| title | Architecture Hub |
|---|---|
| description | How Zelkor components interact and the trust boundaries that protect your agent. |
| type | explanation |
| sidebar_group | Architecture |
| sidebar_order | 1 |
| audience | human |
| edition | all |
High-level flow: You deploy an agent. It communicates strictly through governed model and tool gateways, emitting a trace.
Zelkor is the self-hosted agent runtime: bring the agent you already wrote — it cannot break out, reach unauthorized data or networks, its prompts are verified, budget controlled, and it is under observation; tenants stay isolated.
This hub maps the hops and boundaries that the runtime enforces.
---
config:
theme: neutral
---
flowchart LR
laptop[Your laptop / Client]
subgraph cluster [Your cluster]
model[Model]
tools[Tools]
agent[Your agent]
trace[Run trace]
end
laptop -->|run| agent
agent --> model
agent --> tools
agent --> trace
The DIY baseline is a raw Deployment per agent, LiteLLM or direct provider SDKs, and hand-written NetworkPolicies.
| Concern | DIY: what you build and keep working | Typical DIY failure | Zelkor CE (one Helm release) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provider keys | A Secret mounted into each agent pod | A compromised agent or dependency reads the key | Key stays on the AI Gateway; the agent gets a consumer key (Request Path) |
| Runaway cost | Per-agent retry and loop limits in code | A loop runs overnight against the provider | Gateway request cap returns 429 before the provider |
| Generated code | exec() in the agent container, or a separate sandbox you wire in |
Code runs on the node kernel next to the agent's credentials | Separate gVisor worker pod with no network (Sandbox Isolation) |
| Egress | NetworkPolicies per agent and per datastore | One missing rule lets the agent reach the internet or Postgres | Generated per agent by the chart; on in the production install (Network Boundaries) |
| Tools | Credentials and tenant filters in each tool server | The model chooses the tenant or scope | One MCP gateway; scope from the signed tenant JWT (MCP Governance) |
| Traces | OTel wiring per framework | Tool and guardrail spans missing from the run | One Langfuse trace per run (Run Trace) |
| Tenants | Tenant checks in agent code | One tenant reads another's thread or rows | Enforced at the gateways (Tenant Isolation) |
Each page answers one specific architectural question about how traffic flows and where the trust boundaries lie:
| Page | Question |
|---|---|
| Request Path | How a client call reaches the model |
| Network Boundaries | Who may talk to whom inside the cluster |
| Sandbox Isolation | Where generated code executes |
| MCP Governance | How a tool call is isolated and authenticated |
| External and Third-Party MCP | How Zelkor isolates and governs third-party SaaS and external MCP servers |
| Run Trace | What one run looks like in Langfuse |
| North-South Exposure | What is published to the internet versus ClusterIP |
| Envoy Graph Routing | How Envoy routes incoming calls to the correct agent deployment |
| Drop-In Agent Contract | How the runtime wraps and governs your agent (Intercept, Wrap, MCP) |
| Tenant Isolation | How one tenant identity is applied on a run |
| Agent Datastores | Stateful infrastructure (Postgres, Qdrant) and BYO options |