as an attributable +/// root, and expanding it would blow the budget for no information. +pub fn incoming_funders( + rpc: &mut Rpc, + addr: &str, + tx_budget: &mut usize, + funders_per_addr: usize, + scan_tx_per_addr: usize, +) -> (Vec, bool) { + let sigs = rpc.signatures(addr, SIG_LIMIT); + if sigs.len() >= HUB_THRESHOLD { + return (Vec::new(), true); + } + + let mut funders = Vec::new(); + for (scanned, sig) in sigs.into_iter().enumerate() { + if *tx_budget == 0 || funders.len() >= funders_per_addr || scanned >= scan_tx_per_addr { + break; + } + *tx_budget -= 1; + let Some(tx) = rpc.transaction(&sig) else { + continue; + }; + for (src, dst, _) in system_transfers(&tx) { + if dst == addr && src != addr && !funders.contains(&src) { + funders.push(src); + } + } + } + (funders, false) +} + +/// Trace one wallet's funding graph backward and return its **provenance class**: +/// the sorted set of attributable-origin (hub) addresses it reaches, joined by +/// '+', or the sentinel "rootless" if it reaches none. This is the key two +/// wallets share when the same adversary cannot separate them by provenance. +/// +/// Bounded like everything else here — depth, fan-out, transactions — so the +/// class it returns is a floor: a deeper trace can only merge a rootless wallet +/// into a rooted class, never the reverse. +pub fn provenance_class( + rpc: &mut Rpc, + target: &str, + tx_budget: &mut usize, + depth: usize, + nodes_per_target: usize, + funders_per_addr: usize, + scan_tx_per_addr: usize, +) -> String { + use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashSet, VecDeque}; + + let mut roots: BTreeSet = BTreeSet::new(); + let mut visited: HashSet = HashSet::new(); + let mut nodes = 0usize; + let mut queue: VecDeque<(String, usize)> = VecDeque::new(); + queue.push_back((target.to_string(), 0)); + visited.insert(target.to_string()); + + while let Some((addr, d)) = queue.pop_front() { + if d >= depth || nodes >= nodes_per_target || *tx_budget == 0 { + continue; + } + let (funders, is_hub) = + incoming_funders(rpc, &addr, tx_budget, funders_per_addr, scan_tx_per_addr); + if is_hub && addr != target { + roots.insert(addr.clone()); + continue; + } + for f in funders { + nodes += 1; + if !visited.contains(&f) && nodes < nodes_per_target { + visited.insert(f.clone()); + queue.push_back((f, d + 1)); + } + if nodes >= nodes_per_target { + break; + } + } + } + + if roots.is_empty() { + "rootless".to_string() + } else { + roots.into_iter().collect::>().join("+") + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/runs.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/runs.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f28e3ba5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/runs.rs @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +//! The measured runs this repository publishes, as data rather than prose. +//! +//! `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md` reports one live mainnet measurement in a table. A +//! reader cannot recompute anything from a table, and neither can a test. This +//! module carries the same run as a value, so the bracket, the interval and the +//! gate in [`crate::uncertainty`] all run against the number the repository +//! actually published — including when they refuse it. +//! +//! ## What is committed here, and what is not +//! +//! What is committed is the **class histogram** of the run: how many members, how +//! many classes, how large each class. That is enough to recompute every +//! statistic reported. +//! +//! What is **not** committed is the per-member evidence: the sampled depositor +//! addresses, the funding edges walked, the hub addresses reached. Those were +//! never written to disk, so this run cannot be re-derived from the chain by a +//! third party — only recomputed from the histogram. A reader who wants to check +//! the *tracing* rather than the *arithmetic* has to re-run +//! `riverrun audit 30` against a live RPC and will get a different sample. +//! The neighbouring measurement in this bounty (`solanabr/mirror-pool` PR #5) +//! commits its raw per-member chains as JSON and is therefore checkable offline +//! in a way this run is not. That gap is real and named rather than papered over. +//! +//! The histogram itself is not a guess: `n = 30`, `12 classes`, `largest 19` has +//! exactly one solution, which [`the_published_histogram_is_forced`] proves. + +use crate::uncertainty::{ + effective_k_interval, upper_reading_labels, Bracket, Census, Interval, DEFAULT_REPLICATES, + DEFAULT_SEED, +}; + +/// One live measurement, reduced to what the arithmetic needs. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] +pub struct MeasuredRun { + /// Where it was published. + pub source: &'static str, + /// The pool program measured. + pub pool: &'static str, + /// Members sampled, failures included. + pub sampled: usize, + /// Class sizes of the members that reached an attributable origin. + pub resolved_class_sizes: &'static [usize], + /// Members whose bounded walk reached no origin. Not a class: a gap. + pub unresolved: usize, + /// Members lost to our own RPC. Excluded from the population entirely. + pub rpc_failures: usize, +} + +/// The run behind the headline "advertised k = 30, effective k = 6.5". +/// +/// Privacy Cash, a live Tornado-style SOL pool on Solana mainnet, 30 sampled +/// depositors, of which 11 reached an attributable origin and each reached a +/// distinct one. The remaining 19 reached none within the bound and were reported +/// as a single "rootless" class — which is the bracket's **upper** reading, not a +/// measured class. +pub const PRIVACY_CASH_N30: MeasuredRun = MeasuredRun { + source: "docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md", + pool: "9fhQBbumKEFuXtMBDw8AaQyAjCorLGJQiS3skWZdQyQD", + sampled: 30, + resolved_class_sizes: &[1; 11], + unresolved: 19, + rpc_failures: 0, +}; + +impl MeasuredRun { + pub fn census(&self) -> Census { + Census { + resolved: self.resolved_class_sizes.iter().sum(), + no_origin_within_bound: self.unresolved, + trace_budget_exhausted: 0, + rpc_failure: self.rpc_failures, + } + } + + pub fn bracket(&self) -> Bracket { + Bracket::new(self.resolved_class_sizes, self.unresolved) + .expect("a published run has a non-degenerate histogram") + } + + /// The interval around the **upper** reading — the number that was published. + /// Fixed replicates and fixed seed, so the range is reproducible byte for + /// byte. + pub fn interval(&self) -> Interval { + let labels = upper_reading_labels(self.resolved_class_sizes, self.unresolved); + effective_k_interval(&labels, DEFAULT_REPLICATES, DEFAULT_SEED) + .expect("a published run has members") + } + + /// One block, everything a quote of this run must carry with it. + pub fn report(&self) -> String { + let b = self.bracket(); + let i = self.interval(); + let c = self.census(); + let gate = b.gate(&c); + let verdict = match &gate { + crate::uncertainty::Gate::Publish => "PUBLISH".to_string(), + crate::uncertainty::Gate::Refuse { reason } => format!("REFUSED — {reason}"), + }; + format!( + "{} ({} sampled)\n\ + {}\n\ + effective-k, unresolved merged (published) : {:.2}\n\ + effective-k, unresolved split (adversarial): {:.2}\n\ + bracket : {:.2} … {:.2} members\n\ + 95% resampling range of the merged reading : {:.2} … {:.2} \ + (bias {:+.2}, {} replicates, seed {:#018x})\n\ + gate : {}", + self.pool, + self.sampled, + c.summary(), + b.upper.effective, + b.lower.effective, + b.lower.effective, + b.upper.effective, + i.lo, + i.hi, + i.resampling_bias(), + i.replicates, + i.seed, + verdict + ) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::uncertainty::Gate; + + /// The histogram in [`PRIVACY_CASH_N30`] is a transcription of three numbers + /// published in `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md` — 30 members, 12 classes, largest class + /// 19 — and this checks the transcription is forced rather than chosen: the + /// other 11 classes hold 11 members between them and no class may be empty, + /// so every one of them holds exactly one. + #[test] + fn the_published_histogram_is_forced() { + let published_members = 30; + let published_classes = 12; + let published_largest = 19; + + let rest_members = published_members - published_largest; + let rest_classes = published_classes - 1; + assert_eq!(rest_members, rest_classes, "11 members across 11 non-empty classes"); + + let mut sizes: Vec = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.resolved_class_sizes.to_vec(); + sizes.push(PRIVACY_CASH_N30.unresolved); + assert_eq!(sizes.iter().sum::(), published_members); + assert_eq!(sizes.len(), published_classes); + assert_eq!(sizes.iter().copied().max().unwrap(), published_largest); + } + + /// The upper reading must reproduce what the document published: 2.69 bits of + /// residual anonymity, an effective k of 6.5, worst case 1. If this drifts, + /// either the metric changed or the document is stale. + #[test] + fn the_upper_reading_reproduces_the_published_numbers() { + let b = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.bracket(); + assert_eq!(b.upper.advertised, 30); + assert_eq!(b.upper.classes, 12); + assert_eq!(b.upper.worst_case, 1); + assert!( + (b.upper.residual_bits - 2.690).abs() < 5e-4, + "residual bits {} != published 2.69", + b.upper.residual_bits + ); + assert!( + (b.upper.effective - 6.455).abs() < 5e-3, + "effective k {} != published 6.5", + b.upper.effective + ); + } + + /// The finding this module exists for: the published 6.5 is the *ceiling* of + /// the bracket, not its centre. If every unresolved member is in fact alone, + /// the same run reads as an effective k of 1. + #[test] + fn the_published_number_is_the_ceiling_of_a_bracket_that_bottoms_out_at_one() { + let b = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.bracket(); + assert!((b.lower.effective - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9, "lower {}", b.lower.effective); + assert!((b.upper.effective - 6.455).abs() < 5e-3); + assert!(b.width() > 5.4, "the span is most of the number: {:.2}", b.width()); + } + + /// And the gate refuses it. 11 of 30 members reached an origin, so the run + /// does not support quoting a single effective k, and the tool says so rather + /// than printing the favourable end. + #[test] + fn the_published_run_does_not_pass_this_crate_s_own_gate() { + let b = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.bracket(); + let gate = b.gate(&PRIVACY_CASH_N30.census()); + match gate { + Gate::Refuse { reason } => { + assert!(reason.contains("37%"), "{reason}"); + assert!(reason.contains("1.0…6.5") || reason.contains("1.0…6.4"), "{reason}"); + } + Gate::Publish => panic!("11 of 30 resolved must not publish a point estimate"), + } + } + + /// The interval is reproducible and its bias is positive, which is the tail + /// signature: 11 of the 12 classes are singletons. + #[test] + fn the_interval_is_reproducible_and_shows_the_tail() { + let a = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.interval(); + let b = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.interval(); + assert_eq!(a, b); + assert_eq!(a.replicates, DEFAULT_REPLICATES); + assert!( + a.resampling_bias() > 0.0, + "singleton-heavy classes bias the estimate upward: {}", + a.resampling_bias() + ); + assert!(a.lo < a.hi); + } + + /// The report must never print a number without the bracket, the interval and + /// the verdict beside it. + #[test] + fn the_report_carries_the_uncertainty_with_the_number() { + let r = PRIVACY_CASH_N30.report(); + for expected in ["bracket", "95% resampling range", "gate", "REFUSED", "seed"] { + assert!(r.contains(expected), "report missing {expected}:\n{r}"); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/scenario.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/scenario.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ad78947 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/scenario.rs @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +//! Synthetic funding-graph generators for the exhibit. +//! +//! Three constructions, so the tracer can contrast the field's approach against +//! the two circularity variants: +//! +//! - [`rooted_decoy`] — what every noise-based tool ships. A real transfer is +//! buried among decoys, but the target's funding still chains back to a single +//! labeled origin (a CEX). Decoys add breadth, not rootlessness. Provenance +//! leaks: the tracer names the origin with near-certainty. +//! - [`cyclic_ambiguous`] — the **realistic** defense. The target lives inside a +//! churning pool (a strongly-connected component). Labeled origins *do* fund +//! the pool, but each funds many members and the target sits in the cycle, so +//! the tracer reaches *many* origins at similar depth: a root exists, but +//! *which* one is dissolved (high attribution entropy — the polysemy weapon). +//! - [`cyclic_rootless`] — the **idealized** defense. External funding enters the +//! pool only through unlabeled participants, so the reverse-closure contains no +//! attributable origin at all. Honest caveat encoded in the construction: this +//! holds *only* if the pool's funding sources are themselves unattributable — +//! the moment one is a known CEX, it degrades to [`cyclic_ambiguous`]. + +use crate::graph::ProvenanceGraph; +use crate::rng::SplitMix64; + +/// A generated scenario: the graph plus the set of targets to audit. +pub struct Scheme { + pub graph: ProvenanceGraph, + pub targets: Vec, +} + +/// Build a strongly-connected pool of `pool_size` unlabeled nodes: a directed +/// ring (guaranteeing one SCC of the full size) plus extra intra-pool edges for +/// realistic density. Returns the pool node ids. +fn build_pool(graph: &mut ProvenanceGraph, rng: &mut SplitMix64, pool_size: usize) -> Vec { + let nodes: Vec = (0..pool_size).map(|_| graph.add_node(None)).collect(); + for i in 0..pool_size { + graph.add_funding(nodes[i], nodes[(i + 1) % pool_size]); + } + // Extra churn edges, all internal, keeping the single big cycle. + for _ in 0..pool_size { + let a = nodes[rng.below(pool_size)]; + let b = nodes[rng.below(pool_size)]; + graph.add_funding(a, b); + } + nodes +} + +/// The field's construction: decoys, but a single traceable labeled origin. +pub fn rooted_decoy(rng: &mut SplitMix64, n_targets: usize, chain_len: usize) -> Scheme { + let mut graph = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let n_roots = 4; + let roots: Vec = (0..n_roots) + .map(|i| graph.add_node(Some(i as u32))) + .collect(); + + let mut targets = Vec::with_capacity(n_targets); + for _ in 0..n_targets { + let root = roots[rng.below(n_roots)]; + let mut prev = root; + for _ in 0..chain_len { + let hop = graph.add_node(None); + graph.add_funding(prev, hop); + prev = hop; + } + let target = graph.add_node(None); + graph.add_funding(prev, target); + // Decoy: a fresh, history-less key also funds the target. Adds an + // ancestor, but it is unlabeled, so it does not hide the real origin. + let decoy = graph.add_node(None); + graph.add_funding(decoy, target); + targets.push(target); + } + Scheme { graph, targets } +} + +/// Realistic circularity: a churning pool funded by several labeled origins, so a +/// root exists but attribution is dissolved across many. +pub fn cyclic_ambiguous( + rng: &mut SplitMix64, + n_targets: usize, + pool_size: usize, + n_roots: usize, +) -> Scheme { + let mut graph = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let pool = build_pool(&mut graph, rng, pool_size); + let roots: Vec = (0..n_roots) + .map(|i| graph.add_node(Some(i as u32))) + .collect(); + // Each labeled origin funds several pool members — spreading the blame. + for &r in &roots { + for _ in 0..3 { + graph.add_funding(r, pool[rng.below(pool_size)]); + } + } + let targets: Vec = (0..n_targets).map(|_| pool[rng.below(pool_size)]).collect(); + Scheme { graph, targets } +} + +/// Idealized circularity: external funding enters the pool only through unlabeled +/// participants, so no attributable origin exists in any target's closure. +pub fn cyclic_rootless(rng: &mut SplitMix64, n_targets: usize, pool_size: usize) -> Scheme { + let mut graph = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let pool = build_pool(&mut graph, rng, pool_size); + // A handful of unlabeled external funders seed the pool. + for _ in 0..3 { + let funder = graph.add_node(None); + graph.add_funding(funder, pool[rng.below(pool_size)]); + } + let targets: Vec = (0..n_targets).map(|_| pool[rng.below(pool_size)]).collect(); + Scheme { graph, targets } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + use crate::tracer::Tracer; + + #[test] + fn rooted_scheme_leaks_provenance() { + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(1); + let s = rooted_decoy(&mut rng, 50, 4); + let tracer = Tracer::new(&s.graph); + let leaked = s + .targets + .iter() + .filter(|&&t| tracer.trace(t).has_attributable_root()) + .count(); + assert_eq!(leaked, s.targets.len(), "every target must trace to a root"); + } + + #[test] + fn rootless_scheme_hides_provenance() { + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(2); + let s = cyclic_rootless(&mut rng, 50, 40); + let tracer = Tracer::new(&s.graph); + for &t in &s.targets { + let r = tracer.trace(t); + assert!(!r.has_attributable_root(), "no labeled origin should exist"); + assert!(r.in_cycle, "target should sit in the pool cycle"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn ambiguous_scheme_keeps_a_root_but_dissolves_which() { + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(3); + let s = cyclic_ambiguous(&mut rng, 50, 40, 6); + let tracer = Tracer::new(&s.graph); + for &t in &s.targets { + let r = tracer.trace(t); + assert!(r.has_attributable_root(), "roots do fund the pool"); + assert!(r.in_cycle); + // With multiple labeled origins spread over the pool, attribution + // should be genuinely ambiguous (well above 1 bit). + assert!( + r.attribution_entropy_bits > 1.0, + "attribution should be dissolved, got {} bits", + r.attribution_entropy_bits + ); + } + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/tracer.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/tracer.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28244b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/tracer.rs @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +//! The provenance-tracer — the adversary. +//! +//! Given a target account it answers the two questions on which all +//! chain-analysis rests: +//! +//! 1. **Provenance ("where did it come from?")** — does the backward funding walk +//! reach a *labeled root* (an attributable origin), and how deep? The +//! circularity weapon attacks this: if the target sits in a cycle whose +//! reverse-closure contains no labeled root, the walk has no origin to name. +//! 2. **Attribution ("which origin?")** — when roots *are* reachable, how +//! concentrated is the blame? One reachable root → certain (0 bits of +//! ambiguity). Many equidistant roots → the polysemy weapon: the analyst +//! cannot privilege one, so attribution entropy is high. +//! +//! The tracer computes both, plus whether the target lies inside a non-trivial +//! strongly-connected component (structural rootlessness). It is deliberately the +//! *strongest reasonable* analyst: it sees the entire graph and every label. + +use crate::graph::{ProvenanceGraph, RootLabel}; +use std::collections::{BTreeMap, VecDeque}; + +/// What the analyst learns about one target. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct ProvenanceReport { + pub target: usize, + /// Distinct reachable roots, each with the shortest backward depth to it. + pub reachable_roots: Vec<(RootLabel, usize)>, + /// Depth to the nearest reachable root, if any. + pub nearest_depth: Option, + /// Ambiguity of attribution across reachable roots, in bits. `0.0` means a + /// single root (fully attributed); higher means the analyst cannot decide + /// which origin is responsible. + pub attribution_entropy_bits: f64, + /// True iff the target is inside a cycle (non-trivial SCC) — it has no + /// source node in the inferred ownership relation to point at. + pub in_cycle: bool, + /// Size of the target's strongly-connected component. + pub scc_size: usize, +} + +impl ProvenanceReport { + /// The single fact the whole field leaves open: did the analyst find *any* + /// attributable origin for this target? + pub fn has_attributable_root(&self) -> bool { + !self.reachable_roots.is_empty() + } +} + +/// A tracer bound to a graph. Strongly-connected components are computed once at +/// construction so per-target queries are cheap. +pub struct Tracer<'g> { + graph: &'g ProvenanceGraph, + /// Component id per node. + comp: Vec, + /// Size of each component, indexed by component id. + comp_size: Vec, +} + +impl<'g> Tracer<'g> { + pub fn new(graph: &'g ProvenanceGraph) -> Self { + let (comp, comp_size) = strongly_connected_components(graph); + Self { + graph, + comp, + comp_size, + } + } + + /// Trace one target back through the funding graph. + pub fn trace(&self, target: usize) -> ProvenanceReport { + let n = self.graph.len(); + let mut depth = vec![usize::MAX; n]; + let mut queue = VecDeque::new(); + depth[target] = 0; + queue.push_back(target); + + // label -> shortest depth at which it was reached + let mut roots: BTreeMap = BTreeMap::new(); + + while let Some(v) = queue.pop_front() { + let d = depth[v]; + if let Some(label) = self.graph.root_label(v) { + roots + .entry(label) + .and_modify(|e| *e = (*e).min(d)) + .or_insert(d); + } + for &p in self.graph.predecessors(v) { + if depth[p] == usize::MAX { + depth[p] = d + 1; + queue.push_back(p); + } + } + } + + let reachable_roots: Vec<(RootLabel, usize)> = + roots.iter().map(|(&l, &d)| (l, d)).collect(); + let nearest_depth = reachable_roots.iter().map(|&(_, d)| d).min(); + let attribution_entropy_bits = attribution_entropy(&reachable_roots); + + let scc_size = self.comp_size[self.comp[target]]; + + ProvenanceReport { + target, + reachable_roots, + nearest_depth, + attribution_entropy_bits, + in_cycle: scc_size > 1, + scc_size, + } + } +} + +/// Entropy (bits) of the analyst's belief over which reachable root is the true +/// origin. Weight each root by `1/(1+depth)` — closer origins are more suspect — +/// then normalize and take Shannon entropy. One root → 0 bits; `k` equidistant +/// roots → `log2(k)` bits. +fn attribution_entropy(roots: &[(RootLabel, usize)]) -> f64 { + if roots.len() <= 1 { + return 0.0; + } + let weights: Vec = roots.iter().map(|&(_, d)| 1.0 / (1.0 + d as f64)).collect(); + let total: f64 = weights.iter().sum(); + let mut h = 0.0; + for w in weights { + let p = w / total; + if p > 0.0 { + h -= p * p.log2(); + } + } + h +} + +/// Tarjan's algorithm, iterative (no recursion depth limit), returning the +/// component id of every node and the size of every component. A node in a +/// component of size > 1 lies on a cycle. +fn strongly_connected_components(graph: &ProvenanceGraph) -> (Vec, Vec) { + let n = graph.len(); + const UNVISITED: usize = usize::MAX; + let mut index = vec![UNVISITED; n]; + let mut low = vec![0usize; n]; + let mut on_stack = vec![false; n]; + let mut scc_stack: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut comp = vec![UNVISITED; n]; + let mut sizes: Vec = Vec::new(); + let mut counter = 0usize; + + for start in 0..n { + if index[start] != UNVISITED { + continue; + } + // Work stack of (node, next successor pointer). + let mut work: Vec<(usize, usize)> = vec![(start, 0)]; + while let Some(&(v, pi)) = work.last() { + if pi == 0 { + index[v] = counter; + low[v] = counter; + counter += 1; + scc_stack.push(v); + on_stack[v] = true; + } + let succ = graph.successors(v); + if pi < succ.len() { + let w = succ[pi]; + work.last_mut().unwrap().1 += 1; + if index[w] == UNVISITED { + work.push((w, 0)); + } else if on_stack[w] { + low[v] = low[v].min(index[w]); + } + } else { + // Finished v; propagate low to parent, close SCC if root. + work.pop(); + if let Some(&(parent, _)) = work.last() { + low[parent] = low[parent].min(low[v]); + } + if low[v] == index[v] { + let id = sizes.len(); + let mut size = 0usize; + loop { + let w = scc_stack.pop().unwrap(); + on_stack[w] = false; + comp[w] = id; + size += 1; + if w == v { + break; + } + } + sizes.push(size); + } + } + } + } + (comp, sizes) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn linear_chain_traces_to_its_root() { + // root(label 7) -> a -> b -> target + let mut g = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let root = g.add_node(Some(7)); + let a = g.add_node(None); + let b = g.add_node(None); + let target = g.add_node(None); + g.add_funding(root, a); + g.add_funding(a, b); + g.add_funding(b, target); + + let tracer = Tracer::new(&g); + let r = tracer.trace(target); + assert_eq!(r.reachable_roots, vec![(7, 3)]); + assert_eq!(r.nearest_depth, Some(3)); + assert_eq!(r.attribution_entropy_bits, 0.0); + assert!(!r.in_cycle); + assert!(r.has_attributable_root()); + } + + #[test] + fn pure_cycle_has_no_root_and_is_cyclic() { + // a -> b -> c -> a, no labels. Funding enters nowhere attributable. + let mut g = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let a = g.add_node(None); + let b = g.add_node(None); + let c = g.add_node(None); + g.add_funding(a, b); + g.add_funding(b, c); + g.add_funding(c, a); + + let tracer = Tracer::new(&g); + let r = tracer.trace(a); + assert!(r.reachable_roots.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(r.nearest_depth, None); + assert!(r.in_cycle); + assert_eq!(r.scc_size, 3); + assert!( + !r.has_attributable_root(), + "a cycle has no attributable origin" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn two_equidistant_roots_maximize_ambiguity() { + // root1 -> x -> target ; root2 -> y -> target. Both at depth 2. + let mut g = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let r1 = g.add_node(Some(1)); + let r2 = g.add_node(Some(2)); + let x = g.add_node(None); + let y = g.add_node(None); + let target = g.add_node(None); + g.add_funding(r1, x); + g.add_funding(x, target); + g.add_funding(r2, y); + g.add_funding(y, target); + + let tracer = Tracer::new(&g); + let r = tracer.trace(target); + assert_eq!(r.reachable_roots.len(), 2); + // Two equally-weighted roots → exactly 1 bit of attribution ambiguity. + assert!((r.attribution_entropy_bits - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9); + } + + #[test] + fn cycle_with_external_labeled_funder_is_still_attributable() { + // A labeled root funds the cycle from outside: root -> a, a->b->c->a. + // The target is in a cycle BUT a labeled origin is reachable, so it is + // not truly rootless — the tracer must still find the root. + let mut g = ProvenanceGraph::new(); + let root = g.add_node(Some(9)); + let a = g.add_node(None); + let b = g.add_node(None); + let c = g.add_node(None); + g.add_funding(root, a); + g.add_funding(a, b); + g.add_funding(b, c); + g.add_funding(c, a); + + let tracer = Tracer::new(&g); + let r = tracer.trace(b); + assert!(r.in_cycle, "b is in the a-b-c cycle"); + assert!( + r.has_attributable_root(), + "an external labeled funder defeats naive circularity" + ); + // b <- a <- root : the labeled origin is two backward hops away. + assert_eq!(r.reachable_roots, vec![(9, 2)]); + } +} diff --git a/crates/riverrun-trace/src/uncertainty.rs b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/uncertainty.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6bcf7d20 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/riverrun-trace/src/uncertainty.rs @@ -0,0 +1,735 @@ +//! What a measured effective-k does **not** know: the two uncertainties that must +//! travel with every number this crate publishes. +//! +//! [`effective_k`](crate::effective_k) returns a point estimate from one class +//! histogram. Two different things are missing from it, and neither substitutes +//! for the other: +//! +//! * **The bracket.** Members whose backward walk reached no attributable origin +//! are not a measured class, they are a *gap*. Treating them as one shared +//! "rootless" crowd is the most favourable reading; treating each as its own +//! class is the least favourable. Both are computed exactly, and the truth is +//! between them. `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md` published only the favourable reading. +//! * **The sampling interval.** A pool's depositors are sampled, not censused. +//! Resampling the measured members with replacement and recomputing effective-k +//! gives the spread of the estimator over the draw. This is a bootstrap +//! percentile range, **not** a confidence interval — see [`Interval`]. +//! +//! And one thing that is neither: an **RPC failure is not evidence**. A throttled +//! call that returns nothing must never be recorded as "this wallet has no +//! funder", because that is the one bucket a privacy measurement most wants to be +//! large. [`Census`] separates our failures from the chain's facts and refuses to +//! publish a headline when we caused too many of them. +//! +//! ## Disanalogy with the neighbouring measurement in this bounty +//! +//! `solanabr/mirror-pool` PR #5 brackets and bootstraps `ρ = 2^{−H(C)}`, the +//! *fraction* of nominal k that survives, precisely because ρ is independent of +//! `k` and therefore comparable across pools of different sizes. This crate's +//! headline is `effective_k = 2^{H(X|C)}`, a member count, which is **not** +//! k-independent: two samples of different sizes cannot be compared by it. The +//! bootstrap here holds `n` fixed inside every replicate, so the interval is a +//! statement about *this* sample size and nothing else. Reading an effective-k +//! interval across two pools of different `n` is the mistake ρ exists to avoid, +//! and this crate does not do that comparison. + +use crate::{effective_k, EffectiveK}; +use crate::rng::SplitMix64; +use std::collections::BTreeMap; + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// outcomes and the census +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// Why one member's backward walk produced no class. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum UnresolvedReason { + /// The bounded walk (depth 3, SOL only, capped fan-out) reached no hub. This + /// says something about the *bound*, not only about the wallet: a deeper or + /// SPL-aware trace can only merge this wallet into a rooted class, never the + /// reverse. `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md` states the same limit in prose; here it is + /// a value the arithmetic can act on. + NoOriginWithinBound, + /// The per-target node or transaction budget ran out before the walk + /// terminated. A budget limit, never a finding. + TraceBudgetExhausted, + /// An RPC error, a 429, or a timeout while tracing this member. **Ours, not + /// the chain's.** These members leave the distribution entirely rather than + /// inflating the unresolved bucket. + RpcFailure, +} + +impl UnresolvedReason { + /// Whether the outcome says anything about the wallet as opposed to about our + /// own budget or infrastructure. + /// + /// Nothing here returns `true`. That is deliberate and it is the honest + /// reading of this tracer: `NoOriginWithinBound` is produced by a walk capped + /// at depth 3 with 14 nodes and SOL transfers only, so "no origin" always + /// means "none within the bound we could afford". + pub fn is_evidence(self) -> bool { + false + } + + /// Whether the outcome is a failure of ours rather than a property of the + /// chain. Only these are excluded from the measured population. + pub fn is_our_failure(self) -> bool { + matches!(self, UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure) + } +} + +/// The end state of tracing one member. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum MemberOutcome { + /// Classified: the provenance class the partition groups on. + Resolved { class: String }, + Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason }, +} + +/// A count of every terminal state in a run. No "other" bucket, because an +/// "other" bucket is where an unaccounted failure hides. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct Census { + pub resolved: usize, + pub no_origin_within_bound: usize, + pub trace_budget_exhausted: usize, + pub rpc_failure: usize, +} + +/// Above this share of members lost to our own RPC, a run refuses to publish a +/// headline: one in a hundred. +/// +/// A hard gate rather than a printed warning, because a warning above a number +/// gets dropped when the number is quoted. +pub const MAX_FAILURE_RATE: f64 = 0.01; + +impl Census { + pub fn record(&mut self, outcome: &MemberOutcome) { + match outcome { + MemberOutcome::Resolved { .. } => self.resolved += 1, + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason } => match reason { + UnresolvedReason::NoOriginWithinBound => self.no_origin_within_bound += 1, + UnresolvedReason::TraceBudgetExhausted => self.trace_budget_exhausted += 1, + UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure => self.rpc_failure += 1, + }, + } + } + + pub fn of(outcomes: &[MemberOutcome]) -> Self { + let mut c = Census::default(); + for o in outcomes { + c.record(o); + } + c + } + + /// Every member the run attempted, failures included. + pub fn attempted(&self) -> usize { + self.resolved + self.no_origin_within_bound + self.trace_budget_exhausted + self.rpc_failure + } + + /// Members whose outcome says something about the chain: everything except + /// our own RPC failures. + pub fn measurable(&self) -> usize { + self.attempted() - self.rpc_failure + } + + pub fn failure_rate(&self) -> f64 { + let a = self.attempted(); + if a == 0 { + return 0.0; + } + self.rpc_failure as f64 / a as f64 + } + + /// Whether a headline may be published from this run at all. + pub fn may_publish(&self) -> bool { + self.attempted() > 0 && self.failure_rate() <= MAX_FAILURE_RATE + } + + /// The line that must accompany any figure from this run. + pub fn summary(&self) -> String { + format!( + "attempted {} | resolved {} | unresolved-within-bound {} | budget-unresolved {} \ + | rpc failures {} ({:.2}%)", + self.attempted(), + self.resolved, + self.no_origin_within_bound, + self.trace_budget_exhausted, + self.rpc_failure, + self.failure_rate() * 100.0 + ) + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// the bracket +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The two readings of a run's unresolved members, computed exactly. +/// +/// `upper` merges every unresolved member into one shared class: the reading +/// `docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md` published, and the most favourable one available. +/// `lower` splits them into singletons: the least favourable. Neither is known to +/// be true, so both are reported. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Bracket { + /// Unresolved merged into one class — the favourable reading. + pub upper: EffectiveK, + /// Unresolved split into singletons — the adversarial reading. + pub lower: EffectiveK, + pub resolved: usize, + /// Unresolved members, excluding RPC failures: those are ours and belong to + /// neither reading. + pub unresolved: usize, +} + +/// Below this share of resolved members, the two readings are far enough apart +/// that quoting either one reports the sampling budget rather than the pool. +pub const MIN_RESOLVED_FRACTION: f64 = 0.5; + +/// And below this many resolved members the fraction itself is noise: 4 of 6 is +/// a majority and still nothing. +pub const MIN_RESOLVED_MEMBERS: usize = 8; + +/// Whether a run's headline may be published, and if not, why in one line. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum Gate { + Publish, + Refuse { reason: String }, +} + +impl Gate { + pub fn publishes(&self) -> bool { + matches!(self, Gate::Publish) + } +} + +impl Bracket { + /// Build from the resolved class histogram plus a count of unresolved + /// members. `unresolved` must exclude RPC failures. + pub fn new(resolved_class_sizes: &[usize], unresolved: usize) -> Option { + let resolved: usize = resolved_class_sizes.iter().sum(); + if resolved + unresolved == 0 || resolved_class_sizes.contains(&0) { + return None; + } + + let mut merged: Vec = resolved_class_sizes.to_vec(); + if unresolved > 0 { + merged.push(unresolved); + } + let mut split: Vec = resolved_class_sizes.to_vec(); + split.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(1, unresolved)); + + Some(Bracket { + upper: effective_k(&merged), + lower: effective_k(&split), + resolved, + unresolved, + }) + } + + /// Build from per-member outcomes. RPC failures are dropped rather than + /// counted as unresolved. + pub fn from_outcomes(outcomes: &[MemberOutcome]) -> Option { + let mut counts: BTreeMap<&str, usize> = BTreeMap::new(); + let mut unresolved = 0usize; + for o in outcomes { + match o { + MemberOutcome::Resolved { class } => *counts.entry(class.as_str()).or_insert(0) += 1, + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason } => { + if !reason.is_our_failure() { + unresolved += 1; + } + } + } + } + let sizes: Vec = counts.into_values().collect(); + Bracket::new(&sizes, unresolved) + } + + pub fn measured(&self) -> usize { + self.resolved + self.unresolved + } + + pub fn resolved_fraction(&self) -> f64 { + let m = self.measured(); + if m == 0 { + 0.0 + } else { + self.resolved as f64 / m as f64 + } + } + + /// How many members the bracket spans, in members. The width of what we do + /// not know. + pub fn width(&self) -> f64 { + self.upper.effective - self.lower.effective + } + + /// Whether the sample supports quoting a single number. + pub fn is_informative(&self) -> bool { + self.resolved >= MIN_RESOLVED_MEMBERS + && self.resolved_fraction() >= MIN_RESOLVED_FRACTION + } + + /// The informativeness gate, with the refusal spelled out. Combined with the + /// census so one call decides whether a run publishes. + pub fn gate(&self, census: &Census) -> Gate { + if !census.may_publish() { + return Gate::Refuse { + reason: format!( + "{} of {} members lost to our own RPC ({:.1}%, limit {:.1}%): the unresolved \ + bucket would be our making, not the pool's", + census.rpc_failure, + census.attempted(), + census.failure_rate() * 100.0, + MAX_FAILURE_RATE * 100.0 + ), + }; + } + if self.resolved < MIN_RESOLVED_MEMBERS { + return Gate::Refuse { + reason: format!( + "only {} members resolved to an origin (minimum {}): too few to quote a number", + self.resolved, MIN_RESOLVED_MEMBERS + ), + }; + } + if self.resolved_fraction() < MIN_RESOLVED_FRACTION { + return Gate::Refuse { + reason: format!( + "{} of {} members ({:.0}%) reached an origin, under the {:.0}% floor: \ + effective-k spans {:.1}…{:.1} and the span is the trace bound, not the pool", + self.resolved, + self.measured(), + self.resolved_fraction() * 100.0, + MIN_RESOLVED_FRACTION * 100.0, + self.lower.effective, + self.upper.effective + ), + }; + } + Gate::Publish + } +} + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// the bootstrap interval +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +/// The spread of the resampled estimator, and the estimate it was resampled from. +/// +/// **Not a confidence interval, and not guaranteed to contain `point`.** It is +/// the 2.5th-to-97.5th percentile range of effective-k over bootstrap replicates. +/// Under a heavy tail — one crowd plus many singletons, which is the shape every +/// run here lands in — resampling drops singleton classes about 37% of the time, +/// which raises the estimator, so the whole range can sit above the original +/// estimate. That is a property of the population, not an arithmetic error; the +/// shift is reported as [`Interval::resampling_bias`] rather than hidden inside +/// the range. +/// +/// A second bias is **not** fixed here and moves the same way: plug-in entropy +/// from counts understates `H(C)` at small `n`, and by the chain rule +/// `H(X|C) = log2 K − H(C)` that overstates `H(X|C)` and therefore effective-k. +/// A bootstrap resamples the same estimator, so its range is centred on the +/// biased value. Every effective-k this crate reports is plausibly optimistic, +/// and correcting it needs a different estimator (Miller–Madow, or a +/// coverage-adjusted family) which this crate does not implement. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct Interval { + /// The estimate from the sample as drawn. + pub point: f64, + pub lo: f64, + pub hi: f64, + /// Mean of the replicates. Its distance from `point` is the resampling bias. + pub mean: f64, + pub replicates: usize, + pub seed: u64, +} + +impl Interval { + pub fn width(&self) -> f64 { + self.hi - self.lo + } + + /// `mean − point`: how far resampling moves the estimator. Positive under a + /// heavy tail, and its size is a tail diagnostic. + pub fn resampling_bias(&self) -> f64 { + self.mean - self.point + } + + pub fn contains_point(&self) -> bool { + self.lo <= self.point && self.point <= self.hi + } +} + +/// Replicates behind every published interval. Each is O(n); 10,000 keeps the +/// percentiles stable to about three decimals on a sample of 30. +pub const DEFAULT_REPLICATES: usize = 10_000; + +/// The fixed seed every published interval is computed at, so a reader +/// recomputing a number gets *our* number and not merely a similar one. +pub const DEFAULT_SEED: u64 = 0x7269_7665_7272_756E; // "riverrun" in ascii + +fn class_indices(labels: &[String]) -> (Vec, usize) { + let mut index: BTreeMap<&str, usize> = BTreeMap::new(); + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(labels.len()); + for l in labels { + let next = index.len(); + let id = *index.entry(l.as_str()).or_insert(next); + out.push(id); + } + let classes = index.len(); + (out, classes) +} + +/// One replicate: resample `n` members with replacement, recompute effective-k. +fn replicate(members: &[usize], classes: usize, rng: &mut SplitMix64) -> f64 { + let n = members.len(); + let mut counts = vec![0usize; classes]; + for _ in 0..n { + counts[members[rng.below(n)]] += 1; + } + // A class no resampled member landed in is absent from the replicate, not a + // class of size zero. + let sizes: Vec = counts.into_iter().filter(|&c| c > 0).collect(); + effective_k(&sizes).effective +} + +fn percentile(sorted: &[f64], q: f64) -> f64 { + if sorted.is_empty() { + return f64::NAN; + } + let idx = (q * (sorted.len() - 1) as f64).round() as usize; + sorted[idx.min(sorted.len() - 1)] +} + +/// A 95% percentile range for effective-k over the draw of members. +/// +/// `labels` is one class label per member of the partition being reported — for a +/// bracketed run that is the *upper* reading, where the unresolved share one +/// label. `None` for an empty sample. +pub fn effective_k_interval(labels: &[String], replicates: usize, seed: u64) -> Option { + if labels.is_empty() || replicates == 0 { + return None; + } + let (members, classes) = class_indices(labels); + let mut sizes = vec![0usize; classes]; + for &m in &members { + sizes[m] += 1; + } + let point = effective_k(&sizes).effective; + + let mut rng = SplitMix64::new(seed); + let mut draws: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(replicates); + for _ in 0..replicates { + draws.push(replicate(&members, classes, &mut rng)); + } + draws.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).expect("effective-k is never NaN")); + let mean = draws.iter().sum::() / draws.len() as f64; + + Some(Interval { + point, + lo: percentile(&draws, 0.025), + hi: percentile(&draws, 0.975), + mean, + replicates: draws.len(), + seed, + }) +} + +/// The member labels of a bracket's favourable (upper) reading: the resolved +/// classes as they were measured, plus one shared label for the unresolved. +/// Convenience for feeding [`effective_k_interval`] from a histogram. +pub fn upper_reading_labels(resolved_class_sizes: &[usize], unresolved: usize) -> Vec { + let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(resolved_class_sizes.iter().sum::() + unresolved); + for (i, &n) in resolved_class_sizes.iter().enumerate() { + for _ in 0..n { + out.push(format!("class{i}")); + } + } + for _ in 0..unresolved { + out.push("rootless".to_string()); + } + out +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod census_tests { + use super::*; + + fn resolved(c: &str) -> MemberOutcome { + MemberOutcome::Resolved { class: c.to_string() } + } + fn unresolved(r: UnresolvedReason) -> MemberOutcome { + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: r } + } + + #[test] + fn an_rpc_failure_is_never_evidence_and_leaves_the_distribution() { + assert!(UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure.is_our_failure()); + for r in [ + UnresolvedReason::NoOriginWithinBound, + UnresolvedReason::TraceBudgetExhausted, + UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure, + ] { + assert!(!r.is_evidence(), "{r:?}: a bounded walk never proves absence"); + } + let c = Census::of(&[ + resolved("hubA"), + unresolved(UnresolvedReason::NoOriginWithinBound), + unresolved(UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure), + ]); + assert_eq!(c.attempted(), 3); + assert_eq!(c.measurable(), 2, "our failure is not part of the population"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_run_that_lost_too_many_members_to_rpc_refuses_to_publish() { + let mut c = Census::default(); + for _ in 0..99 { + c.record(&resolved("hubA")); + } + c.record(&unresolved(UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure)); + assert!((c.failure_rate() - 0.01).abs() < 1e-12); + assert!(c.may_publish(), "1 in 100 is exactly at the limit"); + + c.record(&unresolved(UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure)); + assert!(!c.may_publish(), "2 in 101 is over it"); + } + + #[test] + fn an_empty_run_publishes_nothing() { + assert!(!Census::default().may_publish()); + } + + #[test] + fn the_summary_names_the_failures_as_their_own_number() { + let c = Census::of(&[resolved("a"), unresolved(UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure)]); + let s = c.summary(); + assert!(s.contains("rpc failures 1"), "{s}"); + assert!(s.contains("resolved 1"), "{s}"); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod bracket_tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn the_bracket_spans_both_readings_and_the_merge_is_the_favourable_one() { + // Six resolved in two classes of three, six unresolved. + let b = Bracket::new(&[3, 3], 6).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b.upper.advertised, 12); + assert_eq!(b.lower.advertised, 12); + assert_eq!(b.upper.classes, 3, "merged: 3, 3, 6"); + assert_eq!(b.lower.classes, 8, "split: 3, 3, and six singletons"); + assert!( + b.upper.effective > b.lower.effective, + "merging the unresolved must read more favourably: {} vs {}", + b.upper.effective, + b.lower.effective + ); + assert!(b.width() > 0.0); + } + + #[test] + fn with_nothing_unresolved_the_bracket_collapses_to_a_point() { + let b = Bracket::new(&[5, 3, 2], 0).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b.upper, b.lower); + assert!((b.width() - 0.0).abs() < 1e-12); + } + + #[test] + fn an_all_unresolved_run_brackets_the_whole_range() { + // Nothing resolved: the reading is either one crowd of 20 or 20 singletons. + let b = Bracket::new(&[], 20).unwrap(); + assert!((b.upper.effective - 20.0).abs() < 1e-9); + assert!((b.lower.effective - 1.0).abs() < 1e-9); + assert_eq!(b.resolved, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn rpc_failures_are_excluded_from_the_unresolved_bucket() { + let outcomes = vec![ + MemberOutcome::Resolved { class: "hubA".into() }, + MemberOutcome::Resolved { class: "hubA".into() }, + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason::NoOriginWithinBound }, + MemberOutcome::Unresolved { reason: UnresolvedReason::RpcFailure }, + ]; + let b = Bracket::from_outcomes(&outcomes).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b.resolved, 2); + assert_eq!(b.unresolved, 1, "the RPC failure is ours, not the pool's"); + assert_eq!(b.measured(), 3); + } + + #[test] + fn a_mostly_unresolved_sample_is_refused_by_the_gate() { + // Eleven resolved singletons, nineteen unresolved: the shape of the run + // published in docs/EFFECTIVE_K.md. + let b = Bracket::new(&[1; 11], 19).unwrap(); + assert!(!b.is_informative(), "11 of 30 is 37%, under the 50% floor"); + let census = Census { resolved: 11, no_origin_within_bound: 19, ..Census::default() }; + let gate = b.gate(&census); + assert!(!gate.publishes()); + match gate { + Gate::Refuse { reason } => { + assert!(reason.contains("37%"), "the refusal must carry the number: {reason}"); + } + Gate::Publish => unreachable!(), + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_majority_resolved_sample_passes_the_gate() { + let b = Bracket::new(&[4, 4, 4], 3).unwrap(); + assert!(b.is_informative()); + let census = Census { resolved: 12, no_origin_within_bound: 3, ..Census::default() }; + assert!(b.gate(&census).publishes()); + } + + #[test] + fn a_tiny_but_fully_resolved_sample_is_still_refused() { + // 4 of 4 is 100% resolved and still nothing: the floor on the count is + // what stops a two-member run from publishing a clean-looking number. + let b = Bracket::new(&[2, 2], 0).unwrap(); + assert!(b.resolved_fraction() > 0.99); + assert!(!b.is_informative(), "4 members is under the {MIN_RESOLVED_MEMBERS} floor"); + let census = Census { resolved: 4, ..Census::default() }; + match b.gate(&census) { + Gate::Refuse { reason } => assert!(reason.contains("minimum 8"), "{reason}"), + Gate::Publish => panic!("4 resolved members must not publish"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn the_failure_gate_outranks_the_informativeness_gate() { + // A run that would otherwise publish, wrecked by our own RPC. + let b = Bracket::new(&[4, 4, 4], 3).unwrap(); + let census = Census { + resolved: 12, + no_origin_within_bound: 3, + rpc_failure: 5, + ..Census::default() + }; + match b.gate(&census) { + Gate::Refuse { reason } => assert!(reason.contains("our own RPC"), "{reason}"), + Gate::Publish => panic!("25% RPC loss must block the headline"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_degenerate_histogram_is_refused_rather_than_coped_with() { + assert!(Bracket::new(&[], 0).is_none()); + assert!(Bracket::new(&[3, 0, 2], 1).is_none()); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod interval_tests { + use super::*; + + fn labels(spec: &[(&str, usize)]) -> Vec { + let mut out = Vec::new(); + for (name, n) in spec { + for _ in 0..*n { + out.push((*name).to_string()); + } + } + out + } + + #[test] + fn one_class_has_no_sampling_spread() { + let i = effective_k_interval(&labels(&[("hubA", 40)]), 500, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + assert!((i.point - 40.0).abs() < 1e-9); + assert!((i.lo - 40.0).abs() < 1e-9); + assert!((i.hi - 40.0).abs() < 1e-9); + } + + #[test] + fn the_interval_is_reproducible_from_its_seed() { + let l = labels(&[("a", 12), ("b", 9), ("c", 4), ("d", 1)]); + let x = effective_k_interval(&l, 1_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + let y = effective_k_interval(&l, 1_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(x, y, "same sample, same seed, same bytes"); + let z = effective_k_interval(&l, 1_000, DEFAULT_SEED ^ 1).unwrap(); + // The percentiles land on a discrete set of replicate values and can + // coincide across seeds; the replicate mean cannot, so it is what pins + // that a different seed actually redrew the members. + assert_ne!(x.mean, z.mean, "a different seed must actually resample"); + assert_eq!(x.point, z.point, "the point estimate is the sample, not the draw"); + } + + #[test] + fn a_smaller_sample_gives_a_wider_interval() { + let big = labels(&[("a", 40), ("b", 30), ("c", 20), ("d", 10)]); + let small = labels(&[("a", 4), ("b", 3), ("c", 2), ("d", 1)]); + let wide = effective_k_interval(&small, 4_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + let tight = effective_k_interval(&big, 4_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + // Widths are in members, so normalise by the sample size before comparing. + let rel = |i: &Interval, n: usize| i.width() / n as f64; + assert!( + rel(&wide, 10) > rel(&tight, 100), + "small sample {:.3} not relatively wider than large {:.3}", + rel(&wide, 10), + rel(&tight, 100) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_crowded_population_resamples_close_to_its_estimate() { + let l = labels(&[("a", 20), ("b", 10), ("c", 5), ("d", 5)]); + let i = effective_k_interval(&l, 2_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + assert!(i.contains_point(), "point {} outside [{}, {}]", i.point, i.lo, i.hi); + assert!( + i.resampling_bias().abs() / i.point < 0.05, + "crowded classes should barely shift: bias {} on {}", + i.resampling_bias(), + i.point + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_heavy_tail_biases_the_estimate_upward_under_resampling() { + // One crowd plus twenty-four singletons: the shape of every real run here. + // Resampling drops a singleton class ~37% of the time, which moves its + // member into some other class and raises effective-k. The bias is a tail + // diagnostic, so it is asserted rather than assumed. + let mut spec: Vec<(String, usize)> = vec![("crowd".to_string(), 6)]; + for i in 0..24 { + spec.push((format!("solo{i}"), 1)); + } + let l: Vec = spec + .iter() + .flat_map(|(n, c)| std::iter::repeat_n(n.clone(), *c)) + .collect(); + let i = effective_k_interval(&l, 4_000, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + assert!( + i.resampling_bias() > 0.0, + "a heavy tail must bias effective-k upward, got {}", + i.resampling_bias() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn an_empty_sample_yields_nothing() { + assert!(effective_k_interval(&[], 100, DEFAULT_SEED).is_none()); + assert!(effective_k_interval(&labels(&[("a", 3)]), 0, DEFAULT_SEED).is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn the_upper_reading_labels_reproduce_the_bracket_ceiling() { + let b = Bracket::new(&[1; 11], 19).unwrap(); + let l = upper_reading_labels(&[1; 11], 19); + assert_eq!(l.len(), 30); + let i = effective_k_interval(&l, 200, DEFAULT_SEED).unwrap(); + assert!( + (i.point - b.upper.effective).abs() < 1e-9, + "the interval's point must be the bracket's upper reading: {} vs {}", + i.point, + b.upper.effective + ); + } +} diff --git a/demo.sh b/demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..96e07e39 --- /dev/null +++ b/demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# riverrun — everything this repo claims, in one command. +# +# ./demo.sh the offline stages (no network, ~1 min) +# ./demo.sh --live also runs the mainnet measurement (needs network, ~5 min) +# +# Every stage prints numbers, not adjectives. Where a number is a floor rather +# than a result, the stage says so. + +set -euo pipefail +cd "$(dirname "$0")" + +BOLD=$'\033[1m'; DIM=$'\033[2m'; OFF=$'\033[0m' +stage() { printf '\n%s── %s %s%s\n\n' "$BOLD" "$1" "$(printf '─%.0s' $(seq 1 $((60 - ${#1}))))" "$OFF"; } +note() { printf '%s%s%s\n' "$DIM" "$1" "$OFF"; } + +LIVE=0 +[[ "${1:-}" == "--live" ]] && LIVE=1 + +stage "1/6 the whole test suite" +note "50 host + 27 STARK + 7 pool-zk = 92 here; the 15 on-chain e2e need the SBF toolchain and run in stage 6 (99 total)." +suite() { #