A hosted or shared workspace runs every bot's shell on the server as the same user, so "a request from 127.0.0.1" no longer means "the owner". These checks pin what changes there and what does not. The operator-facing description is in self-hosting.
- Loopback trust. At start-up the server logs
local requests: owner trust (…)orlocal requests: service trust (…). A hosted workspace (anyOMB_ADMIN_*setting; shared-workspace Full access only works there) defaults toservice; a self-hosted server keepsowner;OMB_LOOPBACK_TRUST=owner|serviceoverrides (anything else meansservice); the desktop app always keepsownerbehind its per-launch capability. Underservicea session-less loopback request may use onlySERVICE_ALLOW(server/request-auth.ts): health, who-am-I, edition, brand, the bot list, thread messages, attachments, new threads, the guarded send, the exact request fence and its stop, withdrawing a queued line,POST /api/threads/:id/respond(decline only), and the bots' capability routes under/api/internal/*. Everything else answers 403. That is exactly the set the cloud Slack worker calls (checked against the cloud repository's worker source, every released version), so the deployed worker needs no change. - The CLI under service trust.
openmausbot servehands the server it starts a per-launch secret over the server's stdin; that secret opens/api/auth/pairingfor that CLI alone, soservestill prints the first pairing code, and if a code is refused anyway it says why and keeps the server running. Lateropenmausbot pairandopenmausbot sessionsare refused with an explanation. A browser on an SSH tunnel gets the sign-in page, not an app whose every admin call fails. - Who may answer a card. With portal membership or an email sign-in list
that names members, a card that can be traced to a person — who sent its
request (
sender.id), who the thread was opened for, and for a thread a bot opened while working on someone's request, that person — may be answered only by them, an admin or the owner. A card that names nobody (owner-sent, routine, webhook, Slack, pre-upgrade) may be answered by any member, as before. Aservicecaller may only decline. This applies to both respond routes and to "always allow". It adds no card, prompt or gate: the provider CLI's own approval is the card. Who a thread was opened for lives in<data>/thread-starters.json(server-private, never on the wire). - Who answered. Each card a person or service settles records
card.answeredBy({kind:"session", name},{kind:"loopback"}or{kind:"worker"}), and itsuser-approved/user-denieddecision row recordsactor(session id, device label, email, and account id when it is not a portal grant). - Decision log retention. Rows go to
<data>/decisions/YYYY-MM.ndjson. A month file is deleted once all of it is older than the window (180 days by default;decisions.retentionDaysorOMB_DECISION_RETENTION_DAYS). An older server'sdecisions.ndjsonand.1are still read and age out by their last write.GET /api/decisions?limit=is unchanged;GET /api/decisions.csv?from=&to=(admin) exports a date range with formula cells neutralised and secrets redacted. - Settings on a portal-membership workspace.
GET /api/configreportsmembership {authority, pairingCodes, peopleUrl}. Settings → People turns read-only (who signed in, their spend, "Manage people in Admin" linking to<OMB_ADMIN_URL>/people?workspace=<slug>); Remote access offers no pairing code and says people sign in through the organization's portal.
pnpm exec vitest run server/request-auth.test.ts server/decision-log.test.ts \
server/card-answerers.e2e.test.ts server/cli-service-trust.e2e.test.ts \
server/hosted-access.test.ts server/decision-log-wiring.test.ts server/hosted-models-api.test.ts \
src/components/PeopleSection.test.ts src/components/ServerPairingCard.test.ts src/lib/session.test.tsserver/request-auth.test.tsruns the worker's calls and a list of admin calls through the resolver under each trust level, sessions underservice, the desktop capability overridingservice, the serving CLI's secret opening the pairing route and nothing else, and the start-up choice.server/hosted-access.test.ts("treats a session-less local caller as a service by default") boots a portal-membership workspace with shared Full access and no override: the start-up log line, the worker's whole path over loopback (health, bot list, a Full-access thread, a guarded send, its request fence), 403 forPUT /api/config,POST /api/webhooks, session list and revocation, bot creation and loosening, and an unguarded send, with nothing changed afterwards; then an admin portal session saves the retention window and readsmembership. The other cases in that file keepOMB_LOOPBACK_TRUST=ownerbecause they set fixtures up over loopback.server/card-answerers.e2e.test.tsboots a server with one admin and two members on the sign-in list and the fake ACP engine asking permission every turn: another member is refused on both respond routes, the requester approves, the thread's opener declines someone else's request, a thread a bot opened mid-way through a member's request (through the real/api/internal/threadshandoff) leads back to that member, a card that names nobody is answered by any member, an admin and the owner answer anyone's card, and underOMB_LOOPBACK_TRUST=servicea session-less caller cannot approve (or use the bot-scoped route or always-allow) but can decline, while a Slack-shaped guarded request stays answerable by any member. Each answer's decision row and card name who answered.server/cli-service-trust.e2e.test.tsruns the realopenmausbot servewithOMB_LOOPBACK_TRUST=service: it prints a pairing code and keeps running, the pairing route refuses every other local caller, and laterpairandsessionscommands exit with the explanation.
- The live Slack worker was not run against this build; its calls are pinned from its source and exercised route by route above.
- "Always allow" by a refused member is covered by code, not by the fake engine, whose cards carry no allow key.
- Not closed: a bot's shell under
servicetrust can still use the guarded route to post into an existing Full-access thread, or open one while shared Full access is on, so a member can get Full-access work done without a card. It can also stop a request and decline a card, and read files its user owns. A worker-only relay token is the planned fix. - The Settings screens and the sign-in redirect were checked by rendering and unit tests, not in Electron or a browser.
On a disposable worktree rebased onto OpenMausBot main 0bb37982:
pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm i18n:check, pnpm test:packaged-server,
and the files above plus server/index.test.ts,
server/chat-followups-restart.test.ts, server/steer-e2e.test.ts,
server/routines-startup.test.ts, server/enterprise.test.ts,
server/store.test.ts, server/cli-lifecycle.test.ts,
server/cli-pair.test.ts, server/cli.test.ts and
scripts/testing/verification-docs.test.ts passed on macOS. Mutation checks,
each restored afterwards, turned a named test red: the resolver ignoring
service; a hosted workspace defaulting to owner; the server gate not
passing the trust level; members answering any card; a service approving;
task creation not recording its opener; a bot-opened thread not traced back
to the person; a card that names nobody refused to members; the CLI secret
ignored, or opening more than the pairing route; sessions ignoring the
refusal; an SSH tunnel treated as connected; decision rows without the
answerer; month pruning off by one month; the portal People table offering
edits. Every server, session, engine and identity service was a local
fixture. This is not production qualification: no hosted tenant, Slack
worker, Admin or real email was involved.