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roadmap.md

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Roadmap

Open work and deliberate omissions. Nothing here blocks a release; each item needs a design and, when it adds an extension point or changes public API shape, an ADR before work starts. Shipped work is in CHANGELOG.md; protocol features left out on purpose are not planned rows in docs/rfc-matrix.md.

Follow-ups

  • An opt-in for the data protection keychain on macOS. KeychainCredentialStore uses the login keychain on macOS, where Accessibility and accessGroup are not enforced, because the data protection keychain needs a keychain access group entitlement that not every hosting process has (ADR 0009, docs/security-model.md). An opt-in for processes that have one can be added without breaking the API.
  • Client credentials target in TokenManager. Cache and coalesce machine-to-machine tokens (RFC 6749 §4.4) the way user tokens are, with a target derivation of its own and no refresh token or session.
  • OAuthClient(issuer:). An asynchronous convenience that runs discovery (RFC 8414) and builds the configuration, so the common case is one call.
  • Presentation options for AuthorizationUserAgent. A struct that carries per-request choices, such as an ephemeral browser session or a presentation anchor, instead of more parameters on present.
  • A Dependencies struct for the seams. Bundle the transport, clocks, random source and observer that OAuthClient takes as separate parameters into one value.
  • An AsyncHTTPClient transport. HTTPTransport speaks swift-http-types (ADR 0010), so a transport for server-side Swift is a small adapter. It would live in its own target so the core does not link swift-nio, and it needs an ADR 0009 review. Linux itself stays out of scope (ADR 0011).
  • Rate limit for 401-triggered invalidation. A resource that answers 401 invalid_token to every fresh token costs one refresh per request. A limit needs a policy for what to do over it; apps can wrap RequestAuthorizer.evaluate today (docs/security-model.md, known limits).

Not planned

DPoP (RFC 9449), pushed authorization requests (RFC 9126), token introspection (RFC 7662), OpenID Connect ID token validation, dynamic client registration, implicit and password grants. See docs/spec.md §1.